Matter of Marin

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Willard H. Myers, III, Esquire George W. Masterton Prisoners' Legal Services of New York Appellate Trial Attorney 515 Lake Street Elmira, New York 14901

代表答辩人： 代表服务局： Willard H. Myers, III, Esquire George W. Masterton 纽约囚犯法律服务处 上诉审判律师 515 Lake Street Elmira, New York 14901

In a decision dated August 23, 1977, the immigration judge found the respondent deportable as charged, denied his application for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), and ordered his deportation to Colombia The respondent has appealed. The appeal will be dismissed. The respondent, a 46-year-old native and citizen of Colombia, was admitted to the United States for lawful permanent residence on Feb- ruary 3, 1965. In March 1976, he entered a guilty plea in a New York State criminal court to the felony charge of criminal sale of cocaine. On April 29, 1976, he was sentenced to the minimum mandatory sentence provided under New York law for that offense, an indeterminate sen- tence of one year to life. Including credited pretrail confinement, the respondent served some 20 months of this sentence (from November 1975 through May 1978) in New York State penal institutions. On May 11, 1977, while still confined, an Order to Show Cause was issued charging the respondent with being deportable under section 241(a)(11) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(11), as an alien convicted of a designated drug offense. At the hearing held on July 20, 1977, the respondent conceded deportability. The immigration judge accordingly found him deportable as charged and that finding is not in issue on appeal. At the deportation hearing, the respondent applied for relief under section 212(c) of the Act. That section provides, in pertinent part, that aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily pro- ceed abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive y ears, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General with- out regard to certain specified grounds for exclusion enumerated in section 212(a) of the Act. The grounds specified include an alien who has been convicted of a drug offense, as set forth in section 212(a)(23) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(23). In light of our decision in Matter of Silva, Ititerim Decision 2532 (BIA 1976), the immigration judge properly con- cluded that the respondent was statutorily eligible for relief from depor- ttion under section 212(c) even though he had not proceeded abroad subsequent to his entry for lawful permanent residence. See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2 Cir. 1976). Section 212(e), however, does not provide an indiscriminate waiver

在1977年8月23日的决定中，移民法官认定答辩人如所指控可被驱逐出境，驳回其根据《移民和国籍法》第212(c)条、8 U.S.C. 1182(c)提出的不可入境豁免申请，并命令将其驱逐至哥伦比亚。答辩人已提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。 答辩人，46岁，哥伦比亚本土出生和公民，于1965年2月3日获准进入美国作为合法永久居民。1976年3月，他在纽约州刑事法院对可卡因非法销售的重罪指控表示认罪。1976年4月29日，他被判处纽约州法律对该罪行规定的最低强制刑期，即1年至终身的不确定刑期。包括折抵的审前羁押，答辩人在纽约州惩教机构中服刑约20个月（从1975年11月至1978年5月）。 1977年5月11日，在仍被监禁期间，签发说明理由令，指控答辩人作为被判犯有指定毒品犯罪的外籍人士，根据该法第241(a)(11)条、8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(11)可被驱逐出境。在1977年7月20日举行的听证会上，答辩人承认可被驱逐出境。移民法官据此认定其如所指控可被驱逐出境，该认定在上诉中无争议。 在驱逐出境听证会上，答辩人根据该法第212(c)条申请救济。该条相关部分规定，合法获准永久居留、临时自愿出国而非根据驱逐令出国、并返回连续7年合法未放弃住所的外籍人士，可以经司法部长酌情准许入境，而不考虑该法第212(a)条所列的某些特定排除理由。所列理由包括根据该法第212(a)(23)条、8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(23)被判犯有毒品犯罪的外籍人士。鉴于我们在Matter of Silva, 临时决定2532 (BIA 1976)中的决定，移民法官正确认定答辩人依法符合第212(c)条驱逐出境救济资格，即使其在获准合法永久居留入境后未曾出国。参见Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2 Cir. 1976)。 然而，第212(e)条并未提供不加区分地豁免

