Matter of Anderson

Interim Decision #3231

临时决定第3231号

In Deportation Proceedings

在驱逐程序中

A-42057285

A-42057285

Decided by Board September 30, 1994

由委员会于1994年9月30日决定

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Ann E. Benson, Esquire Robert Solmonson Catholic Social Services District Counsel 3710 East 20th Avenue, Suite Anchorage, Alaska 99508-3418

代表答辩人： 代表移民局： Ann E. Benson, Esquire Robert Solmonson Catholic Social Services 地区法律顾问 3710 East 20th Avenue, Suite Anchorage, Alaska 99508-3418

In a decision dated August 13, 1992, the immigration judge found the respondent deportable under section 241(a)(1)(D)(i) of the Immi- gration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(D)(i) (Supp. IV 1992), as an alien whose conditional permanent resident status had been terminated, and granted her request for voluntary departure. The respondent has appealed from the immigration judge's finding of deportability. The appeal will be dismissed.

在1992年8月13日的决定中，移民法官认定答辩人根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(1)(D)(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(D)(i) (Supp. IV 1992)，作为有条件永久居民身份已被终止的外国人，应予驱逐，并批准了她的自愿离境请求。答辩人对移民法官关于可驱逐性的认定提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。

Interim Decision #3231

临时决定第3231号

The respondent is a 31-year-old native and citizen of the Philip- pines. On September 11, 1989, she entered the United States as a conditional permanent resident pursuant to section 216 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 186a (1988), on the basis of her February 23, 1989, marriage to a United States citizen. On September 10, 1991, the respondent filed an Application for Waiver of Requirement to File Joint Petition for Removal of Conditions (Form 1-752) with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The respondent was interviewed by the Service regarding her waiver application on November 21, 1991. A transcript of the interview was presented by the Service at the hearing and was admitted into evidence without objection from the respondent. The respondent's statements during the interview and her testimony during the hearing were consistent. The following facts are not in dispute. The respondent began corresponding with her husband by letter approximately 1 year before their marriage. The correspondence was initiated through the respondent's sister and brother-in-law. The respondent's sister is married to a United States citizen and lives in Kodiak, Alaska, as did the respondent's husband. At the time they began writing to each other, the respondent's husband was married. He obtained a divorce from his wife on January 30, 1989. He then traveled to the Philippines, arriving on February 12, 1989, when the respondent met him for the first time. They were married in the Philippines on February 23, 1989. The respondent's husband returned to Kodiak in early March. He then began living with another woman. The respondent was informed of this development by her sister. In July 1989 she began seeing a man in the Philippines by whom she became pregnant. The respondent entered the United States as a conditional permanent resident on September 11, 1989, to join her husband. She was greeted by her brother-in-law, who drove her to her husband's home. When the respondent saw that another woman was still living with her husband, she immediately asked her brother-in-law to take her to stay with her sister. She has since remained with her sister and brother-in-law. Her son was born on April 27, 1990. According to the respondent's waiver application, her son has been residing in the Philippines since December 19, 1990. The respondent provided babysitting services at her sister's home for her husband's son from his previous marriage and allowed her husband to visit her there until he moved to Fairbanks, Alaska. The respondent has not seen her husband since he left in November 1989, although she has communicated with him by telephone. The Act provides two means by which the conditional basis of a conditional permanent resident's status may be removed. The alien

