Matter of Hosseinian

The United States citizen petitioner applied for immediate rela- tive status for the beneficiary as her spouse under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982). In a decision dated April 8, 1985, the district director denied the peti- tion but certified his decision to the Board for review pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c) (1985). The decision of the district director will be af- firmed. The petitioner is a 39 -year-old native of Hungary and citizen of the United States. The beneficiary is a 38-year-old native and citi- zen of Iran. A marriage certificate submitted with the visa petition indicates that the petitioner and the beneficiary were married in California on May 29, 1983. The record also reflects that the peti- tioner has two prior marriages. To show the legal termination of these marriages, the petitioner submitted divorce decrees purport- ing to terminate each of them. One divorce decree, dated November 23, 1978, was issued by a Hungarian court. This decree states that a marriage entered into by the petitioner and her first husband in Hungary on September 14, 1968, was dissolved with the agreement of both parties. According to the decree, both the petitioner and her first husband were then residing in Los Angeles and were rep- resented in court by Hungarian attorneys. The other decree is a

美国公民申请人根据《移民和国籍法》第201(b)条，8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982)，为受益人作为其配偶申请直系亲属身份。在1985年4月8日的决定中，地区主任拒绝了该申请，但根据8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c) (1985)将其决定认证提交委员会审查。地区主任的决定将予以维持。 申请人是39岁的匈牙利本地人，美国公民。受益人是38岁的伊朗本地人和公民。随签证申请提交的结婚证书表明，申请人和受益人于1983年5月29日在加利福尼亚州结婚。记录还显示申请人有两次先前的婚姻。为证明这些婚姻的合法终止，申请人提交了 purporting 终止每一段婚姻的离婚判决书。一份日期为1978年11月23日的离婚判决书由匈牙利法院签发。该判决书称，申请人与其第一任丈夫于1968年9月14日在匈牙利缔结的婚姻经双方同意而解除。根据该判决书，申请人和其第一任丈夫当时均居住在洛杉矶，并由匈牙利律师在法庭上代表。另一份判决书是

May 16, 1983, final judgment of dissolution of marriage issued by a California court. Also contained in the record is a March 15, 1984, letter to the Immigration. and Naturalization Service from the European Law Division of the Law Library of the Library of Congress, which states that the petitioner's Hungarian divorce is valid under Hun- garian law. It is pointed out that no law in Hungary requires the parties to a divorce to appear personally before the court if they are represented by a duly authorized attorney, unless the court finds it necessary to hear their testimony. The letter also states that the Hungarian court had jurisdiction over the proceedings be- cause under Hungarian law the parties remained citizens of Hun- gary even if they acquired citizenship from another country. The district director noted in his decision that the Board has held that, pursuant to section 1915 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, California allows for recognition of divorces rendered by a tribunal of a foreign country if the tribunal had jurisdiction ac- cording to the laws of that country. See Matter of Kurtin, 12 I&N Dec. 284 (BIA 1967). The district director also pointed out, however, that in 1974, subsequent to the Board's decision in Kurtin, the State of California repealed section 1915 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. See 1974 Cal. Stat., ch. 211, § 6. The district direc- tor further determined that the petitioner's Hungarian divorce would not be recognized under California law. He accordingly denied the instant visa petition on the ground that the petitioner had a prior marriage which had not been terminated and therefore had failed to show that she was legally eligible to enter into her marriage with the beneficiary. The petitioner objects to the reliance on state law to determine whether her foreign divorce would be recognized and suggests that the issue of recognition be resolved by application of a uniform fed- eral standard. She further contends that the Service should be es- topped from refusing to recognize her Hungarian divorce as valid because its validity has already been acknowledged by the granting of a previous visa petition filed by the petitioner for a different beneficiary. The petitioner argues that she detrimentally relied on. the Service's prior acceptance of her Hungarian divorce by filing the instant petition without the assistance of counsel. Section 201(b) of the Act provides for the granting of immediate relative status to the spouse of a citizen of the United States. Where a petition is filed on behalf of an alien spouse, it must be accompanied by a certificate of marriage to the beneficiary and proof of the legal termination of all previous marriages of both the petitioner and the beneficiary. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2) (1987).

