Matter of L-L-P-

Cite as 28 I&N Dec. 241 (BIA 2021) Interim Decision #4010

引用为 28 I&N Dec. 241 (BIA 2021) 临时决定 #4010

Matter of L-L-P-, Respondent Decided February 24, 2021 U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals An applicant for special rule cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2018), based on spousal abuse must demonstrate both that the abuser was his or her lawful spouse and possessed either United States citizenship or lawful permanent resident status at the time of the abuse. FOR RESPONDENT: Laura L. Lichter, Esquire, Denver, Colorado FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Kalin Ivany, Assistant Chief Counsel BEFORE: Board Panel: GREER and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges; PEPPER, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge. GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge: In a decision dated September 17, 2019, an Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application for special rule cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2018), a form of relief reserved for certain victims of domestic violence in accordance with the provisions of the Violence of Against Women Act, enacted as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902 (“VAWA”). The respondent has appealed from this decision. During the pendency of his appeal, he filed a motion to remand so that he may apply for cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents pursuant to section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, based on intervening case law. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposes the respondent’s appeal and motion. The appeal will be dismissed, the motion will be granted, and the record will be remanded. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without being admitted or paroled. The following facts are undisputed. In 2001, an Immigration Judge denied his application for cancellation of

L-L-P- 案，答辩人 2021年2月24日决定 美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会 根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)(2)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2018)，基于配偶虐待申请特殊规则取消递解出境的外国人，必须证明施虐者是其合法配偶，并且在虐待发生时拥有美国公民身份或合法永久居民身份。 答辩人代理人：Laura L. Lichter 律师，科罗拉多州丹佛 国土安全部代理人：Kalin Ivany，助理首席法律顾问 审理：委员会小组：GREER 和 GOODWIN，上诉移民法官；PEPPER，临时上诉移民法官。 GOODWIN，上诉移民法官： 在2019年9月17日的决定中，移民法官驳回了答辩人根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)(2)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2018) 提出的特殊规则取消递解出境申请，该救济形式保留给家庭暴力的某些受害者，依据《暴力侵害妇女法》的规定，该法作为1994年《暴力犯罪控制和执法法》第四章颁布，Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902（“VAWA”）。答辩人对该决定提出上诉。在上诉待决期间，他提交了发回重审的动议，以便根据中间判例法，依据该法第240A(b)(1)条申请某些非永久居民的取消递解出境。国土安全部（“DHS”）反对答辩人的上诉和动议。上诉将被驳回，动议将被批准，案件记录将被发回。 一、事实和程序历史 答辩人是墨西哥本土人和公民，未经入境或假释进入美国。以下事实无争议。2001年，移民法官驳回了其根据该法第240A(b)(1)条提出的取消递解出境申请，因为他未证明对合格亲属造成必要困难，并批准了他的自愿离境请求。答辩人离开美国，但随后未经入境或假释再次进入该国。 2006年，答辩人再次通过送达未指定递解听证时间和日期的出庭通知被置于递解程序中。基于其1995年至2011年的普通法婚姻，他作为受虐配偶自我申请人提交了调整身份申请。2012年，美国公民及移民服务局驳回了其亚裔、寡妇（鳏夫）或特殊移民申请（I-360表），因为他未能证明其前配偶在婚姻期间拥有美国合法移民身份。 在移民法官面前，答辩人寻求根据该法第240A(b)(2)条的特殊规则取消递解出境。移民法官驳回了该申请，因为答辩人未履行举证责任，证明在其婚姻期间，其前配偶在虐待他时拥有作为美国公民或合法永久居民的必要身份。该法第240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)、(II)条。 二、分析 A. 特殊规则取消递解出境 该法第240A(b)(2)(A)条相关规定如下： 司法部长可以取消递解出境，并将被禁止入境或可被递解出境的外国人调整为合法永久居民身份，如果该外国人证明—— (i)(I) 该外国人遭受配偶或父母的殴打或极端虐待，该配偶或父母是或曾经是美国公民（或是美国公民子女的父母，且该子女遭受该公民父母的殴打或极端虐待）；[或] (II) 该外国人遭受配偶或父母的殴打或极端虐待，该配偶或父母是或曾经是合法永久居民（或是合法永久居民子女的父母，且该子女遭受该永久居民父母的殴打或极端虐待）…… 这些规定明确表明，施虐配偶必须在某一时间点是美国公民或合法永久居民。本案提出了一个首次印象问题，即特殊规则取消递解出境的申请人是否必须证明其配偶在申请人遭受虐待并与该配偶结婚时拥有美国公民身份或合法永久居民身份。

