United States v. Dann

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-10191 Plaintiff-Appellee,

美利坚合众国， 案号：10-10191 原告-被上诉人，

D.C. No. v. 08-390-CW MABELLE DE LA ROSA DANN, OPINION Defendant-Appellant.

地区法院案号： 诉 08-390-CW MABELLE DE LA ROSA DANN， 意见书 被告-上诉人。

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding

来自美国加利福尼亚北区联邦地区法院的上诉 Claudia Wilken，地区法官，主审

Argued and Submitted May 9, 2011—San Francisco, California

辩论与提交 2011年5月9日——加利福尼亚州旧金山

Filed July 22, 2011

2011年7月22日存档

Before: Betty B. Fletcher and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges, and Nancy Gertner, District Judge.*

审理法官：Betty B. Fletcher 和 Sidney R. Thomas， 巡回法官，以及 Nancy Gertner，地区法官。*

Opinion by Judge Gertner

Gertner 法官撰写意见书

9723

9723

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9727

美国诉 DANN 案 9727

Barry J. Portman, Federal Public Defender, and Jerome E. Matthews, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oak­ land,California, for the defendant-appellant.

Barry J. Portman，联邦公设辩护人，及 Jerome E. Matthews， 助理 联邦 公设 辩护人， 加利福尼亚州奥克兰，代表被告-上诉人。

Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division Melinda Haag, United States Attorney, Barbara J. Valliere, Chief, Appellate Section, and Assistant United

Thomas E. Perez，助理司法部长，民权 司 Melinda Haag，美国检察官，Barbara J. Valliere，上诉科科长，及助理美国

9728 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9728 美国诉 DANN 案

States Attorney, Merry Jean Chan, Assistant United States Attorney, San Francisco, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

检察官，Merry Jean Chan，助理美国 检察官，加利福尼亚州旧金山，代表原告-被上诉人。

GERTNER, District Judge:

GERTNER，地区法官：

Mabelle de la Rosa Dann (“Dann”) was charged with con­ spiracy to commit visa fraud (count one), visa fraud (count two), forced labor (count three), unlawful conduct regarding documents in furtherance of servitude (count four),

Mabelle de la Rosa Dann（“Dann”）被控共谋实施签证欺诈（第一项）、签证欺诈（第二项）、强迫劳动（第三项）、为奴役目的非法处理文件（第四项），

1 and har­ boring an illegal alien for the purpose of private financial gain (count five). All charges arose out of conduct involving her live-in nanny and housekeeper, Zoraida Peña Canal (“Peña Canal”).

1 以及为私人经济利益窝藏非法外国人（第五项）。所有指控均源于涉及她的住家保姆和管家 Zoraida Peña Canal（“Peña Canal”）的行为。

Dann, an American citizen of Peruvian descent, arranged for Peña Canal to travel from her native Peru to the United States in 2006 and enter under a fraudulently-obtained visa to serve as a nanny and housekeeper. Dann was going through a divorce at the time, was unemployed, and was not receiving child support. Once Peña Canal arrived, Dann kept her pass­ port, forbade her from speaking with anyone outside the home, and failed to pay her for two years, although she often promised that she would. She repeatedly threatened to send Peña Canal back to Peru; and yet when Peña Canal agreed to go home, Dann told her that she would owe her $8,000 because she had only worked off $7,000 of the $15,000 worth of “expenses” that Dann had paid on her behalf. Dann eventu­ ally asked Peña Canal to sign a false statement that she had been paid minimum wage. This statement, along with Peña Canal’s passport and Peruvian identification, were later found by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents underneath clothes in a drawer in Dann’s room.

Dann 是一名秘鲁裔美国公民，她安排 Peña Canal 于2006年从祖国秘鲁前往美国，并持以欺诈手段获得的签证入境，担任保姆和管家。Dann 当时正在办理离婚，失业，且未收到子女抚养费。Peña Canal 抵达后，Dann 扣留了她的护照，禁止她与家外任何人交谈，并两年未支付她工资，尽管她经常承诺会支付。她多次威胁将 Peña Canal 送回秘鲁；然而当 Peña Canal 同意回家时，Dann 告诉她，她将欠她8,000美元，因为她只工作了7,000美元，抵偿 Dann 为她支付的15,000美元“费用”。Dann 最终要求 Peña Canal 签署一份虚假声明，称她已获得最低工资。这份声明，连同 Peña Canal 的护照和秘鲁身份证件，后来被美国移民和海关执法局（“ICE”）探员在 Dann 房间抽屉里的衣物下发现。

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9729

美国诉 DANN 案 9729

Dann was convicted after a jury trial on all five counts and sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. The district court ordered that she pay restitution to Peña Canal of $123,740.34. And because the court found that Peña Canal (who was living in a shelter) needed money immediately, the court ordered Dann to turn over any accrued child support payments that she received from her ex-husband while incarcerated directly to Peña Canal. Dann’s children were eligible for child sup­ port. Her eldest son is now sixteen, and her twins are ten years old.

Dann 经陪审团审判后五项罪名全部成立，被判处60个月监禁。地区法院命令她向 Peña Canal 支付123,740.34美元的赔偿金。并且，由于法院认定 Peña Canal（当时住在收容所）急需用钱，法院命令 Dann 将她入狱期间从前夫处收到的任何已累积的子女抚养费直接交给 Peña Canal。Dann 的子女有资格获得子女抚养费。她的长子现在十六岁，双胞胎十岁。

Dann appeals her convictions for forced labor as well as for the related offenses of document servitude and harboring an alien for financial gain. She also appeals three sentencing enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) and the district court’s restitution order.

Dann 就强迫劳动罪以及相关的文件奴役和为经济利益窝藏外国人罪提出上诉。她还根据《美国量刑指南》（“U.S.S.G.”）对三项量刑加重情节以及地区法院的赔偿令提出上诉。

As we explain below, we affirm the convictions on all counts as supported by sufficient evidence. With respect to sentencing, we decline to reach the merits of the first enhancement for visa fraud because it does not affect the guidelines offense level; we affirm the second enhancement for holding Dann in forced labor for over one year; and we affirm the third enhancement for committing a felony “in con­ nection with” forced labor.

正如我们在下文所解释的，我们确认所有罪名的定罪均有充分证据支持。关于量刑，我们拒绝对第一项签证欺诈的加重情节进行实质审查，因为它不影响指南的犯罪等级；我们确认第二项加重情节，即认定 Dann 使 Peña Canal 处于强迫劳动状态超过一年；并且我们确认第三项加重情节，即实施与强迫劳动“相关”的重罪。

Finally, we reverse the district court’s restitution order. This case raises a question of first impression: whether child support arrearages belong to a criminal defendant such that they may be assigned to a victim by a restitution order while the defendant’s children are still minors. Upon review of Cali­ fornia case law, we conclude that the minor child is the real party in interest to accrued child support. Until the child reaches the age of majority, the parent remains a conduit of the support and may distribute it for his benefit. Thus, any money that Dann receives for child support does not belong to her but rather to her children; it cannot be assigned to Peña Canal.

最后，我们推翻地区法院的赔偿令。本案提出了一个首次印象问题：在刑事被告的子女仍为未成年人时，子女抚养费欠款是否属于刑事被告，从而可以通过赔偿令将其分配给受害者。经审查加利福尼亚州判例法，我们得出结论，未成年子女是已累积子女抚养费的真正利害关系方。在子女达到成年年龄之前，父母仍是抚养费的通道，并可为子女的利益分配抚养费。因此，Dann 收到的任何子女抚养费不属于她，而属于她的子女；不能将其分配给 Peña Canal。

9730 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9730 美国诉 DANN 案

I. Factual Background

一、事实背景

The parties at trial and on appeal present two competing narratives. Dann contends that this case is a not unusual story of the relationship between two women, with all its ups and downs. As a divorced, single mother with three small chil­ dren, Dann was desperate. She gave Peña Canal the opportu­ nity to come to the United States, and she treated her as a family member. Dann took care of, housed, and fed Peña Canal, and wanted to pay her as soon as she had the chance. Dann hoped to give Peña Canal a room of her own but was unable to do so. The two women had their fights, as all family members do. After Peña Canal left Dann, she discovered that she could obtain a T-Visa and stay in the United States, as long as she testified against Dann.

双方在审判和上诉中提出了两种相互竞争的叙述。Dann 主张，本案是两个女人之间关系的不寻常故事，有其起伏。作为一个有三个小孩的离婚单身母亲，Dann 绝望无助。她给了 Peña Canal 来美国的机会，并把她当作家庭成员对待。Dann 照顾、收容并供养 Peña Canal，并希望一有机会就支付她工资。Dann 希望给 Peña Canal 一个自己的房间，但未能做到。两个女人有过争吵，就像所有家庭成员一样。Peña Canal 离开 Dann 后，她发现自己可以获得 T 签证并留在美国，只要她作证指控 Dann。

The government in turn portrays a woman who went to great lengths to violate immigration laws so that Peña Canal could work for her. She needed cheap — or free — labor, and this was her means of procuring it. Her behavior towards Peña Canal became worse and worse over time, culminating in Peña Canal’s working without pay in slave-like conditions, fearful of what would happen if she were to leave.

政府则描绘了一个不遗余力违反移民法以便 Peña Canal 为其工作的女人。她需要廉价——或免费——的劳动力，而这是她获取劳动力的手段。她对 Peña Canal 的行为随着时间的推移越来越糟，最终导致 Peña Canal 在类似奴隶的条件下无薪工作，害怕如果离开会发生什么。

Since Dann was convicted, however, the two narratives are not on equal footing. The Court is to construe all facts in favor of the verdict. The facts below are therefore presented in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Vir­ ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

然而，由于 Dann 已被定罪，这两种叙述并不处于平等地位。法院应以有利于裁决的方式解释所有事实。因此，以下事实以最有利于检方的方式呈现。Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)。

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9731

美国诉 DANN 案 9731

Dann is a naturalized American citizen of Peruvian descent who graduated from U.C. Berkeley’s Business School. She first met Peña Canal during a brief visit to Peru in March of 2002, when Peña Canal was working as a nanny for Dann’s sister. Dann suggested that Peña Canal come to the United States to nanny for her family instead.

Dann 是一名归化的美国公民，秘鲁裔，毕业于加州大学伯克利分校商学院。她于2002年3月短暂访问秘鲁期间首次见到 Peña Canal，当时 Peña Canal 正在为 Dann 的姐姐做保姆。Dann 建议 Peña Canal 来美国为她的家庭做保姆。

Dann returned to Peru a few months later and hired Peña Canal to take care of her twin baby boys during the trip. Again she spoke of taking Peña Canal to the United States. She promised Peña Canal the opportunity to study English and a salary that would increase from $300 to $600 per month. At trial, Peña Canal testified that even at that time, Dann spoke about deductions, calculations, and costs, such as the cost of a visa and the cost of housing in the United States.

Dann 几个月后返回秘鲁，并雇佣 Peña Canal 在旅行期间照顾她的双胞胎男婴。她再次谈到带 Peña Canal 去美国。她承诺 Peña Canal 有机会学习英语，薪水将从每月300美元增加到600美元。在审判中，Peña Canal 作证说，即使在当时，Dann 也谈到扣除、计算和费用，例如签证费用和美国的住房费用。

Dann and Peña Canal went about the process of applying for a visa. Dann filled out the papers for Peña Canal and told her to pretend that she was a tourist going to the United States for vacation. Dann told her that it would be more believable if Peña Canal said that she had a daughter in Peru or a mother who was sick, and so on her first application, Peña Canal stated that she had a four-year-old daughter and presented a false birth certificate as proof. That application was denied.

Dann 和 Peña Canal 开始了申请签证的过程。Dann 为 Peña Canal 填写了文件，并告诉她假装是去美国度假的游客。Dann 告诉她，如果 Peña Canal 说她在秘鲁有一个女儿或母亲生病，会更可信，因此在她的第一次申请中，Peña Canal 声称她有一个四岁的女儿，并出示了虚假的出生证明作为证据。该申请被拒绝。

Dann filled out a second application, this time stating that she and Peña Canal, along with the twins, would go to the United States for Thanksgiving and then return. This time Peña Canal was granted an interview at the U.S. Consulate, but this application was also denied. Dann returned to the United States in November of 2002 but vowed to send for Peña Canal, even if it meant smuggling her with “coyotes” through Mexico.

