INS v. Abudu

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION

移民与归化

SERVICE v. ABUDU

局诉ABUDU

Robert H. Klonoff argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant At- torney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and Marshall Tamor Golding.

Robert H. Klonoff为申请人进行辩论。 与其共同提交书状的有：总检察长Fried、助理总检察长Willard、副总检察长Wallace以及Marshall Tamor Golding。

Dorothy A. Harper argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. *

Dorothy A. Harper为被申请人进行辩论并提交书状。*

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

STEVENS大法官发表了法院意见。

Regulations promulgated by the Attorney General author- ize deportable aliens to file motions to reopen their deporta- tion proceedings to request asylum on the basis of newly dis- covered evidence. Denials of such motions are subject to judicial review in the United States courts of appeals. The question in this case is whether those courts should review such Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denials under an abuse-of-discretion standard, as petitioner contends, or under the strict standard that would be applied when passing on a motion for summary judgment, as the Court of Appeals held. 802 F. 2d 1096 (CA9 1986). Consistently with our prior cases confirming the BIA's broad discretion in considering

总检察长颁布的条例授权可驱逐出境的外国人基于新发现的证据提交动议，重新开启其驱逐出境程序以申请庇护。 对此类动议的驳回须接受美国联邦上诉法院的司法审查。 本案的问题是，这些法院应根据申请人主张的滥用自由裁量权标准审查BIA的此类驳回，还是根据联邦上诉法院所裁定的、审理即决判决动议时适用的严格标准进行审查。 802 F. 2d 1096（CA9 1986）。 与我们先前确认BIA在审议

motions to reopen, we conclude that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

重新开启动议方面享有广泛自由裁量权的判例相一致，我们认定应适用滥用自由裁量权标准，因此撤销联邦上诉法院的判决。

Respondent, a native and citizen of Ghana, first entered the United States in 1965 as a student. While attending medical school in 1973, he spent his summer vacation in

被申请人系加纳本土出生公民，1965年作为学生首次进入美国。 1973年在医学院就读期间，他在加纳度过暑假，

Ghana, and then reentered the United States on a student visa that authorized him to remain until 1976. After becom- ing a licensed physician, he married an American citizen and overstayed his visa. In 1981, he pleaded guilty to charges of attempting to obtain narcotic drugs (Demerol) by fraud. In due course, deportation proceedings were initiated, and re- spondent designated England as the country of deportation if necessary and expressly declined to seek asylum as a refu- gee. On July 1, 1982, the Immigration Judge ordered him deported,' and on August 14, 1984, the BIA dismissed his appeal.

随后持学生签证重新进入美国，该签证授权其停留至1976年。 成为持照医师后，他与一名美国公民结婚，但其签证逾期滞留。1981年，他对以欺诈手段获取麻醉药品（Demerol）的指控认罪。 驱逐出境程序依法启动，被申请人指定必要时以英国为驱逐目的国，并明确拒绝寻求作为难民的庇护。 1982年7月1日，移民法官下令将其驱逐出境，' 1984年8月14日，BIA驳回了他的上诉。

Respondent filed a petition for review in the Court of Ap- peals for the Ninth Circuit. While that petition was pend- ing, on February 1, 1985, respondent filed a motion with the BIA requesting a reopening of his deportation proceeding to enable him to apply for asylum and a withholding of de- portation. In that motion, which was supported by affida- vits and other exhibits, respondent claimed that he had a well-founded fear that if England did not accept him and he was returned to Ghana, his life and freedom would be threat- ened by the regime in power. His fear was based largely on the facts that after the current government seized power in

被申请人向第9巡回联邦上诉法院提交复审申请。 在该申请待决期间，1985年2月1日，被申请人向BIA提交动议，请求重新开启其驱逐出境程序，以便其申请庇护和暂缓驱逐出境。 该动议附有宣誓书和其他证据，被申请人在其中声称有充分理由担心，若英国不接受他而他被遣返加纳，其生命和自由将受到执政政权的威胁。其恐惧主要基于以下事实：现任政府于

1981, it had carried out a systematic campaign of persecution against its political enemies and that respondent's brother and certain close friends were among the targets of that cam- paign. Moreover, in 1984, respondent had received an unso- licited and surprise visit from a former acquaintance who had become a high official in the Ghana government. The visitor invited respondent to return to Ghana, ostensibly because

1981年夺取政权后，对其政治敌人实施了系统性迫害运动，而被申请人的兄弟和一些密友是该运动的目标。 此外，1984年，被申请人接待了一位已成为加纳政府高级官员的旧识主动且意外的造访。 来访者邀请被申请人返回加纳，表面理由是

qualified physicians are in short supply, but respondent con- cluded that his visitor actually wanted to entice him to return in order to force him to disclose the whereabouts of his brother and other enemies of the government.