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Cite as 28 I&N Dec. 241 (BIA 2021) Interim Decision #4010

引用为 28 I&N Dec. 241 (BIA 2021) 临时决定 #4010

removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act because he had not demonstrated the requisite hardship to a qualifying relative and granted his request for voluntary departure. The respondent departed from the United States but then reentered this country without admission or parole. In 2006, the respondent was again placed in removal proceedings through the service of a notice to appear that failed to specify the time and date of his removal hearing. Based on his common law marriage, which lasted from 1995 to 2011, he filed an application for adjustment of status as a battered spouse self-petitioner. In 2012, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service denied his Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant (Form I-360) because he had not established that his former spouse possessed lawful immigration status in the United States during their marriage. Before the Immigration Judge, the respondent sought special rule cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) of the Act. The Immigration Judge denied this application because the respondent had not met his burden of proof to show that, during his marriage, his former spouse held the necessary status either as a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident when she abused him. Sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II) of the Act. II. ANALYSIS A. Special Rule Cancellation of Removal Section 240A(b)(2)(A) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien demonstrates that— (i)(I) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent who is or was a United States citizen (or is the parent of a child of a United States citizen and the child has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by such citizen parent); [or] (II) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent who is or was a lawful permanent resident (or is the parent of a child of an alien who is or was a lawful permanent resident and the child has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by such permanent resident parent) . . . . These provisions plainly state that an abusive spouse must be either a United States citizen or a lawful permanent resident at some point in time. This case presents a matter of first impression, namely, whether an applicant for special rule cancellation of removal must demonstrate that his or her spouse possessed United States citizenship or lawful permanent resident status at the time that the applicant was abused by and married to this spouse.

根据该法第240A(b)(1)条取消递解出境，因为他未证明对合格亲属造成必要困难，并批准了他的自愿离境请求。答辩人离开美国，但随后未经入境或假释再次进入该国。 2006年，答辩人再次通过送达未指定递解听证时间和日期的出庭通知被置于递解程序中。基于其1995年至2011年的普通法婚姻，他作为受虐配偶自我申请人提交了调整身份申请。2012年，美国公民及移民服务局驳回了其亚裔、寡妇（鳏夫）或特殊移民申请（I-360表），因为他未能证明其前配偶在婚姻期间拥有美国合法移民身份。 在移民法官面前，答辩人寻求根据该法第240A(b)(2)条的特殊规则取消递解出境。移民法官驳回了该申请，因为答辩人未履行举证责任，证明在其婚姻期间，其前配偶在虐待他时拥有作为美国公民或合法永久居民的必要身份。该法第240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)、(II)条。 二、分析 A. 特殊规则取消递解出境 该法第240A(b)(2)(A)条相关规定如下： 司法部长可以取消递解出境，并将被禁止入境或可被递解出境的外国人调整为合法永久居民身份，如果该外国人证明—— (i)(I) 该外国人遭受配偶或父母的殴打或极端虐待，该配偶或父母是或曾经是美国公民（或是美国公民子女的父母，且该子女遭受该公民父母的殴打或极端虐待）；[或] (II) 该外国人遭受配偶或父母的殴打或极端虐待，该配偶或父母是或曾经是合法永久居民（或是合法永久居民子女的父母，且该子女遭受该永久居民父母的殴打或极端虐待）…… 这些规定明确表明，施虐配偶必须在某一时间点是美国公民或合法永久居民。本案提出了一个首次印象问题，即特殊规则取消递解出境的申请人是否必须证明其配偶在申请人遭受虐待并与该配偶结婚时拥有美国公民身份或合法永久居民身份。

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Cite as 28 I&N Dec. 241 (BIA 2021) Interim Decision #4010