被申请人是31岁的菲律宾本地人及公民。1989年9月11日，她依据该法第216条、8 U.S.C. § I 186a (1988)，基于其1989年2月23日与美国公民的婚姻，作为有条件永久居民进入美国。1991年9月10日，被申请人向移民归化局提交了《豁免提交解除条件联合申请要求申请书》（Form 1-752）。 1991年11月21日，被申请人就其豁免申请接受了该局的面谈。该局在听证会上出示了面谈记录，该记录在申请人未提出异议的情况下被采纳为证据。被申请人在面谈中的陈述与其在听证会上的证言一致。以下事实不存在争议。 被申请人在结婚前约1年开始与其丈夫通信。通信是通过被申请人的姐姐和姐夫发起的。被申请人的姐姐嫁给了一名美国公民，住在阿拉斯加科迪亚克，被申请人的丈夫也住在那里。在他们开始互相写信时，被申请人的丈夫已婚。他于1989年1月30日与妻子离婚。随后他前往菲律宾，于1989年2月12日抵达，被申请人当时第一次见到他。他们于1989年2月23日在菲律宾结婚。 被申请人的丈夫于3月初返回科迪亚克。随后他开始与另一名女子同居。被申请人从其姐姐处得知了这一情况。1989年7月，她开始在菲律宾与一名男子交往，并因该男子怀孕。被申请人于1989年9月11日作为有条件永久居民进入美国，以与其丈夫团聚。她的姐夫迎接了她，并开车将她送到她丈夫的家。当被申请人看到另一名女子仍与其丈夫同住时，她立即请姐夫带她去与姐姐同住。此后她一直与姐姐和姐夫住在一起。她的儿子于1990年4月27日出生。根据被申请人的豁免申请，她的儿子自1990年12月19日起一直居住在菲律宾。被申请人在其姐姐家中为其丈夫与前妻所生的儿子提供保姆服务，并允许其丈夫在那里探望她，直到他搬到阿拉斯加费尔班克斯。自丈夫1989年11月离开后，被申请人再未见过他，尽管她曾与他电话联系。 该法规定了两种可以解除有条件永久居民身份之条件基础的方式。该外国人

and the United States citizen spouse may file a joint petition to remove the conditional basis of the alien's permanent resident status under section 216(c)(1) of the Act, or the alien may file an application for a waiver of the requirement to file a joint petition under section 216(c)(4).' Matter of Mendes, 201:N Dec. 833 (BIA 1994); Matter of Balsillie, 20 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1992). Section 216(c)(1)(A) of the Act, through reference to section 216(4)(2), requires that the joint petition be filed during the 90 -day period before the second anniversary of the date the alien obtained conditional permanent resident status. The 90- day limit is not imposed for the filing of a waiver request. As previously noted, the respondent, who was not living with her husband, chose to file a waiver application pursuant to section 216(c)(4) of the Act. That section, which provides for three separate waivers of the conditional basis of a conditional permanent resident's status, provides as follows:

以及美国公民配偶可以根据该法第216(c)(1)条提交联合申请，以取消外籍人士永久居民身份的条件基础，或者该外籍人士可以根据第216(c)(4)条提交豁免提交联合申请要求的申请。' Matter of Mendes, 201:N Dec. 833 (BIA 1994); Matter of Balsillie, 20 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1992)。该法第216(c)(1)(A)条通过引用第216(4)(2)条，要求联合申请必须在外籍人士获得有条件永久居民身份之日起第二周年之前的90天期间内提交。90天期限不适用于提交豁免请求。如前所述，未与其丈夫同住的答辩人选择根据该法第216(c)(4)条提交豁免申请。该条规定了三种单独的有条件永久居民身份条件基础豁免，其规定如下：

