In re Sean O'Cealleagh

Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 2006) Interim Decision #3538

引用为 23 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 2006) 临时决定 #3538

File A77 288 177 - San Pedro

案卷 A77 288 177 - San Pedro

Decided August 30, 2006

2006年8月30日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

(1) In order for an offense to qualify for the “purely political offense” exception to the ground of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2000), based on an alien’s conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, the offense must be completely or totally “political.”

(1) 为使某项罪行符合《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2000) 规定的不可入境理由中基于外国人因涉及道德败坏罪行被定罪的“纯粹政治性罪行”例外，该罪行必须完全或彻底是“政治性”的。

(2) The respondent is inadmissible where he properly conceded that his offense, substantively regarded, was not “purely political,” and where there was substantial evidence that the offense was not fabricated or trumped-up and therefore did not qualify from a procedural perspective as a “purely political offense,” because the circumstances surrounding his conviction in Northern Ireland for aiding and abetting the murder of two British corporals reflected a sincere effort to prosecute real lawbreakers.

(2) 被申请人不可入境，因为他适当承认其罪行在实质上不被视为“纯粹政治性”，并且有大量证据表明该罪行并非捏造或构陷，因此从程序角度看不符合“纯粹政治性罪行”的条件，因为他在北爱尔兰因协助和教唆谋杀两名英国下士而被定罪的周围情况反映出起诉真正违法者的真诚努力。

FOR RESPONDENT: James M. Byrne, Esquire, San Francisco, California

被申请人代表：James M. Byrne 律师，加利福尼亚州旧金山

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Richard G. Vinet, Assistant Chief Counsel

国土安全部代表：Richard G. Vinet，助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: OSUNA, Acting Vice Chairman; FILPPU and PAULEY, Board Members.

审理：委员会小组：OSUNA，代理副主席；FILPPU 和 PAULEY，委员会成员。

PAULEY, Board Member:

PAULEY，委员会成员：

In a decision dated April 23, 2004, an Immigration Judge found that the respondent was not inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2000), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), and admitted him to the United States as a returning lawful permanent resident. The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent was not inadmissible based on her finding that his conviction was for a “purely political offense” and was therefore expressly excepted from section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be sustained and the proceedings will be remanded.

在2004年4月23日的决定中，一名移民法官认定被申请人并非因涉及道德败坏罪行（“CIMT”）被定罪而根据《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2000) 不可入境，并允许其作为回美的合法永久居民入境美国。移民法官基于其认定被申请人的定罪属于“纯粹政治性罪行”因而明确属于该法第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条例外，裁定被申请人不可入境不成立。国土安全部（“DHS”）对该决定提出上诉。上诉将获支持，案件将发回重审。

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Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 2006) Interim Decision #3538

引用为 23 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 2006) 临时决定 #3538

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. 事实与程序历史

The respondent, a native of the United Kingdom and citizen of Ireland, was convicted in 1990 in Northern Ireland of aiding and abetting the murders of two British corporals in 1988, causing grievous bodily harm, and false imprisonment.1 The conviction, rendered by a court that had been established to try political-type crimes in Northern Ireland (the Diplock Courts, which were conducted without a jury), arose out of the events of March 19, 1988, when the two British corporals were killed in Belfast, Northern Ireland. The incident occurred during the funeral of another murder victim, who had himself been killed by a loyalist gunman at an Irish Republican Army (“IRA”) funeral.

被申请人，英国本土人、爱尔兰公民，于1990年在北爱尔兰因协助和教唆1988年谋杀两名英国下士、造成严重身体伤害和非法监禁而被定罪。1 该定罪由为审理北爱尔兰政治类犯罪而设立的法院（Diplock法院，无陪审团审理）作出，源于1988年3月19日两名英国下士在北爱尔兰贝尔法斯特被杀的事件。该事件发生在另一名谋杀受害者的葬礼期间，该受害者本人是在爱尔兰共和军（“IRA”）葬礼上被一名效忠派枪手杀害的。

According to the trial court’s written decision,2 a car being driven by the British corporals had approached the funeral cortege after a number of marshals had tried to wave the driver down. The driver then attempted to pass the procession by mounting a footpath at the side of the road. When blocked by the cortege and its crowds, the vehicle attempted to escape by turning into a service road but then reversed at a fairly fast speed. By then the car had attracted the attention of some of those in the crowd, and several vehicles blocked its exit. A group of youths attacked the car and, after breaking the windows, pulled the occupants out of the vehicle. There was a brief respite when the crowd saw that the occupants were armed, but the crowd soon resumed its attack. Each soldier, surrounded by persons striking him, was dragged into a nearby park, stripped of most of his clothing, and further assaulted. After being savagely beaten, the corporals were forced into a taxi and driven to an area where they were forced out of the car. After a final struggle, a gunman shot each officer and fled.