Dann 填写了第二份申请，这次声明她和 Peña Canal 以及双胞胎将去美国过感恩节然后返回。这次 Peña Canal 获得了在美国领事馆的面谈机会，但该申请也被拒绝。Dann 于2002年11月返回美国，但发誓要接 Peña Canal 来，即使这意味着通过墨西哥用“蛇头”偷运她。

During the following two years, Dann tried to help Peña Canal come to the United States on three occasions. Dann was going through a divorce, and in 2004 she wrote to Peña Canal:

在接下来的两年里，Dann 三次尝试帮助 Peña Canal 来美国。Dann 正在办理离婚，2004年她写信给 Peña Canal：

9732 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9732 美国诉 DANN 案

Dear Zoraida,

亲爱的 Zoraida：

I hope you are well. Here, I’m trying to do every­ thing possible to get ahead all alone and with the responsibility of three children. As you probably know, my divorce will be finalized very soon. Now, the judge has ordered that I must go out and work. And I need more help than ever . . . I’m going to try and see how to bring you over here. As you probably know, a man that my brother is acquainted with is going to get in touch with you very soon and will try to bring you. Don’t tell anyone from your family . . . .

希望你一切都好。在这里，我独自一人带着三个孩子的责任，正努力尽一切可能向前迈进。你可能知道，我的离婚很快就会最终确定。现在，法官命令我必须出去工作。我比以往任何时候都更需要帮助……我将尝试看看如何把你带到这里来。你可能知道，我哥哥认识的一个男人很快就会联系你，并会尝试带你过来。不要告诉你家里的任何人……

Finally, in December 2004, Dann arranged for Peña Canal to contact Dann’s friend, Silvana de la Rosa (“Silvana”). Dann and Silvana entered into a contract to bring Peña Canal to the United States. Silvana would pretend that she was so frail from cancer that she needed an assistant, Peña Canal, to travel with her. Dann hired a consultant to teach Peña Canal how to lie to immigration officials, with whom Peña Canal met regularly over a period of several months before her inter­ view at the consulate. Peña Canal was granted a tourist visa and entered the United States on July 27, 2006.

最后，在2004年12月，Dann 安排 Peña Canal 联系 Dann 的朋友 Silvana de la Rosa（“Silvana”）。Dann 和 Silvana 签订合同将 Peña Canal 带到美国。Silvana 会假装因癌症而虚弱，需要助手 Peña Canal 与她同行。Dann 雇佣了一名顾问教 Peña Canal 如何向移民官员撒谎，Peña Canal 在领事馆面谈前的几个月里定期与该顾问会面。Peña Canal 获得了旅游签证，并于2006年7月27日进入美国。

At this point, Dann was unemployed and receiving no child support. She and her three children were living with her mother.

此时，Dann 失业，没有收到子女抚养费。她和三个孩子住在母亲家。

When Peña Canal arrived in the United States, she moved in with Dann and Dann’s three boys at Dann’s mother’s house. The house was cramped, and Peña Canal slept on the floor. Dann promised that they would be there for only a few days, and then they would move to a bigger apartment where they would have more privacy. Around this time, Dann took Peña Canal’s passport for safe-keeping, since Peña Canal did

当 Peña Canal 抵达美国时，她搬进了 Dann 母亲家，与 Dann 和 Dann 的三个男孩同住。房子拥挤，Peña Canal 睡在地板上。Dann 承诺他们只在那里住几天，然后会搬到一个更大的公寓，那里有更多隐私。大约在这个时候，Dann 拿走了 Peña Canal 的护照保管，因为 Peña Canal

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9733

美国诉 DANN 案 9733

not have any private or secure space of her own. When Silvana left the country, Dann tore up Peña Canal’s return ticket to Peru along with the contract to bring Peña Canal to the United States.

没有属于自己的私人或安全空间。当Silvana离开该国时，Dann撕毁了Peña Canal返回秘鲁的机票以及带Peña Canal来美国的合同。

Eventually, in late September of 2006, Dann, her three chil­ dren, and Peña Canal moved out of Dann’s mother’s house and into a two-bedroom apartment. Here again, Peña Canal did not have a room of her own. She slept on the floor in the corner of the living room. Dann began working as a real estate agent but funds were tight. She promised Peña Canal that she would pay her as soon as she got on her feet. Dann, however, never paid Peña Canal.

最终，在2006年9月下旬，Dann、她的三个孩子和Peña Canal搬出了Dann母亲的房子，搬进了一套两居室公寓。在这里，Peña Canal同样没有自己的房间。她睡在客厅角落的地板上。Dann开始做房地产经纪人，但资金紧张。她向Peña Canal承诺，一旦她站稳脚跟就会付钱给她。然而，Dann从未支付给Peña Canal。

Peña Canal’s workday began at 6:00 a.m. when she made breakfast for Dann and the boys. Once the boys were off to school, she had until noon to clean the apartment, do laundry and ironing, and prepare lunch. At about 12:30 p.m., she walked thirty minutes to the twins’ school to pick them up. She would feed them lunch and then supervise their home­ work until the elder son came home. She would take the chil­ dren out to play, feed them dinner at 6:00 p.m., and then get them ready for bed at 8:00 p.m. After the children were asleep, she would tidy the house before retiring at about 10:00 p.m.

Peña Canal的工作日从早上6:00开始，她为Dann和男孩们做早餐。男孩们去上学后，她到中午之前要打扫公寓、洗熨衣物并准备午餐。大约下午12:30，她步行三十分钟到双胞胎的学校接他们。她会喂他们午餐，然后监督他们做作业，直到大儿子回家。她会带孩子们出去玩，下午6:00喂他们晚餐，然后晚上8:00让他们准备睡觉。孩子们睡着后，她会整理房子，然后在晚上10:00左右就寝。

The conditions — and the relationship — worsened over time. In January of 2007, Dann forbade Peña Canal from leav­ ing the apartment without permission. When Dann’s friends came over, she made Peña Canal hide in the gym of the apart­ ment complex. She told Peña Canal not to talk to anyone because she did not want Peña Canal to tell “anybody about the things here at home.” At trial, the property manager of Dann’s apartment complex testified that Dann told him to order Spanish-speaking personnel not to speak with Peña Canal.

条件——以及关系——随着时间的推移而恶化。2007年1月，Dann禁止Peña Canal未经许可离开公寓。当Dann的朋友来访时，她让Peña Canal躲到公寓楼的健身房里。她告诉Peña Canal不要和任何人说话，因为她不想让Peña Canal告诉“任何人家里的事情”。在审判中，Dann公寓楼的物业经理作证说，Dann告诉他命令说西班牙语的人员不要与Peña Canal交谈。

Sometime in the winter of 2007, Dann began restricting Peña Canal’s food intake. Dann forbade Peña Canal from eat­

2007年冬天的某个时候，Dann开始限制Peña Canal的食物摄入量。Dann禁止Peña Canal未经许可吃

9734 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9734 美国诉DANN案

ing fruit or drinking tea without permission. Eventually, Dann began weighing the meat and counting eggs and bread to make sure Peña Canal was not eating more than her ration.

水果或喝茶。最终，Dann开始称肉的重量、数鸡蛋和面包，以确保Peña Canal没有超过她的配给量进食。

By February 2007 — seven months after Peña Canal’s arrival in the United States — Dann still had not paid Peña Canal. At that time, Dann told Peña Canal:

到2007年2月——Peña Canal抵达美国七个月后——Dann仍未支付Peña Canal。当时，Dann告诉Peña Canal：

You shouldn’t — you shouldn’t think that I’m treat­ ing you like a slave, you shouldn’t think that I’m treating you like a slave. I’m going to pay you. I don’t want for you to leave me because I don’t know what would happen to my children. Where would I keep them? The government would take them from me.

你不应该——你不应该认为我在把你当奴隶对待，你不应该认为我在把你当奴隶对待。我会付钱给你的。我不想让你离开我，因为我不知道我的孩子们会怎样。我把他们留在哪里？政府会把他们从我身边带走。

Dann continued to promise to pay Peña Canal. In March of 2007, she opened a bank account for Peña Canal (falsely informing the bank that Peña Canal worked for Whole Foods). Dann kept the bank documents; the personal checks issued to the account were later found in her possession.

Dann继续承诺支付Peña Canal。2007年3月，她为Peña Canal开了一个银行账户（向银行谎称Peña Canal在Whole Foods工作）。Dann保留了银行文件；后来在她身上发现了开给该账户的个人支票。

In January 2008, the two women had a heated argument because Dann thought that Peña Canal had spoken to her son’s trombone teacher without permission. Dann said, “I told you not to talk to anybody. Why did you go and talk to the teacher? Did you want to practice your English?” She threat­ ened to send Peña Canal back to Peru. She said, “I’m giving you a chance to be here in this country. I’m going to buy your ticket right now. But first, I’m going to figure out our accounts.” Dann concluded that Peña Canal owed a total of $15,000, of which she had worked off only $7,000.

2008年1月，两名女子发生了激烈争吵，因为Dann认为Peña Canal未经许可与她儿子的长号老师交谈。Dann说：“我告诉过你不要和任何人说话。你为什么去和老师说话？你想练习英语吗？”她威胁要把Peña Canal送回秘鲁。她说：“我给你机会在这个国家待着。我现在就给你买机票。但首先，我要算算我们的账。”Dann得出结论，Peña Canal总共欠她15,000美元，其中她只工作了7,000美元。

Dann falsely accused Peña Canal of stealing from her on at least four occasions. The last of these, on March 1, 2008, resulted in another argument. This time, Peña Canal stood up to Dann and said,

Dann至少四次诬告Peña Canal偷她的东西。最后一次是在2008年3月1日，导致了另一场争吵。这一次，Peña Canal站起来对Dann说，

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9735

美国诉DANN案 9735

You know what? If I’m here in the United States, [it] is so that I can make as much as a dollar even hon­ estly. Even if it’s cleaning bathrooms, but honest money. I’ve never taken anybody’s money in Peru and even less here. . . . If you think that I’m stealing from you, call the police. Call the police.

你知道吗？如果我在美国，[那]是为了我能诚实地挣到一美元。即使是打扫厕所，但也是诚实的钱。我在秘鲁从未拿过任何人的钱，在这里更不会。……如果你认为我偷你的东西，叫警察。叫警察。

Peña Canal went into the bathroom to wash her face, and Dann followed her in and turned off the light. Dann then grabbed Peña Canal by the neck, called her names, and said she was going to send her back to Peru. When Peña Canal answered that she actually wanted to go home, Dann reminded her of all the clothes that Dann had purchased for her.

Peña Canal走进浴室洗脸，Dann跟着她进去并关了灯。然后Dann抓住Peña Canal的脖子，辱骂她，并说要把她送回秘鲁。当Peña Canal回答说她其实想回家时，Dann提醒她Dann为她买的所有衣服。

Dann continued to insult Peña Canal often, calling her “lit­ tle girl” and “shit.” On March 27, 2008, Peña Canal told Dann to replace a radio she had broken, and Dann said, “You’re talking to me about rights. What rights do you have in the United States? . . . You’re a peasant. I’m giving you an oppor­ tunity here in this country.” Peña Canal replied, “You’re treat­ ing me like a slave. You’re not paying me. You’re not paying me. And besides that, you broke my radio.” Dann countered, “This is my house. In my house, I can do whatever I want.”

Dann继续经常侮辱Peña Canal，称她为“小女孩”和“狗屎”。2008年3月27日，Peña Canal让Dann更换她弄坏的收音机，Dann说：“你在跟我谈权利。你在美国有什么权利？……你是个农民。我在这个国家给你机会。”Peña Canal回答说：“你把我当奴隶对待。你不付钱给我。你不付钱给我。而且，你弄坏了我的收音机。”Dann反驳说：“这是我的房子。在我的房子里，我可以为所欲为。”

A few days later, Dann told her mother — in front of Peña Canal — that Peña Canal had no rights “since here in the United States, the illegal people don’t even have as much as Medi-Cal. They die here.” Then Dann ordered Peña Canal to sign a letter that stated that Dann had paid her minimum wage in California. The agreement stated in full:

几天后，Dann当着Peña Canal的面对她母亲说，Peña Canal没有权利，“因为在美国，非法的人甚至没有Medi-Cal。他们死在这里。”然后Dann命令Peña Canal签署一封信，声明Dann在加利福尼亚州已支付她最低工资。该协议全文如下：

I, Zoraida Peña, have received from Ms. Mabelle Dann the minimum wage in the State of California starting on July 27th, 2007, for the care of her chil­ dren [names omitted] home from school at 2:30 to 6:00 p.m.. In addition, I receive lodging. I occupy the entire living room for a value of $500 in rent.

我，Zoraida Peña，已收到Mabelle Dann女士自2007年7月27日起在加利福尼亚州支付的最低工资，用于照顾她的孩子[姓名省略]从学校2:30到下午6:00回家。此外，我获得住宿。我占用整个客厅，租金价值500美元。

9736 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9736 美国诉DANN案

And food, breakfast, lunch, food [sic] and dinner every day.

以及食物，每天早餐、午餐、食物[原文如此]和晚餐。

In addition to this, I have received some clothes items and gifts from members of Mabelle’s family. Perfumes, clothes items, shoes, jackets, pants, et cetera. I have received a yearly total of $10,200.

除此之外，我还收到了Mabelle家人赠送的一些衣物和礼物。香水、衣物、鞋子、夹克、裤子等等。我每年共收到10,200美元。

Peña Canal testified that she signed the letter, knowing that its contents were false.