合格医师短缺，但被申请人断定来访者实际上是想诱使他回国，以迫使他披露其兄弟及其他政府敌人的下落。

The BIA first stated the standard for granting motions to reopen deportation proceedings in cases such as this:

BIA首先阐述了在此类案件中批准重新开启驱逐出境程序动议的标准：

"A motion to reopen deportation proceedings for the purpose of applying for asylum or withholding of depor- tation will only be granted where prima facie eligibility for such relief has been established and where the alien has reasonably explained his failure to assert the claim prior to completion of the deportation hearing. 8 CFR § 208.11 .... Nor will reopening be granted unless the evidence sought to be offered is material, was not avail- able, and could not have been discovered or presented at

"为申请庇护或暂缓驱逐出境而重新开启驱逐出境程序的动议，仅在已确立初步具备此类救济资格且外国人已合理解释其在驱逐出境听证完成前未提出该主张的情况下，方予批准。 8 CFR § 208.11 .... 除非拟提供的证据具有实质性、先前无法获得且在

the time of the original hearing. 8 CFR §§ 3.2, 103.5, 242.22 .... " App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a.

原听证时无法发现或提交，否则亦不予重新开启。 8 CFR §§ 3.2, 103.5, 242.22 ...." App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a。

The BIA then denied respondent's motion to reopen on both § 208.11 and prima facie case grounds, either of which would have sufficed. First, it held that respondent had not rea- sonably explained his failure to request asylum prior to the completion of the deportation proceedings, as required by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS or Agency) regulations. 2 In support of this holding, the BIA noted that

随后，BIA基于§ 208.11和初步证明理由驳回了被申请人的重新开启动议，其中任一理由均足以支持驳回。 首先，BIA认定被申请人未按移民与归化局（INS或该局）条例的要求，合理解释其在驱逐出境程序完成前未请求庇护。2 为支持该认定，BIA指出

the Immigration Judge had continued the deportation hear- ing from November 10, 1981, until April 29, 1982, to give re- spondent an opportunity to apply for asylum, but that re- spondent had expressly declined to do so, and further, that all of the facts set forth in the motion-except for the sur- prise visit in 1984-had been available to respondent at the time of the hearing. With respect to the visit, the BIA ob- served that "the respondent's visitor was admittedly a long- time friend of the respondent's who in fact may have been paying a purely social visit." App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. Second, the BIA also held that the facts set forth in the motion to reopen did not show either a clear probability of persecution within the meaning of § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 66 Stat. 214, as amended, 8

移民法官曾将驱逐出境听证从1981年11月10日延期至1982年4月29日，以便给被申请人申请庇护的机会，但被申请人明确拒绝这样做，此外，动议中陈述的所有事实——除1984年的意外造访外——在听证时均已为被申请人所知。 关于该造访，BIA指出"被申请人承认来访者是其长期友人，实际上可能纯属社交性拜访。" App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a。 其次，BIA还认定，重新开启动议中陈述的事实既未显示《移民与国籍法》（该法）第243(h)条所指的迫害的明确可能性，66 Stat. 214，经修正，8

U. S. C. § 1253(h),3 or that respondent was eligible for asy- lum as a "refugee," see 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(42), under § 208 of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1158.1 In support of this holding, the BIA noted that no affidavit from his brother had been