根据初审法院的书面判决，2 一辆由英国下士驾驶的汽车在多名纠察试图挥手示意司机停下后接近了葬礼队伍。司机随后试图通过驶上路边人行道超越队伍。当被队伍和人群阻挡时，车辆试图转入一条辅路逃跑，但随后以相当快的速度倒车。此时汽车已引起人群中的一些人注意，几辆车堵住了其出口。一群年轻人袭击了汽车，打破车窗后将车内人员拉出。当人群看到车内人员携带武器时曾短暂停歇，但人群很快恢复攻击。每名士兵被打击他的人包围，被拖进附近的公园，大部分衣服被剥去，并进一步受到殴打。在遭到野蛮殴打后，下士们被强行塞进一辆出租车，驶至一个区域后被强迫下车。经过最后挣扎，一名枪手射杀了每名军官后逃离。

When questioned more than 10 months later, the respondent (who was not shown to be a member of the IRA) told the police that although he had been present at the funeral and had seen the initial attack on the car, he had not taken part. The trial court, however, found that the evidence showed that the respondent had been “close to the car when the mob [was] breaking into it and dragging out the soldiers and beating them.” The court also found that the respondent was thereafter “an active participant in the onslaught,” was among the group that violently led one of the soldiers to the park, “play[ed] at least

在超过10个月后接受询问时，被申请人（未被证明是IRA成员）告诉警方，尽管他出席了葬礼并看到了对汽车的初步袭击，但他没有参与。然而，初审法院认定证据显示被申请人“在暴徒破车而入、拖出士兵并殴打他们时靠近汽车”。法院还认定被申请人此后“是袭击的积极参与者”，属于暴力将其中一名士兵带至公园的人群之一，“至少扮演了

1 The DHS charged only the aiding and abetting offense as a CIMT ground of inadmissibility. 2 Our recitation of facts as to the events of March 19, 1988, is drawn from the criminal court’s written decision, which was made part of the record by the Immigration Judge. Because this document is a publicly available source, we have determined that our discussion of its contents would not be in conflict with the Immigration Judge’s protective order dated April 22, 2004. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46 (2006).

1 国土安全部仅将协助和教唆罪行作为涉及道德败坏罪行的不可入境理由提出指控。 2 我们对1988年3月19日事件的叙述取自刑事法院的书面判决，该判决由移民法官纳入记录。由于该文件是公开可得的来源，我们认定我们对其内容的讨论不会与移民法官2004年4月22日的保护令相冲突。见 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46 (2006)。

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引用为 23 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 2006) 临时决定 #3538

a supporting role in imprisoning and assaulting” the British soldiers, “appear[ed] to take part in carrying” one of them, and was “present when the taxi left with the soldiers and their captors on board.” The respondent was not accused of accompanying the doomed officers during the final taxi ride or of participating in the actual murders. He was convicted based on a theory of “common purpose,” which his attorney failed to challenge.

在监禁和殴打”英国士兵中的“辅助角色”，“似乎参与搬运”其中一人，并且“在出租车载着士兵及其抓捕者离开时在场”。被申请人未被指控在最后的出租车行程中陪同那些注定死亡的军官或参与实际谋杀。他基于“共同目的”理论被定罪，其律师未能对此提出质疑。

For his role in the incident, the then 19-year-old respondent was sentenced to life in prison. The respondent appealed his conviction, but his appeal was dismissed on July 5, 1991. The respondent served more than 8 years in a prison designated for political prisoners before his release pursuant to the Good Friday Accord on April 10, 1998. The Good Friday Accord had followed an agreement between the British Government and the IRA, pursuant to which the British Government had agreed to the early release of certain prisoners once the IRA called a cease-fire.

