Matter of Quilantan

Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3688

引用为 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010) 临时决定 #3688

File A095 426 631 - Dallas, Texas

案卷 A095 426 631 - 德克萨斯州达拉斯

Decided July 28, 2010

2010年7月28日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

For purposes of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006), an alien seeking to show that he or she has been “admitted” to the United States pursuant to section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006), need only prove procedural regularity in his or her entry, which does not require the alien to be questioned by immigration authorities or be admitted in a particular status. Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1980), reaffirmed.

为根据《移民与国籍法》第245(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006)，确立调整身份的资格，寻求证明其已根据该法第101(a)(13)(A)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006)，被“准许入境”美国的外国人，只需证明其入境程序合规，这不要求该外国人接受移民当局的询问或以特定身份获准入境。Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1980)，重申。

FOR RESPONDENT: Furqan Sunny Azhar, Esquire, Dallas, Texas

被申请人代理律师：Furqan Sunny Azhar 律师，德克萨斯州达拉斯

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Judson J. Davis, Assistant Chief Counsel

国土安全部代理律师：Judson J. Davis，助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: COLE and PAULEY, Board Members. Concurring Opinion: FILPPU, Board Member.

审理：委员会合议庭：COLE 和 PAULEY，委员会成员。同意意见：FILPPU，委员会成员。

COLE, Board Member:

COLE，委员会成员：

In a decision dated October 16, 2006, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable under sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and (7)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and (7)(A)(i) (2006), as an alien who entered without being inspected, admitted, or paroled and who was not in possession of a valid entry document. The Immigration Judge also pretermitted the respondent’s application for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006), but granted her voluntary departure. The respondent has timely appealed from that decision and has filed two briefs in support of her appeal. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed a brief in response to our request for supplemental briefing. The appeal will be sustained, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings.

在2006年10月16日的决定中，移民法官认定被申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(6)(A)(i)和(7)(A)(i)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)和(7)(A)(i) (2006)，作为未经检查、准许入境或假释而入境且未持有有效入境文件的外国人，可被驱逐。移民法官还预先驳回了被申请人根据该法第245(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006)，提出的调整身份申请，但批准了她自愿离境。被申请人及时对该决定提出上诉，并提交了两份简报支持其上诉。国土安全部（“DHS”）应我们要求补充简报提交了一份回应简报。上诉将获支持，案件记录将发回移民法官进一步审理。

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. 事实与程序历史

The basic facts in this case are not in dispute. The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States in 1993 using a valid border crossing card. She remained without departure until December 2000, when she returned to Mexico to visit family members. At some point between 1993 and 2000, she lost her border crossing card. In January 2001, she applied for a United States visitor’s visa at the consulate in Mexico, but her application was denied. A few days later, on January 10, 2001, without a valid document to enter, the respondent approached the border as a passenger in a car being driven by her United States citizen friend. According to the respondent’s testimony, the immigration inspector asked her friend whether he was an American citizen but did not ask her anything. The officer then waved the car through the port of entry. The respondent married a United States citizen in January 2006, and she has an approved immediate relative visa petition, which is the basis for her adjustment of status application.1 In a Notice to Appear served on the respondent on August 22, 2005, the DHS charged her with removability under sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and (7)(A)(i) of the Act. The respondent denied the charges, but the Immigration Judge found her to be removable on both grounds. The Immigration Judge also found her to be statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status, because she had not been “admitted” to the United States within the meaning of section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006). Specifically, he held that section 101(a)(13)(A) requires that an alien be lawfully admitted to the United States, which requires a lawful basis to enter the country, as evidenced by a valid document that permits entry or parole. He concluded that procedural regularity at the time of entry was insufficient. The Immigration Judge further found that although the respondent had arguably been inspected, she had not been admitted and thus was statutorily ineligible to adjust status under section 245(a) as one who has been “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.”

本案基本事实无争议。被申请人是墨西哥国民和公民，于1993年持有效边境通行卡进入美国。她一直未离境，直到2000年12月返回墨西哥探亲。在1993年至2000年间的某个时候，她丢失了边境通行卡。2001年1月，她在墨西哥领事馆申请美国访问签证，但申请被拒。几天后，即2001年1月10日，在没有有效入境文件的情况下，被申请人作为乘客乘坐其美国公民朋友驾驶的汽车接近边境。根据被申请人的证词，移民检查员询问她的朋友是否为美国公民，但没有问她任何问题。随后，该官员挥手让汽车通过入境口岸。被申请人于2006年1月与美国公民结婚，她拥有已批准的直系亲属签证申请，这是她调整身份申请的基础。1 在2005年8月22日送达被申请人的出庭通知中，DHS指控她根据该法第212(a)(6)(A)(i)和(7)(A)(i)条可被驱逐。被申请人否认指控，但移民法官认定她基于两项理由均可被驱逐。移民法官还认定她依法不符合调整身份资格，因为她未被该法第101(a)(13)(A)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006)所指“准许入境”美国。具体而言，他裁定第101(a)(13)(A)条要求外国人合法获准进入美国，这需要有合法入境依据，如允许入境或假释的有效文件所证明。他得出结论，入境时的程序合规不足。移民法官进一步认定，尽管被申请人可争辩称已接受检查，但她未被准许入境，因此作为“经检查并准许入境或假释进入美国”的人，依法不符合第245(a)条调整身份资格。

II. ISSUE

II. 问题

Under section 245(a) of the Act, an applicant for adjustment of status must have been “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.”

