Chung Hou Hsiao v. Hazuda

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CHUNG HOU HSIAO,

CHUNG HOU HSIAO，

No. 15-55676

案号：15-55676

Plaintiff-Appellant,

原告-上诉人，

v.

诉

D.C. No. 8:14-cv-00728-

地区法院案号： 8:14-cv-00728-

DOC-DFM

DOC-DFM

OPINION

意见书

MARK J. HAZUDA, Director, Nebraska Service Center, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; JAMES MCCAMENT, Acting Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States; ELAINE DUKE, Acting Secretary, Department of Homeland Security,

MARK J. HAZUDA，内布拉斯加服务中心主任，美国公民及移民服务局；JAMES MCCAMENT，美国公民及移民服务局代理局长；JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III，美国司法部长；ELAINE DUKE，国土安全部代理部长，

Defendants-Appellees.

被告-被上诉人。

Appeal from the United States District Court

来自美国地区法院的上诉

for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

加利福尼亚中区 David O. Carter，地区法官，主审

Argued and Submitted May 10, 2017

辩论和提交于2017年5月10日

Pasadena, California

加利福尼亚州帕萨迪纳

Filed September 1, 2017

归档于2017年9月1日

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HSIAO V. HAZUDA 2

HSIAO 诉 HAZUDA 2

Opinion by Judge Clifton

Clifton 法官撰写意见书

The panel affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service in an action brought by Chung Hou Hsiao challenging the denial of his application to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident.

合议庭维持了地区法院的判决，该判决在美国公民及移民服务局（USCIS）胜诉。该诉讼由 Chung Hou Hsiao 提起，质疑其调整身份为合法永久居民的申请被拒。

The panel addressed adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), a grandfathering provision that allows an alien who would otherwise be disqualified from securing adjustment of status due to unauthorized employment or failing to maintain lawful status to nevertheless obtain adjustment of status if the alien is the beneficiary of a visa petition filed on or before April 30, 2001. In order to qualify, the visa petition must have been “approvable when filed,” meaning, in part, that the visa petition was “meritorious in fact.”

合议庭处理了根据 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) 进行的身份调整，这是一项祖父条款，允许原本因未经授权就业或未能维持合法身份而无资格获得身份调整的外国人，如果该外国人是2001年4月30日或之前提交的签证申请的受益人，仍可获得身份调整。要符合资格，签证申请必须在提交时“可批准”，部分含义是签证申请“事实上具有法律依据”。

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HSIAO V. HAZUDA 3

HSIAO 诉 HAZUDA 3

Hsiao claimed that he was the beneficiary of such visa petitions – even though the petitions were denied – because they were “approvable when filed.” Hsiao’s position was that, to determine whether a previously denied visa petition was “meritorious in fact,” USCIS must reevaluate the petition anew, taking account of any additional evidence that an alien may choose to submit.

Hsiao 声称他是此类签证申请的受益人——尽管申请被拒——因为它们在提交时“可批准”。Hsiao 的立场是，为了确定先前被拒的签证申请是否“事实上具有法律依据”，USCIS 必须重新评估申请，考虑外国人可能选择提交的任何额外证据。

The panel held that, in determining whether an alien’s prior visa petition was “meritorious in fact,” it is generally permissible to treat a denial of the petition as dispositive if it was made on the merits and the denial was not the result of circumstances that changed after the petition was filed. The panel acknowledged that there may be exceptions to this general rule, but that such exceptions did not apply in Hsiao’s case, and there was no allegation that his circumstances changed between when his visa petitions were filed and when they were denied. The panel further held that, although USCIS may have had the option to reconsider the merits of Hsiao’s prior petitions in light of new evidence he submitted, it was not required to do so.

