Matter of Jun Yun Zhang

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 2019) Interim Decision #3957

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 2019) 临时决定 #3957

Decided June 28, 2019

2019年6月28日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

(1) Under the plain language of section 237(a)(3)(D)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D)(i) (2012), it is not necessary to show intent to establish that an alien is deportable for making a false representation of United States citizenship.

(1) 根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(3)(D)(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D)(i) (2012) 的明确语言，无需证明意图即可确定外国人因虚假陈述美国公民身份而可被驱逐。

(2) Although a Certificate of Naturalization (Form N-550) is evidence of United States citizenship, the certificate itself does not confer citizenship status if it is acquired unlawfully.

(2) 尽管入籍证书（表格 N-550）是美国公民身份的证据，但如果该证书是以非法方式获得的，则证书本身并不赋予公民身份。

FOR RESPONDENT: Kai W. De Graaf, New York, New York

代表被申请人：Kai W. De Graaf，纽约州纽约市

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Trisha Lacey, Assistant Chief Counsel

代表国土安全部：Trisha Lacey，助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, MULLANE, and CREPPY, Board Members.

审理法官：委员会小组：MALPHRUS、MULLANE 和 CREPPY，委员会成员。

MALPHRUS, Board Member:

MALPHRUS，委员会成员：

In a decision dated November 8, 2017, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable under section 237(a)(3)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D) (2012), as an alien who falsely claimed to be a United States citizen, but granted his application for cancellation of removal. 1 The respondent has appealed from the Immigration Judge’s finding of removability.2 The appeal will be dismissed. The respondent is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on June 20, 1991. Subsequently, through intermediaries, he purchased a Certificate of Naturalization (Form N-550) from a person who, at the time, was an officer of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) and

在2017年11月8日的决定中，移民法官认定被申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(3)(D)条，8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D) (2012)，作为虚假声称美国公民身份的外国人可被驱逐，但批准了他的取消驱逐申请。1 被申请人对移民法官的可驱逐性认定提出上诉。2 上诉将被驳回。 被申请人是中华人民共和国国民和公民，于1991年6月20日作为合法永久居民获准进入美国。随后，他通过中间人从一名当时是前移民归化局（“INS”）官员的人那里购买了一份入籍证书（表格 N-550），该人后来因非法出售此类证书而被定罪。国土安全部（“DHS”）的一名现任官员作证称，被申请人通过非法手段从前INS官员处获得了他的入籍证书，并且他没有正确完成入籍程序以值得获得证书。 根据移民法官的说法，被申请人的证词显示他无法通过英语和公民考试，没有收到入籍宣誓仪式通知（表格 N-445），也没有参加必要的面试程序。移民法官没有就被申请人是否明知地虚假陈述美国公民身份作出认定。相反，他表示“法院注意到被申请人知情或不知情地试图通过捷径获得美国公民身份。” 在上诉中，被申请人主张他不可被驱逐，并且他的程序应被终止，因为他是美国公民。他争辩说，要根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(3)(D)条认定他可被驱逐，必须证明他作出了“故意”或“明知”的虚假公民身份主张。被申请人还声称他一直相信自己美国公民，并且由于他出于善意行事，他并非为了《移民与国籍法》下的任何“利益”而获得入籍证书。 作为回应，国土安全部争辩说，第237(a)(3)(D)条的法定语言不要求意图或可责心理状态。因此，我们面前的问题是，外国人的虚假美国公民身份主张是否必须明知才能使其可被驱逐。 在 Matter of Richmond, 26 I&N Dec. 779, 783 (BIA 2016) 中，我们审议了《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (2012) 的法定语言，该语言与第237(a)(3)(D)(i)条几乎相同，是否具有明确无误的含义。在考察立法历史时，我们观察到该条款是由《1996年非法移民改革和移民责任法》添加到《移民与国籍法》中的，Pub. L. No. 104-208 的 C 部分，110 Stat. 3009-546（“IIRIRA”），“旨在防止非法外国人未经授权就业和欺诈性获取公共服务和福利。” Id. at 787。我们解释了“为了《移民与国籍法》...或任何联邦或州法律下的任何目的或利益”这一短语的含义和范围。 Id. at 784–89。但我们没有决定虚假公民身份主张是否必须明知才能产生移民后果，因为美国第二巡回上诉法院维持了移民法官关于外国人声称相信自己是美国公民的可信度不利认定。 Id. at 781 n.5, 783。移民法官在本案中没有作出此类明确的可信度认定。