根据该法第245(a)条，调整身份申请人必须“经检查并准许入境或假释进入美国”。

1 The respondent previously married her current husband in 2002, but it was later discovered that she had a legal impediment to contracting this marriage because she had never terminated her prior marriage to a Mexican citizen. She subsequently divorced her Mexican husband in December 2005 and remarried her current United States citizen husband in January 2006.

1 被申请人曾于2002年与其现任丈夫结婚，但后来发现她存在缔结该婚姻的法律障碍，因为她从未终止与一名墨西哥公民的前一段婚姻。她随后于2005年12月与墨西哥丈夫离婚，并于2006年1月与其现任美国公民丈夫再婚。

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Section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act provides that the terms “admission” and “admitted” mean “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Therefore, in order to determine if the respondent is eligible for adjustment of status, we must decide whether she was inspected and “admitted” to the United States. To do so, we must decide whether she need only show procedural regularity in her entry to establish that she was “admitted” pursuant to section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, or whether she must prove compliance with substantive legal requirements.

该法第101(a)(13)(A)条规定，“准许入境”和“获准入境”指“外国人在移民官员检查并授权后合法进入美国”。因此，为确定被申请人是否有资格调整身份，我们必须裁定她是否经检查并“获准入境”美国。为此，我们必须裁定她是否只需证明其入境程序合规即可根据该法第101(a)(13)(A)条确立其“获准入境”，还是必须证明符合实质性法律要求。

III. ANALYSIS

III. 分析

On appeal, the respondent argues that she was inspected and admitted to the United States for purposes of section 245(a) when she presented herself for inspection at the port of entry and the inspecting officer allowed her to enter the United States. She maintains that the term “admitted,” as defined in section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, does not require her to have been lawfully entitled to enter the United States. Rather, she asserts that physically presenting herself for questioning constitutes an inspection, even if she volunteered no information and was not questioned by the immigration authorities. In support of her position, the respondent cites Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1980), where we interpreted the term “admitted,” as it is used in section 245(a) of the Act, to denote only procedural regularity in an entry, not compliance with substantive legal requirements. She asserts that this interpretation remains valid and controlling in her case and that she therefore made a lawful entry into the United States after inspection and authorization. Accordingly, she seeks to have the record be remanded to give her an opportunity to apply for adjustment of status. Following the respondent’s appeal, we requested supplemental briefing from both parties on two issues. First, we requested the parties’ views on the question whether, for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act, the term “admitted” (as defined in section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act to mean “lawful entry” into the United States) requires that an applicant, at the time of the claimed admission, be lawfully privileged or entitled to enter the United States. Second, we sought the parties’ views on whether, in enacting section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act in section 301(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-575 (“IIRIRA”), Congress intended to continue to allow aliens who physically presented themselves for questioning and were permitted to pass through the port of entry to have

在上诉中，被申请人主张，当她到入境口岸接受检查且检查官员允许她进入美国时，她即为第245(a)条之目的经检查并准许入境美国。她坚持认为，该法第101(a)(13)(A)条所定义的“获准入境”一词并不要求她合法有权进入美国。相反，她声称亲自到场接受询问即构成检查，即使她未提供任何信息且未受移民当局询问。为支持其立场，被申请人援引 Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1980)，我们在该案中将该法第245(a)条所使用的“获准入境”一词解释为仅指入境程序合规，而非符合实质性法律要求。她主张该解释在其案件中仍然有效且具有控制力，因此她经检查并授权后合法进入美国。据此，她寻求将案件记录发回，给予她申请调整身份的机会。 在被申请人上诉后，我们要求双方就两个问题提交补充简报。第一，我们征求双方对以下问题的意见：为该法第245(a)条调整身份之目的，“获准入境”一词（该法第101(a)(13)(A)条定义为“合法进入”美国）是否要求申请人在声称的准许入境时合法享有进入美国的特权或权利。第二，我们征求双方对以下问题的意见：在1996年《非法移民改革和移民责任法》C编第301(a)条，Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-575（“IIRIRA”）中制定该法第101(a)(13)(A)条时，国会是否意图继续允许亲自到场接受询问并获准通过入境口岸的外国人被视为

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satisfied the “inspected and admitted” requirement of section 245 of the Act.2 On appeal, both parties agree that the term “admitted” in section 245(a) of the Act demands only procedural regularity in an entry, not compliance with substantive legal requirements, and they urge us to adopt that interpretation. In addition, the DHS argues that the respondent did not establish procedural regularity at the port of entry because she has not shown that she was admitted in a particular nonimmigrant or immigrant status. For the following reasons, we agree with the parties that admission for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act requires only procedural regularity.