1983年5月16日由加利福尼亚州法院签发的婚姻解除最终判决。 记录中还包含一封1984年3月15日国会图书馆法律图书馆欧洲法律部致移民和归化局的信函，该信函称申请人的匈牙利离婚根据匈牙利法律有效。信中指出，匈牙利法律不要求离婚双方在由正式授权律师代表时亲自出庭，除非法院认为有必要听取其证词。该信函还称，匈牙利法院对该程序具有管辖权，因为根据匈牙利法律，即使当事人获得了另一国的公民身份，他们仍为匈牙利公民。 地区主任在其决定中指出，委员会曾裁定，根据《加利福尼亚州民事诉讼法典》第1915条，加利福尼亚州允许承认外国法庭作出的离婚，如果该法庭根据该国法律具有管辖权。见 Matter of Kurtin, 12 I&N Dec. 284 (BIA 1967)。然而，地区主任还指出，1974年，在委员会对Kurtin案作出裁决之后，加利福尼亚州废除了《加利福尼亚州民事诉讼法典》第1915条。见 1974 Cal. Stat., ch. 211, § 6。地区主任进一步认定，申请人的匈牙利离婚根据加利福尼亚州法律将不被承认。他因此以申请人存在未终止的先前婚姻、因而未能证明其有合法资格与受益人结婚为由，拒绝了本签证申请。 申请人反对依赖州法律来确定其外国离婚是否会被承认，并建议通过适用统一的联邦标准来解决承认问题。她进一步主张，服务局应被禁止拒绝承认其匈牙利离婚为有效，因为其有效性已通过批准申请人此前为另一不同受益人提交的签证申请而得到承认。申请人辩称，她在没有律师协助的情况下提交本申请，从而不利地依赖了服务局先前对其匈牙利离婚的接受。 该法第201(b)条规定授予美国公民配偶直系亲属身份。凡代表外籍配偶提交申请，必须附有与受益人的结婚证书以及申请人和受益人所有先前婚姻合法终止的证明。见 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2) (1987)。

We reject the petitioner's argument that the validity of her mar- riage to the beneficiary should be determined by a uniform federal standard. The petitioner cites no authority in support of her argu- ment and gives no indication of the way in which such a federal standard would be formulated. The well rule is that it is the function of the state to determine how its residents may enter into the marital relationship. See Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); United States v. Seay, 718 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970). Therefore, the validity of a marriage for immi- gration purposes is generally governed by the law of the place of celebration of the marriage. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Matter of Luna, 18 I&N Dec. 385 (BIA 1983); Matter of Bautista, 16 I&N Dec. 602 BIA 1978); Matter of Arenas, 15 I&N Dec. 174 BIA 1975); Matter of P-, 4 I&N Doe_ 610 (BIA, Acting A.G. 1952). Where one of the parties to a marriage has a prior divorce, we look to the law of the state where the subsequent marriage was celebrated to determine whether or not that state would recognize the validity of the divorce. Matter of Ma, 15 I&N Dec. 70 (IRA 1974). As the marriage between the petitioner and the beneficiary was celebrated in California, the issue before us is whether the petition- er's divorce in Hungary would be recognized as valid under Califor- nia law. In Matter of Kurtin, supra, we referred to section 1915 of the California Code of Civil Procedure and found that California would recognize as valid a Yugoslav divorce decree granted in ab- sentia to two nationals of Yugoslavia, where the Yugoslav court had jurisdiction over the parties under Yugoslav law. As noted by the district director, however, section 1915 of the California Code of Civil Procedure was repealed in 1974. Accordingly, we withdraw from the holding in Kurtin as to the applicable law in the State of California. We now hold that the controlling California law on the facts before us is found in the sections of the California Civil Code which provide as follows:

我们驳回申请人关于其与受益人婚姻的有效性应由统一的联邦标准确定的主张。申请人未援引任何支持其主张的权威依据，也未说明此种联邦标准将如何制定。既定的规则是，确定其居民如何进入婚姻关系是州的职能。见 Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); United States v. Seay, 718 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970)。因此，婚姻在移民目的上的有效性一般由婚姻举行地的法律管辖。Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Matter of Luna, 18 I&N Dec. 385 (BIA 1983); Matter of Bautista, 16 I&N Dec. 602 (BIA 1978); Matter of Arenas, 15 I&N Dec. 174 (BIA 1975); Matter of P-, 4 I&N Dec. 610 (BIA, Acting A.G. 1952)。如果婚姻一方有先前离婚，我们依据后续婚姻举行地的州法律来确定该州是否承认该离婚的有效性。Matter of Ma, 15 I&N Dec. 70 (BIA 1974)。 由于申请人与受益人之间的婚姻在加利福尼亚州举行，我们面前的问题是申请人在匈牙利的离婚根据加利福尼亚州法律是否会被认定为有效。在 Matter of Kurtin, supra 中，我们引用了《加利福尼亚州民事诉讼法典》第1915条，并认定加利福尼亚州将承认南斯拉夫法院对两名南斯拉夫国民缺席作出的离婚判决为有效，只要南斯拉夫法院根据南斯拉夫法律对当事人具有管辖权。然而，正如地区主任所指出的，《加利福尼亚州民事诉讼法典》第1915条已于1974年被废除。因此，我们撤回Kurtin案中关于加利福尼亚州适用法律的裁决。 我们现在裁定，在我们面前的事实上，控制性的加利福尼亚州法律见于《加利福尼亚州民法典》以下条款：

The divorce decre from the Hungarian court specificaly states that both the petitioner and her first husband were residing in Los Angeles at the time the judgment was entered. Thus, it is clear that California would refuse to recognize the Hungarian decree, de- spite the fact that it is valid under Hungarian law, because both parties were domiciled in California at the time of the foreign di- vorce proceeding. See Lee v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 550 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Atherley's Estate, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975). In visa petition proceedings, the burden is on the petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. See Matter of Brantigan, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). The petitioner has neither shown that her Hungarian divorce is valid under the law of California, which denies recognition to foreign divorces granted to two clomiciliaries of California, nor has she rebutted the information in the Hungari- an divorce decree indicating that she and her first husband were residents of California at the time the judgment was entered. Be- cause the petitioner has not established that her first marriage was legally terminated, she has not established that she had the capac- ity to marry the beneficiary. Her marriage to the beneficiary, therefore, is deemed invalid for immigration purposes. We find no merit in the petitioner's contention that the Service should be estopped from refusing to recognize her Hungarian di- vorce as valid because its validity has already been acknowledged by the granting of a previous visa petition filed by the petitioner for a different beneficiary. Evidence regarding the visa petition filed for this other beneficiary is not before us. Even assuming, however, that a previous visa petition was erroneously granted by the Service, it is not clear that estoppel will lie against the Govern- ment in immigration cases. See Heckler v. Community Health Serv- ices, 467 U.S. 51 (1984); INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982); Matter of Tuakoi, 19 I&N Dec. 341 (BIA 1985). Further, even if estoppel is applicable against the Government, the petitioner has failed to show the elements necessary for equitable estoppel. In order to show estoppel, the petitioner must prove that an action by the Gov- ernment or its agent constituted affirmative misconduct, that she

