Matter of Montero

Interim Decision 412216

临时决定 412216

In Deportation Proceedings

驱逐出境程序

This is an appeal from the order of the immigration judge finding the respondent deportable, denying her application for a waiver of documents, and granting her the privilege of voluntary departure. The appeal will be dismissed. The record relates to a married female alien, 42 years of age, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic. She was granted an immigrant visa on October 26, 1962, at which time she stated that it was her intention to go to the United States permanently, to work in New York. She married a Dominican on January 1, 1963. She entered the United States alone on February 22, 1963 in possession of her immigrant visa. She stayed in New York City in the apartment of the sister of the father of her children for about 20 days. Immediately after receiving her 1-151 (Alien Registration

本上诉针对移民法官的命令，该命令认定被上诉人可被驱逐出境，驳回其文件豁免申请，并准许其自愿离境的特权。上诉将被驳回。 记录涉及一名已婚女性外国人，42岁，多米尼加共和国国民及公民。她于1962年10月26日获得移民签证，当时她表示其意图是永久前往美国，在纽约工作。她于1963年1月1日与一名多米尼加人结婚。她于1963年2月22日独自入境美国，持有其移民签证。她在纽约市其子女的父亲的姐妹的公寓中居住了约20天。在收到其1-151（外国人登记

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Interim Decision #2216

临时决定 #2216

Receipt Card), she returned to the Dominican Republic, where she and her husband owned and operated a business. In order to purchase merchandise for her business, she there- after started making frequent shopping trips to Puerto Rico. On April 16, 1964, during questioning by an immigrant inspector, she signed a statement that she resided in the Dominican Republic, not in the United State; and that she "renounced" her "resi- dence" in the United States and would thereafter travel to the United States with a visitor's visa. She surrendered her alien registration card to the immigrant inspector. From 1964 to 1970 she entered the United States numerous times with a visitor's visa. She is now in the United States pursuant to her latest entry as a nonimmigrant visitor, the date of which was April 9, 1970. She was authorized to remain until April 30, 1970. She has remained thereafter without authority. At the deportation hearing, the respondent claimed that she was improperly deprived of her resident status during the inter- view with the immigrant inspector on April 16, 1964. She claims that she should have been afforded an exclusion hearing before an immigration judge and warned of her right to counsel before a statement was taken. Inasmuch as she was not warned, she claims that her due process rights were denied and that her status as a resident continues to the present time. Consequently, she claims that she should be considered a lawful permanent resident and deportation proceedings terminated. She further requests that, pursuant to section 211(b), documentary requirements be waived, retroactively, to excuse the fact that she did not present the documents required of a returning resident at the time of her present entry. The immigration judge found that she could not have qualified for returning resident status on April 16, 1964 and dehied her application for a waiver of documents. We agree with his finding and decision. On April 16, 1964 the respondent was entitled to be admitted as a returning resident only if she was returning to the United States from a temporary visit abroad. The facts indicate that on that date she was not returning from a temporary visit abroad. Even without considering her 1964 statement renouncing her residence, it is clear from her present testimony that she had no fixed intent to return to the United States when she departed during March 1963. To establish that a visit abroad was temporary, the alien must show that he or she departed with a fixed intent to return, Matter of B--, 9 L & N. Dec. 211(BIA, 1961), reversed on other grounds, Barrese v. Ryan, 203 F. Supp. 880 (D. Conn., 1962); Santos v. INS, 421 F.2d 1303 (CA. 9, 1970). "The intention of the departing immigrant must be to return within a period relatively short, fixed

