Matter of Perez-Contreras

The respondent appeals from a decision dated August 3, 1992, in which the immigration judge found the respondent deportable and ineligible for relief from deportation and ordered him deported to Mexico.' The appeal will be sustained and the proceedings will be terminated. The request for oral argument is denied.

被申请人对1992年8月3日的决定提出上诉，在该决定中，移民法官认定被申请人可被驱逐且无资格获得驱逐救济，并命令将其驱逐至墨西哥。¹ 上诉将获支持，程序将终止。口头辩论请求被驳回。

The respondent is a 21-year-old native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States on September 15, 1985, as a lawful permanent resident? On November 19, 1991, he was convicted, in the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Franklin County, of the offense of assault in the third degree in violation of section 9A.36.031(1)(f) of the Revised Code of Washington. The respondent was also convicted in the same court on January 8, 1992, of the offense of robbery in the second degree in violation of sections 9A.56.190 and 9A.56.210(1) of the Revised Code of Washington. On July 15, 1992, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form 1-221) against the respondent, charging him with deportability as an alien convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude and a firearm violation. At a hearing on August 3, 1992, the respondent, through counsel, denied deportability. The immigration judge found the respondent deportable and ordered his deportation, giving rise to the instant appeal. The Service has first charged the respondent with deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, which provides for the deportability of any alien who

被申请人是21岁的墨西哥本土公民，于1985年9月15日作为合法永久居民进入美国。² 1991年11月19日，他在华盛顿州富兰克林县高等法院被判定犯有违反《华盛顿州修订法典》第9A.36.031(1)(f)条的三级攻击罪。被申请人还于1992年1月8日在同一法院被判定犯有违反《华盛顿州修订法典》第9A.56.190和9A.56.210(1)条的二级抢劫罪。1992年7月15日，移民和归化局对被申请人签发了出庭说明和听证通知（Form 1-221），指控其作为被判定犯有两项涉及道德败坏的犯罪和一项枪支违规罪的外国人而可被驱逐。在1992年8月3日的听证中，被申请人通过律师否认可被驱逐。移民法官认定被申请人可被驱逐并命令将其驱逐，由此产生本上诉。 移民局首先根据该法案第241(a)(2)(C)条指控被申请人可被驱逐，该条规定任何外国人在以下情况下可被驱逐：

The criminal information for the respondent's assault charge states that he shot the victim in the arm with a pistol "with criminal negligence." The Service alleges, and the immigration judge apparently found, that the foregoing statement establishes that the respondent was convicted of a firearm offense. We disagree. The respondent was convicted of assault in the third degree under subsection (f) of section 9A.36.031(1) of the Revised Code of Washington, which provides as follows:

被申请人攻击罪指控的刑事起诉书称，他"因刑事过失"用手枪射击了受害人的手臂。移民局主张，且移民法官显然认定，上述陈述证明被申请人被判定犯有枪支犯罪。我们不同意。 被申请人被判定犯有《华盛顿州修订法典》第9A.36.031(1)条(f)款规定的三级攻击罪，该款规定如下：

He therefore canot be considered to have ben "convicted" of a firearm offense and is not deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act. We will next address whether the respondent's conviction for assault in the third degree constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.s We have observed that moral turpitude is a nebulous

因此，不能认定其被"判定"犯有枪支犯罪，且其不可根据该法案第241(a)(2)(C)条被驱逐。 我们接下来将处理被申请人的三级攻击罪定罪是否构成涉及道德败坏的犯罪。⁵ 我们已指出，道德败坏是一个模糊的

concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general. See generally Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989), and cases cited therein. Assault may or may not involve moral turpitude. Matter of Danesh, 19 I&N Dec. 669 (BIA 1988). Simple assault is generally not considered to be a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of Short, supra. In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Okabe v. INS, 671 F.2d 863 (5th. Cir. 1982); Winestock v. INS, 576 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1978); Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Meyer v. Day, 54 F.2d 336, 337 (2d Cir. 1931); United States ex rel. Shladzien v. Warden of Eastern State Penitentiary, 45 F.2d 204, 205-06 (E.D. Pa. 1930); Matter of Balao, 20 I&N Dec. 440 (BIA 1992); Matter of Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 225 (BIA 1980). Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. Matter of Danesh, supra. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere. See Ciambelli ex rel. Maranci v. Johnson, 12 F.2d 465 (D. Mass. 1926) (holding that assault and battery upon a police officer does not involve moral turpitude where intent is not charged); Matter of Lopez, 13 I&N Dec. 725, 726-27 (BIA 1971) (finding no moral turpitude where statute does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter and indictment does not reveal intent); Matter of Espinosa, 10 I&N Dec. 98 (BIA 1962) (finding no moral turpitude where statute did not distinguish between the offenses of making a false, as opposed to a fraudulent, statement based on mens rea). In two cases, we have found moral turpitude present in criminally reckless conduct. Matter of Wojtkow, 18 I&N Dec. 111 (BIA 1981) (defining reckless conduct as the awareness of and conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk); Matter of Medina, 15 I&N Dec. 611 (BIA 1976), affd, 547 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1 977) (defining reckless conduct as the conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk). While reckless conduct may not evince an intent to cause a particular harm, it does reflect a willingness to disregard the risks inherent in the conduct. Matter of Medina, supra, at 614. The respondent was convicted of causing injury to his victim "with criminal negligence." Criminal negligence exists when the perpetrator "fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable man would exercise in the same situation." Wash. Rev. Code Ann.

概念，通常指本质上卑劣、邪恶或堕落，违反道德规则以及人与人之间（无论是个人之间还是个人与社会之间）应尽的义务，从而震动公众良知的行为。一般参见 Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989) 及其中引用的案例。殴打可能涉及也可能不涉及道德败坏。Matter of Danesh, 19 I&N Dec. 669 (BIA 1988)。简单殴打一般不被视为涉及道德败坏的犯罪。Matter of Short, supra。 在确定某项犯罪是否涉及道德败坏时，我们考虑该行为是否伴随恶意动机或腐败心理。Okabe v. INS, 671 F.2d 863 (5th. Cir. 1982); Winestock v. INS, 576 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1978); Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Meyer v. Day, 54 F.2d 336, 337 (2d Cir. 1931); United States ex rel. Shladzien v. Warden of Eastern State Penitentiary, 45 F.2d 204, 205-06 (E.D. Pa. 1930); Matter of Balao, 20 I&N Dec. 440 (BIA 1992); Matter of Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 225 (BIA 1980)。当明知或故意行为是某项罪行的构成要件时，我们认定存在道德败坏。Matter of Danesh, supra。然而，当无法从法规中确定所要求的犯罪心理时，道德败坏并不当然存在。参见 Ciambelli ex rel. Maranci v. Johnson, 12 F.2d 465 (D. Mass. 1926)（裁定对警察的殴打和 batteria 在未指控故意的情况下不涉及道德败坏）；Matter of Lopez, 13 I&N Dec. 725, 726-27 (BIA 1971)（认定法规未区分自愿和非自愿过失杀人且起诉书未揭示故意时不存在道德败坏）；Matter of Espinosa, 10 I&N Dec. 98 (BIA 1962)（认定法规未根据犯罪心理区分作出虚假陈述与欺诈性陈述的罪行时不存在道德败坏）。 在两个案件中，我们认定犯罪过失行为中存在道德败坏。Matter of Wojtkow, 18 I&N Dec. 111 (BIA 1981)（将过失行为定义为对重大且不合理的风险的认识和自觉漠视）；Matter of Medina, 15 I&N Dec. 611 (BIA 1976), affd, 547 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1 977)（将过失行为定义为对重大且不合理的风险的自觉漠视）。虽然过失行为可能不表明造成特定损害的故意，但它确实反映了漠视行为固有风险的意愿。Matter of Medina, supra, at 614。 被申请人因"犯罪过失"造成受害人伤害而被定罪。犯罪过失存在于行为人"未能意识到可能发生不法行为的重大风险，且其未能意识到该重大风险构成对合理人在相同情况下会采取的注意标准的严重偏离"时。Wash. Rev. Code Ann.

