Matter of Konan Waldo Douglas

Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 197 (BIA 2013) Interim Decision #3792

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 197 (BIA 2013) 临时决定 #3792

Decided October 17, 2013

2013年10月17日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室

Board of Immigration Appeals

移民上诉委员会

A child who has satisfied the statutory conditions of former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (2000), before the age of 18 years has acquired United States citizenship, regardless of whether the naturalized parent acquired legal custody of the child before or after the naturalization. Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2008), followed. Jordon v. Attorney General of U.S., 424 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 2005), not followed.

在18岁之前满足《移民与国籍法》前第321(a)条（8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (2000)）法定条件的儿童已获得美国公民身份，无论归化的父母是在归化之前还是之后获得该儿童的法定监护权。遵循 Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2008)。不遵循 Jordon v. Attorney General of U.S., 424 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 2005)。

FOR RESPONDENT: Wayne Sachs, Esquire, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

被申请人代理律师：Wayne Sachs 律师，宾夕法尼亚州费城

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Jeffrey T. Bubier, Senior Attorney

国土安全部代理律师：Jeffrey T. Bubier 高级律师

BEFORE: Board Panel: COLE, PAULEY, and GREER, Board Members.

审理法官：委员会成员 COLE、PAULEY 和 GREER。

PAULEY, Board Member:

PAULEY，委员会成员：

In a decision dated January 15, 2013, an Immigration Judge determined that the respondent did not derive United States citizenship through his mother, incorporating by reference an October 15, 2012, interim decision. The Immigration Judge also sustained the charge of removability against the respondent and ordered him removed to Jamaica. The respondent has appealed, challenging only the denial of his claim to derivative citizenship. The respondent’s appeal will be sustained and the proceedings will be terminated.

在2013年1月15日的决定中，移民法官认定被申请人未通过其母亲获得美国公民身份，并援引了2012年10月15日的临时决定。移民法官还维持了对被申请人的驱逐指控，并命令将其驱逐至牙买加。被申请人提出上诉，仅对其衍生公民身份主张被驳回提出异议。被申请人的上诉将获支持，程序将终止。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. 事实与程序历史

This case is governed by former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (2000), which was in effect at the time relevant to the respondent’s case.1 That section described the conditions

本案受《移民与国籍法》前第321(a)条（8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (2000)）管辖，该条在被申请人案件相关时有效。1 该条描述了条件

1 Former section 321 was repealed and replaced by section 320 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (2012), pursuant to sections 101 and 103 of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631–32 (enacted Oct. 30, 2000), which applies to

1 前第321条被《法案》第320条（8 U.S.C. § 1431 (2012)）废止并取代，依据2000年《儿童公民法》第101和103条，Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631–32（2000年10月30日颁布），该法适用于

(continued . . .)

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under which a child born outside the United States of alien parents automatically acquired citizenship.

根据该条，在美国境外出生、父母为外国人的儿童自动获得公民身份。

The facts in this case are not in dispute. The record reflects that the respondent was born in Jamaica on January 29, 1976, to his married parents, each of whom was a native and citizen of Jamaica. On December 14, 1981, the respondent entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident. The respondent’s mother was naturalized on April 13, 1988. His parents were divorced on July 25, 1990. The respondent became 18 years old in 1994.

本案事实无争议。记录显示，被申请人于1976年1月29日在牙买加出生，其父母已婚，均为牙买加国民和公民。1981年12月14日，被申请人作为合法永久居民进入美国。被申请人的母亲于1988年4月13日归化。其父母于1990年7月25日离婚。被申请人于1994年满18岁。

II. ANALYSIS

II. 分析

Former section 321(a) of the Act provided that citizenship was automatically acquired by a child born outside the United States of alien parents under the following conditions:

《法案》前第321(a)条规定，在美国境外出生、父母为外国人的儿童在以下条件下自动获得公民身份：

(1) The naturalization of both parents; or (2) The naturalization of the surviving parent if one of the parents is deceased; or

(1) 父母双方归化；或 (2) 父母一方死亡时，尚存父母归化；或

(3) The naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents or the naturalization of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation; and if

(3) 父母合法分居时，拥有子女法定监护权的父母归化，或子女为非婚生且亲子关系未通过合法化确立时，母亲归化；且如果

(4) Such naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen years; and

(4) 该归化发生在该子女未满十八岁时；且

(5) Such child is residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent last naturalized under clause (1) of this subsection, or the parent naturalized under clause (2) or (3) of the subsection, or thereafter begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years.