Peña Canal作证说，她签署了这封信，知道其内容是虚假的。

At trial, the prosecutor asked Peña Canal why she had stayed with Dann; Peña Canal answered: (i) she didn’t trust anybody and had nowhere to go; (ii) Dann had her passport; (iii) Dann was making false accusations against her that she was taking her money; and (iv) the children were her respon­ sibility.

在审判中，检察官问Peña Canal为什么她留在Dann身边；Peña Canal回答：(i) 她不信任任何人，无处可去；(ii) Dann拿走了她的护照；(iii) Dann诬告她拿她的钱；以及(iv) 孩子们是她的责任。

Peña Canal had made friends at the twins’ school when she went to pick them up. Although she did not speak English, there were a few Spanish-speakers at the school, including the school custodian, Anselma Soto (“Soto”). Peña Canal told him about her working conditions, that she had not been paid, and that she was not allowed to talk to anyone. Eventually Peña Canal began keeping some of her belongings with Soto in an envelope at the school. She also became friends with a gardener, Miguel Lopez (“Lopez”). She told him that she was afraid to leave work because Dann “was accusing her, saying that she was going to report her to immigration, that she was illegal and that she couldn’t be in this country.” Another mother at the school, Amy Oz (“Oz”) began giving Peña Canal rides to and from school. She spoke a little Spanish, and Peña Canal told her that she would get in trouble if she was found talking with her. In March of 2008, Oz contacted La Raza Centro Legal, an organization that assists domestic workers, on Peña Canal’s behalf.

Peña Canal在去双胞胎学校接他们时结交了朋友。虽然她不会说英语，但学校里有几个说西班牙语的人，包括学校管理员Anselma Soto（“Soto”）。Peña Canal告诉他她的工作条件，她没有得到报酬，并且不被允许和任何人说话。最终，Peña Canal开始将一些物品放在一个信封里交给Soto保存在学校。她还与园丁Miguel Lopez（“Lopez”）成为了朋友。她告诉他，她害怕离开工作，因为Dann“指控她，说她要向移民局举报她，她是非法的，不能在这个国家。”学校的另一位母亲Amy Oz（“Oz”）开始接送Peña Canal上下学。她会说一点西班牙语，Peña Canal告诉她，如果被发现和她说话，她会有麻烦。2008年3月，Oz代表Peña Canal联系了La Raza Centro Legal，一个帮助家庭工人的组织。

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9737

美国诉DANN案 9737

Soto, Lopez, and Oz helped Peña Canal leave on April 16, 2008. Peña Canal dropped the children off at the school. She then went through the school kitchen and hid in a car that was driven to a safe house. Oz was responsible for calling Dann to tell her that she would need to pick up her children herself and that she should pick up a letter from Peña Canal at the school. The letter contained keys to Dann’s apartment and asked Dann to return Peña Canal’s passport and Peruvian identification.

Soto、Lopez和Oz帮助Peña Canal于2008年4月16日离开。Peña Canal把孩子们送到学校。然后她穿过学校厨房，躲进一辆被开到安全屋的汽车里。Oz负责打电话给Dann，告诉她需要自己接孩子，并让她在学校取一封Peña Canal的信。信中包含Dann公寓的钥匙，并要求Dann归还Peña Canal的护照和秘鲁身份证件。

When Dann got to the school and read the letter, she became hysterical. She said that Peña Canal had taken every­ thing — she had emptied Dann’s house, taken the keys, all her jewelry and all her money. Dann later told Oz that Peña Canal had been a terrible nanny who had stolen her jewelry. On April 21, 2008, Dann e-mailed her sister and said, “Zoraida escaped, got away, left. But at least she was here for two years. But I realized from the day she got here that she wanted to look for another job.”

当Dann到达学校读到信时，她变得歇斯底里。她说Peña Canal拿走了一切——她搬空了Dann的房子，拿走了钥匙、她所有的珠宝和所有的钱。Dann后来告诉Oz，Peña Canal是个糟糕的保姆，偷了她的珠宝。2008年4月21日，Dann给她的姐姐发了电子邮件说：“Zoraida逃跑了，离开了，走了。但至少她在这里待了两年。但我从她来到这里的那天起就意识到她想找另一份工作。”

Meanwhile, Peña Canal met with a lawyer from La Raza Centro Legal, the immigration advocacy group with whom Oz had spoken on her behalf. She had told Oz that she wanted to stay in the United States. La Raza contacted ICE and reported Peña Canal’s situation. Upon ICE’s recommendation, Peña Canal was granted a T-Visa pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I) (requiring that the victim cooperate in the prosecution of the trafficker).

与此同时，Peña Canal会见了La Raza Centro Legal的律师，这是Oz代表她联系的移民倡导组织。她告诉Oz她想留在美国。La Raza联系了ICE并报告了Peña Canal的情况。根据ICE的建议，Peña Canal依据8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I)获得了T签证（要求受害者在起诉贩运者时合作）。

Peña Canal also filed a civil suit against Dann and her mother, Vittett, seeking civil, punitive and other damages. Peña Canal was granted a default judgment and $612,812.82 in compensatory and punitive damages. Canal v. Dann, No. 09-03366CW, 2010 WL 3491136, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010).

Peña Canal还对Dann和她的母亲Vittett提起了民事诉讼，要求民事、惩罚性及其他损害赔偿。Peña Canal获得了缺席判决和612,812.82美元的补偿性和惩罚性赔偿。Canal v. Dann, No. 09-03366CW, 2010 WL 3491136, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010)。

Dann never returned Peña Canal’s passport or Peruvian identification. A police officer testified that he went to the

Dann从未归还Peña Canal的护照或秘鲁身份证件。一名警察作证说，他代表Peña Canal去了

9738 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9738 美国诉DANN案

apartment on Peña Canal’s behalf to ask for these papers. Dann was not present but called him back later. She denied having any documents, denied knowing what he was talking about, and denied having any property that belonged to Peña Canal.

公寓索要这些文件。Dann不在场，但后来给他回了电话。她否认拥有任何文件，否认知道他在说什么，并否认拥有任何属于Peña Canal的财产。

In June of 2008, ICE agents searched Dann’s apartment. They found Peña Canal’s passport, her Peruvian identification card, and checks for a bank account in her name, along with the agreement that Dann had forced her to sign about mini­ mum wage, all buried under clothing in a drawer in Dann’s room.

2008年6月，ICE探员搜查了Dann的公寓。他们在Dann房间的抽屉里，在衣物下面发现了Peña Canal的护照、她的秘鲁身份证以及以她名字开的银行账户的支票，还有Dann强迫她签署的关于最低工资的协议。

II. Procedural Background

II. 程序背景

On June 5, 2008, Dann was charged in a one-count indict­ ment with harboring an illegal alien for purpose of private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(i). On February 4, 2009, the government filed a superceding indictment, charging Dann with five counts: (i) conspiracy to commit visa fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1546(a); (ii) visa fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a); (iii) forced labor and attempted forced labor in vio­ lation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1594; (iv) document servi­ tude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592; and (v) harboring an illegal alien for private financial gain in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(i).

2008年6月5日，Dann在一份单罪起诉书中被指控为私人经济利益窝藏非法外国人，违反了8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)和(B)(i)。2009年2月4日，政府提交了一份替代起诉书，指控Dann五项罪名：(i) 共谋实施签证欺诈，违反18 U.S.C. §§ 371和1546(a)；(ii) 签证欺诈，违反18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)；(iii) 强迫劳动和企图强迫劳动，违反18 U.S.C. §§ 1589和1594；(iv) 文件奴役，违反18 U.S.C. § 1592；以及(v) 为私人经济利益窝藏非法外国人，违反8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)和(B)(i)。

After a jury trial, Dann was convicted on all five counts. During deliberations, the jury asked four questions. One ques­ tion was about visa fraud. The other questions were about the forced labor charge.

经过陪审团审判，Dann被判五项罪名全部成立。在评议期间，陪审团提出了四个问题。一个问题关于签证欺诈。其他问题关于强迫劳动指控。

The district court instructed the jury that forced labor has three elements: (1) that Dann obtained or attempted to obtain the labor or services of Peña Canal; (2) by means of a scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause Peña Canal to believe that, if she did not perform such labor or services, she or another

地区法院指示陪审团，强迫劳动有三个要素：(1) Dann获得或企图获得Peña Canal的劳动或服务；(2) 通过旨在使Peña Canal相信，如果她不提供此类劳动或服务，她或另一

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9739

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9739

person would suffer serious harm; and (3) that Dann acted knowingly. The jury asked, “Must the charge of forced labor apply to the entire duration of Ms. Peña Canal’s service, or can it be applied only to a portion of the time?” The district court answered, “It need not apply to the entire duration of Peña Canal’s service. It could be applied to only a portion of the time.”

人将遭受严重伤害的计划、方案或模式；以及(3) Dann明知故犯。陪审团问：“强迫劳动指控是否必须适用于Peña Canal服务的整个期间，还是可以仅适用于部分时间？”地区法院回答：“不必适用于Peña Canal服务的整个期间。可以仅适用于部分时间。”

The jury also asked, “Is the duration of time relevant to determining serious harm?” The district court answered, “Yes, the duration of time is relevant. A harm that might be serious if it happened for only a short — that might not be serious if it happened for a short time might be serious if it went on for a very long time.” Shortly after this instruction, the jury returned with a unanimous verdict of guilty on all five counts.

陪审团还问：“时间长度与确定严重伤害有关吗？”地区法院回答：“是的，时间长度有关。一个如果只发生很短时间可能不严重的伤害——如果发生很短时间可能不严重，但如果持续很长时间可能严重。”在此指示后不久，陪审团一致裁定五项罪名全部有罪。

On October 15, 2009, Dann filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and/or motion for new trial. Dann had also made an oral motion for a judgment of acquittal after the government rested and at the close of all the evidence. The district court denied these motions in a written order on December 23, 2009. United States v. Dann, No. 08-00390, 2009 WL 5062345 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2009).

2009年10月15日，Dann提交了无罪判决动议和/或重新审判动议。Dann还在政府举证完毕和所有证据结束时口头提出了无罪判决动议。地区法院于2009年12月23日以书面命令驳回了这些动议。United States v. Dann, No. 08-00390, 2009 WL 5062345 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2009)。

On April 14, 2010, the district court sentenced Dann to 60 months on each count, to run concurrently. The court also ordered restitution in the amount of $123,740.34, payable to Peña Canal. As part of this restitution, the district court ordered that any accrued child support payable to Dann while she is incarcerated be paid directly to Peña Canal.

2010年4月14日，地区法院判处Dann每项罪名60个月监禁，同时执行。法院还命令向Peña Canal支付123,740.34美元的赔偿金。作为赔偿的一部分，地区法院命令，Dann在监禁期间应付给她的任何累积子女抚养费直接支付给Peña Canal。

Dann filed a notice of appeal on April 22, 2010. On April 28, 2010, she filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) to correct the sentence on the grounds that the district court erred when it ordered accrued child support to be paid to the victim. The district court denied this motion

Dann于2010年4月22日提交了上诉通知。2010年4月28日，她根据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》35(a)提交动议，要求纠正判决，理由是地区法院在命令将累积子女抚养费支付给受害者时犯了错误。地区法院驳回了该动议

9740 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9740 UNITED STATES v. DANN

on July 22, 2010. United States v. Dann, No. 08-00390, 2010 WL 2891585 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010).

于2010年7月22日。United States v. Dann, No. 08-00390, 2010 WL 2891585 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010)。

Dann appeals her conviction and sentence. We address each in turn below.

Dann对定罪和判决提出上诉。我们将在下文逐一处理。

I. Standard of Review

一、审查标准

Dann argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for forced labor, document servi­ tude, and harboring an illegal alien for financial gain. The Court reviews the district court’s denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Carranza, 289 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2002).

Dann在上诉中主张，没有足够证据支持其强迫劳动、文件奴役和为经济利益窝藏非法外国人的定罪。法院对地区法院驳回无罪判决动议进行重新审查。参见，例如，United States v. Carranza, 289 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2002)。

The Court asks whether, “[a]fter viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The analysis requires two steps: First, the court reviews the evi­ dence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the pros­ ecution; then, the court determines whether the evidence, so construed, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The Nevils court cautioned:

法院询问，在“以最有利于检方的观点审视证据后，任何理性的事实认定者是否能够排除合理怀疑地认定犯罪的基本要素。”Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319。分析需要两个步骤：首先，法院以最有利于检方的观点审查审判中出示的证据；然后，法院确定如此解释的证据是否允许任何理性的事实认定者排除合理怀疑地认定被告有罪。参见，例如，United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)。Nevils法院警告说：

This means that a court of appeals may not usurp the role of the finder of fact by considering how it would have resolved the conflicts, made the inferences, or considered the evidence at trial. Rather, when faced with a record of historical facts that supports con­ flicting inferences a reviewing court must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such con­

这意味着上诉法院不得通过考虑其将如何解决冲突、作出推论或考虑审判证据来篡夺事实认定者的角色。相反，当面对支持相互冲突推论的历史事实记录时，审查法院必须推定——即使记录中没有明确显示——事实认定者以有利于检方的方式解决了任何此类冲

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9741

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9741

flicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.

