Matter of Gawaran

In a decision dated December 8, 1989, an immigration judge found the respondent deportable on the charges set forth in the Order to Show Cause, Notice of Hearing, and Warrant for Arrest of Alien (Form 1-221S), denied her requests for relief from deportation pursuant to sections 216(c)(4)(A) and 241(0(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 186a(c)(4)(A) and 1251(0(1) (1988), but

在1989年12月8日的决定中，一名移民法官认定被申请人因《出庭通知、听证通知及外国人逮捕令》（表格1-221S）所列指控而应被驱逐出境，驳回了她根据《移民与国籍法》第216(c)(4)(A)条和第241(0(1)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1 186a(c)(4)(A)和1251(0(1) (1988)提出的驱逐出境救济请求，但

granted her the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. Both parties have appealed the decision of the immigration judge. The appeal of the Immigration and Naturalization Service will be dis- missed as untimely. The respondent's appeal will be dismissed_ The regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 3.38(b) (1994) provide as follows: "The notice of appeal of the decision shall be filed with the Office of the Immigration Judge having administrative control over the Record of Proceeding within ten (10) calendar days after service of the decision. Time will be 13 days if mailed." The record reflects that the immigration judge's written decision was mailed to the Service on December 8, 1989, along with a notice informing the Service attorney that she had until December 21, 1989, to submit an appeal. The record reflects that the Service's Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR -26) was not filed with the Office of the Immigration Judge until December 22, 1989. Thus, the Service's appeal was not riled within the prescribed period for filing. See Da Cruz v. INS, 4 F.3d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Board improperly adjudicated on the merits a Service appeal that was untimely by 1 day because "[t]he time limit for filing an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional"). Accordingly, the Service's appeal will be dismissed as untimely. The respondent is a 36 -year-old native and citizen of the Philip- pines. On January 11, 1987, she was admitted to the United States as a conditional permanent resident pursuant to section 216 of the Act, based on her marriage to a United States citizen. The Service subsequently discovered that the respondent was married to a national of the Philippines whom she did not divorce prior to her marriage to the United States citizen. On January 11, 1989, the Service issued an Order to Show Cause against the respondent, charging her with deportability pursuant to former section 241(a)(1) of the Act1 as an alien who was excludable at entry because she lacked a valid labor certification and a valid immigrant visa. Moreover, on June 2, 1989, the Service issued a notice terminating the respondent's conditional permanent residence. 2 The Service lodged an additional charge against the respondent, contend- ing that she was deportable as an alien whose conditional permanent

准予她自愿离境以代替驱逐出境的特权。双方均对移民法官的决定提出上诉。移民和归化局的上诉将因逾期而驳回。被申请人的上诉将被驳回。 8 C.F.R. § 3.38(b) (1994)的法规规定如下：“对决定的上诉通知应在决定送达后十(10)个日历日内向对程序记录具有行政控制权的移民法官办公室提交。若邮寄则为13天。”记录显示，移民法官的书面决定于1989年12月8日邮寄给移民局，并附有一份通知，告知移民局律师她可在1989年12月21日之前提交上诉。记录显示，移民局的上诉通知（表格EOIR-26）直到1989年12月22日才提交给移民法官办公室。因此，移民局的上诉未在规定提交期限内提交。见Da Cruz v. INS, 4 F.3d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1993)（裁定委员会不当对逾期1天的移民局上诉进行实体裁决，因为“提交上诉的时限是强制性和管辖性的”）。因此，移民局的上诉将因逾期而驳回。 被申请人是36岁的菲律宾本地人和公民。1987年1月11日，她根据该法第216条，基于其与美国公民的婚姻，作为有条件永久居民获准进入美国。移民局随后发现，被申请人与一名菲律宾国民结婚，而在她与美国公民结婚之前并未与该菲律宾国民离婚。 1989年1月11日，移民局对被申请人发出出庭通知，指控她根据该法原第241(a)(1)条1应被驱逐出境，理由是她作为入境时可被排除的外国人，因为她缺乏有效劳工证和有效移民签证。此外，1989年6月2日，移民局发出通知，终止被申请人的有条件永久居留。2 移民局对被申请人追加了一项指控，主张她作为有条件永久