引用为 28 I&N Dec. 241 (BIA 2021) 临时决定 #4010

This is a legal question, which we review de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2020). 1. Statutory Construction We begin by considering whether sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) clearly and unambiguously specify the point in time at which the abusive spouse must possess either United States citizenship or lawful permanent resident status. See Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1056 (2019) (“[W]e begin ‘where all such inquiries begin: with the language of the statute itself.’” (citation omitted)); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (stating that a court should “interpret[] a statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment”). “To determine whether Congress has directly spoken on [an] issue, we use ‘traditional tools of statutory construction.’” Banuelos v. Barr, 953 F.3d 1176, 1180 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. (“Chevron”), 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends, because we “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. Sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act require an alien to have been “battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse . . . who is or was” either a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. We perceive, from the plain language of the statute, more than one possible time frame for the spouse to hold United States citizen or lawful permanent resident status. The word “is” in these provisions could be interpreted to mean that the spouse held United States citizenship or permanent resident status at the time of the marriage and abuse, or, as the respondent argues, at the time the application for cancellation of removal was filed. As the statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we conclude that sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) are ambiguous. We must therefore determine which interpretation reasonably reflects Congress’ intentions for these provisions. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (stating that “ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion”); Martinez-Perez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2020) (same). 2. Overall Statutory Context “The broader context . . . of the statute provides considerable assistance” in construing an ambiguous term or phrase. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519

这是一个法律问题，我们重新审查。8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2020)。 1. 法定解释 我们首先考虑第240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)和(II)条是否清楚明确地规定了施虐配偶必须拥有美国公民身份或合法永久居民身份的时间点。见 Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1056 (2019)（“[我们]开始于‘所有此类调查开始的地方：法规本身的语言。’”（引用省略））；另见 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020)（指出法院应“按照法规颁布时其术语的普通公共含义解释法规”）。 “要确定国会是否已直接[对]问题表态，我们使用‘传统的法定解释工具。’” Banuelos v. Barr, 953 F.3d 1176, 1180 (10th Cir. 2020)（引用 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. (“Chevron”), 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)）。如果法规语言清楚明确，我们的调查即结束，因为我们必须“实现国会明确表达的意图。” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43。 该法第240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)和(II)条要求外国人遭受“配偶……是或曾经是”美国公民或合法永久居民的“殴打或极端虐待”。我们从法规的平实语言中看出，配偶拥有美国公民或合法永久居民身份的可能时间框架不止一个。这些条款中的“是”一词可以解释为配偶在婚姻和虐待发生时拥有美国公民或永久居民身份，或者如答辩人所主张，在提交取消递解出境申请时拥有。由于法规可作多种解释，我们得出结论，第240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)和(II)条存在歧义。因此，我们必须确定哪种解释合理反映了国会对这些条款的意图。见 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)（指出“机构管辖范围内法规中的歧义是授权机构以合理方式填补法定空白”）；Martinez-Perez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2020)（同上）。 2. 整体法定背景 “法规的更广泛背景……提供了相当大的帮助”来解释歧义术语或短语。Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519

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引用为 28 I&N Dec. 241 (BIA 2021) 临时决定 #4010

U.S. 337, 345 (1997). An analysis of the overall statutory context may not resolve an ambiguity, but it will assist in determining which meaning applies when considering the statute’s purpose. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94–95 (1993); see also Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Travelers Cos., Inc., 585 F.3d 1366, 1374 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e must ask whether the word is used ambiguously within the actual . . . context in which it appears. After all, when interpreting a . . . statute, we derive meaning not just from abstract words in isolation, but from their context . . . as a whole.”). Here, the parentheticals in sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) provide context in determining the overall meaning of those provisions. For instance, the parenthetical at section 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) provides that an applicant may be “( . . . the parent of a child of a United States citizen and the child has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by such citizen parent).”1 We find it significant that the phrase “has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by such citizen parent” in this parenthetical is in the present perfect tense. Section 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act (emphasis added). Congress uses this tense to “denot[e] an act that has been completed.” Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 216 (1976); see also Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010) (looking to “Congress’ choice of verb tense to ascertain a statute’s temporal reach”). The parenthetical specifies that this past harm must have been committed “by [a] citizen parent.” Thus, the ordinary meaning of this parenthetical is that the child must have been abused by a parent who was a citizen at the time the abuse took place. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738. Notably, removing the final phrase “by such citizen parent” from this parenthetical would not change our understanding of the statute except with regard to the abuser’s status at the time the abuse occurred. In this way, Congress used the phrase “by such citizen parent” to explicitly tie the abusive parent’s citizenship status to the past abuse, indicating that the abusive parent must have possessed United States citizenship status at the time the abuse took place. Based on our examination of sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) as a whole, including their parentheticals, we conclude that the abusive spouse (or parent) must be a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of the abuse. Moreover, because the spousal portion of these provisions requires the abuser to be a “spouse,” this abuse must have occurred during the course of the marriage. Section 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act (emphasis added); see also section 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act.