突，并且必须尊重该解决方案。

Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

同上（引号和引注省略）。

Nevertheless, Dann will prevail if, once all of the evidence has been construed in favor of the government, the evidence is still “so supportive of innocence that no rational juror could conclude that the government proved its case beyond a rea­ sonable doubt.” Id. at 1167.

然而，如果在以有利于政府的观点解释所有证据后，证据仍然“如此支持无罪，以至于没有理性的陪审员能够排除合理怀疑地认定政府证明了其案件”，Dann将胜诉。Id. at 1167。

II. Discussion

二、讨论

Dann argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for three of the five crimes for which she was convicted: forced labor, document servitude, and alien harbor­ ing for financial gain. We consider each in turn.

Dann主张，证据不足以支持其被判五项罪名中的三项：强迫劳动、文件奴役和为经济利益窝藏外国人。我们逐一考虑。

First, Dann argues that she should be acquitted of forced labor because there was insufficient evidence that she intended to threaten serious harm.

首先，Dann主张她应被判强迫劳动无罪，因为没有足够证据表明她意图威胁严重伤害。

The federal forced labor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a), pro­ vides:

联邦强迫劳动法规，18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)，规定：

(a) Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by any one of, or by any com­ bination of, the following means—

(a) 任何人明知通过以下任何一种方式或任何组合方式提供或获得他人的劳动或服务——

(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person;

(1) 通过武力、武力威胁、身体约束或对该人或另一人的身体约束威胁；

(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another per­ son;

(2) 通过严重伤害或对该人或另一人的严重伤害威胁；

9742 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9742 UNITED STATES v. DANN

(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process;

(3) 通过滥用或威胁滥用法律或法律程序；

or

或

(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pat­ tern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physi­ cal restraint,

(4) 通过任何计划、方案或模式，旨在使该人相信，如果该人不提供此类劳动或服务，该人或另一人将遭受严重伤害或身体约束，

shall be punished as provided under subsection(d).

应按照(d)小节的规定处罚。

The government limited this case to the fourth means of violating the forced labor statute, and the court instructed:

政府将本案限于违反强迫劳动法规的第四种方式，法院指示：

If you find that Dann obtained the labor or services of Peña Canal, then you must determine whether she did so by means of a scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause Peña Canal to believe that, if she did not perform such labor or services, she or another person would suffer serious harm.

如果你认定Dann获得了Peña Canal的劳动或服务，那么你必须确定她是否通过旨在使Peña Canal相信，如果她不提供此类劳动或服务，她或另一人将遭受严重伤害的计划、方案或模式这样做。

The court then defined serious harm exactly as described in the statute, which includes “physical or nonphysical” harm, “including psychological, financial or reputational harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2). The jury convicted on this count.

法院随后完全按照法规中的定义定义了严重伤害，包括“身体或非身体”伤害，“包括心理、经济或名誉伤害”。18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2)。陪审团就此项罪名定罪。

Dann does not challenge the instruction. Rather she argues that her relationship with Peña Canal does not fit within the forced labor statute and that the evidence presented was insuf­ ficient to support the conviction as a matter of law.

Dann没有质疑该指示。相反，她主张她与Peña Canal的关系不符合强迫劳动法规，并且所出示的证据在法律上不足以支持定罪。

The acts proved by the government in this case are well within the scope of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence

政府在本案中证明的行为完全属于《2000年人口贩运和暴力受害者

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9743

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9743

Protection Act of 2000. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464. Legislative history suggests that Congress passed this act to correct what they viewed as the Supreme Court’s mistaken holding in United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988). Kozminski limited the definition of involuntary servitude to “physical” or “legal” coercion. Id. at 952. In § 1589, Congress intended to “reach cases in which persons are held in a condi­ tion of servitude through nonviolent coercion.” Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 § 102(b)(13).

2000年《保护法》。Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464。立法史表明，国会通过该法是为了纠正其认为最高法院在United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)一案中所作的错误判决。Kozminski将非自愿奴役的定义限于“身体”或“法律”强制。Id. at 952。在§ 1589中，国会意图“涵盖通过非暴力强制使他人处于奴役状态的情形”。2000年《人口贩运和暴力保护法》§ 102(b)(13)。

[1] Congress concluded that the means used by modern- day traffickers are “increasingly subtle.” H.R. Rep. No. 106­ 939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.), 2000 WL 1479163, at *91. And therefore § 1589 defines harm broadly as:

[1] 国会得出结论，现代人口贩子使用的手段“越来越微妙”。H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.), 2000 WL 1479163, at *91。因此§ 1589将伤害广泛定义为：

any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, includ­ ing psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that harm.

任何伤害，无论是身体还是非身体，包括心理、经济或名誉伤害，在所有周围情况下，足以迫使具有相同背景和相同情况的理性人提供或继续提供劳动或服务以避免遭受该伤害。

18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2). In other words, someone is guilty of forced labor if he intends to cause a person in his employ to believe that if she does not continue to work, she will suffer the type of serious harm — physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, reputation harm — that would com­ pel someone in her circumstances to continue working to avoid that harm. See, e.g., United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 712, 714 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding threat to stop paying victim’s poor family members constitutes serious harm).

18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2)。换言之，如果某人意图使其雇员相信，如果她不继续工作，她将遭受那种——身体或非身体，包括心理、经济、名誉伤害——会迫使其情况下的某人继续工作以避免该伤害的严重伤害，则该人犯有强迫劳动罪。参见，例如，United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 712, 714 (7th Cir. 2008)（认定威胁停止支付受害者贫困家庭成员构成严重伤害）。

To be sure, not all bad employer-employee relationships or even bad employer-immigrant nanny relationships will consti­ tute forced labor. First, the threat of harm must be serious. Congress intended to address serious trafficking, or cases

诚然，并非所有不良雇主-雇员关系，甚至不良雇主-移民保姆关系，都会构成强迫劳动。首先，伤害威胁必须是严重的。国会意图处理严重贩运，或案件

9744 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9744 UNITED STATES v. DANN

“where traffickers threaten harm to third persons, restrain their victims without physical violence or injury, or threaten dire consequences by means other than overt violence.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 101 (Conf. Rep.). According to the stat­ ute, the threat, considered from the vantage point of a reason­ able person in the place of the victim, must be “sufficiently serious” to compel that person to remain. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2).

“其中贩运者威胁伤害第三方，在没有身体暴力或伤害的情况下限制受害者，或通过公开暴力以外的方式威胁可怕后果。”H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 101 (Conf. Rep.)。根据法规，从处于受害者位置的理性人的角度考虑，威胁必须“足够严重”以迫使该人留下。参见18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2)。

Second, the scope of the statute is narrowed by the require­ ment of scienter. Calimlim, 538 F.3d at 711-12. The jury must find that the employer intended to cause the victim to believe that she would suffer serious harm — from the vantage point of the victim — if she did not continue to work. While the serious harm need not be effectuated at the defendant’s hand, the statute “requires that the plan be intended to cause the vic­ tim to believe that that harm will befall her.” Id. (internal quo­ tation marks and punctuation omitted). The linchpin of the serious harm analysis under § 1589 is not just that serious harm was threatened but that the employer intended the vic­ tim to believe that such harm would befall her.

第二，该法规的适用范围因明知要件而收窄。Calimlim, 538 F.3d at 711-12。陪审团必须认定，雇主意图使受害人相信——从受害人的视角来看——如果她不继续工作，她将遭受严重伤害。虽然严重伤害不必由被告亲手实施，但该法规“要求该计划意图使受害人相信该伤害将降临于她。”Id.（内部引号和标点省略）。根据§ 1589对严重伤害分析的关键不仅在于严重伤害受到了威胁，而且在于雇主意图使受害人相信该等伤害将降临于她。

Here, Dann argues that there was insufficient evidence that she intended to make Peña Canal believe that she would suf­ fer serious harm if she were to stop working for Dann. The government counters that the evidence supports Dann’s intent to have Peña Canal believe: (i) that she would not be paid back wages for close to two years of work and in fact would owe Dann $8,000 for expenses already paid; (ii) that Dann would falsely accuse her of wrongdoing and cause reputa­ tional harm; (iii) that Peña Canal would suffer immigration consequences because she would either not be able to leave the country at all (since Dann held her passport and papers) or she would be sent back to Peru and would not have the

在此，Dann主张，没有充分证据表明她意图使Peña Canal相信如果她停止为Dann工作将遭受严重伤害。政府反驳称，证据支持Dann具有使Peña Canal相信以下事项的意图：(i) 她近两年的工作将得不到补发工资，而且实际上将欠Dann已支付的8,000美元费用；(ii) Dann将虚假指控她有不法行为并造成名誉损害；(iii) Peña Canal将遭受移民后果，因为她要么根本无法离开该国（因为Dann持有她的护照和文件），要么将被送回秘鲁并且不会有

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9745

美国诉DANN案 9745

opportunity to study in the United States; and (iv) that the children for whom she cared would be taken from their mother.

在美国学习的机会；以及(iv) 她照看的孩子们将被从他们的母亲身边带走。

While we consider each of these harms separately below, we are to ask whether, from the vantage point of an immigrant in Peña Canal’s position, these harms — taken together — were sufficiently serious so as to compel her to remain in Dann’s employ.

虽然我们在下文分别考虑这些伤害中的每一项，但我们要问的是，从处于Peña Canal境地的移民的视角来看，这些伤害——综合起来——是否足够严重，以至于迫使她继续受雇于Dann。

First, Dann argues that there was insufficient evidence that Dann intended Peña Canal to believe that she would suffer serious financial harm if she were to leave. Dann points out that Peña Canal never testified that Dann told her that she would not be paid back wages. That may well be true, but the inference was clear. Dann told Peña Canal that she would owe money if she left. After one argument, Dann said, “I’m giving

首先，Dann主张，没有充分证据表明Dann意图使Peña Canal相信如果她离开将遭受严重的经济伤害。Dann指出，Peña Canal从未作证称Dann告诉过她将得不到补发工资。这或许确实如此，但推论是明确的。Dann告诉Peña Canal，如果她离开就会欠钱。在一次争吵后，Dann说：“我给你

9746 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9746 美国诉DANN案

you a chance to be here in this country. I’m going to buy your ticket right now. But first, I’m going to figure out our accounts.” And then she concluded that Peña Canal owed her a total of $15,000, of which only $7,000 had been worked off. On another occasion, when Peña Canal told Dann to send her home, Dann began to calculate the cost of clothes that she had purchased for Peña Canal.

你一个留在这个国家的机会。我现在就去给你买票。但首先，我要算算我们的账。”然后她得出结论，Peña Canal共欠她15,000美元，其中只有7,000美元已通过劳动偿还。另一次，当Peña Canal让Dann送她回家时，Dann开始计算她为Peña Canal购买衣物的费用。

Moreover, as the district court pointed out, Dann made Peña Canal sign a note stating that she had been paid mini­ mum wage. The district court found this fact persuasive:

此外，正如地区法院所指出的，Dann让Peña Canal签署了一份说明，称她已获得最低工资。地区法院认为这一事实具有说服力：

The jury could make three reasonable inferences from this note when considered in conjunction with Defendant’s false promises to pay Ms. Peña Canal and the debt Defendant imposed on Ms. Peña Canal: (1) Defendant had no intention of paying Ms. Peña Canal, (2) Defendant had a consciousness of guilt for not paying Ms. Peña Canal so she wanted to preserve the note to guard against any possible future charges and (3) Defendant wanted Ms. Peña Canal to be aware that Defendant would keep this note to deter her from trying to enforce her rights.

陪审团结合被告对Peña Canal女士的虚假付款承诺和被告强加给Peña Canal女士的债务，可以从这份说明中得出三项合理推论：(1) 被告无意支付Peña Canal女士，(2) 被告因未支付Peña Canal女士而有罪责意识，因此她想保留该说明以防将来任何可能的指控，以及(3) 被告想让Peña Canal女士知道被告会保留这份说明，以阻止她试图行使自己的权利。

Dann, 2009 WL 5062345, at *2. We agree.

Dann, 2009 WL 5062345, at *2。我们同意。

[2] We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that Dann intended Peña Canal to believe that Peña Canal would suffer financial harm and that that financial harm was “sufficiently serious” within the meaning of the statute. For an immigrant without access to a bank account and not a dollar to her name, a juror could con­ clude that the failure to pay her — and thus the lack of money to leave or live — was sufficiently serious to compel Peña Canal to continue working.

