Matter of Hassan

(1) In order for a child to confer immediate relative status upon a parent under the provisions of section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the petitioning child must be a United States citizen at least 21 years of age, and qualify as a "child" as defined in section 101(b) of the Act. (2) Beneficiary, the natural father of a United States citizen petitioner, obtained a divorce in 1950 at the Royal Egyptian Consulate located in New York. Notwithstanding the fact that the divorce occurred in a foreign consulate in the United States, it was not a foreign divorce. Therefore, the principle of international comity is not involved, and the divorce is subject to the requirements of full faith and credit. Since this divorce was not obtained in accordance with applicable New York statutory provisions it was invalid in the State of New York, was not entitled to full faith and credit in any other jurisdiction, and was invalid for immigration purposes. (3) Since the beneficiary's divorce was invalid in the United States (notwithstanding the fact it was valid in Egypt). beneficiary was not free to contract a valid marriage with petitioner's mother in the United States so as to legitimate the petitioner and enable him to confer immediate relative status on his father. Under the circumstances revoca- tion of the approval of the visa petition was proper. (4) Matter of 6 I. & N. Dec. 470 (BIA 1954) reaffirmed.

(1) 为使子女能够依据《移民与国籍法》第201(b)条的规定赋予父母即时亲属身份，提出申请的子女必须是年满21岁的美国公民，并且符合该法第101(b)条所定义的“子女”资格。 (2) 受益人，即美国公民申请人的生父，于1950年在位于纽约的埃及皇家领事馆取得离婚。尽管该离婚发生在美国境内的外国领事馆，但它并非外国离婚。因此，国际礼让原则不适用，该离婚须受完全诚信与信用要求的约束。由于该离婚并非依照纽约州适用的成文法规定取得，故在纽约州无效，无权在任何其他法域获得完全诚信与信用，并且在移民目的上无效。 (3) 由于受益人的离婚在美国无效（尽管其在埃及有效），受益人无权在美国与申请人的母亲缔结有效婚姻，从而使申请人获得婚生子女地位并使其能够赋予其父即时亲属身份。在此情况下，撤销对签证申请的批准是适当的。 (4) 维持Matter of 6 I. & N. Dec. 470 (BIA 1954)之裁定。

ON BEHALF Or PlartiONER: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Arlene Tuck Ulman, Esquire George Indelicato 3730 Rhode Island Avenue N.W. Appellate Trial Attorney 'Washington, D.C. 20036

代表申请人： 代表移民局： Arlene Tuck Ulman，律师 George Indelicato 3730 Rhode Island Avenue N.W. 上诉审判律师 华盛顿特区 20036

The United States citizen petitioner applied for immediate relative status for the beneficiary as his father under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The petition was initially approved; however, after due notice to the petitioner, the approval was revoked by' the District Director in a decision dated January 15, 1975. The petitioner has appealed. The appeal will be dismissed. The issue in this case is whether the beneficiary, the natural father of th e petitioner, is entitled to immediate relative status under section 2001(b) of the Act, as the "parent" of an adult United States citizen. Counsel has offered two alternative arguments in support of the peti- tion. In the first argument, counsel assumes that the petitioner must once have been the "child" of the beneficiary within the statutory definition,

美国公民申请人依据《移民与国籍法》第201(b)条为其父即受益人申请即时亲属身份。该申请最初获得批准；然而，在适当通知申请人后，地区局长于1975年1月15日作出的决定中撤销了该批准。申请人已提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。 本案的争议在于，受益人即申请人的生父，是否有权依据该法第2001(b)条作为成年美国公民的“父母”获得即时亲属身份。律师为支持该申请提出了两项替代性论点。 在第一项论点中，律师假定申请人必须曾经是该法定义范围内受益人的“子女”，