1 Section 237(a)(3)(D)(i) of the Act provides:

1 《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(3)(D)(i)条规定：

Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under this Act (including section 274A) or any Federal or State law is deportable.

任何外国人为了《移民与国籍法》（包括第274A条）或任何联邦或州法律下的任何目的或利益，虚假陈述或曾经虚假陈述自己是美国公民，即可被驱逐。

2 Neither party has appealed the Immigration Judge’s grant of cancellation of removal, so this issue is not before us. See, e.g., Matter of A.J. Valdez and Z. Valdez, 27 I&N Dec. 496, 496 n.1, 498 n.3 (BIA 2018).

2 双方均未对移民法官批准取消驱逐提出上诉，因此该问题不在我们面前。参见，例如，Matter of A.J. Valdez and Z. Valdez, 27 I&N Dec. 496, 496 n.1, 498 n.3 (BIA 2018)。

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 2019) Interim Decision #3957

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 2019) 临时决定 #3957

who was later convicted of illegally selling such certificates. A current officer of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) testified that the respondent obtained his Certificate of Naturalization from the former INS officer through unlawful means and that he did not properly complete the naturalization process to merit the issuance of a certificate. According to the Immigration Judge, the respondent’s testimony revealed that he could not pass the English and civics tests, did not receive a Notice of Naturalization Oath Ceremony (Form N-445), and did not participate in the requisite interview process. The Immigration Judge did not make a finding as to whether the respondent knowingly made a false representation of United States citizenship. Rather, he stated that the “Court is mindful that the respondent either knowingly or unknowingly tried to obtain United States citizenship through a shortcut.” On appeal, the respondent argues that he is not removable and that his proceedings should be terminated because he is a United States citizen. He contends that to find him removable under section 237(a)(3)(D) of the Act, it must be shown that he made a false claim to citizenship that was “willful” or “knowing.” The respondent also asserts that he has always believed he was a United States citizen and that because he acted in good faith, he did not obtain the Certificate of Naturalization for any “benefit” under the Act. In response, the DHS argues that the statutory language of section 237(a)(3)(D) does not require intent or a culpable mental state. The question before us, therefore, is whether an alien’s false claim to United States citizenship must be made knowingly to render him or her removable. In Matter of Richmond, 26 I&N Dec. 779, 783 (BIA 2016), we considered whether the statutory language of section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (2012), which is virtually identical to that of section 237(a)(3)(D)(i), has a plain and unambiguous meaning. In looking to the legislative history, we observed that this provision was added to the Act by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (“IIRIRA”), “with the intent to prevent unauthorized employment and fraudulent procurement of public services and benefits by illegal aliens.” Id. at 787. We interpreted the meaning and scope of the phrase “for any purpose or benefit under this Act . . . or any Federal or State law.” Id. at 784–89. But we did not decide whether a false claim to citizenship must be knowingly made to give rise to immigration consequences, because the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had upheld the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding regarding the alien’s claimed belief that he was a United States citizen. Id. at 781 n.5, 783. The Immigration Judge made no such explicit credibility finding in this case.