(5) 该子女在根据本款第(1)项最后归化的父母归化时，或根据本款第(2)或(3)项归化的父母归化时，依据合法永久居留的合法入境正在美国居住，或此后在未满十八岁时开始在美国永久居住。

(Emphasis added.) We have held that a child who has satisfied the statutory conditions of former section 321(a) of the Act before the age of 18 years has acquired United States citizenship, regardless of whether the naturalized parent acquired legal custody of the child before or after the naturalization. Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2008). Under our analysis, therefore, the respondent has met the requirements for United States citizenship.

（强调为后加。）我们已裁定，在18岁之前满足《法案》前第321(a)条法定条件的儿童已获得美国公民身份，无论归化的父母是在归化之前还是之后获得该儿童的法定监护权。Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2008)。因此，根据我们的分析，被申请人已满足美国公民身份的要求。

However, according to case law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued prior to our decision, “a child seeking to establish derivative citizenship under § 1432(a) must prove . . . ‘that his _______________________________ individuals who were under the age of 18 on February 27, 2001, its effective date. See generally Matter of Guzman-Gomez, 24 I&N Dec. 824 (BIA 2009).

然而，根据美国第三巡回上诉法院在我们决定之前发布的判例法，“寻求根据§ 1432(a)确立衍生公民身份的儿童必须证明……‘其_______________________________ 在2001年2月27日（其生效日期）未满18岁的个人。参见 Matter of Guzman-Gomez, 24 I&N Dec. 824 (BIA 2009)。

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[parent] was naturalized after a legal separation from his [other parent].’” Jordon v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 424 F.3d 320, 330 (3d Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (quoting Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2005)). The respondent nevertheless argues that Matter of Baires should be followed in the Third Circuit. We agree.

[父母]在与他的[另一方父母]合法分居后归化。’” Jordon v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 424 F.3d 320, 330 (3d Cir. 2005)（原文有改动）（引用 Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2005)）。被申请人仍主张在第三巡回法院应遵循 Matter of Baires。我们同意。

In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court held that where a statute is silent or ambiguous, an agency’s interpretation should be given deference if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. The Court has also emphasized that the Chevron principle of deference must be applied to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions, even where a court has previously issued a contrary decision and believes that its construction is the better one, provided that the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. National Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).

在 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 中，最高法院裁定，当法规沉默或含糊时，如果机构的解释基于对法规的允许性构建，则应给予尊重。法院还强调，Chevron 尊重原则必须适用于机构对含糊法定条款的解释，即使法院此前已作出相反裁决并认为其构建更佳，只要机构的解释合理。National Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)（“法院先前对法规的司法构建优先于原本有权获得 Chevron 尊重的机构构建，仅当先前的法院裁决认为其构建源于法规的明确条款，从而没有给机构自由裁量留下空间时。”）。

The Third Circuit, in concluding that “legal separation must occur prior to naturalization” for a child to derive citizenship in Jordon v. Attorney General of U.S., 424 F.3d at 330, simply reiterated the language it had used in Bagot. However, the court in Bagot did not address the question before us now because the sequence of the legal separation of the parents and the naturalization of one parent was not at issue. In fact, the court stated that the case turned only on whether the father had “legal custody” of the child. Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d at 257.

第三巡回法院在 Jordon v. Attorney General of U.S., 424 F.3d at 330 中得出结论，认为“合法分居必须发生在归化之前”儿童才能衍生公民身份，这仅仅是重申了其在 Bagot 中使用的语言。然而，Bagot 法院并未处理我们现在面临的问题，因为父母的合法分居与一方父母的归化的先后顺序并未成为争议点。事实上，法院指出案件仅取决于父亲是否对该儿童拥有“法定监护权”。Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d at 257。

Before addressing that key issue of legal custody, the court summarized the requirements of former section 321(a)(3) of the Act, noting that the child must first establish that “his father was naturalized after a legal separation from his mother,” a fact that had been conceded. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the court was apparently paraphrasing the statute by using the word “after” as a synonym for the word “when.” However, it engaged in no analysis of the statute’s use of that term in deciding the case.