[2] 我们认定，有充分证据使理性陪审员认定Dann意图使Peña Canal相信Peña Canal将遭受经济伤害，且该经济伤害在该法规含义内“足够严重”。对于一名无法使用银行账户且身无分文的移民而言，陪审员可以认定，不支付其工资——因而没有钱离开或生活——足够严重，以至于迫使Peña Canal继续工作。

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9747

美国诉DANN案 9747

[3] Second, Dann argues that there was insufficient evi­ dence that Dann intended that Peña Canal believe that Peña Canal would suffer reputational harm if she were to leave. Again, Dann points out that Peña Canal never testified that Dann told her that she would call Peña Canal a thief if she left or that Dann would tell people back in Peru that she was untrustworthy. But here again, we are to draw every inference in favor of the guilty verdict.

[3] 其次，Dann主张，没有充分证据表明Dann意图使Peña Canal相信如果她离开将遭受名誉伤害。Dann再次指出，Peña Canal从未作证称Dann告诉过她如果她离开就会称她为小偷，或者Dann会告诉秘鲁的人们她不可信赖。但在此同样，我们应当作出有利于有罪判决的每一项推论。

[4] The jury heard evidence that Dann falsely accused Peña Canal of theft on four occasions. The jury could reason­ ably conclude that Dann intended Peña Canal to believe that she would in fact falsely accuse her when she left. And in fact that fear was realized: When Dann read Peña Canal’s letter, she told everyone within earshot at the school that Peña Canal was a thief who had robbed her and taken everything she had.

[4] 陪审团听取了证据，表明Dann四次虚假指控Peña Canal盗窃。陪审团可以合理认定，Dann意图使Peña Canal相信她离开时Dann事实上会虚假指控她。而且事实上这一恐惧成为了现实：当Dann读到Peña Canal的信时，她向学校里所有能听到的人说Peña Canal是个偷了她东西、拿走她所有财物的小偷。

[5] There was also evidence that Dann intended Peña Canal to fear immigration harm. As the Seventh Circuit artic­ ulated in Calimlim, a victim has fewer means of escape where the threats in her case involve immigration. 538 F.3d at 712 (noting that the immigrant victim “did not have an exit option: because the threats in her case involved her immigration sta­ tus, she could not freely work for another employer in order to escape the threatened harm.”).

[5] 还有证据表明Dann意图使Peña Canal害怕移民伤害。正如第七巡回法院在Calimlim案中所阐述的，当案件中的威胁涉及移民问题时，受害人的逃脱手段更少。538 F.3d at 712（指出该移民受害人“没有退出选项：因为她案件中的威胁涉及她的移民身份，她无法自由地为另一雇主工作以逃避所威胁的伤害。”）。

9748 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9748 美国诉DANN案

That threat alone — to be forced to leave the country — could constitute serious harm to an immigrant who came to the United States in part to study English and who dreamed of starting a business. See United States v. Djoumessi, 538 F.3d 547, 552 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that the defendant’s threats to send victim back to Cameroon were coercive in light of the victim’s special vulnerability as illegal immigrant). Dann also had custody of Peña Canal’s passport and Peruvian identifica­ tion; Peña Canal testified that she stayed in part because Dann held her papers. And in fact, when she did leave, the only request she made of Dann in her closing letter was the return of her Peruvian passport and identification.

仅该威胁——被迫离开该国——对于一名部分为学习英语来到美国并梦想创业的移民而言，就可能构成严重伤害。参见United States v. Djoumessi, 538 F.3d 547, 552 (6th Cir. 2008)（指出被告将受害人送回喀麦隆的威胁，鉴于受害人作为非法移民的特殊脆弱性，具有胁迫性）。Dann还保管着Peña Canal的护照和秘鲁身份证件；Peña Canal作证称她部分因为Dann持有她的文件而留下来。而且事实上，当她确实离开时，她在告别信中对Dann提出的唯一请求就是归还她的秘鲁护照和身份证件。

[7] Thus the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, suggests that Dann intended to inspire two related immigration fears in Peña Canal: that she would be forced to leave the country or that she would not be able to leave the country because she had no documents. Both threats are serious, and this exercise of control is further evidence of scienter. And in fact Dann used the word “escape” to describe Peña Canal’s eventual departure.

[7] 因此，以最有利于控方的角度审视证据，表明Dann意图在Peña Canal心中激起两种相关的移民恐惧：她将被强迫离开该国，或者她将因没有证件而无法离开该国。两种威胁都是严重的，这种控制行为是明知的进一步证据。而且事实上Dann用“逃脱”一词来描述Peña Canal最终的离开。

[8] Finally, there was evidence to suggest that Dann intended Peña Canal to fear what would happen to the chil­ dren if she were to leave. Such a fear is squarely within the intent of Congress, which enacted § 1589 to address “traffick­ ers [who] use more subtle means designed to cause their vic­ tims to believe that serious harm will result to themselves or others if they leave, as when a nanny is led to believe that the

[8] 最后，有证据表明Dann意图使Peña Canal害怕如果她离开孩子们会怎样。这种恐惧完全在国会的意图范围内，国会颁布§ 1589是为了应对“贩运者使用更隐蔽的手段，旨在使受害人相信如果她们离开将对自己或他人造成严重伤害，例如使保姆相信她

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9749

美国诉DANN案 9749

children in her care will be harmed if she leaves the home.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 101 (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).

照看的孩子们如果她离开家将受到伤害。”H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 101 (Conf. Rep.)（着重号为原文所加）。

You shouldn’t — you shouldn’t think that I’m treat­ ing you like a slave, you shouldn’t think that I’m treating you like a slave. I’m going to pay you. I don’t want for you to leave me because I don’t know what would happen to my children. Where would I keep them? The government would take them from me.

你不应该——你不应该认为我把你当奴隶对待，你不应该认为我把你当奴隶对待。我会付钱给你的。我不想让你离开我，因为我不知道我的孩子们会怎样。我把他们留在哪里？政府会把他们从我身边带走。

There are two reasonable interpretations: Dann may have been apologizing for not paying Peña Canal and pleading with her to stay so that she would not lose her children. Alterna­ tively, Dann may have been threatening that the children would suffer if Peña Canal were to leave — exactly the type of coercion that Congress envisioned. Again, drawing all inferences in favor of the verdict, we must assume that the jury came to the latter conclusion. A juror could conclude that a reasonable person in Peña Canal’s position — that is, a nanny who had cared for three boys from infancy — would feel compelled to stay on account of such a threat.

有两种合理的解释：Dann可能一直在为未支付Peña Canal工资而道歉，并恳求她留下来，以免她失去孩子。另一种可能是，Dann可能一直在威胁说，如果Peña Canal离开，孩子们将遭受痛苦——这正是国会所设想的那种胁迫。再次，以有利于判决的方式推断一切，我们必须假定陪审团得出了后一种结论。陪审员可以得出结论，一个处于Peña Canal地位的理性人——即一个从婴儿期起照顾三个男孩的保姆——会因这样的威胁而感到被迫留下来。

[10] In sum, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Dann intended to cause Peña Canal to believe that she would suffer financial, reputational, and immigration harms, as well as cause harm to Dann’s children. Such a juror could further conclude that the sum of these threatened harms would have compelled a reasonable person in Peña Canal’s position to continue to work for Dann. Having determined that there was sufficient evidence to support Dann’s conviction for forced labor, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Dann’s Rule 35(a) motion on this ground.

[10] 总之，一个理性的陪审员可以得出结论，Dann意图使Peña Canal相信她将遭受经济、声誉和移民方面的伤害，并导致Dann的孩子们受到伤害。这样的陪审员还可以进一步得出结论，这些威胁性伤害的总和会迫使一个处于Peña Canal地位的理性人继续为Dann工作。在确定有足够证据支持Dann强迫劳动定罪后，我们维持地区法院基于此理由驳回Dann规则35(a)动议的裁定。

9750 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9750 美国诉DANN案

[11] Dann also challenges her conviction for document servitude, which arises out of her forced labor conviction. Document servitude occurs where a defendant “knowingly . . . conceals, removes, confiscates, or possesses any actual or purported passport or other immigration document . . . of another person . . . in the course of” trafficking, peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude or forced labor. 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a)(1). The district court instructed the jury on the three elements of this crime as follows:

[11] Dann还质疑其文件奴役定罪，该定罪源于其强迫劳动定罪。文件奴役发生在被告“在”贩运、劳役偿债、奴役、非自愿奴役或强迫劳动“过程中，明知……隐藏、移除、没收或持有他人的任何实际或 purported 护照或其他移民文件……”。18 U.S.C. § 1592(a)(1)。地区法院就本罪的三个要素对陪审团指示如下：

First, Ms. Dann concealed, removed, confiscated, or possessed Ms. Peña Canal’s passport or other immi­ gration document or government identification docu­ ment. Second, such acts were undertaken in the course of committing or with the intent to commit the crime of forced labor. Third, that Ms. Dann acted knowingly in doing such an act or acts.

第一，Dann女士隐藏、移除、没收或持有Peña Canal女士的护照或其他移民文件或政府身份证明文件。第二，此类行为是在实施或意图实施强迫劳动罪的过程中进行的。第三，Dann女士在实施此类行为时是明知的。

Dann challenges the second element.

Dann质疑第二个要素。

Dann first argues that there was insufficient evidence that she had any intent to commit forced labor, an argument we have already rejected. Second, Dann argues that even if she had the intent to commit forced labor, she did not keep Peña Canal’s documents in order to commit that offense. She notes that Peña Canal testified that she gave her documents to Dann because she did not have any safe place to put them; she did not testify that she looked for the documents or that she asked Dann to give them back to her. Indeed, this case stands in contrast to other document servitude cases where the pass­ ports were kept in a locked drawer, or where an employer confiscated documents upon arrival. See, e.g., United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 245 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 376-77 (8th Cir. 2009).

Dann首先辩称，没有足够证据表明她有任何实施强迫劳动的意图，这一论点我们已驳回。其次，Dann辩称，即使她有实施强迫劳动的意图，她保留Peña Canal的文件也不是为了实施该罪行。她指出，Peña Canal作证说，她把文件交给Dann是因为她没有安全的地方存放；她没有作证说寻找过文件或要求Dann归还。事实上，本案与其他文件奴役案件形成对比，那些案件中护照被保存在上锁的抽屉里，或雇主在抵达时没收文件。参见，例如，美国诉Sabhnani案，599 F.3d 215, 245 (2d Cir. 2010)；美国诉Farrell案，563 F.3d 364, 376-77 (8th Cir. 2009)。

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9751

美国诉DANN案 9751

up. 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a). Here, the jury heard evidence that when the police asked Dann for the papers on Peña Canal’s behalf, she claimed that she did not have them. They heard evidence that the documents were ultimately found alongside the note about minimum wage, buried under clothes in a drawer.

起来。18 U.S.C. § 1592(a)。在此，陪审团听取了证据，当警察代表Peña Canal向Dann索要文件时，她声称她没有这些文件。他们听取了证据，这些文件最终与关于最低工资的纸条一起被发现，埋在抽屉里的衣服下面。

Again, there are two stories. Dann may have kept the pass­ port for safe keeping and may have genuinely believed that she did not have it when the police asked. Alternatively, she may have hid the passport in a place where Peña Canal likely would not have found it, along with the false minimum wage note, in order to prevent Peña Canal from leaving. Construing all inferences in favor of the verdict, we must assume the lat­ ter. A rational juror could have concluded that Dann pos­ sessed and concealed Peña Canal’s passport as part of her plan to cause Peña Canal to believe that she could not leave, or that she would suffer serious harm if she did.

再次，有两种说法。Dann可能为了安全保管而保留了护照，并且可能真的相信当警察询问时她没有护照。或者，她可能将护照藏在一个Peña Canal不太可能找到的地方，连同虚假的最低工资纸条，以防止Peña Canal离开。以有利于判决的方式推断一切，我们必须假定后一种情况。一个理性的陪审员可以得出结论，Dann持有并隐藏Peña Canal的护照，作为其计划的一部分，以使Peña Canal相信她不能离开，或者如果她离开将遭受严重伤害。

Finally, Dann challenges her conviction for alien harboring for financial gain. The district court instructed the jury that to convict Dann on this count, it had to find:

最后，Dann质疑其为经济利益窝藏外国人的定罪。地区法院指示陪审团，要判定Dann在此罪名上有罪，必须认定：

First, that Ms. Peña Canal was an alien. Second, Ms. Peña Canal had come to, entered, or remained unlawfully in the United States. Third, Ms. Dann knew or was in reckless disregard of the fact that Ms. Peña Canal had come to, entered, or remained unlawfully in the United States. Fourth, Ms. Dann concealed, harbored, or shielded Ms. Peña Canal for the purpose of avoiding Ms. Peña Canal’s detection

第一，Peña Canal女士是外国人。第二，Peña Canal女士非法来到、进入或留在美国。第三，Dann女士知道或罔顾Peña Canal女士非法来到、进入或留在美国的事实。第四，Dann女士隐藏、窝藏或庇护Peña Canal女士，目的是避免Peña Canal女士被

9752 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9752 美国诉DANN案

by the immigration authorities. And fifth, Ms. Dann concealed, harbored, or shielded Ms. Peña Canal for the purpose of private financial gain.

