Matter of Xiu Hong Li

Interim Decision #3244

临时决定第3244号

File A72 134 165 - Northern Service Center

案卷A72 134 165 - 北部服务中心

Decided April 19, 1995

1995年4月19日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

On April 22, 1993, a Regional Service Center (“RSC”) director denied the visa petition filed by the United States citizen petitioner on behalf of the ben- eficiary for preference status as his unmarried daughter under section 203(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993). The RSC director certified his decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The record will be remanded for further consideration. The petitioner filed a visa petition on behalf of the beneficiary, a 22-year-old native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, on Decem- ber 9, 1992, asserting that she is his natural daughter. In support of the visa petition, the petitioner submitted a number of certified copies of Chinese notarial certificates, accompanied by English-language translations, the most

1993年4月22日，区域服务中心（“RSC”）主任否决了美国公民申请人代表受益人提交的签证申请，该申请依据《移民与国籍法》第203(a)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993)，请求将其作为未婚女儿给予偏好身份。RSC主任将其决定认证至移民上诉委员会。案卷将发回进一步审议。 申请人于1992年12月9日代表受益人提交了签证申请，受益人为22岁、中华人民共和国出生的公民，申请人主张其为自己的亲生女儿。为支持签证申请，申请人提交了若干经认证的中国公证书副本，并附英文翻译，其中最

pertinent of which are the following: a statement that the beneficiary was born on March 3, 1971, to her natural father, Xu Bao Yi, and her natural mother, Chen Xue Yan; a statement that the petitioner and Chen Xue Yan were married on August 24, 1964; and, a statement that the beneficiary was adopted on March 3, 1971, by her adoptive father, Li Meng Yang, and adop- tive mother, Cai Pei Ying, but that the adoptive relationship established between them was terminated under Chinese adoption law on October 20, 1992. The RSC director denied the visa petition on April 22, 1993. He con- cluded that the October 20, 1992, order renouncing the adoptive relationship did not reestablish the natural relationship between the petitioner and benefi- ciary for immigration purposes since the adoption had irrevocably severed the natural parent-child relationship. He stated that it “was within the realm of future possibility that this adopted beneficiary could receive from, or con- fer to, her adoptive parents an immigration benefit.” Therefore, the RSC director concluded, approval of the visa petition filed by the beneficiary’s natural father was barred under the “proviso” of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1988). As noted, the RSC director certified his decision to the Board. The threshold question facing the Board in this case is whether the natural relationship between a parent and child is irrevocably severed when a child is adopted through an adoption that satisfies the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E), even if that adoption subsequently is lawfully terminated. If not, under what circumstances could the natural relationships be recognized again for immigration purposes?

相关的如下：一份声明称受益人于1971年3月3日出生，其生父为Xu Bao Yi，生母为Chen Xue Yan；一份声明称申请人与Chen Xue Yan于1964年8月24日结婚；以及一份声明称受益人于1971年3月3日被其养父Li Meng Yang和养母Cai Pei Ying收养，但双方之间建立的收养关系已于1992年10月20日根据中国收养法终止。 RSC主任于1993年4月22日否决了签证申请。他认定，1992年10月20日放弃收养关系的裁定并未为移民目的重新建立申请人与受益人之间的自然关系，因为该收养已不可撤销地切断了自然父母子女关系。他表示，“该被收养受益人未来有可能从养父母处获得或向养父母授予移民利益。”因此，RSC主任认定，批准受益人亲生父亲提交的签证申请受到该法第101(b)(1)(E)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1988)的“但书”禁止。如前所述，RSC主任将其决定认证至委员会。 本案中委员会面临的首要问题是，当子女通过符合第101(b)(1)(E)条要求的收养被收养时，即使该收养随后被合法终止，父母与子女之间的自然关系是否不可撤销地被切断。如果不是，则在何种情况下自然关系可再次为移民目的被承认？

I. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND BOARD PRECEDENT REGARDING ADOPTIONS

I. 关于收养的法律条文和委员会先例

Section 101(b)(1) of the Act defines the term “child” for immigration pur- poses, in pertinent part, as follows:

该法第101(b)(1)条为移民目的对“子女”一词的相关定义如下：

This Board recently has addressed the effect of an adoption that meets the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act on natural relationships for immigration purposes. In Matter of Li, 20 I&N Dec. 700 (BIA 1993), we held that an adoption which satisfies the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E),

本委员会最近处理了符合该法第101(b)(1)(E)条要求的收养对移民目的自然关系的影响。在Matter of Li，20 I&N Dec. 700 (BIA 1993)中，我们裁定，符合第101(b)(1)(E)条要求的收养，

whether or not an immigration benefit has been accorded or could be accorded by virtue thereof, precludes a natural parent of any such adopted child from being accorded any right, privilege, or status under the Act because the adoption severs the relationship between the child and his or her natural parents for immigration purposes. In so holding, we overruled our prior decisions of Matter of Lum, 11 I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1964), and its prog- eny, Matter of Valsamakis, 12 I&N Dec. 421 (BIA 1967), and withdrew from certain language in Matter of Kirby, 13 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1969). We concluded that the plain language of the “proviso” to section 101(b)(1)(E) restricted the rights of natural parents once an adoption took place which met the age, custody, and residence requirements of that section, without regard to whether an immigration benefit had been accorded or could be accorded by virtue of that adoption.

无论是否已凭借该收养授予或可能授予移民利益，均禁止该被收养子女的任何亲生父母享有本法下的任何权利、特权或身份，因为该收养为移民目的切断了子女与其亲生父母之间的关系。在作出该裁定时，我们推翻了此前的Matter of Lum，11 I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1964)及其后续Matter of Valsamakis，12 I&N Dec. 421 (BIA 1967)的决定，并撤回Matter of Kirby，13 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1969)中的某些表述。 我们认定，第101(b)(1)(E)条“但书”的明确语言在符合该条年龄、监护和居住要求的收养发生后即限制亲生父母的权利，而不论是否已凭借该收养授予或可能授予移民利益。

II. TERMINATION OF ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIPS

II. 收养关系的终止

Regarding the effect for immigration purposes of a lawful termination of an adoption, we initially note that nowhere does the explicit language of the statute, in section 101(b)(1)(E) or elsewhere, address such a circumstance. Nor did our decision in Matter of Li, supra, involve a situation where an adoption had been terminated. Thus, in Li, we did not address the question faced in the present case. We simply determined that there are situations where the status of “parent,” once established, may be terminated, as through an adoption meeting the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E). This Board, however, has previously dealt with the question of what effect a termination of adoption has on the adoptive relationships. In Matter of Kong, 17 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1979), we found that an alien whose adoption had been terminated could no longer confer or obtain immigration benefits based on the adoptive relationship. 1 In that case, we found that the petitioner and the beneficiary, who had previously been related as siblings through adoption, no longer shared a common parent after the petitioner’s adoptive relationship with the beneficiary’s natural parents had been severed. Thus, the petitioner and beneficiary no longer qualified as siblings under the Act. Id. at 153. By making that determination, we recognized that there are situa- tions where the status of “parent,” including the status of adoptive parent, may be terminated. Id. However, Matter of Kong dealt only with the issue of what effect a termination of adoption had on the adoptive relationship. We

关于合法终止收养对移民目的的影响，我们首先指出，该法第101(b)(1)(E)条或其他地方的明确语言均未涉及此种情形。我们在Matter of Li，supra中的裁定也未涉及收养已被终止的情况。因此，在Li案中，我们未处理本案面临的问题。我们仅认定，存在“父母”身份一旦确立即可被终止的情形，例如通过符合第101(b)(1)(E)条要求的收养。 然而，本委员会此前已处理过终止收养对收养关系有何影响的问题。在Matter of Kong，17 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1979)中，我们认定，收养已被终止的外国人不再能够基于收养关系授予或获得移民利益。1 在该案中，我们认定，申请人及受益人此前通过收养关系成为兄弟姐妹，但在申请人与受益人的亲生父母的收养关系被切断后，不再共享共同父母。因此，申请人和受益人不再符合本法下的兄弟姐妹资格。Id. at 153。通过该认定，我们承认存在“父母”身份（包括养父母身份）可被终止的情形。Id. 然而，Matter of Kong仅处理终止收养对收养关系有何影响的问题。我们