合议庭认为，在确定外国人的先前签证申请是否“事实上具有法律依据”时，通常允许将申请的拒绝视为决定性因素，如果拒绝是基于案情实质作出的，且拒绝不是申请提交后情况变化的结果。合议庭承认这一一般规则可能存在例外，但此类例外不适用于 Hsiao 的案件，且没有指控称他的情况在签证申请提交和被拒之间发生了变化。合议庭进一步认为，尽管 USCIS 可能有权根据 Hsiao 提交的新证据重新考虑其先前申请的案情，但并无义务这样做。

Scott Eric Bratton (argued) and Margaret W. Wong, Margaret Wong & Associates, Cleveland, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Scott Eric Bratton（辩论）和 Margaret W. Wong，Margaret Wong & Associates，俄亥俄州克利夫兰，为原告-上诉人。

Glenn Matthew Girdharry (argued), Assistant Director; Elianis N. Perez, Senior Litigation Counsel; William C. Peachey, Director; District Court Section, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

Glenn Matthew Girdharry（辩论），助理主任；Elianis N. Perez，高级诉讼律师；William C. Peachey，主任；地区法院科，移民诉讼办公室，美国司法部，华盛顿特区；为被告-被上诉人。

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HSIAO V. HAZUDA 4

HSIAO 诉 HAZUDA 4

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

CLIFTON，巡回法官：

The Immigration and Nationality Act permits an alien who is already in the United States and meets certain criteria to apply to adjust his immigration status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence without having to return to his country of origin and submit an application at the United States consulate in that country. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). An alien is disqualified from using this process, however, if he has engaged in unauthorized employment or has failed to continuously maintain lawful immigration status since entering the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2). Such a disqualification will be forgiven if the alien was the beneficiary of a qualifying visa petition (or labor certification application) that was filed on or before April 30, 2001, and if the alien meets certain other requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). In order to qualify, the visa petition must have been “approvable when filed.” 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(1)(i)(A).

《移民与国籍法》允许已经在美国并符合某些标准的外国人申请将其移民身份调整为合法永久居民，而无需返回原籍国并在该国美国领事馆提交申请。8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)。但是，如果外国人从事未经授权的就业或自进入美国以来未能连续维持合法移民身份，则无资格使用此程序。8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2)。如果外国人是2001年4月30日或之前提交的合格签证申请（或劳工证申请）的受益人，并且满足某些其他要求，则此类无资格将被豁免。8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)。要符合资格，签证申请必须在提交时“可批准”。8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(1)(i)(A)。

What does it mean for a visa petition to have been “approvable when filed”? If the petition was actually approved, then it qualifies, of course, but what if it was denied? Is the denial dispositive, or should an alien be permitted to relitigate the merits of a previously denied petition when he makes a subsequent application to adjust his immigration status?

签证申请在提交时“可批准”是什么意思？如果申请实际获得批准，那么当然符合资格，但如果被拒呢？拒绝是否具有决定性，或者应允许外国人在其随后申请调整移民身份时重新诉讼先前被拒申请的案情？

In this case, an alien sought to adjust his immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident, but in order to do so, he needed to prove that at least one of the two visa petitions he filed prior to 2001 was approvable when filed, even though both were ultimately denied. United States

在本案中，一名外国人寻求将其移民身份调整为合法永久居民，但为此，他需要证明他在2001年之前提交的两份签证申请中至少有一份在提交时可批准，尽管两份最终都被拒。美国

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HSIAO V. HAZUDA 5

HSIAO 诉 HAZUDA 5

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) rejected the alien’s application to adjust his status because the petitions were denied on their merits and because there was no allegation that the petitions were denied on the basis of circumstances that changed between the time when they were filed and the time when they were adjudicated. The alien challenged the denial of his application to adjust status in district court, where he argued that the mere fact that the prior visa petitions were denied was insufficient to demonstrate that they were not approvable when filed. He contended that USCIS should have reevaluated the merits of the visa petitions in light of new evidence he submitted.