for all who demonstrate statutory eligibility for such relief. Instead, the Attorney General or his delegate is required to determine as a matter of discretion whether an applicant warrants the relief sought. The alien bears the burden of demonstrating that his application merits favorable consideration. In the case before us, the immigration judge concluded that the respondent had failed to establish that "a waiver of deportability Masi merited as a matter of discretion." ' In this regard, he noted the nature of the respondent's criminal offense and subsequent confinement and concluded that a waiver should not be granted absent a showing of "unusual or outstanding equities." Other than his residence in the United States for 12 years, however, the respondent was "unable to advance any substantial equities." z He was single, childless, and had no relatives residing in this country. His closest relatives (a brother and sister) both lived in Colombia. 'The respondent's employment history was sporadic and he presented no evidence that he would have particu- lar difficulty returning to Colombia other than stating that "life [was] too hard there." Based on the "entire record," the immigration judge concluded that the respondent's conviction as a drug offender had not been sufficiently offset by his "twelve years of residence in the United States" and "his adjustment to prison life" to warrant the granting of discretionary relief under section 212(0_ The application for relief was accordingly denied. On appeal, the respondent, through counsel, states that the "decision of the immigration judge denying [his section 212(c)] application . . . in the exercise of discretion was neither founded upon standards which have been promulgated through regulation or adjudication, nor did the standards applied rest upon a permissible basis." The respondent sub- mits that a wealth of preeendenti al standards exist regarding the discre- tionary granting of section 212(e) relief, that the immigration judge made a "radical departure from the precedent decisions of this Board [by instead] employing the standards of Matter of Fernandez, supra, and Matter of Arai, supra," that he did so without citation or comment on the existing precedent decisions, that this departure "violated any standard for fair play, as well as due process," and that the factors actually relied upon by the immigration judge were impermissible.

给所有证明依法符合此类救济资格的人。相反，司法部长或其代表须作为酌情事项确定申请人是否值得所寻求的救济。外籍人士承担证明其申请值得有利考虑的举证责任。 在我们面前的案件中，移民法官认定答辩人未能证明"作为酌情事项值得给予可驱逐性豁免"。' 在这方面，他注意到答辩人犯罪行为的性质和随后的监禁，并认定在没有"不寻常或杰出衡平因素"的情况下不应给予豁免。然而，除了在美国居住12年外，答辩人"无法提出任何实质性衡平因素"。 z 他单身、无子女，且没有亲属居住在本国。其最亲近的亲属（一兄一姐）均居住在哥伦比亚。答辩人的就业经历断断续续，且未提供证据表明他返回哥伦比亚会有特别困难，只是说"那里的生活太艰难了"。 基于"整个记录"，移民法官认定答辩人作为毒品犯罪者的定罪未被其"在美国居住十二年"和"其对监狱生活的适应"充分抵消，不足以根据第212(0条给予酌情救济。救济申请据此被驳回。 在上诉中，答辩人通过律师称，"移民法官在行使酌情权时驳回[其第212(c)条]申请的决定……既非基于通过法规或裁决颁布的标准，所适用的标准也不基于可允许的基础。"答辩人提出，关于酌情给予第212(e)条救济存在大量先例标准，移民法官"[反而]采用Matter of Fernandez, supra和Matter of Arai, supra的标准，从根本上背离了本委员会的先例决定"，他这样做时未引用或评论现有先例决定，这种背离"违反了任何公平对待标准以及正当程序"，且移民法官实际依赖的因素是不可允许的。

We find no merit to this basis of appeal. The Board has not adopted an inflexible test for an immigration judge to use to determine as a contclus- ory matter whether section 212(c) relief should be granted as a matter of discretion. The undesirability and "difficulty, if not impossibility, of defining any standard in discretionary matters of this character which may be applied in a stereotyped manner" has long been recognized . See Matter of L—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 767 (BIA 1949; A.G. 1949) (involving the seventh proviso to section 3 of the Act of 1917). Instead, it has been held that each case must be judged on its own merits. The immigration judge must balance the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations pre- sented in his behalf to determine whether the granting of section 212(c) relief appears in the best interests of this country. In order to provide the framework for an equitable application of discretionary relief, the Board has enunciated factors relevant to the issue of whether section 212(c) relief should be granted as a matter of discretion. Among the factors deemed adverse to a respondent's appli- cation have been the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclu- sion ground at issue, the presence of additional significant violations of tins country's immigration laws, the existence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency, and seriousness, and the presence of other evidence indicative of a respondent's bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. See, for example, Matter of C'arraseo, Interim Decision 2579 (BIA 1977), aff d on other grounds, C arraseo-Favela v. INS, 563 F.2d 1220 (5 Cir. 1977); Matter of Ed- ward-3, 10 I. & N. Dec. 506 (BIA 1963, 1964); Matter of M—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 804 (BIA 1949) (involving the seventh proviso to section 3 of the Irranigration Act of 1917); Matter of V—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 293 (BIA 1942) (seventh proviso); Matter of G—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 8 (BIA 1940; A.G. L940) (seventh proviso). Although in an individual case, one or more of these adverse factors may ultimately be determinative of whether section 212(c) relief is in fact granted, their presence does not preclude a respondent from pre- senting evidence in support of a favorable exercise of discretion. See r-issian v. INS, 548 F.2d 325, 330 (10 Cir. 1977). 3 Favorable con- siderations have been found to include such factors as family ties within the United States, residence of long duration in this country (particu-

