Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

注：在可行的情况下，判词摘要（前注）将与本意见书同时发布，本案即如此处理。判词摘要不构成本院意见的任何部分，而是由判决汇编者为方便读者而编写。参见 United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337。 美国最高法院

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES ET AL. v. RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES 等诉 RAIMONDO， 商务部长，等。

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

通知：本意见在发表于《美国判例汇编》之前须经正式修订。请读者将任何排版或其他正式错误通知美国最高法院判例汇编官，地址：Washington, D. C. 20543，pio@supremecourt.gov。 美国最高法院

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES, ET AL., PETITIONERS 22–451 v. GINA RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES等， 申请人 22–451 诉 GINA RAIMONDO，商务部长等

RELENTLESS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 22–1219 v. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

RELENTLESS, INC.等，申请人 22–1219 诉 商务部等

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

ROBERTS首席大法官发表本院意见。

Since our decision in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re­ sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), we have sometimes required courts to defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of the statutes those agencies administer— even when a reviewing court reads the statute differently. In these cases we consider whether that doctrine should be overruled.

自本院在Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984)案中作出裁判以来，我们有时要求法院遵从机构对其所执行法律的“可允许的”解释——即使审查法院对法律的解读不同。在这些案件中，我们考虑该原则是否应被推翻。

I Our Chevron doctrine requires courts to use a two-step

I 我们的Chevron原则要求法院使用两步

framework to interpret statutes administered by federal agencies. After determining that a case satisfies the vari­ ous preconditions we have set for Chevron to apply, a re­ viewing court must first assess “whether Congress has di­ rectly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id., at 842. If, and only if, congressional intent is “clear,” that is the end of the inquiry. Ibid. But if the court determines that “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” at hand, the court must, at Chevron’s second step, defer to the agency’s interpretation if it “is based on a per­ missible construction of the statute.” Id., at 843. The re­ viewing courts in each of the cases before us applied Chev­ ron’s framework to resolve in favor of the Government challenges to the same agency rule.

框架来解释联邦机构执行的法律。在确定案件满足我们为适用Chevron设定的各项前提条件后，审查法院必须首先评估“国会是否已就所涉确切问题直接表态”。Id., at 842。如果且仅如果国会意图“明确”，调查即告结束。Ibid。但如果法院认定“法律对所涉具体问题沉默或含糊”，则法院必须在Chevron第二步遵从机构的解释，如果该解释“基于对法律的可允许的建构”。Id., at 843。在我们面前各案的审查法院均适用Chevron框架，以支持政府而解决对同一机构规则的挑战。

A Before 1976, unregulated foreign vessels dominated fish­ ing in the international waters off the U. S. coast, which be­ gan just 12 nautical miles offshore. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94–459, pp. 2–3 (1975). Recognizing the resultant over­ fishing and the need for sound management of fishery re­ sources, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA). See 90 Stat. 331 (codified as amended at 16 U. S. C. §1801 et seq.). The MSA and subsequent amendments extended the jurisdic­ tion of the United States to 200 nautical miles beyond the U. S. territorial sea and claimed “exclusive fishery manage­ ment authority over all fish” within that area, known as the “exclusive economic zone.” §1811(a); see Presidential Proc­ lamation No. 5030, 3 CFR 22 (1983 Comp.); §§101, 102, 90 Stat. 336. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) administers the MSA under a delegation from the Secretary of Commerce.

A 在1976年之前，不受管制的外国船只在距美国海岸仅12海里的国际水域捕鱼中占据主导地位。见，例如，S. Rep. No. 94–459, pp. 2–3 (1975)。认识到由此产生的过度捕捞以及对渔业资源进行健全管理的需要，国会制定了《Magnuson-Stevens渔业保护和管理法》（MSA）。见90 Stat. 331（经修订编纂于16 U. S. C. §1801 et seq.）。MSA及后续修正案将美国管辖权扩展至美国领海以外200海里，并对该区域（称为“专属经济区”）内的“所有鱼类”主张“专属渔业管理权”。§1811(a)；见第5030号总统公告，3 CFR 22 (1983 Comp.)；§§101, 102, 90 Stat. 336。国家海洋渔业局（NMFS）根据商务部长的授权执行MSA。

The MSA established eight regional fishery management councils composed of representatives from the coastal States, fishery stakeholders, and NMFS. See 16 U. S. C.