公民及移民服务局（“USCIS”）拒绝了该外国人调整身份的申请，因为申请基于案情实质被拒，且没有指控称申请被拒是基于提交和裁决之间情况变化。该外国人在地区法院质疑其调整身份申请被拒，他辩称先前签证申请被拒这一事实本身不足以证明它们在提交时不可批准。他主张 USCIS 应根据他提交的新证据重新评估签证申请的案情。

The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS and held that USCIS was permitted to reevaluate the merits of a previously denied visa petition to determine whether it was approvable when filed but that it was only obligated to do so if the denial was due to circumstances that changed between when the petition was filed and when it was adjudicated. We agree with the district court, and we affirm.

地区法院批准了 USCIS 的简易判决，并认为 USCIS 可以重新评估先前被拒签证申请的案情以确定其在提交时是否可批准，但只有在拒绝是由于申请提交和裁决之间情况变化时才必须这样做。我们同意地区法院的意见，并维持原判。

Chung Hou Hsiao came to the United States from Taiwan in 1993 on a student visa. He earned a master’s degree in electrical engineering from Fairleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey in 1995.

Chung Hou Hsiao 于1993年持学生签证从中国台湾来到美国。他于1995年在新泽西州 Fairleigh Dickinson 大学获得电气工程硕士学位。

In 1998 Hsiao filed an I-140 petition seeking a visa pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(2)(A) and 1154(a)(1)(F), which permit an alien with an advanced degree or “exceptional ability” to obtain a visa. The statute authorizes the Attorney General to waive an otherwise-applicable requirement that the alien’s services be sought by a specific

1998年，Hsiao 根据 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(2)(A) 和 1154(a)(1)(F) 提交了 I-140 申请寻求签证，该条款允许拥有高级学位或“特殊才能”的外国人获得签证。该法规授权司法部长豁免原本适用的要求，即外国人的服务需由特定

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HSIAO V. HAZUDA 6

HSIAO 诉 HAZUDA 6

employer if the Attorney General determines that such a waiver is “in the national interest.” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i). Hsiao stated that his advanced degree and exceptional ability were in the field of electrical and computational engineering. After considering the documents Hsiao provided in response to a request for additional evidence, the Immigration and Naturalization Service1 denied the petition, explaining that, although the record established that Hsiao was “a competent researcher,” “[t]he record [did] not contain evidence to establish that the waiver of the [requirement for a] job offer [by a specific employer] would be in the national interest. The record establishe[d] that the qualifications and the job would be easily articulated on a labor certification and job offer.”

雇主寻求，如果司法部长确定此类豁免“符合国家利益”。8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i)。Hsiao 声明他的高级学位和特殊才能是在电气和计算工程领域。在考虑了 Hsiao 响应补充证据请求提供的文件后，移民和归化局1 拒绝了申请，解释说，尽管记录证明 Hsiao 是“一名有能力的研究人员”，“记录没有包含证据证明豁免[特定雇主]工作邀请[要求]将符合国家利益。记录证明资格和工作可以很容易地在劳工证和工作邀请中阐明。”

Hsiao filed a second I-140 petition in 2000 seeking a visa pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(1)(A) and 1154(a)(1)(E), which permit an alien of “extraordinary ability” to obtain a visa without the requirement that the alien’s services be sought by an employer. Hsiao claimed that he possessed extraordinary ability in the field of computer technology. After the INS requested additional evidence and Hsiao provided supplemental materials, the INS concluded that “the evidence submitted [did] not establish that [Hsiao was] one of that small percentage who [had] risen to the very top of the field” and that he thus did not qualify “as an alien of extraordinary ability.” The INS therefore denied the petition.

Hsiao 于2000年提交了第二份 I-140 申请，根据 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(1)(A) 和 1154(a)(1)(E) 寻求签证，该条款允许“杰出能力”的外国人获得签证，而无需外国人的服务由雇主寻求。Hsiao 声称他在计算机技术领域拥有杰出能力。在 INS 请求补充证据且 Hsiao 提供了补充材料后，INS 得出结论“提交的证据不能证明[Hsiao 是]少数达到领域顶尖的人之一”，因此他没有资格“作为杰出能力的外国人”。因此，INS 拒绝了申请。

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HSIAO V. HAZUDA 7

HSIAO 诉 HAZUDA 7

Hsiao filed a third I-140 petition in 2012 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A), the “exceptional ability” provision. He claimed exceptional ability in solar technology, a different field from what he had claimed in his prior petitions. He again sought a national interest waiver to the job offer requirement, and USCIS approved the petition.