因在该事件中的角色，当时19岁的被申请人被判处终身监禁。被申请人对定罪提出上诉，但其上诉于1991年7月5日被驳回。被申请人在一所指定为政治犯的监狱服刑超过8年，后根据1998年4月10日的《耶稣受难日协议》获释。《耶稣受难日协议》是在英国政府与IRA达成协议之后达成的，根据该协议，英国政府同意在IRA宣布停火后提前释放某些囚犯。

In 2001 the respondent secured lawful permanent resident status in the United States after filing an application for adjustment of status that disclosed his conviction for a CIMT. On February 25, 2004, the respondent applied for admission to the United States as a returning resident alien. The DHS placed the respondent in removal proceedings, charging him with inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. That section makes inadmissible “any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense).” The Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent’s conviction was for a “purely political offense” was based on her determination that he was prosecuted, incarcerated, and eventually released as a political criminal. The DHS challenges that finding on appeal.

2001年，被申请人在提交披露其涉及道德败坏罪行定罪的调整身份申请后，获得了美国的合法永久居民身份。2004年2月25日，被申请人作为回美居民外国人申请入境美国。国土安全部将被申请人置于遣返程序中，指控其根据该法第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条不可入境。该条规定“任何外国人因……涉及道德败坏的罪行（纯粹政治性罪行除外）被定罪，或承认已实施，或承认实施构成该罪行基本要素的行为”不可入境。移民法官认定被申请人的定罪属于“纯粹政治性罪行”，是基于其裁定他作为政治犯被起诉、监禁并最终释放。国土安全部在上诉中对该认定提出质疑。

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

II. 法律框架

This is a case of first impression, in that none of our published decisions has considered the meaning of the term “purely political offense” under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.3 Before addressing the relatively narrow issues in this case, we will begin by briefly setting the stage in terms of

这是一个首次印象的案件，因为我们没有任何已公布的裁决考虑过该法第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条中“纯粹政治性罪行”一词的含义。3 在处理本案中相对狭窄的问题之前，我们将首先简要介绍背景，包括

Nor have we defined the term in the other context in which it appears in the Act: section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2000) (describing certain crimes of violence as aggravated felonies). A somewhat similar term, “serious nonpolitical crime,” though stated in the obverse and lacking the adverb “purely,” serves as a ground of ineligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. See sections 208(b)(2)(A)(iii), 241(b)(3)(B)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2000); see also McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds, Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2000).

我们也没有在该法中出现该词的其他语境中定义该术语：该法第101(a)(43)(F)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2000)（将某些暴力犯罪描述为加重重罪）。一个有些类似的术语，“严重非政治性犯罪”，尽管表述相反且缺少副词“纯粹”，作为庇护和暂缓遣返的不合格理由。见该法第208(b)(2)(A)(iii)、241(b)(3)(B)(iii)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii)、1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2000)；另见 McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986)，因其他理由被推翻，Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2000)。

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exploring the legislative background and apparent origin of the “purely political offense” provision, the types of “political offenses” that exist, and the standard we will employ to determine whether the respondent’s crime qualifies as a “purely political offense.”

探讨“纯粹政治性罪行”条款的立法背景和明显起源、存在的“政治性罪行”类型，以及我们用来确定被申请人罪行是否符合“纯粹政治性罪行”的标准。

A. Origin of the Provision

A. 条款的起源

The current “purely political offense” provision first appeared in section 212(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 182. It appears to be the successor of virtually identical language enacted as the second proviso to section 3 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874 (relating to an “offense purely political”). That language, which was repealed by the 1952 Act, was considered by the Central Office of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service in Matter of K-, 4 I&N Dec. 108 (C.O. 1950). However, although the language appears to have been in effect in 1941, we did not allude to it in our decision in Matter of B-, 1 I&N Dec. 47 (BIA, A.G. 1941). In that case, we held, without regard to an exception for “offenses purely political,” that section 3 of the Act of 1917, which authorized the exclusion of aliens found guilty of committing a CIMT, would not be applied to a German Jew who had been convicted under the Nazi regime based on trumped-up fraud charges, because the “conviction occurred primarily because of political considerations, to wit: the fact that the defendant was a Jew.”4 Id. at 50.