in order to confer immediate relative status, under section 201(b), upon the beneficiary as a "parent." See sections 101(b)(1) and (2). She con- tends that the petitioner, although born out of wedlock, was legitimated according to the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(C). Counsel's alterna- tive argument is that even if the petitioner was not legitimated, there is no congressional directive that the petitioner must have qualified as the "child" of the beneficiary in order to confer benefits, as an adult, upon his parent. Moreover, counsel contends that the intent of Congress to unite families would be subverted if that requirement is read into section 201(b). We turn first to counsel's contention that the petitioner is the legitimated son of the beneficiary. The beneficiary, Mr. Hassan, is a native and citizen of Egypt. He entered the United States in 1948 as the servant of an official assigned to the Egyptian Embassy in Washington, D.C. The beneficiary's wife, whom he had married in 1946 in Cairo, Egypt, did not accompany him to the United States. On December 4, 1950, the beneficiary went to the. Royal Egyptian Consulate in New York City and obtained an irrevocable divorce from his Egyptian wife. One year later, he married a United States citizen in the State of Maryland. A petition to accord him immediate relative status was filed by his American wife in 1952. It was denied by the District Director on the ground that the beneficiary's consular divorce was not valid for immigration purposes and that he was not free, therefore, to marry in the United States. The petitioner appealed that decision to this Board; we affirmed the District Director's decision in Matter of H—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 470 (BIA 1954). In the present appeal, taken some 20 years after our decision in Matter of H—, supra, we are once again concerned with Mr. Hassan's consular divorce. In the present context, the petitioner's claim to legitimated status must be evaluated in ligh.t of our holding in Matter of supra. The registration of the petitioner's birth indicates that he was officially acknowledged by the beneficiary shortly after his birth on January lo, 1953. It is counsel's contention that the petitioner was legitimated under the laws of his residence; the District of Columbia, when his father, Mr. Hassan, entered into a. common-law marriage with his mother in the District in the mid-1950's_ Quite obviously, unless we now find that Mr. Hassan was free to enter into the alleged common-law marriage, we cannot accept counsel's theory. In short, we are urged to overturn Matter of H—, supra, and to extend belated recognition to the beneficiary's consular divorce for the following two reasons. First, counsel contends that the Board's characterization of the ben- efieiary's divorce as a "consular divorce" (a decree granted at a foreign

才能依据第201(b)条赋予受益人作为“父母”的即时亲属身份。参见第101(b)(1)和(2)条。她主张，申请人虽为非婚生，但已按照第101(b)(1)(C)条的要求获得婚生子女地位。律师的替代性论点是，即使申请人未获得婚生子女地位，国会也没有指令要求申请人必须曾经符合受益人“子女”的资格，才能作为成年人赋予其父母利益。此外，律师主张，如果将这一要求读入第201(b)条，国会团聚家庭的意图将被颠覆。我们首先处理律师关于申请人是受益人婚生子的主张。 受益人哈桑先生是埃及本土出生和公民。他于1948年作为被派驻华盛顿特区埃及大使馆的一名官员的仆役进入美国。受益人的妻子（他于1946年在埃及开罗与其结婚）未随他前往美国。 1950年12月4日，受益人前往纽约市的埃及皇家领事馆，与其埃及妻子取得不可撤销的离婚。一年后，他在马里兰州与一名美国公民结婚。1952年，他的美国妻子提交了一份赋予他即时亲属身份的申请。地区局长以受益人的领事离婚在移民目的上无效、因此他无权在美国结婚为由予以拒绝。申请人将该决定上诉至本委员会；我们在Matter of H—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 470 (BIA 1954)中维持了地区局长的决定。 在本次上诉中——距我们在Matter of H—, supra中的裁定约20年之后——我们再次关注哈桑先生的领事离婚。在当前语境下，申请人关于婚生子女地位的主张必须根据我们在Matter of supra中的裁定来评估。申请人的出生登记表明，他在1953年1月10日出生后不久即获得受益人的正式承认。律师主张，当申请人的父亲哈桑先生于1950年代中期在哥伦比亚特区与其母亲缔结普通法婚姻时，申请人已根据其居住地哥伦比亚特区的法律获得婚生子女地位。非常明显，除非我们现在认定哈桑先生当时有权缔结所称的普通法婚姻，否则我们无法接受律师的理论。简言之，我们被促请推翻Matter of H—, supra，并基于以下两个理由对受益人的领事离婚给予迟来的承认。 第一，律师主张，本委员会将受益人的离婚定性为“领事离婚”（即由外国

consulate within the United States) is inaccurate. According to counsel, although the proceeding was commenced in New York City, it was concluded, some three years later, in Egypt. Moreover, it was a pro- ceeding in which both parties participated and over which the rendering authorities in Egypt had competent jurisdiction. Thus, it is more pre- cisely characterized as a foreign divorce. As such, recognition of its validity becomes a matter of international comity. If recognized by the jurisdiction most concerned with the effect of the decree, namely, the beneficiary's residence at the time of the proceeding, it must be recog- nized for immigration purposes. Second, counsel contends that the Board erred in holding that the beneficiary was a resident of New York, and that, as a consequence, New York law governed the validity of the divorce. Counsel maintains that the beneficiary's residence was the District of Columbia. Therefore, as a corollary to the first argument, counsel contends that recognition of the foreign divorce must be assessed in light of the laws and policies of the District of Columbia. We observe, at the outset, that unless we find that the beneficiary's divorce was a foreign judgment, and not a consular divorce, as counsel contends, we need not discuss the choice of law issue. For if the divorce is, as we held in Matter of H—, supra, a consular divorce, granted in usurpation of New York's traditional and exclusive authority in mat- rimonial matters over persons within her borders, it cannot be recog- nized by the District of Columbia. It is axiomatic, under the principle of full faith and credit, that no jurisdiction can adopt, as valid, a divorce decree which is void in the jurisdiction where rendered. Therefore, the pivotal issue in counsel's first argument is whether the beneficiary's divorce was a "New York" divorce, obtained in a consulate in New York or whether New York was only coincidentally the site of the institution of divorce proceedings which eventually culminated in a filial decree of divorce issued by an Egyptian court in Egypt. To assist us in answering this question, we have asked the Library of Congress to provide us with information on the Egyptian law of divorce. From a memorandum submitted, we have learned that in Egypt, mar- riage and divorce are performed by a government official called al- Dia'zun. According to Article 31 of the "Ordinance for the Ma'zuns," (Egyptian Official Gazette, No. 25 of February 27, 1915):

