Matter of Sano

The United States citizen petitioner, now deceased, filed a visa petition on behalf of the beneficiary to accord her immediate rela- tive status as his spouse on May 24, 1983_ The petition was not ap- proved by the time of the petitioner's death on September 14, 1983, and was therefore denied by the district director in a decision dated December 1, 1983. The beneficiary, through counsel, has ap-

现已去世的美国公民申请人于1983年5月24日代表受益人提交了签证申请，以赋予其作为配偶的直系亲属身份。该申请在申请人于1983年9月14日去世时尚未获批，因此被地区主任在1983年12月1日的决定中拒绝。受益人通过律师已

pealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal the beneficiary argues that she should be accorded im- mediate relative status because the Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service unreasonably delayed adjudication of the visa petition. She claims that such actions constitute affirmative misconduct, which warrants a grant of the petition. The Service contends that the beneficiary has no right to appeal the district director's deci- sion following the death of the petitioner and that, in any case, the beneficiary's estoppel argument is without merit. We must first address the question of the beneficiary's standing to pursue this appeal. According to the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(3) (1985), when the district director renders a decision de- nying a visa petition, the "petitioner will be notified of the decision . . . and of the petitioner's right to appeal to the Board. . . ." See also 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(d)(4) (1985). In interpreting this regulation the Board has determined that an appeal from the denial of a visa peti- tion may be filed only by the petitioner. See Mutter of DaBaase, 16 I&N Dec. 720 (BIA 1979); Matter of Kurys, 11 I&N Dec. 315 (BIA 1965); see also Matter of Anabo, 18 I&N Dec. 87 (BIA 1981); Matter of Arteaga-Godoy, 14 I&N Dec. 226 (BIA 1972); lA C. anrdon & a Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 3.5h (rev. ed. 1985). We have likewise held that only the petitioner can appeal from the revocation of a previously approved visa petition. Matter of C-, 9 I&N Dec. 547 (BIA 1962); see also 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(b) (1985). Judicial opinion has been in accord. See Joseph v. Landon, 679 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1982); Scalzo v. Harney, 225 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1963), Nerd per curiam, 388 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849 (1965); see also Wright v. INS, 379 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 928 (1967); Pacheco Pereira v. INS, 342 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1965). But see Horn Sin v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The beneficiary asserts that the Board can assume jurisdiction upon certification pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c) (1985) to avoid the question of the beneficiary's standing to appeal and requests that we do so in this case. She cites our decision in Matter of Varela, 13 I&N Dec. 453 (BIA 1970), where the Board considered a similar appeal by a beneficiary following the petitioner's death. In that case we noted the question of standing but proceeded to decide the issue presented on its merits. We have also previously accepted ju- risdiction upon certification to circumvent the issue of the benefi- ciary's lack of standing. Matter of Artpaga -Codoy, supra. We now find our review in those cases to have been inappropriate. As we recently stated in Matter of Zaidan, 19 I&N Dec. 297 BIA 1985), the Board's appellate jurisdiction is defined by the regula-

对该决定提出上诉。上诉将因缺乏管辖权而被驳回。 在上诉中，受益人主张，由于移民和归化局不合理地延迟审理签证申请，她应被赋予直系亲属身份。她声称此类行为构成积极不当行为， warranting 批准该申请。移民局主张，受益人在申请人去世后无权对地区主任的决定提出上诉，且无论如何，受益人的禁反言论点没有依据。 我们必须首先处理受益人提起本上诉的资格问题。根据8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(3) (1985)的条例，当地区主任作出拒绝签证申请的决定时，“申请人将被告知该决定……以及申请人向委员会上诉的权利……”。另见8 C.F.R. § 204.1(d)(4) (1985)。在解释该条例时，委员会已认定，对签证申请被拒的上诉只能由申请人提出。见Matter of DaBaase, 16 I&N Dec. 720 (BIA 1979)；Matter of Kurys, 11 I&N Dec. 315 (BIA 1965)；另见Matter of Anabo, 18 I&N Dec. 87 (BIA 1981)；Matter of Arteaga-Godoy, 14 I&N Dec. 226 (BIA 1972)；1A C. Gordon & a Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 3.5h (rev. ed. 1985)。我们同样认定，只有申请人可以对先前已批准的签证申请的撤销提出上诉。Matter of C-, 9 I&N Dec. 547 (BIA 1962)；另见8 C.F.R. § 205.2(b) (1985)。司法意见亦持一致立场。见Joseph v. Landon, 679 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1982)；Scalzo v. Harney, 225 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1963)，Nerd per curiam，388 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1964)，cert. denied，382 U.S. 849 (1965)；另见Wright v. INS, 379 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.)，cert. denied，389 U.S. 928 (1967)；Pacheco Pereira v. INS, 342 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1965)。但见Horn Sin v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)。 受益人主张，委员会可以根据8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c) (1985)通过认证取得管辖权，以回避受益人的上诉资格问题，并请求我们在本案中这样做。她援引我们在Matter of Varela, 13 I&N Dec. 453 (BIA 1970)中的决定，该案中委员会在申请人去世后审议了受益人提出的类似上诉。在该案中，我们注意到了资格问题，但继续根据案情裁决所提出的问题。我们此前也曾接受通过认证取得管辖权，以规避受益人缺乏资格的问题。Matter of Arteaga-Godoy，同上。我们现在认为，我们在那些案件中的审查是不适当的。 正如我们最近在Matter of Zaidan, 19 I&N Dec. 297 (BIA 1985)中所指出的，委员会的上诉管辖权由条例