满足该法第245条“经检查并准许入境”的要求。2 在上诉中，双方均同意该法第245(a)条中的“获准入境”一词仅要求入境程序合规，而非符合实质性法律要求，并敦促我们采纳该解释。此外，DHS主张被申请人未证明入境口岸的程序合规，因为她未证明以特定非移民或移民身份获准入境。 基于以下理由，我们同意双方意见，即为该法第245(a)条调整身份之目的，准许入境仅要求程序合规。

A. Legislative History of Adjustment of Status Provisions

A. 调整身份条款的立法历史

As originally enacted, section 245(a) of the Act provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

该法第245(a)条最初颁布时，相关部分规定如下：

The status of an alien who was lawfully admitted to the United States as a bona fide nonimmigrant and who is continuing to maintain that status may be adjusted by the Attorney General in his discretion (under such regulations as he may prescribe to insure the application of this paragraph solely to the cases of aliens who entered the United States in good faith as nonimmigrants) to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence [if certain requirements have been met].

合法获准进入美国作为真实非移民并继续维持该身份的外国人，其身份可由司法部长酌情（根据其可能制定的规章，以确保本款仅适用于作为非移民善意进入美国的外国人案件）调整为合法永久居民身份[如果满足某些要求]。

Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 245(a), 66 Stat. 163, 217 (emphasis added). Thus, the statute originally provided adjustment of status to aliens who were lawfully admitted to the United States as bona fide nonimmigrants and continued to maintain that status. See Matter of Pires Da Silva, 10 I&N Dec. 191, 192 (BIA 1963), overruled on other grounds by Tibke v. INS, 335 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1964), and modified, Matter of Krastman, 11 I&N Dec. 720 (BIA 1966). Congress subsequently amended the statute in 1958 to provide as follows:

1952年6月27日《移民与国籍法》，第477章，第245(a)条，66 Stat. 163, 217（强调为后加）。因此，该法规最初向合法获准进入美国作为真实非移民并继续维持该身份的外国人提供调整身份。见 Matter of Pires Da Silva, 10 I&N Dec. 191, 192 (BIA 1963)，因其他理由被 Tibke v. INS, 335 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1964) 推翻，并经 Matter of Krastman, 11 I&N Dec. 720 (BIA 1966) 修改。 国会随后于1958年修订该法规，规定如下：

The status of an alien who was admitted to the United States as a bona fide nonimmigrant may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence [if certain requirements have been met].

获准进入美国作为真实非移民的外国人，其身份可由司法部长酌情并根据其可能制定的规章，调整为合法永久居民身份[如果满足某些要求]。

Act of Aug. 21, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-700, 72 Stat. 699 (emphasis added). Thus, Congress dropped the requirement of lawful admission and maintenance of nonimmigrant status, but adjustment of status still remained available only

1958年8月21日法案，Pub. L. No. 85-700, 72 Stat. 699（强调为后加）。因此，国会取消了合法入境和维持非移民身份的要求，但调整身份仍仅适用于

2 Before the enactment of the IIRIRA, section 101(a)(13) of the Act defined an “entry” but not an “admission,” and it did not state that an “entry” had to be lawful.

2 在IIRIRA颁布之前，该法第101(a)(13)条定义了“入境”但未定义“准许入境”，且未规定“入境”必须合法。

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to aliens who had been admitted as bona fide nonimmigrants. See Matter of Pires Da Silva, 10 I&N Dec. at 192. In 1960, Congress further amended section 245(a) of the Act to remove the requirement that an alien have been admitted as a bona fide nonimmigrant. The language of the statute was amended to read as follows:

适用于曾作为真实非移民被准许入境的外国人。见Matter of Pires Da Silva，10 I&N Dec. at 192。 1960年，国会进一步修订了该法第245(a)条，取消了外国人必须作为真实非移民被准许入境的要求。该法规的措辞被修订为如下内容：

The status of an alien, other than an alien crewman, who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence [if certain requirements have been met].

经检查并准许入境或假释进入美国的外国人（外籍船员除外）的身份，可由司法部长在其自由裁量权范围内并根据其可能规定的条例，调整为合法永久居民的身份[如果满足某些要求]。

Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, § 10, 74 Stat. 504, 505; see also Matter of Pires Da Silva, 10 I&N Dec. at 192. This 1960 amendment is significant because it replaced the requirement that the alien be admitted as a bona fide nonimmigrant, i.e., that an alien’s admission be substantively lawful, with a requirement that the alien simply be inspected and admitted, i.e., that his or her admission be procedurally regular. In Matter of Pires Da Silva, 10 I&N Dec. at 192-94, we reviewed the legislative history and discussed the significance of the removal of the bona fide nonimmigrant requirement in the 1960 amendments. See id. at 192-93 (discussing section 10 of House Joint Resolution 397, which was enacted as the Act of July 14, 1960); see also S. Rep. No. 86-1651 at 10-12 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3135-38, 1960 WL 4866. We noted that Congress expressed its intention to broaden the statute “so as to include all aliens (other than alien crewmen) who have been inspected and admitted or who have been paroled into the United States, thereby providing considerably more flexibility in the administration of the law.” Matter of Pires Da Silva, 10 I&N Dec. at 193. We further commented as follows:

1960年7月14日法案，Pub. L. No. 86-648，§ 10，74 Stat. 504，505；另见Matter of Pires Da Silva，10 I&N Dec. at 192。 1960年的这一修正案意义重大，因为它将外国人必须作为真实非移民被准许入境的要求，即外国人的入境必须实质合法，替换为外国人仅需经检查并准许入境的要求，即其入境程序合规即可。在Matter of Pires Da Silva，10 I&N Dec. at 192-94中，我们审查了立法历史并讨论了1960年修正案中取消真实非移民要求的意义。见同上at 192-93（讨论众议院联合决议397第10条，该条后颁布为1960年7月14日法案）；另见S. Rep. No. 86-1651 at 10-12（1960），重印于1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124，3135-38，1960 WL 4866。 我们注意到，国会表示其意图是扩大该法规，“以包括所有经检查并准许入境或已被假释进入美国的外国人（外籍船员除外），从而在法律执行中提供更大的灵活性。”Matter of Pires Da Silva，10 I&N Dec. at 193。我们进一步评论如下：

The legislative history fails to reveal any discussion as to the nature of the “considerably more flexibility in the administration of the law” referred to above in connection with the enactment of the proposed amendment. . . . It is believed that the change in language may have been motivated by a series of Service decisions in which the bona fides of the nonimmigrant status of the aliens were questioned and resulted in holdings that aliens, who were not actually bona fide nonimmigrants and were in fact immigrants, were not eligible for adjustment of status. The elimination of the necessity of examining into the bona fides of the nonimmigrant status of persons who were inspected and admitted as nonimmigrants would provide the greater flexibility in the administration of the law referred to in the legislative history.

立法历史未显示任何关于上述与拟议修正案颁布相关的“在法律执行中提供更大的灵活性”性质的讨论。……据信，措辞的变化可能是由一系列移民局决定所推动的，在这些决定中，外国人非移民身份的真实性受到质疑，并导致裁定那些实际上并非真实非移民而实际上是移民的外国人不符合调整身份的资格。消除审查经检查并作为非移民准许入境者非移民身份真实性的必要性，将在立法历史中提到的法律执行中提供更大的灵活性。

Id. at 193-94 (footnote omitted). Thus, we held that an alien was not required to be admitted as a bona fide nonimmigrant in order to be “inspected and admitted.” In other words, as long as an alien’s entry into the United States as a nonimmigrant was procedurally

同上at 193-94（脚注省略）。 因此，我们裁定外国人无需作为真实非移民被准许入境即可满足“经检查并准许入境”的要求。换言之，只要外国人作为非移民进入美国在程序上

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proper (i.e., the alien underwent an inspection by an immigration officer, who subsequently admitted the alien), the alien could seek adjustment of status under section 245(a). Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308, presented a factual scenario nearly identical to the one in this case. After considering the relevant statutes, we expressly rejected the notion that only an alien who had been “lawfully or legally” admitted to the United States could qualify for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act. Id. at 310. Instead, we determined that an alien who had physically presented herself for questioning and made no knowing false claim of citizenship had satisfied the “inspected and admitted” requirement of section 245(a) of the Act. Thus, we interpreted the term “admitted” to denote only procedural regularity, not compliance with substantive legal requirements.

合规（即外国人接受了移民官员的检查，该官员随后准许其入境），该外国人即可根据第245(a)条寻求调整身份。 Matter of Areguillin，17 I&N Dec. 308呈现了与本桉几乎相同的事实情景。在考虑相关法规后，我们明确拒绝了只有“合法或依法”获准进入美国的外国人才有资格根据该法第245(a)条调整身份的观点。同上at 310。相反，我们认定，亲自到场接受询问且未故意虚假声称公民身份的外国人已满足该法第245(a)条的“经检查并准许入境”要求。因此，我们将“准许入境”一词解释为仅表示程序合规，而非遵守实质性法律要求。

B. Adjustment of Status After the IIRIRA

B. IIRIRA之后的调整身份

In light of the 1996 enactment of the current definition of the terms “admission” and “admitted” at section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, we are confronted with the question whether the interpretation we set forth in Matter of Areguillin in 1980 remains valid. Specifically, we must decide whether, in enacting the IIRIRA, Congress intended to continue to allow aliens who had presented themselves for inspection and were allowed to enter the United States to have satisfied the inspection and admission requirements for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act. We find that, by themselves, the terms “admitted” and “admission,” as defined in section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, continue to denote procedural regularity for purposes of adjustment of status, rather than compliance with substantive legal requirements.3 We held in Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec.

鉴于1996年该法第101(a)(13)(A)条颁布了“入境”和“准许入境”术语的现行定义，我们面临的问题是，我们在1980年Matter of Areguillin中阐述的解释是否仍然有效。具体而言，我们必须裁定，在颁布IIRIRA时，国会是否意图继续允许已到场接受检查并获准进入美国的外国人满足该法第245(a)条调整身份的检查和准许入境要求。 我们认定，该法第101(a)(13)(A)条所定义的“准许入境”和“入境”术语本身，就调整身份而言，继续表示程序合规，而非遵守实质性法律要求。3 我们在Matter of Areguillin，17 I&N Dec.

3 We acknowledge that subsequent to the enactment of the IIRIRA in 1996, we issued a decision construing the related term “lawfully” to denote compliance with substantive legal requirements for purposes of section 101(a)(20) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2000), which defines the term “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” See Matter of Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003). However, our holding in that case was limited to the specific situation presented by section 101(a)(20), which uses the phrase “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” (Emphasis added.) In Matter of Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. at 550, we observed that pre-1996 Board decisions and decisions by the Federal courts of appeals found that the phrase “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” did not apply to aliens who had obtained their permanent resident status by fraud or had otherwise not been entitled to it. We found that the reasoning in those decisions remained sound and survived the 1996 amendments to the Act. Id. In contrast, we must now address the ambiguity created by Congress’s use of the term “lawful” (continued...)