U.S. 337, 345 (1997)。对整体法定背景的分析可能无法解决歧义，但在考虑法规目的时，它将有助于确定哪种含义适用。参见 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94–95 (1993)；另见 Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Travelers Cos., Inc., 585 F.3d 1366, 1374 (10th Cir. 2009)（“我们必须询问该词在其出现的实际……上下文中是否被歧义地使用。毕竟，在解释……法规时，我们不仅从孤立的抽象词语中获取含义，还从其作为整体的上下文……中获取含义。”）。 在此，第 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) 和 (II) 条中的括号内容为确定这些条款的整体含义提供了上下文。例如，第 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) 条中的括号规定，申请人可以是“（……美国公民子女的父母，且该子女已被该公民父母殴打或遭受极端残忍对待）。”1 我们认为，该括号中的短语“已被该公民父母殴打或遭受极端残忍对待”使用现在完成时具有重要意义。该法第 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) 条（强调为新增）。国会使用该时态来“表示已完成的行为”。Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 216 (1976)；另见 Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010)（着眼于“国会选择的动词时态以确定法规的时间范围”）。该括号明确规定，这种过去的伤害必须“由[公民]父母”实施。因此，该括号的通常含义是，子女必须已被在虐待发生时身为公民的父母虐待。参见 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738。 值得注意的是，从该括号中删除最后一个短语“由该公民父母”不会改变我们对法规的理解，除非涉及虐待者在虐待发生时的身份。通过这种方式，国会使用短语“由该公民父母”明确将虐待父母的公民身份与过去的虐待联系起来，表明虐待父母在虐待发生时必须拥有美国公民身份。基于我们对第 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) 和 (II) 条作为一个整体（包括其括号内容）的审查，我们得出结论，虐待配偶（或父母）在虐待发生时必须是美国公民或合法永久居民。此外，由于这些条款中涉及配偶的部分要求虐待者是“配偶”，这种虐待必须发生在婚姻关系存续期间。该法第 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) 条（强调为新增）；另见该法第 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) 条。

1 The parenthetical is identical in both sections, except as to the status of the parent as either a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. We examine only the first parenthetical, but our reasoning applies to both sections.

1 该括号在两个条款中完全相同，除非涉及父母作为美国公民或合法永久居民的身份。我们仅审查第一个括号，但我们的推理适用于两个条款。

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With the context of the statute as a whole in mind, we interpret the term “is” in sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) as requiring that the abusive spouse (or parent) be a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time the battery or extreme cruelty occurred. We interpret the expanded phrase, “is or was” in the statute to mean that the spouse (or parent) may later lose his or her citizenship or lawful permanent resident status. Yet the applicant does not lose the opportunity to apply for special rule cancellation of removal so long as that spouse (or parent) was a citizen or permanent resident at the time the abuse occurred, and, in the spousal context, the applicant was married to the abuser during this abuse. To sum up our interpretation of the statute in the marriage context, the spouse must be a spouse during the abuse—that is, the abuse occurs during the marriage—and that, at the time of the abuse, the spouse is either a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. We next consider whether our interpretation is reasonable given Congress’ intent in designing the VAWA. 3. Legislative Intent Because the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, we may consider whether the relevant legislative history of the VAWA provisions in the Act confirms our interpretation of sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II). See Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 518 (BIA 2015); see also United States v. Manning, 526 F.3d 611, 614 (10th Cir. 2008) (“If the statute’s plain language is ambiguous as to [c]ongressional intent, ‘we look to the legislative history and the underlying public policy of the statute.’” (citation omitted)). Although legislative statements have less force than the plain language of the statute, such statements are helpful to corroborate and underscore a reasonable interpretation of the statute. See generally, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982). A review of the relevant legislative history confirms that our interpretation of these provisions is consistent with the underlying purpose of the VAWA. In Matter of Pangan-Sis, 27 I&N Dec. 130, 133–34 (BIA 2017), we discussed the legislative history of the VAWA in the context of an exception to inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2012), for certain battered women and children. 2 We observed that Congress intended to reduce marriage fraud by requiring a conditional permanent resident to file a joint petition with his or her United States citizen or permanent resident spouse to remove the conditions on residence. However, this requirement “created a situation in which abused alien spouses were reluctant to leave their United States citizen or lawful 2 We recognize that Pagnan-Sis discussed a separate provision of the Act. We rely upon this case solely for its discussion of legislative intent with regards to the VAWA.