MSA设立了八个区域渔业管理委员会，由沿海各州、渔业利益相关者和NMFS的代表组成。见16 U. S. C.

§§1852(a), (b). The councils develop fishery management plans, which NMFS approves and promulgates as final reg­ ulations. See §§1852(h), 1854(a). In service of the statute’s fishery conservation and management goals, see §1851(a), the MSA requires that certain provisions—such as “a mech­ anism for specifying annual catch limits . . . at a level such that overfishing does not occur,” §1853(a)(15)—be included in these plans, see §1853(a). The plans may also include additional discretionary provisions. See §1853(b). For ex­ ample, plans may “prohibit, limit, condition, or require the use of specified types and quantities of fishing gear, fishing vessels, or equipment,” §1853(b)(4); “reserve a portion of the allowable biological catch of the fishery for use in scientific research,” §1853(b)(11); and “prescribe such other measures, requirements, or conditions and restrictions as are determined to be necessary and appropriate for the con­ servation and management of the fishery,” §1853(b)(14).

§§1852(a), (b)。各委员会制定渔业管理计划，由NMFS批准并作为最终法规颁布。见§§1852(h), 1854(a)。为服务于该法的渔业保护和管理目标，见§1851(a)，MSA要求这些计划中必须包含某些条款——例如“一种规定年度捕捞限额的机制……其水平应确保不发生过度捕捞”，§1853(a)(15)——见§1853(a)。计划还可包含额外的自由裁量条款。见§1853(b)。例如，计划可以“禁止、限制、设定条件或要求使用特定类型和数量的渔具、渔船或设备”，§1853(b)(4)；“保留渔业可允许生物捕捞量的一部分用于科学研究”，§1853(b)(11)；以及“规定经确定对渔业保护和管理必要且适当的其他措施、要求或条件和限制”，§1853(b)(14)。

Relevant here, a plan may also require that “one or more observers be carried on board” domestic vessels “for the pur­ pose of collecting data necessary for the conservation and management of the fishery.” §1853(b)(8). The MSA speci­ fies three groups that must cover costs associated with ob­ servers: (1) foreign fishing vessels operating within the ex­ clusive economic zone (which must carry observers), see §§1821(h)(1)(A), (h)(4), (h)(6); (2) vessels participating in certain limited access privilege programs, which impose quotas permitting fishermen to harvest only specific quan­ tities of a fishery’s total allowable catch, see §§1802(26), 1853a(c)(1)(H), (e)(2), 1854(d)(2); and (3) vessels within the jurisdiction of the North Pacific Council, where many of the largest and most successful commercial fishing enterprises in the Nation operate, see §1862(a). In the latter two cases, the MSA expressly caps the relevant fees at two or three percent of the value of fish harvested on the vessels. See §§1854(d)(2)(B), 1862(b)(2)(E). And in general, it author­

与此相关，计划还可要求“在船上搭载一名或多名观察员”，以“为收集渔业保护和管理所需的数据”，§1853(b)(8)。MSA明确规定了必须承担观察员相关费用的三类群体：(1) 在专属经济区内作业的外国渔船（必须搭载观察员），见§§1821(h)(1)(A), (h)(4), (h)(6)；(2) 参与某些有限准入特权计划的船只，该计划施加配额，允许渔民仅捕捞渔业总可允许捕捞量中的特定数量，见§§1802(26), 1853a(c)(1)(H), (e)(2), 1854(d)(2)；以及(3) 北太平洋委员会管辖范围内的船只，全国许多最大和最成功的商业渔业企业在该区域运营，见§1862(a)。在后两种情况下，MSA明确将相关费用上限设定为船只所捕捞鱼类价值的2%或3%。见§§1854(d)(2)(B), 1862(b)(2)(E)。并且一般而言，该法授权

izes the Secretary to impose “sanctions” when “any pay­ ment required for observer services provided to or con­ tracted by an owner or operator . . . has not been paid.” §1858(g)(1)(D).