tions set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1985). Unless the regulations af- firmatively grant us power to act in a particular matter, we have no appellate jurisdiction over it. Matter of Sum, 13 I&N Dec. 65 (BIA 1968). Under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)(5) (1985), an appeal will lie to the Board from "[d]ecisions on petitions filed in accordance with section 204 of the act . . . as provided in Parts 204 and 205, respec- tively, of this chapter." (Emphasis added.) As we have noted, the regulations in Part 204 provide solely for an appeal to the Board by the petitioner. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(3) (1985). Inasmuch as the only authority accorded to the Board by the regulations under Part 204 relates to appe-als by the petitioner, we find that our jurisdic- tion. is limited to such appeals. We therefore conclude that we lack jurisdiction to address an appeal by the beneficiary from the denial of a visa petition. CI Matter of Zaidan, supra. To the extent that our decision in Matter of Varela, supra, conflicts with this conclu- sion, it is hereby modified. Since we have not been granted authority by the regulations to review the beneficiary's appeal, we are also unable to assume juris- diction over the matter by certification. The regulation that gives us the power to certify cases permits certification only to matters within our appellate jurisdiction as set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1985). See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c) (1985); Matter of Vrettakos, 14 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1973, 1974). Inasmuch as the Board lacks authority to review an appeal by a beneficiary from the district director's denial of a visa petition, we conclude that we are likewise precluded from certifying such a case. To the extent that Matter of Arteaga-Godoy, supra, is contrary, it is overruled. Accordingly, the beneficiary's appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. As the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, IT IS ORDERED: that the record of proceedings be returned to the local office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service without further action.

8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1985)所载的条例界定。除非条例明确授予我们在特定事项中行事的权力，否则我们对其无上诉管辖权。Matter of Sum, 13 I&N Dec. 65 (BIA 1968)。根据8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)(5) (1985)，可向委员会提出上诉的是“[对]根据该法第204条提交的申请的决定……分别按本章第204部分和第205部分的规定。”（着重号为原文所加。）正如我们已指出的，第204部分的条例仅规定申请人可以向委员会上诉。见8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(3) (1985)。由于第204部分条例赋予委员会的权限仅涉及申请人的上诉，我们认定我们的管辖权仅限于此类上诉。因此，我们得出结论，我们无管辖权处理受益人对签证申请被拒提出的上诉。参见Matter of Zaidan，同上。若我们在Matter of Varela，同上中的决定与本结论相冲突，特此予以修改。 由于条例未授予我们审查受益人上诉的权限，我们亦无法通过认证取得对该事项的管辖权。赋予我们认证案件权力的条例仅允许对属于8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1985)所载我们上诉管辖权范围内的事项进行认证。见8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c) (1985)；Matter of Vrettakos, 14 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1973, 1974)。由于委员会无权审查受益人对地区主任拒绝签证申请提出的上诉，我们得出结论，我们同样被禁止对此类案件进行认证。若Matter of Arteaga-Godoy，同上与此相反，则予以推翻。 因此，受益人的上诉将因缺乏管辖权而被驳回。 由于委员会对该上诉无管辖权， 特此命令：将诉讼记录退回移民和归化局当地办公室，无需进一步行动。