我们认为这一上诉理由没有依据。委员会并未采用一种僵化的检验标准，供移民法官据以结论性地判定是否应作为裁量事项给予第212(c)条救济。对于此类裁量事项，界定任何可被刻板适用的标准所具有的不可取性以及"困难、乃至不可能性"，早已得到承认。见 Matter of L—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 767 (BIA 1949; A.G. 1949)（涉及1917年法案第3条的第七项但书）。相反，已确立的规则是，每一案件都必须根据其自身是非曲直来评判。移民法官必须权衡证明外籍人士作为永久居民不受欢迎的不利因素与其所提出的社会和人道考量，以判定给予第212(c)条救济是否看来符合本国的最佳利益。 为了为公平适用裁量救济提供框架，委员会已阐明了与是否应作为裁量事项给予第212(c)条救济这一问题相关的因素。被视为不利于 respondent 申请的因素包括：所涉驱逐理由的性质和基本情形、是否存在其他对本國移民法的重大违反、是否存在犯罪记录以及若存在则其性质、近期性和严重性，以及是否存在其他表明 respondent 品格不良或作为本国永久居民不受欢迎的证据。例如见 Matter of C'arraseo, Interim Decision 2579 (BIA 1977), aff'd on other grounds, C arraseo-Favela v. INS, 563 F.2d 1220 (5 Cir. 1977)；Matter of Ed-ward-3, 10 I. & N. Dec. 506 (BIA 1963, 1964)；Matter of M—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 804 (BIA 1949)（涉及1917年移民法第3条的第七项但书）；Matter of V—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 293 (BIA 1942)（第七项但书）；Matter of G—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 8 (BIA 1940; A.G. L940)（第七项但书）。 尽管在个别案件中，这些不利因素中的一项或多项可能最终决定是否实际给予第212(c)条救济，但它们的存在并不妨碍 respondent 提出支持有利行使裁量权的证据。见 r-issian v. INS, 548 F.2d 325, 330 (10 Cir. 1977)。3 已被认定属于有利考量的因素包括：在美国境内的家庭纽带、在本国长期居住（尤其是当居住的开始发生在 respondent 年幼之时）、若驱逐出境对 respondent 及家庭造成的困难、在本国武装部队服役、工作经历、财产或商业联系的存在、对社区的价值和服务的证据、若存在犯罪记录则真正改过自新的证明，以及其他证明 respondent 品格良好的证据（例如来自家人、朋友和负责任的社区代表的宣誓书）。见 Matter of Edwards, supra；Matter of G—A—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1956)；Matter of F—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 537 (BIA 1955)；Matter of S —, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392 (BIA 1954; A.G. 1955)；Matter of M — , 5 I. & N. Dec. 598 (BIA 1954)；Matter of G— Y—G--, 4 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1950; Act'g A.G. 1951)（第七项但书）；Matter of M— , 3 I. & N. Dec. 804 (BIA 1949)（第七项但书）；Matter of V—I— , 3 I. & N. Dec. 571 (BIA 1949)（第七项但书）；Matter of L—, supra；Matter of V—, supra；Matter of G—, supra。 在审查整体记录后，移民法官须权衡有利和不利事项，以判定是否应有利地行使裁量权。移民法官决定的依据必须在其意见中阐明。在某些案件中，第212(c)条救济资格所固有的最低限度衡平因素（即至少7年的居住和合法永久居民身份）本身可能就足以值得采取有利的裁量行动。然而，并未采用任何一般标准规定在不存在不利因素的情况下通常应批准此类救济申请，因为第212(c)条救济申请必然至少附带一项不利考量（即请求豁免的驱逐理由）。比较 Matter of Arai, supra（涉及根据该法案第245条对调整身份申请进行裁量审查的标准）。另见 Matter of alas, Interim Decision 2485 (BIA 1974; A.G. 1976)。 第212(c)条救济申请人必须提出以证明有理由采取有利裁量行动的衡平因素，在每一案件中都将取决于请求豁免的驱逐理由的性质和情形以及是否存在任何其他不利事项。随着负面因素变得更为严重，申请人便有责任提出额外的抵消性有利证据，在某些案件中这可能必须涉及不寻常或杰出的衡平因素。有时可能仅凭请求豁免的驱逐理由的情形和性质就要求作出此种证明。 这一领域所提供的标准必然是一般性的。然而，第212(c)条下所期望的裁量救济公平可用性的框架，是由阐明被视为与决策过程相关的因素、要求移民法官具体说明所达成的任何裁量决定的依据，以及本委员会审查任何此类决定的上诉存在所构成的。