在将法规作为一个整体加以考虑的背景下，我们将第240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)和(II)条中的“is”一词解释为要求施虐配偶（或父母）在殴打或极端残忍行为发生时是美国公民或合法永久居民。我们将法规中扩展后的短语“is or was”解释为，配偶（或父母）此后可能丧失其公民身份或合法永久居民身份。然而，只要该配偶（或父母）在虐待发生时是公民或永久居民，且就配偶情形而言，申请人在该虐待期间与施虐者存在婚姻关系，申请人就不丧失申请特殊规则取消递解出境的机会。概括我们对婚姻情形下法规的解释：配偶在虐待期间必须是配偶——即虐待发生在婚姻存续期间——并且在虐待发生时，该配偶要么是美国公民，要么是合法永久居民。我们接下来考虑，鉴于国会在设计《反妇女暴力法》（VAWA）时的意图，我们的解释是否合理。 3. 立法意图 由于法规的平义存在歧义，我们可以考虑该法中VAWA条款的相关立法史是否印证我们对第240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)和(II)条的解释。见Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 518 (BIA 2015)；另见United States v. Manning, 526 F.3d 611, 614 (10th Cir. 2008)（“如果法规的平义在国会意图方面存在歧义，‘我们便诉诸立法史和法规的 underlying public policy。’”（引注省略））。尽管立法陈述的效力不及法规的平义，但此类陈述有助于印证并强调对法规的合理解释。一般参见，例如，Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982)。对相关立法史的审查印证，我们对这些条款的解释与VAWA的 underlying purpose 相一致。 在Matter of Pangan-Sis, 27 I&N Dec. 130, 133–34 (BIA 2017)中，我们在该法第212(a)(6)(A)条（8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2012)）下针对某些受虐待妇女和儿童的不可入境例外这一背景下，讨论了VAWA的立法史。2 我们注意到，国会意图通过要求有条件永久居民与其美国公民或永久居民配偶共同提交申请以解除居留条件，来减少婚姻欺诈。然而，这一要求“造成了一种局面，即受虐待的外籍配偶不愿离开其美国公民或合法 2 我们认识到Pagnan-Sis讨论的是该法的另一项条款。我们仅依据该案关于VAWA立法意图的讨论。

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permanent resident abusers for fear of losing their potential to adjust their status.” Id. at 133. We discussed how the House Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the VAWA recognized that [d]omestic battery problems can become terribly exacerbated in marriages where one spouse is not a citizen, and the non-citizen[’]s legal status depends on his or her marriage to the abuser. Current law fosters domestic violence in such situations by placing full and complete control of the alien’s spouse’s ability to gain permanent legal status in the hands of the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse. Id. at 134 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 26, 37 (1993), 1993 WL 484760). This concern of Congress—that an alien spouse would be subject to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse’s control over his or her immigration status—motivated the VAWA legislation to ensure that aliens do not remain in abusive relationships because of immigration consequences. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 111 (2000) (Conf. Rep.) (Joint Explanatory Statement), 2000 WL 1479163, at *111 (stating that the VAWA was “designed . . . to prevent immigration law from being used by an abusive citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse as a tool to prevent an abused immigrant spouse from reporting abuse or leaving the abusive relationship”); see also 140 Cong. Rec. H10,693, H10,693 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Schumer), 1994 WL 545675, at *H10,693-01 (stating that the VAWA “permits immigrant spouses of United States citizens to escape from their abusive spouses without risking deportation”). This Board and the circuit courts have recognized that Congress intended the VAWA to prevent abusive citizens and residents from using immigration benefits as a means to control their alien spouses. See, e.g., Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 983 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that Congress enacted the VAWA to protect victims of abuse); see also Da Silva v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 948 F.3d 629, 636 (3d Cir. 2020) (“VAWA cancellation of removal is ‘intended to ameliorate the impact of harsh provisions of immigration law on abused women.’” (citation omitted)); Toro v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland of Sec., 707 F.3d 1224, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating that the purpose of the VAWA’s self-petitioning provisions “is to prevent the citizen or resident from using the petitioning process as a means to control or abuse an alien spouse” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 37)); Matter of Pangan-Sis, 27 I&N Dec. at 134 (quoting same); Matter of M-L-M-A-, 26 I&N Dec. 360, 364 (BIA 2014) (“[A] purpose of VAWA relief is to empower aliens to leave abusive relationships.”); Matter of A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 66, 77 (BIA 2009) (stating that “the underlying purpose of the battered spouse provisions of the Act . . . is to enable aliens to leave their abusive citizen or lawful permanent resident spouses who may use the threat