移民当局发现。第五，Dann女士隐藏、窝藏或庇护Peña Canal女士，目的是为了私人经济利益。

Dann challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the fourth element.

Dann质疑第四个要素的证据充分性。

As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree as to whether the government had to prove that Dann harbored Peña Canal to prevent detection by immigration authorities. The govern­ ment argues that according to United States v. Acosta de Evans, harboring does not require that the defendant actively take steps to hide the alien from immigration authorities; it is sufficient that the defendant provided the alien with shelter for financial gain. 531 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1976).

作为初步事项，双方对政府是否必须证明Dann窝藏Peña Canal以防止移民当局发现存在分歧。政府辩称，根据美国诉Acosta de Evans案，窝藏不要求被告积极采取措施向移民当局隐藏外国人；被告为经济利益向外国人提供住所即足够。531 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1976)。

[14] Although the government is correct, the jury was instructed on a different standard: specifically, it was asked whether “Ms. Dann concealed, harbored, or shielded Ms. Peña Canal for the purpose of avoiding Ms. Peña Canal’s detection by the immigration authorities.” To convict Dann, according to this instruction, the jury had to find that she expressly shielded her from immigration authorities, not just that she gave her shelter. Dann argues, and we agree, that this Court is bound by that instruction. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980) (“We cannot affirm a crimi­ nal conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury.”); McCormick, 500 U.S. at 270 n.8.

[14] 尽管政府是正确的，但陪审团被指示适用不同的标准：具体而言，他们被问及“Dann女士是否隐藏、窝藏或庇护Peña Canal女士，目的是避免Peña Canal女士被移民当局发现。”根据这一指示，要判定Dann有罪，陪审团必须认定她明确庇护她免受移民当局发现，而不仅仅是提供住所。Dann辩称，并且我们同意，本法院受该指示约束。参见Chiarella诉美国案，445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980)（“我们不能基于未向陪审团提出的理论维持刑事定罪。”）；McCormick案，500 U.S. at 270 n.8。

The district court found, based on this standard, that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Dann shielded Peña Canal for the purpose of avoiding detec­ tion by immigration authorities. Dann restricted Peña Canal’s movement and forbade her from speaking to anyone outside the home. Dann even asked the manager of the apartment complex to tell the Spanish-speaking staff not to talk to Peña Canal. Dann repeatedly reminded Peña Canal of her illegal status and asked if Peña Canal was “scared” when she talked

地区法院基于这一标准认定，有足够证据让理性陪审员得出结论，Dann庇护Peña Canal是为了避免移民当局发现。Dann限制Peña Canal的行动，并禁止她与家外任何人交谈。Dann甚至要求公寓经理告诉讲西班牙语的员工不要与Peña Canal交谈。Dann反复提醒Peña Canal她的非法身份，并在Peña Canal与

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9753

美国诉DANN案 9753

to a police officer. Whenever Peña Canal came into the house, Dann or her mother would ask if she had spoken to anyone.

警察交谈时问她是否“害怕”。每当Peña Canal进入房子，Dann或她的母亲都会问她是否与任何人交谈过。

[15] Dann contends that this story is more consistent with someone who did not want her good employee to be poached. That interpretation is plausible, but it is not the only one. The same evidence suggests that Dann was harboring Peña Canal from immigration authorities. And that inference is more plausible given the fact that Dann, herself, was implicated in the visa fraud.

[15] Dann争辩说，这个故事更符合一个不想自己好员工被挖走的人。这种解释是合理的，但不是唯一的。同样的证据表明Dann窝藏Peña Canal以躲避移民当局。而且，鉴于Dann本人也卷入了签证欺诈，这一推断更为合理。

[16] We conclude therefore that there was sufficient evi­ dence to support Dann’s conviction for alien harboring for financial gain, and AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Dann’s Rule 35(a) motion on this final claim.

[16] 因此，我们得出结论，有足够证据支持Dann为经济利益窝藏外国人的定罪，并维持地区法院基于这一最终主张驳回Dann规则35(a)动议的裁定。

In addition to challenging her conviction, Dann challenges the district court’s sentencing guideline calculation and the restitution order that required her to sign over to the victim any payments made by her ex-husband toward accrued child support.

除了质疑其定罪外，Dann还质疑地区法院的量刑指南计算和赔偿令，该命令要求她将前夫支付的任何子女抚养费款项签署转让给受害者。

I. Standard of Review

I. 审查标准

This Court reviews “the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of a case for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Grissom, 525 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A res­ titution order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, provided that it is within the bounds of the statutory framework. Fac­ tual findings supporting an order of restitution are reviewed for clear error. The legality of an order of restitution is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Foreman, 329 F.3d 1037,

本法院“对地区法院对量刑指南的解释进行重新审查，对地区法院将量刑指南适用于案件事实进行滥用自由裁量权审查，对地区法院的事实认定进行明显错误审查。”美国诉Grissom案，525 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2008)（内部引号和引文省略）。“赔偿令在法定框架范围内进行滥用自由裁量权审查。支持赔偿令的事实认定进行明显错误审查。赔偿令的合法性进行重新审查。”美国诉Foreman案，329 F.3d 1037,

9754 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9754 美国诉DANN案

1039 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

1039 (9th Cir. 2003)（内部引号和引文省略）。

II. Discussion

II. 讨论

The district court accepted the Guidelines calculation in Dann’s Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), which calculated Dann’s offense at a base level of 27, her criminal history as Category I, with the resulting Guidelines prison range of 70 to 87 months. The probation officer recommended, and the court agreed, to a prison term of 60 months under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, based on her behavioral and mental health issues.

地区法院接受了Dann量刑前报告（“PSR”）中的指南计算，该计算将Dann的犯罪基础等级定为27，犯罪历史为第一类， resulting 指南监禁范围为70至87个月。缓刑官建议，法院同意，根据18 U.S.C. § 3553，基于她的行为和精神健康问题，判处60个月监禁。

Dann argues on appeal that the district court erred in apply­ ing the following Guidelines enhancements to her sentence: for visa fraud, a four-level enhancement for committing visa fraud with reason to believe that the visa would be used to facilitate a felony; and for forced labor, a three-level enhance­ ment for holding a victim in document servitude for over a year and a two-level enhancement for committing a felony (visa fraud) in connection with forced labor. We consider each in turn.

Dann在上诉中辩称，地区法院在对其刑罚适用以下指南增强时犯了错误：对于签证欺诈，因有理由相信签证将用于促进重罪而增加四级；对于强迫劳动，因使受害者处于文件奴役状态超过一年而增加三级，以及因与强迫劳动相关的重罪（签证欺诈）而增加二级。我们依次考虑每一项。

Visa fraud falls under § 2L2.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which governs “Trafficking in a Docu­ ment Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship, or Legal Resi­ dent Status, or a United States Passport; False Statement in Respect to the Citizenship or Immigration Status of Anoth­ er[.]” The base offense level under this Guideline is eleven

签证欺诈属于《美国量刑指南手册》§ 2L2.1，该节管辖“贩运与归化、公民身份或合法居民身份相关的文件，或美国护照；关于他人公民身份或移民身份的虚假陈述[.]”该指南下的基础犯罪等级为十一级

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9755

美国诉DANN案 9755

and includes an enhancement of four levels “[i]f the defendant knew, believed, or had reason to believe that a passport or visa was to be used to facilitate the commission of a felony offense, other than an offense involving violation of the immi­ gration laws.” U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1(b)(3). In the PSR, the proba­ tion officer reasoned that “the defendant had reason to believe that the visa would facilitate her conduct that rose to a felony, unlawful conduct regarding documents in furtherance of ser­ vitude.” Dann argues that the trial court erred in imposing this enhancement because the crime of document servitude — identified by the probation officer — is “an offense involving violation of the immigration laws” and is thus excepted by the clear language of the Guidelines.

并且包含四级的加重，“[如果]被告人知道、相信或有理由相信护照或签证将被用于便利实施重罪，而非涉及违反移民法的罪行。” U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1(b)(3)。在PSR中，缓刑官推理认为“被告人有理由相信签证将便利其行为，该行为达到重罪程度，即涉及文件以促进奴役的非法行为。” Dann辩称，初审法院施加这一加重情节是错误的，因为缓刑官所指的文件奴役罪是“涉及违反移民法的罪行”，因此被《指南》的明确语言所排除。

We need not reach this argument. Dann’s base offense level of 27 was driven by the forced labor offense and not visa fraud. An enhancement on visa fraud would not affect the Guideline range, and therefore any error would be harmless.

我们无需触及这一论点。Dann的27级基础犯罪等级是由强迫劳动罪而非签证欺诈驱动的。对签证欺诈的加重不会影响《指南》范围，因此任何错误都是无害的。

Cf. United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2011).

参见 United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2011)。

[17] Next, Dann challenges the Guideline enhancements to her base offense level on the forced labor conviction. Sentenc­ ing for forced labor is governed by § 2H4.1 of the U.S. Sen­ tencing Guidelines Manual, for “Peonage, Involuntary Servitude, Slave Trade, and Child Soldiers.” The base level is 22. The offense may be subject to a three-level enhancement “[i]f any victim was held in a condition of peonage or invol­ untary servitude for [ ] more than one year,” U.S.S.G.

[17] 接下来，Dann对强迫劳动定罪的基础犯罪等级的《指南》加重情节提出质疑。强迫劳动的量刑受《美国量刑指南手册》§ 2H4.1管辖，针对“劳役偿债、非自愿奴役、奴隶贸易和儿童兵”。基础等级为22。如果“任何受害者被置于劳役偿债或非自愿奴役状态超过一年”，该罪行可受三级加重，U.S.S.G.

9756 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9756 UNITED STATES v. DANN

§ 2H4.1(b)(3),

§ 2H4.1(b)(3)，

8 and an additional two-level enhancement “[i]f any other felony offense was committed during the commis­ sion of, or in connection with, the peonage or involuntary ser­ vitude offense,” id. § 2H4.1(b)(4). Here, the district court applied both of these enhancements over Dann’s objections.

8以及额外的两级加重，“[如果]在劳役偿债或非自愿奴役罪行的实施期间或与之相关，实施了任何其他重罪”，同上 § 2H4.1(b)(4)。在此，地区法院不顾Dann的反对适用了这两项加重情节。

This Court reviews a district court’s factual findings in sup­ port of a sentencing enhancement for clear error. United States v. Rivera-Alonzo, 584 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “Reversal for clear error requires a definite and firm conviction that the district court made a mistake.” Rodriguez v. United States, 542 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

本法院以明显错误标准审查地区法院支持量刑加重情节的事实认定。United States v. Rivera-Alonzo, 584 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2009)（引用省略）。“因明显错误而撤销需要明确而坚定的信念，即地区法院犯了错误。” Rodriguez v. United States, 542 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir. 2008)（内部引号和引用省略）。

Dann argues that the evidence before the district court failed to show that she had held Peña Canal in forced labor for more than one year, or from at least April 15, 2007 until her escape on April 16, 2008. She contends that the evidence supported forced labor for a much shorter period. The govern­ ment’s closing argument focused on the beginning of 2008 when Dann’s conduct was at its worst. And in fact, the jury asked whether the charge of forced labor had to apply to the entire duration of Peña Canal’s service. The question may suggest that the jury believed that Peña Canal was not subject to forced labor for the entire time that she resided with Dann.

Dann辩称，地区法院面前的证据未能显示她使Peña Canal处于强迫劳动超过一年，或至少从2007年4月15日至2008年4月16日她逃跑。她主张证据支持的强迫劳动时间要短得多。政府的结案陈词集中在2008年初，当时Dann的行为最为恶劣。事实上，陪审团曾询问强迫劳动指控是否必须适用于Peña Canal服务的整个期间。这个问题可能表明陪审团认为Peña Canal并非在她与Dann同住的整个期间都遭受强迫劳动。

To be sure, the government’s evidence indicated that the worst of Dann’s bad behavior occurred in or after January 2008. It was at that time that Dann told Peña Canal that she owed $15,000. Thereafter, Dann became increasingly control­ ling and abusive, ultimately physically accosting Peña Canal. Dann then forced Peña Canal to sign the “agreement” stating that she had been paid minimum wage.

诚然，政府的证据表明Dann最恶劣的行为发生在2008年1月或之后。正是在那时，Dann告诉Peña Canal她欠15,000美元。此后，Dann变得越来越控制和虐待，最终对Peña Canal进行人身攻击。然后Dann强迫Peña Canal签署“协议”，声明她已获得最低工资。

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9757

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9757

Nevertheless, there was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Peña Canal was subject to forced labor prior to April 2007. She tes­ tified that Dann began to restrict her movement by January of 2007 and forbade her from leaving the apartment without her permission. She told Peña Canal not to “talk to anybody, not to reveal anything about us, don’t tell anybody anything.” Dann even told the property manager of the apartment com­ plex to order Spanish-speaking personnel not to talk with Peña Canal.