.Matter of Fernandez, supra, which involved an application for section 212(h) relief filled by an incarcerated applicant in exclusion proceedings, should not be read as permit- tlaig an immigration judge to decline to entertain an application for relief under section 213(c) by a statutorily eligible respondent merely because he is held in confinement. A respondent with the right to apply for such relief must be given the reasonable opportu- niity to meet his burden of establishing that relief should he granted as a matter of dtseretion. See Matter of M—, 71. & N. Dec. 368 (BIA 1956).

.Matter of Fernandez, supra，该案涉及一名被监禁的申请人在驱逐程序中提交的第212(h)条救济申请，不应被解读为允许移民法官仅仅因为依法符合条件的 respondent 被关押而拒绝审理其根据第213(c)条提出的救济申请。有权申请此类救济的 respondent 必须被给予合理机会，以履行其证明应作为裁量事项给予救济的责任。见 Matter of M—, 71. & N. Dec. 368 (BIA 1956)。

Interim Decision #2666 .

临时决定 #2666 .

laxly when the inception of residence occurred while the respondent was of young age), evidence of hardship to the respondent and family if deportation occurs, service in this country's Armed Forces, a history of employment, the existence of property or business ties, evidence of value and service to the community, proof of a genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to a respondent's good character (e.g., affidavits from family, friends, and responsible community representatives). See Matter of Edwards, supra; Matter of G—A—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1956); Matter of F—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 537 (BIA 1955); Matter of S —, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392 (BIA 1954; A.G. 1955); Matter of M — , 5 I. & N. Dec. 598 (BIA 1954); Matter of G— Y—G--, 4 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1950; Act'g A.G. 1951) (seventh proviso); Matter of M— , 3 I. & N. Dec. 804 (BIA 1949) (seventh proviso); Matter of V—I— , 3 I. & N. Dec. 571 (BIA 1949) (seventh proviso); Matter of L—, supra; Matter of V—, supra; Matter of G—, supra. Upon review of the record as a whole, the immigration judge is required to balance the positive and adverse matters to determine whether discretion should be favorably exercised. The basis for the immigration judge's decision must be enunciated in his opinion. In some cases, the minimum equities inherent in eligibility for section 212(c) relief (i.e., residence of at least seven years and status as a lawful permanent resident) may be sufficient in and of themselves to warrant favorable discretionary action. No general standard has been adopted that applications for such relief should ordinarily be granted in the absence of unfavorable factors, however, as an application for section 212(c) relief of necessity carries with it at least one adverse considera- tion (the ground of exclusion sought waived). Compare Matter of Arai, supra (involving standards for discretionary review of application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act). See also Matter of alas, Interim Decision 2485 (BIA 1974; A.G. 1976). The equities that an applicant for section 212(c) relief must bring forward to establish that favorable discretionary action is warranted will depend in each case on the nature and circumstances of the ground of exclusion sought waived and on the presence of any additional ad- v erse matters. As the negative factors grow more serious, it becomes incumbent upon the applicant to introduce additional offsetting favor- able evidence, which in some cases may have to involve unusual or outstanding equities. Such a showing at times may be required solely by virtue of the circumstances and nature of the exclusion ground sought waived. The standards provided in this area have of necessity been general in n ature. The framework for the desired equitable availability of discre- tionary relief under section 212(c), however, is furnished by the enunci- ation of factors deemed relevant to the decision-mating process, the