他后来因非法出售此类证书而被定罪。国土安全部（“DHS”）的一名现任官员作证称，被申请人通过非法手段从前INS官员处获得了他的入籍证书，并且他没有正确完成入籍程序以值得获得证书。 根据移民法官的说法，被申请人的证词显示他无法通过英语和公民考试，没有收到入籍宣誓仪式通知（表格 N-445），也没有参加必要的面试程序。移民法官没有就被申请人是否明知地虚假陈述美国公民身份作出认定。相反，他表示“法院注意到被申请人知情或不知情地试图通过捷径获得美国公民身份。” 在上诉中，被申请人主张他不可被驱逐，并且他的程序应被终止，因为他是美国公民。他争辩说，要根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(3)(D)条认定他可被驱逐，必须证明他作出了“故意”或“明知”的虚假公民身份主张。被申请人还声称他一直相信自己美国公民，并且由于他出于善意行事，他并非为了《移民与国籍法》下的任何“利益”而获得入籍证书。 作为回应，国土安全部争辩说，第237(a)(3)(D)条的法定语言不要求意图或可责心理状态。因此，我们面前的问题是，外国人的虚假美国公民身份主张是否必须明知才能使其可被驱逐。 在 Matter of Richmond, 26 I&N Dec. 779, 783 (BIA 2016) 中，我们审议了《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (2012) 的法定语言，该语言与第237(a)(3)(D)(i)条几乎相同，是否具有明确无误的含义。在考察立法历史时，我们观察到该条款是由《1996年非法移民改革和移民责任法》添加到《移民与国籍法》中的，Pub. L. No. 104-208 的 C 部分，110 Stat. 3009-546（“IIRIRA”），“旨在防止非法外国人未经授权就业和欺诈性获取公共服务和福利。” Id. at 787。我们解释了“为了《移民与国籍法》...或任何联邦或州法律下的任何目的或利益”这一短语的含义和范围。 Id. at 784–89。但我们没有决定虚假公民身份主张是否必须明知才能产生移民后果，因为美国第二巡回上诉法院维持了移民法官关于外国人声称相信自己是美国公民的可信度不利认定。 Id. at 781 n.5, 783。移民法官在本案中没有作出此类明确的可信度认定。

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 2019) Interim Decision #3957

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 2019) 临时决定 #3957

We have a duty to follow the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“If the statute is clear and unambiguous ‘that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’” (citations omitted)). In interpreting statutory language, we determine if its meaning is plain by referring “to the language itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1997); see also Matter of A. Vasquez, 27 I&N Dec. 503, 504 (BIA 2019). Section 237(a)(3)(D)(i) of the Act provides that an alien is deportable if he “falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit.” The plain language of this section does not require an intent to falsely represent citizenship status.3 Significantly, Congress carved out a narrow exception to this provision for those aliens whose parents are or were United States citizens; who permanently resided in the United States prior to the age of 16 years; and who reasonably believed that they were United States citizens when they made such a claim.4 Section 237(a)(3)(D)(ii) of the Act; see also section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II) of the Act. This exception indicates that an alien is not required to know that a claim to citizenship is false, because if Congress had intended to include a knowledge or willfulness requirement in section 237(a)(3)(D)(i), there would be no need for a good faith exception.

我们有义务遵循法规的明确无误语言。K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)（“如果法规清晰明确，‘事情就到此为止，因为法院以及机构都必须实现国会明确表达的意图。’（引用省略））。在解释法定语言时，我们通过参考“语言本身、语言使用的具体上下文以及法规整体的更广泛上下文”来确定其含义是否明确。Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1997)；另见 Matter of A. Vasquez, 27 I&N Dec. 503, 504 (BIA 2019)。 《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(3)(D)(i)条规定，如果外国人“为了任何目的或利益虚假陈述或曾经虚假陈述自己是美国公民”，则可被驱逐。该条的明确语言不要求虚假陈述公民身份的意图。3 值得注意的是，国会为该条款 carve out 了一个狭窄的例外，适用于那些父母是或曾经是美国公民的外国人；在16岁之前永久居住在美国；并且在作出此类主张时合理相信自己美国公民。4 《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(3)(D)(ii)条；另见《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II)条。这一例外表明，外国人不需要知道公民身份主张是虚假的，因为如果国会打算在第237(a)(3)(D)(i)条中包含知情或故意要求，就没有必要设立善意例外。