seeking a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Act on the basis of extreme hardship. On January 30, 1992, the district director issued a decision denying the respondent's waiver application, and deportation proceedings were initiated under section 241(a)(1)(D)(i) of the Act. In denying the waiver application, the district director stated that the respondent bad failed to demonstrate that her deportation from the United States would result in extreme hardship. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e) (1992). The respondent appeared before the immigration judge on May 15, 1992, with her representative and stated that she wished to apply for a waiver under section 216(c)(4) of the Act. However, the respondent's representative stated that the respondent was seeking a "just cause waiver," which the immigration judge treated as a request for the waiver under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the Act. At a reconvened deportation hearing on August 13, 1992, the immigration judge informed the respondent's counsel that the respon- dent was ineligible for the section 216(c)(4)(B) waiver because her marriage had not been terminated. The respondent's counsel requested a continuance to look into the possibility of terminating the marriage. However, the immigration judge, after hearing the respondent's testimony, concluded that the circumstances surrounding the marriage supported the Service's position that the marriage had not been entered into in good faith. As a result, the immigration judge determined that a continuance was not warranted and found that the respondent was ineligible to apply for a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(B) because she remained married to her husband. On appeal, the respondent argues that she is entitled to a waiver under section 21 6(c)(4)(C) of the Act because she entered into the marriage in good faith and was subjected to humiliating treatment by her husband. In particular, she alleges that her husband treated her with extreme insensitivity by engaging in an adulterous relationship after their marriage. She also claims that she should be given an opportunity to terminate her marriage, thereby indicating that she still seeks to apply for the waiver under section 216(c)(4)(B), as argued before the immigration judge. At the outset, a jurisdictional issue arises from the fact that the respondent requested a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the Act from the immigration judge after the denial of her section 216(c)(4)(A) waiver application by the district director. The question before us is whether the respondent, whose application for one of the three waivers under section 216(c)(4) was denied by the Service, can seek consider- ation before the immigration judge of an alternative waiver under that section. We hold that she cannot. Original jurisdiction to rule on the merits of an application for a

根据该法第216(c)(4)(A)条以极端困难为由申请豁免。1992年1月30日，地区主任作出决定，驳回受益人的豁免申请，并根据该法第241(a)(1)(D)(i)条启动驱逐程序。在驳回豁免申请时，地区主任指出，受益人未能证明将其驱逐出美国将导致极端困难。见8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e) (1992)。受益人于1992年5月15日与其代理人一起出现在移民法官面前，并表示她希望根据该法第216(c)(4)条申请豁免。然而，受益人的代理人表示，受益人寻求的是“正当理由豁免”，移民法官将其视为根据该法第216(c)(4)(B)条提出的豁免请求。 在1992年8月13日重新召开的驱逐听证会上，移民法官告知受益人的律师，受益人没有资格获得第216(c)(4)(B)条豁免，因为她的婚姻尚未终止。受益人的律师请求延期，以研究终止婚姻的可能性。然而，移民法官在听取受益人的证词后，认定围绕婚姻的情况支持移民局关于该婚姻并非以善意缔结的立场。因此，移民法官认定没有必要延期，并认定受益人没有资格根据第216(c)(4)(B)条申请豁免，因为她仍与其丈夫保持婚姻关系。 在上诉中，受益人主张，她有权根据该法第21 6(c)(4)(C)条获得豁免，因为她是以善意缔结婚姻的，并遭受了丈夫的羞辱性对待。特别是，她声称，丈夫在婚后发生通奸关系，以极端不敏感的方式对待她。她还声称，应给予她终止婚姻的机会，从而表明她仍寻求根据第216(c)(4)(B)条申请豁免，正如在移民法官面前所主张的那样。 首先，出现了一个管辖权问题，其事实是：在地区主任驳回受益人根据该法第216(c)(4)(A)条提出的豁免申请后，受益人向移民法官请求根据该法第216(c)(4)(B)条获得豁免。摆在我们面前的问题是，受益人根据第216(c)(4)条提出的三项豁免之一的申请已被移民局驳回，她是否可以在移民法官面前寻求考虑该条下的另一项豁免。我们认定她不能。 对要求提交联合申请的豁免申请进行实质裁决的原始管辖权属于

