Matter of Martinez-Gonzalez

File A73 599 459 - Vermont Service Center

案卷A73 599 459 - 佛蒙特服务中心

Decided September 24, 1997

1997年9月24日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

In a decision dated July 16, 1996, the Regional Service Center (“RSC”) director denied the visa petition filed by the petitioner to accord the benefi- ciary preference status as his legitimated daughter under section 203(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(B) (1994). The petitioner has appealed from this decision. The appeal will be dismissed.

在1996年7月16日的决定中，区域服务中心（“RSC”）主任拒绝了申请人提交的签证申请，该申请旨在根据《移民与国籍法》第203(a)(2)(B)条，8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(B) (1994)，给予受益人作为其准正女儿的优先身份。申请人已对该决定提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。

I. BACKGROUND

一、背景

A 73-year-old native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, the petitioner became a lawful permanent resident of the United States on May 29, 1994. On April 26, 1995, he filed a visa petition on behalf of his daughter, the bene- ficiary. The beneficiary was born on January 26, 1962, and is a citizen of the

申请人是一名73岁的多米尼加共和国国民和公民，于1994年5月29日成为美国合法永久居民。1995年4月26日，他代表其女儿，即受益人，提交了签证申请。受益人出生于1962年1月26日，是

Dominican Republic. The record indicates that the beneficiary currently resides in Puerto Rico. In support of his petition, the petitioner submitted a copy of his alien regis- tration receipt card, a certified and translated birth certificate and baptismal certificate for the beneficiary, a letter from the school the beneficiary attended between 1990 and 1991, a vaccine register pertaining to the benefi- ciary, an affidavit pertaining to the birth of the beneficiary, and a certified and translated copy of his own birth certificate.1 After reviewing this evidence, the RSC director determined that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary had at any time qualified as his “child” under section 101(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (1994), and denied his visa peti- tion on this basis. The petitioner has appealed from this decision and has sub- mitted an affidavit in support of his appeal. The affidavit is signed by seven individuals who know the petitioner personally and who attest to the fact that he is the father of the beneficiary.

多米尼加共和国公民。记录显示受益人目前居住在波多黎各。 为支持其申请，申请人提交了其外国人登记收据卡副本、受益人的经认证和翻译的出生证明和洗礼证明、受益人1990年至1991年就读学校的信件、与受益人有关的疫苗登记册、关于受益人出生的宣誓书，以及其本人出生证明的经认证和翻译的副本。1 在审查这些证据后，RSC主任认定申请人未能证明受益人曾在任何时候符合该法第101(b)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (1994)中其“孩子”的资格，并据此拒绝了其签证申请。申请人已对该决定提出上诉，并提交了一份宣誓书以支持其上诉。该宣誓书由七名个人签署，他们亲自认识申请人，并证明他是受益人的父亲。

II. ANALYSIS

二、分析

In visa petition proceedings, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the claimed relationship. Matter of Brantigan, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the beneficiary is fully qualified for the benefit sought. Matter of Patel, 19 I&N Dec. 774 (BIA 1988); Matter of Soo Hoo, 11 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1965). In the present case, the petitioner has filed a visa petition on behalf of the beneficiary under section 203(a)(2)(B) of the Act. This section of the Act allows a lawful permanent resident of the United States to obtain a visa for his unmarried son or daughter if the son or daughter once qualified as the peti- tioner’s “child” under section 101(b) of the Act. See Matter of Vizcaino, 19 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 1988); Matter of Coker, 14 I&N Dec. 521 (BIA 1974). The relevant portion of section 101(b)(1) of the Act provides as follows: The term “child” means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is—

在签证申请程序中，申请人负有证明所主张关系的责任。Matter of Brantigan，11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966)。申请人必须以优势证据证明受益人完全符合所寻求利益的资格。Matter of Patel，19 I&N Dec. 774 (BIA 1988)；Matter of Soo Hoo，11 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1965)。 在本案中，申请人根据该法第203(a)(2)(B)条代表受益人提交了签证申请。该法该条允许美国合法永久居民为其未婚子女获得签证，如果该子女曾经符合该法第101(b)条中申请人“孩子”的资格。见Matter of Vizcaino，19 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 1988)；Matter of Coker，14 I&N Dec. 521 (BIA 1974)。 该法第101(b)(1)条的相关部分规定如下： “孩子”一词是指未满二十一岁的未婚人士，且其——

The evidence of record contains no indication that the petitioner is or was ever married to the mother of the beneficiary. The beneficiary therefore never qualified as the petitioner’s child under sections 101(b)(1)(A) or (B) of the Act, and the petitioner must instead demonstrate that she qualified as his child under sections 101(b)(1)(C) or (D) of the Act at one time.