Hsiao 于2012年根据 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A)（“特殊才能”条款）提交了第三份 I-140 申请。他声称在太阳能技术方面具有特殊才能，这与他先前申请中声称的领域不同。他再次寻求对工作邀请要求的国家利益豁免，USCIS 批准了申请。

Hsiao then filed an I-485 application to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. He also filed a supplement stating that he was in unlawful immigration status because he had remained in the United States past the end of the period of his lawful admission and had failed to maintain lawful status. Ordinarily, that circumstance (or the circumstance of having undertaken employment without authorization, which also appears to apply to Hsiao) would, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2), disqualify an alien from obtaining adjustment of status.

然后 Hsiao 提交了 I-485 申请，将其身份调整为合法永久居民。他还提交了一份补充说明，称他处于非法移民身份，因为他合法入境期限结束后仍留在美国，且未能维持合法身份。通常，这种情况（或未经授权就业的情况，似乎也适用于 Hsiao）将根据 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2) 使外国人无资格获得身份调整。

Hsiao sought relief from that disqualification on the basis of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), the “grandfathering” provision. The grandfathering provision allows an alien who would otherwise be disqualified from securing adjustment of status due to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) to nevertheless obtain adjustment of status provided that he meets certain requirements. In addition to other requirements that the parties seem to agree Hsiao satisfied, the grandfathering provision requires that the alien be the beneficiary of “a petition for classification under [8 U.S.C. § 1154] that was filed with the Attorney General on or before April 30, 2001.”2 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(B)(i).

Hsiao依据8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)的“祖父条款”寻求豁免该取消资格。祖父条款允许原本因8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)而无法获得调整身份的外国人，只要满足某些要求，仍可获得调整身份。除双方似乎同意Hsiao已满足的其他要求外，祖父条款要求该外国人必须是“根据[8 U.S.C. § 1154]于2001年4月30日或之前向司法部长提交的归类申请”的受益人。2 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(B)(i)。

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HSIAO V. HAZUDA 8

HSIAO 诉 HAZUDA 8

According to 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(1)(i)(A), a petition only counts under the grandfathering provision if it was “approvable when filed.”

根据8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(1)(i)(A)，申请只有在“提交时可批准”的情况下才符合祖父条款。

Hsiao claimed he was the beneficiary of two such petitions, namely the 1998 and 2000 petitions described above. He argued that, even though those petitions were denied, they were nevertheless approvable when filed. In support of his position, Hsiao cited some evidence that was in the record at the time the petitions were originally adjudicated, and he also provided new evidence. USCIS denied Hsiao’s application to adjust status, explaining that the petitions “were denied for cause and were not approved” and concluding that the “petitions were not approvable when filed.” His administrative appeal was denied on the same grounds.

Hsiao声称他是两份此类申请的受益人，即上述1998年和2000年的申请。他辩称，尽管这些申请被拒，但它们在提交时是可批准的。为支持其立场，Hsiao引用了申请最初裁决时记录中的一些证据，并且他还提供了新证据。USCIS拒绝了Hsiao的调整身份申请，解释说这些申请“因故被拒且未获批准”，并得出结论“申请在提交时不可批准”。他的行政上诉基于相同理由被驳回。

Hsiao then filed a complaint in the Central District of California, where he then resided, invoking the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge the denial of his application to adjust his status. The district court concluded that USCIS did not violate the APA in denying Hsiao’s application to adjust his status, denied summary judgment to Hsiao, and granted summary judgment to USCIS. Hsiao timely appealed.