尤其是当居住的开始发生在 respondent 年幼之时）、若驱逐出境对 respondent 及家庭造成的困难的证据、在本国武装部队服役、工作经历、财产或商业联系的存在、对社区的价值和服务的证据、若存在犯罪记录则真正改过自新的证明，以及其他证明 respondent 品格良好的证据（例如来自家人、朋友和负责任的社区代表的宣誓书）。见 Matter of Edwards, supra；Matter of G—A—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1956)；Matter of F—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 537 (BIA 1955)；Matter of S —, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392 (BIA 1954; A.G. 1955)；Matter of M — , 5 I. & N. Dec. 598 (BIA 1954)；Matter of G— Y—G--, 4 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1950; Act'g A.G. 1951)（第七项但书）；Matter of M— , 3 I. & N. Dec. 804 (BIA 1949)（第七项但书）；Matter of V—I— , 3 I. & N. Dec. 571 (BIA 1949)（第七项但书）；Matter of L—, supra；Matter of V—, supra；Matter of G—, supra。 在审查整体记录后，移民法官须权衡有利和不利事项，以判定是否应有利地行使裁量权。移民法官决定的依据必须在其意见中阐明。在某些案件中，第212(c)条救济资格所固有的最低限度衡平因素（即至少7年的居住和合法永久居民身份）本身可能就足以值得采取有利的裁量行动。然而，并未采用任何一般标准规定在不存在不利因素的情况下通常应批准此类救济申请，因为第212(c)条救济申请必然至少附带一项不利考量（即请求豁免的驱逐理由）。比较 Matter of Arai, supra（涉及根据该法案第245条对调整身份申请进行裁量审查的标准）。另见 Matter of alas, Interim Decision 2485 (BIA 1974; A.G. 1976)。 第212(c)条救济申请人必须提出以证明有理由采取有利裁量行动的衡平因素，在每一案件中都将取决于请求豁免的驱逐理由的性质和情形以及是否存在任何其他不利事项。随着负面因素变得更为严重，申请人便有责任提出额外的抵消性有利证据，在某些案件中这可能必须涉及不寻常或杰出的衡平因素。有时可能仅凭请求豁免的驱逐理由的情形和性质就要求作出此种证明。 这一领域所提供的标准必然是一般性的。然而，第212(c)条下所期望的裁量救济公平可用性的框架，是由阐明被视为与决策过程相关的因素、要求移民法官具体说明所达成的任何裁量决定的依据，以及本委员会审查任何此类决定的上诉存在所构成的。

requirement that the immigration judge specify the basis for any discre- tionary decision reached, and the presence of this Board to review any such decision on appeal. It is within this context that the respondent submits that the immi- gration judge when exercising his discretion made a "radical departure" from the precedent decisions of the Board. We find no such departure, "radical" or otherwise. The immigration judge reviewed the record as a whole after providing the respondent the complete opportunity to intro- duce offsetting equitable matters in his behalf. Based on the nature of the adverse matters of record, the immigration judge concluded that favorable discretionary action should be withheld absent a showing of "unusual" or "outstanding" equities. Matter of Arai, supra, was cited in this regard. We agree that such a requirement was proper in view of both the nature of the criminal offense at issue here ', its recency, and the significant period (some 30 months) for which the respondent was confined. The respondent objects to the immigration judge's citation to Matter of Arai, supra. As a general rule it is prudent to avoid cross-application, as between different types of relief from deportation, of particular principles or standards for the exercise of discretion. In the present ease, however, the reference to Arai concerned only the general ap- proach stated there (i.e., the balancing of favorable and unfavorable factors within the context of the relief sought). This may be applied to any case involving the exercise of discretion. Appellate counsel states that the Arai standards require a showing of "unusual" or "outstanding" equities in every section 245 case in which adverse factors appear. An adverse matter will be present in every section 212(c) application. It is, therefore, submitted that if the Arai standards are adapted in section 212(e) cases, the existence of the single urifavorable matter inherent in such cases would improperly become the "trigger for a showing by the applicant of a higher order of equities • - ." This requirement, it is argued, would be "inconsistent with the ameliorative purpose of the statute." The problem with this analysis, however, lies in a mistaken reading of Afatter of Arai, supra. The decision in Arai did not mandate a showing of extraordinary equities in every case in which adverse matters ap- pear. It merely indicated that dependent upon the nature of the adverse