在美国境内的领事馆作出的裁决）是不准确的。据律师称，尽管程序在纽约市启动，但约三年后在埃及终结。此外，该程序是双方均参与的程序，埃及作出裁决的机关对其具有适当管辖权。因此，更准确地说，它应被定性为外国离婚。如此，承认其有效性便成为国际礼让问题。如果该离婚获得与裁决效力最相关的法域——即受益人在程序进行时的居住地——的承认，则必须为移民目的予以承认。 第二，律师主张，本委员会认定受益人是纽约居民、并因此由纽约法律管辖离婚有效性，是错误的。律师坚持认为受益人的居住地是哥伦比亚特区。因此，作为第一项论点的推论，律师主张对外国离婚的承认必须根据哥伦比亚特区的法律和政策来评估。 我们一开始就注意到，除非我们认定受益人的离婚是外国判决而非如律师所主张的领事离婚，否则我们无需讨论法律选择问题。因为如果该离婚如我们在Matter of H—, supra中所认定的那样，是在篡夺纽约对其境内人员婚姻事务的传统和专属管辖权的情况下作出的领事离婚，则哥伦比亚特区不能予以承认。根据完全诚信与信用原则，任何法域都不能将作出地法域无效的离婚裁决采纳为有效，这是不言自明的。 因此，律师第一项论点的关键问题在于，受益人的离婚是在纽约领事馆取得的“纽约”离婚，还是纽约仅仅是最终由埃及法院在埃及作出离婚裁决的离婚程序启动地的偶然所在地。 为协助我们回答这一问题，我们请国会图书馆提供有关埃及离婚法的信息。从提交的一份备忘录中我们了解到，在埃及，结婚和离婚由政府官员即al- Dia'zun办理。根据“Ma'zun条例”第31条（《埃及官方公报》1915年2月27日第25号）：

In situations which involve the marriage or divorce of Egyptian

在涉及埃及

nationals abroad, the Egyptian consuls are empowered to perform the same functions which the Ma'zuns are assigned in Egypt. Under Article 16 of the "Consular Law" (Egyptian Official Gazette, No. 78 of August 13, 1925), the consul is authorized "to draw the pronouncements of divorce and attest their authenticity . . ." (subsection 3). The record indicates that Mr. Hassan went to the Royal Egyptian Consulate in New York on December 4, 1950, and pronounced himself irrevocably divorced from his Egyptian wife before the presiding con- sul. Two years later, in connection with a visa petition filed on his behalf, he presented as evidence of the termination of his first marriage, a certificate issued by the Egyptian Consulate. In this certificate, which was issued on November 5, 1952, the Egyptian Consul attested to the validity, under Egyptian law, of the divorce which had been concluded two years earlier. Reference to the "Consular Law," mentioned above, indicates that this attestation by the consul, acting in his capacity as Ma'zun, was clearly authorized. The substance of this certificate is set out below.

海外国民的结婚或离婚情形中，埃及领事被授权履行Ma'zun在埃及所承担的相同职能。根据“领事法”第16条（《埃及官方公报》1925年8月13日第78号），领事被授权“起草离婚宣告并证明其真实性……”（第3款）。 记录显示，哈桑先生于1950年12月4日前往纽约的埃及皇家领事馆，在主持领事面前宣告与其埃及妻子不可撤销地离婚。两年后，在为其提交的签证申请中，他提交了一份由埃及领事馆签发的证书，作为其第一次婚姻终止的证据。该证书于1952年11月5日签发，埃及领事在其中证明两年前完成的离婚根据埃及法律有效。上文提到的“领事法”表明，领事以Ma'zun身份作出的这一证明显然是获得授权的。该证书的实质内容列示如下。

This is to certify that Mr. A 0 H was married on December 5th, 1946 at Cairo, EGYPT. to Miss E I A and was divorced from said wife on December 4th, 1950_ This divorce was concluded at the office of the Royal Consulate General of Egypt in New York, U.S.A., in conformity with stipulations of the Egyptian Law and entered in the Divorce Records under No. 20 {Emphasis added.)

