Matter of D-K-

Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 761 (BIA 2012) Interim Decision #3747

引用为 25 I&N Dec. 761 (BIA 2012) 临时决定 #3747

Decided April 12, 2012

2012年4月12日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室

Board of Immigration Appeals

移民上诉委员会

(1) An alien who is a refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,

(1) 根据《移民与国籍法》第207条，

8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2006), and has not adjusted status to that of a lawful permanent resident may be placed in removal proceedings without a prior determination by the Department of Homeland Security that the alien is inadmissible to the United States. Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I&N Dec. 407 (BIA 1986), distinguished.

8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2006)，属于难民且尚未调整身份为合法永久居民的外国人，可以在国土安全部事先未裁定该外国人不准入境美国的情况下，被置于遣返程序中。Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I&N Dec. 407 (BIA 1986)，予以区分。

(2) When removal proceedings are initiated against an alien who has been “admitted” to the

(2) 当针对已作为难民“获准入境”美国的外国人启动遣返程序时，

United States as a refugee, the charges of removability must be under section 237 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006), rather than section 212 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006).

遣返可移除性的指控必须依据该法第237条，8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006)，而非该法第212条，8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006)。

FOR RESPONDENT: Kara Hartzler, Esquire, Florence, Arizona

代表 respondent：Kara Hartzler 律师，亚利桑那州弗洛伦斯

FORTHEDEPARTMENTOFHOMELANDSECURITY: VictoriaLevin,AssistantChief Counsel

代表国土安全部：Victoria Levin，助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: COLE, PAULEY, and WENDTLAND, Board Members.

审理：委员会小组：COLE、PAULEY 和 WENDTLAND，委员会成员。

PAULEY, Board Member:

PAULEY，委员会成员：

The respondent, who is a refugee, has appealed from the June 2, 2011, decision of the Immigration Judge finding him removable, denying his applications for relief, and ordering him removed from the United States. We hold that a refugee who has not adjusted status to that of a lawful permanent resident may be placed in removal proceedings without a prior determination bythe Department of Homeland Security(“DHS”) that the alien is inadmissible to the United States. However, we also determine that because such an alien was “admitted” to the United States as a refugee, he or she must be charged in the notice to appear under section 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006), rather than section 212 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006). The appeal will be sustained in part and dismissed in part, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings.

respondent 是一名难民，对移民法官2011年6月2日的决定提出上诉，该决定认定他可被遣返，驳回其救济申请，并命令将其遣返美国。我们认定，尚未调整身份为合法永久居民的难民，可以在国土安全部（“DHS”）事先未裁定该外国人不准入境美国的情况下，被置于遣返程序中。然而，我们也判定，由于此类外国人作为难民“获准入境”美国，因此必须在出庭通知中依据《移民与国籍法》第237条，8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006)，而非该法第212条，8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006) 对其提出指控。上诉部分获准，部分驳回，案件记录将发回移民法官进一步审理。

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. 事实与程序历史

The respondent is a native and citizen of Macedonia who entered the United States as a refugee on March 16, 1998. The record reflects that he applied for adjustment of status with the DHS in 2005 but that after his interview, he failed to submit documentation requested regarding his criminal history, so his application was denied on May 12, 2006. On June 22, 2009, the respondent was convicted of distribution of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public secondary school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860 (2006), for which he was sentenced to 24 months in prison.

respondent 是马其顿国民和公民，于1998年3月16日作为难民进入美国。记录显示，他于2005年向DHS申请调整身份，但在面谈后，他未能提交所要求的关于其犯罪历史的文件，因此其申请于2006年5月12日被拒。2009年6月22日，respondent 因违反21 U.S.C. § 860 (2006)，在公立中学1000英尺范围内分销可卡因而被定罪，并被判处24个月监禁。

On October 8, 2010, the DHS issued a notice to appear charging that the respondent is an alien who has been admitted but is removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act based on his conviction for an aggravated felony relating to the illicit trafficking of a controlled substance under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006). However, on January 13, 2011, the DHS withdrew the charge and filed a Form I-261 (Additional Charges of Inadmissibility/Deportability) with the Immigration Court charging that the respondent is inadmissible under sections 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and a controlled substance violation. The DHS filed a second Form I-261 on May 3, 2011, charging the respondent under section 212(a)(2)(C) of the Act as an alien who the consular officer or Attorney General knows or has reason to believe is a controlled substance trafficker.

