Administrative precedent · Other immigration matters
Matter of Garcia-Hernandez
23 I&N Dec. 590 (BIA 2003)
The respondent, a Mexican native, was found ineligible for cancellation of removal based on a 1997 conviction for spousal injury (a crime involving moral turpitude) and a 1994 battery conviction not involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that the 1997 conviction fell within the petty offense exception of section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), so it did not bar cancellation under section 240A(b)(1)(C) or preclude good moral character under section 101(f)(3), and that the 'only one crime' proviso refers only to one crime involving moral turpitude.
Rule cited
The petty offense exception for a crime involving moral turpitude applies in determining eligibility for cancellation of removal; the 'only one crime' proviso refers only to one crime involving moral turpitude, and other non-turpitudinous offenses do not defeat the exception.
Scope of application
Applies to cancellation of removal cases within the Board of Immigration Appeals' jurisdiction concerning the petty offense exception and the 'only one crime' proviso; binding on the BIA and immigration courts, not a federal court precedent.
Official citation and verification records
Checked:2026-11-04 · Official decision source
- 第5章 - 法定期间内行为的附条件禁止条款
[^ 9] See Matter of Garcia-Hernandez (PDF) , 23 I&N Dec. 590, 594-95 (BIA 2003).
The records identify official use of the cited rule. A partial reversal, statutory amendment or controlling court ruling may affect its scope.
Complete reference translation, organized by original page and paragraph. Headings, citations and footnotes are retained. The English document is the official text.
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Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 590 (BIA 2003) Interim Decision #3490
引用为 23 I&N Dec. 590 (BIA 2003) 临时决定第3490号
In re Fidel GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, Respondent
关于 Fidel GARCIA-HERNANDEZ,被申请人
File A74 108 643 - San Diego
案卷号 A74 108 643 - 圣地亚哥
Decided May 8, 2003
2003年5月8日决定
U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals
美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会
(1) An alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude that falls within the “petty offense” exception in section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (1994), is not ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1998), because he “has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2)” of the Act.
(1) 外国人因涉及道德败坏的犯罪被定罪,该犯罪属于《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)条,8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (1994)中的“轻微犯罪”例外,则其并不因该法第240A(b)(1)(C)条,8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1998)而丧失取消递解出境的资格,因为他“未被判定犯有该法第212(a)(2)条规定的罪行”。
(2) An alien who has committed a crime involving moral turpitude that falls within the “petty offense” exception is not ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(B) of the Act, because commission of a petty offense does not bar the offender from establishing good moral character under section 101(f)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (Supp. IV 1998).
(2) 外国人实施了属于“轻微犯罪”例外的涉及道德败坏的犯罪,并不因该法第240A(b)(1)(B)条而丧失取消递解出境的资格,因为实施轻微犯罪并不妨碍犯罪人根据该法第101(f)(3)条,8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (Supp. IV 1998)确立良好道德品质。
(3) An alien who has committed more than one petty offense is not ineligible for the “petty offense” exception if “only one crime” is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(3) 实施了不止一项轻微犯罪的外国人,如果“仅有一项犯罪”是涉及道德败坏的犯罪,则并不丧失“轻微犯罪”例外的资格。
(4) The respondent, who was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude that qualifies as a petty offense, was not rendered ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of Act by either his conviction or his commission of another offense that is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
(4) 被申请人因涉及道德败坏的犯罪被定罪,该犯罪符合轻微犯罪的条件,其定罪或实施另一项不涉及道德败坏的犯罪均未使其根据该法第240A(b)(1)条丧失取消递解出境的资格。
FOR RESPONDENT: Kevin A. Bove, Esquire, Escondido, California
被申请人代理律师:Kevin A. Bove,Esquire,加利福尼亚州埃斯孔迪多
FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Michael Adams, Assistant District Counsel
移民与归化局代理律师:Michael Adams,助理地区法律顾问
BEFORE: Board Panel: GRANT, OSUNA, and PAULEY, Board Members.