兹证明A 0 H 先生于1946年12月5日在埃及开罗与E I A 小姐结婚，并于1950年12月4日与上述妻子离婚。该离婚是在美国纽约埃及皇家总领事馆办公室内，依照埃及法律规定完成的，并登记于离婚记录第20号。（着重号为后加。）

Despite the fact that the certificate recites December 4, 1950, as the date on which the divorce was "concluded" according to Egyptian la-w, counsel maintains that the divorce was not finalized until 1953. In support of this assertion, she had provided a document in Arabic with two English translations. This document, issued by the Shari'a court of Abdeen in Egypt under the seal of the Ministry of Justice, records the remarriage of the beneficiary's first wife by a Ma'zun on February 25, 1953. Both translations state that the bride "was divorced from Mx. Ahmed Osman Hassan on December 4, 1950, in the presence of 1VIr. Ahmed Abdul Aziz Sherif, Consul, at the Consulate General in New York." 2 The translations further state that this divorce was certified or approved by the Egyptian Ministry of Justice on February 24, 1953, the day before the remarriage. On the basis of this document, counsel argues that the divorce was not final and binding upon the beneficiary until it was certified in 1953. More importantly, she argues that when it was certified, it constituted. a

尽管该证书载明1950年12月4日系根据埃及法律离婚"成立"之日，律师仍主张该离婚直至1953年才最终完成。为支持此主张，她提供了一份阿拉伯文文件及两份英文译本。该文件由埃及阿卜丁伊斯兰教法法院签发，加盖司法部印章，记载受益人的第一任妻子于1953年2月25日由一名Ma'zun主持再婚。两份译本均载明，新娘"于1950年12月4日在纽约总领事馆领事1VIr. Ahmed Abdul Aziz Sherif在场的情况下与Mx. Ahmed Osman Hassan离婚"。2 译本进一步载明，该离婚于1953年2月24日即再婚的前一日经埃及司法部认证或批准。 基于该文件，律师主张该离婚直至1953年获认证时才对受益人具有终局性和约束力。更重要的是，她主张该离婚在获认证时构成了一项

"foreign" decree of divorce, recognizable in United States courts under the doctrine of international comity. We cannot agree. Our materials on Egyptian law indicate that the document which counsel has submitted is in the nature of an administrative record. It registers the remarriage of the beneficiary's ex-wife; it also reflects compliance on the part of the Egyptian wife, upon remarriage, with registration requirements contained in the "Ordinance of the Ma'zuns." It does not refer to a certification of the divorce, in the sense of "give effect to"; it simply refers to the registration in the Shari'a court of a divorce obtained abroad. Specifically, the law of Egypt requires the recording or registering of a divorce with a Ma'zun or in a Shari'a court. Article 33 of the "Ordi- nance of the Ma'zuns" reads: If the separation [between the couple] reached the Ma'zun who performed the marriage and he has the register of marriage in his possession, he shall enter the divorce at the bottom of the marriage folio. But if this Ma'zun did not perform [originally] the marriage and the marriage registeris not in his possession, he must im this case notify the Shari'a court or the Ma'run [who performed the marriagelin order to note the divorce in the proper register. This provision is not operative if the marriage resulting in separation did not take place either in Egypt or in the Sudan. [Emphasis added.]

"外国"离婚判决，可依国际礼让原则在美国法院获得承认。我们不能同意。 我们关于埃及法律的资料表明，律师提交的文件性质上属于行政记录。它登记了受益人前妻的再婚；它也反映了埃及妻子在再婚时遵守了"Ma'zun条例"所载的登记要求。它并非指对离婚的认证，即"赋予效力"意义上的认证；它仅指在伊斯兰教法法院登记在境外取得的离婚。 具体而言，埃及法律要求向Ma'zun或在伊斯兰教法法院记录或登记离婚。"Ma'zun条例"第33条规定： 如果[夫妻之间的]分离已告知主持婚姻的Ma'zun且其持有婚姻登记簿，他应当在婚姻卷宗底部记载该离婚。但如果该Ma'zun[最初]并未主持该婚姻且其不持有婚姻登记簿，则在此情况下他必须通知伊斯兰教法法院或[主持婚姻的]Ma'zun，以便在适当登记簿中注明该离婚。 如果导致分离的婚姻既未在埃及也未在苏丹举行，则本条规定不适用。[着重号为原文所加。]

Therefore, although the "Consular Law" empowers the consul to register the divorce when pronounced in a foreign country, the divorce must also be registered with the Ma'zun who performed the marriage or in the appropriate Shari'a court. Moreover, if the divorcee wishes to remarry, Article 28 of the "Ordinance of the Ma'zuns" requires her to prove to the Ma'zun who presides over the marriage ceremony that her divorce from a previous husband has been duly recorded.