Hsiao随后在他当时居住的加利福尼亚中区法院提起诉讼，援引《行政程序法》质疑其调整身份申请被拒。地区法院认定USCIS在拒绝Hsiao调整身份申请时未违反APA，驳回了Hsiao的简易判决动议，并准许了USCIS的简易判决动议。Hsiao及时上诉。

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We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2017). When considering a challenge to a final agency decision brought pursuant to the APA, “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

我们重新审查简易判决的准许。Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2017)。当根据APA考虑对机构最终决定的质疑时，“审查法院应当……认定并撤销被认定为……任意、反复无常、滥用自由裁量权或 otherwise 不符合法律的机构行为、认定和结论。”5 U.S.C. § 706(2)。

Hsiao does not challenge the original denial of his 1998 and 2000 I-140 petitions. Indeed, he could not do so as the time period for challenging those denials has long since run. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Nor does he contend that the relevant regulations are improper interpretations of the statute. Rather, the dispute in this appeal is whether USCIS correctly interpreted its own regulations in determining that Hsiao’s 1998 and 2000 I-140 petitions were not “approvable when filed.”

Hsiao未质疑其1998年和2000年I-140申请的最初拒绝。事实上，他无法这样做，因为质疑这些拒绝的期限早已届满。见28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)。他也不主张相关法规是对法规的不当解释。相反，本次上诉的争议在于USCIS在认定Hsiao的1998年和2000年I-140申请并非“提交时可批准”时是否正确解释了其自身法规。

The term “approvable when filed” is defined in the applicable regulation:

“提交时可批准”一词在适用法规中定义如下：

Approvable when filed means that, as of the date of the filing of the qualifying immigrant visa petition . . . , the qualifying petition . . . was properly filed, meritorious in fact, and non-frivolous (“frivolous” being defined herein as patently without substance). This determination will be made based on the circumstances that existed at the time the qualifying petition or application was filed. A visa petition that was properly filed on or

提交时可批准是指，截至提交合格移民签证申请之日……，该合格申请……已适当提交、事实上具有价值且非轻率（“轻率”在此定义为明显缺乏实质内容）。该认定将基于提交合格申请或请求时存在的情况作出。在2001年4月30日或之前适当提交且提交时可批准，但后来因提交后出现的情况而被撤回、拒绝或撤销的签证申请，如果该外国人 otherwise 有资格根据[8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)]提交调整身份申请，则将保留该外国受益人的祖父条款地位。

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before April 30, 2001, and was approvable when filed, but was later withdrawn, denied, or revoked due to circumstances that have arisen after the time of filing, will preserve the alien beneficiary’s grandfathered status if the alien is otherwise eligible to file an application for adjustment of status under [8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)].

在2001年4月30日或之前适当提交且提交时可批准，但后来因提交后出现的情况而被撤回、拒绝或撤销的签证申请，如果该外国人 otherwise 有资格根据[8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)]提交调整身份申请，则将保留该外国受益人的祖父条款地位。

8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(3). “Properly filed” means that the petition was received or postmarked by April 30, 2001, and was accepted for filing. 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(2). “Circumstances that have arisen after the time of filing means circumstances similar to those outlined in [8 C.F.R. §§ 205.1(a)(3)(i), (ii)].” 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(4). In turn, 8 C.F.R. §§ 205.1(a)(3)(i), (ii) discuss voluntary withdrawal of a petition as well as situations in which a petition will be revoked due to certain changes in circumstances experienced by the alien or his sponsor including death, marriage, divorce, a child reaching the age of twenty-one, and bankruptcy.

8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(3)。“适当提交”是指申请在2001年4月30日或之前收到或邮戳日期为当日，并被接受提交。8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(2)。“提交后出现的情况是指类似于[8 C.F.R. §§ 205.1(a)(3)(i), (ii)]中概述的情况。”8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(4)。反过来，8 C.F.R. §§ 205.1(a)(3)(i), (ii)讨论了申请的主动撤回以及因外国人及其担保人经历的某些情况变化（包括死亡、结婚、离婚、子女年满二十一岁和破产）而导致申请被撤销的情形。

USCIS does not contend that Hsiao’s petitions were not properly filed or that they were frivolous. Accordingly, the only dispute is whether the petitions were “meritorious in fact,” or, more precisely, what process USCIS should have followed in determining whether the petitions were meritorious in fact.