要求移民法官具体说明所达成的任何裁量决定的依据，以及本委员会审查任何此类决定的上诉存在。 正是在这一背景下，respondent 提出，移民法官在行使其裁量权时"根本偏离"了委员会的判例决定。我们未发现此种偏离，无论是否"根本"。移民法官在给予 respondent 完整机会为其自身提出抵消性衡平事项后，审查了整体记录。基于记录中不利事项的性质，移民法官得出结论认为，在未证明存在"不寻常"或"杰出"衡平因素的情况下，应不予采取有利的裁量行动。就此引用了 Matter of Arai, supra。我们同意，鉴于此处所涉刑事犯罪的性质、其近期性以及 respondent 被关押的显著期间（约30个月），此种要求是适当的。 respondent 反对移民法官引用 Matter of Arai, supra。作为一般规则，在不同类型的驱逐救济之间交叉适用行使裁量权的特定原则或标准时应谨慎行事。然而，在本案中，对 Arai 的引用仅涉及该案所述的一般方法（即在所寻求救济的背景下权衡有利和不利因素）。这可以适用于任何涉及行使裁量权的案件。 上诉律师称，Arai 标准要求在每一个出现不利因素的第245条案件中证明存在"不寻常"或"杰出"的衡平因素。在每一个第212(c)条申请中都会存在不利事项。因此，有人提出，如果将 Arai 标准适用于第212(e)条案件，则此类案件中固有的单一不利事项的存在将不适当地成为"申请人证明更高层次衡平因素的触发条件"。据称，这一要求将"与该法案的改善目的不一致"。 然而，这一分析的问题在于对 Matter of Arai, supra 的误读。Arai 案的裁决并未强制要求在每一个出现不利事项的案件中都证明存在杰出衡平因素。它仅表明，取决于不利事项的性质

matters of record, such a showing might be required. This is equally true in the context of a section 212(c) application. The immigration judge was not mistaken in this regard as he clearly based his require- ment for a showing of "unusual" or "outstanding" countervailing equities on the nature of the unfavorable matters in the record before him, rather than on the mere fact that adverse factors were present. We, therefore, find no error in the immigration judge's reference to Matter of Arai, supra. We further agree that the equities presented by respondent did not sufficiently offset the adverse matters of record. The respondent states that the factors deemed relevant by the immigration judge were in large part impermissible. In this regard, it is submitted that the immigration judge improperly deemed the respondent's absence of close family ties to this country to be an "adverse" matter. A respondent, however, bears the burden of demonstrating that discretionary relief should be exercised in his behalf. Thus, while the absence of a particular favorable matter (e.g., close family ties) is not an "adverse" factor, it will of necessity make it more difficult for a respon- , dent to successfully establish that he warrants the relief sought. Here, it is clear from the immigration judge's decision that he did not treat the respondent's familial status as a negative factor requiring a showing of countervailing equities. He merely noted the absence of family ties in Lhe context of the respondent's failure to allow sufficient equities to offset the specified adverse matters. We find no merit to the challenge to the other considerations cited by the immigration judge in reaching his decision on the exercise of discre- tion (e.g., the presence of a brother and sister in Colombia; the absence of a showing of unusual "hardships" if deported) for the same reasons noted above. Each factor cited was relevant to the issue of whether discretion should be favorably exercised, and each was considered by the immigration judge in the context of finding that the respondent had failed to come forward with sufficient equities to offset the significant unfavorable evidence. As an additional, but related, basis of appeal, the respondent submits that new standards must be adopted with specific regard to the treat- ment of applications for section 212(c) relief filed by imprisoned aliens_ It is stated that the Board has required applicants with a criminal record to demonstrate a "positive rehabilitation" before discretionary relief will be granted. The respondent submits that we have tied this showing of rehabilitation exclusively to time-based factors (i.e., the recency of the offense or fact of present confinement). The result, it is argued, is that a District Director by merely electing to issue an Order to Show Cause while an alien is confined can effectively preclude any successful application by that respondent for section 212(c) relief. This