部长在“向所有者或经营者提供或由其承包的观察员服务所需的任何付款……未获支付”时实施“制裁”。§1858(g)(1)(D)。

The MSA does not contain similar terms addressing whether Atlantic herring fishermen may be required to bear costs associated with any observers a plan may man­ date. And at one point, NMFS fully funded the observer coverage the New England Fishery Management Council required in its plan for the Atlantic herring fishery. See 79 Fed. Reg. 8792 (2014). In 2013, however, the council pro­ posed amending its fishery management plans to empower it to require fishermen to pay for observers if federal fund­ ing became unavailable. Several years later, NMFS prom­ ulgated a rule approving the amendment. See 85 Fed. Reg. 7414 (2020).

MSA不包含类似条款来处理大西洋鲱鱼渔民是否可被要求承担计划可能规定的任何观察员相关费用。并且曾有一段时间，NMFS全额资助新英格兰渔业管理委员会在其大西洋鲱鱼渔业计划中要求的观察员覆盖。见79 Fed. Reg. 8792 (2014)。然而在2013年，该委员会提议修订其渔业管理计划，授权其在联邦资金不可用时要求渔民支付观察员费用。数年后，NMFS颁布规则批准了该修订。见85 Fed. Reg. 7414 (2020)。

With respect to the Atlantic herring fishery, the Rule cre­ ated an industry funded program that aims to ensure ob­ server coverage on 50 percent of trips undertaken by vessels with certain types of permits. Under that program, vessel representatives must “declare into” a fishery before begin­ ning a trip by notifying NMFS of the trip and announcing the species the vessel intends to harvest. If NMFS deter­ mines that an observer is required, but declines to assign a Government-paid one, the vessel must contract with and pay for a Government-certified third-party observer. NMFS estimated that the cost of such an observer would be up to $710 per day, reducing annual returns to the vessel owner by up to 20 percent. See id., at 7417–7418.

关于大西洋鲱鱼渔业，该规则创建了一个行业资助计划，旨在确保持有某些类型许可证的船只所进行航次的50%有观察员覆盖。根据该计划，船只代表必须在开始航次前“申报进入”某一渔业，通知NMFS该航次并宣布船只打算捕捞的物种。如果NMFS确定需要观察员，但拒绝指派政府付费的观察员，则船只必须与政府认证的第三方观察员签约并支付费用。NMFS估计此类观察员的费用最高为每天710美元，使船东的年回报减少最多20%。见id., at 7417–7418。

B Petitioners Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc., H&L Axels­ son, Inc., Lund Marr Trawlers LLC, and Scombrus One LLC are family businesses that operate in the Atlantic her­ ring fishery. In February 2020, they challenged the Rule under the MSA, 16 U. S. C. §1855(f ), which incorporates

B 申请人Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc.、H&L Axelsson, Inc.、Lund Marr Trawlers LLC和Scombrus One LLC是在大西洋鲱鱼渔业经营的家族企业。2020年2月，他们根据MSA，16 U. S. C. §1855(f)，挑战该规则，该条纳入

the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq. In relevant part, they argued that the MSA does not authorize NMFS to mandate that they pay for observers re­ quired by a fishery management plan. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Government. It con­ cluded that the MSA authorized the Rule, but noted that even if these petitioners’ “arguments were enough to raise an ambiguity in the statutory text,” deference to the agency’s interpretation would be warranted under Chevron. 544 F. Supp. 3d 82, 107 (DC 2021); see id., at 103–107.