Interim Decision #3231

临时决定#3231

• waiver of the requirement to file a joint petition is with the appropriate regional service center director, rather than the immigra- tion judge.2 Matter of Lemhamnzad, 20 l&N Dec. 316 (BIA 1991); 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(c) (1994). The immigration judge only has jurisdiction to review the denial of a waiver application. Matter of Lemhammad, supra; 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(f) (1994). The waiver application contains a section which sets forth the three alternative grounds for the waiver under section 216(c)(4) and allows the alien to indicate which applies.3 The respondent selected the extreme hardship alternative. The district director's denial of the respondent's waiver request was accordingly limited to consideration of her claim of extreme hardship under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Act. At the time she initially filed her waiver application, the respondent should have applied for any waiver that she deemed applicable to her. She could not later request a waiver from the immigration judge under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the Act after having applied only for the waiver under section 216(c)(4)(A) with the Service. In order to have an alternative waiver under section 216(c)(4)(B) considered, the respon- dent should have submitted a new application to the Service. To rule otherwise would be to allow circumvention of the regulatory jurisdic- tional scheme and could serve to encourage aliens to withhold evidence and arguments until the review stage for purposes of delay. We note that if the respondent had become statutorily eligible to apply for the section 216(c)(4)(B) waiver by virtue of changed circumstances, i.e., through the termination of her marriage between the time that her waiver application was denied and her appearance before the immigration judge, she could have sought a continuance from the immigration judge to pursue her alternative application with the Service. See Matter of Mender, supra.

• 要求提交联合申请的豁免申请的原始管辖权属于适当的地区服务中心主任，而非移民法官。2 Matter of Lemhamnzad, 20 l&N Dec. 316 (BIA 1991); 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(c) (1994)。移民法官仅具有审查豁免申请被驳回的管辖权。Matter of Lemhammad, supra; 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(f) (1994)。 豁免申请包含一节，其中列明了第216(c)(4)条下豁免的三项替代理由，并允许外国人表明适用哪一项。3 受益人选择了极端困难这一替代理由。地区主任对受益人豁免请求的驳回因此仅限于考虑她根据该法第216(c)(4)(A)条提出的极端困难主张。在受益人最初提交豁免申请时，她本应申请其认为适用于自己的任何豁免。她不能在仅向移民局申请第216(c)(4)(A)条豁免后，后来又向移民法官请求第216(c)(4)(B)条豁免。为使第216(c)(4)(B)条下的替代豁免得到考虑，受益人本应向移民局提交新的申请。作出相反裁定将允许规避监管管辖权制度，并可能鼓励外国人为拖延目的而扣留证据和论点。 我们注意到，如果受益人因情况变化，即在豁免申请被驳回至其出现在移民法官面前期间婚姻终止，而在法律上具备申请第216(c)(4)(B)条豁免的资格，她本可以向移民法官寻求延期，以便向移民局推进其替代申请。见Matter of Mender, supra。

Interim Decision #3231

临时决定#3231

We must also determine whether the respondent can apply for a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(C) of the Act on appeal. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that such a waiver request must be submitted to the regional service center, which exercises original jurisdiction, rather than to this Board. Furthermore, we only have authority to review a waiver application after the immigration judge has considered it. We note in this regard that although the alleged circumstances of extreme mental cruelty were known to the respon- dent at the time she filed her waiver application with the Service, she chose not to pursue a waiver on that basis. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the immigration judge's order and in accordance with our decision in Matter of Chouliaris, 16 1&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1977), the respondent is permitted to depart from the United States voluntarily within 30 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district director; and in the event of failure so to depart, the respondent shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's order.

我们还必须确定受益人是否可以在上诉中根据该法第216(c)(4)(C)条申请豁免。基于上述理由，我们认定此类豁免请求必须提交给行使原始管辖权的地区服务中心，而非本委员会。此外，我们只有在移民法官审议豁免申请后才有权审查该申请。我们在此注意到，尽管受益人在向移民局提交豁免申请时已知悉所称的极端精神虐待情况，但她选择不以此为由寻求豁免。 因此，上诉将被驳回。 命令： 上诉被驳回。 进一步命令： 根据移民法官的命令，并依照我们在Matter of Chouliaris, 16 1&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1977)中的裁决，允许受益人自本命令之日起30天内或地区主任可能批准的超过该时间的任何延长期内自愿离开美国；如未能如此离开，则应按移民法官命令的规定将受益人驱逐。

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