审理:委员会合议庭:GRANT、OSUNA和PAULEY,委员会成员。
PAULEY, Board Member:
PAULEY,委员会成员:
In a decision dated July 29, 1998, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable and denied his applications for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (Supp. IV 1998), and for voluntary departure. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings.
在1998年7月29日的决定中,移民法官认定被申请人可被递解出境,并驳回了其根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)条,8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (Supp. IV 1998)提出的取消递解出境申请以及自愿离境申请。被申请人对该决定提出上诉。上诉将获支持,案件记录将发回移民法官进一步审理。
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
一、事实与程序历史
The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection or parole. Removability is not in dispute. The respondent was served a Notice to Appear (Form I-862) on May 14, 1997, and in due course applied for cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents and, in the alternative, for voluntary departure.
被申请人是墨西哥本土公民,未经检查或假释进入美国。递解出境的可递解性不存在争议。被申请人于1997年5月14日收到出庭通知(I-862表),并适时申请了非永久居民取消递解出境,以及替代性的自愿离境。
In his decision, the Immigration Judge pretermitted the cancellation application based on the respondent’s conviction in 1997 for corporal injury to a spouse in violation of section 273.5 of the California Penal Code, for which he was sentenced to probation on the condition that he serve 90 days in custody. The Immigration Judge determined that under Matter of Tran, 21 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 1996), this conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge further determined that the respondent was not eligible for the “petty offense” exception in section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (1994), because he had not been convicted of “only one crime.” The Immigration Judge based this finding on the respondent’s 1994 conviction for battery under section 242 of the California Penal Code, a crime not involving moral turpitude, for which the respondent was sentenced to probation on the condition that he serve 15 days in custody or in a work release program. The Immigration Judge accordingly found that the respondent was ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act because he had been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2).
在其决定中,移民法官基于被申请人1997年因违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第273.5条对配偶实施身体伤害而被定罪,判处缓刑并附条件羁押90天,预驳回了取消递解出境申请。移民法官认定,根据Matter of Tran,21 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 1996),该定罪属于涉及道德败坏的犯罪。移民法官进一步认定,被申请人不符合该法第212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)条,8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (1994)中的“轻微犯罪”例外,因为他并非仅被判定犯有“仅一项犯罪”。移民法官基于被申请人1994年因违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第242条实施殴打而被定罪——该犯罪不涉及道德败坏,被申请人被判处缓刑并附条件羁押15天或参加工作释放计划——作出此认定。因此,移民法官认定被申请人根据该法第240A(b)(1)(C)条不符合取消递解出境的资格,因为他已被判定犯有第212(a)(2)条规定的罪行。
The Immigration Judge further found that the respondent could not meet the requirement in section 240A(b)(1)(B) of the Act that he establish he was a person of good moral character during the requisite 10-year period, because his 1997 conviction placed him among the “class[] of persons, whether inadmissible or not, described in . . . subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 212(a)(2),” within the meaning of section 101(f)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (Supp. IV 1998), which defines good moral character.
移民法官进一步认定,被申请人无法满足该法第240A(b)(1)(B)条的要求,即在规定的10年期间内证明其为具有良好道德品质的人,因为其1997年的定罪使其属于该法第101(f)(3)条,8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (Supp. IV 1998)所指的“无论是否不可入境,均属于第212(a)(2)条(A)和(B)项所述的一类或多类人员”,该条定义了良好道德品质。
II. ISSUES
二、争议问题
This case presents two principal questions: (1) whether an alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act if he committed a crime involving moral turpitude that falls within the “petty offense” exception in section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II); and, if not, (2) whether the commission of another offense that is not a crime involving moral turpitude renders the “petty offense” exception inapplicable.