因此，尽管"领事法"授权领事在离婚于外国宣告时予以登记，该离婚仍须向主持婚姻的Ma'zun或向适当的伊斯兰教法法院登记。此外，如果离婚者希望再婚，"Ma'zun条例"第28条要求其向主持婚礼的Ma'zun证明其与前夫的离婚已妥为登记。

The document which counsel has provided indicates that the Ma'zun who remarried the beneficiary's first wife was satisfied that her divorce had been properly recorded with the Shari'a court, on the day before he performed the ceremony. As a consequence, there were no instructions from the Shari'a judge indicating that the divorce's validity had been questioned. As Article 28 directs, the Ma'zun noted in the marriage contract, the date and place of the party's divorce. The date given was December 4, 1950; the place, New York. Therefore, after reassessment, we have concluded that the reasoning

律师提供的文件表明，主持受益人第一任妻子再婚的Ma'zun确信其离婚已于其主持仪式前一日在伊斯兰教法法院妥为登记。因此，没有伊斯兰教法法官的指示表明该离婚的有效性受到质疑。按照第28条的指示，Ma'zun在婚姻契约中注明了当事人离婚的日期和地点。所注日期为1950年12月4日；地点为纽约。 因此，经重新评估，我们得出结论认为，上述理由

in Matter of H— , supra, remains sound. Although the document pro- vided by counsel removes all doubt that the divorce was recognized as valid in Egypt, it does not alter our conclusion that "the doctrine of comity would appear to have no application, since, notwithstanding the fact that the divorce occurred in a foreign consulate in the United States, it was not a foreign divorce, and insofar as its recognition by the State of Maryland with respect to the subsequent marriage, is subject only to the requirement of full faith and credit . . . ," Matter of H— , supra, at 472. Hence, while counsel has presented persuasive evidence that the Board erroneously assumed, in Matter of H— , supra, that Mr. Hassan was a resident of New York when he obtained his divorce, we cannot conclude that this evidence impacts on the outcome of the decision. Even if the beneficiary has been a resident of the District of Columbia at all times, the divorce must still be denied recognition. For just as the District must extend its recognition to a decree validly rendered in a sister state, under the doctrine of full faith and credit, so too must it deny recognition to a decree which is void under the law of the jurisdic- tion where it was issued. 3 In an alternative argument, counsel contends that the petitioner need not qualify as a "child" within the statutory definition in order to confer immediate relative status upon his father under section 231(b) of the Act. We cannot agree_ Section 101(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 pro- vided interrelated definitions of the terms "child" and "parent" which would govern their use in Titles I and II of the statute. In Title II of that Act, parents were merely accorded preference status under section 203(a)(2). Moreover, section 203(a)(2) referred only to parents of United States citizens "at least twenty-one years of age," It was not until the term "parent" arose in another context, without the age restrictions, that the Board had an occasion to determine pre- cisely the nature of the interrelationship between the two definitions— parent and child. Matter of G— , 8 I. & N. Dee. 355 (BIA 1959), concerned the use of "parent" within section 7 of the Act of September 11, 1957 (P.L. 85-316). Section 14 of the same Act directed that the definitional provisions contained in subsections (a) and (b) of section 101 of the 1952 Act apply to section 7 of the 1957 law. Therefore, the Board had squarely before it the question of what "circumstances" within section 101(b)(1) lead to the creation of the status of "parent." (See definition of parent in section 101(b)(2).) In light of the steadily liberaliz- ing policy of the Congress to unite and preserve the immigrant's family

在Matter of H—案（同上）中仍然成立。尽管律师提供的文件消除了该离婚在埃及被认定为有效的所有疑问，但它并未改变我们的结论，即"礼让原则似乎不适用，因为尽管该离婚发生在美国境内的外国领事馆，它并非外国离婚，且就其被马里兰州承认用于后续婚姻而言，仅受完全诚信与信用要求的约束……"，Matter of H—案，同上，第472页。 因此，尽管律师提出了有说服力的证据表明委员会在Matter of H—案（同上）中错误地假定Hassan先生在获得离婚时为纽约州居民，但我们不能认为该证据影响裁决结果。即使受益人在所有时候均为哥伦比亚特区居民，该离婚仍必须被拒绝承认。因为正如哥伦比亚特区必须依完全诚信与信用原则对姐妹州有效作出的判决予以承认一样，它也必须对在作出地法域法律下无效的判决拒绝承认。3 在另一项主张中，律师辩称申请人无需符合法定定义中的"子女"资格即可根据该法第231(b)条为其父亲赋予直系亲属身份。我们不能同意。 1952年《移民与国籍法》第101(b)条对"子女"和"父母"二词作出了相互关联的定义，该定义支配其在法规第一编和第二编中的使用。在该法第二编中，父母仅依第203(a)(2)条获得优先身份。此外，第203(a)(2)条仅提及"至少二十一岁"的美国公民的父母。 直到"父母"一词在另一语境中出现且无年龄限制时，委员会才有机会准确判定父母与子女两项定义之间相互关系的性质。Matter of G—案，8 I. & N. Dec. 355（BIA 1959），涉及"父母"一词在1957年9月11日法（P.L. 85-316）第7条中的使用。同一法第14条规定，1952年法第101条(a)款和(b)款所载定义条款适用于1957年法第7条。因此，委员会直接面对的问题是，第101(b)(1)条中的何种"情形"导致"父母"身份的产生。（见第101(b)(2)条中父母的定义。）鉴于国会 steadily 自由化的政策旨在团聚并维护移民的家庭