《行政程序法》（APA），5 U. S. C. §551 et seq.。在相关部分，他们主张MSA未授权NMFS强制要求他们为渔业管理计划所要求的观察员付费。地区法院作出有利于政府的简易判决。它认定MSA授权该规则，但指出即使这些申请人的“论点足以在成文法文本中引起歧义”，根据Chevron，遵从机构的解释也是正当的。544 F. Supp. 3d 82, 107 (DC 2021)；见id., at 103–107。

A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit affirmed. See 45 F. 4th 359 (2022). The majority addressed various provi­ sions of the MSA and concluded that it was not “wholly un­ ambiguous” whether NMFS may require Atlantic herring fishermen to pay for observers. Id., at 366. Because there remained “some question” as to Congress’s intent, id., at 369, the court proceeded to Chevron’s second step and de­ ferred to the agency’s interpretation as a “reasonable” con­ struction of the MSA, 45 F. 4th, at 370. In dissent, Judge Walker concluded that Congress’s silence on industry funded observers for the Atlantic herring fishery—coupled with the express provision for such observers in other fish­ eries and on foreign vessels—unambiguously indicated that NMFS lacked the authority to “require [Atlantic herring] fishermen to pay the wages of at-sea monitors.” Id., at 375.

哥伦比亚特区巡回法院的合议庭以分歧意见维持原判。见45 F. 4th 359 (2022)。多数意见处理了MSA的各个条款，并认定NMFS是否可以要求大西洋鲱鱼渔民支付观察员费用并非“完全明确”。Id., at 366。由于关于国会意图仍存在“一些问题”，id., at 369，法院进入Chevron第二步，并遵从机构的解释，将其视为对MSA的“合理”建构，45 F. 4th, at 370。Walker法官在异议意见中认定，国会对于大西洋鲱鱼渔业行业资助观察员的沉默——加上其他渔业和外国船只对此类观察员的明确规定——明确表明NMFS缺乏“要求[大西洋鲱鱼]渔民支付海上监测员报酬”的权力。Id., at 375。

C Petitioners Relentless Inc., Huntress Inc., and Seafreeze Fleet LLC own two vessels that operate in the Atlantic her­ ring fishery: the F/V Relentless and the F/V Persistence. 1 These vessels use small-mesh bottom-trawl gear and can freeze fish at sea, so they can catch more species of fish and take longer trips than other vessels (about 10 to 14 days, as

C 申请人Relentless Inc.、Huntress Inc.和Seafreeze Fleet LLC拥有两艘在大西洋鲱鱼渔业作业的船舶：F/V Relentless号和F/V Persistence号。1 这些船舶使用小网目底拖网渔具，并可在海上冷冻渔获，因此它们能捕获更多种类的鱼，且比其他船舶航行更长时间（约10至14天，而

opposed to the more typical 2 to 4). As a result, they gener­ ally declare into multiple fisheries per trip so they can catch whatever the ocean offers up. If the vessels declare into the Atlantic herring fishery for a particular trip, they must carry an observer for that trip if NMFS selects the trip for coverage, even if they end up harvesting fewer herring than other vessels—or no herring at all.

通常为2至4天）。因此，它们通常每次航行申报进入多个渔业，以便捕获海洋提供的任何渔获。如果船舶为特定航行申报进入大西洋鲱鱼渔业，且NMFS选择该航行进行覆盖，则它们必须为该航行携带观察员，即使它们最终捕获的鲱鱼少于其他船舶——或根本没有鲱鱼。

This set of petitioners, like those in the D. C. Circuit case, filed a suit challenging the Rule as unauthorized by the MSA. The District Court, like the D. C. Circuit, deferred to NMFS’s contrary interpretation under Chevron and thus granted summary judgment to the Government. See 561 F. Supp. 3d 226, 234–238 (RI 2021).