在解决法定监护权这一关键问题之前，法院概述了《法案》前第321(a)(3)条的要求，指出儿童必须首先证明“其父亲在与母亲合法分居后归化”，这一事实已被承认。Id.（强调为后加）。因此，法院显然是通过使用“after”一词作为“when”的同义词来转述法规。然而，它在裁决案件时并未对法规使用该术语进行分析。

The intent of Congress is presumed to be expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); Matter of Otiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). The word “when” is not defined in the Act and has no “plain meaning” in legal lexicon. According to Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1341 (10th ed. 2004), “when” has various meanings in different contexts,

国会的意图被推定通过所用词语的通常含义来表达。INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); Matter of Otiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013)。“when”一词在《法案》中未定义，在法律词汇中没有“明确含义”。根据 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1341 (10th ed. 2004)，“when”在不同语境中有多种含义，

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including “at or during which time,” “while,” “if,” and “although.” It can be used as an adverb indicating time or a conjunction indicating condition. Id.

包括“在或在此期间”、“当……时”、“如果”和“虽然”。它可以用作表示时间的副词或表示条件的连词。Id.

The Third Circuit’s judicial construction of former section 321(a)(3) in Bagot was not concerned with the temporal occurrence of the legal custody of the child, and there is no indication that it interpreted the statute to be unambiguous. See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that “a provision is ambiguous when, despite a studied examination of the statutory context, the natural reading of a provision remains elusive”); see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”); Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2001). Having considered that the word “when” can have a number of different possible meanings, we conclude that the use of that term in former section 321(a)(3) is ambiguous. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.27 (1985) (stating that words are “ambiguous” if they are “reasonably susceptible of different interpretations”); Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 518 (2009) (finding a provision ambiguous where it was not “clear that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue”).

第三巡回法院在 Bagot 中对前第321(a)(3)条的司法构建并未关注儿童法定监护权的时间发生，也没有迹象表明其将法规解释为明确无误。参见 In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004)（指出“当尽管对法规上下文进行了仔细审查，条款的自然解读仍然难以捉摸时，该条款就是含糊的”）；另见 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)（“法定语言的明确性或含糊性通过参考语言本身、使用该语言的具体上下文以及法规整体的更广泛上下文来确定。”）；Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2001)。考虑到“when”一词可以有多种不同可能的含义，我们得出结论，前第321(a)(3)条中该术语的使用是含糊的。参见 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.27 (1985)（指出如果词语“合理可作不同解释”，则它们是“含糊的”）；Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2005)；另见 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 518 (2009)（在“不清楚国会是否对争议的精确问题有意图”的情况下认定条款含糊）。

As to the reasonableness of our construction of former section 321(a)(3) in Matter of Baires, we continue to consider our original analysis to be sound. In Baires we relied on a decision of the Commissioner of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, a policy statement in a Department of State Passport Bulletin, and an interpretation of the statute in the Adjudicator’s Field Manual of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. See Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec. at 469–70. Each of those sources supported the conclusion that a child may derive citizenship if the parent is awarded legal custody of the child after that parent’s naturalization, as long as both actions occur before the child reaches the age of 18 years.

关于我们在 Matter of Baires 中对前第321(a)(3)条构建的合理性，我们仍然认为我们最初的分析是合理的。在 Baires 中，我们依据了前移民和归化局局长的决定、国务院护照公告中的政策声明以及美国公民及移民服务局《裁决者现场手册》中对法规的解释。参见 Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec. at 469–70。这些来源中的每一个都支持以下结论：如果父母在该父母归化后获得子女的法定监护权，只要两者都发生在子女年满18岁之前，子女就可以衍生公民身份。

In reviewing this issue, we have also now examined the legislative history of the statutory provision. As originally enacted, the statute stated the following:

在审查此问题时，我们现在还审查了法定条款的立法历史。该法规最初颁布时规定如下：

That a child born without the United States of alien parents shall be deemed a citizen of the United States by virtue of the naturalization of or resumption of American citizenship by the parent: Provided, That such naturalization or resumption takes place during the minority of such child: And provided further, That the citizenship of such minor child shall begin at the time such minor child begins to reside permanently in the United States.