unit, the Board held that the "circumstances" referred to in section 101(b)(2) referred only to the events in subsections (A) through (E) which create a child-parent relationship. Those circumstances include: a legitimate birth, the creation of a steprelationship, legitimation, il- legitimate birth in relation to the mother, and an adoption. The term "circumstances" does not refer to the words "unmarried" or "under twenty-one years of age." Therefore, "While for immigration purposes a `child' ceases to be a child even if it fits into the various categories when it reaches the age of twenty-one or becomes married, the parent, once the required relationship has been established, always remains a par- ent." Matter of G—, supra, at 359. (Emphasis added.) In dicta, the Board also notcd that if the age and marital restrictions in the definition of child were read into the definition of parent, the provisions in the 1952 Act giving parents a preference would also have to be restricted to the parents of adult unmarried citizens since section 203(a)(2) refers to parents of citizens over 21 but makes no mention of marital status. In light of Congress' clear intent to unite the families of immigrants, such a restriction appeared unwarranted. In keeping with these observations, the Board held in Matter of Schaad, 10 L & N. Dec. 555 (BIA 1964), that a 32-year-old married petitioner could not confer preference status under section 203(a)(2) on her stepfather, because the steprelationship had not been created before the petitioner reached the age of 18, as section 101(b)(1)(B) requires. The petitioner's age and marital status were dearly not relevant to the denial. In 1965, Congress created the provision which the present petitioner invokes to confer immigration benefits upon his father. This provision, section 201(b),4 in effect, reaffirmed the terms of section 203(a)(2) of the 1952 Act while elevating the parents of citizens over 21 from "preferred" to "nonquota" status. Thus, the new amendment enables the parents of adult United States citizens, as well as the spouses and children, to enter this country as "immediate relatives," without numerical limita- tion. As part of Title II of the Act, the new provision's use of the terms "child" and "parent" is governed by the definitions set out In sections 101(b)(1) and (2). 5 Hence, in discussing the applicability of the term

单位，委员会认为第101(b)(2)条所指的"情形"仅指(A)至(E)项中产生子女-父母关系的事件。这些情形包括：婚生子女、继关系的形成、准正、非婚生子女与母亲的关系以及收养。"情形"一词并非指"未婚"或"二十一岁以下"等词语。因此，"虽然就移民目的而言，`子女'即使符合各类情形，一旦年满二十一岁或结婚即不再是子女，但父母一旦确立所需关系，则始终为父母。"Matter of G—案，同上，第359页。（着重号为原文所加。） 在附带意见中，委员会还指出，如果将子女定义中的年龄和婚姻限制读入父母定义，则1952年法中给予父母优先权的条款也将不得不限于成年未婚公民的父母，因为第203(a)(2)条提及21岁以上公民的父母但未提及婚姻状况。鉴于国会团聚移民家庭的明确意图，此种限制似乎缺乏依据。与上述意见一致，委员会在Matter of Schaad案，10 I. & N. Dec. 555（BIA 1964）中认定，一名32岁的已婚申请人不能依第203(a)(2)条为其继父赋予优先身份，因为继关系未在申请人年满18岁之前形成，而第101(b)(1)(B)条有此要求。申请人的年龄和婚姻状况显然与驳回无关。 1965年，国会设立了现任申请人据以向其父亲赋予移民利益的条款。该条款即第201(b)条，4 实际上重申了1952年法第203(a)(2)条的条款，同时将21岁以上公民的父母从"优先"身份提升为"非配额"身份。因此，新修正案使成年美国公民的父母以及配偶和子女能够作为"直系亲属"进入本国，不受数量限制。作为该法第二编的一部分，新条款对"子女"和"父母"二词的使用受第101(b)(1)和(2)条所载定义的支配。5 因此，在讨论该词