USCIS不主张Hsiao的申请未适当提交或属于轻率。因此，唯一争议在于申请是否“事实上具有价值”，或者更准确地说，USCIS在认定申请是否事实上具有价值时应遵循何种程序。

Hsiao’s position is that, to determine whether a previously denied visa petition was meritorious in fact, USCIS must reevaluate the petition anew, taking account of any additional evidence that an alien may choose to submit. By contrast, USCIS contends that consideration of additional evidence may be warranted when a petition is denied based on

Hsiao的立场是，为认定先前被拒的签证申请是否事实上具有价值，USCIS必须重新评估该申请，考虑外国人可能选择提交的任何额外证据。相比之下，USCIS主张，当申请因提交后出现的情况而被拒时，考虑额外证据可能是有理由的，但当申请在没有此类情况变化的情况下基于实质理由被拒时，USCIS可以仅依据拒绝这一事实作为申请事实上不具有价值的决定性证据。

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circumstances that arose after filing, but when a petition is denied on the merits absent such a change in circumstances, then USCIS is permitted to rely on the mere fact of the denial as conclusive proof that the petition was not meritorious in fact.

当申请因提交后出现的情况而被拒时，考虑额外证据可能是有理由的，但当申请在没有此类情况变化的情况下基于实质理由被拒时，USCIS可以仅依据拒绝这一事实作为申请事实上不具有价值的决定性证据。

An agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if we were not required to accord deference to the agency’s interpretation here, we would conclude that USCIS’s interpretation of the regulations in this case is more logical.

机构对其自身法规的解释“具有控制力，除非明显错误或与法规不一致。”Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)（内部引号省略）。即使我们在此不必遵从机构的解释，我们也会得出结论，USCIS在本案中对法规的解释更为合乎逻辑。

USCIS’s position conforms more closely with the text of the regulation. The regulation states that “[a] visa petition that was . . . approvable when filed, but was later withdrawn, denied, or revoked due to circumstances that have arisen after the time of filing, will preserve the alien beneficiary’s grandfathered status.” 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(3) (emphasis added). This statement means that the term “approvable when filed” is not an invitation to relitigate any petition that was denied on its merits. Rather, the “approvable when filed” standard is a safety valve for petitions that would have been approved on their merits if they had been adjudicated on the day they were filed but were not approved because of subsequent events.

USCIS的立场更符合法规文本。法规规定，“在提交时……可批准，但后来因提交后出现的情况而被撤回、拒绝或撤销的签证申请，将保留外国受益人的祖父条款地位。”8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(3)（强调添加）。这一表述意味着“提交时可批准”一词并非邀请对任何基于实质理由被拒的申请重新诉讼。相反，“提交时可批准”标准是一个安全阀，适用于如果在其提交之日裁决本会基于实质理由获得批准，但因后续事件而未获批准的申请。

This reading comports with the agency’s guidance from when the regulation was adopted. The background section published in the Federal Register concurrently with promulgation of the regulation explains: “When the Service has denied an immigrant visa petition (or has revoked a prior approval) based on ineligibility at the time of filing, the

这一解读符合法规通过时机构的指导。与法规颁布同时发表在《联邦公报》上的背景部分解释说：“当服务局基于提交时的不合格而拒绝移民签证申请（或撤销先前批准）时，

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petition does not qualify to grandfather the alien beneficiary for purposes of section [1255(i)].” Adjustment of Status to That Person Admitted for Permanent Residence; Temporary Removal of Certain Restrictions of Eligibility, 66 Fed. Reg. 16383, 16385 (Mar. 26, 2001). There is no suggestion in the regulation or the guidance that USCIS must reevaluate a petition that has already been denied when the denial was based on the circumstances that existed when the petition was filed.

