Matter of Li

In Visa Petition Revocation Proceedings

在签证申请撤销程序中

A-71867441

A-71867441

Decided by Board September 29, 1993

由委员会于1993年9月29日决定

(1) An adopted child, as defined by section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1988), may not confer immigration benefits upon a natural parent without regard to whether the adopted child has been accorded or could be accorded immigration benefits by virtue of his or her adoptive status. Matter of Valsamakis, 12 I&N Dec. 421 (BIA 1967); and Matter of Lum, 11 I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1964), overruled. Matter of Kirby, 13 l&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1969), modified. (2) The petitioner, who was an adopted child under the immigration laws, may not confer immigration benefits upon the beneficiary, his natural sibling, because their common natural parent no longer has the status of parent of the adopted child for immigration purposes. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Stephen P. Gleit, Esquire Thomas K. Ware Gleit & Fair Service Center 401 Broadway, Suite 601 Counsel New York, New York 10013

(1) 根据《移民和国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1988) 所定义的收养子女，不得赋予其自然父母移民利益，无论该收养子女是否已因收养身份而被赋予或可以被赋予移民利益。Matter of Valsamakis, 12 I&N Dec. 421 (BIA 1967)；以及 Matter of Lum, 11 I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1964)，被推翻。Matter of Kirby, 13 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1969)，被修改。 (2) 申请人，根据移民法曾为收养子女，不得赋予受益人，即其自然兄弟姐妹，移民利益，因为他们的共同自然父母在移民目的上不再具有该收养子女的父/母身份。 申请人代表： 服务局代表： Stephen P. Gleit, Esquire Thomas K. Ware Gleit & Fair 服务中心 401 Broadway, Suite 601 法律顾问 纽约，纽约 10013

The petitioner applied for preference classification for the benefi- ciary as his sibling pursuant to section 203(a)(5) of the immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(5) (1988).' The petition was approved on May 26, 1990. In a decision dated August 3, 1991, the district director revoked approval of the petition. The petitioner has appealed. The appeal will be dismissed. The request for oral argument is denied. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e) (1993).

申请人根据《移民和国籍法》第203(a)(5)条，8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(5) (1988)，为受益人作为其兄弟姐妹申请优先分类。该申请于1990年5月26日获批。在1991年8月3日的决定中，地区主任撤销了申请的批准。申请人已提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。口头辩论请求被拒绝。见 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e) (1993)。

Under section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1988), the Attorney General may revoke the approval of any visa petition approved by her for what she deems to be "good and sufficient cause." A notice of intention to revoke a visa petition is properly issued for "good and sufficient cause" when the evidence of record at the time of issuance, if unexplained and unrebutted, would warrant a denial of the visa petition based upon the petitioner's failure to meet the requisite burden of proof. Matter of Arias, 19 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 1988); Matter of Estime, 19 I&N Dec. 450 (BIA 1987). The basis for issuance of the notice of intention to revoke in these proceedings was the Immigration and Naturalization Service's position that, as a matter of law, the beneficiary was ineligible for classification as the sibling of the petitioner. For the reasons we discuss below, we find the notice of intention to revoke to have been properly issued for good and sufficient cause. The petitioner, a naturalized citizen of the United States, was adopted as a child. He did not gain.an immigration benefit by virtue of his adoption. However, after gaining lawful status in the United States, he filed a petition to have immediate relative status conferred upon his adoptive mother. That petition was granted upon the petitioner establishing that his adoption satisfied the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1988). He then sought to have a petition for preference classification approved on behalf of his natural sibling. That petition was approved, but the approval was subsequently revoked by the Service. The question before us is whether a petitioner, who qualifies as an adopted child within the provisions of section 101(bX1)(E) of the Act, can successfully petition for a natural sibling on the basis of their relationship to a common natural parent? Does the natural sibling relationship survive for immigration purposes when a child has been adopted and that adoption satisfies the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E)? The petitioner finds support for his position that his natural sibling is eligible for immigration benefits by virtue of their relationship to a common natural parent in Matter of Fujii, 12 I&N Dec. 495 (D.D. 1967).2 In that case, a district director held that the relationship of brother and sister created by the legitimate birth of siblings to the same parents is not destroyed by the subsequent adoption of a sibling, and, therefore, the natural siblings of the adopted child are entitled to any immigration benefit generally available to siblings.