收据卡）后，她立即返回多米尼加共和国，她和丈夫在那里拥有并经营一家企业。 为了为其企业购买商品，她此后开始频繁前往波多黎各购物。1964年4月16日，在移民检查员的询问中，她签署了一份声明，称她居住在多米尼加共和国，而非美国；并且她“放弃”了她在美国的“居留”，此后将持访客签证前往美国。她将外国人登记卡交给了移民检查员。从1964年到1970年，她多次持访客签证进入美国。她目前根据其最近一次作为非移民访客的入境（日期为1970年4月9日）留在美国。她获准停留至1970年4月30日。此后她未经授权继续停留。 在驱逐出境听证会上，答辩人声称她在1964年4月16日与移民检查员的会面中被不当剥夺了居民身份。她声称，在录取声明之前，她本应获得移民法官的排除听证并被警告其获得律师的权利。由于她未被警告，她声称其正当程序权利被剥夺，且其居民身份持续至今。因此，她声称应被视为合法永久居民并终止驱逐出境程序。她进一步请求，根据第211(b)条，追溯性地豁免文件要求，以原谅她在本次入境时未出示返回居民所需文件的事实。移民法官认定她无法在1964年4月16日符合返回居民身份，并驳回了她的文件豁免申请。我们同意其认定和决定。 1964年4月16日，答辩人只有在从国外临时访问返回美国时才有权作为返回居民入境。事实表明，在该日期她并非从国外临时访问返回。即使不考虑她1964年放弃居留的声明，从她目前的证词也清楚表明，她在1963年3月离开时没有返回美国的固定意图。要证明国外访问是临时的，外国人必须表明其离开时具有返回的固定意图，Matter of B--, 9 L & N. Dec. 211(BIA, 1961)，因其他理由被推翻，Barrese v. Ryan, 203 F. Supp. 880 (D. Conn., 1962)；Santos v. INS, 421 F.2d 1303 (CA. 9, 1970)。“离境移民的意图必须是在相对较短、由某些早期事件确定的期限内返回”，U.S. ex rel Lesto v. Day, 21 F.2d 307 (CA. 2, 1927)。答辩人的意图并非在由早期事件确定的期限内返回美国。她的丈夫、子女、住所、企业和财务资源均在多米尼加共和国。当她离开美国时，她并未留下她的住所；相反，她返回或重新建立了她在多米尼加共和国的住所。 答辩人1964年4月16日签署的声明仅进一步佐证了上述结论。她声称该声明是被胁迫的，因为移民检查员告知她不能使用其外国人登记卡，且未告知她获得律师或听证的权利。记录中没有证据表明她的声明是被胁迫或以其他方式非自愿的。告知获得律师权利的要求仅限于被羁押者，Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)。答辩人在签署相关声明时并未被羁押。此外，已裁定在移民程序的调查阶段没有被告知获得律师权利的权利。Matter of Steele, 12 I. & N. Dec. 302 (ETA, 1967)。然而，即使没有该声明，记录也清楚表明答辩人在1964年不能作为返回居民入境。事实上，她在1963年3月至1964年4月期间作为返回居民的所有入境均系检查官员的错误。 答辩人未因1964年缺乏听证而受到损害，因为1972年已提供了一次听证。移民法官从1964年排除听证的角度审理了此案，并认定答辩人当时会被认定不可入境。她并未因放弃居留的声明而失去居民身份。相反，她早已失去该身份，因为她在1963年3月离开时没有固定返回意图而放弃了它。她当时的意图是永久居住在多米尼加共和国。 事实是，答辩人直到多米尼加共和国的事件导致其企业财务逆转之后才寻求永久返回美国，这些事件在1963年她返回多米尼加共和国时是不可预见的。由于我们认定答辩人在1963年3月离开时放弃了其合法永久居民身份，且她在本次入境时不是返回居民，她没有资格获得适用于返回居民的文件豁免。 命令：上诉被驳回。 进一步命令，根据移民法官的命令，允许答辩人自本决定之日起30天内或地区局长可能批准的任何延长期内自愿离开美国；如果未能如此离开，答辩人应按照移民法官的命令被驱逐出境。