§ 9A.08.010(1)(d) (West 1992). Compare Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.08.010(1)(d) (West 1992) (defining negligent mens rea) with Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.08.010(I)(c) (West 1992) (defining reckless conduct) and Matter of Danesh, supra (holding that aggravated assault on a peace officer is morally turpitudinous where the assault was committed "knowingly and intentionally"); and Matter of Medina, supra (defining reckless conduct). Intentional conduct is specifically excluded from this section. State v Sample, 757 P.2d 539 (1988) (stating that simple assault is not a lesser included offense of assault in the third degree because simple assault requires proof of intent, whereas assault in the third degree does not). Moreover, the conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk is not required. See Matter of Wojtkow, supra; Matter of Medina, supra. Since there was no intent required for conviction, nor any conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, we find no moral turpitude inherent in the statute. See United States ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y. 1929) (holding that manslaughter in the second degree does not involve moral turpitude since no evil intent was involved); United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (ruling that libel is not morally turpitudinous where conduct is negligent because no moral baseness was shown); Matter of Szegedi, 10 I&N Dec. 28, 34 (BIA 1962) (finding that involuntary manslaughter resulting from grossly negligent conduct does not involve moral turpitude because the intent element is not present); Matter of J-, 4 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1951) (holding that aggravated assault does not involve moral turpitude because specific intent must accompany act); Matter of M-, 2 I&N Dec. 686, 691 (BIA 1946) (finding that conduct proscribed by statute that does not require intent is not morally turpitudinous). The Service cites Matter of Baker, 15 I&N Dec. 50 (BIA 1974), modified, Matter of Short, supra, in support of its contention that the respondent's conviction involves moral turpitude. 6 The Virgin Islands statute at issue in Matter of Baker proscribed assault' where serious injury resulted, without specifying intent. We found that the provision involved moral turpitude because of the injury caused and because assault in the third degree was more serious than simple assault. The holding was criticized by two Board members in dissenting opinions. To the extent that Matter of Baker holds that any assault resulting in great bodily harm involves moral turpitude, without regard to the existence of intentional conduct or the conscious disregard of a

§ 9A.08.010(1)(d) (West 1992)。比较 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.08.010(1)(d) (West 1992)（定义过失犯罪心理）与 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.08.010(I)(c) (West 1992)（定义过失行为）以及 Matter of Danesh, supra（认定在殴打系"明知且故意"实施的情况下，对治安官员的加重殴打具有道德败坏性）；以及 Matter of Medina, supra（定义过失行为）。故意行为被明确排除在本条之外。State v Sample, 757 P.2d 539 (1988)（指出简单殴打不是三级殴打的较轻包含罪行，因为简单殴打要求证明故意，而三级殴打则不要求）。此外，不要求对重大且不合理的风险的自觉漠视。参见 Matter of Wojtkow, supra; Matter of Medina, supra。 由于定罪不要求故意，也不要求对重大且不合理的风险的任何自觉漠视，我们认定该法规中不存在固有的道德败坏。参见 United States ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y. 1929)（裁定二级过失杀人因不涉及恶意而不涉及道德败坏）；United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)（裁定在行为系过失的情况下诽谤不具有道德败坏性，因为未显示道德卑劣）；Matter of Szegedi, 10 I&N Dec. 28, 34 (BIA 1962)（认定因严重过失行为导致的自愿过失杀人因不存在故意要件而不涉及道德败坏）；Matter of J-, 4 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1951)（裁定加重殴打因行为必须伴随特定故意而不涉及道德败坏）；Matter of M-, 2 I&N Dec. 686, 691 (BIA 1946)（认定法规所禁止的不要求故意的行为不具有道德败坏性）。 移民局引用 Matter of Baker, 15 I&N Dec. 50 (BIA 1974), modified, Matter of Short, supra，以支持其关于被申请人定罪涉及道德败坏的主张。6 Matter of Baker 中涉及的维尔京群岛法规禁止在造成严重伤害的情况下的殴打，但未明确故意。我们认定该条款涉及道德败坏，因为造成了伤害，且三级殴打比简单殴打更严重。该裁定受到两名委员会成员在反对意见中的批评。就 Matter of Baker 认定任何造成严重身体伤害的殴打均涉及道德败坏、而不论是否存在故意行为或对重大且不合理的风险的自觉漠视而言，

substantial and unjustifiable risk, it is inconsistent with other Board and judicial caselaw and we herein withdraw from it.. See United States ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, supra; Matter of Lopez, supra; Matter of Szegedi, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the respondent's conviction for assault in the third degree does not involve moral turpitude under the facts of this case. The Service has failed to establish deportability under either of the grounds charged, and the proceedings will therefore be terminated. ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the deportation proceed- ings are hereby terminated.

重大且不合理的风险，它与委员会的其他判例和司法判例不一致，我们特此撤回该裁定。参见 United States ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, supra; Matter of Lopez, supra; Matter of Szegedi, supra。 因此，我们认定，根据本案事实，被申请人因三级殴打而被定罪不涉及道德败坏。移民局未能根据所控任一理由确立可驱逐性，因此程序将终止。 命令： 上诉获准，驱逐程序特此终止。