该申请不符合为第[1255(i)]条目的使外国受益人获得祖父条款保护的资格。”Adjustment of Status to That Person Admitted for Permanent Residence; Temporary Removal of Certain Restrictions of Eligibility, 66 Fed. Reg. 16383, 16385 (Mar. 26, 2001)。法规或指导中没有任何暗示表明USCIS必须重新评估已被拒绝的申请，当拒绝是基于提交申请时存在的情况时。

This understanding is also consistent with the First Circuit’s interpretation of the regulation. In Echevarria v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2007), an alien argued that her previously filed visa petition was meritorious in fact even though it was denied on the merits. The alien’s petition had originally been denied because an immigration officer determined that she had failed to demonstrate that her marriage was bona fide. Id. at 18. Like Hsiao, when the alien subsequently sought grandfathering for purposes of an application to adjust status, she submitted new evidence and argued that the agency “was under some automatic obligation to decide the bona fides issue afresh on whatever record [was then] presented long after the event and long after a contrary determination for which no review was sought.” Id. at 20.

这一理解也与第一巡回法院对法规的解释一致。在Echevarria v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2007)中，一名外国人主张其先前提交的签证申请事实上具有价值，尽管该申请基于实质理由被拒。该外国人的申请最初被拒，因为移民官员认定她未能证明其婚姻是真实的。Id. at 18。与Hsiao一样，当该外国人随后为调整身份申请寻求祖父条款保护时，她提交了新证据并主张机构“有某种自动义务，根据[当时]提交的任何记录，在事件发生很久之后，在对未寻求复审的相反裁定作出很久之后，重新决定真实性问题。”Id. at 20。

Echevarria explained that even though a prior denial of a visa petition hypothetically could subsequently prove to have been mistaken, “there is no reason to think that the grandfathering provision was meant to give a second bite at the apple to one who earlier had a full and fair opportunity to” make his case. Id. at 19–20. The court therefore held “that in general, possibly with rare exceptions, a court should not require revisiting the original visa determination, if one was made ‘on the merits,’ did not depend on changed

Echevarria解释说，即使签证申请的先前拒绝假设性地后来可能被证明是错误的，“没有理由认为祖父条款旨在给一个早先有充分和公平机会”陈述其案件的人第二次机会。Id. at 19–20。因此，法院裁定“一般而言，可能除了罕见例外，法院不应要求重新审视最初的签证裁定，如果该裁定是‘基于实质理由’作出的，不依赖于变化的情况，并且当时可以有效复审。”Id. at 20。

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circumstances, and could have been effectively reviewed at the time.” Id. at 20.

不依赖于变化的情况，并且当时可以有效复审。”Id. at 20。

We agree. Hsiao does not contend that there was no opportunity for review when his visa petitions were originally denied. If he believed that the denials were improper, he should have challenged the denials then and there. Requiring the agency to now readjudicate a question that was already resolved well over a decade ago would not be a sensible reading of the regulation.

我们同意。Hsiao不主张其签证申请最初被拒时没有复审机会。如果他认为拒绝不当，他应当当时当地质疑这些拒绝。要求机构现在重新裁决一个十多年前早已解决的问题，不会是对法规的明智解读。

The Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in In re Riero, 24 I. & N. Dec. 267 (B.I.A. 2007), which was decided shortly before Echevarria and on which Hsiao relies heavily, is not to the contrary. In Riero, the alien had also been the beneficiary of a visa petition that was rejected because of “significant doubt as to the bona fides of [his] marriage.” Id. at 270. The Immigration Judge nevertheless considered new evidence about the marriage adduced as part of Riero’s application to adjust status. Id. at 269. The BIA agreed with the IJ that the new evidence was insufficient to establish that the marriage was bona fide and therefore also agreed that Riero was not eligible for adjustment of status. Id. at 270. Hsiao contends that USCIS should have conducted a procedurally similar evaluation of the new evidence in his case.