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residence had been terminated. Following several deportation hearings in this matter and the parties' submission of briefs, the immigration judge issued his decision fmding the respondent to be deportable as charged and denying her requests for relief under sections 216(c)(4) and 241(t)(1) of the Act. The respondent's appeal followed. On appeal, the respondent has not contested her deportability. She has raised two issues in her brief on appeal. She argues first that the immigration judge erred by concluding that she is not eligible for relief under section 241(f)(1) of the Act. The respondent also asserts that she has established "extreme hardship" within the meaning of section 216(e)(4)(A) of the Act, and that her request for a hardship waiver should accordingly be approved. We find no merit to the respondent's arguments on appeal. We consider first the respondent's argument pertaining to the waiver under section 241(0(1). As it applies to the respondent, 3 section 241(0(1) of the Act provides as follows:

居民身份已被终止的外国人应被驱逐出境。在有关此事的数次驱逐出境听证会以及双方提交简报之后，移民法官作出决定，认定被申请人如所指控应被驱逐出境，并驳回她根据该法第216(c)(4)条和第241(t)(1)条提出的救济请求。被申请人随后提出上诉。 在上诉中，被申请人未对其应被驱逐出境提出异议。她在上诉简报中提出两个问题。她首先主张，移民法官错误地认定她不符合该法第241(f)(1)条规定的救济资格。被申请人还主张，她已确立该法第216(e)(4)(A)条含义范围内的“极端困难”，因此她的困难豁免请求应获批准。我们认为被申请人的上诉论点没有依据。 我们首先审议被申请人关于第241(0(1)条豁免的论点。就适用于被申请人而言，3 该法第241(0(1)条规定如下：

(B) A waiver of deportation for fraud or misrepresentation granted under subpara- graph (A) shall also operate to waive deportation based on the grounds of inadmissibility at entry described under subparagraph (A)(ii) directly resulting from such fraud or misrepresentation. The respondent argues that the provisions of section 241(0(1) should be applied in such a manner as to waive the charge of deportability against her under former section 241(a)(9)(B) of the Act. She argues that her acquisition of conditional permanent residence "was tied directly to her original fraudulent behavior in entering the

(B) 根据(A)项授予的因欺诈或虚假陈述的驱逐出境豁免，也应豁免基于(A)(ii)项所述入境时不可入境理由的驱逐出境，且该等理由直接源于该欺诈或虚假陈述。 被申请人主张，第241(0(1)条的规定应以某种方式适用，以豁免根据该法原第241(a)(9)(B)条对她提出的驱逐出境指控。她主张，她获得有条件永久居留“直接与她最初通过重婚关系进入

United States through a bigamous relationship," and that section 241(0(1) should accordingly waive the charges under both sections 241(a)(1) and 241(a)(9)(B). The immigration judge rejected this construction of section 241(0(1) of the Act. Relying on Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975), he found that the respondent was ineligible for relief under section 241(0(1) because she is deportable on a ground that is independent of the charges that she was excludable at the time of entry. In Reid v. INS, supra, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the provisions of section 241(0(1) were available to an alien to waive the charge of deportability under former section 241(a)(2) that he had entered the United States without inspection. The Court held:

美国时的欺诈行为相关”，因此第241(0(1)条应豁免第241(a)(1)条和第241(a)(9)(B)条两项指控。移民法官驳回了对第241(0(1)条的这种解释。他依据Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975)，认定被申请人不符合第241(0(1)条规定的救济资格，因为她基于一项独立于其在入境时可被排除的指控的理由而应被驱逐出境。 在Reid v. INS, supra中，最高法院审议的问题是，外国人是否可利用第241(0(1)条的规定来豁免根据原第241(a)(2)条提出的驱逐出境指控，即其未经检查进入美国。法院裁定：