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Interim Decision #2216 by some early event," U.S. ex rel Lesto v. Day, 21 F.2d 307 (CA. 2, 1927). The intention of the respondent was not to return to the United States within a period fixed by an early event. Her husband, children, home, business, and financial resources were all in the Dominican Republic. When she departed from the United States she did not leave behind her home; rather, she returned to or reestablished her home in the Dominican Republic. The respondent's signed statement of April 16, 1964 merely adds corroboration of the above conclusion. She claims that the state- ment was coerced because the immigrant inspector informed her that she could not use her alien registration card, and did not advise her of her right to counsel or a hearing. There is no evidence in the record indicating that her statement was coerced or otherwise involuntary. The requirement of giving advice as to the right to counsel is limited to a person in custody, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The respondent was not in custody when she executed the statement in question. Furthermore, it has been held that there is no right to advice as to the right to counsel during investigative stages of immigration proceedings. Matter of Steele, 12 I. & N. Dec. 302 (ETA, 1967). Even without the statement, however, the record is clear that the respondent was not admissi- ble in 1964 as a returning resident. In fact, all of her admissions as a returning resident between March 1963 and April 1964 were erroneous on the part of the inspecting officers. The respondent was not prejudiced by the lack of a hearing in 1964, inasmuch as one was furnished in 1972. The immigration judge considered the case from the standpoint of a 1964 exclusion hearing and decided that the respondent would have been then found excludable. She did not lose her resident status because of her statement renouncing her residence. Rather, she had already lost it, because she abandoned it when she departed during March 1963 with no fixed intent to return. Her intent then was to reside permanently in the Dominican Republic. The fact is that the respondent did not seek to return perma- nently to the United States until after events in the Dominican Republic caused financial reverses to her business, events which were not foreseeable when she returned to the Dominican Repub- lic in 1963. Inasmuch as we find that the respondent abandoned her lawful permanent resident status when she departed during March 1963, and that she was not a returning resident at the time of her present entry, she is not eligible for a waiver of the documents applicable to a returning resident. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. It ie further ordered that, pursuant to the immigration judge's order, the respondent be permitted to depart from the United

临时决定 #2216 由某些早期事件确定，”U.S. ex rel Lesto v. Day, 21 F.2d 307 (CA. 2, 1927)。答辩人的意图并非在由早期事件确定的期限内返回美国。她的丈夫、子女、住所、企业和财务资源均在多米尼加共和国。当她离开美国时，她并未留下她的住所；相反，她返回或重新建立了她在多米尼加共和国的住所。 答辩人1964年4月16日签署的声明仅进一步佐证了上述结论。她声称该声明是被胁迫的，因为移民检查员告知她不能使用其外国人登记卡，且未告知她获得律师或听证的权利。记录中没有证据表明她的声明是被胁迫或以其他方式非自愿的。告知获得律师权利的要求仅限于被羁押者，Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)。答辩人在签署相关声明时并未被羁押。此外，已裁定在移民程序的调查阶段没有被告知获得律师权利的权利。Matter of Steele, 12 I. & N. Dec. 302 (ETA, 1967)。然而，即使没有该声明，记录也清楚表明答辩人在1964年不能作为返回居民入境。事实上，她在1963年3月至1964年4月期间作为返回居民的所有入境均系检查官员的错误。 答辩人未因1964年缺乏听证而受到损害，因为1972年已提供了一次听证。移民法官从1964年排除听证的角度审理了此案，并认定答辩人当时会被认定不可入境。她并未因放弃居留的声明而失去居民身份。相反，她早已失去该身份，因为她在1963年3月离开时没有固定返回意图而放弃了它。她当时的意图是永久居住在多米尼加共和国。 事实是，答辩人直到多米尼加共和国的事件导致其企业财务逆转之后才寻求永久返回美国，这些事件在1963年她返回多米尼加共和国时是不可预见的。由于我们认定答辩人在1963年3月离开时放弃了其合法永久居民身份，且她在本次入境时不是返回居民，她没有资格获得适用于返回居民的文件豁免。 命令：上诉被驳回。 进一步命令，根据移民法官的命令，允许答辩人自本决定之日起30天内或地区局长可能批准的任何延长期内自愿离开美国；如果未能如此离开，答辩人应按照移民法官的命令被驱逐出境。

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Interim Decision #2216

临时决定 #2216

States voluntarily within 30 days from the date of this decision or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the District Director; and that, in the event of failure so to depart, the respondent shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's order.

自本决定之日起30天内或地区局长可能批准的任何延长期内自愿离开美国；如果未能如此离开，答辩人应按照移民法官的命令被驱逐出境。

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