当前的“纯粹政治性罪行”条款首次出现在1952年《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)条，Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 182。它似乎是1917年2月5日《移民法》第3条第二但书所制定的几乎相同语言的继承者，39 Stat. 874（涉及“纯粹政治性罪行”）。该语言被1952年法案废除，前移民和归化局中央办公室在 Matter of K-, 4 I&N Dec. 108 (C.O. 1950) 中考虑过该语言。然而，尽管该语言似乎在1941年生效，我们在 Matter of B-, 1 I&N Dec. 47 (BIA, A.G. 1941) 的裁决中并未提及它。在该案中，我们裁定，不考虑“纯粹政治性罪行”的例外，1917年法案第3条授权排除被认定犯有涉及道德败坏罪行的外国人，不适用于一名在纳粹政权下因捏造的欺诈指控被定罪的德国犹太人，因为“定罪主要出于政治考虑，即：被告是犹太人。”4 Id. at 50。

At the time of the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the House of Representatives Managers stated:

在1952年《移民与国籍法》通过时，众议院代表管理人员表示：

In order to remove any fear that under the provisions of the bill certain religious, racial, or political persecutees would be arbitrarily excluded from admission to or deported from the United States, the conferees desire to make a few clarifying statements. Regarding the sections of the bill which provide for the exclusion of aliens convicted of two or more offenses, other than purely political offenses, it is the opinion of the conferees that those convictions which were obviously based on trumped-up charges or predicated upon repressive measures against racial, religious or political minorities, should be regarded as purely political in nature and should not result in the exclusion of the alien.

为了消除任何担忧，即根据法案条款，某些宗教、种族或政治受迫害者会被任意排除在进入美国之外或被驱逐出美国，会议代表们希望作出几点澄清说明。关于法案中规定排除被判定犯有两项或以上罪行（纯粹政治性罪行除外）的外国人的条款，会议代表们认为，那些明显基于捏造指控或基于对种族、宗教或政治少数群体的压制性措施而作出的定罪，应被视为具有纯粹政治性质，不应导致该外国人被排除。

Conf. Rep. No. 82-2096 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1753, 1754, 1952 WL 3083. We read the statement as likely reflecting an awareness of Matter of B-, supra, and Matter of K-, supra, and as an express reassurance that persons who are the subjects of political prosecutions should be included in the protected category.

Conf. Rep. No. 82-2096 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1753, 1754, 1952 WL 3083。我们认为该陈述很可能反映了对Matter of B-案（见上文）和Matter of K-案（见上文）的认识，并明确保证政治迫害的对象应被纳入受保护类别。

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B. Political Offenses

B. 政治罪行

There appear to be essentially three types of “political” crimes that have been identified, primarily in the extradition context. One sort, which the respondent essentially contends is applicable to his conviction, involves baseless, trumped-up, or fabricated charges. There is no dispute among the parties that a fabricated or trumped-up charge may be a “purely political

似乎基本上已识别出三种类型的“政治”犯罪，主要是在引渡背景下。一种类型——被申请人实质上主张适用于其定罪——涉及毫无根据、捏造或虚构的指控。各方之间没有争议的是，虚构或捏造的指控可以是“纯粹政治

5 offense,” as indeed we held in Matter of B-, supra. A second type of “political” offense, not involved here, is one that consists of an act or acts directed against the State, such as treason, sedition, or espionage, that contains none of the elements of ordinary crimes. The third kind of “political” crime, again not at issue here and denominated under extradition law as a “relative” political offense, is one in which a common offense such as murder, assault, or theft is so connected with a political act that the offense is regarded as “political.” See 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extradition § 44 (2002); see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1986). We have no occasion to explore the extent of portability of extradition principles to the “purely political offense” language we must apply, except to note the very different purposes served by extradition and removal or exclusion proceedings.6

5 罪行”，正如我们在Matter of B-案（见上文）中所裁定的那样。第二种类型的“政治”罪行——本案不涉及——由针对国家的行为构成，如叛国、煽动叛乱或间谍活动，不包含普通犯罪的任何要素。第三种“政治”犯罪——同样不是本案争议点，在引渡法下被称为“相对”政治罪行——是指谋杀、袭击或盗窃等普通犯罪与政治行为联系如此紧密，以至于该罪行被视为“政治性”。见31A Am. Jur. 2d Extradition § 44 (2002)；另见Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1986)。我们没有机会探讨引渡原则对我们必须适用的“纯粹政治罪行”措辞的可移植性程度，只需指出引渡与驱逐或排除程序所服务的目的是非常不同的。6