Id. at 623; see also Salas-Velasquez v. INS, 34 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 1994); Braun v. INS, 992 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1993); Matter of Sosa- Hernandez, 20 I&N Dec. 758 (BIA 1993); Matter of Connelly, 19 I&N Dec. 156 (BIA 1984); Matter of Matti, 19 I&N Dec. 43 (BIA 1984). We agree with the immigration judge's conclusion that the respon- dent is ineligible for relief under section 241(0(1) because she is deportable on a ground that is separate from the charges that she was excludable at the time of her entry. As the immigration judge observed in his decision, an alien could he found deportable on the ground that her conditional permanent residence was terminated "even if there were no fraud." Under these circumstances, section 241(0(1) could not waive a charge of deportability under former section 241(a)(9)(B) of the Act, because there would be no deportation charge "directly resulting" from an alien's fraud or misrepresentation. In the instant case, the respondent's conditional permanent resi- dence was terminated because she failed to file a joint petition to remove the conditional basis of her status. Former section 241(a)(9)(B) of the Act proVided for the deportation of "an alien with permanent resident status on a conditional basis under section 216 [who] has such status terminated." The Service did not allege any fraud or misrepre- sentation in connection with the lodged charge, nor was proof of fraud or misrepresentation required in order to sustain the charge of deportability. The respondent's deportability under former section 241(a)(9)(B) resulted from her failure to file the joint petition; such failure occurred 2 years after her admission for conditional permanent

同上，第623页；另见Salas-Velasquez v. INS, 34 F.3d 705（第8巡回法院，1994年）；Braun v. INS, 992 F.2d 1016（第9巡回法院，1993年）；Matter of Sosa-Hernandez, 20 I&N Dec. 758（BIA 1993）；Matter of Connelly, 19 I&N Dec. 156（BIA 1984）；Matter of Matti, 19 I&N Dec. 43（BIA 1984）。我们同意移民法官的结论，即该respondent（被申请人）不符合第241(0(1)条规定的救济资格，因为她是以一项与她入境时被排除的指控相分离的理由而被驱逐的。正如移民法官在其裁决中所指出的，即使“不存在欺诈”，也可以认定一名外国人因其有条件永久居留权被终止而被驱逐。在此情况下，第241(0(1)条不能豁免《移民与国籍法》原第241(a)(9)(B)条下的驱逐指控，因为不存在“直接源于”外国人欺诈或虚假陈述的驱逐指控。在本案中，该respondent的有条件永久居留权因其未能提交联合申请以取消其身份的有条件基础而被终止。《移民与国籍法》原第241(a)(9)(B)条规定，“根据第216条拥有有条件永久居民身份的外国人[其]该身份已被终止”应予驱逐。移民局未就所提出的指控主张任何欺诈或虚假陈述，且为维持驱逐指控也不需要证明欺诈或虚假陈述。该respondent根据原第241(a)(9)(B)条的驱逐资格源于其未能提交联合申请；该未能提交发生在其以有条件永久居留身份入境2年之后，

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residence and accordingly did not render her "excludable at the time of entry" within the meaning of section 241(0(1). We therefore find no merit to the respondent's argument that her bigamous marriage constituted fraudulent behavior which underlies all charges of deportability against her. The immigration Judge properly held that section 241(0(1) of the Act does not waive the charge of deportability which resulted from the termination of the respondent's conditional permanent residence. We accordingly will not disturb the immigration judge's conclusion that the respondent is ineligible for a section 241(0(1) waiver. Finally, we find that the respondent has net properly filed or pursued an "extreme hardship" application under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Act. Under the regulations, an alien must file an application for a waiver under section 216(c)(4XA) with the Service. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(c) (1994). The alien may seek review of an adverse decision in deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(i) (1994); see also Matter of Lemhammad, 20 I&N Dec. 316 (BIA 1991). In Matter ofAnderson, 20 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 1994), the Board recently held that an immigration judge does not have original jurisdiction to consider a waiver application under section 216(c)(4) of the. Act. Thus, the immigration judge's jurisdiction over a hardship waiver under section 216(c)(4) is limited to a review of the Service's denial of the application. Id. The record reflects that at a deportation hearing on June 22, 1989, the respondent's counsel stated his belief that the respondent was ineligible for the hardship waiver under section 216(c)(4), and that she would seek relief only under section 241(0(1). At a subsequent hearing on September 20, 1989, the respondent's counsel let stand the immigration judge's statement that the respondent had "not pursued" relief under section 216(c)(4). Further, when the immigration judge questioned the respondent's counsel on December 6, 1989, as to whether there were any remaining matters that the parties had not covered, respondent's counsel indicated that there were not. We note that in the absence of egregious circumstances, an alien is bound by the "reasonable tactical actions" of her counsel. Matter of Velasquez, 19 I&N Dec. 377, 383 (BIA 1986). Inasmuch as respondent's counsel elected not to seek review before the immigration judge of an application for relief under section 216(c)(4)(A), we conclude that the respondent has waived the opportunity to have her application, if any, considered by the immigration judge.4