2010年10月8日，DHS签发了一份出庭通知，指控 respondent 是一名已获准入境但根据该法第237(a)(2)(A)(iii)条可被遣返的外国人，依据是其因涉及该法第101(a)(43)(B)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006) 所规定的非法贩运管制物质的重罪而被定罪。然而，2011年1月13日，DHS撤回了该指控，并向移民法院提交了I-261表格（额外的不准入境/可驱逐性指控），指控 respondent 根据该法第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)和(II)条不准入境，理由是其为涉及道德败坏犯罪和管制物质违规而被定罪的外国人。DHS于2011年5月3日提交了第二份I-261表格，根据该法第212(a)(2)(C)条指控 respondent 为领事官员或司法部长知道或有理由相信是管制物质贩运者的外国人。

The Immigration Judge sustained all three charges lodged under section 212 of the Act, found the respondent statutorily ineligible for both a waiver under section 209(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2006), and adjustment of status, and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46. 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988) (“Convention Against Torture”).

移民法官维持了根据该法第212条提出的所有三项指控，认定 respondent 根据该法第209(c)条，8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2006) 的豁免和调整身份在法定上均不合格，并驳回了其庇护、暂缓遣返以及根据《禁止酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚公约》（1984年12月10日通过并开放供签署，G.A. Res. 39/46. 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984)（1987年6月26日生效；对美国1988年4月18日生效）（“《禁止酷刑公约》”）的申请。

On appeal, the respondent asserts that the Immigration Judge should have terminated his removal proceedings. First, he argues that the Immigration Judge did not have jurisdiction over these proceedings because in Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I&N Dec. 407 (BIA 1986), we held that an alien who is a refugee maynot be placed in immigration proceedings until there is a prior determination bythe DHS that the alien is inadmissible to the United States for purposes of adjustment of status. Second, he contends that since the notice to appear alleges that he was “admitted” to the United States as a refugee, he was improperly charged under the inadmissibility provisions of section 212 of the Act.

在上诉中，respondent 主张移民法官本应终止其遣返程序。首先，他辩称移民法官对这些程序没有管辖权，因为在 Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I&N Dec. 407 (BIA 1986) 中，我们裁定难民外国人不得被置于移民程序中，除非DHS事先裁定该外国人为调整身份目的不准入境美国。其次，他主张，由于出庭通知声称他作为难民“获准入境”美国，因此根据该法第212条的不准入境规定对其提出指控不当。

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II. ANALYSIS

II. 分析

Section 207(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (2006), states that the Attorney General may admit any refugee who is not firmly resettled in any foreign country, is determined to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and is admissible as an immigrant. Refugee status may be terminated under section 207(c)(4) of the Act if the Attorney General determines that at the time of the alien’s admission he or she was not, in fact, a “refugee” as defined by the Act.1 See 8 C.F.R. § 207.9 (2011).

该法第207(c)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (2006) 规定，司法部长可以接纳任何未在任何外国牢固安置、被认定对美国具有特殊人道主义关切且可作为移民入境的外国人。如果司法部长认定在外国人入境时其事实上并非该法所定义的“难民”，则可根据该法第207(c)(4)条终止难民身份。1 见 8 C.F.R. § 207.9 (2011)。

Furthermore,undertheadjustmentofstatusproceduresatsection209(a)(1) of the Act, an alien whose refugee status has not been terminated and who has been physically present in the United States for at least 1 year shall return or be returned to the custody of the DHS for inspection and examination for admission as an immigrant. See also 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a)(1) (2011). If the alien is found to be admissible, he or she shall be regarded as a lawful permanent resident as of the date of his or her arrival in the United States. Section 209(a)(2) of the Act. However, if the alien is found inadmissible, he or she may renew the application for adjustment of status before an Immigration Judge during removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). See 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(e).

此外，根据该法第209(a)(1)条的调整身份程序，难民身份未被终止且已在美国实际居留至少1年的外国人，应返回或被执行返回DHS监管，以作为移民入境进行检查和审查。另见 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a)(1) (2011)。如果该外国人被认定可入境，则其应被视为自抵达美国之日起为合法永久居民。该法第209(a)(2)条。然而，如果该外国人被认定不准入境，其可以在根据该法第240条，8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006) 的遣返程序中向移民法官重新提出调整身份申请。见 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(e)。

In this case, neither party maintains on appeal that the respondent was not a refugee under section 101(a)(42) of the Act at the time he was admitted in 1998. Rather, the respondent relies on Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray to argue that the DHS was required to make an inadmissibility determination before placing him in removal proceedings. The respondent contends that although the DHS denied his application for adjustment of status, the denial was based on his failure to provide additional documentation, not his inadmissibility to the United States.