记录中的证据没有表明申请人与受益人的母亲现在或曾经结婚。因此，受益人从未符合该法第101(b)(1)(A)或(B)条中申请人孩子的资格，申请人必须转而证明她曾符合该法第101(b)(1)(C)或(D)条中其孩子的资格。

A. Qualification as a Legitimated Child Under Section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act

A. 根据该法第101(b)(1)(C)条符合准正孩子的资格

To have qualified as the petitioner’s child under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act, the beneficiary must have satisfied three basic requirements: (1) she must have been legitimated under the laws of her residence or domicile or that of her father; (2) this legitimation must have taken place before she reached the age of 18; and (3) she must have been in the legal custody of her father at the time of the legitimation. In addition, as we ruled in Matter of Bueno, 21 I&N Dec. 1029 (BIA 1997), she must be the petitioner’s natural child. In the present case, the petitioner has submitted ample proof to establish that the beneficiary is his natural child. He has provided a certified and trans- lated copy of the beneficiary’s birth certificate, which indicates that the birth was registered in the same year that it occurred, and which identifies him as the father of the beneficiary. He has also presented a baptismal certificate identifying him as the beneficiary’s father and a letter from the beneficiary’s school, which refers to him in the same manner. Finally, he has provided an affidavit from seven individuals who know him personally and who attest to the fact that the beneficiary is his daughter. In light of this convincing proof, we must conclude that the petitioner has satisfied the paternity requirement of section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act. The key issues to be resolved, then, are whether the beneficiary was legiti- mated under the laws of her residence or domicile or that of her father,2

要符合该法第101(b)(1)(C)条中申请人孩子的资格，受益人必须满足三项基本要求：(1) 她必须根据其居住地或住所地法律或其父亲的法律被准正；(2) 此种准正必须发生在她年满18岁之前；(3) 在准正时她必须处于其父亲的法定监护之下。此外，正如我们在Matter of Bueno，21 I&N Dec. 1029 (BIA 1997)中所裁定的，她必须是申请人的亲生子女。 在本案中，申请人提交了充分证据证明受益人是其亲生子女。他提供了受益人出生证明的经认证和翻译的副本，该证明表明出生在发生的同一年登记，并指明他为受益人的父亲。他还提交了指明他为受益人父亲的洗礼证明和受益人学校的信件，该信件以同样方式提及他。最后，他提供了七名亲自认识他并证明受益人是他女儿的个人宣誓书。鉴于这一令人信服的证据，我们必须得出结论，申请人已满足该法第101(b)(1)(C)条的父亲身份要求。 因此，需要解决的关键问题是，受益人是否根据其居住地或住所地法律或其父亲的法律被准正，2

whether this legitimation occurred before she reached the age of 18, and whether she was in her father’s legal custody at the time of legitimation. In prior decisions, we have defined legitimation as the act of placing a child born out of wedlock in the same legal position as a child born in wed- lock. See Matter of Reyes, 17 I&N Dec. 512, 514 (BIA 1980). We have also held that, in the Dominican Republic, the act of acknowledging paternity in accordance with Dominican law constitutes legitimation for immigration purposes. See Matter of Cabrera, 21 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 1996). This holding was based on the enactment of Ley No. 14-19 que crea el Codigo para la Proteccion de Ninos, Ninas y Adolescentes [Law No. 14-94, Code for the Protection of Children and Adolescents] Gaceta Official, Apr. 25, 1994 (enacted Apr. 22, 1994)(hereinafter Code for the Protection of Children), in the Dominican Republic on April 22, 1994. The Code for the Protection of Children changed the Dominican law on parentage and filiation to eliminate all legal distinctions between children born in wedlock and those born out of wedlock. The law took effect on January 1, 1995, and was intended to apply to all “‘present and future legal situations’ and to ‘legal situations that were established and created before the promulgation of the . . . law and continue in existence after such promulgation.’” Matter of Cabrera, supra, at 590 (quoting a Library of Congress legal opinion). When a country eliminates all legal distinctions between children born in wedlock and those born out of wedlock, as the Dominican Republic has done with the enactment of the Code for the Protection of Children, we have held that all children born out of wedlock are deemed to be the legitimate or legiti- mated children of their natural fathers from the time that the country’s laws are changed.3 See Matter of Hernandez, 19 I&N Dec. 14 (BIA 1983); Matter of Clarke, 18 I&N Dec. 369 (BIA 1983). However, such children may only be included within the definition of the term “child” provided in section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act if the parent-child relationship is established by the requisite degree of proof and the legitimizing act occurred prior to the child’s 18th birthday. See section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act; Matter of Hernandez, supra. The legitimizing act in the case of Dominican law could be either the change in the law itself or the acknowledgment of paternity. See Matter of Cabrera, supra. Both events are required to accomplish legitimation, and, therefore, both events must have occurred prior to a child’s 18th birthday in