因此并未使其在第241(0(1)条含义内构成“入境时被排除”。我们因此认为，该respondent关于其重婚构成欺诈行为、而该欺诈行为构成对其所有驱逐指控之基础的论点没有依据。移民法官正确地裁定，《移民与国籍法》第241(0(1)条并不豁免因该respondent有条件永久居留权被终止而产生的驱逐指控。我们因此不会推翻移民法官关于该respondent不符合第241(0(1)条豁免资格的结论。最后，我们认为该respondent未正确提交或寻求《移民与国籍法》第216(c)(4)(A)条下的“极端困难”申请。根据相关法规，外国人必须向移民局提交第216(c)(4)(A)条下的豁免申请。8 C.F.R. § 216.5(c)（1994年）。该外国人可以在驱逐程序中寻求对不利决定的复审。8 C.F.R. § 216.5(i)（1994年）；另见Matter of Lemhammad, 20 I&N Dec. 316（BIA 1991）。在Matter of Anderson, 20 I&N Dec. 888（BIA 1994）中，委员会最近裁定，移民法官不具有考虑《移民与国籍法》第216(c)(4)条下豁免申请的原始管辖权。因此，移民法官对第216(c)(4)条下困难豁免的管辖权仅限于对移民局拒绝该申请的复审。同上。记录显示，在1989年6月22日的驱逐听证会上，该respondent的律师表示其认为该respondent不符合第216(c)(4)条下的困难豁免资格，且她将仅寻求第241(0(1)条下的救济。在1989年9月20日的后续听证会上，该respondent的律师未对移民法官关于该respondent“未寻求”第216(c)(4)条下救济的陈述提出异议。此外，当移民法官于1989年12月6日询问该respondent的律师是否还有双方未涉及的任何剩余事项时，该respondent的律师表示没有。我们注意到，在不存在恶劣情形的情况下，外国人受其律师“合理战术行为”的约束。Matter of Velasquez, 19 I&N Dec. 377, 383（BIA 1986）。鉴于该respondent的律师选择不向移民法官寻求对第216(c)(4)(A)条下救济申请的复审，我们得出结论，该respondent已放弃让其申请（如有）由移民法官考虑的机会。4

Assuming arguendo that the respondent has not waived the opportunity to pursue relief under section 216(c)(4)(A), we see no reason to disturb the immigration judge's fmding that the respondent failed to demonstrate "extreme hardship" within the meaning of section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Act The respondent did not demonstrate that she would experience any unusual hardship from deportation arising out of circumstances which occurred during the period that she was admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the immigration judge's decision denying the respondent's applications for relief from deporta- tion is wholly supported by the record. The parties' appeals will be dismissed. ORDER The appeal of the Immigration and Naturalization Service is dismissed as untimely. FURTHER ORDER: The respondent's appeal is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the immigration judge's order and in accordance with our decision in Matter of Chouliaris, 16 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1977), the respondent is permitted to depart from the United States voluntarily within 30 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district director, and in the event of failure to so depart, the respondent shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's order.

即使假定该respondent未放弃寻求第216(c)(4)(A)条下救济的机会，我们也没有理由推翻移民法官关于该respondent未能证明《移民与国籍法》第216(c)(4)(A)条含义内“极端困难”的认定。该respondent未能证明，她将因在其以有条件基础被接纳为永久居民期间发生的情形而产生的驱逐而遭受任何异常困难。基于上述，我们得出结论，移民法官拒绝该respondent救济申请的裁决完全得到记录的支持。双方的 appeal 将被驳回。命令：移民和归化局的 appeal 因逾期而被驳回。进一步命令：该respondent的 appeal 被驳回。进一步命令：根据移民法官的命令并依照我们在Matter of Chouliaris, 16 I&N Dec. 168（BIA 1977）中的裁决，该respondent被允许在本命令作出之日起30天内或地区局长可能批准的任何延长期内自愿离开美国，如未能如此离开，该respondent应按照移民法官的命令被驱逐。