3 我们承认，在1996年颁布IIRIRA之后，我们发布了一项决定，将该法第101(a)(20)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20)（2000）中相关术语“合法”解释为表示遵守实质性法律要求，该条定义了“合法获准永久居留”一词。见Matter of Koloamatangi，23 I&N Dec. 548（BIA 2003）。然而，我们在该案中的裁定仅限于第101(a)(20)条所呈现的特定情况，该条使用了“合法获准永久居留”一语。（强调添加。）在Matter of Koloamatangi，23 I&N Dec. at 550中，我们观察到，1996年之前的委员会决定和联邦上诉法院的决定认定，“合法获准永久居留”一语不适用于通过欺诈获得永久居民身份或原本无权获得该身份的外国人。我们认定那些决定中的推理仍然合理，并在1996年该法修正案后继续有效。同上。相比之下，我们现在必须处理国会使用“合法”一词所造成的歧义（续...）

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at 310, that an admission occurs as long as it is procedurally regular. Specifically, we stated that an admission “occurs when the inspecting officer communicates to the applicant that he has determined that the applicant is not inadmissible.” Id. at 310 n.6. We are not persuaded that section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, as enacted by the IIRIRA, abrogates our holding in Matter of Areguillin. Initially, we find no indication that in enacting the current definition of the term “admitted” at section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, Congress intended to supersede the Board’s long-standing interpretation of that term as it applies to the “inspected and admitted” requirement of section 245(a). Specifically, we find no evidence that in amending former section 101(a)(13) of the Act, Congress intended to reestablish, for purposes of demonstrating eligibility for adjustment of status, the former requirement that an alien’s admission must comply with substantive legal requirements. On the contrary, as we indicated in Matter of Pires Da Silva, 10 I&N Dec. 191, by changing the law in 1960, Congress intended to establish that aliens who presented themselves for inspection and were allowed to enter the United States had satisfied the requirements for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act. Furthermore, it has been well documented that Congress amended section 101(a)(13) of the Act simply to eliminate that aspect of the “entry doctrine” that permitted aliens who had entered without inspection to have greater procedural and substantive rights in deportation proceedings than those who had presented themselves for inspection at a port of entry and had been placed in exclusion proceedings. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-469I, at 225-26 (1996), 1996 WL 168955 (accompanying H.R. 2022); Memorandum from David Martin, INS General Counsel, to Michael L. Aytes, Ass’t Comm’r, Office of Benefits (Feb. 19, 1997) (discussing, inter alia, the amendment to section 101(a)(13) of the Act), reprinted in 74 Interpreter Releases, No. 11, Mar. 24, 1997, app. II at 516-22. A contrary interpretation of section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act would attribute to Congress an intent to reinstate an additional requirement of substantive legal compliance for adjustment of status under section 245(a), despite the absence of any evidence of such congressional intent. It would also significantly affect the applicability of other statutory provisions of the Act. In this regard, when Congress amended former section 101(a)(13), it also amended section 237(a) to require that an alien be “in and admitted to the United States” in order to be subject to the various grounds of deportability.

at 310中裁定，只要程序合规，入境即发生。具体而言，我们指出，入境“发生在检查官员向申请人传达其已认定申请人不不可入境时。”同上at 310 n.6。我们不相信IIRIRA颁布的该法第101(a)(13)(A)条废除了我们在Matter of Areguillin中的裁定。 首先，我们未发现任何迹象表明，在颁布该法第101(a)(13)(A)条“准许入境”一词的现行定义时，国会意图取代委员会对该术语适用于第245(a)条“经检查并准许入境”要求的长期解释。具体而言，我们未发现证据表明，在修订该法原第101(a)(13)条时，国会意图为证明调整身份资格之目的，重新确立外国人入境必须遵守实质性法律要求的前要求。相反，正如我们在Matter of Pires Da Silva，10 I&N Dec. 191中指出的，通过1960年修改法律，国会意图确立，已到场接受检查并获准进入美国的外国人已满足该法第245(a)条调整身份的要求。 此外，有充分记录表明，国会修订该法第101(a)(13)条仅仅是为了消除“入境原则”中允许未经检查入境的外国人在驱逐程序中比在入境口岸到场接受检查并被置于排除程序中的外国人享有更大程序性和实质性权利的那一方面。见H.R. Rep. No. 104-469I，at 225-26（1996），1996 WL 168955（附随H.R. 2022）；David Martin，INS总法律顾问，致Michael L. Aytes，福利办公室助理专员备忘录（1997年2月19日）（除其他外讨论该法第101(a)(13)条的修正），重印于74 Interpreter Releases，No. 11，Mar. 24，1997，app. II at 516-22。 对该法第101(a)(13)(A)条的相反解释将把国会意图归于恢复第245(a)条调整身份的实质性法律合规额外要求，尽管缺乏任何此类国会意图的证据。这还将显著影响该法其他法定条款的适用性。在这方面，当国会修订原第101(a)(13)条时，它还修订了第237(a)条，要求外国人“在美国境内并获准入境”才能受到各种驱逐理由的约束。

(...continued) to modify the term “entry” in section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, as that term is used to define “admitted” for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245(a).