3 By contrast, section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, which is not applicable here, renders an alien inadmissible if he or she “by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act.” (Emphasis added.) The absence of a “knowing” or “willful” requirement for false claims to citizenship in sections 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) and 237(a)(3)(D)(i) indicates that there was no congressional intent to include one. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006) (“[A] negative inference may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is included in other provisions of the same statute.”); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (citation omitted)). 4 Although the respondent indicated at one point in his appellate brief that he has believed he is a United States citizen, he has never argued that he falls within the exception relating to a reasonable belief under section 237(a)(3)(D)(ii) of the Act. We note in this regard that the Eighth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, previously remanded a case where the issues were whether a minor’s status at the time of her misrepresentation of United States citizenship would excuse her from inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) and whether her maturity level should be considered in determining if her retraction of the misrepresentation was timely. See Sandoval v. Holder, 641 F.3d 982, 986–89 (8th Cir. 2011). However, the respondent’s case presents a different issue and does not require us to reach the questions raised in Sandoval.

3 相比之下，《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条（此处不适用）规定，如果外国人“通过欺诈或故意虚假陈述重大事实，寻求获得（或已寻求获得或已获得）签证、其他文件、或进入美国或《移民与国籍法》下提供的其他利益”，则不可入境。（强调添加。）第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)条和第237(a)(3)(D)(i)条中缺乏对虚假公民身份主张的“知情”或“故意”要求，表明国会无意包含此类要求。参见 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006)（“[A] 可以从一个法定条款排除而同一法规其他条款包含的语言中得出否定推论。”）；Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)（“[W]here 国会在法规的一节中包含特定语言但在同一法案的另一节中省略它，通常推定国会在不同包含或排除中有意和故意行事。”（引用省略））。 4 尽管被申请人在其上诉摘要中曾表示他相信自己美国公民，但他从未主张他属于《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(3)(D)(ii)条下关于合理相信的例外。我们注意到，在本案管辖的第八巡回法院，先前曾发回一个案件，问题在于未成年人虚假陈述美国公民身份时的身份是否会免除其根据第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)条的不可入境性，以及她的成熟程度是否应在确定她撤回虚假陈述是否及时时考虑。参见 Sandoval v. Holder, 641 F.3d 982, 986–89 (8th Cir. 2011)。然而，被申请人的案件提出了不同的问题，不需要我们触及 Sandoval 中提出的问题。

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引用为 27 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 2019) 临时决定 #3957

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Patel v. U.S. Attorney General, 917 F.3d 1319, 1326 n.5 (11th Cir. 2019), where the court addressed the nearly identical exception in section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II) of the Act, is instructive. With respect to whether a false claim to citizenship must be “knowing” to establish inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), the court stated, “We seriously doubt that [the statute] requires the false claim to be knowing. For starters, the text does not mention a ‘knowing’ or ‘willful’ false representation of citizenship.” Id.; see also Valadez-Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1309 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that unlike the corresponding criminal provision, which “requires the representation to be both false and willful,” section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) “only requires falsity”). Furthermore, the court concluded that interpreting section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) “to include a knowing requirement . . . would render superfluous the exception in the immediately following subsection.” Patel, 917 F.3d at 1326 n.5 (“If [section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)] contains a knowing requirement, the exception Congress explicitly included is entirely unnecessary.”); see also Richmond v. Holder, 714 F.3d 725, 729 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that for aliens who cannot meet the requirements of the exception, “false citizenship claims need not be knowing to run afoul of [section] 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)”). The existence of the exception in section 237(a)(3)(D)(ii) of the Act similarly shows that Congress chose to exclude a scienter requirement from section 237(a)(3)(D)(i). Thus, we conclude that under the plain language of that section, it is not necessary to show intent to establish that an alien is deportable for making a false representation of United States citizenship.5 An alien need only falsely claim to be a United States citizen for any purpose or benefit under the Act or any Federal or State law to be deportable. As support for his arguments, the respondent relies on our precedent decisions in Matter of Barcenas-Barrera, 25 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2009), and Matter of Wong, 11 I&N Dec. 712 (BIA 1966). However, these cases do not resolve the issue before us. Matter of Barcenas-Barrera determined that an alien who was convicted of willfully and knowingly making a false representation of birth in the United States on a passport application was inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act, but it did not hold that proof of such intent is required to find an alien inadmissible under that provision. See Matter of Barcenas-Barrera, 25 I&N Dec. at 42. In addition, Matter of Wong, which predates enactment of the IIRIRA, does not stand for the broad proposition that the respondent asserts—“that in order for a false claim of citizenship to have any negative consequence, it must be made knowingly and intentionally.” That case involved the narrow question whether an alien was “inspected” for purposes of adjustment of status if her

