Matter of Avetisyan

Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012) Interim Decision #3740

引用为 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012) 临时决定第3740号

Decided January 31, 2012

2012年1月31日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室

Board of Immigration Appeals

移民上诉委员会

(1) Pursuant to the authority delegated by the Attorney General and the responsibility

(1) 依据司法部长授予的权力以及

to exercise that authority with independent judgment and discretion, the Immigration Judges and the Board may administratively close removal proceedings, even if a party opposes, if it is otherwise appropriate under the circumstances. Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 1996), overruled.

以独立判断和裁量行使该权力的责任，移民法官和委员会可以行政关闭驱逐程序，即使一方当事人反对，如果根据具体情况另行适当。Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 1996)，被推翻。

(2) In determining whether administrative closure of proceedings is appropriate, an Immigration Judge or the Board should weigh all relevant factors, including but not limited to: (1) the reason administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to administrative closure; (3) the likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other action he or she is pursuing outside of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5) the responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate outcome of removal proceedings (for example, termination of the proceedings or entry of a removal order) when the case is recalendared before the Immigration Judge or the appeal is reinstated before the Board.

(2) 在确定行政关闭程序是否适当时，移民法官或委员会应权衡所有相关因素，包括但不限于：(1) 寻求行政关闭的原因；(2) 反对行政关闭的任何依据；(3) 被申请人在驱逐程序之外正在寻求的任何请愿、申请或其他行动中获得成功的可能性；(4) 关闭的预期持续时间；(5) 任何一方对造成当前或预期延迟的责任（如有）；以及 (6) 当案件在移民法官面前重新排期或上诉在委员会面前恢复时，驱逐程序的最终结果（例如，程序终止或驱逐令的作出）。

FOR RESPONDENT: Pro se

代表被申请人：自行代理

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Wendy L. Wallace, Assistant Chief Counsel

代表国土安全部：Wendy L. Wallace，助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: BoardPanel: MILLER,ADKINS-BLANCH,andGUENDELSBERGER,Board Members.

审理：委员会小组：MILLER、ADKINS-BLANCH 和 GUENDELSBERGER，委员会成员。

MILLER, Board Member:

MILLER，委员会成员：

In a decision dated June 25, 2009, an Immigration Judge administratively closed the removal proceedings against the respondent. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has filed this interlocutory appeal from that decision. To avoid piecemeal review of the myriad questions that may arise in the course of proceedings before us, we do not ordinarily entertain interlocutoryappeals. See Matter of Ruiz-Campuzano, 17 I&N Dec. 108 (BIA 1979). We have, however, on occasion ruled on the merits of interlocutory appeals where we deemed it necessary to address important jurisdictional questions regarding the administration of the immigration laws or to correct

在2009年6月25日的决定中，一名移民法官行政关闭了对被申请人的驱逐程序。国土安全部（“DHS”）对该决定提起了本次中间上诉。为避免对我们面前程序中可能出现的众多问题进行零散审查，我们通常不受理中间上诉。见 Matter of Ruiz-Campuzano, 17 I&N Dec. 108 (BIA 1979)。然而，我们有时会在认为有必要处理有关移民法实施的重要管辖权问题或纠正

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recurring problems in the handling of cases by Immigration Judges. See, e.g., Matter of Guevara, 20 I&N Dec. 238 (BIA 1990, 1991); Matter of Dobere, 20 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 1990). Inasmuch as this appeal raises an important question regarding the administration of proceedings under our immigration laws, we will address it. The appeal will be dismissed.

移民法官处理案件中反复出现的问题时，对中间上诉的实体问题作出裁决。见，例如，Matter of Guevara, 20 I&N Dec. 238 (BIA 1990, 1991)；Matter of Dobere, 20 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 1990)。鉴于本上诉提出了关于根据我们的移民法实施程序的重要问题，我们将予以处理。上诉将被驳回。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. 事实和程序历史

The respondent is a native and citizen of Armenia. On April 21, 2004, the DHS personally served the respondent with a Notice to Appear (Form I-862), which alleged that she was admitted to the United States on or about March 8, 2003, as a nonimmigrant J-1 exchange visitor for special studies and that her participation in the program ended on March 30, 2003. The Notice to Appear charged that the respondent was removable under section 237(a)(1)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2000), as a nonimmigrant who failed to maintain or complywith the conditions of the status under which she was admitted. At a hearing on June 3, 2004, the respondent admitted the factual allegations and conceded the charge but indicated that she wished to apply for relief from removal.