永久居民虐待者，因为害怕失去调整身份的可能性。” Id. at 133。我们讨论了伴随 VAWA 的众议院司法委员会报告如何认识到： [在]一方配偶不是公民且非公民的法律地位取决于其与虐待者的婚姻的婚姻中，家庭殴打问题可能会严重加剧。现行法律通过将外国人配偶获得永久合法身份的能力完全控制在公民或合法永久居民配偶手中，助长了此类情况下的家庭暴力。 Id. at 134（引用 H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 26, 37 (1993), 1993 WL 484760）。 国会的这一关切——即外国人配偶将受制于美国公民或合法永久居民配偶对其移民身份的控制——促使 VAWA 立法确保外国人不会因移民后果而留在虐待关系中。参见 H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 111 (2000) (Conf. Rep.) (Joint Explanatory Statement), 2000 WL 1479163, at *111（指出 VAWA“旨在……防止虐待公民或合法永久居民配偶利用移民法作为工具，阻止受虐待移民配偶报告虐待或离开虐待关系”）；另见 140 Cong. Rec. H10,693, H10,693 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994)（Rep. Schumer 的声明），1994 WL 545675, at *H10,693-01（指出 VAWA“允许美国公民的移民配偶摆脱虐待配偶而不冒被驱逐出境的风险”）。 本委员会和巡回法院已认识到，国会意图让 VAWA 防止虐待公民和居民利用移民福利作为控制其外国人配偶的手段。参见，例如，Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 983 (10th Cir. 2005)（认识到国会颁布 VAWA 以保护虐待受害者）；另见 Da Silva v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 948 F.3d 629, 636 (3d Cir. 2020)（“VAWA 取消递解出境‘旨在减轻严厉移民法条款对受虐待妇女的影响。’”（引用省略））；Toro v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland of Sec., 707 F.3d 1224, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013)（指出 VAWA 自我申请条款的目的“是防止公民或居民利用申请过程作为控制或虐待外国人配偶的手段”（引用 H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 37））；Matter of Pangan-Sis, 27 I&N Dec. at 134（引用同上）；Matter of M-L-M-A-, 26 I&N Dec. 360, 364 (BIA 2014)（“[VAWA 救济的]一个目的是赋予外国人离开虐待关系的能力。”）；Matter of A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 66, 77 (BIA 2009)（指出“该法受虐待配偶条款的 underlying 目的……是使外国人能够离开其可能利用威胁的虐待公民或合法永久居民配偶”

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of deportation or sponsorship for an immigration benefit to maintain control over them”). Although the VAWA has been amended several times to include a self-petitioning visa provision, special rule cancellation of removal for battered aliens, and an exception to inadmissibility, we recognize that, in enacting all these benefits, one of Congress’ goals was to free abused spouses, who are married to United States citizens or lawful permanent residents, from the fear that remaining in an abusive marriage is the only way to obtain lawful immigration status. This goal clearly contemplates that the abusive United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse is actually able to use that status to benefit—or punish—his or her alien spouse. We made this particularly clear in Matter of Pangan-Sis, 27 I&N Dec. at 135, where we stated that the VAWA exception to inadmissibility in that case covers “a spouse of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident who suffers abuse . . . . However, coverage is not extended to aliens who are married to non-United States citizens and non-lawful permanent residents, because such persons lack ‘immigration leverage’ over their spouses.” In light of this discussion from Pangan-Sis, we conclude that our interpretation of sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) is reasonable and consistent with congressional intent. Where the abuser is the spouse of an applicant seeking special rule cancellation of removal based on spousal abuse, the applicant must demonstrate that the abuser held both legal status as the applicant’s legally recognized spouse and United States citizenship or lawful permanent resident status at the time of the abuse. We have recognized that special rule cancellation of removal is a continuing application since an applicant continues to accrue physical presence and good moral character until the final administrative order is entered. See Matter of M-L-M-A-, 26 I&N Dec. at 363. However, the continuing nature of this form of relief does not relieve an applicant of the burden to demonstrate that, at the time of abuse occurring during the marriage, the abuser was his or her lawful spouse and either a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. Our decision in M-L-M-A- supports this conclusion. There, we granted special rule cancellation of removal to an applicant who had divorced her abuser, after the abuse had taken place. Since her abuser was her lawful spouse and either a citizen or permanent resident at the time of the abuse, her divorce was irrelevant to her statutory eligibility for this form of relief. Our interpretation of sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) gives full effect to the language enacted by Congress and is consistent with congressional intent. We therefore hold that an applicant for special rule cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) based on spousal abuse must demonstrate both that the abuser was his or her lawful spouse and