U. S. C. § 1253(h)，3 或者被申请人根据该法 § 208，8 U. S. C. § 1158.1 有资格作为“难民”获得庇护，见 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(42)。 为支持这一裁定，BIA 指出，其兄弟未提供任何宣誓书，

withholding of deportation, Motion to Reopen to Permit Respondent to Apply for Asylum and Request Withholding of Deportation in No. 86-7075 (CA9), p. 1 (pp. 14-19 of Pleadings of the Record), the focus throughout the proceedings has been on the asylum application, and our discussion will maintain the same focus. This focus should not obscure the fact that our holding today applies to BIA reopening decisions regarding both asylum and withholding of deportation requests. First, the standard for granting reopening under 8 CFR § 3.2 (1987) is the same for both asylum and with- holding of deportation requests; accordingly, the BIA's determination re- garding whether "evidence sought to be offered [on reopening] is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing," ibid., is subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review regardless of the underlying substantive claim asserted by the alien. Further, since all asylum requests "made after the institution of ex- clusion or deportation proceedings ... shall also be considered as requests for withholding exclusion or deportation pursuant to section 243(h) of the Act," 8 CFR § 208.3(b) (1987); since, normally, "the relevant evidence will be identical on both claims," 802 F. 2d 1096, 1102 (CA9 1986) (case below), see Matter of Mogharrabi, Interim Dec. No. 3028, p. 12 (BIA June 12,

不予驱逐出境，Motion to Reopen to Permit Respondent to Apply for Asylum and Request Withholding of Deportation in No. 86-7075 (CA9), p. 1 (pp. 14-19 of Pleadings of the Record)，但整个程序中的焦点一直是庇护申请，我们的讨论也将保持同样的焦点。 这一焦点不应掩盖以下事实：我们今天的裁定适用于 BIA 关于庇护请求和不予驱逐出境请求的重新开放决定。首先，根据 8 CFR § 3.2 (1987) 准予重新开放的标准对庇护请求和不予驱逐出境请求是相同的；因此，BIA 关于“[重新开放时]拟提供的证据是否具有实质性，且在先前听证时无法获得且不可能被发现或提出”的判定，ibid.，无论外国人主张的 underlying 实体请求为何，均受滥用自由裁量权审查标准的约束。此外，由于所有“在排除出境或驱逐出境程序启动后提出的”庇护请求“也应被视为根据该法第 243(h) 条提出的不予排除出境或不予驱逐出境请求”，8 CFR § 208.3(b) (1987)；由于通常情况下“相关证据在两项请求上将是相同的”，802 F. 2d 1096, 1102 (CA9 1986)（下级案件），见 Matter of Mogharrabi, Interim Dec. No. 3028, p. 12 (BIA June 12,

of the underlying basis of the alien's request. See n. 10, infra. I See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421 (1987) ("well-founded fear of persecution" contains subjective and objective components, but does not require proof that persecution is more likely than not to occur if alien is deported).

见下文 n. 10。 I 见 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421 (1987)（“有充分理由恐惧迫害”包含主观和客观要素，但不要求证明如果外国人被驱逐出境，迫害更可能发生而非不发生）。

offered, and that there was no satisfactory explanation of the details of respondent's relationship with the enemies of the government or the reasons why that relationship might lead to his persecution. The BIA concluded that his conjectures about probable threats were too speculative to constitute a prima facie showing of eligibility for either asylum or with- holding of deportation.

未提供，且对请愿人与政府敌人之间关系的细节、或该关系可能导致其遭受迫害的原因，没有令人满意的解释。 BIA 认定，他关于可能威胁的推测过于臆测，不足以构成有资格获得庇护或不予驱逐出境的 prima facie 表面证据。

When respondent petitioned for review of the order deny- ing his motion to reopen, the Court of Appeals consolidated that petition with his pending petition to review the original order of deportation. The court affirmed the deportation order, 5 but reversed the order denying the motion to reopen and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the asylum and withholding of deportation claims. In support of the latter holding, the court began by noting that although the BIA has "wide discretion" to deny motions to reopen, and although such denials are normally reviewed only for "abuse of discre- tion," in this case "the sole issue" was whether respondent had "presented a prima facie case for reopening." 802 F. 2d, at 1099-1100. The court stated that "[w]hen the Board restricts its decision [refusing to reopen] to whether the alien has established a prima facie case it is only this basis for its decision that we review." Id., at 1100 (internal quotation omitted). The court then reasoned:

当请愿人申请审查拒绝其重新开放动议的命令时，上诉法院将该申请与其待决的审查原驱逐出境命令的申请合并。 法院维持了驱逐出境命令，5 但撤销了拒绝重新开放动议的命令，并发回进行关于庇护和不予驱逐出境请求的证据听证。 为支持后一裁定，法院首先指出，尽管 BIA 拥有“广泛自由裁量权”拒绝重新开放动议，且此类拒绝通常仅以“滥用自由裁量权”标准审查，但在本案中“唯一问题”是请愿人是否“提出了重新开放的 prima facie 表面案件”。 802 F. 2d, at 1099-1100。 法院指出，“当委员会将其[拒绝重新开放]决定限于外国人是否已确立 prima facie 表面案件时，我们仅审查其决定的这一依据。” Id., at 1100（内部引文省略）。 法院随后推理：

"Upon motion to reopen, the Board must draw reason- able inferences from the facts in favor of the petitioner. A motion to reopen is analogous to a motion for summary judgment; each is accompanied by affidavits and other

“在重新开放动议中，委员会必须从有利于请愿人的角度对事实作出合理推断。 重新开放动议类似于即决判决动议；两者均附有宣誓书和其他

evidentiary material and may be granted if the motion presents 'proof that will support the desired findings [of a prima facie case] .. .until it is contradicted or over- ruled by other evidence.' Maroufi v. INS, 772 F. 2d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1985). In both cases, inferences are to

证据材料，并且如果该动议提出‘支持所期望的[ prima facie 表面案件]认定的证据……直到被其他证据反驳或推翻’，则可以获准。 Maroufi v. INS, 772 F. 2d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1985)。 在两种情况下，推断均应

be drawn in favor of the party whose entitlement to fur- ther proceedings is at stake: the non-moving party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and the alien seeking reopening under 8 CFR 3.2. See, e. g., U. S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962) ('choice of inferences to be drawn from the subsidiary facts contained in the affidavits ... sub- mitted [is inappropriate]. On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts con- tained in such materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.')... "[F]or purposes of the limited screening function of mo- tions to reopen, the BIA must draw all reasonable infer- ences in favor of the alien unless the evidence presented is 'inherently unbelievable.' Hernandez-Ortiz [v. INS], 777 F. 2d [509,] 514 [CA9 1985].

有利于其进一步程序权利处于利害关系中的一方：Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 下的非动议方，以及根据 8 CFR 3.2 寻求重新开放的外国人。 见，例如，U. S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962)（‘从宣誓书中所含附属事实作出的推断选择……提交[是不适当的]。 在即决判决中，从此类材料所含 underlying 事实作出的推断必须从最有利于反对动议一方的角度审视。’）…… “[F]就重新开放动议的有限筛查功能而言，BIA 必须作出一切有利于外国人的合理推断，除非所提交的证据‘本质上不可信’。 Hernandez-Ortiz [v. INS], 777 F. 2d [509,] 514 [CA9 1985]。”

"While the visit from the Ghanian official could be viewed as benign, it could also be viewed, as Dr. Abudu suggests, as threatening. Viewing the inferences in favor of the petitioner as we must, we conclude that the affidavits made out a prima facie case of well- founded fear of persecution." Id., at 1101-1102 (cita- tions omitted). Although the BIA had denied respondent's motion to re- open both on the ground that he had failed to make out a prima facie case for asylum and on the ground that he had failed to explain reasonably his decision not to request asy- lum in the first instance, and although the Government had

“虽然加纳官员的来访可被视为善意，但也可如 Abudu 博士所主张的那样被视为威胁。 我们必须从有利于请愿人的角度审视推断，因此认定宣誓书构成了有充分理由恐惧迫害的 prima facie 表面案件。” Id., at 1101-1102（引文省略）。 尽管 BIA 既以被申请人未能构成庇护的 prima facie 表面案件为由、又以他未能合理说明其最初决定不请求庇护为由，拒绝了其重新开放动议，且尽管政府在

contended in the Court of Appeals that "petitioner neither offered a reasonable explanation for the belatedness of his application for asylum and withholding of deportation nor made a prima facie showing of entitlement to such relief," Brief for Respondent in Nos. 84-7686 and 86-7075 (CA9), p. 16 (emphasis added), the Court of Appeals did not discuss, as a separate matter, the "failure to explain" ground in the BIA's decision. The Court of Appeals' statement that "the

上诉法院主张“请愿人既未就其庇护和不予驱逐出境申请的迟延提出合理解释，也未就获得此类救济的资格作出 prima facie 表面证明”，Brief for Respondent in Nos. 84-7686 and 86-7075 (CA9), p. 16（着重号为原文所加），但上诉法院并未将 BIA 决定中的“未能解释”依据作为单独事项进行讨论。 上诉法院关于“本案

sole issue [in this case] is whether petitioner presented a prima facie case for reopening," 802 F. 2d, at 1100, reveals