被申请人是亚美尼亚本土公民。2004年4月21日，DHS亲自向被申请人送达了出庭通知（表格 I-862），该通知指称她于2003年3月8日前后作为非移民 J-1 交流访问者入境美国进行特殊学习，且她参与该项目于2003年3月30日结束。出庭通知指控被申请人根据《移民和国籍法》第237(a)(1)(C)(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2000)，作为未能维持或遵守其入境身份条件的非移民而可被驱逐。在2004年6月3日的听证会上，被申请人承认了事实指称并承认了指控，但表示她希望申请免于驱逐的救济。

At a subsequent hearing on November 15, 2006, the respondent advised the Immigration Judge that she had recentlymarried, that she and her husband had a United States citizen child, and that her husband was in the process of becoming a naturalized United States citizen and would be filing a visa petition on her behalf. The Immigration Judge continued the hearing for proof of the husband’s naturalization and filing of the visa petition.

在2006年11月15日的后续听证会上，被申请人告知移民法官她最近结婚了，她和丈夫有一个美国公民子女，她的丈夫正在办理归化为美国公民的手续，并将代表她提交签证申请。移民法官因丈夫归化证明和签证申请提交而延期听证。

At the next hearing on February 14, 2007, the respondent presented proof that the visa petition was filed on January 29, 2007, but indicated that her husband had not yet been sworn in as a citizen. The Immigration Judge again continued the proceedings. On June 14, 2007, the respondent informed the Immigration Judge that her husband had become a citizen and that they had been interviewed in connection with the visa petition on May 30, 2007, but thatadditional documents had been requested.1 During continuedproceedings on September 25, 2007, the respondent stated that she had provided all of the requested documents and was awaiting adjudication of the visa petition.

在2007年2月14日的下一次听证会上，被申请人出示了签证申请于2007年1月29日提交的证明，但表示她的丈夫尚未宣誓成为公民。移民法官再次延期程序。2007年6月14日，被申请人告知移民法官她的丈夫已成为公民，他们已于2007年5月30日就签证申请接受了面谈，但被要求提供额外文件。1 在2007年9月25日的继续程序中，被申请人表示她已提供了所有要求的文件，正在等待签证申请的裁决。

The Immigration Judge granted five additional continuances for the adjudication of the pending visa petition. During the December 11, 2007, hearing, counsel for the DHS indicated that she did not have the file and that it was possibly with the visa petition unit. On April 15, 2008, counsel for the

移民法官又批准了五次延期以裁决待决的签证申请。在2007年12月11日的听证会上，DHS的律师表示她没有案卷，案卷可能在签证申请部门。2008年4月15日，

1 Although the record before us does not include the husband’s certificate of naturalization, there is no allegation from the DHS that he is not now a United States citizen.

1 尽管我们面前的记录不包括丈夫的归化证书，但DHS没有指称他现在不是美国公民。

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DHS explained that the file was being transferred back and forth for each hearing before the Immigration Judge. At that time, the respondent sought administrative closure of the case pending the adjudication of the visa petition, to which the DHS counsel objected.

DHS的律师解释说，案卷在移民法官每次听证会前来回转移。当时，被申请人寻求在签证申请裁决期间行政关闭案件，DHS律师对此表示反对。

Two subsequent hearings were held on January 5, 2009, and April 21, 2009. During the final hearing on June 25, 2009, the respondent again asked that proceedings be administratively closed. The DHS counsel opposed administrative closure and requested one additional continuance. The Immigration Judge denied the DHS’s request and administratively closed the proceedings.

随后于2009年1月5日和2009年4月21日举行了两次听证会。在2009年6月25日的最终听证会上，被申请人再次要求行政关闭程序。DHS律师反对行政关闭并要求再延期一次。移民法官拒绝了DHS的请求并行政关闭了程序。

II. ISSUE

II. 问题

The issue before us is whether an Immigration Judge or the Board has the authority to administratively close a case if either party to the proceeding opposes. We review this question of law de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2011).

我们面前的问题是，如果程序的任何一方当事人反对，移民法官或委员会是否有权行政关闭案件。我们重新审查这一法律问题。8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2011)。

III. ANALYSIS

III. 分析

Administrative closure is a procedural tool created for the convenience of the Immigration Courts and the Board.2 Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479, 480 (BIA 1996). In Gutierrez, we held that a case may not be administratively closed if either of the parties has opposed. We now find that it is improper to afford absolute deference to a party’s objection, and we hold that an Immigration Judge or the Board has the authority to administratively close a case, even if a party opposes, if it is otherwise appropriate under the circumstances.