驱逐出境或为移民利益提供担保以维持对他们的控制”）。 尽管《防止对妇女施暴法》（VAWA）已多次修订，加入了自我申请签证条款、针对受虐待外国人的特殊规则取消驱逐出境，以及不可入境情形的例外，但我们认识到，在制定所有这些利益时，国会的目的之一是使与美国公民或合法永久居民结婚的受虐待配偶摆脱这样一种恐惧，即留在受虐待的婚姻中是获得合法移民身份的唯一途径。这一目的明确设想，施虐的美国公民或合法永久居民配偶实际上能够利用该身份来惠及——或惩罚——其外国配偶。我们在 Matter of Pangan-Sis, 27 I&N Dec. at 135 中对此尤为明确，我们在该案中指出，该案中的 VAWA 不可入境例外涵盖“遭受虐待的美国公民或合法永久居民的配偶……。然而，该涵盖范围不延伸至与非美国公民且非合法永久居民结婚的外国人，因为此类人员对其配偶缺乏‘移民杠杆’。” 鉴于 Pangan-Sis 中的上述讨论，我们得出结论：我们对第 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) 和 (II) 条的解释是合理的，且与国会意图一致。当施虐者是寻求基于配偶虐待的特殊规则取消驱逐出境的申请人的配偶时，申请人必须证明施虐者在虐待发生时同时具有作为申请人合法承认配偶的法律身份以及美国公民或合法永久居民身份。 我们已认识到，特殊规则取消驱逐出境是一项持续申请，因为申请人持续累积实际居留和良好道德品质，直至最终行政命令作出。见 Matter of M-L-M-A-, 26 I&N Dec. at 363。然而，这种救济形式的持续性并不免除申请人证明在婚姻期间发生虐待时，施虐者是其合法配偶且为美国公民或合法永久居民的举证责任。我们在 M-L-M-A- 中的裁决支持这一结论。在该案中，我们向一名在虐待发生后已与其施虐者离婚的申请人授予了特殊规则取消驱逐出境。由于她的施虐者在虐待发生时是其合法配偶且为公民或永久居民，她的离婚与其对该救济形式的法定资格无关。 我们对第 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) 和 (II) 条的解释使国会制定的语言充分发挥效力，且与国会意图一致。因此，我们裁定，基于配偶虐待而根据第 240A(b)(2) 条申请特殊规则取消驱逐出境的申请人必须证明施虐者是其合法配偶且

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possessed either United States citizenship or lawful permanent resident status at the time of the abuse, even if the abuser’s spousal status, citizenship, or lawful permanent resident status was later terminated or revoked, or the abuser can no longer use an immigration benefit to control the applicant. 4. Application to the Respondent’s Case The respondent has not demonstrated that his former spouse was a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time they were married and when she abused him. The parties agreed below, and do not otherwise dispute on appeal, that the respondent’s former spouse was not a United States citizen or permanent resident during the marriage and abuse. The parties further agreed below, and do not dispute on appeal, that she had likely obtained permanent residence some years after the marriage and abuse ended. Because the respondent has not shown that his former spouse was a citizen or permanent resident during the marriage and abuse, he is ineligible for special rule cancellation of removal pursuant to section 240A(b)(2) of the Act.3 We are not persuaded by the respondent’s argument that his former wife used the fact that she had applied for, but had not yet obtained, immigration status during their marriage as “leverage” to keep him in the abusive marriage. An abusive spouse must have the actual ability to affect an alien’s immigration status in order to threaten the alien in the manner contemplated by the VAWA. Thus, the Immigration Judge correctly denied the respondent’s application for special rule cancellation of removal. B. Motion to Remand The respondent argues that remand is warranted so that he can apply for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act because he may be able to establish the requisite 10 years of continuous physical presence for this form of relief under intervening case law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises. See