Department of State regulations also support this interpretation: “The term ‘purely political offense’, as used in INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, includes offenses that resulted in convictions obviously based on fabricated charges or predicated upon repressive measures against racial, religious, or political minorities.” 22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a)(6) (2006). Our reading is confirmed by the Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual, which provides:

国务院条例也支持这一解释：“‘纯粹政治罪行’一词，如该法INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)中所使用，包括导致明显基于捏造指控或基于对种族、宗教或政治少数群体的压制性措施的定罪的罪行。”22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a)(6) (2006)。我们的解读得到国务院《外交事务手册》的确认，其中规定：

Where there is any indication that the offense for which the alien was convicted was of a political nature, or prosecution therefor was politically motivated, the consular officer shall request CA/VO/L/A to make a determination. The imposition of a cruel or unusual punishment, or of a punishment which is clearly disproportionate to the offense, as well as cases falling within the provisions of 22 CFR 40.21(a)(6), raise the question as to whether the conviction was for a purely political reason.

如果有任何迹象表明该外国人被定罪的罪行具有政治性质，或起诉具有政治动机，领事官员必须请求CA/VO/L/A作出裁定。施加残忍或不寻常的惩罚，或明显与罪行不相称的惩罚，以及属于22 CFR 40.21(a)(6)条款范围内的案件，都会引发关于该定罪是否出于纯粹政治原因的疑问。

Vol. 9 Foreign Affairs Manual, Subpart C, 22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a), note 10(a) (TL: VISA-46; Aug. 26, 1991) (Political Offenses). 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in which this case arises, has indicated that in determining whether an offense is “political” in nature for immigration purposes, extradition law may serve as a guide. McMullen v. INS, supra. The same was found by the Central Office in Matter of K-, supra.

Vol. 9 Foreign Affairs Manual, Subpart C, 22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a), note 10(a) (TL: VISA-46; Aug. 26, 1991)（政治罪行）。 6 本案所源自的美国第九巡回上诉法院已指出，在确定某项罪行就移民目的而言是否具有“政治”性质时，引渡法可以作为指南。McMullen v. INS，见上文。中央办公室在Matter of K-案（见上文）中也持相同看法。

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C. Applicable Standard

C. 适用标准

As previously observed, the language at issue here has never been the subject of interpretation by the Board or, to our knowledge, a Federal court. The question whether an offense is merely “political,” as opposed to “purely political,” for purposes of eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal has, however, been considered. We note that in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999), the Supreme Court endorsed the balancing test we set forth in Matter of McMullen, 19 I&N Dec. 90, 97-99 (BIA 1984), for determining whether an offense was a “serious nonpolitical crime,” that is, whether the common-law or criminal character of the acts outweighed its political nature.

如前所述，此处所涉措辞从未成为委员会的解释对象，据我们所知，也从未成为联邦法院的解释对象。然而，就庇护和暂缓驱逐的资格而言，某项罪行是仅仅“政治性”还是“纯粹政治性”的问题已被考虑过。我们注意到，在INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999)案中，最高法院认可了我们在Matter of McMullen, 19 I&N Dec. 90, 97-99 (BIA 1984)案中提出的平衡测试，用于确定某项罪行是否为“严重非政治犯罪”，即行为的普通法或犯罪性质是否超过其政治性质。

But we conclude that this test is not applicable here. The phrase that we must interpret in this case is “purely political offense,” not “serious nonpolitical crime.” Unless we are to disregard Congress’s choice to include the adverb “purely,” we must give that word substantive meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (stating that every

但我们认为该测试在此不适用。本案中我们必须解释的短语是“纯粹政治罪行”，而非“严重非政治犯罪”。除非我们要无视国会选择加入副词“纯粹”，否则我们必须赋予该词实质含义。见，例如，United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)（指出在解释法规时，每个

7 clause and word should be given effect, if possible, in interpreting a statute).

7 条款和词语都应尽可能赋予效力）。

Among the dictionary meanings assigned to the term “pure” are “not mixed,” “complete,” and “total.” See Webster’s II New College Dictionary 899 (1995). Taking these definitions into consideration, we find that an offense must be found to be completely or totally “political” in order to qualify for the CIMT exception. In sum, because of Congress’s use of the word “purely” in section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), we conclude that a balancing test is not appropriate in this quite different context.