唯一问题是请愿人是否提出了重新开放的 prima facie 表面案件”的陈述，802 F. 2d, at 1100，表明

that the court seems to have blended the two grounds into one. 6

法院似乎将两项依据合并为一项。 6

The petition for certiorari described this case as involving "the extent to which a reviewing court is required to defer to the BIA's ruling on a motion to reopen deportation proceed- ings." Pet. for Cert. 8. Like the Court of Appeals' opinion, the questions presented, though, did not clearly separate the two grounds upon which the BIA had denied respondent's motion to reopen, 7 and respondent reported to us, incor-

调卷令申请将本案描述为涉及“审查法院在多大程度上必须遵从 BIA 关于重新开放驱逐出境程序动议的裁定”。 Pet. for Cert. 8。 然而，与上诉法院的意见一样，所提出的问题并未明确区分 BIA 拒绝被申请人重新开放动议所依据的两项理由，7 且被申请人向我们报告，incor-

rectly, that "the sole question before the Ninth Circuit was whether the Respondent had established a prima facie case of a well founded fear of persecution." Brief in Opposition 20. Petitioner's reply memorandum, though, eliminated any pos- sible doubts about the issue it was asking us to resolve:

正确地指出，“第九巡回法院面临的唯一问题是，被申请人是否已确立初步证据表明有充分理由恐惧迫害。”反对简报第20页。 然而，申请人的回复备忘录消除了关于其要求我们解决的问题的任何可能疑问：

"[T]he important question for present purposes [is] whether the BIA correctly found that respondent had not offered significant new evidence and had not ade- quately explained his previous failure to seek asylum or withholding of deportation (see 8 CFR 3.2, 208.11)." Reply Memorandum for Petitioner 2, n. 2.8

“就目前而言，重要的问题是，移民上诉委员会（BIA）是否正确地认定被申请人未提供重要的新证据，且未充分解释其先前未寻求庇护或暂缓驱逐出境的理由（见8 CFR 3.2, 208.11）。”申请人回复备忘录第2页，脚注2.8。

Thus, we granted certiorari, 480 U. S. 930 (1987), not to decide the substantive issues of what constitutes a prima facie case for establishing eligibility for asylum on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution, or of what standard of re- view applies, either initially or on motion to reopen, when the

因此，我们批准了调卷令，480 U. S. 930 (1987)，并非为了裁决实质性问题的构成，即何为基于有充分理由恐惧迫害而确立庇护资格的初步案件，或适用何种审查标准，无论是在最初还是在重新开放动议时，当

BIA rests its grant or denial of relief squarely on prima facie case grounds, 9 but rather to determine the standard a Court of Appeals must apply when reviewing the BIA's conclusion that an alien has not reasonably explained his failure to assert his asylum claim at the outset.

移民上诉委员会将其准予或拒绝救济完全建立在初步案件理由上，9 而是为了确定上诉法院在审查移民上诉委员会关于外国人未合理解释其最初未提出庇护主张的结论时必须适用的标准。

II There are at least three independent grounds on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen. First, it may hold that the movant has not established a prima facie case for the un- derlying substantive relief sought. The standard of review of such a denial is not before us today, as we have explained. Second, the BIA may hold that the movant has not intro- duced previously unavailable, material evidence, 8 CFR § 3.2

II 移民上诉委员会至少可以基于三个独立理由拒绝重新开放动议。首先，它可以认定动议人未确立初步案件以支持所寻求的 underlying 实质性救济。如我们已解释，此类拒绝的审查标准今日不在本院面前。其次，移民上诉委员会可以认定动议人未引入先前无法获得的实质性证据，8 CFR § 3.2

(1987), or, in an asylum application case, that the movant has not reasonably explained his failure to apply for asylum ini- tially, 8 CFR §208.11 (1987). (The issues under the two regulations may, of course, both involve the incremental sig- nificance of whatever allegedly new evidence is introduced by the movant.) We decide today that the appropriate stand- ard of review of such denials is abuse of discretion. Third, in cases in which the ultimate grant of relief is discretionary (asylum, suspension of deportation, and adjustment of status, but not withholding of deportation), the BIA may leap ahead, as it were, over the two threshold concerns (prima facie case and new evidence/reasonable explanation), and simply deter- mine that even if they were met, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief. We have con- sistently held that denials on this third ground are subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard. INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U. S. 444 (1985) (suspension of deportation); INS v. Baga- masbad, 429 U. S. 24 (1976) (adjustment of status).