尽管如此，初审法官有充分证据以优势证据认定Peña Canal在2007年4月之前遭受强迫劳动。她作证说Dann在2007年1月开始限制她的行动，并禁止她未经许可离开公寓。她告诉Peña Canal不要“和任何人说话，不要透露关于我们的任何事情，不要告诉任何人任何事情。”Dann甚至告诉公寓楼的物业经理命令讲西班牙语的人员不要与Peña Canal交谈。

Sometime in the winter of 2007, Dann also began restrict­ ing Peña Canal’s food intake, forbidding her from eating fruit and drinking tea without permission and eventually weighing the meat and counting the eggs and bread. It was in February of 2007 that Dann told Peña Canal:

2007年冬天的某个时候，Dann也开始限制Peña Canal的食物摄入，禁止她未经许可吃水果和喝茶，最终称肉和数鸡蛋和面包。正是在2007年2月，Dann告诉Peña Canal：

You shouldn’t — you shouldn’t think that I’m treat­ ing you like a slave, you shouldn’t think that I’m treating you like a slave. I’m going to pay you. I don’t want for you to leave me because I don’t know what would happen to my children. Where would I keep them? The government would take them from me.

你不应该——你不应该认为我在把你当奴隶对待，你不应该认为我在把你当奴隶对待。我会付钱给你的。我不想让你离开我，因为我不知道我的孩子们会怎样。我把他们留在哪里？政府会把他们从我身边带走。

The district court could have reasonably concluded that Dann already knew the implications of her conduct with Peña Canal — that she was in fact treating her like a slave. By April of 2007, Peña Canal had already foregone eight months in unpaid wages that she risked losing if she were to leave.

地区法院可以合理推断Dann已经知道她对Peña Canal行为的影响——她实际上在把她当奴隶对待。到2007年4月，Peña Canal已经放弃了八个月的无薪工资，如果她离开，她将面临失去这些工资的风险。

[18] We conclude that the district court did not clearly err when it found that Peña Canal had been held in forced labor for over one year and therefore AFFIRM the district court’s Guideline enhancement.

[18] 我们认定，地区法院在认定Peña Canal被置于强迫劳动超过一年时没有明显错误，因此维持地区法院的《指南》加重情节。

Finally, Dann challenges the sentencing enhancement for committing another felony “during the commission of, or in

最后，Dann对根据《美国量刑指南手册》§ 2H4.1(b)(4)在强迫劳动“实施期间或与之相关”实施另一重罪的量刑加重情节提出质疑。地区法院采纳了PSR，该PSR建议Dann实施了与强迫劳动相关的签证欺诈重罪。Dann辩称，在她实施签证欺诈时，她没有实施强迫劳动的意图。她主张这些罪行完全无关。

9758 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9758 UNITED STATES v. DANN

connection with” forced labor under § 2H4.1(b)(4) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The district court adopted the PSR, which suggested that Dann committed the felony of visa fraud in connection with the forced labor. Dann argues that at the time that she committed visa fraud, she had no intention of committing forced labor. These crimes, she argues, are entirely unrelated.

根据《美国量刑指南手册》§ 2H4.1(b)(4)，与强迫劳动“相关”。地区法院采纳了PSR，该PSR建议Dann实施了与强迫劳动相关的签证欺诈重罪。Dann辩称，在她实施签证欺诈时，她没有实施强迫劳动的意图。她主张这些罪行完全无关。

If any other felony offense was committed during the commission of, or in connection with, the peonage or involuntary servitude offense, increase to the greater of:

如果在劳役偿债或非自愿奴役罪行的实施期间或与之相关，实施了任何其他重罪，增加至以下较高者：

(A) 2 plus the offense level as determined above, or

(A) 2加上上述确定的犯罪等级，或

(B) 2 plus the offense guideline applicable to that other offense, but in no event greater than level 43.

(B) 2加上适用于该其他罪行的犯罪指南，但无论如何不超过43级。

The first step in our analysis is to determine what it means to commit a crime “in connection with” forced labor under § 2H4.1(b)(4). This is a matter of first impression, as the com­ mentary in this section does not define the term and no court has interpreted the language of this enhancement.

我们分析的第一步是确定根据§ 2H4.1(b)(4)实施“与”强迫劳动“相关”的犯罪意味着什么。这是一个首次印象问题，因为该节的注释没有定义该术语，也没有法院解释过这一加重情节的语言。

There is, however, an analogous provision in the offense guideline for unlawful possession of a firearm, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6):

然而，在非法持有枪支的犯罪指南U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)中有一个类似的规定：

If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connec­ tion with another felony offense, increase by 4 levels.

如果被告人使用或持有任何枪支或弹药与另一重罪相关；或持有或转让任何枪支或弹药，知道、意图或有理由相信它将与另一重罪相关使用或持有，增加4级。

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9759

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9759

(emphasis added). The commentary of § 2K2.1(b)(6) states that possession of a firearm “in connection with” another fel­ ony applies “if the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense or another offense, respectively.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. 14.

（强调添加）。§ 2K2.1(b)(6)的注释规定，持有枪支“与”另一重罪“相关”适用“如果枪支或弹药便利了，或有潜力便利另一重罪或另一罪行，分别。” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. 14。

Clearly, the drafters must be held to define terms consis­ tently throughout the Guidelines. Thus “in connection with” must mean facilitation. In the forced labor context, a felony is committed “in connection with” forced labor where that crime facilitates or has the potential of facilitating forced labor — or conversely where forced labor facilitates or has the potential of facilitating another felony offense. In this case, it is clear that the visa fraud facilitated the forced labor. Indeed, as we have explained, Dann used Peña Canal’s illegal immigration status to intimidate her, to cause her to fear deportation or to fear the risk of leaving without documenta­ tion. This evidence is sufficient to show that Dann committed forced labor in connection with visa fraud.

显然，起草者必须在整个《指南》中一致地定义术语。因此“与……相关”必须意味着便利。在强迫劳动背景下，重罪“与”强迫劳动“相关”实施，是指该犯罪便利了或有潜力便利强迫劳动——或者反过来，强迫劳动便利了或有潜力便利另一重罪。在本案中，很明显签证欺诈便利了强迫劳动。事实上，正如我们已经解释的，Dann利用Peña Canal的非法移民身份来恐吓她，使她害怕被驱逐出境或害怕无证件离开的风险。这一证据足以表明Dann实施了与签证欺诈相关的强迫劳动。

Dann, however, suggests that according to our holding in United States v. Jimison, “in connection with” requires an additional element of intent. 493 F.3d 1148, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007). She argues that the enhancement applies only where the defendant commits the first felony (either forced labor or the other crime) with the intent to commit the other. This argument is unavailing. In Jimison, we interpreted the second half of § 2K2.1(b)(6)— the enhancement that applies where a defendant “possessed or transferred any firearm or ammuni­ tion with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6). We held that, to prove the application of this enhancement, the government must provide sufficient evidence that when the defendant came into posses­ sion of the firearm, he had a “firm intent” to use it to commit a felony. Jimison, 493 F.3d at 1149. The intent requirement was drawn directly from the language of the enhancement (requiring “knowledge, intent, or reason to believe”). There is

然而，Dann建议，根据我们在United States v. Jimison中的裁决，“与……相关”需要额外的意图要素。493 F.3d 1148, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)。她主张，加重情节仅适用于被告人实施第一重罪（强迫劳动或其他犯罪）时具有实施另一犯罪的意图。这一论点没有说服力。在Jimison中，我们解释了§ 2K2.1(b)(6)的后半部分——适用于被告人“持有或转让任何枪支或弹药，知道、意图或有理由相信它将与另一重罪相关使用或持有”的加重情节。U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)。我们认定，为证明这一加重情节的适用，政府必须提供充分证据，证明当被告人获得枪支时，他有“坚定的意图”用它实施重罪。Jimison, 493 F.3d at 1149。意图要求直接来自加重情节的语言（要求“知道、意图或有理由相信”）。没有

9760 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9760 UNITED STATES v. DANN

no comparable intent language in the forced labor Guideline under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, and we cannot read intent into the provision.

在U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1下的强迫劳动指南中没有类似的意图语言，我们不能将意图读入该规定。

[20] We conclude therefore that a felony is committed “in connection with” forced labor where it facilitates or is facili­ tated by the offense of forced labor. And because in this case visa fraud facilitated Dann’s commission of forced labor, the district court’s Guideline enhancement is AFFIRMED.

[20] 因此我们认定，重罪“与”强迫劳动“相关”实施，是指它便利了或被强迫劳动罪行便利。并且由于在本案中签证欺诈便利了Dann实施强迫劳动，地区法院的《指南》加重情节被维持。

Finally, we turn to the district court’s restitution order. At sentencing, the Court ordered Dann to pay $123,740.34 in res­ titution and required that “any payments made by [Dann’s ex- husband] toward back child support that he owes shall be signed over to the victim as payment towards restitution.” Dann filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce­ dure 35(a) to correct the sentence on the grounds that the dis­ trict court erred when it ordered accrued child support to be paid to Peña Canal. The district court denied the Rule 35(a) motion.

最后，我们转向地区法院的赔偿令。在量刑时，法院命令Dann支付123,740.34美元的赔偿金，并要求“其前夫所欠的、由其支付的任何子女抚养费欠款，均应签署转让给受害人，作为赔偿金的支付。”Dann根据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》35(a)提出动议，要求更正量刑，理由是地区法院命令将累积的子女抚养费支付给Peña Canal属于错误。地区法院驳回了该35(a)动议。

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9761

美国诉DANN案 9761

On appeal, Dann argues that the district court erred by assigning a debt that did not belong to Dann but rather to her minor children, who are now sixteen, ten, and ten years old respectively. This Court reviews legal issues regarding a resti­ tution order de novo. Foreman, 329 F.3d at 1039.

在上诉中，Dann主张地区法院将一笔不属于Dann而属于其未成年子女（现分别为十六岁、十岁和十岁）的债务予以分配，属于错误。本法院对有关赔偿令的法律问题进行重新审查。Foreman, 329 F.3d at 1039。

[21] The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act requires that a district court consider three factors before ordering restitu­ tion: “(A) the financial resources and other assets of the defendant, including whether any of these assets are jointly controlled; (B) projected earnings and other income of the defendant; and (C) any financial obligations of the defendant; including obligations to dependents.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)(A)-(C). Any restitution order under this section may be enforced only as against property that is the defen­ dant’s own according to the relevant state law. See, e.g., United States v. Berger, 574 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Ramirez, 795 F.2d 1494, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The determination of child support rights is a matter of state statu­ tory and common law.”), superseded by statute as recognized in In re Leibowitz, 217 F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir. 2000).

[21]《强制性受害人赔偿法》要求地区法院在下令赔偿前考虑三个因素：“(A)被告的财务资源和其他资产，包括这些资产中是否有任何资产受共同控制；(B)被告的预期收入和其他收入；以及(C)被告的任何财务义务，包括对受抚养人的义务。”18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)(A)-(C)。根据该条作出的任何赔偿令，只能针对根据相关州法律属于被告本人的财产执行。参见，例如，United States v. Berger, 574 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2009)；In re Ramirez, 795 F.2d 1494, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986)（“子女抚养权的确定属于州成文法和普通法事项。”），该案被成文法取代，如In re Leibowitz, 217 F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir. 2000)所确认。

[22] The question before the Court is whether child sup­ port arrearages belong to Dann such that they may be assigned to the victim by a restitution order, or whether the arrearage actually belongs to her children. This is a matter of first impression.

[22]本法院面临的问题是，子女抚养费欠款是否属于Dann，从而可以通过赔偿令分配给受害人，还是该欠款实际上属于她的子女。这是一个首次印象问题。

9762 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9762 美国诉DANN案

As a general rule, a parent’s obligation to pay child support runs to the child, rather than to the other parent, and “the par­ ent, to whom such support is paid, is but a mere conduit for the disbursement of that support.” Williams v. Williams, 8 Cal. App. 3d 636, 640 (1970). Indeed, the equities between the parents do not alter the child support obligation. Comer, 14 Cal. 4th 504, 516 (1996).

作为一般规则，父母支付子女抚养费的义务是向子女而非向另一方父母承担的，“接受该抚养费支付的父母，不过是该抚养费 disbursement 的纯粹通道。”Williams v. Williams, 8 Cal. App. 3d 636, 640 (1970)。事实上，父母之间的衡平并不改变子女抚养义务。Comer, 14 Cal. 4th 504, 516 (1996)。

We acknowledge California authority recognizing that when a custodial parent has expended her own resources, she may recover the accrued child support for her own benefit, and that that right of reimbursement may be assigned in cer­ tain circumstances. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Utigard, 126 Cal. App. 3d 133, 141-42 (1981)); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11477(a) (requiring the assignment of child support arrear- ages to the state where the state has dispersed cash assistance to the child).