在本案中，双方在上诉中均不主张 respondent 在1998年获准入境时不是该法第101(a)(42)条所规定的难民。相反，respondent 依据 Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray 主张，DHS在将其置于遣返程序之前必须作出不准入境裁定。respondent 主张，尽管DHS拒绝了他的调整身份申请，但拒绝是基于他未能提供额外文件，而非其不准入境美国。

A. Inadmissibility Determinations by the DHS

A. DHS的不准入境裁定

In Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, we found that the alien’s exclusion proceedings were improperlycommenced because, prior to their initiation, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service failed to terminate the alien’s

在 Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray 中，我们认定该外国人的驱逐程序启动不当，因为在启动之前，前移民和归化局未能终止该外国人的

1 A “refugee” is defined under section 101(a)(42) of the Act, in part, as

1 “难民”根据该法第101(a)(42)条部分定义为

any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

任何身处其国籍国之外的人……且因种族、宗教、国籍、特定社会团体成员身份或政治观点而遭受迫害或有充分理由畏惧迫害，无法或不愿返回该国，或无法或不愿利用该国的保护。

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refugee status or determine him to be inadmissible as an immigrant after examination under oath by an immigration officer pursuant to the Act and the regulations. In that case we addressed the original implementing regulations for section 209(a) of the Act, which was enacted as part of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. At that time the regulations provided that after 1 year, refugees were to appear before an immigration officer for examination under oath to determine their eligibility for permanent residence. 8 C.F.R. §§ 209.1(a)(1), (b) (1986). However, these regulations have since been amended to streamline the adjustment process, making the decision whether to interview a refugee seeking permanent resident status a discretionary determination for the DHS. See 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(d) (1999); see also Adjustment of Status of Refugees and Asylees; Processing Under Direct Mail Program, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,105, 30,109 (June 3, 1998). Consequently,wearenotpersuadedbytherespondent’sargumentsthatMatter of Garcia-Alzugaray is determinative here.2

难民身份，或根据该法和法规在移民官员宣誓审查后裁定其作为移民不准入境。在该案中，我们讨论了该法第209(a)条的最初实施条例，该条是作为1980年《难民法》的一部分颁布的，Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102。当时条例规定，1年后，难民应到移民官员面前接受宣誓审查，以确定其永久居留资格。8 C.F.R. §§ 209.1(a)(1), (b) (1986)。然而，这些条例此后经过修订以简化调整程序，使得是否面谈寻求永久居民身份的难民成为DHS的酌情决定。见 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(d) (1999)；另见 Adjustment of Status of Refugees and Asylees; Processing Under Direct Mail Program, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,105, 30,109 (June 3, 1998)。因此，我们不被 respondent 关于 Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray 在此具有决定性的论点所说服。2

Furthermore, neither section 209 of the Act nor the regulations explicitly state that termination of refugee status is necessary before an alien is placed in removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act. In Matter of Smriko, 23 I&N Dec. 836, 837 (BIA 2005), we ruled that a refugee who had adjusted status could be placed in removal proceedings even though his status as a refugee was never terminated. Specifically, we found that 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(e) (2005) did not require termination of refugee status before the commencement of removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act. Id. at 839-40. Thus, interpreting the language of the Act and the regulations, we concluded in Matter of Smriko that Congress did not consider termination of refugee status to be a prerequisite to the initiation of removal proceedings against refugees. 23 I&N Dec. at 838. Moreover, in Kaganovich v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2006), the United States Court of Appeals for the

此外，该法第209条和条例均未明确规定在根据该法第240条将外国人置于遣返程序之前必须终止难民身份。在 Matter of Smriko, 23 I&N Dec. 836, 837 (BIA 2005) 中，我们裁定已调整身份的难民可以被置于遣返程序中，即使其难民身份从未被终止。具体而言，我们认定 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(e) (2005) 不要求在根据该法第240条启动遣返程序之前终止难民身份。Id. at 839-40。因此，在解释该法和条例的语言时，我们在 Matter of Smriko 中得出结论，国会不认为终止难民身份是针对难民启动遣返程序的前提条件。23 I&N Dec. at 838。此外，在 Kaganovich v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2006) 中，美国第九巡回上诉法院

2 Although the respondent cites to an unpublished Board decision in which we applied Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, that alien was in exclusion proceedings, and unpublished decisions do not constitute binding precedent. See Matter of Echeverria, 25 I&N Dec. 512, 519 (BIA 2011); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2011) (“By majority vote of the permanent Board members, selected decisions of the Board rendered by a three-member panel . . . may be designated to serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.”). The respondent also cites Romanishyn v. Attorney General of the United States, 455 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2006), in support of his argument that he is not subject to removal proceedings. However, that case was issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which does not have jurisdiction here, and it does not squarely address the issue raised by the respondent, namely, whether a refugee may be placed in removal proceedings without a prior finding of inadmissibility by the DHS.

2 尽管 respondent 引用了 Board 的一份未公布裁决，其中我们适用了 Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray，但该外国人当时处于 exclusion proceedings 中，且未公布裁决不构成具有约束力的先例。See Matter of Echeverria, 25 I&N Dec. 512, 519 (BIA 2011); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2011)（“经常任 Board 成员多数票，由三名成员组成的合议庭作出的选定裁决……可以被指定为在涉及同一问题或诸问题的所有程序中作为先例。”）。respondent 还引用了 Romanishyn v. Attorney General of the United States, 455 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2006)，以支持其不受 removal proceedings 约束的主张。然而，该案由 United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 作出，该法院在此无管辖权，且该案并未直接处理 respondent 提出的问题，即难民是否可以在 DHS 事先未认定不可入境的情况下被置于 removal proceedings 中。

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Ninth Circuit, which has jurisdiction over the respondent’s case, deferred to our interpretation of the Act and regulations in Matter of Smriko.