(1987)，或在庇护申请案件中，动议人未合理解释其最初未申请庇护，8 CFR § 208.11 (1987)。（当然，两项规定下的问题都可能涉及动议人引入的任何所谓新证据的增量意义。）我们今日裁定，对此类拒绝的适当审查标准是滥用自由裁量权。第三，在最终准予救济属于自由裁量的案件中（庇护、暂缓驱逐出境和调整身份，但不包括暂缓驱逐出境），移民上诉委员会可以如其所言，跳过两个门槛问题（初步案件和新证据/合理解释），直接认定即使满足这些条件，动议人也无权获得自由裁量的救济。我们一贯认定，基于第三理由的拒绝受滥用自由裁量权标准的审查。INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U. S. 444 (1985)（暂缓驱逐出境）；INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U. S. 24 (1976)（调整身份）。

We have discussed 8 CFR § 3.2 (1987), which is one of the two regulations before us today, in dicta:

我们在附带意见中讨论了8 CFR § 3.2 (1987)，这是今日摆在我们面前的两项规定之一：

"[Section 3.2] is framed negatively; it directs the Board not to reopen unless certain showings are made. It does not affirmatively require the Board to reopen the pro- ceedings under any particular condition. Thus, the regulations may be construed to provide the Board with discretion in determining under what circumstances pro- ceedings should be reopened." INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S. 139, 144, n. 5 (1981). This footnote, and our subsequent citations of it, INS v. Rios-Pineda, supra, at 449; INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U. S.

“［第3.2条］以否定方式表述；它指示委员会除非作出某些表明，否则不得重新开放。它并未肯定性地要求委员会在任何特定条件下重新开放程序。因此，该规定可被解释为赋予委员会在决定何种情况下应重新开放程序方面的自由裁量权。”INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S. 139, 144, 脚注5 (1981)。 该脚注以及我们随后对其的引用，INS v. Rios-Pineda, 前引, 第449页；INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U. S.

183, 188, n. 6 (1984),1 stand for the proposition that the BIA

183, 188, 脚注6 (1984)，1 支持以下主张：移民上诉委员会

has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the alien has made out a prima facie case for relief; that is, our prior glosses on § 3.2 have served as support for an abuse-of-discre- tion standard of review for the third type of denial, where the

有权拒绝重新开放动议，即使外国人已提出初步案件以获得救济；也就是说，我们先前对§ 3.2的注释已成为第三类拒绝的滥用自由裁量权审查标准的支持，即

BIA simply refuses to grant relief that is itself discretionary in nature, even if the alien has surmounted the requisite thresholds of prima facie case and new evidence/reasonable explanation.

移民上诉委员会仅拒绝准予本身具有自由裁量性质的救济，即使外国人已跨越初步案件和新证据/合理解释的必要门槛。

But even before reaching the ultimate decision on an alien's application for discretionary relief from deportation, or be- fore reaching the point at which mandatory relief is called for in a withholding of deportation case, the BIA's discretion may be called into play regarding the specific, evidentiary re- quirements of §§3.2 and 208.11. That is, in a given case the BIA may determine, either as a sufficient ground for denying relief or as a necessary step toward granting relief, whether

但即使在对外国人关于驱逐出境自由裁量救济的申请作出最终决定之前，或在暂缓驱逐出境案件中达到要求强制救济的程度之前，移民上诉委员会的自由裁量权可能就§§ 3.2和208.11的具体证据要求而被援用。也就是说，在特定案件中，移民上诉委员会可以确定——无论是作为拒绝救济的充分理由，还是作为准予救济的必要步骤——是否

the alien has produced previously unavailable, material evi- dence (§ 3.2), and, in asylum cases, whether the alien has reasonably explained his or her failure to request asylum initially (§ 208.11). We hold today that such decisions are subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.