第十一巡回法院在Patel v. U.S. Attorney General, 917 F.3d 1319, 1326 n.5 (11th Cir. 2019)一案中的推理具有指导意义，该案中法院处理了该法第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II)条中几乎相同的例外规定。关于虚假声称公民身份是否必须为“明知”才能根据第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)条确立不可入境，法院指出，“我们严重怀疑[该法规]要求虚假声称是明知的。首先，文本并未提及对公民身份的‘明知’或‘故意’虚假陈述。”Id.；另见Valadez-Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1309 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010)（指出与相应的刑事条款不同，后者“要求陈述既是虚假的又是故意的”，第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)条“仅要求虚假性”）。此外，法院得出结论，将第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)条解释为“包含明知要求……将使紧接其后的子条款中的例外规定成为多余。”Patel, 917 F.3d at 1326 n.5（“如果[第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)条]包含明知要求，国会明确纳入的例外规定就完全多余了。”）；另见Richmond v. Holder, 714 F.3d 725, 729 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013)（指出对于不能满足例外规定要求的外国人，“虚假公民身份声称无需是明知的即可触犯[第]212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)条”）。 该法第237(a)(3)(D)(ii)条中例外规定的存在同样表明国会选择将犯罪意图要求排除在第237(a)(3)(D)(i)条之外。因此，我们得出结论，根据该条的平实语言，无需证明意图即可确立外国人因虚假陈述美国公民身份而可被驱逐。5外国人只需为根据该法或任何联邦或州法律获得任何目的或利益而虚假声称是美国公民，即可被驱逐。 作为其论点的支持，答辩人依据我们在Matter of Barcenas-Barrera, 25 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2009)和Matter of Wong, 11 I&N Dec. 712 (BIA 1966)中的先例裁决。然而，这些案件并未解决我们面前的问题。Matter of Barcenas-Barrera认定，一名因在护照申请中故意和明知地虚假陈述在美国出生而被定罪的外国人根据该法第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)条不可入境，但该案并未裁定根据该条款认定外国人不可入境需要证明此种意图。见Matter of Barcenas-Barrera, 25 I&N Dec. at 42。此外，Matter of Wong案（早于IIRIRA的颁布）并不支持答辩人所主张的宽泛命题——“为了使虚假公民身份声称产生任何负面后果，必须明知且故意地作出。”该案涉及一个狭窄的问题，即如果一名外国人在入境时的

5 Proof of a criminal conviction is also not required to sustain a charge of removability under section 237(a)(3)(D)(i) of the Act.