对 respondent 案件有管辖权的 Ninth Circuit 遵从了我们在 Matter of Smriko 中对《移民与国籍法》及条例的解释。

On appeal, the respondent does not dispute that an alien who is a refugee may be placed in removal proceedings without the prior termination of his or her refugee status. Instead, he argues that because Smriko and Kaganovich were refugees who had adjusted status, which he has not, their removal proceedings were proper since the DHS had previouslyfound them admissible to the United States in granting them permanent resident status. However, neither Smriko nor Kaganovich holds that an admissibility determination by the DHS is a preliminary step to the initiation of removal proceedings. Furthermore, we observed in Matter of Smriko that section 239 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2000), which governs the commencement of removal proceedings, refers to “the alien” and does not distinguish between aliens who are refugees and other aliens. 23 I&N Dec. at 838.

在上诉中，respondent 不争辩作为难民的外国人可以在其难民身份事先终止之前被置于 removal proceedings 中。相反，他主张，由于 Smriko 和 Kaganovich 是已调整身份的难民，而他尚未调整身份，他们的 removal proceedings 是适当的，因为 DHS 在授予他们永久居民身份时已先前认定他们可入境美国。然而，Smriko 和 Kaganovich 均未裁定 DHS 的可入境性认定是启动 removal proceedings 的前置步骤。此外，我们在 Matter of Smriko 中指出，《移民与国籍法》第 239 条，8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2000)，该条规范 removal proceedings 的启动，提及的是“the alien”，并未区分作为难民的外国人与其他外国人。23 I&N Dec. at 838。

Accordingly,weconcludethatremovalproceedingswereproperlyinitiated against the respondent without a prior determination by the DHS that he was inadmissible to the United States and that the Immigration Judge therefore had jurisdiction to adjudicate these proceedings. The respondent’s appeal in this regard will be dismissed.

因此，我们认定，在 DHS 事先未认定 respondent 不可入境美国的情况下，对 respondent 启动 removal proceedings 是适当的，移民法官因此有管辖权裁决这些程序。respondent 就此提出的上诉将被驳回。

B. Removal Charges Under Section 212 of the Act

B. 根据《移民与国籍法》第 212 条提出的 removal 指控

Although it was appropriate for the DHS to initiate removal proceedings, we agree with the respondent that he was improperly charged in the notice to appear with inadmissibility under section 212 of the Act. We hold that because the respondent was “admitted” to the United States as a refugee, any charges should have been brought under thegroundsof deportabilityinsection 237.

尽管 DHS 启动 removal proceedings 是适当的，但我们同意 respondent 的主张，即其在出庭通知中被不当指控为根据《移民与国籍法》第 212 条不可入境。我们认定，由于 respondent 作为难民被“admitted”进入美国，任何指控本应根据第 237 条的可驱逐理由提出。

Section 237(a) of the Act states that any alien in and “admitted” to the United States shall be removed if the alien falls within one or more specific enumerated classes of deportable aliens.3 Under section 101(a)(13)(A), the terms “admission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” The burden is on the DHS to show by clear and convincing evidence

《移民与国籍法》第 237(a) 条规定，任何在并“admitted”进入美国的外国人，如果属于一个或多个具体列举的可驱逐外国人类别，则应被驱逐。3 根据第 101(a)(13)(A) 条，“admission”和“admitted”被定义为“外国人在移民官员检查并授权后合法进入美国”。DHS 负有以明确且令人信服的证据证明

3 The requirement that an alien be “admitted” to the United States in order to be subject to the deportability grounds was added to the statute by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (“IIRIRA”), for proceedings commenced on or after April 1, 1997. Prior to enactment of the IIRIRA, the deportation grounds, which then appeared at former section 241 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994), provided only for applicability to aliens “in” the United States.

3 要求外国人必须“admitted”进入美国才受可驱逐理由约束的规定，是由《1996年非法移民改革和移民责任法》，Pub. L. No. 104-208 的 C 部分，110 Stat. 3009-546（“IIRIRA”），针对 1997 年 4 月 1 日或之后启动的程序添加到该法规中的。在 IIRIRA 颁布之前，当时位于《移民与国籍法》原第 241 条，8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994) 的驱逐理由，仅规定适用于“在”美国的外国人。

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that an alien who has been admitted to the United States is deportable. Section 240(c)(3)(A) of the Act.