这组申请人，如同哥伦比亚特区巡回法院案件中的申请人一样，提起诉讼，质疑该规则未经《马格努森-史蒂文斯渔业养护和管理法》（MSA）授权。地区法院与哥伦比亚特区巡回法院一样，根据Chevron案遵从NMFS的相反解释，因此对政府作出简易判决。见561 F. Supp. 3d 226, 234–238 (RI 2021)。

The First Circuit affirmed. See 62 F. 4th 621 (2023). It relied on a “default norm” that regulated entities must bear compliance costs, as well as the MSA’s sanctions provision, Section 1858(g)(1)(D). See id., at 629–631. And it rejected petitioners’ argument that the express statutory authoriza­ tion of three industry funding programs demonstrated that NMFS lacked the broad implicit authority it asserted to im­ pose such a program for the Atlantic herring fishery. See id., at 631–633. The court ultimately concluded that the “[a]gency’s interpretation of its authority to require at-sea monitors who are paid for by owners of regulated vessels does not ‘exceed[] the bounds of the permissible.’” Id., at 633–634 (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U. S. 212, 218 (2002); alteration in original). In reaching that conclusion, the First Circuit stated that it was applying Chevron’s two- step framework. 62 F. 4th, at 628. But it did not explain which aspects of its analysis were relevant to which of Chevron’s two steps. Similarly, it declined to decide whether the result was “a product of Chevron step one or step two.” Id., at 634.

第一巡回法院维持原判。见62 F. 4th 621 (2023)。它依据一项“默认规范”，即受监管实体必须承担合规成本，以及MSA的制裁条款第1858(g)(1)(D)条。见同上，第629–631页。它驳回了申请人的论点，即三项行业资助计划的明确法定授权表明NMFS缺乏其主张的广泛默示权力来为大西洋鲱鱼渔业实施此类计划。见同上，第631–633页。法院最终得出结论，“[a]gency对其要求受监管船舶船东支付海上观察员费用的权力的解释并未‘超出允许的范围’。”同上，第633–634页（引用Barnhart诉Walton案，535 U. S. 212, 218 (2002)；原文有改动）。在得出该结论时，第一巡回法院表示其适用了Chevron的两步框架。62 F. 4th，第628页。但它未解释其分析的哪些方面与Chevron两步中的哪一步相关。 同样，它拒绝裁定结果是否是“Chevron第一步或第二步的产物”。同上，第634页。

We granted certiorari in both cases, limited to the ques­ tion whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified. See

我们在两案中均批准了调卷令，仅限于Chevron是否应被推翻或澄清的问题。见

601 U. S. ___ (2023); 598 U. S. ___ (2023). 2

601 U. S. ___ (2023)；598 U. S. ___ (2023)。2

II A Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Ju­ diciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate “Cases” and “Controversies”—concrete disputes with consequences for the parties involved. The Framers appreciated that the laws judges would necessarily apply in resolving those dis­ putes would not always be clear. Cognizant of the limits of human language and foresight, they anticipated that “[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation,” would be “more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning” was settled “by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.” The Federalist No. 37, p. 236 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).

II A 宪法第三条赋予联邦司法机构裁决“案件”和“争议”——对当事方有后果的具体纠纷——的责任和权力。制宪者认识到，法官在解决这些纠纷时必然适用的法律并不总是明确的。考虑到人类语言和远见的局限，他们预计“所有新法律，尽管以最高技术技巧撰写，并经最充分和最成熟的审议通过”，在其含义“通过一系列具体的讨论和裁决”得到确定之前，将“或多或少模糊和含糊不清”。《联邦党人文集》第37篇，第236页（J. Cooke编，1961年）（J. Madison）。

The Framers also envisioned that the final “interpreta­ tion of the laws” would be “the proper and peculiar province of the courts.” Id., No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton). Unlike the political branches, the courts would by design exercise “nei­ ther Force nor Will, but merely judgment.” Id., at 523. To ensure the “steady, upright and impartial administration of the laws,” the Framers structured the Constitution to allow judges to exercise that judgment independent of influence from the political branches. Id., at 522; see id., at 522–524; Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011).