行政关闭是为移民法院和委员会便利而创设的程序工具。2 Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479, 480 (BIA 1996)。在 Gutierrez 中，我们裁定如果任何一方当事人反对，案件不得行政关闭。我们现在认为，对一方当事人的反对给予绝对尊重是不适当的，我们裁定移民法官或委员会有权行政关闭案件，即使一方当事人反对，如果根据具体情况另行适当。

A. Authority of the DHS, the Immigration Judge, and the Board

A. DHS、移民法官和委员会的权力

Immigration proceedings are civil proceedings undertaken to determine an individual’s eligibility to remain in the United States. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 462 (BIA 2011). The DHS is invested with the sole discretion

移民程序是为确定个人是否有资格留在美国而进行的民事程序。见 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)；Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 462 (BIA 2011)。DHS被赋予唯一的裁量权

2 Administrative closure is not limited to the immigration context. It is utilized throughout the Federal court system, under a variety of names, as a tool for managing a court’s docket. See St. Marks Place Hous. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 610 F.3d 75, 80-81 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Ali v. Quarterman, 607 F.3d 1046, 1047-48 (5th Cir. 2010); Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Mapp, 521 F.3d 290, 295-96 (4th Cir. 2008); CitiFinancial Corp. v. Harrison, 453 F.3d 245, 250-51& nn.11-13 (5th Cir. 2006).

2 行政关闭不限于移民领域。它在整个联邦法院系统中以各种名称被用作管理法院案卷的工具。见 St. Marks Place Hous. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 610 F.3d 75, 80-81 (D.C. Cir. 2010)；Ali v. Quarterman, 607 F.3d 1046, 1047-48 (5th Cir. 2010)；Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Mapp, 521 F.3d 290, 295-96 (4th Cir. 2008)；CitiFinancial Corp. v. Harrison, 453 F.3d 245, 250-51 & nn.11-13 (5th Cir. 2006)。

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to commence removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (2011); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.6(a) (2011). Removal proceedings are commenced by the filing of a notice to appear with the Immigration Court, with service on the respondent. Section 239 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1 (2011). Prior to the commencement of proceedings, the DHS may cancel a notice to appear for specified reasons. 8 C.F.R. §§ 239.2(a), 1239.2(a) (2011). Thereafter, the DHS may move to dismiss proceedings on any ground that mayhave warranted cancelling the notice to appear. 8 C.F.R. §§ 239.2(c), 1239.2(c).

启动驱逐程序。见 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (2011)；另见 8 C.F.R. § 235.6(a) (2011)。驱逐程序通过向移民法院提交出庭通知并向被申请人送达而启动。《法》第239条，8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2006)；8 C.F.R. § 1239.1 (2011)。在程序启动之前，DHS可以因特定原因取消出庭通知。8 C.F.R. §§ 239.2(a), 1239.2(a) (2011)。此后，DHS可以以任何可能 warrant 取消出庭通知的理由动议驳回程序。8 C.F.R. §§ 239.2(c), 1239.2(c)。

Once the notice to appear is filed with the Immigration Court, jurisdiction over proceedings vests with the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2011). In immigration proceedings, it is the Immigration Judge’s responsibility to determine whether the respondent is subject to removal as charged in the notice to appear and to adjudicate the respondent’s application for relief from removal, if any. Sections 240(a)(3), (c)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(a)(3), (c)(1)(A) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.1(a)(1)(i), 1240.11 (2011). In conducting proceedings, an Immigration Judge exercises the powers and duties delegated by law and by the Attorney General of the United States through regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2011). An Immigration Judge has the authority to regulate the course of the hearing and to take any action consistent with applicable law and regulations as may be appropriate. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.1(a)(1)(iv), (c). In deciding individual cases, an Immigration Judge must exercise his or her independent judgment and discretion and may take any action consistent with the Act and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b).

一旦出庭通知提交给移民法院，对程序的管辖权归属于移民法官。8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2011)。在移民程序中，移民法官有责任确定被申请人是否如出庭通知所指控的那样可被驱逐，并裁决被申请人免于驱逐的申请（如有）。《法》第240(a)(3)、(c)(1)(A)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(a)(3), (c)(1)(A) (2006)；8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.1(a)(1)(i), 1240.11 (2011)。在进行程序时，移民法官行使法律和美国司法部长通过法规授予的权力和职责。8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2011)。移民法官有权管理听证进程并采取与适用法律和法规一致的任何适当行动。8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.1(a)(1)(iv), (c)。在裁决个别案件时，移民法官必须行使独立判断和裁量，并可以采取与《法》和法规一致、对此类案件的处理适当且必要的任何行动。8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b)。

The Board is similarly empowered by the Attorney General through regulation to resolve the questions before it on appeal in a manner that is timely, impartial, and consistent with the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). Board Members must exercise independent judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases coming before them, and they may take any action consistent with their authority under the Act and the regulations as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii).