已获准进入美国的外国人可被驱逐。《移民与国籍法》第 240(c)(3)(A) 条。

With regard to refugees, the language of both the Act and the regulations states that they are “admitted” to the United States. Section 207(a) of the Act addresses the annual “admission” of refugees into the United States. Section 207(c)(1) indicates that the Attorney General may “admit” refugees to the United States in his discretion, and section 207(c)(3) provides for a waiver of inadmissibility for aliens seeking “admission” to the United States as refugees. Moreover, section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act discusses parole of aliens into the United States and states that it “shall not be regarded as an admission,” and section 212(d)(5)(B) provides that an alien who is a refugee may not be paroled unless there are compelling reasons in the public interest requiring that he or she be paroled, rather than “admitted” as a refugee under section 207 of the Act.

关于难民，《移民与国籍法》和条例的措辞均规定他们被“admitted”进入美国。《移民与国籍法》第 207(a) 条涉及难民每年“admission”进入美国。第 207(c)(1) 条表明司法部长可以酌情“admit”难民进入美国，第 207(c)(3) 条规定对寻求作为难民“admission”进入美国的外国人豁免不可入境。此外，《移民与国籍法》第 212(d)(5)(A) 条讨论外国人假释进入美国，并规定其“shall not be regarded as an admission”，第 212(d)(5)(B) 条规定作为难民的外国人不得被假释，除非有符合公共利益的令人信服的理由要求其被假释，而非根据《移民与国籍法》第 207 条作为难民被“admitted”。

Under the regulations, an alien who believes he or she is a refugee may applyfor “admission” to the United States byfiling a Form I-590 (Registration for Classification as Refugee) with the DHS or consular office in the area where he or she is located. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 207.1(a), 207.2(a) (2011). The overseas office is then delegated authority to determine the alien’s admissibility as an immigrant. See 8 C.F.R. § 207.3 (2011). Although an initial admissibility determination may be more lenient for refugees than it is for other aliens because some of the inadmissibility provisions are not applicable to refugees and others may be waived under section 207(c)(3), the Act and the regulations still contemplate that refugees are “admitted” to the United States, albeit in the Attorney General’s discretion. Thereafter, an approved Form I-590 allows the alien to be “admitted” conditionally as a refugee at a port of entry in the United States within 4 months of the date the form is approved. See 8 C.F.R. § 207.4 (2011). Finally, an alien who is “admitted” as a refugee must accrue 1 year of physical presence within the United States from the date he or she entered before applying for adjustment of status under section 209(a)(1) of the Act. See 8 C.F.R. § 207.8 (2011).

根据条例，认为自己为难民的外国人可以通过向其所在地区的 DHS 或领事办公室提交 Form I-590（Registration for Classification as Refugee）申请“admission”进入美国。See 8 C.F.R. §§ 207.1(a), 207.2(a) (2011)。海外办公室随后被授权确定该外国人作为移民的可入境性。See 8 C.F.R. § 207.3 (2011)。尽管对难民的可入境性初步认定可能比其他外国人更宽松，因为某些不可入境条款不适用于难民，其他条款可根据第 207(c)(3) 条豁免，但《移民与国籍法》和条例仍设想难民被“admitted”进入美国，尽管是依司法部长的酌情权。此后，经批准的 Form I-590 允许该外国人在该表批准之日起 4 个月内在美国入境口岸作为难民有条件地被“admitted”。See 8 C.F.R. § 207.4 (2011)。最后，作为难民被“admitted”的外国人必须在申请《移民与国籍法》第 209(a)(1) 条下的调整身份之前，自其入境之日起在美国境内累积 1 年的实际居留。See 8 C.F.R. § 207.8 (2011)。

Prior to 1997, the regulations stated that upon termination of an alien’s refugee status or a determination that he or she is inadmissible, the alien was subject to exclusion proceedings under former sections 235, 236, and 237 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226, and 1227 (1994). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 207.8, 209.1(a) (1997); see also Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,337, 10,346 (Mar. 6, 1997). However, in their current form, the regulations provide that upon termination of refugee status, the alien is to be placed in removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act, without regard to whether the alien should be charged under section 212 or section 237 of the Act. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 207.9, 209.1(e).

在 1997 年之前，条例规定，在外国人的难民身份终止或认定其不可入境后，该外国人须根据《移民与国籍法》原第 235、236 和 237 条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226, and 1227 (1994)，接受 exclusion proceedings。See 8 C.F.R. §§ 207.8, 209.1(a) (1997); see also Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,337, 10,346 (Mar. 6, 1997)。然而，在其现行形式中，条例规定，难民身份终止后，该外国人应根据《移民与国籍法》第 240 条被置于 removal proceedings 中，而不论该外国人应根据《移民与国籍法》第 212 条还是第 237 条被指控。See 8 C.F.R. §§ 207.9, 209.1(e)。