5 根据该法第237(a)(3)(D)(i)条维持可驱逐性指控也不需要刑事定罪证明。

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引用为27 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 2019) 临时决定#3957

false claim to citizenship at the time of admission was made in good faith. Matter of Wong, 11 I&N Dec. at 713. Here, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent falsely claimed United States citizenship after he unlawfully purchased a Certificate of Naturalization and used it to obtain a United States passport, which is clearly a “benefit” under the Act. Matter of Barcenas-Barrera, 25 I&N Dec. at 44. Moreover, the respondent used his illegally obtained passport to travel abroad and reenter the United States, which the Immigration Judge also found to be a benefit. See Castro v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 671 F.3d 356, 369 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that obtaining entry to the United States by making a false claim to citizenship at the border is a “benefit” under the Act); Jamieson v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2005) (same). There is no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent’s false claim to be a United States citizen was made with a subjective intent to obtain such benefits. See Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151, 159 (BIA 2007) (stating that an alien’s intent is a factual finding made by the Immigration Judge, which is reviewed for clear error). The Immigration Judge properly concluded that the respondent is removable under section 237(a)(3)(D) of the Act because there is clear and convincing evidence that his unlawful acquisition of a Certificate of Naturalization was for the purpose of obtaining these benefits. See Matter of Richmond, 26 I&N Dec. at 784 (finding that an alien is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) of the Act if he makes a false claim to citizenship with the subjective intent to obtain a “purpose or benefit” under the Act or other law); see also section 240(c)(3)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012). The respondent also maintains that he is a United States citizen and that the DHS lacked the authority to cancel his Certificate of Naturalization. Contrary to his arguments, this case does not involve the revocation of naturalization, also referred to as denaturalization, which can only occur in Federal district court. See section 340(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012); Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1093–94, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000); Matter of Falodun, 27 I&N Dec. 52, 55–56 (BIA 2017). However, the DHS has the authority to cancel a Certificate of Naturalization, because the statute and the regulations provide for administrative cancellation if a Certificate of Naturalization was illegally or fraudulently obtained or created. Section 342 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1453 (2012); 8 C.F.R. §§ 342.1, 342.8 (2019). Although a Certificate of Naturalization is evidence of United States citizenship, the certificate itself does not confer citizenship status if it is acquired unlawfully. See section 338 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1449 (2012). As the Immigration Judge determined, the respondent obtained his Certificate of Naturalization “through unlawful means” from a former INS official who was later convicted for his criminal activity in this regard. Therefore, the

虚假公民身份声称是善意作出的，她是否被视为“经过检查”以进行身份调整。Matter of Wong, 11 I&N Dec. at 713。 在此，移民法官认定，答辩人在非法购买归化证书并使用其获得美国护照后虚假声称美国公民身份，这显然是该法下的“利益”。Matter of Barcenas-Barrera, 25 I&N Dec. at 44。此外，答辩人使用其非法获得的护照出国旅行并重新进入美国，移民法官也认定这是一项利益。见Castro v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 671 F.3d 356, 369 (3d Cir. 2012)（指出通过在边境虚假声称公民身份获得进入美国是该法下的“利益”）；Jamieson v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2005)（同上）。移民法官关于答辩人虚假声称美国公民身份是出于获得此类利益的主观意图的认定不存在明显错误。见Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151, 159 (BIA 2007)（指出外国人的意图是移民法官作出的事实认定，按明显错误标准审查）。移民法官正确得出结论，答辩人根据该法第237(a)(3)(D)条可被驱逐，因为有明确且令人信服的证据表明其非法获取归化证书是为了获得这些利益。见Matter of Richmond, 26 I&N Dec. at 784（认定如果外国人以根据该法或其他法律获得“目的或利益”的主观意图虚假声称公民身份，则根据该法第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)条不可入境）；另见该法第240(c)(3)(A)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012)。 答辩人还坚持他是美国公民，且DHS无权取消其归化证书。与他的论点相反，本案不涉及撤销归化（也称为取消国籍），后者只能在联邦地区法院进行。见该法第340(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012)；Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1093–94, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000)；Matter of Falodun, 27 I&N Dec. 52, 55–56 (BIA 2017)。然而，DHS有权取消归化证书，因为法规和条例规定，如果归化证书是非法或欺诈性获得或制作的，可以进行行政取消。该法第342条，8 U.S.C. § 1453 (2012)；8 C.F.R. §§ 342.1, 342.8 (2019)。 尽管归化证书是美国公民身份的证据，但如果非法获得，证书本身并不授予公民身份。见该法第338条，8 U.S.C. § 1449 (2012)。正如移民法官所认定，答辩人从一名后来因此方面的犯罪活动被定罪的前INS官员处“通过非法手段”获得了其归化证书。因此，