在美国境外出生、父母为外国人的儿童，应因父母归化或恢复美国公民身份而被视为美国公民：但条件是该归化或恢复发生在该儿童未成年期间：并进一步条件是，该未成年儿童的公民身份应自该未成年儿童开始在美国永久居住时开始。

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Act of Mar. 2, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-193, § 5, 34 Stat. 1228, 1229. Thus, the statute had no legal custody requirement and only provided that the naturalization must have occurred while the child was a minor. Following its significant amendment in 1940, this provision was in the same statutory format and contained essentially the same requirements as former section 321(a)(3) of the Act. See Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 314, 54 Stat. 1137, 1145–46. It was revised again in 1952 and 1978, but those amendments are not pertinent to the part of the statute we consider here. See Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-417, § 5, 92 Stat. 917, 918; Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 321(a), 66 Stat. 163, 245 (1952). Our review of the legislative history of each of these enactments does not reveal anything relevant to the question now before us. Furthermore, aside from the Third Circuit’s opinions, we are aware of no case law that is contrary to our holding in Matter of Baires.

1907年3月2日法案，Pub. L. No. 59-193, § 5, 34 Stat. 1228, 1229。因此，该法规没有法定监护要求，仅规定入籍必须发生在子女未成年时。在1940年重大修订后，该条款采用相同的法规格式，并包含与法案前第321(a)(3)条基本相同的要件。见1940年国籍法，Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 314, 54 Stat. 1137, 1145–46。该条款在1952年和1978年再次修订，但这些修订与我们在此审议的法规部分无关。见1978年10月5日法案，Pub. L. No. 95-417, § 5, 92 Stat. 917, 918；移民与国籍法，Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 321(a), 66 Stat. 163, 245 (1952)。我们对每个这些立法的立法历史的审查未发现与当前问题相关的任何内容。此外，除了第三巡回法院的意见外，我们不知道有任何判例法与我们在Matter of Baires中的裁决相反。

In summary, we have found nothing in the legislative history of former section 321(a)(3) of the Act or the case law interpreting it that is inconsistent with or counsels against our conclusion in Matter of Baires. We continue to believe that Congress’ intent was to accord a child United States citizenship, regardless of whether the naturalized parent acquired legal custody of the child before or after the naturalization, so long as the statutory conditions were satisfied before the child reached the age of 18.

总之，我们在法案前第321(a)(3)条的立法历史或解释它的判例法中未发现任何与我们在Matter of Baires中的结论不一致或建议反对的内容。我们仍然认为，国会的意图是赋予子女美国公民身份，无论入籍父母是在入籍之前还是之后获得子女的法定监护权，只要法定条件在子女年满18岁之前得到满足。

Since we find that former section 321(a)(3) of the Act is ambiguous and that our interpretation of it is reasonable, we respectfully decline to follow the Third Circuit’s case law to the contrary and will apply our holding in Matter of Baires to cases arising in that circuit. See National Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 982; see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999). We note that “this result will promote national unity” in the application of the statute. Matter of M-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 46, 49 (BIA 2012).

由于我们认定法案前第321(a)(3)条存在歧义，且我们对它的解释是合理的，我们恭敬地拒绝遵循第三巡回法院相反的判例法，并将把我们在Matter of Baires中的裁决适用于该巡回法院产生的案件。见National Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 982；另见INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999)。我们注意到，在法规适用中“这一结果将促进国家统一”。Matter of M-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 46, 49 (BIA 2012)。

In light of our disposition, we need not address the other arguments raised on appeal. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be sustained and the proceedings will be terminated.

鉴于我们的处理，我们无需处理上诉中提出的其他论点。因此，应支持答辩人的上诉，并终止程序。

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