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In Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373, 374 n.4 (A.G. 2002), the Attorney General stated in a footnote that the alien, who was a refugee, was not paroled or permanently admitted into the United States and that she was conditionally admitted as a refugee, thereby deferring her admissibility inspection and examination by Federal immigration officials. See 8 C.F.R. § 207.4. As support for this footnote, the Attorney General cited Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I&N Dec. at 408-10. There, we had noted that under prior versions of the Act, refugees had “conditional entrant” status but that in enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress replaced this with refugee status, thus allowing refugees conditional admission for later adjustment to permanent residence, and it specifically rejected prior proposed Senate language that would have admitted refugees as lawful permanent residents upon entry. Id. at 408. As a result, while Jean’s inspection and examination for lawful permanent resident status may have been deferred for 1 year, we do not read the AttorneyGeneral’s footnote or Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray as a pronouncement that inspection and authorization by an immigration officer did not precede the respondent’s initial admission as a refugee under section 207(c)(1) of the Act.4

在 Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373, 374 n.4 (A.G. 2002) 中，司法部长在脚注中表示，该外国人作为难民，未被假释或永久准入美国，而是作为难民有条件准入，从而推迟了联邦移民官员对其进行的可入境性检查和审查。See 8 C.F.R. § 207.4。作为该脚注的支持，司法部长引用了 Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I&N Dec. at 408-10。在该案中，我们曾指出，根据《移民与国籍法》的先前版本，难民具有“conditional entrant”身份，但在颁布《1980年难民法》时，国会以难民身份取代了这一身份，从而允许难民有条件准入以便日后调整为永久居民，并且国会明确拒绝了先前拟议的参议院措辞，该措辞本会允许难民在入境时作为 lawful permanent residents 准入。Id. at 408。因此，尽管 Jean 的 lawful permanent resident 身份检查和审查可能被推迟了 1 年，但我们不将司法部长的脚注或 Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray 解读为宣告移民官员的检查和授权未先于 respondent 根据《移民与国籍法》第 207(c)(1) 条作为难民的初始准入。4

We acknowledge the conditional nature of a refugee’s status. However, the fact that a refugee admission is impermanent and subject to contingencies does not resolve the question whether it nevertheless qualifies as a kind of “admission” for purposes of the applicability of the deportability grounds at section 237(a) of the Act. That question was not resolved in either Matter of Jean—in which the applicability of the inadmissibility grounds was not contested, see supra note 4—or Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray—which applied previous statutory and regulatory provisions that did not yet focus on the concept of “admission” and that (in the case of the regulations) expressly provided that aliens whose refugee status had been terminated were subject to exclusion proceedings.

我们承认难民身份的有条件性质。然而，难民准入是不永久的且受制于或有事项这一事实，并不能解决其是否仍构成一种“admission”从而适用《移民与国籍法》第 237(a) 条可驱逐理由的问题。该问题在 Matter of Jean——其中不可入境理由的适用性未被质疑，见上文脚注 4——或 Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray——其适用了尚未聚焦于“admission”概念的先前法定和条例规定，并且（就条例而言）明确规定难民身份已终止的外国人须接受 exclusion proceedings——中均未得到解决。

We also recognize that the concept of a “conditional admission” is not without ambiguity. The proposition that such a status does not qualify as a “true” admission, which can require the bringing of charges ondeportabilityratherthaninadmissibilitygrounds,hassomepersuasiveforce. But if a refugee has not been “admitted,” and also has not been paroled in view

我们还认识到，“conditional admission”的概念并非没有歧义。这样一种身份不构成“真正”的准入，从而可能要求根据可驱逐理由而非不可入境理由提出指控，这一主张具有一定说服力。但如果难民未被“admitted”，也未被假释，鉴于

4 As the Attorney General’s opinion observed, Jean did not contest her inadmissibility as charged under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. See Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. at 375-76. Thus, there was no occasion in Jean’s case to consider the question whether the charge against her was properly brought under the inadmissibility rather than the deportability provisions of the Act.

4 正如司法部长意见所述，Jean 未质疑其根据《移民与国籍法》第 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) 条作为被判犯有涉及道德败坏罪行之外国人的不可入境指控。See Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. at 375-76。因此，在 Jean 的案件中没有机会考虑对其提出的指控是否应根据《移民与国籍法》的不可入境条款而非可驱逐条款适当提出。

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of the restrictive language at section 212(d)(5) of the Act as discussed above, then the nature of his or her status becomes unclear. Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act, as amended by the IIRIRA, provides that aliens who are present in the United States without having been either admitted or paroled are inadmissible, thereby presumably possessing no legal status. That provision does not appear to contemplate a third possible category, consisting of aliens who, despite having been neither admitted nor paroled, are authorized to be present in the United States as refugees. And if this conundrum is to be resolved by construing the word “admitted” in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) to encompass conditional refugeeadmissions,then it is difficult to fathomwhy the same construction would not be afforded to the same word as used in the language describing the applicability of the deportability provisions at section 237(a). “As a rule, a single statutory term should be interpreted consistently.” Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397, 404 (BIA 2011) (citing Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005)). To the extent that the pertinent language is ambiguous, we believe that a construction recognizing that a “conditional admission” is nevertheless a form of “admission” for purposes of section 237(a) of the Act would best comport with the overall structure of the statute.