根据该法第205条，8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1988)，司法部长可以以其认为的“良好且充分的理由”撤销其批准的任何签证申请。当签发时记录中的证据，如果未经解释和反驳，将因申请人未能满足所需的举证责任而足以构成拒绝签证申请的理由时，即为“良好且充分的理由”妥善发出了撤销签证申请意向通知。Matter of Arias, 19 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 1988)；Matter of Estime, 19 I&N Dec. 450 (BIA 1987)。在本程序中发出撤销意向通知的依据是移民和归化局的立场，即作为法律问题，受益人没有资格被归类为申请人的兄弟姐妹。基于我们下文讨论的理由，我们认定撤销意向通知系因良好且充分的理由而妥善发出。 申请人是一名美国归化公民，在儿童时期被收养。他并未因收养而获得移民利益。然而，在获得美国合法身份后，他提交了一份申请，要求将直系亲属身份授予其养母。该申请在申请人证明其收养符合该法第101(b)(1)(E)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1988)的要求后获得批准。随后，他寻求为其自然血亲兄弟姐妹批准一份优先类别申请。该申请获得批准，但该批准随后被移民局撤销。 摆在我们面前的问题是，符合该法第101(b)(1)(E)条规定的收养子女资格的申请人，能否基于其与共同自然父母的关系，成功为其自然血亲兄弟姐妹提交申请？当儿童已被收养且该收养符合第101(b)(1)(E)条的要求时，自然血亲兄弟姐妹关系在移民目的上是否存续？ 申请人从Matter of Fujii, 12 I&N Dec. 495 (D.D. 1967)中为其立场找到支持，即其自然血亲兄弟姐妹因与共同自然父母的关系而有资格获得移民利益。2 在该案中，地区局长认定，同一父母合法生育的兄弟姐妹所建立的兄弟姐妹关系不因兄弟姐妹随后被收养而消灭，因此，被收养儿童的自然血亲兄弟姐妹有权获得通常可供兄弟姐妹享有的任何移民利益。

On the other hand, the Service submits that a parent/child relationship ceased to exist between the petitioner and his natural parents subsequent to his adoption and that thereafter his natural parents' other children, including the beneficiary, could no longer qualify as his siblings within the scope of the Act. The Service cites Matter of Kong, 17 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1979), in support for this position. As a starting point, we note that the Act does not define "brother" or "sister," but does define the terms "child," "parent," "father," and "mother." The relevant portions of section 101(b)(1) provide:

另一方面，服务局提出，在申请人被收养后，申请人与自然父母之间的父/母子女关系不复存在，此后其自然父母的其他子女，包括受益人，不再有资格作为该法范围内的兄弟姐妹。服务局引用 Matter of Kong, 17 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1979) 支持这一立场。 作为起点，我们注意到该法未定义“兄弟”或“姐妹”，但定义了“子女”、“父母”、“父亲”和“母亲”等术语。第101(b)(1)条的相关部分规定：

(E) a child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child has been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years: Provided, That no natural parent of any such adopted child shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this Act.... 3 Section 101(b)(2) of the Act provides that the term "parent," "father," or "mother" means a parent, father, or mother only where the relationship "exists" by reason of any of the circumstances set forth in section 101(bX1). The Board has long held that in order to qualify as siblings under section 203(a)(5) of the Act, a petitioner must establish that he and the beneficiary once qualified as children of a common parent within the meaning of sections 101(b)(1) and (2) of the Act. See Matter of Mourillorz, 18 I&N Dec. 122 (BIA 1981); Matter of Kong, supra; Matter of Ferreira, 16 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 1978); Matter of Clahar, 16 I&N Dec. 484 (BIA 1978); Matter of Bourne, 16 I&N Dec. 367 (BIA 1977); Matter of Gur, 16 I&N Dec- 123 (BIA 1977); Matter of Behman, 15 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1975); Matter of Garner, 15 I&N Dec. 215, 216 n.2 (BIA 1975), and cases cited therein; Matter ofHeung, 15 I&N Dec. 145 (BIA 1974). This "once qualified" rule has been applied to "give effect to the time limitations set out in the Act's definition of 'child', while recognizing that the circumstances creating the relationship are unaffected by the passage of time, marriage of the child, or even death." Matter of Kong, supra, at 153. As we explained in Kong,

