Matter of S-S-

Decided May 6 , 1997

1997年5月6日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

The respondent has filed a timely appeal from an Immigration Judge’s December 15, 1994, decision finding him deportable as charged and ineligi- ble for the requested relief of asylum and withholding of deportation. The appeal will be dismissed.

被申请人对移民法官1994年12月15日的决定及时提出上诉，该决定认定其可被驱逐出境，且不符合所请求的庇护和暂缓驱逐出境的救济资格。上诉将被驳回。

I. BACKGROUND

一、背景

The respondent is a 30-year-old native and citizen of Laos who entered the United States as a refugee in December 1988. In August 1993, he pleaded guilty to the offense of terrorism, a class “D” felony under Iowa law. The respondent received a suspended sentence for a prison term not to exceed 5

被申请人是30岁的老挝国民和公民，于1988年12月作为难民进入美国。1993年8月，他对恐怖主义罪行认罪，该罪在爱荷华州法律下属于“D”级重罪。被申请人获得刑期不超过5年的监禁缓刑，

years, and 2 years’ probation. In September 1993, he was charged with deportability under section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and National- ity Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993), as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, as an aggravated felon. At the deportation hearing on December 15, 1994, the Immigration Judge sustained both charges of deportability. He held that the respondent’s indeterminate sentence was, in legal effect, a sentence for the maximum term imposed, 5 years. Moreover, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent’s aggravated felony conviction made him stat- utorily ineligible for either asylum or withholding of deportation. The respondent’s appeal ensued.

以及2年缓刑。1993年9月，他根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(A)(i)条、《美国法典》第8编第1251(a)(2)(A)(i)节（Supp. V 1993），作为被判犯有涉及道德败坏罪行的外国人被指控可被驱逐出境，并根据该法第241(a)(2)(A)(iii)条作为加重重罪犯被指控。在1994年12月15日的驱逐出境听证会上，移民法官维持了这两项驱逐出境指控。他裁定，被申请人的不确定刑期在法律上即为所判处的最高刑期5年的刑罚。此外，移民法官认为，被申请人的加重重罪定罪使其依法不符合庇护或暂缓驱逐出境的资格。被申请人随后提出上诉。

II. DEPORTABILITY

二、可驱逐性

The respondent’s first claim of error on appeal relates to the Immigration Judge’s deportability finding. He argues that his suspended sentence for an indeterminate term not to exceed 5 years cannot properly be deemed a sen- tence of “a year or longer” for purposes of deportability as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, or “at least five years” for purposes of deportability as an aggravated felon as defined in section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (1994).1 In addressing these arguments, our first task is to determine the source of law that will govern in order to decide whether the sentence requirements at issue have been satisfied. While the respondent’s appeal was pending before this Board, section 101(a)(48)(B) of the Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B)) was created by section 322(a)(1) of the Illegal Immigra- tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 (enacted Sept. 30, 1996) (“IIRIRA”). This amendment provides, in pertinent part:

被申请人在上诉中的第一个错误主张涉及移民法官的可驱逐性认定。他辩称，其刑期不超过5年的不确定刑期的缓刑，不能适当地被视为作为被判犯有涉及道德败坏罪行的外国人可被驱逐出境目的下的“一年或以上”的刑罚，也不能被视为作为该法第101(a)(43)(F)条、《美国法典》第8编第1101(a)(43)(F)节（1994年）所定义的加重重罪犯可被驱逐出境目的下的“至少五年”的刑罚。1 在处理这些论点时，我们的首要任务是确定将适用的法律来源，以决定所涉刑罚要求是否已得到满足。在被申请人的上诉待决于本委员会期间，该法第101(a)(48)(B)条（将编入《美国法典》第8编第1101(a)(48)(B)节）由《1996年非法移民改革和移民责任法》第322(a)(1)条创设，该法为第104-208号公法C部分，110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628（1996年9月30日颁布）（“IIRIRA”）。该修正案的相关部分规定：