在虐待发生时拥有美国公民身份或合法永久居民身份，即使施虐者的配偶身份、公民身份或合法永久居民身份后来被终止或撤销，或施虐者不再能够利用移民利益控制申请人。 4. 适用于本案被申请人的案件 被申请人未能证明其前配偶在他们结婚时以及她虐待他时是美国公民或合法永久居民。双方在下级程序中一致同意，且在上诉中未另行争议，即被申请人的前配偶在婚姻和虐待期间不是美国公民或永久居民。双方在下级程序中进一步一致同意，且在上诉中未争议，即她很可能在婚姻和虐待结束数年后获得了永久居留权。由于被申请人未能证明其前配偶在婚姻和虐待期间是公民或永久居民，他根据该法第 240A(b)(2) 条不符合特殊规则取消驱逐出境的资格。3 我们不被被申请人的以下论点所说服：其前妻利用她在婚姻期间已申请但尚未获得移民身份这一事实作为“杠杆”使其留在受虐待的婚姻中。施虐配偶必须具有实际影响外国人移民身份的能力，才能以 VAWA 所设想的方式威胁该外国人。因此，移民法官正确地驳回了被申请人的特殊规则取消驱逐出境申请。 B. 发回重审的动议 被申请人主张，发回重审是有正当理由的，以便他可以根据该法第 240A(b)(1) 条申请取消驱逐出境，因为根据美国第十巡回上诉法院（本案产生于其管辖范围内）的介入判例法，他可能能够确立该救济形式所要求的 10 年连续实际居留。见

3 On appeal, the respondent renews his argument that the DHS has access to the respondent’s former spouse’s immigration records, and it refuses to share them, despite formal requests that it do so. The Immigration Judge properly determined that the respondent was responsible for demonstrating eligibility for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2020). The DHS is not required to provide documentation of immigration status for persons not a party to these matters. Moreover, the refusal to share information about the ex-wife’s current lawful immigration status is not a due process violation, as it would not affect the outcome in the respondent’s case. See Matumona v. Barr, 945 F.3d 1294, 1308 (10th Cir. 2019) (“To prevail on a due-process challenge, the petitioner must show prejudicial error.”).

3 在上诉中，被申请人重申其论点，即国土安全部（DHS）可以查阅被申请人前配偶的移民记录，但尽管有正式请求，其仍拒绝分享这些记录。移民法官正确地认定，被申请人有责任证明其获得救济的资格。8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2020)。DHS 无需为不是这些事项当事人的人员提供移民身份文件。此外，拒绝分享有关前妻当前合法移民身份的信息不构成正当程序违反，因为这不会影响被申请人案件的结果。见 Matumona v. Barr, 945 F.3d 1294, 1308 (10th Cir. 2019)（“要在正当程序挑战中胜诉，申请人必须证明存在偏见性错误。”）。

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Banuelos, 953 F.3d at 1184 (holding that the “stop-time” rule ending the period of continuous physical presence for cancellation of removal is not triggered by the combination of two documents containing the date and time of the removal hearing). Because the relevant notice to appear failed to specify the time and date of the respondent’s hearing, it was incomplete, and we agree with the respondent that he may now be able to establish the requisite period of physical presence under section 240A(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal is dismissed and his motion to remand is granted so that he may pursue cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act. ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: The respondent’s motion to remand is granted, and the record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and the entry of a new decision.

Banuelos, 953 F.3d at 1184（裁定：终止取消驱逐出境连续实际居留期间的“停止计时”规则，不因两份包含驱逐听证日期和时间的文件相结合而被触发）。由于相关的出庭通知未能指明被申请人听证的时间和日期，该通知不完整，我们同意被申请人的主张，即他现在可能能够根据第 240A(b)(1)(A) 条确立所要求的实际居留期间。因此，被申请人的上诉被驳回，其发回重审的动议获准，以便他可以根据该法第 240A(b)(1) 条寻求取消驱逐出境。 命令：被申请人的上诉被驳回。 进一步命令：被申请人的发回重审动议获准，案件记录发回移民法官，以便按照上述意见进行进一步程序并作出新裁决。

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