记录中的事项，可能要求这样的证明。在212(c)条申请的语境下同样如此。移民法官在此方面没有错误，因为他要求证明存在“不寻常”或“杰出”的相抵衡平因素，显然是基于其面前记录中不利事项的性质，而非仅仅基于存在不利因素这一事实。因此，我们认定移民法官引用Matter of Arai, supra并无错误。 我们还同意，被上诉人提出的衡平因素不足以抵消记录中的不利事项。被上诉人声称，移民法官认为相关的因素在很大程度上是不允许的。在这方面，有人提出，移民法官将被上诉人与本国缺乏密切家庭关系不当视为“不利”事项。 然而，被上诉人负有证明应当为其行使自由裁量救济的举证责任。因此，虽然缺乏某一特定有利事项（例如密切家庭关系）并非“不利”因素，但它必然会使被上诉人更难成功证明其值得获得所寻求的救济。在此，从移民法官的决定中可以清楚看出，他并未将被上诉人的家庭状况视为需要证明相抵衡平因素的负面因素。他仅仅是在被上诉人未能提供足够衡平因素以抵消所指明的不利事项的语境下，指出了家庭关系的缺失。 我们认定，对被上诉人针对移民法官在就自由裁量权行使作出决定时所引用的其他考量因素（例如哥伦比亚有兄弟姐妹；未证明若被驱逐会遭受不寻常的“困难”）提出的质疑，基于上述相同理由，没有依据。所引用的每一因素都与是否应有利地行使自由裁量权的问题相关，且移民法官在认定被上诉人未能提出足够衡平因素以抵消重大不利证据的语境下，对每一因素均予以了考量。 作为附加但相关的上诉理由，被上诉人提出，必须针对被监禁外国人提交的212(c)条救济申请的处理，采用新的标准。据称，委员会要求有犯罪记录的申请人证明“积极改造”，才会给予自由裁量救济。被上诉人提出，我们将这种改造的证明完全与基于时间的因素（即犯罪的近期性或目前被监禁的事实）挂钩。据称，其结果是，地区主任仅仅选择在外国人被监禁期间签发出庭通知，就能有效阻止该被上诉人成功申请212(c)条救济。这

leads the respondent to the "inescapable conclusion" that under the Board's present standards the prosecution of incarcerated aliens is "selective," "impermissible," and clearly at variance with the due pro- cess and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. It is urged that the remedy to this perceived constitutional defect is either for the Board to adopt revised standards which would permit an incar- cerated alien to demonstrate his "entitlement to relief without regard to the fact that he is currently confined" and without use of a "time-based measure . . : of reformation" or for the Board to "forbid the commence- ment of proceedings altogether [against incarcerated aliens] until [they have] been permitted a sufficient period [to demonstrate their] reforma- tion." We find no merit to this ground of appeal. It is true that applicants for section 212(c) relief who have criminal records will ordinarily be re- quired to make a showing of rehabilitation. It is also true that this Board has found both the fact of confinement and the recency of the offense to be relevant to the question of whether rehabilitation has been estab- lished. However, although those factors may ultimately in given cases be determinative of the issue, we have never adopted a "conclusive" time-based standard of reformation that creates an irrebuttable pre- sumption that a confined alien can never establish either that he is rehabilitated or that relief should otherwise be granted. 5 Confined aliens and those who have recently cumulated eihninal acts Nvill have a more difficult task in showing that discretionary relief should be exercised in their behalf than aliens who have committed the same offenses in the more distant past. Dependent upon the nature of the offense and the circumstances of confinement, it may well be that a confined respondent will not be able to demonstrate rehabilitation. This does not mean, however, that different and constitutionally defective standards are applied to aliens, depending on whether they are recent criminals, in confinement, or released ex-offenders. The same test for the exercise of discretion is applied to each category of aliens. It is the factual circumstances that the alien finds himself in as a result of his own misconduct that results in the varying difficulty for successful applica- tion for discretionary relief. This fact does not mandate that standards be adopted which ignore considerations clearly relevant to the issue of