委员会同样由司法部长通过法规授权，以及时、公正且符合《法》的方式解决其面前的上诉问题。8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)。委员会成员在审议和裁决提交给他们的案件时必须行使独立判断和裁量，并且可以采取与其根据《法》和法规的权限一致、对案件处理适当且必要的任何行动。8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii)。

During the course of proceedings, an Immigration Judge or the Board may find it necessary or, in the interests of justice and fairness to the parties, prudent to defer further action for some period of time. One option available to an Immigration Judge is a continuance. Because it keeps a case on the Immigration Judge’s active calendar, a continuance may be appropriately utilized to await additional action required of the parties that will be, or is expected to be, completed within a reasonably certain and brief amount of time. Pursuant to regulation, a continuance may be granted at the

在程序进行期间，移民法官或委员会可能认为有必要，或为了当事人的利益和公平，谨慎地推迟进一步行动一段时间。移民法官可用的一个选项是延期。由于延期使案件保留在移民法官的活跃日程上，延期可适当地用于等待要求当事人采取的额外行动，该行动将在合理确定且短暂的时间内完成或预计完成。根据法规，延期可在

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Immigration Judge’s own instance or, for good cause shown, upon the request of a party. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.29, 1240.6 (2011); see also Matter of Silva-Rodriguez, 20 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1992); Matter of Perez-Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 433 (BIA 1987); Matter of Sibrun, 18 I&N Dec. 354 (BIA 1983).

移民法官自行决定，或经一方当事人请求并说明正当理由。8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.29, 1240.6 (2011)；另见 Matter of Silva-Rodriguez, 20 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1992)；Matter of Perez-Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 433 (BIA 1987)；Matter of Sibrun, 18 I&N Dec. 354 (BIA 1983)。

Administrative closure, which is available to an Immigration Judge and the Board, is used to temporarily remove a case from an Immigration Judge’s active calendar or from the Board’s docket. Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. at 480. In general, administrative closure may be appropriate to await an action or event that is relevant to immigration proceedings but is outside the control of the parties or the court and may not occur for a significant or undetermined period of time.3

行政关闭，可由移民法官和委员会使用，用于将案件暂时从移民法官的活跃日程或委员会的待审案件中移除。Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 第480页。一般而言，行政关闭可能适合等待与移民程序相关但超出当事人或法院控制且可能在相当长或不确定期间内不会发生的行动或事件。3

The Board’s published jurisprudence on the issue of administrative closure began in the context of in absentia cases. In Matter of Amico, 19 I&N Dec. 652, 653 (BIA 1988), the Immigration Judge administratively closed the case over the objection of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) when the alien failed to appear for the last hearing scheduled in deportation proceedings, which had already been continued several times and in which deportabilityhad been established. We found that administrative closure was inappropriate under the circumstances, where the record at that time indicated that all notice requirements had been met and where administrativelyclosing the caseallowedthealien, bysimplyfailing to appear, to avoid an order regarding his deportability and all of the associated consequences. Id. at 654; see also Matter of Lopez-Barrios, 20 I&N Dec. 203, 204 (BIA 1990); Matter of Rosales, 19 I&N Dec. 655, 656 (BIA 1988).

委员会关于行政关闭问题的已公布判例始于缺席案件背景。在 Matter of Amico, 19 I&N Dec. 652, 653 (BIA 1988) 中，移民法官不顾前移民和归化局（“INS”）的反对，在外国人未能出席驱逐程序中最后一次预定的听证会时行政关闭了案件，该听证会已多次延期且驱逐可能性已确立。我们认定，在当时情况下行政关闭不适当，因为当时的记录表明所有通知要求均已满足，且行政关闭案件使外国人仅通过不出庭即可避免关于其驱逐可能性的命令及所有相关后果。Id. 第654页；另见 Matter of Lopez-Barrios, 20 I&N Dec. 203, 204 (BIA 1990)；Matter of Rosales, 19 I&N Dec. 655, 656 (BIA 1988)。

In Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. at 480, we stated a general rule that “[a] case may not be administratively closed if opposed by either of the parties.” This statement, which has been interpreted as investing a party, typically the DHS, with absolute veto power over administrative closure requests, is troubling in a number of respects. First, in Gutierrez, we had administrativelyclosedthealien’sappealpursuanttothesettlementagreement in American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991), so that she could applyfor temporaryprotected status, and the issue was whether the alien could obtain reopening of proceedings to pursue an application for adjustment of status when there had been no request for the Board to reinstate the appeal or for the Immigration Judge to recalendar the case. There was no issue as to the propriety of administrative closure and

在 Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 第480页中，我们陈述了一项一般规则：“如果任何一方反对，案件不得行政关闭。”该陈述被解释为赋予一方（通常是DHS）对行政关闭请求的绝对否决权，这在多个方面令人不安。首先，在 Gutierrez 中，我们根据 American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) 中的和解协议行政关闭了外国人的上诉，以便她可以申请临时保护身份，问题在于当没有请求委员会恢复上诉或移民法官重新安排案件日历时，外国人是否可以获得重新开案以寻求调整身份申请。关于行政关闭的适当性没有争议，且

3 Outside the immigration context, see, for example, Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Mapp, 521 F.3d at 293-96, discussing a Federal district court’s administrative closure of the indemnificationportionofadeclaratoryjudgmentactionbetweentheinsurerandtheinsured pending the resolution of the factual dispute in the State court suit between the insured and an accident victim.