(E) 在十六岁以下被收养的子女，如果该子女在收养父母或父母的合法监护下，并与其共同居住至少两年：但规定，任何此类收养子女的自然父母此后不得因该亲子关系而根据本法被赋予任何权利、特权或身份……3 该法第101(b)(2)条规定，“父母”、“父亲”或“母亲”一词仅指因第101(b)(1)条所列任何情况而“存在”关系的父母、父亲或母亲。 委员会长期以来一直认为，为了根据该法第203(a)(5)条符合兄弟姐妹资格，申请人必须证明其和受益人曾经符合该法第101(b)(1)和(2)条含义内的共同父母的子女资格。见 Matter of Mourillorz, 18 I&N Dec. 122 (BIA 1981)；Matter of Kong, supra；Matter of Ferreira, 16 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 1978)；Matter of Clahar, 16 I&N Dec. 484 (BIA 1978)；Matter of Bourne, 16 I&N Dec. 367 (BIA 1977)；Matter of Gur, 16 I&N Dec. 123 (BIA 1977)；Matter of Behman, 15 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1975)；Matter of Garner, 15 I&N Dec. 215, 216 n.2 (BIA 1975)，及其中引用的案例；Matter of Heung, 15 I&N Dec. 145 (BIA 1974)。 这一“曾经符合”规则被适用于“实施该法‘子女’定义中规定的时间限制，同时承认创建关系的情况不受时间流逝、子女婚姻甚至死亡的影响。” Matter of Kong, supra, at 153。正如我们在 Kong 中解释的，

however, this language was not intended to suggest that the status of "parent," once established, could not be terminated. In Kong, we clarified that to qualify as siblings under section 203(a)(5) of the Act, a petitioner must establish both that he and the beneficiary once qualified as children of a common parent and that the parental relationship has not been severed. In that case, we found that a sibling relationship created by an adoption did not survive for immigration purposes the termination of the adoption. Although the petitioner and beneficiary "once qualified" as sister and brother, they no longer qualified as siblings under the Act because they no longer had a common parent. The petitioner's adoptive parents were not her "parents" at the time the visa petition was filed because the relationship between them and her had been severed. Does the parent/child relationship between natural parents and child survive for immigration purposes when a child has been adopted? Section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act defines the adoptive child relationships that will be recognized under the Act. Under that section, there must be a legal adoption while the child is under 16 years of age and the child must have been in the legal custody of, and have resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least 2 years. If "such" an adoption occurs, the child is recognized as the child of the adoptive parent or parents, and no natural parent can thereafter by virtue of such parentage be accorded any "right, privilege, or status" under the Act. See section 101(b)(1XE) of the Act; Matter of 5-, 9 I&N Dec. 567 (BIA 1962); Matter of K-, 9 I&N Dec. 116 (BIA 1960). If an adoption occurs, but it does not satisfy the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E), the relationship between the natural parent and the child continues to be recognized under the Act. See Matter of B -, supra. Thus, for purposes of any "right, privilege, or status" under the Act, a child may be recognized as the child of his or her natural parents or of his or her adoptive parent or parents, but not of both. The determinative test is whether an. adoption occurred that satisfied the requirements of section 101(b)(1XE). If "such" an adoption has occurred, any right, privilege, or status of the natural parents under the Act is thereafter terminated. Thus, natural parents no longer have the "status" of parents under the Act once "such" an adoption has occurred. Accordingly, where there is "such" an adoption, a sibling relationship will not be recognized for immigration purposes based simply on the fact that the petitioner and beneficiary "once qualified" as children of a common natural parent because it can no longer be shown that the natural parent has the "status" under the At of "parent" of the adopted child. We note that in Matter of Lum, 11 I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1964), we added a gloss to the language of section 101(b)(I)(E) of the Act that we