匈牙利法院的离婚判决书明确说明，申请人和其第一任丈夫在判决作出时均居住在洛杉矶。因此，很明显，加利福尼亚州将拒绝承认匈牙利判决，尽管该判决根据匈牙利法律有效，因为双方在外国离婚程序时均居住于加利福尼亚州。见 Lee v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 550 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Atherley's Estate, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975)。 在签证申请程序中，申请人负有证明其符合所寻求福利资格的举证责任。见 Matter of Brantigan, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966)。申请人既未证明其匈牙利离婚根据加利福尼亚州法律有效——该法律拒绝承认授予加利福尼亚州两名居住者的外国离婚——也未反驳匈牙利离婚判决书中表明她和其第一任丈夫在判决作出时为加利福尼亚州居民的信息。由于申请人未证明其第一次婚姻已合法终止，她未证明其有与受益人结婚的能力。因此，她与受益人的婚姻在移民目的上被视为无效。 我们认为申请人关于服务局应被禁止拒绝承认其匈牙利离婚为有效的主张没有依据，理由是其有效性已通过批准申请人此前为另一不同受益人提交的签证申请而得到承认。关于为这一其他受益人提交的签证申请的证据不在我们面前。然而，即使假设服务局此前错误地批准了一份签证申请，在移民案件中禁止反言是否可针对政府成立也并不明确。见 Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51 (1984); INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982); Matter of Tuakoi, 19 I&N Dec. 341 (BIA 1985)。此外，即使禁止反言可针对政府适用，申请人也未能证明衡平法禁止反言所必需的要件。为证明禁止反言，申请人必须证明政府或其代理人的行为构成积极不当行为，且她

reasonably relied on the action or representation of the Govern- ment, and that she was prejudiced thereby. See Heckler v. Commu- nity Health Services, supra. We do not find the failure of the Service to detect an invalid ter- mination of a prior marriage to constitute "affirmative miscon- duct." See Mukherjee v. INS, 793 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Matter of Tayabji, 19 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 1985) (a district director's approval of an alien's application for a waiver under beetion 212(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1982), in excess of his authority); Matter of Morales, 15 MN Dec. 411 (MA 1975) (the Service's erro- neous approval of a visa petition); Matter of Polanco, 14 I&N Dec. 483 (BIA 1973), and Matter of Khan, 14 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 1973) (immigration inspectors' admission of inadmissible aliens). In addi- tion, it does not appear that the petitioner has been prejudiced by her reliance on the Government's erroneous action, as she received the benefit of conferring status on a prior spouse who was not enti- tled to an immigrant visa. Further, her position has not been ad- versely affected simply because she anticipated no problems with the instant petition and therefore filed it without the assistance of counsel. The petition was denied as a matter of law. Had the appli- cation been filed by an attorney, the validity of the petitioner's prior divorce would still have been the determinative issue. More- over; we note that the petitioner is currently represented by coun- sel, who submitted a rebuttal to the district director's decision. Accordingly, the decision of the district director will be affirmed. ORDER: The decision of the district director is affirmed.

合理依赖政府的行动或陈述，且她因此受到损害。见 Heckler v. Community Health Services, supra。 我们不认为移民局未能发现先前婚姻的无效终止构成“积极不当行为”。见 Mukherjee v. INS, 793 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1986)；另见 Matter of Tayabji, 19 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 1985)（地区主任批准外国人根据该法第212(e)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1982) 提出的豁免申请，超越其权限）；Matter of Morales, 15 MN Dec. 411 (MA 1975)（移民局错误批准签证申请）；Matter of Polanco, 14 I&N Dec. 483 (BIA 1973)，以及 Matter of Khan, 14 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 1973)（移民检查员准许不可入境的外国人入境）。此外，申请人似乎并未因依赖政府的错误行动而受到损害，因为她获得了将身份赋予一位无权获得移民签证的前配偶的利益。而且，她的立场并未仅仅因为她预计本申请不会有问题因而未聘请律师提交申请而受到不利影响。该申请作为法律问题被拒。即使申请由律师提交，申请人先前离婚的有效性仍将是决定性争点。此外，我们注意到申请人目前由律师代理，该律师已就地区主任的决定提交了反驳意见。 因此，地区主任的决定将予维持。 命令：地区主任的决定予以维持。