赋予“pure”一词的词典含义包括“不混合的”、“完全的”和“全部的”。见Webster’s II New College Dictionary 899 (1995)。考虑到这些定义，我们认为必须认定某项罪行完全或彻底具有“政治性”，才能符合CIMT例外。总之，由于国会在第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条中使用了“纯粹”一词，我们得出结论，在这一截然不同的语境中，平衡测试不合适。

III. DISCUSSION

III. 讨论

The respondent has conceded that his crime, judged from solely a substantive perspective, was not “purely political,”8 and that the Immigration Judge relied exclusively on the circumstances surrounding the prosecution and punishment of the offense to reach her conclusion that the offense nevertheless fit that description. This concession, if well founded, greatly simplifies our task, for we need not then examine in depth whether the offense

被申请人已承认，仅从实质角度判断，其罪行并非“纯粹政治性”，8并且移民法官完全依赖起诉和惩罚该罪行的情况来得出该罪行仍符合该描述的结论。这一承认如果成立，将大大简化我们的任务，因为届时我们无需深入审查该罪行

7 We recognize, as the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, that this canon of statutory construction is not a mandate and may not be used to lead to a resulting interpretation that is at odds with congressional intent. See Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1264 (2006). But, unlike in that case, we find nothing here to indicate that the term “purely” should not be given effect, nor any reason not to accord the term its natural meaning. 8 According to the respondent’s brief, he “is not claiming that the alleged acts for which he was convicted were purely political, but the conviction was a purely political conviction.”

7 我们认识到，正如最高法院最近重申的那样，这一法定解释准则并非强制性要求，且不得用于导致与国会意图相悖的解释结果。见Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1264 (2006)。但是，与该案不同，我们在此未发现任何表明“纯粹”一词不应被赋予效力的迹象，也没有任何理由不赋予该词其自然含义。 8 根据被申请人的辩护状，他“并非声称其被定罪的所指行为是纯粹政治性的，而是该定罪是纯粹政治性定罪。”

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would meet a “political offense” test viewed exclusively through a substantive lens, much less qualify as a “purely political offense.”

仅从实质角度审视，是否会符合“政治罪行”测试，更不用说符合“纯粹政治罪行”的资格了。

We will briefly digress to find that there is good reason for the respondent’s concession that his crime fails to meet the test enunciated above. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that “for a criminal act to be ‘political,’ the individual must have been motivated by political reasons.” INS v. McMullen, 788 F.2d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds, Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2000). This sine qua non aspect of a “political” crime is not present here.

我们将稍作离题，以认定被申请人承认其罪行不符合上述测试是有充分理由的。美国第九巡回上诉法院已裁定，“要使犯罪行为具有‘政治性’，个人必须出于政治动机。”INS v. McMullen, 788 F.2d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1986)，因其他理由被推翻，Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2000)。这一“政治”犯罪的必要条件在此不存在。

The respondent’s charged crime was aiding and abetting the murder of two members of a military force that had been perceived by nationalist individuals as an occupying power in Northern Ireland for the previous two decades. The crowd of mourners into which the victims lucklessly drove likely viewed the armed men as provocateurs, or perhaps even as physical threats—not surprisingly in such a volatile atmosphere so recently after the murders of several nationalist mourners by a loyalist at just such a funeral. But while the respondent’s offense certainly took place in a political milieu and may have been committed in some small part for political reasons, the principal, and perhaps even sole, motivation appears to have been anger or revenge directed at the unfortunate British corporals by the funeral attendees, of which the respondent was one. We thus find that if viewed from the perspective of assessing whether the crime was purely political as a substantive matter, the ruling below clearly could not have withstood scrutiny, and that the respondent’s concession to that effect is therefore well justified.9 Barapind v. Enomoto, supra.