该准正是否发生在她年满18岁之前，以及 在准正时她是否处于其父亲的法定监护之下。 在既往裁决中，我们将准正界定为将 非婚生子女置于与婚生子女相同法律地位的行为。见Matter of Reyes, 17 I&N Dec. 512, 514 (BIA 1980)。我们还 裁定，在多米尼加共和国，依照多米尼加法律承认亲子关系的行为构成移民目的上的准正。见Matter of Cabrera, 21 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 1996)。该裁定 基于多米尼加共和国于1994年4月22日颁布的Ley No. 14-19 que crea el Codigo para la Proteccion de Ninos, Ninas y Adolescentes [第14-94号法律，儿童和青少年保护法典] Gaceta Official, Apr. 25, 1994 ( enacted Apr. 22, 1994)(以下简称《儿童保护法典》)。《儿童保护 法典》修改了多米尼加关于亲子关系和血统的法律，以消除 婚生子女与非婚生子女之间的一切法律区别。该法于1995年1月1日生效，旨在适用于所有“‘现在和未来的法律情形’以及‘在该法颁布之前已确立和创设、并在该法颁布之后继续存在的法律情形’。”Matter of Cabrera, supra, at 590 (引用国会图书馆法律意见)。 当一国消除婚生子女与非婚生子女之间的一切法律区别时，正如多米尼加共和国通过颁布《儿童保护法典》所做的那样，我们 裁定，所有非婚生子女自该国法律变更之时起，视为其生父的婚生子女或已准正子女。3 见Matter of Hernandez, 19 I&N Dec. 14 (BIA 1983); Matter of Clarke, 18 I&N Dec. 369 (BIA 1983)。但是，此类子女只有在亲子关系以 所需程度的证据确立，且准正行为发生在子女18岁生日之前时，才可以被纳入该法第 101(b)(1)(C)条所规定的“子女”一词的定义。见该法第101(b)(1)(C)条；Matter of Hernandez, supra。在多米尼加法律的情况下，准正行为可以是法律本身的变更，也可以是 对亲子关系的承认。见Matter of Cabrera, supra。完成准正需要这两个事件，因此，这两个事件都必须发生在子女18岁生日之前，

order for the child to meet the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(C). See Mat- ter of Hernandez, supra; 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(ii) (1997). Children who were acknowledged after their 18th birthday or who turned 18 prior to Janu- ary 1, 1995, the effective date of the Code for the Protection of Children, and who were not legitimated under the former Dominican law, cannot meet these requirements. In the present case, the petitioner turned 18 on January 26, 1980. She had not been legitimated under the former law of the Dominican Republic, and she turned 18 prior to the enactment of the new law. Given this fact, she was not legitimated under the laws of the Dominican Republic prior to her 18th birthday and she cannot qualify as a legitimated child under section 101(b)(1)(C). As such, she is ineligible for preference status as the peti- tioner’s legitimated daughter under section 203(a)(2)(B) of the Act, and we need not address whether she has satisfied the other requirements of section 101(b)(1)(C).

为使子女符合该法第101(b)(1)(C)条的要求，须如此。见Mat- ter of Hernandez, supra; 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(ii) (1997)。在18岁生日之后才被承认，或在1995年1月1日（《儿童保护法典》生效之日）之前已满18岁，且未根据前多米尼加法律准正的子女，不能符合 这些要求。 在本案中，申请人于1980年1月26日年满18岁。她未根据多米尼加共和国前法律被准正，且她在新法颁布之前已年满18岁。鉴于这一事实，她未在其18岁生日之前根据多米尼加共和国法律被准正，因此不能符合该法第101(b)(1)(C)条规定的已准正子女资格。因此，她不符合该法第203(a)(2)(B)条规定的作为申请人已准正女儿的优先类别资格，我们 无需处理她是否满足第101(b)(1)(C)条的其他要求。