制宪者还设想，最终的“法律解释”将是“法院的适当和特有领域”。同上，第78篇，第525页（A. Hamilton）。与政治分支不同，法院按设计将行使“既无武力也无意志，而仅有判断”。同上，第523页。为确保“稳定、正直和公正地执行法律”，制宪者构建宪法，允许法官行使该判断，独立于政治分支的影响。同上，第522页；见同上，第522–524页；Stern诉Marshall案，564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011)。

This Court embraced the Framers’ understanding of the judicial function early on. In the foundational decision of Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall famously de­ clared that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 1 Cranch 137,

本法院早期就接受了制宪者对司法职能的理解。在奠基性判决Marbury诉Madison案中，首席大法官Marshall著名地宣称：“确定法律是什么，明确是司法部门的领域和职责。”1 Cranch 137,

177 (1803). And in the following decades, the Court under­ stood “interpret[ing] the laws, in the last resort,” to be a “solemn duty” of the Judiciary. United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 162 (1841) (Story, J., for the Court). When the meaning of a statute was at issue, the judicial role was to “interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.” Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 515 (1840).

177 (1803)。在随后的几十年里，法院将“最终解释法律”理解为司法机构的一项“庄严职责”。United States诉Dickson案，15 Pet. 141, 162 (1841)（Story大法官代表法院撰写）。当法规含义存在争议时，司法角色是“解释国会法案，以确定当事方的权利”。Decatur诉Paulding案，14 Pet. 497, 515 (1840)。

The Court also recognized from the outset, though, that exercising independent judgment often included according due respect to Executive Branch interpretations of federal statutes. For example, in Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206 (1827), the Court explained that “[i]n the con­ struction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contempo­ raneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great respect.” Id., at 210; see also United States v. Vowell, 5 Cranch 368, 372 (1809) (Mar­ shall, C. J., for the Court).

然而，法院从一开始也认识到，行使独立判断通常包括对行政部门对联邦法规的解释给予应有尊重。例如，在Edwards’ Lessee诉Darby案，12 Wheat. 206 (1827)中，法院解释称：“在对一项存疑和模糊的法律进行解释时，那些被要求根据该法律行事并被任命将其条款付诸实施的人的同时代解释，有权获得极大的尊重。”同上，第210页；另见United States诉Vowell案，5 Cranch 368, 372 (1809)（Marshall首席大法官代表法院撰写）。

Such respect was thought especially warranted when an Executive Branch interpretation was issued roughly con­ temporaneously with enactment of the statute and re­ mained consistent over time. See Dickson, 15 Pet., at 161; United States v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 142 U. S. 615, 621 (1892); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 145–146 (1920). That is because “the longstand­ ing ‘practice of the government’”—like any other interpre­ tive aid—“can inform [a court’s] determination of ‘what the law is.’” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 525 (2014) (first quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819); then quoting Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177). The Court also gave “the most respectful consideration” to Executive Branch interpretations simply because “[t]he officers con­ cerned [were] usually able men, and masters of the subject,” who were “[n]ot unfrequently . . . the draftsmen of the laws they [were] afterwards called upon to interpret.” United

当行政部门的解释与法规颁布大致同时发布并随时间保持一致时，这种尊重被认为尤其必要。见Dickson案，15 Pet.，第161页；United States诉Alabama Great Southern R. Co.案，142 U. S. 615, 621 (1892)；National Lead Co.诉United States案，252 U. S. 140, 145–146 (1920)。这是因为“政府的长期‘实践’”——如同任何其他解释辅助手段——“可以告知[法院]对‘法律是什么’的确定”。NLRB诉Noel Canning案，573 U. S. 513, 525 (2014)（首先引用McCulloch诉Maryland案，4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819)；然后引用Marbury案，1 Cranch，第177页）。法院还给予行政部门解释“最尊重的考虑”，仅仅因为“[t]相关官员通常是能干的人，且是主题的专家”，他们“[n]ot unfrequently……是其后来被要求解释的法律的起草人”。United

States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763 (1878); see also Jacobs v. Prichard, 223 U. S. 200, 214 (1912).