made no specific finding in Kong regarding the termination’s effect on the prior natural relationships. 2 It might be argued that our reasoning in Matter of Li, supra, could be extended to apply to all situations where an adoption has occurred meeting the statutory requirements under section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, leading to the conclusion that the natural relationship is severed irrevocably from the point of the adoption on. However, we do not believe that such a result is either required by statute or serves the purposes underlying the immigration laws. It does not appear that Congress, in drafting section 101(b)(1)(E), was contemplating the situation where an adoption might be legally terminated, particularly in a context where no immigration benefits had resulted from that adoption. Rather, it appears that Congress, in drafting section 101(b)(1)(E), contemplated the existence of an ongoing adoptive relation- ship. Its intent in including the “proviso” was to ensure that a child could be recognized as a child of his natural parents or of his adoptive parents, but not of both. See Matter of Li, supra, at 705 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2016). Moreover, to rule that natural relationships never could be recognized again under any circumstances for immigration purposes following the legal termination of an adoption could lead to patently unjust results, which we are confident would not have been intended by Congress. For example, a minor child could be separated from his or her natural parents and adopted due to a mistaken belief that he or she had been orphaned. The parents could later reappear, the adoption be terminated, and the natural parental relationship be reestablished while the child is still a minor under circumstances where there was obviously no fraud or attempt to manipulate the immigration laws. By extending the reasoning of Matter of Li to such a situation, the alien would be rendered “parentless” under the immigration laws, since the effect of Matter of Kong would be to bar all future recognition of the adoptive parent-child relationship for immigration purposes. In such a situation, to conclude that the natural parental relationship had been severed irrevocably and could not be recognized for immigration purposes under any circumstances would dis- tort rather than further the purposes of the Act. Thus, we conclude that the language of the statute was not intended to address the specific situation before us. And, we decline to find that the natu- ral relationship between a parent and child is irrevocably severed under all circumstances when a child is adopted through an adoption that satisfies the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E), even if that adoption subsequently is lawfully terminated.

在Kong案中，我们没有就终止收养对先前自然关系的影响作出具体认定。2 可能会有人主张，我们在上述Matter of Li案中的推理可以扩展适用于所有已发生符合该法第101(b)(1)(E)条法定要求的收养的情形，从而得出结论：自然关系自收养之时起即不可撤销地切断。然而，我们认为，这样的结果既非法律所要求，也不符合移民法所依据的目的。国会起草第101(b)(1)(E)条时，似乎并未考虑到收养可能被合法终止的情形，尤其是在该收养并未产生任何移民利益的情况下。相反，国会起草第101(b)(1)(E)条时，似乎考虑的是持续存在的收养关系。其纳入“但书”的意图在于确保子女可以被认定为其自然父母的子女或养父母的子女，但不能同时是两者的子女。见上述Matter of Li案，第705页（引述H.R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2016）。 此外，裁定在收养被合法终止后，自然关系在任何情况下均不得再为移民目的而被认定，可能导致明显不公正的结果，我们确信这并非国会本意。例如，未成年子女可能因被误认为孤儿而与自然父母分离并被收养。父母后来可能重新出现，收养被终止，自然亲子关系在子女仍为未成年人时得以重新确立，而在此情形下显然不存在欺诈或操纵移民法的企图。将Matter of Li案的推理扩展适用于此种情形，将使该外国人在移民法下成为“无父母”者，因为Matter of Kong案的效果将是禁止今后为移民目的对养亲子关系的一切认定。在此种情形下，认定自然亲子关系已被不可撤销地切断且在任何情况下均不得为移民目的而被认定，将扭曲而非促进该法的目的。 因此，我们得出结论：该法的用语并非旨在处理我们面前的具体情形。并且，我们拒绝认定：当子女通过符合第101(b)(1)(E)条要求的收养而被收养时，父母与子女之间的自然关系在任何情况下均不可撤销地切断，即使该收养随后被合法终止。