如上所述，对于该法第212(d)(5)条的限制性语言，如果其身份的性质变得不明确。经IIRIRA修订的该法第212(a)(6)(A)(i)条规定，未经入境许可或假释而身在美国的外国人不可入境，据此推定其不具有合法身份。该条款似乎并未考虑第三种可能的类别，即尽管既未获入境许可也未获假释，但作为难民被授权留在美国的外国人。而如果这一难题要通过将第212(a)(6)(A)(i)条中的“admitted”一词解释为涵盖有条件难民入境来解决，那么就难以理解为何对第237(a)条中描述递解出境条款适用性的语言中所使用的同一词不给予同样的解释。“作为一项规则，单一的法定术语应被一致地解释。”Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397, 404 (BIA 2011)（引用Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005)）。就相关语言存在歧义而言，我们认为，承认“有条件入境”仍然是该法第237(a)条意义上的“入境”的一种形式的解释，最符合该法规的整体结构。

To be sure, our construction effectively envisions that a refugee who ultimately becomes a lawful permanent resident will have been “admitted” twice—first, upon conditional admission under section 207 of the Act, and second, upon reinspection and adjustment to permanent resident status under section 209(a) of the Act—and that after each of those admissions, he or she will have been subject to charges under onlythe deportabilitygrounds, and not the grounds of inadmissibility. Butthisnotionof multipleadmissions,with the deportability grounds applying after each admission, is consistent with the approach we have taken in other immigration contexts.

诚然，我们的解释实际上设想，最终成为合法永久居民的难民将已经“入境”两次——第一次是根据该法第207条的有条件入境，第二次是根据该法第209(a)条在重新检查并调整为永久居民身份时——并且在每一次入境之后，他或她将仅受递解出境理由的指控，而不受不可入境理由的指控。但这种多次入境的概念，即在每次入境后适用递解出境理由，与我们在其他移民语境中所采取的做法是一致的。

In Matter of Alyazji, we reaffirmed our prior case law to the extent it held that aliens who enter the United States as nonimmigrants and then adjust their status to that of a lawful permanent resident have two admissions—first at the border on their nonimmigrant visas, and then again during the adjustment process.5 Similarly, in Matter of Sesay, 25 I&N Dec. 431 (BIA 2011), we addressed the situation of an alien who is admitted as a fiancé(e) of a United States citizen under section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Act and then

在Matter of Alyazji中，我们重申了先前的判例法，即认为以非移民身份进入美国然后调整身份为合法永久居民的外国人拥有两次入境——第一次是在边境持非移民签证入境，第二次是在调整身份过程中。5 同样，在Matter of Sesay, 25 I&N Dec. 431 (BIA 2011)中，我们处理了一名外国人的情况，该外国人根据该法第101(a)(15)(K)条作为美国公民的未婚夫（妻）获准入

5 Indeed, we reaffirmed that the statutory scheme warranted treatment of an adjustment of status as an admission, even though an adjustment does not come within the literal definition of the term “admission” at section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act. See Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. at 399-404. In this case, the justification for treating a conditional refugee admission as an “admission” is even stronger because such an admission comes within the statutory definition’s reference to a lawful entry into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer, as discussed above.

5 事实上，我们重申，法定方案值得将身份调整视为入境，即使身份调整不属于该法第101(a)(13)(A)条中“入境”一词的字面定义范围。见Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. at 399-404。在本案中，将有条件难民入境视为“入境”的理由更为充分，因为如上所述，此种入境属于法定定义中关于经移民官员检查和授权后合法进入美国的表述范围。

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(after marriage to the citizen) adjusts status to that of a lawful permanent resident on a conditional basis under section 216 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (2006). In each of these contexts, we treated the alien, at least implicitly, as being subject to the deportation grounds after the first admission, as well as the second (if it occurs at all). See Matter of Sesay, 25 I&N Dec. at 432 (noting that an alien who had been admitted as a fiancé visa holder, but who subsequently had been denied adjustment of status, was charged with deportabilityunder section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Act); Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. at 406-07 (stating that a second admission through adjustment of status “merely extends an existing period of presence that was sufficient in and of itself to support the alien’s susceptibility to the grounds of deportability.”).