本案提出两个主要问题:(1) 外国人实施了属于第212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)条“轻微犯罪”例外的涉及道德败坏的犯罪,是否根据该法第240A(b)(1)条丧失取消递解出境的资格;如果否,(2) 实施另一项不涉及道德败坏的犯罪是否使“轻微犯罪”例外不适用。
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III. APPLICABLE STATUTES
三、适用法规
Section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, which sets forth the criteria to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents, provides in pertinent part as follows:
该法第240A(b)(1)条规定了某些非永久居民确立取消递解出境资格的标准,相关部分规定如下:
The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien—
司法部长可以取消递解出境,并将以下外国人调整为合法永久居民身份:该外国人不可入境或可被递解出境,如果该外国人——
(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application;
(A) 在此类申请之日之前,已连续不少于10年实际居住在美国;
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2) . . . . (Emphasis added.)
(B) 在此期间一直是具有良好道德品质的人; (C) 未被判定犯有第212(a)(2)条、第237(a)(2)条……规定的罪行。 (强调为后加。)
Section 212(a)(2)(A) provides in relevant part:
第212(a)(2)(A)条相关部分规定:
(i) In General.—Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of . . .—
(i) 一般规定。——除第(ii)款另有规定外,任何外国人被判定犯有……——
(I) a crime involving moral turpitude . . . is inadmissible. (ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if— . . . (II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted . . . did not exceed imprisonment for one year and . . . the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed). (Emphasis added.)
(I) 涉及道德败坏的犯罪……不可入境。 (ii) 例外。——第(i)(I)款不适用于仅实施一项犯罪的外国人,如果—— …… (II) 该外国人被定罪之犯罪可能判处的最高刑罚……不超过一年监禁,且……该外国人未被判处超过6个月的监禁刑期(无论该刑期最终执行程度如何)。(强调为后加。)
Section 101(f) provides in relevant part:
第101(f)条相关部分规定:
For the purposes of this Act—No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established, is, or was
为本法之目的——任何人不得被视为或被认定为具有良好道德品质的人,如果在要求确立良好道德品质的期间内,其属于或曾经属于
. . . (3) a member of one or more of the classes of persons, whether inadmissible or not, described in . . . subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 212(a)(2) . . . ; if the offense described therein, for which such person was convicted . . . , was committed during such period . . . . (Emphasis added.)
…… (3) 无论是否不可入境,均属于第212(a)(2)条……(A)和(B)项所述的一类或多类人员……;如果其中所述、该人被判定犯有……的罪行是在该期间内实施的……。(强调为后加。)
IV. ANALYSIS
四、分析
A. Applicability of the “Petty Offense” Exception to Cancellation of Removal Eligibility
A. “轻微犯罪”例外对取消递解出境资格的适用性
We first address whether the respondent’s 1997 conviction for spousal injury rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C), or sections 240A(b)(1)(B) and 101(f)(3) of the Act. We conclude that it does not.
我们首先处理被申请人1997年因配偶伤害被定罪是否使其根据该法第240A(b)(1)(C)条,或第240A(b)(1)(B)条和第101(f)(3)条丧失取消递解出境的资格。我们结论认为并不丧失。
We agree that the respondent’s 1997 conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude. See Matter of Tran, supra (holding that willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse in violation of section 273.5 of the California
我们同意被申请人1997年的定罪属于涉及道德败坏的犯罪。参见Matter of Tran,同上(认定违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第273.5条故意对配偶实施身体伤害属于涉及道德败坏的犯罪)。
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Penal Code is a crime involving moral turpitude). However, this conviction, considered alone, clearly qualifies for the “petty offense” exception. The respondent was convicted under a misdemeanor statute that carried a maximum sentence of no more than 1 year in prison,1 and he received a sentence of less than 6 months. Accordingly, we conclude that the respondent would not be inadmissible on the basis of this offense.
然而,单独考虑该定罪,显然符合“轻微犯罪”例外。被申请人根据轻罪法规被定罪,该法规规定的最高刑期不超过1年监禁,1 且其被判处的刑期少于6个月。因此,我们结论认为被申请人不会因该犯罪而不可入境。
We further find that this conviction, standing alone, does not render the respondent ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act, which requires an applicant to show that he “has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2).” We view the plain language of this provision as incorporating the entirety of section 212(a)(2), including the exception for petty offenses set forth therein. Accordingly, we find that the “petty offense” exception also applies when determining eligibility for cancellation of removal.