3 在移民语境之外，例如见 Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Mapp, 521 F.3d 第293-96页，讨论联邦地区法院在保险人与被保险人之间宣告性判决诉讼中对赔偿部分的行政关闭，等待被保险人与事故受害者之间州法院诉讼中事实争议的解决。

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no indication that administrative closure had ever been opposed. Also, there was no concern that the alien would improperly benefit from administrative closure, as in the in absentia context in Matter of Amico.

没有迹象表明行政关闭曾被反对。此外，没有担心外国人会不当受益于行政关闭，如 Matter of Amico 中的缺席语境。

More importantly, the rule stated in Gutierrez directly conflicts with the delegated authority of the Immigration Judges and the Board and their responsibilityto exercise independent judgment and discretion in adjudicating cases and to take any action necessary and appropriate for the disposition of the case. The circuit courts and the Board have rejected the notion that a party to proceedings may exercise absolute veto power over the authority of an Immigration Judge or the Board to act in proceedings involving motions to reopen or requests for continuances.

更重要的是，Gutierrez 中陈述的规则直接与移民法官和委员会的授权权限及其在裁决案件中行使独立判断和自由裁量权以及采取任何必要和适当行动处理案件的责任相冲突。巡回法院和委员会已拒绝当事人可以在涉及重新开案动议或延期请求的程序中对移民法官或委员会的权力行使绝对否决权的观念。

Specifically, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have criticized our decision in Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec. 253, 256-57 (BIA 2002), where we listed five factors required for granting a motion to reopen to apply for adjustment of status based on a pending family-based visa petition, one of which was the Government’s lack of opposition to the motion. Ahmed v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 2008); Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 50-52 (2d Cir. 2008); Sarr v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 354, 363-64 (6th Cir. 2007). The courts indicated that permitting the DHS to unilaterally block such a motion to reopen interfered with the Board’s exercise of its independent judgment and discretion.

具体而言，美国第二、第六和第九巡回上诉法院批评了我们在 Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec. 253, 256-57 (BIA 2002) 中的决定，其中我们列出了批准基于待决家庭类签证申请调整身份的重新开案动议所需的五个因素，其中之一是政府不反对该动议。Ahmed v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 2008)；Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 50-52 (2d Cir. 2008)；Sarr v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 354, 363-64 (6th Cir. 2007)。法院表示，允许DHS单方面阻止此类重新开案动议干扰了委员会行使独立判断和自由裁量权。

Following the reasoning in those cases, we held in Matter of Lamus, 25 I&N Dec. 61, 64-65 (BIA 2009), that a motion to reopen under Matter of Velarde may not be denied based solely on DHS opposition to the motion and without regard to the merit of that opposition. Rather, arguments advanced in opposition to a motion should be considered but should not preclude an Immigration Judge or the Board from exercising independent judgment and discretion in adjudicating that motion. Id. at 65.

遵循这些案件的推理，我们在 Matter of Lamus, 25 I&N Dec. 61, 64-65 (BIA 2009) 中认定，根据 Matter of Velarde 提出的重新开案动议不得仅基于DHS反对该动议且不考虑该反对的实质而予以拒绝。相反，反对动议提出的论点应予以考虑，但不应阻止移民法官或委员会在裁决该动议时行使独立判断和自由裁量权。Id. 第65页。

In Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 790-91 (BIA 2009), we addressed the issue in the context of DHS opposition to a request for a continuance, enumerating nonexclusive factors for an Immigration Judge to address when considering a request for a continuance pending the adjudication of a family-based visa petition, which included the reasonableness of anyDHS opposition to a continuance. We specifically stated that unsupported DHS opposition does not carry much weight and that an Immigration Judge should evaluate the DHS’s objection considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 791; see also Malilia v. Holder, 632 F.3d 598, 606 (9th Cir. 2011) (approving of the factors set forth in Matter of Hashmi). In Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127, 135-36 (BIA 2009), we endorsed the same factors for

在 Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 790-91 (BIA 2009) 中，我们在DHS反对延期请求的背景下处理了该问题，列举了移民法官在考虑因家庭类签证申请待决而请求延期时应处理的非排他性因素，其中包括DHS对延期的任何反对的合理性。我们特别指出，无支持的DHS反对没有多大分量，移民法官应在考虑全部情况后评估DHS的反对意见。Id. 第791页；另见 Malilia v. Holder, 632 F.3d 598, 606 (9th Cir. 2011)（批准 Matter of Hashmi 中列出的因素）。在 Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127, 135-36 (BIA 2009) 中，我们认可了相同的因素用于