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"parent" to the new provision, the Board concluded in Matter of Citino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 427 (BIA 1967), that the decision was governed by our earlier decision construing the interrelationship between the terms "parent" and "child," e.g., Matter of supra. Applying the holding in Matter of G— , supra, to the issue in Citino, we held that the petitioner, a 33-year-old married woman, could confer 201(b) status on her step- mother since the steprelationship had been created within the require- ments of section 101(b)(1)(B). The opposite result was reached in cases involving the same issue when the parent-child relationships were not created in accordance with (A) through (E) of section 101 of the statute. See Matter of Polidoro, 12 L & N. Dec. 353 (BIA 1967), and Matter of Huerta-Leon, Interim Decision 2367 (BIA 1975). We find no support within the statute nor in our decisions for counsel's contention that section 201(b) in Title II of the Act need not be read in conjunction with the definitions in Title I. Inasmuch as the petitioner, in this ease, has never qualified as a "child" for immigration purposes, he cannot bestow immediate relative status, as an adult, upon the ben- eficiary. Accordingly, the appeal will he dismissed . ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

在新条款中加入"父母"，委员会在Matter of Citino案，12 I. & N. Dec. 427（BIA 1967）中得出结论，该决定受我们先前解释"父母"与"子女"这两个术语之间相互关系的裁决所支配，例如，Matter of 同上。将Matter of G—案，同上，的裁决适用于Citino案中的问题，我们认定，申请人，一位33岁的已婚妇女，可以赋予其继母201(b)条身份，因为继关系是在第101(b)(1)(B)条的要求范围内建立的。在涉及同一问题但亲子关系未按照该法规第101条(A)至(E)款建立的情况下，得出了相反的结论。参见Matter of Polidoro案，12 I. & N. Dec. 353（BIA 1967），以及Matter of Huerta-Leon案，临时决定2367（BIA 1975）。 我们在法规中以及我们的裁决中均未找到支持律师主张的依据，即该法案第二编中的第201(b)条无需与第一编中的定义结合解读。鉴于本案中的申请人从未为移民目的取得"子女"资格，他作为成年人不能赋予受益人直系亲属身份。 因此，上诉将被驳回。 命令：上诉驳回。

I concur in that portion of the majority decision which finds that the parent-child relationship under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is governed by the same definition as in the case of an adopted child, Matter of Caramanzana, 12 I. & N. Dec. 47 (BIA 1967), stepchild, Matter of Schaal, 10 I. & N. Dec. 555 (BIA 1964), or son or daughter, Nazarene v. Attorney General of the United States, 512 F.2d 936 (C_A_D_ C. 1975). I also agree that so far as this record is concerned we are confronted with a purely "consular divorce" in the United States, invalid under the law of the State of New York, and one to which full faith and credit could not be given by the District of Columbia.' The Board recognized in the reiterate the fact that the section 101 definitions were automatically applicable to the parts of the new Act which were incorporated into the existing framework of Titles I and II. For the name reason, there was no need to include en express provision ion applying the defini - tions of parent and child to section 201(b), as amended, in 1965, since, the definitions themselves are prefaced with the sentence—"As used in Titles I and II." In short, the absence of a preserving clause cannot be seen as an indication that Congress severed the existing connection between the two provisions.

我同意多数裁决中认定《移民与国籍法》第201(b)条下的亲子关系受与收养子女、Matter of Caramanzana案，12 I. & N. Dec. 47（BIA 1967）、继子女、Matter of Schaal案，10 I. & N. Dec. 555（BIA 1964）、或儿子或女儿、Nazarene v. Attorney General of the United States案，512 F.2d 936（C_A_D_ C. 1975）相同定义支配的那部分。 我也同意，就本记录而言，我们面对的是在美国的一桩纯粹的"领事离婚"，根据纽约州法律无效，且哥伦比亚特区不能给予其完全诚信与信用。'委员会在 重申第101条定义自动适用于新法案中被纳入第一编和第二编现有框架的部分这一事实时予以认可。出于同样的原因，无需在1965年加入一项明示条款将父母和子女的定义适用于经修正的第201(b)条，因为这些定义本身以这样一句话开头——"如用于第一编和第二编。"简言之，保留条款的缺失不能被视为国会切断了这两项条款之间现有联系的迹象。