我们进一步认定,单独该定罪并不使被申请人根据该法第240A(b)(1)(C)条丧失取消递解出境的资格,该条要求申请人证明其“未被判定犯有第212(a)(2)条规定的罪行”。我们认为该条款的平实语言纳入了第212(a)(2)条的全部内容,包括其中规定的轻微犯罪例外。因此,我们认定“轻微犯罪”例外在确定取消递解出境资格时也适用。
For similar reasons, the respondent cannot be considered, on the basis of his 1997 conviction alone, an alien “described in” section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act for purposes of the good moral character definition in section 101(f)(3). We find that an alien is not within the class of aliens described in section 212(a)(2)(A) if the “petty offense” exception applies to his or her crime. See Matter of Urpi-Sancho, 13 I&N Dec. 641 (BIA 1970) (holding that an alien convicted of a petty offense involving moral turpitude was not ineligible for voluntary departure); Matter of M-, 7 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA 1956) (same, regarding eligibility for suspension of deportation). Put in other terms, the “description” of the category of offenses encompassing crimes involving moral turpitude also includes the exception. Accordingly, the respondent is not barred, on the basis of the 1997 conviction alone, from establishing good moral character for purposes of section 240A(b)(1)(B) of the Act.2
出于类似理由,仅基于其1997年的定罪,被申请人不能被认定为第101(f)(3)条良好道德品质定义所指的该法第212(a)(2)(A)条“所述”的外国人。我们认定,如果“轻微犯罪”例外适用于某外国人的犯罪,则该外国人不属于第212(a)(2)(A)条所述的外国人类别。参见Matter of Urpi-Sancho,13 I&N Dec. 641 (BIA 1970)(认定因涉及道德败坏的轻微犯罪被定罪的外国人并不丧失自愿离境的资格);Matter of M-,7 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA 1956)(同上,关于暂停递解出境的资格)。换言之,包含涉及道德败坏犯罪的罪行类别的“描述”也包括该例外。因此,仅基于1997年的定罪,被申请人并不被禁止为该法第240A(b)(1)(B)条之目的确立良好道德品质。2
Therefore, we do not find that the respondent’s 1997 conviction for spousal injury is a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude that disqualifies him from establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C), or under sections 240A(b)(1)(B) and 101(f)(3).
因此,我们不认为被申请人1997年因配偶伤害被定罪属于涉及道德败坏的犯罪定罪,从而使其根据第240A(b)(1)(C)条,或根据第240A(b)(1)(B)条和第101(f)(3)条丧失确立取消递解出境资格的资格。
1 The offense of willful infliction of corporal injury under the California statute is a felony. However, as in Matter of Tran, supra, the respondent in this case was charged under the provisions of section 17(b)(4) of the California Penal Code that enabled the prosecutor to charge the offense at a misdemeanor level. 2 In addition, the “whether inadmissible or not” language in section 101(f)(3), properly understood, does not show that the “petty offense” exception is inapplicable. In Matter of M-, supra, we held that the phrase “whether excludable or not” was primarily designed to assure that the provision was applicable to aliens in deportation proceedings, as well as to those in exclusion proceedings. Id. at 150-51. The change in phrase (which was brought about by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (“IIRIRA”)), from “whether excludable or not” to “whether inadmissible or not” was merely conforming in nature, reflecting the elimination of exclusion proceedings by the IIRIRA.