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consideration when the request for a continuance relates to a pending employment-based visa petition.4

在延期请求与待决就业类签证申请相关时予以考虑。4

As with a motion to reopen or a request for continuance, we are persuaded that neither an Immigration Judge nor the Board may abdicate the responsibility to exercise independent judgment and discretion in a case by permitting a party’s opposition to act as an absolute bar to administrative closure of that case when circumstances otherwise warrant such action. Accordingly, we hold that the Immigration Judges and the Board have the authority, in the exercise of independent judgment and discretion, to administratively close proceedings under appropriate circumstances, even if a party opposes. To the extent that Matter of Gutierrez and related cases hold, or may be construed to hold, otherwise, we now overrule them. Inasmuch as the circuit courts that have addressed the matter have generally deferred, either explicitly or implicitly, to our decision in Gutierrez, we find no legal authority from those courts that constrains us from overruling our decision. See Vahora v. Holder, 626 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2010); Cantu-Delgadillo v. Holder, 584 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2009); Lopez-Reyes v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007); Garza-Moreno v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 239 (6th Cir. 2007); Perez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159, 1161 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003).

如同重新开案动议或延期请求，我们确信移民法官和委员会均不得通过允许一方的反对在情况否则需要此类行动时作为对该案件行政关闭的绝对障碍，来放弃在案件中行使独立判断和自由裁量权的责任。因此，我们认定，移民法官和委员会有权在行使独立判断和自由裁量权时，在适当情况下行政关闭程序，即使一方反对。在 Matter of Gutierrez 及相关案件认定或可能被解释为认定相反的范围内，我们现在推翻它们。鉴于处理该事项的巡回法院一般已明确或默示遵从我们在 Gutierrez 中的决定，我们未发现来自这些法院的法律权威限制我们推翻我们的决定。见 Vahora v. Holder, 626 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2010)；Cantu-Delgadillo v. Holder, 584 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2009)；Lopez-Reyes v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007)；Garza-Moreno v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 239 (6th Cir. 2007)；Perez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2007)；另见 Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159, 1161 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003)。

In reaching this decision, we have considered the respective roles and responsibilities of the DHS, the Immigration Judges, and the Board in removal proceedings. The DHS exercises its prosecutorial discretion when it decides whether to commence removal proceedings and what charges to lodge against a respondent. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). Neither an Immigration Judge nor the Board may review a decision by the DHS to institute proceedings. Matter of Bahta, 22 I&N Dec. 1381, 1391 (BIA 2000). However, once jurisdiction over removal proceedings vests with the Immigration Judge, he or she has the authority to regulate the course of those proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14(a), 1240.1(a)(1)(iv), (c). Administrative closure is a tool used to regulate proceedings, that is, to manage an Immigration Judge’s calendar (or the Board’s docket). Although administrative closure impacts the course removal proceedings may take, it does not preclude the DHS from instituting or pursuing those proceedings and so does not infringe on the DHS’s prosecutorial discretion.

在作出此决定时，我们考虑了DHS、移民法官和委员会在驱逐程序中的各自角色和责任。DHS在决定是否启动驱逐程序以及对答辩人提出何种指控时行使检察自由裁量权。见 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)；Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)。移民法官和委员会均不得审查DHS启动程序的决定。Matter of Bahta, 22 I&N Dec. 1381, 1391 (BIA 2000)。然而，一旦对驱逐程序的管辖权归属于移民法官，他或她有权规范这些程序的进程。8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14(a), 1240.1(a)(1)(iv), (c)。行政关闭是用于规范程序的工具，即管理移民法官的日程（或委员会的待审案件）。尽管行政关闭影响驱逐程序可能采取的进程，但它不阻止DHS启动或继续这些程序，因此不侵犯DHS的检察自由裁量权。

4 In both Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 791 n.4, and Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. at 135 n.10, we encouraged the DHS to consider administrative closure, rather than additional continuances, in appropriate circumstances.

4 在 Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 第791页 n.4 和 Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 第135页 n.10 中，我们鼓励DHS在适当情况下考虑行政关闭，而非额外延期。

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This conclusion is evident from the undisputed fact that administrative closure does not result in a final order. Thus, at any time after a case has been administratively closed, the DHS may move to recalendar it before the Immigration Judge or reinstate the appeal before the Board, or it may seek immediate review of an Immigration Judge’s decision to administratively close proceedings by filing an interlocutory appeal.5 See Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that the Government’s possible exercise of prosecutorial discretion included appealing the Immigration Judge’s decision or filing a motion to reopen). In this way, administrative closure differs from termination of proceedings, where the Immigration Judge or the Board issues a final order, which constitutes a conclusion of the proceedings and which, in the absence of a successful appeal of that decision or a motion, would require the DHS to file another charging document to initiate new proceedings.6