移民上诉委员会在 In re Riero, 24 I. & N. Dec. 267 (B.I.A. 2007) 一案中的裁决——该裁决在 Echevarria 案前不久作出，且 Hsiao heavily 依赖该裁决——并非相反。在 Riero 案中，该外国人同样是一项签证申请的受益人，该申请因“对[其]婚姻的真实性存在重大怀疑”而被拒绝。Id. at 270。移民法官 nevertheless 考虑了在 Riero 调整身份申请中提出的关于该婚姻的新证据。Id. at 269。移民上诉委员会同意移民法官的意见，认为新证据不足以证明该婚姻是真实的，因此也同意 Riero 不符合调整身份的资格。Id. at 270。Hsiao 主张，USCIS 本应在其案件中对新证据进行程序上类似的评估。

The BIA’s approval of an IJ’s exercise of discretion to review new evidence in one case, however, does not obligate a similar review for all future applicants who seek to avail themselves of the grandfathering provision. Even though the Echevarria court did not cite Riero, it allowed for such a distinction when it noted that whether an adjudicator of a later application to adjust status “could as a matter of grace choose

然而，移民上诉委员会批准移民法官在一个案件中行使自由裁量权审查新证据，并不使未来所有寻求利用祖父条款的申请人都有权获得类似审查。尽管 Echevarria 法院未援引 Riero，但它在指出后来调整身份申请的裁决者“是否可以作为恩惠选择

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to reexamine [an] earlier [visa petition] decision [was] a different issue which [was] not presented in [that] case.” 505 F.3d at 20. That question is not presented by Hsiao’s case either. Although USCIS may have had the option to reconsider the merits of Hsiao’s prior petitions in light of the new evidence he submitted, it was not required to do so.3

重新审查[先前][签证申请]决定[是]一个不同的问题，[该问题]未在[该]案件中提出”时，允许了这种区分。505 F.3d at 20。Hsiao 的案件也未提出该问题。尽管 USCIS 可能可以选择根据 Hsiao 提交的新证据重新考虑其先前申请的实体问题，但并未被要求这样做。3

Accordingly, we hold that, in determining whether an alien’s prior visa petition was “meritorious in fact” for purposes of the grandfathering provision, it is generally permissible to treat a denial of the petition as dispositive if the denial was made on the merits and if the denial was not the result of circumstances that changed after the petition was filed. We acknowledge that there may be exceptions to this general rule, such as if there was not an opportunity for effective review at the time of the original denial.

因此，我们裁定，在确定外国人的先前签证申请就祖父条款而言是否“事实上具有价值”时，如果拒绝是基于实体问题作出的，且该拒绝并非申请提交后情况变化的结果，则一般可以将该申请的拒绝视为决定性。我们承认这一一般规则可能存在例外，例如在原始拒绝时没有有效审查机会的情况。

Such exceptions do not apply in Hsiao’s case, however. His visa petitions were denied on the merits, and there is no allegation that his circumstances changed between when the petitions were filed and when they were denied. USCIS was

然而，此类例外不适用于 Hsiao 的案件。他的签证申请是基于实体问题被拒绝的，且没有指控称其情况在申请提交与拒绝之间发生了变化。USCIS 因此

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thus permitted to treat the denials of the petitions as dispositive in determining that they were not meritorious in fact and therefore were not approvable when filed. USCIS’s determination that Hsiao was not grandfathered and not eligible to adjust his status was therefore not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to USCIS.

因此被允许在确定申请事实上不具有价值且因此在提交时不可获批准时，将申请的拒绝视为决定性。USCIS 关于 Hsiao 不属于祖父条款范围且不符合调整身份资格的裁定因此并非“任意、反复无常、滥用自由裁量权或其他不符合法律”。5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)。我们维持地区法院对 USCIS 作出的简易判决。

The district court correctly concluded that USCIS was permitted to treat prior merits-based denials of Hsiao’s visa petitions as dispositive proof that the petitions were not approvable when filed. We therefore affirm.

地区法院正确裁定，USCIS 可以将先前基于实体问题对 Hsiao 签证申请的拒绝视为申请在提交时不可获批准的决定性证据。我们因此维持原判。