1 根据加州法规,故意实施人身伤害的罪行是重罪。 然而,如同在Matter of Tran案中一样,本案中的 respondent 根据加州刑法典第17(b)(4)条的规定被起诉,该规定使检察官能够以轻罪级别起诉该罪行。 2 此外,第101(f)(3)条中的“无论是否不可入境”的措辞,正确理解后,并不表明“轻微罪行”例外不适用。在Matter of M-案中,我们裁定,“无论是否可驱逐”这一短语主要旨在确保该规定适用于驱逐程序中的外国人,以及排除程序中的外国人。Id. at 150-51。短语从“无论是否可驱逐”变为“无论是否不可入境”(这是由1996年《非法移民改革和移民责任法》,Pub. L. No. 104-208的C部分,110 Stat. 3009-546(“IIRIRA”)带来的),仅仅是性质上的顺应,反映了IIRIRA取消了排除程序。
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B. “Only One Crime” Proviso
B. “仅一项罪行”但书
In his central holding, the Immigration Judge found that section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act precluded the respondent from taking advantage of the “petty offense” exception because he had not been convicted of “only one crime.” We do not agree.
在其核心裁决中,移民法官认定,该法第212(a)(2)(A)(ii)条阻止 respondent 利用“轻微罪行”例外,因为他未被判定犯有“仅一项罪行”。我们不同意。
The “only one crime” proviso, taken in context, is subject to two principal interpretations: (1) that it is triggered, as the Immigration Judge determined, by the commission of any other crime, including a mere infraction; or (2) that it is triggered only by the commission of another crime involving moral turpitude. So far as we are aware, the issue is one of first impression. For the reasons set forth below, we construe the “only one crime” proviso as referring to “only one such crime,” meaning only one crime involving moral turpitude.3
“仅一项罪行”但书,结合上下文,有两种主要解释:(1)如移民法官所认定,它因实施任何其他罪行而被触发,包括单纯的违规;或(2)它仅因实施另一项涉及道德败坏的罪行而被触发。据我们所知,该问题是一个首次印象问题。基于以下理由,我们将“仅一项罪行”但书解释为指“仅一项此类罪行”,即仅一项涉及道德败坏的罪行。3
As a threshold matter, we note that the Immigration Judge implicitly, and correctly, treated the respondent’s 1994 conviction for battery as one that is not for a crime involving moral turpitude. See Matter of Fualaau, 21 I&N Dec. 475 (BIA 1996). Turning to section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), we observe that an alien is not eligible for the “petty offense” exception unless the alien has committed “only one crime.” Accepting the Immigration Judge’s view would mean that the commission of any offense—even one of a very minor nature, such as a driving infraction—would preclude application of the “petty offense” exception. Although this is a possible construction of the “only one crime” phrase, we believe that the far more sensible construction is to read the word “crime” in the context of offenses that are the subject matter of section 212(a)(2)(A). Viewed in this fashion, the word “crime” refers most logically to a crime involving moral turpitude. It seems extremely unlikely that Congress, having determined to create a “petty offense” exception to inadmissibility based on an alien’s commission of a crime involving moral turpitude—a significant policy decision—would have intended to divest the alien of the benefit of that exception if he or she were found to have committed any other crime, including a mere infraction.
作为门槛事项,我们注意到移民法官隐含且正确地对待了 respondent 1994年的殴打罪定罪,认为它不属于涉及道德败坏的罪行。见 Matter of Fualaau, 21 I&N Dec. 475 (BIA 1996)。转向第212(a)(2)(A)(ii)条,我们观察到,外国人只有在实施了“仅一项罪行”时才有资格获得“轻微罪行”例外。接受移民法官的观点将意味着实施任何罪行——即使是极其轻微的罪行,如驾驶违规——都将阻止“轻微罪行”例外的适用。尽管这是“仅一项罪行”短语的一种可能解释,但我们认为更合理的解释是在第212(a)(2)(A)条所涉罪行的背景下理解“罪行”一词。以这种方式看待,“罪行”一词最合乎逻辑地指涉及道德败坏的罪行。国会既然决定基于外国人实施涉及道德败坏的罪行而创设“轻微罪行”不可入境例外——一项重大政策决定——却意图在发现外国人实施任何其他罪行(包括单纯违规)时剥夺其该例外的利益,这似乎极不可能。
The history of the provision also militates strongly in favor of a construction that interprets the word “crime” as meaning a second crime involving moral turpitude. For over half a century, beginning with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the statute has contained a “petty offense” exception ground of excludability/inadmissibility for a crime
该条款的历史也强烈支持将“罪行”一词解释为指第二项涉及道德败坏的罪行。半个多世纪以来,从1952年《移民和国籍法》开始,该法规一直包含一项因涉及道德败坏的罪行而不可驱逐/不可入境的“轻微罪行”例外理由
3 A third conceivable meaning is that the bar applies more broadly to the commission of any other offense that would be a ground of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2). But we do not believe this construction is valid because it would lead to partial redundancy, in that each of the other offenses described in section 212(a)(2) provides an independent ground for finding an alien ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C).