这一结论从行政关闭不会导致最终命令这一无争议事实中显而易见。因此，在案件行政关闭后的任何时间，DHS可以动议在移民法官面前重新安排或恢复委员会的上诉，或者可以通过提出中间上诉寻求立即审查移民法官行政关闭程序的决定。5 见 Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 2007)（指出政府可能行使检察自由裁量权包括对移民法官的决定提出上诉或提出重新开案动议）。这样，行政关闭不同于程序终止，后者中移民法官或委员会发布最终命令，构成程序的结论，并且在对该决定的上诉或动议未成功的情况下，将要求DHS提交另一份指控文件以启动新程序。6

In addition, under the guidance provided herein, infra, the decision toadministrativelycloseproceedings(asopposed to thedecisiontocommence proceedings) involves an assessment of factors that are particularly relevant to the efficient management of the resources of the Immigration Courts and the Board and that are routinely evaluated by Immigration Judges, the Board, and the circuit courts. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32; Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598. By way of analogy, we observe that the decision to grant or deny a continuance or a motion to reopen, a matter reserved to the discretion of the Immigration Judge or the Board (rather than the DHS), also impacts the course of removal proceedings initiated by the DHS. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1) (2011). The circuit courts and the Board have crafted meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of such decisions, rejecting the notion that DHS opposition alone is sufficient to act as an absolute bar to action in those contexts. See Ahmed v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 768; Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42; Sarr v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 354; Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127; Matter of Lamus, 25 I&N Dec. 61; Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785.

此外，根据本决定下文提供的指导，决定行政关闭程序（而非决定启动程序）涉及对与移民法院和委员会资源高效管理特别相关的因素的评估，这些因素通常由移民法官、委员会和巡回法院进行评估。见 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32; Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598。通过类比，我们注意到，批准或拒绝延期或重新开案动议的决定——该事项保留给移民法官或委员会（而非DHS）的自由裁量权——也影响DHS启动的驱逐程序进程。见 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1) (2011)。巡回法院和委员会已制定了有意义的标淮来评估此类决定的适当性，拒绝了仅凭DHS反对就足以在这些情况下作为行动的绝对障碍的观念。见 Ahmed v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 768; Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42; Sarr v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 354; Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127; Matter of Lamus, 25 I&N Dec. 61; Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785。

5 These options are also available to respondents. 6 Termination of proceedings typically occurs when the Immigration Judge or the Board determines on the merits that the respondent is not removable as charged in the notice to appear. An Immigration Judge has the regulatory authority to terminate proceedings under two provisions not applicable here. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1238.1(e), 1239.2(f) (2011).

5 这些选项也适用于答辩人。 6 程序终止通常发生在移民法官或委员会根据案情实质裁定答辩人并非如出庭通知所指控的可驱逐时。移民法官根据两项不适用于此的规定拥有终止程序的监管权力。见 8 C.F.R. §§ 1238.1(e), 1239.2(f) (2011)。

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B. Standards for Evaluating When Administrative Closure

B. 评估行政关闭何时

May Be Appropriate

可能适当的标准

Other than in the previously discussed cases in the in absentia context, wehavenotspecificallyaddressedthequestionof whenadministrativeclosure is appropriate. We are persuaded that the guidance offered in our decisions on motions to reopen and requests for continuances is useful when adapted to the administrative closure context. Thus, we conclude that when evaluating a request for administrative closure, it is appropriate for an Immigration Judge or the Board to weigh all relevant factors presented in the case, including but not limited to: (1) the reason administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for anyopposition to administrative closure; (3) the likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other action he or she is pursuing outside of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5) the responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate outcome of removal proceedings (for example, termination of the proceedings or entry of a removal order) when the case is recalendared before the Immigration Judge or the appeal is reinstated before the Board.

除了先前讨论的缺席背景下的案件外，我们尚未具体处理行政关闭何时适当的问题。我们确信，我们在关于重新开案动议和延期请求的决定中提供的指导在适应行政关闭背景时是有用的。因此，我们得出结论，在评估行政关闭请求时，移民法官或委员会权衡案件中提出的所有相关因素是适当的，包括但不限于：(1) 寻求行政关闭的原因；(2) 任何反对行政关闭的依据；(3) 答辩人在其在驱逐程序之外寻求的任何请愿、申请或其他行动中成功的可能性；(4) 关闭的预期持续时间；(5) 任何一方在促成任何当前或预期延迟方面的责任（如有）；以及 (6) 当案件在移民法官面前重新排期或上诉在委员会面前恢复时驱逐程序的最终结果（例如，程序终止或驱逐令的录入）。

Considering these factors, it may, for example, be appropriate for an Immigration Judge to administratively close removal proceedings where an alien demonstrates that he or she is the beneficiary of an approved visa petition filed by a lawful permanent resident spouse who is actively pursuing, but has not yet completed, an application for naturalization. Similarly, it may be appropriate for the Board to administratively close proceedings on appeal where the alien establishes that he or she has properly appealed from the denial of a prima facie approvable visa petition, but the appeal has not been forwarded to the Board for adjudication.