然而，这一表述并非意在暗示“父母”身份一旦确立便不可终止。在Kong案中，我们阐明，要符合该法第203(a)(5)条规定的兄弟姐妹资格，申请人必须证明其与受益人曾同为同一父母的子女，且该父母关系未被切断。在该案中，我们认定，因收养而产生的兄弟姐妹关系在收养终止后，就移民目的而言不再存续。尽管申请人与受益人“曾符合”姐妹和兄弟的资格，但由于他们不再拥有共同的父母，因此不再符合该法规定的兄弟姐妹资格。申请人的养父母在提交签证申请时并非其“父母”，因为他们与她之间的关系已被切断。 当子女被收养时，亲生父母与子女之间的父母/子女关系就移民目的而言是否存续？该法第101(b)(1)(E)条界定了该法将承认的养子女关系。根据该条，必须在子女未满16岁时进行合法收养，且子女必须已处于收养父母一方的法定监护下并与收养父母一方共同居住至少2年。如果发生了“此类”收养，该子女即被承认为收养父母一方的子女，此后任何亲生父母不得凭借此种亲子关系享有该法规定的任何“权利、特权或身份”。参见该法第101(b)(1)(E)条；Matter of 5-, 9 I&N Dec. 567 (BIA 1962)；Matter of K-, 9 I&N Dec. 116 (BIA 1960)。如果发生了收养，但不符合第101(b)(1)(E)条的要求，则亲生父母与子女之间的关系继续根据该法得到承认。参见Matter of B -, supra。因此，就该法规定的任何“权利、特权或身份”而言，子女可以被承认为其亲生父母的子女，或者其收养父母一方的子女，但不能同时是两者的子女。决定性检验标准是是否发生了符合第101(b)(1)(E)条要求的收养。如果发生了“此类”收养，亲生父母在该法下的任何权利、特权或身份此后即告终止。因此，一旦发生“此类”收养，亲生父母不再具有该法下的父母“身份”。相应地，在存在“此类”收养的情况下，兄弟姐妹关系不会仅因申请人和受益人“曾符合”同一亲生父母的子女资格就移民目的得到承认，因为不再能够证明该亲生父母具有该法下被收养子女的“父母”“身份”。 我们注意到，在Matter of Lum, 11 I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1964)中，我们对该法第101(b)(1)(E)条的措辞添加了一段解释性文字，而我们现在认定该解释无法得到法条文字的支持。

now fmd cannot be supported by the words of the statute. In Matter of Lum, we held that the term "such adopted child" contained in the proviso to section 101(b)(1)(E)—that no natural parent of any such adopted child shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this Act—"obviously means an adopted child who under the terms of the section is eligible for—or has obtained—an immigration benefit." Id. at 56.4 As such, we considered the proviso barring a natural parent from receiving an immigration benefit to be inapplicable where an adopted child had received no immigration benefit from his or her adoptive status and as a matter of either law or fact was in no position to claim such benefit. Consequent- ly, in the factual context of Lum, where an adopted child had not received an immigration benefit by virtue of her adoption and where her adoptive parents were dead or presumed dead, we held that the fact of her adoption was immaterial to the eligibility of her natural mother for immediate relative status based upon their natural relationship. However, contrary to our holding in Matter of Lum, we do not find it "obvious" from a plain reading of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act that the proscription on its application was only intended to be applicable where an adopted child had received, or could receive or confer, an immigration benefit by virtue of his or her adoption. There is no support for this finding in the language of section 101(b)(1)(E), and simply terming it "obviously" correct does not make it so. That section, by its express terms, makes no distinction between adopted children on the basis of whether they have received or conferred, or whether they remain eligible to receive or confer, an immigration benefit by virtue of their adoptive status. Congress could have written the proviso in the manner enunciated in Lum, but it did not do so. Rather, the restrictive language of that section, defining an adopted child by virtue of the child's having met age, custody, and residence requirements, proscribes, without qualification, any right, privilege, or status to the natural parent of "any such child." Where an adoption has occurred which meets the definitional requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, there simply is no statutory basis by which the phrase "any such child" can be qualified to allow "any right, privilege, or status" thereafter to be accorded to a natural parent of an adopted