3 第三种可能的含义是,该禁令更广泛地适用于实施任何其他根据第212(a)(2)条构成不可入境理由的罪行。但我们认为这种解释无效,因为它会导致部分冗余,即第212(a)(2)条中描述的其他每项罪行都提供了独立的理由,认定外国人不符合第240A(b)(1)(C)条下的取消驱逐资格。
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involving moral turpitude. Although the exception underwent various substantive changes, until the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 4978 (“1990 Act”), a constant element was that the “only one crime” bar was always cast in terms of “only one such offense.” Section 212(a)(9) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1988) (emphasis added). Thus, the exception was unavailable only if the alien had committed more than one crime involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Matter of Urpi-Sancho, supra, at 642 (noting that “conviction of just one petty offense involving moral turpitude will not make an alien excludable under [section 212(a)(9)]”).
涉及道德败坏。尽管该例外经历了各种实质性变化,直到1990年《移民法》,Pub. L. No. 101-649,1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 4978(“1990年法案”),一个不变的因素是“仅一项罪行”禁令总是以“仅一项此类罪行”的措辞表述。该法第212(a)(9)条,8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1988)(强调添加)。因此,只有当外国人实施了超过一项涉及道德败坏的罪行时,该例外才不可用。见,例如,Matter of Urpi-Sancho, supra, at 642(指出“仅一项涉及道德败坏的轻微罪行定罪不会使外国人根据[第212(a)(9)条]成为可驱逐的”)。
It is in this context that we must consider the changes wrought by the Immigration Act of 1990. Because the Act’s enforcement-related provisions, including the provision at issue here, were added to the Act in conference and apparently had their source in various House and Senate bills, no committee reports explaining the amendments to section 212(a) exist. It seems clear, however, that the amendment with which we are concerned had two purposes: one organizational, and the other substantive.
正是在这种背景下,我们必须考虑1990年《移民法》带来的变化。由于该法案与执法相关的条款,包括此处涉及的条款,是在会议中添加到法案中的,并且显然源自各种众议院和参议院法案,因此不存在解释第212(a)条修正案的委员会报告。然而,似乎清楚的是,我们所关注的修正案有两个目的:一个是组织性的,另一个是实质性的。
Prior to the organizational change, the law had six criminal and related grounds of exclusion, including section 212(a)(9), which related to crimes involving moral turpitude. The 1990 Act consolidated all of these into section 212(a)(2), and in the course thereof made several purely stylistic changes.
在组织性变化之前,法律有六项刑事及相关驱逐理由,包括第212(a)(9)条,该条涉及道德败坏的罪行。1990年法案将所有这些合并到第212(a)(2)条中,并在此过程中进行了几处纯粹风格上的变化。
The substantive modifications related to the scope of the “petty offense” exception. In 1984 Congress had simplified the provision to some degree, by shifting the focus from whether the crime was classifiable as a felony or a misdemeanor to what sentence was actually imposed. See Continuing Appropriations, 1985—Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 220(a), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1837, 1976, 2027-28 (1994). In doing so, however, it allowed many aliens who were convicted of serious offenses, but who received minor sentences, to escape a finding of inadmissibility. The 1990 Act reversed this policy, requiring that the offense itself, as well as the sentence imposed, be relatively minor. By 1990, the 1984 amendment had also created a complication because in 1988 we held that a suspended sentence was one actually imposed. See Matter of Castro, 19 I&N Dec. 692 (BIA 1988). Thus it became important to determine whether the criminal court had suspended the imposition or execution of a sentence. The 1990 Act resolved this problem by adding language that the exception applies “regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed.” Immigration Act of 1990, § 601, 104 Stat. at 5067-68.