外国人已提供先前无法获得的实质性证据（§ 3.2），以及在庇护案件中，外国人是否合理解释了其最初未请求庇护（§ 208.11）。我们今日裁定，此类决定受滥用自由裁量权审查标准的约束。

The reasons why motions to reopen are disfavored in de- portation proceedings are comparable to those that apply to petitions for rehearing," and to motions for new trials on the basis of newly discovered evidence. 12 There is a strong pub-

重新审理动议在驱逐出境程序中不受青睐的原因，与适用于复审申请以及基于新发现证据而提出的重新审判动议的原因相类似。12 存在一种强烈的公

lic interest in bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the interest in giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective cases. The relevance of this interest to deportation proceedings was pointedly explained in an opinion that we recently quoted with approval:

共利益，即在与给予对方当事人公平机会以发展和陈述其各自案件的利益相一致的前提下，尽可能迅速地将诉讼终结。这一利益与驱逐出境程序的相关性，已在一份我们最近予以赞同引用的意见书中被明确指出：

"'If INS discretion is to mean anything, it must be that the INS has some latitude in deciding when to re- open a case. The INS should have the right to be re- strictive. Granting such motions too freely will permit endless delay of deportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously produce new and material facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case. It will also waste the time and efforts of immigration judges called upon to preside at hearings automatically required by the prima facie allegations[, a requirement not disputed in this case]."' INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S., at 144, n. 5 (quoting from Judge Wallace's dissenting opin- ion in Villena v. INS, 622 F. 2d 1352, 1362 (CA9 1980) (en banc) (CA9 companion case to Jong Ha Wang).

"'如果INS的自由裁量权要有任何意义，那就必须是INS在决定何时重新开启案件时拥有一定的裁量空间。INS应当有权采取限制性立场。过于随意地批准此类动议，将使那些富有创造力且多产、足以不断产生新的重大事实以确立初步证据案件的外国人得以无休止地拖延驱逐出境。这还将浪费移民法官的时间和精力，他们被要求主持因初步证据主张而自动要求的听证[, 该要求在本题中并无争议]。'" INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S., at 144, n. 5（引用Wallace法官在Villena v. INS, 622 F. 2d 1352, 1362 (CA9 1980)（全体庭审）中的反对意见（CA9中与Jong Ha Wang相关的伴随案件））。

As we have detailed above, the Court of Appeals in this case purported to decide "whether [respondent] presented a prima facie case for reopening." 802 F. 2d, at 1100. In so doing, the Court of Appeals set out a standard for BIA mo- tions to reopen deportation proceedings, see supra, at 100-

正如我们在上文所详述的，本案中的上诉法院声称要裁决"[被上诉人]是否提出了重新开启的初步证据案件"。802 F. 2d, at 1100。在这样做时，上诉法院为BIA重新开启驱逐出境程序的动议设定了一项标准，参见上文，at 100-

101, that appears to have conflated the quite separate issues whether the alien has presented a prima facie case for asy- lum with whether the alien has reasonably explained his fail- ure to apply for asylum initially and has indeed offered previ- ously unavailable, material evidence. To the extent that

101，该标准似乎混淆了两个相当不同的问题：外国人是否提出了庇护的初步证据案件，以及外国人是否合理地解释了他最初未能申请庇护的原因，并且确实提供了先前无法获得的重大证据。就

the reasoning of the Court of Appeals addresses the issue of reopening rather than the issue of prima facie case for asy- lum," it is not supported by our cases, and has been consist- ently rejected by other Circuits and by other panels in the Ninth Circuit. 5 We have never suggested that all ambigu-

上诉法院的推理涉及的是重新开启的问题，而非庇护初步证据案件的问题"，它不为我们判例所支持，并已被其他巡回法院和第九巡回法院的其他合议庭一致拒绝。5 我们从未暗示所有含糊

1 As we have stated throughout the opinion, to the extent that the Court of Appeals' reasoning addresses the issue of prima facie case for asylum, we offer no view of its validity, save our observation, infra, at 111, that the untimeliness of an asylum claim may be relevant to the BIA's decision as to the prima facie case issue on reopening.

1 正如我们在意见全文中所述，就上诉法院的推理涉及庇护初步证据案件问题而言，我们对其有效性不发表意见，除了我们在下文at 111的观察，即庇护申请的不及时可能与BIA在重新开启时对初步证据案件问题的裁决相关。

ities in the factual averments must be resolved in the movant's favor, and we have never analogized such a motion to a motion for summary judgment. The appropriate anal- ogy is a motion for a new trial in a criminal case on the basis of newly discovered evidence, as to which courts have uni- formly held that the moving party bears a heavy burden.