（...续） 以修改该法第101(a)(13)(A)条中的“入境”一词，该词用于定义第245(a)条调整身份之目的的“准许入境”。

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(Emphasis added.) See IIRIRA § 301(d)(1), 110 Stat. at 3009-579 (striking “in the United States” and inserting “in and admitted to the United States”). However, section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Act renders deportable those aliens who, at the time of entry, are “within one or more of the classes of aliens inadmissible by the law existing at such time.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, section 237 makes any alien who was in and admitted to the United States deportable if he was inadmissible at the time of entry. If the phrase “lawful entry” demanded a substantively lawful admission, this provision of the Act would be internally inconsistent, because an alien could not be both “admitted” and “inadmissible” at the time of entry. Similarly, interpreting the term “admitted” in section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act to require an entry to be in compliance with substantive legal requirements, rather than only with procedural regularity, would effectively render null section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Act, which provides a waiver of deportability that is expressly available to aliens who obtained admission by fraud or misrepresentation.4 See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (noting that a “cardinal principle” of statutory construction is not to destroy parts of a statute, but rather to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word). The fact that Congress retained section 237(a)(1)(H) when it amended former section 101(a)(13) demonstrates that Congress understood that an “admission” could occur in the absence of compliance with substantive legal requirements. See generally IIRIRA § 305(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 3009-598 (redesignating former section 241 of the Act as current section 237 of the Act). Finally, if an “admission” under section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act were to require an entry in compliance with substantive legal requirements, the waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) would potentially become available to aliens who had procured lawful permanent residence by fraud and misrepresentation, in contravention of our holding in Matter of Ayala, 22 I&N Dec. 398 (BIA 1998) (stating that the statutory bar in section 212(h) applies to any alien who previously gained admission as a lawful permanent resident, notwithstanding any fraud or misrepresentation in procuring that admission).5

（强调为后加。）见《非法移民改革和移民责任法》第301(d)(1)条，110 Stat. 第3009-579页（删除“在合众国境内”并插入“在合众国境内并获准入境”）。然而，该法第237(a)(1)(A)条规定，在入境时“属于当时法律规定的不可入境的外国人一个或多个类别”的外国人可被驱逐。（强调为后加。）因此，第237条使任何在合众国境内并获准入境的外国人，如果在入境时不可入境，则可被驱逐。如果“合法入境”一词要求实质合法的准许入境，则该法的这一规定将自相矛盾，因为一个外国人不可能在入境时同时既“获准入境”又“不可入境”。 同样，将该法第101(a)(13)(A)条中的“获准入境”一词解释为要求入境符合实质性法律要求，而不仅仅是程序合规，将实际上使该法第237(a)(1)(H)条归于无效，该条明确为通过欺诈或虚假陈述获得准许入境的外国人提供了驱逐豁免。4 见 United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)（指出法律解释的“基本原则”不是破坏法律的组成部分，而是在可能的情况下赋予每个条款和词语效力）。国会在修订原第101(a)(13)条时保留了第237(a)(1)(H)条，这一事实表明国会理解“准许入境”可以在不符合实质性法律要求的情况下发生。见《非法移民改革和移民责任法》第305(a)(2)条，110 Stat. 第3009-598页（一般性规定）（将原该法第241条重新指定为现行该法第237条）。 最后，如果该法第101(a)(13)(A)条下的“准许入境”要求入境符合实质性法律要求，则第212(h)条下的不可入境豁免可能变得适用于通过欺诈和虚假陈述获得合法永久居留权的外国人，这违背了我们在 Matter of Ayala, 22 I&N Dec. 398 (BIA 1998) 中的裁决（指出第212(h)条中的法定禁止适用于任何先前作为合法永久居民获得准许入境的外国人，尽管在获得该准许入境时存在任何欺诈或虚假陈述）。5

4 We have previously recognized that section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Act specifically contemplates that an alien may obtain admission either by fraud or by misrepresentation, whether innocent or not. See Matter of Fu, 23 I&N Dec. 985 (BIA 2006). 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently cited with approval our reasoning in Matter of Ayala and found that when section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act is considered in the context of a waiver under section 212(h), it is clear that “Congress intended to define admission in procedural, rather than substantive, terms” for purposes of section 212(h) of the Act. Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010).

4 我们此前已认识到，该法第237(a)(1)(H)条特别设想一个外国人可以通过欺诈或虚假陈述获得准许入境，无论是否无辜。见 Matter of Fu, 23 I&N Dec. 985 (BIA 2006)。 5 合众国第九巡回上诉法院最近赞同地引用了我们在 Matter of Ayala 中的推理，并认定当该法第101(a)(13)(A)条结合第212(h)条下的豁免来考虑时，显然“国会意图为第212(h)条之目的以程序性而非实质性术语来定义准许入境”。Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010)。