States诉Moore案，95 U. S. 760, 763 (1878)；另见Jacobs诉Prichard案，223 U. S. 200, 214 (1912)。

“Respect,” though, was just that. The views of the Exec­ utive Branch could inform the judgment of the Judiciary, but did not supersede it. Whatever respect an Executive Branch interpretation was due, a judge “certainly would not be bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a department.” Decatur, 14 Pet., at 515; see also Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. 1, 16 (1932). Otherwise, ju­ dicial judgment would not be independent at all. As Justice Story put it, “in cases where [a court’s] own judgment . . . differ[ed] from that of other high functionaries,” the court was “not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.” Dickson, 15 Pet., at 162.

然而，“尊重”仅此而已。行政部门的观点可以告知司法机构的判断，但不能取代它。无论行政部门的解释应得到何种尊重，法官“certainly不会被迫采纳部门首脑给出的解释”。Decatur案，14 Pet.，第515页；另见Burnet诉Chicago Portrait Co.案，285 U. S. 1, 16 (1932)。否则，司法判断将根本不独立。正如Story大法官所言，“在[法院]自己的判断……与其他高级官员不同的案件中”，法院“无权放弃或放弃它”。Dickson案，15 Pet.，第162页。

B The New Deal ushered in a “rapid expansion of the ad­ ministrative process.” United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 644 (1950). But as new agencies with new powers proliferated, the Court continued to adhere to the tradi­ tional understanding that questions of law were for courts to decide, exercising independent judgment.

B 新政带来了“行政程序的迅速扩张”。United States诉Morton Salt Co.案，338 U. S. 632, 644 (1950)。但随着拥有新权力的新机构激增，法院继续坚持传统理解，即法律问题由法院行使独立判断来决定。

During this period, the Court often treated agency deter­ minations of fact as binding on the courts, provided that there was “evidence to support the findings.” St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 51 (1936). “When the legislature itself acts within the broad field of legislative discretion,” the Court reasoned, “its determina­ tions are conclusive.” Ibid. Congress could therefore “ap­ point[] an agent to act within that sphere of legislative au­ thority” and “endow the agent with power to make findings of fact which are conclusive, provided the requirements of due process which are specially applicable to such an agency are met, as in according a fair hearing and acting upon evidence and not arbitrarily.” Ibid. (emphasis added).

在此期间，法院通常将机构的事实认定视为对法院具有约束力，前提是有“证据支持该认定”。St. Joseph Stock Yards Co.诉United States案，298 U. S. 38, 51 (1936)。法院推理称，“当立法机关本身在广泛的立法裁量领域内行事时，其决定是决定性的。”同上。因此，国会可以“任命一名代理人在该立法权力范围内行事”，并“赋予该代理人作出具有决定性的事实认定的权力，前提是满足特别适用于此类机构的正当程序要求，如给予公平听证并基于证据而非任意行事。”同上（强调为后加）。

But the Court did not extend similar deference to agency

但法院未将类似的遵从延伸至机构

resolutions of questions of law. It instead made clear, re­ peatedly, that “[t]he interpretation of the meaning of stat­ utes, as applied to justiciable controversies,” was “exclu­ sively a judicial function.” United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 544 (1940); see also Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358, 369 (1946); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 678, 681–682, n. 1 (1944). The Court understood, in the words of Justice Brandeis, that “[t]he supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied.” St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U. S., at 84 (concurring opinion). It also continued to note, as it long had, that the informed judgment of the Ex­ ecutive Branch—especially in the form of an interpretation issued contemporaneously with the enactment of the stat­ ute—could be entitled to “great weight.” American Truck­ ing Assns., 310 U. S., at 549.