被申请人被指控的罪行是协助和教唆谋杀两名军事力量成员，该军事力量在过去二十年中被民族主义个人视为北爱尔兰的占领力量。受害者不幸驶入的哀悼人群很可能将武装人员视为挑衅者，甚至可能视为人身威胁——在如此动荡的气氛中，在几名民族主义哀悼者刚刚在正是这样的葬礼上被一名忠诚者谋杀之后，这并不奇怪。但是，尽管被申请人的罪行确实发生在政治环境中，并且可能有一小部分出于政治原因，但主要、甚至可能是唯一的动机似乎是葬礼参加者（被申请人是其中之一）对不幸的英国下士的愤怒或报复。因此，我们认为，如果从评估该罪行作为实质问题是否纯粹政治性的角度审视，下级裁决显然无法经得起审查，因此被申请人对此的承认是完全合理的。9 Barapind v. Enomoto，见上文。

We come, therefore, to the nub of the case: whether the respondent’s offense of aiding and abetting the murder of the two British corporals was a fabricated charge or the equivalent. In this regard, the respondent contends that “it is quite clear from the findings of facts by the [Immigration Judge] that the

因此，我们来到本案的核心问题：被申请人协助和教唆谋杀两名英国下士的罪行是否是捏造指控或同等性质。在这方面，被申请人主张“从[移民法官]的事实认定中可以非常清楚地看出，

Given this conclusion, we need not reach the DHS’s argument that the crime also fails to meet the substantive “purely political offense” standard on another ground–namely the Supreme Court’s and Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of our approach in Matter of McMullen, supra, particularly our exclusion from the political offense category of any crime that “‘is grossly out of proportion to the political objective or if it involves acts of an atrocious nature.’” INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, supra, at 429 (quoting Matter of McMullen, supra, at 97-98).

鉴于这一结论，我们无需触及DHS的论点，即该罪行基于另一理由也不符合实质性“纯粹政治罪行”标准——即最高法院和第九巡回法院认可了我们在Matter of McMullen案（见上文）中的方法，特别是我们将任何“‘与政治目标严重不成比例或涉及残暴性质行为’”的犯罪排除在政治罪行类别之外。INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre，见上文，第429页（引用Matter of McMullen，见上文，第97-98页）。

Likewise, we need not decide the DHS’s further contention that the terms of the current extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom exclude from the political offense exception those types of offenses of which the respondent was convicted. However, we observe that like the Ninth Circuit, we have held that the issues involved in a deportation hearing differ from those involved in an extradition case, and that resolution of even a common issue in one proceeding is not binding in the other, because extradition and deportation proceedings are distinct and separate. See McMullen v. INS, supra, at 596.

同样，我们无需裁定DHS的进一步主张，即美国与英国之间现行引渡条约的条款将被申请人被定罪的此类罪行排除在政治罪行例外之外。然而，我们注意到，与第九巡回法院一样，我们已裁定驱逐听证中涉及的问题与引渡案件中的问题不同，且一个程序中即使对共同问题的解决在另一程序中也不具有约束力，因为引渡和驱逐程序是截然不同的。见McMullen v. INS，见上文，第596页。

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respondent was not involved in the murder,” a conclusion that he asserts is echoed by many other groups and commentators. Among these he notes the criticism in a House Concurrent Resolution of the 105th Congress of the “controversial doctrine of common purpose convicting people such as Sean Kelly . . . on the premise that they should have anticipated the actions of others around them.” H.R. Con. Res. 152, 105th Cong., 143 Cong. Rec. E2368 (1997), 1997 WL 712708. The respondent essentially argues that he is innocent of aiding and abetting the killings of the two British corporals, from which it would also follow that any punishment would be disproportionate, and that his crime was therefore essentially trumped up or fabricated. Consequently, he contends that if only the manner of prosecution and punishment are considered, the crime was properly determined by the Immigration Judge to be a “purely political offense.”

被申请人未参与谋杀”，他声称这一结论得到许多其他团体和评论者的呼应。其中他提到，第105届国会的一项众议院共同决议批评了“有争议的共同目的原则，该原则以肖恩·凯利等人本应预见到周围他人行为为前提，判定其有罪。”H.R. Con. Res. 152, 105th Cong., 143 Cong. Rec. E2368 (1997), 1997 WL 712708。被申请人实质上主张，他对于协助和教唆杀害两名英国下士是无罪的，由此也可推出任何惩罚都将是不相称的，因此他的罪行本质上是捏造或虚构的。因此，他主张，如果仅考虑起诉和惩罚的方式，移民法官已正确认定该罪行为“纯粹政治犯罪”。

We conclude, however, that the offense was not fabricated. Nor were the prosecution and conviction purely political, within the meaning of the “purely political offense” concept. There is no question that the murders of the victims occurred, and there was evidence that the respondent played a role in violently leading the soldiers to the park and otherwise participating in their assault. The degree of the respondent’s involvement in the ultimate crime of murder may not have satisfied the concept of “aiding and abetting” under United States law. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).10 However, such a correlation is not required for a determination that the offense was not fabricated or trumped up in the sense that (i) the charging and convicting authority–here the British Government–lacked a good faith belief that the charges and conviction were well founded and (ii) the respondent was prosecuted only for political purposes.