实质性修改涉及“轻微罪行”例外的范围。1984年,国会通过将重点从罪行是否可归类为重罪或轻罪转移到实际判处的刑罚,在某种程度上简化了该条款。见 Continuing Appropriations, 1985—Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 220(a), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1837, 1976, 2027-28 (1994)。然而,在这样做时,它允许许多被判定犯有严重罪行但获得轻微刑罚的外国人逃避不可入境的认定。1990年法案逆转了这一政策,要求罪行本身以及判处的刑罚都相对轻微。到1990年,1984年修正案也造成了一个复杂问题,因为我们在1988年裁定缓刑是实际判处的刑罚。见 Matter of Castro, 19 I&N Dec. 692 (BIA 1988)。因此,确定刑事法院是暂停了刑罚的判处还是执行变得很重要。1990年法案通过添加语言解决了这个问题,即该例外适用“无论刑罚最终执行的程度如何”。Immigration Act of 1990, § 601, 104 Stat. at 5067-68。
There is no indication—apart from deletion of the word “such” itself—that the 1990 change in the “only one crime” provision at issue here was anything more than a stylistic change resulting from the reorganization of section
没有迹象表明——除了删除“such”一词本身——此处涉及的“仅一项罪行”条款的1990年变化不仅仅是因第212(a)条重组而产生的风格变化,
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212(a), it being implicit that the bar is only activated by an alien’s commission of another turpitudinous offense. This, in combination with the history of the provision, confirms our understanding that the “only one crime” bar is meant to apply only where the alien is found to have committed another crime involving moral turpitude.
212(a),其中隐含的是,该禁止条款仅因外国人实施了另一项卑劣罪行而被激活。这一点,结合该条款的历史,证实了我们的理解,即“仅一项犯罪”禁止条款仅意在适用于外国人被认定实施了另一项涉及道德败坏的犯罪的情形。
We conclude that the phrase “only one crime” in section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act does not bear the construction placed upon it by the Immigration Judge. The basis on which the Immigration Judge found the respondent ineligible for cancellation of removal cannot, therefore, be sustained. Accordingly, we will remand the case for further proceedings.
我们得出结论,该法第212(a)(2)(A)(ii)条中的“仅一项罪行”短语不承担移民法官所赋予的解释。因此,移民法官认定 respondent 不符合取消驱逐资格的依据不能维持。据此,我们将案件发回进行进一步程序。
C. Voluntary Departure
C. 自愿离境
The Immigration Judge also found the respondent ineligible for voluntary departure because his 1997 conviction precluded him from establishing good moral character for the requisite 5-year period. For reasons previously stated, we disagree and find that the conviction does not bar him from this form of relief on statutory grounds.
移民法官还认定 respondent 不符合自愿离境资格,因为其1997年的定罪阻止他在所需的5年期间内证明良好道德品质。基于前述理由,我们不同意,并认定该定罪不基于法定理由阻止他获得这种形式的救济。
V. CONCLUSION
V. 结论
The respondent’s appeal will be sustained and this matter will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for consideration of the respondent’s applications for relief, consistent with this decision. We express no view on whether the respondent otherwise meets the requirements for such relief or merits a grant in the exercise of discretion.
respondent 的上诉将获支持,此事将发回移民法官,以根据本决定考虑 respondent 的救济申请。我们对 respondent 是否在其他方面满足此类救济的要求或在行使自由裁量权时值得批准不发表意见。
ORDER: The appeal is sustained. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, and for the entry of a new decision.
命令:上诉获支持。 进一步命令:记录发回移民法院进行与本意见一致的进一步程序,并作出新决定。
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