III. STANDARD TO BE APPLIED WHERE ADOPTION TERMINATED

III. 收养被终止时适用的标准

Under what circumstances could natural relationships be again recog- nized, for immigration purposes, if an adoption is legally terminated? The petitioner essentially argues on appeal that once an adoption has been termi- nated, the natural relationship is automatically reestablished as if the adop- tion had never taken place. In support of this argument, he urges that our decision in Matter of B-, 9 I&N Dec. 46 (BIA 1960), is controlling. He main- tains that, where an adoption has been legally terminated, the effect is the same as though the adoption had never existed. Therefore, the section 101(b)(1)(E) “proviso” would not preclude an immigration benefit based on the natural relationship. We cannot agree that Matter of B-, supra, controls the issue before us. That case involved an adoption which did not meet the requirements of sec- tion 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act because the alien was adopted after the applica- ble age limit set forth in that section. The natural relationship, therefore, never terminated for immigration purposes because the adoption was not rec- ognized for immigration purposes. The situation before us is distinguishable, however, because there has been a qualifying adoption that did sever the nat- ural relationship. The question that remains is whether, after the termination of an adoption, the natural relationship may be recognized for immigration purposes. Consistent with the language and purposes of the Act, we find that it can be under certain circumstances. First, we find that if the provisions of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act have been invoked in order to obtain or confer an immigration benefit by virtue of the adoptive relationship, the natural relationship cannot again be recognized for immigration purposes even if it is established that the adoptive relation- ship has been legally terminated. To conclude otherwise would seriously contravene the congressional intent reflected in the “proviso” of section 101(b)(1)(E). Moreover, this finding is consistent with the concept that an alien should be recognized for immigration purposes as a child of his natural parents or of his adoptive parents, but not of both. See Matter of Li, supra, at 704. Thus, once an immigration benefit has resulted from an adoptive par- ent-child relationship, the natural parent-child relationship cannot again be recognized under the provisions of section 101(b) of the Act. We find, however, that a natural parent-child relationship can be again recognized for immigration purposes following the termination of an adop- tion if the petitioner can establish that the following four criteria are met. First, a petitioner must demonstrate that no immigration benefit was obtained or conferred as a result of the adoptive relationship. Secondly, it must be demonstrated that a natural parent-child relationship meeting the require- ments of section 101(b) once existed. Thirdly, it must be demonstrated that any subsequent adoption that satisfied the requirements of section

如果收养被合法终止，自然关系在何种情况下可以再次为移民目的而被认定？申请人在上诉中实质上主张，一旦收养被终止，自然关系即自动重新确立，如同收养从未发生。为支持该主张，他力称我们在Matter of B-, 9 I&N Dec. 46 (BIA 1960)案中的裁定具有控制力。他坚持认为，在收养已被合法终止的情况下，其效果与收养从未存在相同。因此，第101(b)(1)(E)条“但书”不会排除基于自然关系的移民利益。 我们不能同意上述Matter of B-案对本案所涉问题具有控制力。该案涉及的收养不符合该法第101(b)(1)(E)条的要求，因为该外国人的收养是在该条规定的适用年龄上限之后进行的。因此，自然关系从未为移民目的而终止，因为该收养未获移民目的之认可。然而，我们面前的情形有所不同，因为存在一项符合条件的收养，该收养确实切断了自然关系。剩下的问题是，在收养终止后，自然关系是否可以再次为移民目的而被认定。根据该法的用语和目的，我们认定在某些情况下可以。 首先，我们认定，如果该法第101(b)(1)(E)条的规定已被援引，以凭借收养关系获得或授予移民利益，则即使证明收养关系已被合法终止，自然关系也不得再次为移民目的而被认定。作出相反结论将严重违反第101(b)(1)(E)条“但书”所体现的国会意图。此外，该认定符合以下理念：外国人为移民目的应被认定为其自然父母的子女或养父母的子女，但不能同时是两者的子女。见上述Matter of Li案，第704页。因此，一旦移民利益已由养亲子关系产生，自然亲子关系不得再依该法第101(b)条的规定而被认定。 然而，我们认定，如果申请人能够证明满足以下四项标准，则在收养终止后，自然亲子关系可以再次为移民目的而被认定。第一，申请人必须证明未因收养关系而获得或授予任何移民利益。第二，必须证明曾经存在符合第101(b)条要求的自然亲子关系。第三，必须证明任何后续符合第

101(b)(1)(E) has been lawfully terminated under the applicable law. Finally, the petitioner must demonstrate that his or her natural relationship with the beneficiary has been reestablished, either through operation of law or through other legal process (i.e., we do not assume that natural relationships are automatically reestablished solely by virtue of the fact that an adoption has been lawfully terminated).