在Matter of Lum案中，我们裁定，第101(b)(1)(E)条但书中所载的“此类养子女”一语——即任何此类养子女的亲生父母此后不得凭借此种亲子关系享有本法规定的任何权利、特权或身份——“显然是指根据该条条款有资格获得——或已获得——移民利益的养子女。”Id. at 56.4 因此，我们认为，在养子女未因其收养身份获得任何移民利益，且在法律或事实上均无法主张此类利益的情况下，禁止亲生父母获得移民利益的但书不适用。 consequently，在Lum案的事实背景下，即养子女未因其收养获得移民利益，且其养父母已死亡或推定死亡，我们裁定，其收养事实对其亲生母亲基于自然关系申请直系亲属身份的资格无关紧要。 然而，与我们在Matter of Lum案中的裁定相反，我们并不认为从该法第101(b)(1)(E)条的平文阅读中可以“显然”看出，对其适用的禁止仅意在适用于养子女已因其收养获得、或可能获得或授予移民利益的情形。第101(b)(1)(E)条的措辞中没有任何支持这一认定的依据，仅仅将其称为“显然”正确并不能使其如此。该条通过其明确条款，并未根据养子女是否已因其收养身份获得或授予、或是否仍有资格获得或授予移民利益而对养子女作出区分。国会本可以按照Lum案所阐述的方式撰写但书，但国会并未如此。相反，该条的限缩性措辞——通过子女满足年龄、监护和居住要求来界定养子女——无保留地禁止“任何此类子女”的亲生父母享有任何权利、特权或身份。在发生了符合该法第101(b)(1)(E)条定义要求的收养的情况下，根本不存在法定依据可使“任何此类子女”一语受到限定，从而允许此后向被收养子女的亲生父母授予“任何权利、特权或身份”，

Interim Decision #3207

临时决定第3207号

child simply because no immigration benefit had been or could be accorded by virtue of the adoption. Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous it must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive since there is a strong presump- tion that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987); North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983). Words are to be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). We look to the legislative history to determine only whether there is "'clearly expressed legisla- tive intention— contrary to statutory language, which would require us to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses. United States v. Tames, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). In this case, there is no legislative history for section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act which indicates a congressional intent contrary to our interpretation of the plain meaning of the statutory language. See H.R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2016. In accordance with the plain meaning of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, we hold that an adoption that meets the requirements of that section in all instances, whether or not an immigration benefit has been or could be obtained by virtue thereof, precludes a natural parent of any such adopted child from being thereafter accorded any right, privilege, or status under the Act. In so holding, we overrule Matter of Lum, supra, and its progeny, Matter of Valsamakis, 12 I&N Dec. 421 (BIA 1967), to the extent the holdings in those cases are inconsistent with our holding today. We also withdraw from the language in Matter of Kirby, 13 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1969), which references Matter of Lum. We finally note that we are not persuaded by the district director's analysis in Matter of ujii, supra, that a sibling relationship created by the legitimate birth of a petitioner and beneficiary to the same parent is not terminated by the subsequent adoption of the petitioner in compliance with the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E). The district director found the following determinative:

子女，仅仅因为尚未或不能因收养而授予任何移民利益。 如果法条语言清晰且无歧义，通常必须将其视为决定性的，因为存在一种强有力的推定，即国会通过其选择的语言表达其意图。INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987)；North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983)。词语应按其通常、当代、普通含义解释。参见Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)。我们查阅立法历史仅是为了确定是否存在“明确表达的立法意图”——与法条语言相反，从而要求我们质疑国会通过其选择的语言表达其意图这一强有力的推定。United States v. Tames, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986)（引用Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)）。在本案中，没有关于该法第101(b)(1)(E)条的立法历史表明国会意图与我们对法条语言平文含义的解释相反。参见H.R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957)，重印于1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2016。 根据该法第101(b)(1)(E)条的平文含义，我们裁定，符合该条要求的收养在任何情况下，无论是否已因此获得或可能获得移民利益，均禁止任何此类被收养子女的亲生父母此后享有该法规定的任何权利、特权或身份。在作出此裁定时，我们推翻Matter of Lum, supra及其后续案件Matter of Valsamakis, 12 I&N Dec. 421 (BIA 1967)，只要这些案件中的裁定与我们今天的裁定不一致。我们还撤回Matter of Kirby, 13 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1969)中提及Matter of Lum的表述。 我们最后指出，我们未被地区局长在Matter of ujii, supra案中的分析所说服，即申请人和受益人合法出生为同一父母的子女所创造的兄弟姐妹关系，不因申请人随后符合第101(b)(1)(E)条要求的收养而终止。地区局长认定以下内容具有决定性：