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As previously noted, the DHS argues that while an “admission” under section 101(a)(13)(A) only requires procedural regularity, the evidence does not establish that the respondent’s entry complied with such procedural regularity. According to the respondent’s testimony, the immigration officer only spoke to the driver of the vehicle and allowed the vehicle to enter based on the driver’s declaration of United States citizenship. The DHS asserts that the immigration officer essentially treated the respondent as a United States citizen and that she did not undergo an inspection and admission. Further, the DHS maintains that regardless of whether the immigration officer treated the respondent as a United States citizen, he did not ask her any questions and did not determine her admissibility. Thus, the DHS contends that because procedural regularity required the respondent to present herself before an immigration officer as an alien, she did not make a lawful entry into the United States after inspection and authorization and therefore was not properly “admitted.” It is true that an immigration officer is not empowered to inspect a citizen in the same manner as an alien. An alien who enters the United States under a false claim of United States citizenship has not been inspected and is not eligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act. See, e.g., Reid v. INS, 492 F.2d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 1974); Matter of S-, 9 I&N Dec. 599, 600 (BIA 1962). However, according to the Immigration Judge, the facts were undisputed that the respondent presented herself for inspection, and he made no finding that she falsely claimed to be a United States citizen. Thus, the controlling law is Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308, which held that an alien who physically presents herself for questioning and makes no knowing false claim to citizenship is “inspected,” even though she volunteers no information and is asked no questions by the immigration authorities, and that such an alien has satisfied the “inspected and admitted” requirement of 245(a) of the Act. See also Matter of G-, 3 I&N Dec. 136, 138 (BIA 1948) (holding that an alien who physically presents himself for questioning, regardless of whether he is asked any questions, has been “inspected”). The DHS has offered no support for its assertion that the respondent must be admitted in a particular “status” in order for procedural regularity to be found. We therefore conclude that the respondent made a lawful entry into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer within the meaning of section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act and that she is not removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). Furthermore, because the respondent was thus “admitted” to the United States, she is eligible for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded for adjudication of her application for that relief.

如前所述，国土安全部主张，虽然第101(a)(13)(A)条下的“准许入境”仅要求程序合规，但证据不能证明受访人的入境符合此类程序合规。根据受访人的证词，移民官员只与车辆驾驶员交谈，并基于驾驶员关于合众国公民身份的声明允许车辆入境。国土安全部声称，移民官员实质上将受访人视为合众国公民，她并未接受检查和准许入境。此外，国土安全部坚持认为，无论移民官员是否将受访人视为合众国公民，他都没有向她提出任何问题，也没有裁定她的可入境性。因此，国土安全部争辩说，由于程序合规要求受访人作为外国人亲自出现在移民官员面前，她在检查与授权后并未合法进入合众国，因此未被适当“准许入境”。 诚然，移民官员无权像检查外国人一样检查公民。以虚假声称合众国公民身份进入合众国的外国人未经检查，且没有资格根据该法第245条调整身份。见，例如，Reid v. INS, 492 F.2d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 1974); Matter of S-, 9 I&N Dec. 599, 600 (BIA 1962)。然而，根据移民法官的说法，受访人亲自接受检查的事实没有争议，且他未认定她虚假声称是合众国公民。因此，具有控制性的法律是 Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308，该案裁定，亲自出面接受询问且未明知虚假声称公民身份的外国人即属“接受检查”，即使她未主动提供任何信息且移民当局未向她提出任何问题，且此类外国人已满足该法第245(a)条“经检查并准许入境”的要求。另见 Matter of G-, 3 I&N Dec. 136, 138 (BIA 1948)（裁定亲自出面接受询问的外国人，无论是否被问及任何问题，均属“接受检查”）。 国土安全部未为其主张提供任何支持，即受访人必须以特定“身份”获准入境才能认定程序合规。因此，我们裁定，受访人在移民官员检查与授权后合法进入合众国，符合该法第101(a)(13)(A)条的含义，且她不可根据第212(a)(6)(A)(i)条被驱逐。此外，由于受访人因此被“准许入境”合众国，她有资格根据该法第245(a)条调整身份。据此，受访人的上诉将获支持，案件记录将发回重审，以裁定其该项救济申请。

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ORDER: The appeal is sustained. FURTHER ORDER: The decision of the Immigration Judge is vacated, and the record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.

命令：上诉获支持。 进一步命令：移民法官的决定被撤销，案件记录发回重审，以按照上述意见进行进一步程序并作出新决定。

CONCURRING OPINION: Lauri Steven Filppu, Board Member

协同意见：Lauri Steven Filppu，委员会成员

I respectfully concur in the majority’s conclusion that an “admission” only requires a procedurally lawful entry. The respondent seeks adjustment of status. But she is only eligible for that relief if she was “admitted,” as that term is defined by section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006). The majority focuses on the specific history of adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act and the anomaly that would arise if being “admitted” to the United States required a substantively lawful admission. This is obviously relevant, but “admitted” is a defined term. Our focus at the outset needs to be on the language of section 101(a)(13)(A) itself, which provides:

我恭敬地赞同多数意见的结论，即“准许入境”仅要求程序合法的入境。 受访人寻求调整身份。但她只有在她被“准许入境”的情况下才有资格获得该救济，该术语由《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(13)(A)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006) 定义。 多数意见侧重于该法第245条下调整身份的具体历史，以及如果被“准许入境”合众国要求实质合法的准许入境将会产生的异常现象。这显然相关，但“准许入境”是一个定义术语。我们首先需要关注第101(a)(13)(A)条本身的措辞，该条规定：

The terms “admission” and “admitted” mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.