使被上诉人得出“不可避免的结论”，即根据委员会现行标准，对被监禁外国人的起诉是“选择性的”、“不允许的”，并且明显违反《美国宪法》的正当程序条款和平等保护条款。有人敦促，对这一所认为的宪法缺陷的补救办法，要么是由委员会采用修订后的标准，允许被监禁的外国人“证明其有权获得救济，而不论其目前被监禁的事实”，并且不使用“基于时间的……改造衡量标准”；要么是由委员会“完全禁止[对被监禁外国人]启动程序，直到[他们]被给予足够的时间[来证明其]改造”。 我们认定这一上诉理由没有依据。确实，有犯罪记录的212(c)条救济申请人通常会被要求证明改造。也确实，本委员会认定监禁事实和犯罪的近期性均与是否已确立改造的问题相关。然而，尽管这些因素在特定案件中最终可能对问题具有决定性，但我们从未采用“结论性的”基于时间的改造标准，从而创设不可反驳的推定，即被监禁的外国人永远无法证明其已改造或应另行给予救济。5 被监禁的外国人和近期有累积犯罪行为的人，在证明应为其行使自由裁量救济方面，比在更久远的过去犯下相同罪行的外国人面临更困难的任务。取决于犯罪的性质和监禁的情况，被监禁的被上诉人很可能无法证明改造。然而，这并不意味着根据外国人是近期犯罪者、被监禁者还是已释放的前罪犯，对其适用不同的且具有宪法缺陷的标准。对每一类外国人都适用相同的自由裁量权行使检验标准。是外国人因其自身不当行为而所处的实际情形，导致成功申请自由裁量救济的难度各不相同。这一事实并不要求采用忽视与改造问题及自由裁量权行使明显相关的考量因素的标准。

rehabilitation and the exercise of discretion. Nor does it compel a District Director to withhold instituting proceedings in cases where an alien is either recently convicted or still confined in order to give the alien a better opportunity to demonstrate his rehabilitation. See section 242(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(h). In any case involving discretionary relief, the timing of the issuance of the Order to Show Cause can have a significant effect on either statu- tory eligibility for the relief sought or on the circumstances relevant to the exercise of discretion. That fact alone, however, does not render a District Director's decision to institute proceedings suspect. The re- spondent cites Lennon, v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. N.Y. 1975) (involving an allegation that deportation proceedings were insti- tuted against an alien solely because of his lawful exercise of constitu- tional rights). We find no allegation or evidence, however, of an abuse of discretion of the nature at issue in Lennon. 6 We finally note in this regard that the decision to institute deportation proceedings is vested hi the discretion of the District Director. 8 C.F.R. 242.1(a). This Board is an administrative body of limited jurisdiction and is not the proper forum in which to seek review of the rationale underly- ing a District Director's decision to issue an Order to Show Cause. Matter of Lennon,, Interim Decision 2304 (BIA 1974), rev'd on other grounds, Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187 (2 Cir. 1975); Matter of Gcroninzo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 680 (BIA 1971). Upon review of the record, we conclude that the immigration judge's decision is supported by both law and fact. We find no merit to the arguments advanced on appeal by the respondent. The appeal will accordingly be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

改造和自由裁量权的行使。它也不强制地区主任在外国人近期被定罪或仍被监禁的案件中不启动程序，以便给该外国人更好的机会证明其改造。见该法第242(h)条，8 U.S.C. 1252(h)。 在任何涉及自由裁量救济的案件中，签发出庭通知的时机可能对所寻求救济的法定资格或与自由裁量权行使相关的情形产生重大影响。然而，仅此事实并不使地区主任启动程序的决定受到怀疑。被上诉人引用了Lennon v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. N.Y. 1975)（涉及指控仅因外国人合法行使宪法权利而对其启动驱逐程序）。然而，我们认定没有关于Lennon案中所涉性质之滥用自由裁量权的指控或证据。6 我们最后在此指出，启动驱逐程序的决定属于地区主任的自由裁量权。8 C.F.R. 242.1(a)。本委员会是管辖权有限的行政机构，不是寻求审查地区主任签发出庭通知决定之理由的适当论坛。Matter of Lennon, Interim Decision 2304 (BIA 1974), rev'd on other grounds, Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187 (2 Cir. 1975); Matter of Geronzo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 680 (BIA 1971)。 经审查记录，我们认定移民法官的决定有法律和事实依据。我们认定被上诉人在上诉中提出的论点没有依据。上诉 accordingly 将被驳回。 命令：上诉被驳回。