Id. at 497. However, the familial definitions in section 101(b) of the Act exclusively relate to parent/child relationships and only those

Id. at 497。然而，该法第101(b)条中的家庭定义仅涉及父母/子女关系，且仅那些

relationships are defined. All other familial relationships are depen- dent on these definitions. That is, to determine whether a sibling relationship will be recognized, one must look to the parent/child definitions as a starting point. It would neither be expected that there would be a reference to siblings or other relatives in the section 101(b)(1)(E) proviso nor necessary that there should be. A sibling relationship can only be recognized through the fact of having a common parent within the definition of the Act. If a natural parent loses his or her "status" as a "parent" under the Act as a result of the proviso to section 101(b)(1)(E), then no sibling relationships can be recognized through that parent as there is no longer a parental relationship that is recognized under the Act. We note that if one were to accept the analysis of the district director in Matter of Fujii, .supra, the restrictive proviso of section 101(b)(1)(E) could be rendered meaningless over time. For example, under the district director's interpretation of the law, a child adopted in accordance with the terms of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act could, subsequent to his or her naturalization, petition for immigrant benefits on behalf of a natural sibling, who could then, in turn, petition for the natural parent that he or she shares with the adopted child. Over time, this would allow for the use of adoption as a means for an adopted child's natural parents to immigrate as a direct result of the adoption. Accordingly, we disapprove of the reasoning and holding in Matter of Fujii, supra. The basis for revocation of the previously approved visa petition in this case was the Service's determination that, as a matter of law, the beneficiary was ineligible for classification as the sibling of the petitioner. We uphold that determination. Since the petitioner quali- fied as an adopted child within the definition of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, he is precluded from successfully petitioning for visa preference classification on behalf of his natural sibling. To the extent that a relationship between the petitioner and his natural parents was terminated by virtue of his adoption, he cannot now establish that he and the beneficiary are children of a common parent as is required by the Act for the purpose of establishing a sibling relationship. Section 203(a)(5) of the Act. Accordingly, the petitioner's appeal of the revocation of the previously approved visa petition will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

关系得到界定。所有其他亲属关系均取决于这些定义。也就是说，要确定兄弟姐妹关系是否会被承认，必须以父母/子女的定义为起点。既不能期望在第101(b)(1)(E)条但书中提及兄弟姐妹或其他亲属，也没有必要这样做。兄弟姐妹关系只能通过在该法定义范围内拥有共同父母这一事实而得到承认。如果自然父母因第101(b)(1)(E)条但书而丧失其在该法下作为"父母"的"身份"，则无法再通过该父母承认任何兄弟姐妹关系，因为该法下不再存在被承认的父母关系。 我们注意到，如果接受Matter of Fujii案（同上）中地区主任的分析，第101(b)(1)(E)条的限制性但书可能会随着时间的推移而变得毫无意义。例如，按照地区主任对法律的解释，依该法第101(b)(1)(E)条条款被收养的子女，在其归化之后，可以为其自然兄弟姐妹申请移民福利，而后者又可以反过来为其与被收养子女共同拥有的自然父母提出申请。随着时间的推移，这将使收养成为被收养子女的自然父母因收养而直接移民的手段。因此，我们不认可Matter of Fujii案（同上）的推理和裁决。 本案中撤销先前批准的签证申请的依据是，移民局认定，作为法律问题，受益人无资格被归类为申请人的兄弟姐妹。我们维持该认定。由于申请人符合该法第101(b)(1)(E)条定义范围内的被收养子女资格，其被禁止代表其自然兄弟姐妹成功申请签证优先分类。就申请人与及其自然父母之间的关系因收养而终止而言，其现在无法证明其与受益人是共同父母的子女，而这是该法为确立兄弟姐妹关系所要求的。该法第203(a)(5)条。因此，申请人就撤销先前批准的签证申请提出的上诉将被驳回。 命令： 上诉被驳回。