我们认可加利福尼亚州的权威判例，即当监护父母支出了自己的资源时，她可以为自己的利益追回累积的子女抚养费，且该补偿权在某些情况下可以转让。参见，例如，In re Marriage of Utigard, 126 Cal. App. 3d 133, 141-42 (1981))；Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11477(a)（要求在该州已向子女发放现金援助的情况下，将子女抚养费欠款转让给该州）。

The California Supreme Court holdings in In re Marriage of Damico and Comer, however, suggest that even the assign­ able right of reimbursement to the custodial parent is super- ceded if reimbursement is sought when the children are minors. In re Marriage of Damico, 7 Cal. 4th 673 (1994); Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 516. For example, the Damico court held that a custodial parent is estopped from bringing a claim for accrued child support if she concealed the children from the non-custodial parent when the children were minors. Damico, 7 Cal. 4th at 684-85. In Comer, however, this hold­ ing was limited to cases where the custodial parent brings a suit after the children have reached majority. 14 Cal. 4th at 516. A custodial parent may sue for accrued child support even if she previously concealed the child, so long as the child is not yet an adult. Id. Comer thus seems to suggest that accrued payments belong to the child until adulthood.

然而，加利福尼亚州最高法院在In re Marriage of Damico和Comer案中的判决表明，即使在子女未成年时寻求补偿，监护父母可转让的补偿权也会被取代。In re Marriage of Damico, 7 Cal. 4th 673 (1994)；Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 516。例如，Damico法院认定，如果监护父母在子女未成年时向非监护父母隐瞒子女，则监护父母被禁止提出累积子女抚养费索赔。Damico, 7 Cal. 4th at 684-85。然而，在Comer案中，该判决被限定于监护父母在子女成年后提起诉讼的案件。14 Cal. 4th at 516。监护父母即使此前隐瞒了子女，只要子女尚未成年，仍可以就累积子女抚养费提起诉讼。Id. 因此，Comer似乎表明，累积的付款在子女成年之前属于子女。

The Comer court explained that

Comer法院解释道：

[t]his distinction [regarding the child’s age] is a sig­ nificant one, because, in contrast to most adults, chil­

[这一关于子女年龄的区分]是一个重要的区分，因为与大多数成年人不同，子

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9763

美国诉DANN案 9763

dren (particularly those in their early years) in fairness cannot be expected to raise themselves and pursue an education without the financial support of responsible adults . . . The child’s need for suste­ nance must be the paramount consideration.

女（尤其是年幼子女）公平而言不能指望在没有负责任的成年人的经济支持下自我抚养并追求教育……子女对抚养的需求必须是首要考虑。

Id. at 516 (quotation marks and citation omitted). If child sup­ port has not been paid for a period of time, it is likely that the child’s needs were met at only a minimal level. Id. at 517-18. Thus, a child may have accrued needs, including educational expenses or cultural opportunities, that may be met by an accrued child support payment, and these needs trump the custodial parent’s entitlement to reimbursement.

Id. at 516（引号和引注省略）。如果子女抚养费在一段时间内未支付，子女的需求很可能仅以最低水平得到满足。Id. at 517-18。因此，子女可能有累积的需求，包括教育费用或文化机会，这些需求可以通过累积的子女抚养费付款得到满足，而这些需求优先于监护父母的补偿权。

[23] Read together, Damico and Comer suggest that so long as the children have not reached majority, a custodial parent remains the “conduit” for child support — even accrued child support. We therefore conclude that under Cali­ fornia law, a creditor (in this case a crime victim with a resti­ tution order) is not entitled to accrued child support payments owed to a custodial parent of children who have not yet reached the age of majority.

[23]综合解读，Damico和Comer表明，只要子女尚未成年，监护父母仍然是子女抚养费——甚至是累积子女抚养费——的“通道”。因此，我们得出结论：根据加利福尼亚州法律，债权人（在本案中为持有赔偿令的犯罪受害人）无权获得欠尚未达到成年年龄子女的监护父母的累积子女抚养费付款。

In re Estate of Spirtos, 443 F.3d 1172, 1177 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006), is not to the contrary. In a footnote, this Court noted that “[u]nder California law, ‘the custodial parent, not the child, has the beneficial interest in collecting arrearages in child support.’ ” Id. (quoting Cnty. of Shasta v. Smith, 38 Cal. App. 4th 329, 335 (1995) and citing In re Marriage of Lackey, 143 Cal. App. 3d 698, 706 (1983) and Utigard, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 143). Spirtos, Shasta and Lackey cite Utigard for the proposition that a child is not the real party of interest in accrued child support. Spirtos, 443 F.3d at 1177 n.4; Shasta, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 335; Lackey, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 706.

In re Estate of Spirtos, 443 F.3d 1172, 1177 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006)并非相反。在一个脚注中，本法院指出，“根据加利福尼亚州法律，‘监护父母而非子女，在收取子女抚养费欠款方面享有受益权益。’”Id.（引用Cnty. of Shasta v. Smith, 38 Cal. App. 4th 329, 335 (1995)，并引用In re Marriage of Lackey, 143 Cal. App. 3d 698, 706 (1983)和Utigard, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 143）。Spirtos、Shasta和Lackey引用Utigard以支持子女不是累积子女抚养费的实际利害关系方这一命题。Spirtos, 443 F.3d at 1177 n.4；Shasta, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 335；Lackey, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 706。

Utigard, however, involved adult children’s interest in col­ lecting child support arrearages. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 137 (“Mary Lou . . . and four of her adult children appeal from the

然而，Utigard涉及的是成年子女在收取子女抚养费欠款方面的利益。126 Cal. App. 3d at 137（“Mary Lou……及其四名成年子女对

9764 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9764 美国诉DANN案

judgment.”) (emphasis added). In Utigard, the court addressed a property dispute after a divorce. The plaintiff’s ex-husband conveyed their marital home to his new wife in an attempt to avoid a writ of execution for then accrued child support. When the plaintiff eventually filed an action under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act five years later, the trial court found that the statute of limitations had run. Because her children — who were minors at the time of the conveyance — were not barred by the statute of limitations, she attempted to have the writ of execution issued in their names. In a very narrow ruling, the Utigard court found that the now adult children had no interest in the accrued child support. Id. at 143.

判决提出上诉。”）（强调为后加）。在Utigard案中，法院处理的是离婚后的财产纠纷。原告的前夫将他们的婚姻住所转让给他的新妻子，试图逃避当时已累积子女抚养费的执行令。当原告最终在五年后根据《统一欺诈性转让法》提起诉讼时，初审法院认定诉讼时效已过。由于她的子女——在转让时尚未成年——不受诉讼时效限制，她试图以他们的名义签发执行令。Utigard法院在非常狭窄的裁决中认定，现已成年的子女对累积子女抚养费没有利益。Id. at 143。

The Utigard court noted that in this case “no issue [was] tendered concerning the present or future needs of the chil­ dren, nor any issue concerning the relation of the unpaid sup­ port to the children’s needs.” 126 Cal. App. 3d at 139. They declined to reach the “question under what conditions the children might be deemed the beneficiaries of arrearages in child support. . . . Similarly, [they did] not decide how to resolve a dispute between parent and child as to entitlement to arrearages.” Id. at 144.

Utigard法院指出，在该案中“未提出任何关于子女当前或未来需求的问题，也未提出任何关于未付抚养费与子女需求之间关系的问题。”126 Cal. App. 3d at 139。他们拒绝触及“子女在何种条件下可能被视为子女抚养费欠款受益人的问题……同样，[他们]没有裁决如何解决父母与子女之间关于欠款权利的争议。”Id. at 144。

Indeed, the holding in Utigard seems to hinge precisely on the fact that the case did not involve minor children who needed funds. Throughout the case law, California courts are guided by a fundamental principle: “In any proceedings involving custody and support it is axiomatic that the court should always adopt the course that is for the best interests of the child.” Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Evans v. Evans, 185 Cal. App. 2d 566, 572 (1960)).

事实上，Utigard的判决似乎恰恰取决于该案不涉及需要资金的未成年子女这一事实。在整个判例法中，加利福尼亚州法院遵循一项基本原则：“在任何涉及监护和抚养的诉讼中，公理是法院应始终采取符合子女最佳利益的路线。”Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 517（内部引号省略）（引用Evans v. Evans, 185 Cal. App. 2d 566, 572 (1960)）。

We have therefore concluded that under California law, the custodial parent is a conduit for accrued child support to meet the needs of her minor children. In the case at hand, however, the district court pointed out that Dann is not currently the

因此，我们得出结论：根据加利福尼亚州法律，监护父母是累积子女抚养费的通道，以满足其未成年子女的需求。然而，在本案中，地区法院指出Dann目前不是

UNITED STATES v. DANN 9765

美国诉DANN案 9765

custodial parent. Because Dann is incarcerated, the district court assumed that payments made to her would not benefit her children. Like a parent of a child who has reached the age of majority, the district court reasoned, Dann is entitled to accrued child support as reimbursement to her personally for the funds that she expended to care for her children while she was not receiving support. Accordingly the funds belong to Dann and not to her children; and any sums received should be paid to Peña Canal, who provided child support services during this time period.

监护父母。由于Dann被监禁，地区法院假定支付给她的款项不会使其子女受益。地区法院推理，如同子女已达到成年年龄的父母一样，Dann有权获得累积子女抚养费，作为对其在未收到抚养费期间为照顾子女而支出资金的个人补偿。因此，该资金属于Dann而非其子女；任何收到的款项应支付给在此期间提供育儿服务的Peña Canal。

While at first glance the district court’s order seems equita­ ble in this particular case, its implications are troubling. The district court assumed that accrued child support payments paid to Dann would not benefit Dann’s children simply because Dann is incarcerated. By this logic, young children of incarcerated parents could lose the benefit of accrued child support payments which — as the district court recognized — the children may very well need.

虽然乍看之下，地区法院的命令在本案中似乎公平，但其影响令人不安。地区法院假定，支付给Dann的已累积子女抚养费不会使Dann的子女受益，仅仅因为Dann被监禁。按照这种逻辑，被监禁父母的年幼子女可能会失去已累积子女抚养费的利益——正如地区法院所承认的——这些子女很可能非常需要这些费用。

[24] The district court erred when it assumed that these funds belonged to Dann in the first instance. As applied to these facts, we read California law as stating that, until a child reaches the age of majority, the child is the real party of inter­ est in child support arrearages. To the extent that accrued child support payments are made to a parent while she is in prison, she remains a conduit for her child’s support and free to disperse those funds for the care of her child. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 516; Williams, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 640. Accrued child support is simply not the property of the parent (of a

[24] 地区法院错误地假定这些资金首先属于Dann。适用于这些事实，我们将加利福尼亚州法律解读为：在子女达到成年年龄之前，子女是子女抚养费欠款的真正利害关系方。就已累积子女抚养费支付给服刑中的父母而言，她仍然是其子女抚养费的通道，并可自由支配这些资金用于其子女的照护。见Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 516；Williams, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 640。已累积子女抚养费根本不是（尚未达到成年年龄的子女的）父母的财产，不能被重新分配给受害人作为赔偿。

9766 UNITED STATES v. DANN

9766 美国诉DANN案

child who has not yet reached majority) to be redistributed to a victim as restitution.

子女（尚未达到成年年龄）的父母财产，不能被重新分配给受害人作为赔偿。

We should note that the district court’s order in this case also raises practical challenges. The single most important question in an action that involves child support in any form is the need and interest of the minor child. See In re Marriage of Lippel, 51 Cal. 3d 1160, 1172 n.4 (1990). State family courts or probate courts are best equipped to balance the equi­ ties and determine the best interest of children, and federal courts should not interfere by exercising authority over child support payments in a criminal proceeding. In the case at hand, for instance, the children were not represented. No guardian ad litem weighed in at the sentencing hearing in fed­ eral court when the restitution order was rendered. Although perhaps equitable in the instant case, a restitution order simply cannot redistribute child support — or accrued child support — where minor children are involved.

我们应当指出，本案中地区法院的命令还带来了实际挑战。在任何形式的子女抚养费诉讼中，最重要的单一问题是未成年子女的需求和利益。见In re Marriage of Lippel, 51 Cal. 3d 1160, 1172 n.4 (1990)。州家庭法院或遗嘱认证法院最有能力平衡公平因素并确定子女的最佳利益，联邦法院不应通过在刑事程序中对子女抚养费支付行使权力来干预。例如，在本案中，子女没有代理人。在联邦法院作出赔偿令的量刑听证会上，没有诉讼监护人发表意见。尽管在本案中或许公平，但赔偿令在涉及未成年子女时根本不能重新分配子女抚养费——或已累积子女抚养费。