考虑这些因素，例如，在外国人证明其是由正在积极寻求但尚未完成入籍申请的合法永久居民配偶提交的已批准签证申请的受益人时，移民法官行政关闭驱逐程序可能是适当的。同样，在外国人证明其已 properly 对 prima facie 可批准的签证申请的拒绝提出上诉，但上诉尚未转发给委员会裁决时，委员会在上诉中行政关闭程序可能是适当的。

On the other hand, it would not be appropriate for an Immigration Judge or the Board to administratively close proceedings if the request is based on a purely speculative event or action (such as a possible change in a law or regulation); an event or action that is certain to occur, but not within a period of time that is reasonable under the circumstances (for example, remote availability of a fourth-preference family-based visa); or an event or action that may or may not affect the course of an alien’s immigration proceedings (such as a collateral attack on a criminal conviction). We emphasize, however, that these are examples only; each situation must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances of the particular case.

另一方面，如果请求基于纯粹推测性的事件或行动（例如法律或法规的可能变化）；确定会发生但不在合理时间内的事件或行动（例如，第四优先家庭类签证的遥远可用性）；或可能或可能不影响外国人移民程序进程的事件或行动（例如，对刑事定罪的附带攻击），移民法官或委员会行政关闭程序将是不适当的。然而，我们强调，这些仅是示例；每种情况必须根据特定案件的全部情况来评估。

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C. Appeal of the DHS

C. DHS的上诉

The Immigration Judge in this case administratively closed proceedings over the DHS’s objection. We find that the Immigration Judge had the authority to do so in the exercise of her independent judgment and discretion. The remaining question is whether the Immigration Judge properly exercised that authority in this case. We conclude that she did.

本案中的移民法官在DHS反对下行政关闭了程序。我们认定移民法官在行使独立判断和自由裁量权时有权这样做。剩下的问题是移民法官在本案中是否适当行使了该权力。我们得出结论她确实如此。

The record shows that the respondent is the beneficiary of a prima facie approvable visa petition filed by her now United States citizen spouse, who is the father of her United States citizen child. The DHS objected to administrative closure of the proceedings onlybecause that visa petition had not yet been adjudicated. However, despite the numerous continuances granted by the Immigration Judge, and through no apparent fault of the respondent or her petitioner husband, the visa petition has been pending before the DHS for a significant and unexplained period of time. The DHS has not identified anyobvious impediment to the approval of the visa petition or to the respondent’s abilitytosuccessfullyapplyforadjustmentof status once the visa petition is approved. Her adjustment of status would warrant termination of these proceedings. We therefore agree with the Immigration Judge that the circumstances in this case support the administrative closure of proceedings.7

记录显示，答辩人是由她现在的美国公民配偶提交的 prima facie 可批准的签证申请的受益人，该配偶是她美国公民孩子的父亲。DHS仅因该签证申请尚未裁决而反对行政关闭程序。然而，尽管移民法官批准了众多延期，且无明显归咎于答辩人或其申请人丈夫的过错，签证申请已在DHS待决相当长且未解释的时间。DHS未指出任何对签证申请批准或答辩人在签证申请批准后成功申请调整身份能力的明显障碍。她的调整身份将 warrant 终止这些程序。因此，我们同意移民法官的意见，即本案情况支持行政关闭程序。7

IV. CONCLUSION

IV. 结论

We hold that the Immigration Judges and the Board may, in the exercise of independent judgment and discretion, administratively close proceedings under the appropriate circumstances, even if a party opposes. To the extent that Matter of Gutierrez and related cases hold, or may be construed to hold, otherwise, they are hereby overruled. We agree with the Immigration Judge that administrative closure is warranted in this case. Accordingly, the DHS’s appeal will be dismissed and the record will be returned to the Immigration Judge.

我们认定，移民法官和委员会可以在行使独立判断和自由裁量权时，在适当情况下行政关闭程序，即使一方反对。在 Matter of Gutierrez 及相关案件认定或可能被解释为认定相反的范围内，它们在此被推翻。我们同意移民法官的意见，即本案中行政关闭是适当的。因此，DHS的上诉将被驳回，记录将退回移民法官。

7 Because we agree with the administrative closure of proceedings, we need not address the DHS’s contention that the Immigration Judge erred in denying its request for a continuance.

7 因为我们同意行政关闭程序，我们无需处理DHS关于移民法官错误拒绝其延期请求的论点。

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