IIRIRA § 322(a)(1). There is relevant legislative history on this provision. According to the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, Congress’ specific purpose in enacting section 322(a)(1) of the IIRIRA was to overturn prior administrative precedent holding that a sentence is not “actually imposed” when the court has suspended the “imposition” of the sentence. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, available in 1996 WL 563320, at 495-97. See generally Matter of Esposito, 21 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1995); Matter of Castro, 19 I&N Dec. 692 (BIA 1988). Section 322(c) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-629, contains the express effective date for section 322(a). It states, in pertinent part, that the “amend- ments made by subsection (a) shall apply to convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.” We accordingly find that section 322(a) of the IIRIRA took effect on Sep- tember 30, 1996, the date of the IIRIRA’s enactment. See id. See generally Matter of N-J-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 812 (BIA 1997); Matter of Yeung, 21 I&N Dec. 610 (BIA 1996). We find further that section 101(a)(48)(B) of the Act, as created by section 322(a)(1) of the IIRIRA, applies to the respondent’s pending deportation case, even though it was not in effect at the time of the Immigration Judge’s decision.2 In applying section 101(a)(48)(B) of the Act to determine whether the respondent’s sentence satisfies the imprisonment components of the deporta- tion charges, we begin by noting that the fact that his sentence was suspended is irrelevant to the analysis, as is the length of time actually served, if any. This is so even if the “imposition” of that sentence was suspended, as is asserted on appeal. Rather, the only relevant inquiry is the term to which the respondent was sentenced by the court. In this case, the respondent was ordered committed to the custody of the Iowa Department of Corrections for a term not to exceed 5 years. Under Iowa sentencing law, an incarcerated individual remains in the custody of the director of the Department of Corrections until the maximum term of the per- son’s confinement has been completed or until released by order of the Board of Parole, unless the sentencing judge reconsiders the sentence within 90 days from the date the individual begins to serve the sentence of confine- ment. Iowa Code Ann. §§ 902.3, 902.4, 902.6 (West 1996); see also State v. Kulish, 148 N.W.2d 428 (1967) (finding that, under Iowa law, the ultimate determination of the length of sentence within the statutory maximum rests

IIRIRA第322(a)(1)条。 关于该条款有相关的立法历史。根据会议委员会联合解释声明，国会颁布IIRIRA第322(a)(1)条的具体目的是推翻先前行政先例，该先例认为当法院缓期“宣告”刑罚时，刑罚并非“实际判处”。参见H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, available in 1996 WL 563320, at 495-97。一般参见Matter of Esposito, 21 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1995)；Matter of Castro, 19 I&N Dec. 692 (BIA 1988)。 IIRIRA第322(c)条，110 Stat. at 3009-629，包含第322(a)条的明确生效日期。其相关部分规定，“(a)小节所作的修订应适用于本法颁布之日之前、当日或之后作出的定罪和刑罚。” 我们因此认定，IIRIRA第322(a)条于1996年9月30日，即IIRIRA颁布之日生效。参见同上。一般参见Matter of N-J-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 812 (BIA 1997)；Matter of Yeung, 21 I&N Dec. 610 (BIA 1996)。我们进一步认定，由IIRIRA第322(a)(1)条创设的该法第101(a)(48)(B)条适用于被申请人待决的驱逐出境案件，即使它在移民法官作出决定时尚未生效。2 在适用该法第101(a)(48)(B)条确定被申请人的刑罚是否满足驱逐出境指控的监禁组成部分时，我们首先指出，其刑罚被缓期这一事实与分析无关，实际服刑时间（如有）的长度也无关。即使该刑罚的“宣告”被缓期，如上诉中所主张，也是如此。相反，唯一相关的调查是法院对被申请人判处的刑期。 在本案中，被申请人被命令交由爱荷华州惩教署羁押，刑期不超过5年。根据爱荷华州量刑法律，被监禁的个人在最高监禁刑期完成之前或假释委员会命令释放之前，一直处于惩教署署长的羁押之下，除非量刑法官在个人开始服监禁刑之日起90天内重新考虑刑罚。爱荷华州注释法典第902.3、902.4、902.6节（West 1996）；另见State v. Kulish, 148 N.W.2d 428 (1967)（认定根据爱荷华州法律，在法定最高刑期内对刑期长度的最终确定取决于