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respondent never properly completed the naturalization process, which requires filing an Application for Naturalization (Form N-400), taking an oath of allegiance at a public ceremony, and obtaining a valid Certificate of Naturalization to document the grant of United States citizenship. See Matter of Falodun, 27 I&N Dec. at 54; see also section 337(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (2012). As we stated in Matter of Falodun, a Certificate of Naturalization “cannot be [administratively] cancelled if it was issued to a person who lawfully filed an Application for Naturalization and proceeded through the entire naturalization process to the oath of allegiance.” Matter of Falodun, 27 I&N Dec. at 55–56 (citing section 340 of the Act). However, since the respondent obtained a Certificate of Naturalization without completing the statutorily prescribed naturalization process, he never lawfully naturalized, and his certificate was properly cancelled. See section 310(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1421(d) (2012); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 830 (1971) (observing that an alien has no right to naturalization unless all the statutory requirements are met); cf. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (“[T]here must be strict compliance with all the congressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship. Failure to comply with any of these conditions renders the certificate of citizenship ‘illegally procured,’ and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be set aside.”). In claiming that the cancellation of his Certificate of Naturalization was ineffective, the respondent cites section 342 of the Act, which provides that the cancellation of a Certificate of Naturalization does not affect “the citizenship status of the person in whose name the document was issued.” However, his reliance on that provision is misplaced. Since his Certificate of Naturalization was illegally obtained, he was never entitled to the citizenship status it purported to accord. See Matter of Falodun, 27 I&N Dec. at 55; cf. Matter of Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. 548, 551 (BIA 2003) (holding that an alien who acquired permanent resident status by fraud “is deemed, ab initio, never to have obtained [such] status”). We agree with the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent is removable from the United States under section 237(a)(3)(D) of the Act. We need not address his remaining contentions on appeal. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

答辩人从未正确完成归化程序，该程序要求提交归化申请（N-400表格）、在公开仪式上宣誓效忠，并获得有效的归化证书以记录美国公民身份的授予。见Matter of Falodun, 27 I&N Dec. at 54；另见该法第337(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (2012)。 正如我们在Matter of Falodun中所指出，归化证书“如果签发给合法提交归化申请并走完整个归化程序直至宣誓效忠的人，则不能[行政]取消。”Matter of Falodun, 27 I&N Dec. at 55–56（引用该法第340条）。然而，由于答辩人未完成法定归化程序即获得归化证书，他从未合法归化，其证书被适当取消。见该法第310(d)条，8 U.S.C. § 1421(d) (2012)；Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 830 (1971)（指出除非满足所有法定要求，外国人无权归化）；cf. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981)（“[必须]严格遵守国会施加的所有取得公民身份的先决条件。未能遵守任何这些条件使公民身份证书成为‘非法取得’，非法取得的归化可以被撤销。”）。 在声称其归化证书的取消无效时，答辩人引用了该法第342条，该条规定归化证书的取消不影响“证书以其名义签发的人的公民身份”。然而，他对该条款的依赖是错误的。由于其归化证书是非法获得的，他从未有权获得该证书所声称赋予的公民身份。见Matter of Falodun, 27 I&N Dec. at 55；cf. Matter of Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. 548, 551 (BIA 2003)（认定通过欺诈获得永久居民身份的外国人“被视为自始从未获得[此类]身份”）。 我们同意移民法官的认定，即答辩人根据该法第237(a)(3)(D)条可从美国被驱逐。我们无需处理其在上诉中的其余主张。见INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976)（per curiam）（“作为一般规则，法院和机构无需对解决其结果所不需要的问题作出认定。”）。因此，答辩人的上诉将被驳回。 命令：上诉驳回。

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