然而，我们认定该罪行并非捏造。起诉和定罪也并非在“纯粹政治犯罪”概念意义上的纯粹政治性。毫无疑问，受害人的谋杀确实发生，且有证据表明被申请人在暴力带领士兵前往公园以及以其他方式参与袭击中发挥了作用。被申请人对最终谋杀罪的参与程度可能不符合美国法律下“协助和教唆”的概念。见18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)。10 然而，要认定该罪行并非捏造或虚构，即（i）起诉和定罪机关——此处为英国政府——缺乏对指控和定罪有充分依据的善意确信，以及（ii）被申请人仅出于政治目的被起诉，并不需要这种对应关系。

Neither the United Kingdom nor any other country is required to adhere to the elements of an aiding and abetting offense under our law. And while there may be some limit to how far a foreign government may go in defining an offense without rendering permissible a conclusion that the offense is “purely political,” we find that that limit was not exceeded or even approached in this case through the use of the concept of “common purpose.” The circumstances surrounding the respondent’s conviction reflect a sincere effort to identify and punish those persons genuinely responsible for the deaths of the soldiers. The use of special provisions associated with the Diplock court system, the location of the respondent’s confinement, and his release pursuant to the Good

联合王国或任何其他国家均无须遵循我国法律下协助和教唆罪的要件。尽管外国政府在界定罪行时可能有一定限度，超出该限度即不能得出该罪行为“纯粹政治犯罪”的允许结论，但我们认定，本案中通过使用“共同目的”概念并未超出甚至未接近该限度。围绕被申请人定罪的情况反映出，有关方面真诚努力查明并惩罚对士兵死亡真正负有责任的人。使用与Diplock法庭制度相关的特别规定、被申请人关押地点以及根据《耶稣受难日协议》将其释放，

See, e.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) (“In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant ‘in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.’” (quoting Learned Hand in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938))).

见，例如，Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)（“为协助和教唆他人实施犯罪，被告必须‘在某种程度上将自己与该项冒险联系在一起，参与其中，如同参与他希望促成之事，并通过自己的行动力求使其成功。’”（引用Learned Hand在United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)中的意见））。

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Friday Accord are, to be sure, relevant factors that favor his claim. Those factors, however, do not overcome the substantial evidence of a bona fide effort to prosecute real lawbreakers such that the respondent’s conviction falls within the exception he invokes.11

诚然，这些因素有利于其主张。然而，这些因素并不能推翻关于存在善意努力起诉真正违法者的实质性证据，从而被申请人的定罪属于其援引的例外情形。11

IV. CONCLUSION

IV. 结论

We conclude that the respondent’s crime was not fabricated and that it cannot otherwise be considered a “purely political offense” when viewed in the totality of all relevant circumstances. We will therefore vacate the Immigration Judge’s decision that the respondent’s conviction falls within the “purely political offense” exception to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. Consequently, we find that the respondent is removable as charged, and we will remand the record for further proceedings.

我们认定，被申请人的罪行并非捏造，且在综合考虑所有相关情形后，也不能被视为“纯粹政治犯罪”。因此，我们将撤销移民法官关于被申请人定罪属于该法第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条“纯粹政治犯罪”例外的决定。 consequently，我们认定被申请人可依指控被驱逐，并将案件记录发回进一步审理。

We note also the DHS’s point that a number of individuals tried for crimes arising out of the same episode were acquitted, and that the conviction/acquittal rate for the special Diplock courts employed in his case was approximately the same as for ordinary criminal courts functioning in Northern Ireland. Such facts are not consistent with a conclusion that the British Government was bent on prosecuting and convicting the respondent for purely political reasons.

我们还注意到国土安全部指出，因同一事件所涉罪行受审的若干个人被宣告无罪，且其案件中使用的特别Diplock法庭的定罪/无罪释放率与在北爱尔兰运作的普通刑事法庭大致相同。此类事实与英国政府纯粹出于政治原因起诉并定罪被申请人的结论不符。

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