B. Qualification as a Child Born Out of Wedlock Under Section 101(b)(1)(D)

B. 根据第101(b)(1)(D)条作为非婚生子女的资格

Having concluded that the beneficiary cannot qualify for preference status as the petitioner’s legitimated daughter, we must now consider whether the petitioner has presented enough proof to establish that she, at one time, quali- fied as his daughter born out of wedlock under section 101(b)(1)(D) of the Act. To meet the requirements of this section, the beneficiary must be the nat- ural daughter of the petitioner and must have established a bona fide par- ent-child relationship with the petitioner when she was unmarried and under the age of 21. Matter of Vizcaino, 19 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 1988). According to the regulations, “[e]vidence of a parent/child relationship should establish more than merely a biological relationship.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iii). “Emotional and/or financial ties or a genuine concern and interest by the father for the child’s support, instruction, and general welfare must be shown.” Id.; see also Matter of Pineda, 20 I&N Dec. 70 (BIA 1989). The regulations also state the following:

在认定受益人不能作为申请人的已准正女儿获得优先类别资格后，我们现在必须考虑申请人是否已提供足够证据证明她曾一度符合该法第101(b)(1)(D)条规定的其非婚生女儿资格。为满足该条的要求，受益人必须是申请人的亲生女儿，并且必须在她未婚且未满21岁时与申请人建立了真实的亲子关系。Matter of Vizcaino, 19 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 1988)。 根据法规，“亲子关系的证据应确立的不仅仅是生物学关系。”8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iii)。“必须显示出情感和/或经济联系，或父亲对子女的抚养、教育和一般福利的真正关心和利益。”Id.; 另见Matter of Pineda, 20 I&N Dec. 70 (BIA 1989)。 法规还规定如下：

8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iii). As we noted above, the petitioner has presented ample proof to establish that the beneficiary is his natural daughter. Nevertheless, we find that he has failed to present enough evidence to demonstrate that he and the beneficiary

8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iii)。 如上所述，申请人已提供充分证据证明受益人是其亲生女儿。然而，我们认定他未能提供足够证据证明他和受益人

had a bona fide parent-child relationship prior to her 21st birthday. See, e.g., Matter of Pineda, supra; Matter of Vizcaino, supra. The petitioner has pre- sented birth and baptismal certificates and an affidavit regarding the benefi- ciary’s birth, but these documents do not show that the petitioner took a genuine interest in the beneficiary’s “support, instruction, and general wel- fare” while she was under the age of 21. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iii). The affi- davit from the seven individuals who know the petitioner personally also fails to speak to the nature of the relationship between the parties. The letter from the beneficiary’s school does indicate that the petitioner took an interest in the beneficiary’s education, but it refers to a time period after the benefi- ciary’s 21st birthday. Given these facts, we cannot find that the petitioner has met his burden of showing that he and the beneficiary shared a bona fide par- ent-child relationship, and we cannot grant the beneficiary preference status as his daughter under section 101(b)(1)(D) of the Act.

在她21岁生日之前存在真实的亲子关系。见，例如， Matter of Pineda, supra; Matter of Vizcaino, supra。申请人提交了受益人的出生和洗礼证明以及关于受益人出生的宣誓书，但这些文件并未显示申请人在受益人未满21岁时对其“抚养、教育和一般福利”有真正的关心。8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iii)。来自七名亲自认识申请人的个人的宣誓书也 未能说明双方关系的性质。受益人学校的信函确实表明申请人对受益人的教育有兴趣，但它指的是受益人21岁生日之后的时间段。鉴于这些事实，我们不能认定申请人已履行其举证责任，证明他和受益人之间存在真实的亲子关系，我们也不能授予受益人根据该法第101(b)(1)(D)条作为其女儿的优先类别资格。

III. CONCLUSION

III. 结论

In light of the foregoing, we will dismiss the petitioner’s appeal. We note, however, that the petitioner may file a new visa petition on behalf of the ben- eficiary should he hereafter be able to produce additional, probative evidence showing that a bona fide parent-child relationship existed between the parties prior to the beneficiary’s 21st birthday. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

鉴于上述情况，我们将驳回申请人的上诉。但我们注意到，如果申请人此后能够提供额外的、有证明力的证据，表明在受益人21岁生日之前双方之间存在真实的亲子关系，他可以代表受益人提交新的签证申请。 命令： 上诉被驳回。