事实陈述中的含糊之处必须以有利于动议人的方式解决，而我们从未将此类动议类比为简易判决动议。适当的类比是刑事案件中基于新发现证据的重新审判动议，对此法院一致认为动议方承担沉重负担。

See, e. g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 414, n. 18 (1988) (citing cases). Moreover, this is the tenor of the Attorney General's regulations, which plainly disfavor motions to re- open. See n. 2, supra. In sum, although all adjudications by administrative agencies are to some degree judicial and to

参见，例如，Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 414, n. 18 (1988)（引用判例）。此外，这是司法部长条例的主旨，其明确不青睐重新开启动议。参见上文n. 2。总之，尽管行政机构的所有裁决在某种程度上是司法性的，并在

some degree political 1 6 -and therefore an abuse-of-discretion standard will often apply to agency adjudications not gov- erned by specific statutory commands-INS officials must exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations, 7 and therefore the reasons for giving deference to agency decisions on petitions for reopen- ing or reconsideration in other administrative contexts apply

某种程度上具有政治性 1 6——因此，自由裁量权滥用标准往往适用于不受具体法定命令约束的机构裁决——移民归化局（INS）官员必须行使尤其敏感的政治职能，这些职能涉及对外关系问题， 7 因此，在其他行政语境中，对机构关于重新开案或重新考虑的申请所作决定给予尊重的理由同样适用

with even greater force in the INS context.

具有更大的效力。

III We have no doubt that if respondent had made a timely application for asylum, supported by the factual allegations and exhibits set forth in his motion to reopen, the Immigra- tion Judge would have been required to grant him an eviden-

III 我们毫不怀疑，如果被上诉人及时提出了庇护申请，并附有其重新开启动议中陈述的事实主张和证据，移民法官将被要求给予他证据

tiary hearing. See 8 CFR §§ 208.6 (1987) (requiring appear- ance before immigration officer for asylum application) and 208.10(c) (permitting presentation of evidence in deportation proceedings). We are equally convinced, however, that an alien who has already been found deportable has a much heavier burden when he first advances his request for asylum -in a motion to reopen. In passing on the sufficiency of such a motion, the BIA is entitled to attach significance to its un- timeliness, both for the purpose of evaluating the probability

听证。参见8 CFR §§ 208.6 (1987)（要求为庇护申请亲自到移民官员面前）和208.10(c)（允许在驱逐出境程序中出示证据）。然而，我们同样确信，已被裁定可驱逐出境的外国人，在其首次通过重新开启动议提出庇护请求时，承担着重得多的负担。在裁定此类动议的充分性时，BIA有权重视其不及时性，既是为了评估可能性

that the movant can prove his allegations and for the purpose of determining whether the movant has complied with the regulation requiring a reasonable explanation for the failure to request asylum during the deportation proceeding.

即动议人能够证明其主张，并且是为了确定动议人是否遵守了要求在驱逐出境程序期间未请求庇护作出合理解释的法规。

In this case we have no hesitation in concluding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it held that respondent had not reasonably explained his failure to apply for asylum prior to the completion of the initial deportation proceeding. The surprise visit in 1984 was admittedly an event with un- certain meaning, but it was neither arbitrary nor unreason- able for the BIA to regard it as not providing any significant additional support for a claim that respondent had not previ- ously considered strong enough to prompt him to assert that he had a well-founded fear of persecution.

在本案中，我们毫不犹豫地认定，BIA在裁定 respondent 未合理解释其在初始驱逐出境程序完成之前未申请庇护时，没有滥用其自由裁量权。1984年的意外来访固然是一个含义不确定的事件，但BIA认为该事件并未为这样一项主张提供任何重要的额外支持——即 respondent 此前认为该主张不够有力，不足以促使他声称自己有充分理由恐惧迫害——这既非任意也非不合理。

The portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment that re- versed the BIA order denying the motion to reopen is reversed.

上诉法院判决中撤销BIA驳回重新开启动议之命令的部分被撤销。

It is so ordered.

特此命令。

JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or de- cision of this case.

KENNEDY大法官未参与本案的审理或裁决。