with the parole board). There is no indication that the respondent’s sentence has been reconsidered pursuant to the time period allotted by the statute. We agree with the Immigration Judge that the term to which the respon- dent was sentenced by the court was for the maximum potential term, 5 years. See Nguyen v. INS, 53 F.3d 310 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding that it was rea- sonable and permissible for the Board to measure an indeterminate sentence by the maximum term of imprisonment for purposes of section 101(a)(43) of the Act); see also Pichardo v. INS, 104 F.3d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1997); Matter of D-, 20 I&N Dec. 827, 829 (BIA 1994); Matter of Chen, 10 I&N Dec. 671 (BIA 1964); Matter of Ohnhauser, 10 I&N Dec. 501 (BIA 1964); Matter of R-, 1 I&N Dec. 540 (BIA 1943); Matter of R-, 1 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 1942). We thus find that the respondent’s prison sentence satisfies the imprisonment components of both deportation charges. The respondent also asserts on the Notice of Appeal that the Immigration Judge improperly characterized his offense as a “crime of violence” under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act. He does not develop this argument in his appeal brief, apart from stating that the crime occurred when his mental capacity was in a “reduced” state. In order to determine whether the crime of terrorism is a crime of violence, we look to the statutory definition, not the facts underlying the conviction.3 See Matter of B-, 21 I&N Dec. 287 (BIA 1996); see also United States v. Moore, 38 F.3d 977 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bauer, 990 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1992). We agree with the Immigration Judge that the offense of terrorism, in violation of section 708.6 of the Iowa Code Anno- tated, is a felony involving a substantial risk that physical force may be used against the victim. Thus, the respondent’s offense is a “crime of violence,” as defined in the Act, and therefore constitutes an aggravated felony under sec- tion 101(a)(43) of the Act. In sum, we uphold the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent is deportable as charged under sections 241(a)(2)(A)(i) and (iii) of the Act, as having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and an aggra- vated felony.

与假释委员会）。没有迹象表明，依据法规所分配的期限，对受访者的刑罚进行了重新考虑。我们同意移民法官的意见，即法院对受访者判处的刑期是最高可能刑期，5年。参见 Nguyen v. INS, 53 F.3d 310 (10th Cir. 1995)（认定委员会为《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(43)条之目的以最高监禁刑期衡量不定期刑是合理且允许的）；另参见 Pichardo v. INS, 104 F.3d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1997)；Matter of D-, 20 I&N Dec. 827, 829 (BIA 1994)；Matter of Chen, 10 I&N Dec. 671 (BIA 1964)；Matter of Ohnhauser, 10 I&N Dec. 501 (BIA 1964)；Matter of R-, 1 I&N Dec. 540 (BIA 1943)；Matter of R-, 1 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 1942)。因此，我们认定受访者的监禁刑期满足两项驱逐指控中的监禁要件。 受访者还在上诉通知中主张，移民法官将其罪行不当定性为《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(43)(F)条下的“暴力犯罪”。他在上诉状中未展开这一论点，仅称该犯罪发生在其精神状态处于“减弱”状态时。为确定恐怖主义犯罪是否属于暴力犯罪，我们依据法定定义，而非定罪所依据的事实。3 参见 Matter of B-, 21 I&N Dec. 287 (BIA 1996)；另参见 United States v. Moore, 38 F.3d 977 (8th Cir. 1994)；United States v. Bauer, 990 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1993)；United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1992)。我们同意移民法官的意见，即违反《爱荷华州注释法典》第708.6条的恐怖主义罪行是一项重罪，涉及对受害人可能使用身体力量的重大风险。因此，受访者的罪行属于《移民与国籍法》所定义的“暴力犯罪”，从而构成《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(43)条下的加重重罪。 总之，我们维持移民法官的认定，即受访者因被判犯有涉及道德败坏的犯罪和加重重罪，依据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(A)(i)和(iii)条，如所指控应予驱逐。

III. RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION

三、免于驱逐的救济

The respondent’s remaining claim of error relates to the Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum and withholding of deportation. He asserts, among other things, that his status as an aggravated felon should not bar him from receiving these forms of relief. We disagree.

受访者剩余的错误主张涉及移民法官驳回庇护和暂缓驱逐。他主张，除其他事项外，其加重重罪身份不应妨碍其获得这些形式的救济。我们不同意。

Since the respondent qualifies as an aggravated felon, he is per se barred from applying for asylum. Section 208(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (1994); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(d)(4) (1996).4 Moreover, as the respon- dent’s sentence for the aggravated felony conviction was for a term of at least 5 years, he is conclusively disqualified from withholding of deportation. See 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,343-44 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(2),(3)) (interim, effective Apr. 1, 1997); see also Matter of Q-T-M-T-, 21 I&N Dec. 639 (BIA 1996); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (1996). ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

由于受访者符合加重重罪人的资格，其当然被禁止申请庇护。《移民与国籍法》第208(d)条，8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (1994)；另参见 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(d)(4) (1996)。4 此外，由于受访者因加重重罪定罪被判处的刑期为至少5年，其被终局性地取消暂缓驱逐的资格。参见 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,343-44（将编入 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(2),(3)）（临时规定，1997年4月1日生效）；另参见 Matter of Q-T-M-T-, 21 I&N Dec. 639 (BIA 1996)；8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (1996)。 命令： 上诉驳回。