“准许入境”和“获准入境”这两个术语，就外国人而言，是指该外国人在移民官员检查与授权后合法进入合众国。

The starting point in statutory construction is the language of the statute. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984). Clear and unambiguous language must be given effect, except in rare cases such as where doing so would “produce a result ‘demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). In isolation, the “lawful entry” provision of the definition would most naturally be understood to demand a substantively lawful entry, especially as a procedurally lawful entry is separately signified by the requirement of an “inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” But the meaning and clarity of statutory language should be assessed in the context in which it is used, not in isolation. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004); Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 372 (1994). As defined terms, the words “admission” and “admitted” only take on life in the provisions in which they are employed. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) argues that within the context of the statute as a whole, the word “lawful” in section 101(a)(13)(A)

法律解释的起点是法规的措辞。见 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)。清晰且无歧义的措辞必须赋予效力，除非在罕见情况下，例如这样做会“产生‘明显违背其起草者意图’的结果”。Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)（引用 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)）；另见 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)。 孤立地看，定义中的“合法入境”规定最自然地会被理解为要求实质合法的入境，尤其是因为程序合法的入境已由“移民官员检查与授权”的要求单独表示。但法定措辞的含义和清晰度应在其所使用的语境中评估，而非孤立地评估。Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004); Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 372 (1994)。作为定义术语，“准许入境”和“获准入境”这些词仅在其被使用的条款中才具有生命力。 国土安全部（“DHS”）主张，在法规整体的语境中，第101(a)(13)(A)条中的“合法”一词

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Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010) Interim Decision #3688

引用为 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010) 临时决定 #3688

does not demand a substantively lawful entry. Instead, it simply reinforces the statute’s “inspection and authorization” language, making it clear that an admission cannot be accomplished by an entry that procedurally evades inspection. See Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (determining that an “admission” only requires a procedurally lawful entry, not a substantively lawful entry). While this reading of the word “lawful” is not the most natural reading, I agree with the majority that it is the reading that emerges from an overall examination of the statute. In particular, I find persuasive the portions of the majority opinion’s analyzing the use of the term “admission” in the contexts of sections 212(h) and 237(a)(1)(A) and (H) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h) and 1227(a)(1)(A) and (H) (2006). I agree that those statutory sections would essentially be rendered meaningless or would operate in ways not envisioned by Congress if we were to construe an admission as requiring legal compliance with the substantive provisions of the statute. As explained by the majority, the legislative history reflects that Congress added the definition of admission to replace certain aspects of the “entry doctrine,” under which aliens who had entered the United States without inspection gained privileges in immigration proceedings that were not available to aliens who presented themselves for inspection at a port of entry. H.R. Rep. No. 104-469(I), at 225-26 (1996), 1996 WL 168955.1 Our construction of the terms “admission” and “admitted” to demand only a procedurally lawful entry does give limited meaning to the word “lawful,” but it is the interpretation most in keeping with the overall structure and sound operation of the statute as a whole. Accordingly, I agree that an alien can be “admitted” even if he or she is substantively inadmissible at the time of the entry in question.

并不要求实体上合法的入境。相反，它只是强化了法规中“检查与授权”的措辞，明确表明不能通过程序上规避检查的入境来完成一次入境。参见 Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010)（认定“入境”只要求程序上合法的入境，而非实体上合法的入境）。虽然对“合法”一词的这种解读并非最自然的解读，但我同意多数意见，认为这是从对法规的整体考察中得出的解读。 具体而言，我认为多数意见中分析《移民与国籍法》第212(h)条以及第237(a)(1)(A)和(H)条、8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h) 和 1227(a)(1)(A) 和 (H) (2006) 语境下“入境”一词使用的部分具有说服力。我同意，如果我们把入境解释为要求在法律上遵守法规的实体条款，那么这些法定条款基本上将变得毫无意义，或者将以国会未曾设想的方式运作。正如多数意见所解释的，立法史反映出国会增加了入境的定义，以取代“入境原则”的某些方面，根据该原则，未经检查进入美国的外国人在移民程序中获得了在入境口岸接受检查的外国人所无法获得的特权。H.R. Rep. No. 104-469(I), at 225-26 (1996), 1996 WL 168955.1 我们将“入境”和“获准入境”解释为只要求程序上合法的入境，这确实赋予了“合法”一词有限的含义，但这是最符合法规整体结构和健全运作的解释。因此，我同意，即使外国人在相关入境时实体上不可入境，其也可以被“获准入境”。

1 The interpretation we adopt here is consistent with the approach we took in Matter of Ayala, 22 I&N Dec. 398 (BIA 1998). But I fail to see how concerns over undermining that 1998 decision should influence our reading of what was intended by a 1996 legislative enactment. What is relevant is how the term “admitted” best operates in the section 212(h) context, and to that extent Ayala does support our present interpretation.

1 我们在此采用的解释与我们 in Matter of Ayala, 22 I&N Dec. 398 (BIA 1998) 一案中所采取的方法一致。但我不明白，对损害该1998年裁决的担忧何以会影响我们对1996年立法 enactments 意图的解读。相关的是“获准入境”一词在第212(h)条语境下如何最好地运作，就此而言，Ayala 确实支持我们目前的解释。

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