original Hassan decision (Matter of H—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 470) that the consular decree might well be recognized as valid in Egypt. Petitioner has submitted two widely divergent translations of an Egyptian docu- ment. The net effect of a reading of the translations is that the Egyptian authorities did indeed recognize as valid the divorce obtained in the New York consulate. There is a dirth of any evidence that the parties to the divorce, or their representatives, secured a foreign divorce in a manner which can be recognized here under principles of comity. That should end the inquiry so far as this Board is concerned. The further majority discussion of E gyptian divorce law, is both confusing, and unnecessary, in my opinion- Foreign law is a matter of fact, to be proved as evidence. Here the Board has, on its own, obtained a memorandum of law from the Library of Congress, which it has then proceeded to rely on heavily, adversely to the petitioner—and without showing it to the parties prior to decision. One can recognize the neces- sity for the Board requesting such a memorandum in some cir- cumstances not present here 2 but the practice of rendering an opinion based on the memorandum, without the parties seeing it and having a chance to comment, is most questionable. In addition, it will be noted that the present claim is based on an alleged common-law marriage between Hassan Sr. (the beneficiary) and one Frances Mae, beginning sometime prior to the birth of the peti- tioner in 1953 and allegedly continuing until 1959. Frances Mae Hen- dricks (the petitioner's mother according to his birth certificate) and Frances Robinson (referred to as the petitioner's mother by Hassan Sr.) presumably are one and the same person. However, the record indicates that Frances also had .a prior existing marriage and there is no proof whatsoever of the termination of that marriage. Thus, even assuming the impediment to a common-law marriage ceased as to Hassan Sr., it has not been shown to have ceased as to his claimed, common-law, "wife." Nor has any evidence been submitted to prove a true common- law marriage even assuming no impediment as to either party. With the record in this state, the majority discussion of esoteric Egyptian and Islamic divorce law is a needless exercise, and, since it is based on a Library of Congress memorandum received into evidence at the Board level, without briefing or scrutiny by the parties, it may quite possibly be an erroneous one as well. The case has appealing aspects. The petitioner is a United States Marine Corps veteran who enlisted at the age of 18. It is alleged that the beneficiary supported and raised the petitioner from infancy, and that Hassan, Sr. has been in the United States since 1948. The visa petition was filed as a preliminary to an application for adjustment of status.

最初的Hassan裁决（Matter of H—案，6 I. & N. Dec. 470）认为，该领事判决很可能在埃及被认定为有效。申请人提交了一份埃及文件的两份差异很大的译本。阅读这些译本的净效果是，埃及当局确实承认在纽约领事馆获得的离婚为有效。没有任何证据表明离婚双方或其代表以根据礼让原则可在此承认的方式获得了外国离婚。就本委员会而言，这应当结束调查。在我看来，多数意见对埃及离婚法的进一步讨论既令人困惑，又没有必要。外国法是一个事实问题，须作为证据加以证明。在此，委员会自行从国会图书馆获得了一份法律备忘录，然后大量依赖该备忘录，对申请人不利——而且在裁决前未向双方出示。人们可以理解委员会在某些情况下（本案不存在这种情况）需要请求此类备忘录2，但在双方未看到备忘录且没有机会发表意见的情况下，基于该备忘录作出裁决的做法是非常有问题的。 此外，应当指出，目前的请求是基于Hassan Sr.（受益人）与一位Frances Mae之间据称的事实婚姻，该婚姻始于1953年申请人出生之前的某个时间，并据称持续到1959年。Frances Mae Hendricks（根据其出生证明为申请人的母亲）和Frances Robinson（被Hassan Sr.称为申请人的母亲）大概是同一个人。然而，记录表明Frances还有一段先前存在的婚姻，而且完全没有证据证明该婚姻已终止。因此，即使假设对Hassan Sr.而言事实婚姻的障碍已消除，也未证明对其所称的事实婚姻"妻子"而言该障碍已消除。也没有提交任何证据证明存在真正的事实婚姻，即使假设双方均无障碍。 在记录处于此种状态的情况下，多数意见对深奥的埃及和伊斯兰离婚法的讨论是多余的，而且，由于该讨论基于在委员会层面纳入证据的国会图书馆备忘录，未经双方简报或审查，它很可能也是错误的。 本案有引人同情的方面。申请人是一名美国海军陆战队退伍军人，18岁入伍。据称受益人从申请人婴儿时期起就抚养和养育他，而且Hassan, Sr.自1948年以来一直在美国。该签证申请是作为调整身份申请的前置程序而提交的。

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While the file before us does not purport to examine the good moral character of the beneficiary, so far as known he may be able to qualify for suspension of deportation, and that avenue of relief may be open to him. For the reasons stated, I agree with the majority, that the present petition cannot be approved, but would deny solely because petitioner has failed to sustain his burden under Matter of Brantigan, 11 I. & N. Dec. 493 (BIA 1966).

虽然我们面前的档案并不旨在审查受益人的良好道德品质，但就已知情况而言，他可能能够符合暂停驱逐出境的资格，而且这条救济途径可能对他开放。基于所述理由，我同意多数意见，即目前的申请不能获批，但仅因申请人未能承担Matter of Brantigan案，11 I. & N. Dec. 493（BIA 1966）下的举证责任而予以拒绝。