101(b)(1)(E)条要求的收养已根据适用法律被合法终止。最后，申请人必须证明其与受益人的自然关系已通过法律运作或其他法律程序重新确立（即，我们不推定自然关系仅因收养已被合法终止这一事实而自动重新确立）。

IV. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD TO THIS CASE

IV. 本标准在本案中的适用

The evidence before us reflects that this beneficiary’s adoption in 1971 met the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act. Therefore, under Matter of Li, supra, her relationship with her natural parents was severed by virtue of that adoption. Accordingly, for the present visa petition to be approvable, the petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evi- dence that the four criteria discussed above are met. There would not appear to be any dispute regarding the first three require- ments. There is no evidence or claim that the beneficiary obtained or con- ferred any immigration benefit through her adoptive relationship with Li Meng Yang and Cai Pei Ying. The petitioner has also presented evidence that the beneficiary was his legitimate biological child and, as such, once met the definition of child contained in section 101(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The peti- tioner has presented adequate evidence that the beneficiary’s adoption was properly terminated on October 20, 1992, under applicable Chinese law. 3 Finally, with respect to the fourth requirement, we note that the petitioner has presented evidence on appeal regarding the legal effect of the termination of adoption, which consists of a translation of pertinent sections of Chinese law regarding adoptions. Specifically, the Adoption Law of the People’s Republic of China, Chapter IV, Article 28, states as follows:

我们面前的证据表明，该受益人于1971年的收养符合该法第101(b)(1)(E)条的要求。因此，根据上述Matter of Li案，其与自然父母的关系因该收养而被切断。相应地，为使本签证申请获得批准，申请人必须以优势证据证明上述四项标准均已满足。 关于前三项要求，似乎不存在任何争议。没有证据或主张表明受益人通过其与Li Meng Yang和Cai Pei Ying的收养关系获得或授予了任何移民利益。申请人还提交了证据，证明受益人是其婚生亲生子女，因此曾经符合该法第101(b)(1)(A)条所载的子女定义。申请人已提交充分证据，证明受益人的收养已于1992年10月20日根据适用的中国法律被适当终止。3 最后，关于第四项要求，我们注意到申请人已在上诉中提交了关于收养终止法律效力的证据，其中包括中国法律关于收养的相关条文的译文。具体而言，《中华人民共和国收养法》第四章第28条规定如下：

Ordinarily, we would not consider evidence first offered on appeal. See Matter of Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988). However, in this instance the issue to which this evidence pertains was understandably not focused on below, inasmuch as no standard had yet been articulated regarding the treatment of terminations of adoption for immigration purposes. In light of our decision, accordingly, we

通常，我们不会考虑首次在上诉时提交的证据。见Matter of Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988)；Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988)。然而，在本案中，该证据所涉及的问题在下级程序中可以理解地未获重点关注，因为当时尚未就收养终止在移民目的上的处理阐明任何标准。鉴于我们的裁定，因此我们

find it appropriate to remand this matter to the RSC director to allow the peti- tioner a full and fair opportunity to meet his burden of establishing that the natural parental relationship has been reestablished under Chinese law such that it can be recognized for immigration purposes. Accordingly, this matter will be remanded to the RSC director for further consideration of the visa petition. ORDER: The record is remanded to the RSC director for further consideration of the visa petition consistent with the foregoing opinion, and for the entry of a new decision.

认为将本事项发回RSC主任是适当的，以便申请人有充分和公平的机会履行其举证责任，证明自然亲子关系已根据中国法律重新确立，从而可以为移民目的而被认定。 相应地，本事项将发回RSC主任，以进一步审议该签证申请。 命令： 记录发回RSC主任，以根据上述意见进一步审议该签证申请，并作出新的决定。