（在与该公民结婚后）根据该法第216条、8 U.S.C. § 1186a (2006)以有条件 basis 调整为合法永久居民身份。在每一种语境中，我们至少隐含地将该外国人视为在第一次入境后以及第二次入境后（如果发生的话）受递解出境理由的约束。见Matter of Sesay, 25 I&N Dec. at 432（指出一名曾作为未婚夫签证持有人获准入但随后身份调整被拒的外国人被依据该法第237(a)(1)(B)条指控递解出境）；Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. at 406-07（指出通过身份调整的第二次入境“仅仅延长了现有的停留期间，该期间本身已足以支持该外国人受递解出境理由的约束”）。

Furthermore, we agree with the respondent that despite the DHS’s assertions to the Immigration Judge, Kaganovich v. Gonzales does not give the DHS authority to charge him under section 212 of the Act. In that case, Kaganovich, a refugee who had obtained permanent resident status, was stopped at a port of entry as he tried to drive from Mexico back into the United States with another alien who presented false documentation. Kaganovich v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d at 896. Thereafter, Kaganovich was placed in removal proceedings and was charged with alien smuggling under section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) of the Act. See section 101(a)(13)(C) of the Act. Here, the respondent was not outside the United States attempting to reenter.

此外，我们同意答辩人的意见，即尽管DHS向移民法官提出了主张，Kaganovich v. Gonzales并未赋予DHS依据该法第212条对其提出指控的权力。在该案中，Kaganovich是一名已获得永久居民身份的难民，当他试图与另一名持虚假证件的外国人一起从墨西哥驾车返回美国时，在入境口岸被拦截。Kaganovich v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d at 896。此后，Kaganovich被置于遣返程序中，并被依据该法第212(a)(6)(E)(i)条指控外国人走私。见该法第101(a)(13)(C)条。在本案中，答辩人并非在美国境外试图重新入境。

Thus, we conclude that under the language of the Act and regulations, and also in view of the context and structure of the provisions at issue, an alien admitted to the United States as a refugee has been “admitted” for purposes of section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act. Specifically, the alien has made a lawful entry into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. Although after 1 year the alien must be reinspected for admission in a different status, that of a lawful permanent resident, this requirement does not undermine his or her initial admission as a refugee under section 207 of the Act. Consequently, the respondent is present in the United States pursuant to a prior admission as a refugee, and anycharges in the notice to appear must be based on the grounds of deportability under section 237 of the Act.

因此，我们得出结论，根据该法及法规的语言，并且考虑到所涉条款的语境和结构，作为难民获准入美国的外国人已为该法第101(a)(13)(A)条之目的而“入境”。具体而言，该外国人在经移民官员检查和授权后已合法进入美国。尽管1年后该外国人必须接受重新检查以不同身份（即合法永久居民身份）入境，但这一要求并不削弱其根据该法第207条作为难民的初始入境。因此，答辩人是依据先前作为难民的入境而在美国境内，出庭通知中的任何指控必须基于该法第237条规定的递解出境理由。

Initially, the notice to appear charged that the respondent was “admitted” but removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act. However, the DHS subsequentlywithdrew that charge and filed two Forms I-261 lodging charges of inadmissibilityunder section 212. The Immigration Judge made alternative findings, concluding not onlythat the respondent was inadmissible as charged, but also that he was deportable under section 237 of the Act because his conviction was categorically for an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(B). However,sincetherespondentwasnotproperlychargedunder section 237 at the time of the Immigration Judge’s decision, the alternative

最初，出庭通知指控答辩人已“入境”但依据该法第237(a)(2)(A)(iii)条可被遣返。然而，DHS随后撤回了该指控，并提交了两份I-261表格，提出依据第212条的不可入境指控。移民法官作出了替代性认定，不仅认定答辩人如所指控不可入境，还认定其依据该法第237条可被递解出境，因为其定罪绝对属于该法第101(a)(43)(B)条规定的加重重罪。然而，由于在移民法官作出决定时答辩人并未依据第237条被适当指控，该替代性

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analysis under that section was hypothetical in nature. Therefore, upon our de novo review, we conclude that the Immigration Judge’s removability determinations were improper, and we will sustain the respondent’s appeal in this regard. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2011).

依据该条的分析在性质上是假设性的。因此，经我们重新审查，我们得出结论，移民法官的遣返性认定不当，我们将在此方面支持答辩人的上诉。见8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2011)。

Furthermore, we recognize the Immigration Judge’s extensive analysis regarding the respondent’s eligibility for relief from removal. However, the respondent has not been properly charged, and his removability is a threshold determination. As a result, we find that a remand is warranted for the DHS to have an opportunity to amend the notice to appear and for the Immigration Judge to further address the issues of the respondent’s removability and his eligibility for relief. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be sustained in part and dismissed in part, and the record will be remanded for further proceedings.

此外，我们认可移民法官关于答辩人是否有资格获得遣返救济的详尽分析。然而，答辩人未被适当指控，而其遣返性是一项门槛性认定。因此，我们认为有必要发回重审，使DHS有机会修改出庭通知，并使移民法官进一步处理答辩人的遣返性及其救济资格问题。据此，答辩人的上诉将部分支持、部分驳回，并将记录发回重审以进行进一步程序。

ORDER: The appeal is sustained in part and dismissed in part. FURTHER ORDER: Therecord is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.

命令：上诉部分支持、部分驳回。 进一步命令：记录发回移民法官，以按照上述意见进行进一步程序并作出新决定。

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