对法律问题的解决。相反，它反复明确表示，“对法规含义的解释，适用于可司法裁决的争议”，是“专属的司法职能”。United States诉American Trucking Assns., Inc.案，310 U. S. 534, 544 (1940)；另见Social Security Bd.诉Nierotko案，327 U. S. 358, 369 (1946)；Medo Photo Supply Corp.诉NLRB案，321 U. S. 678, 681–682, n. 1 (1944)。用Brandeis大法官的话说，法院理解“法律至上要求有机会让某个法院决定是否适用了错误的法治规则”。St. Joseph Stock Yards案，298 U. S.，第84页（同意意见）。它还继续指出，正如长期以来一样，行政部门的知情判断——特别是以与法规颁布同时发布的解释形式——可能有权获得“重大权重”。American Trucking Assns.案，310 U. S.，第549页。

Perhaps most notably along those lines, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 (1944), the Court explained that the “interpretations and opinions” of the relevant agency, “made in pursuance of official duty” and “based upon . . . specialized experience,” “constitute[d] a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants [could] properly resort for guidance,” even on legal questions. Id., at 139–140. “The weight of such a judgment in a particular case,” the Court observed, would “depend upon the thor­ oughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its rea­ soning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce­ ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Id., at 140.

或许在这方面最值得注意的是，在Skidmore诉Swift & Co.案，323 U. S. 134 (1944)中，法院解释称，相关机构的“解释和意见”，“根据官方职责作出”并“基于……专门经验”，“构成[了]经验和知情判断的体系，法院和诉讼当事人[可以]适当地求助以寻求指导”，即使在法律问题上也是如此。同上，第139–140页。法院观察到，“此类判断在特定案件中的权重”将“取决于其审议中明显的彻底性、其推理的有效性、其与先前和后来声明的 consistency，以及所有赋予其说服力的因素，如果缺乏控制力的话。”同上，第140页。

On occasion, to be sure, the Court applied deferential re­ view upon concluding that a particular statute empowered an agency to decide how a broad statutory term applied to specific facts found by the agency. For example, in Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402 (1941), the Court deferred to an ad­ ministrative conclusion that a coal-burning railroad that

诚然，法院有时在认定某一特定法规授权行政机关决定某一宽泛的法定术语如何适用于该机关所认定的具体事实后，会适用尊重性审查。例如，在Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402 (1941)案中，法院尊重了一项行政结论，即一家与若干煤矿有安排的燃煤铁路公司

had arrangements with several coal mines was not a coal “producer” under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937. Con­ gress had “specifically” granted the agency the authority to make that determination. Id., at 411. The Court thus rea­ soned that “[w]here, as here, a determination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and the administrative conclusion left untouched” so long as the agency’s decision constituted “a sensible exercise of judgment.” Id., at 412–413. Similarly, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944), the Court deferred to the determination of the National Labor Relations Board that newsboys were “employee[s]” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. The Act had, in the Court’s judgment, “assigned primarily” to the Board the task of marking a “definitive limitation around the term ‘employee.’” Id., at 130. The Court accordingly viewed its own role as “limited” to assessing whether the Board’s de­ termination had a “‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law.” Id., at 131.

根据1937年《烟煤法》不是煤炭“生产者”。国会已“专门”授予该机关作出该认定的权力。Id., at 411。因此，法院推理称，“在如同本案这样将认定留给行政机关的情况下，只要该机关的决定构成‘对判断的合理行使’，这一授权将受到尊重，行政结论将不受触动。”Id., at 412–413。同样，在NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944)案中，法院尊重了国家劳资关系委员会的认定，即报童属于《国家劳资关系法》意义上的“雇员”。在法院看来，该法“主要”将界定“‘雇员’一词的确定性界限”的任务分配给了该委员会。Id., at 130。因此，法院将其自身角色视为“限于”评估该委员会的认定是否具有“‘记录中的依据’以及法律上的合理基础”。Id., at 131。

Such deferential review, though, was cabined to fact- bound determinations like those at issue in Gray and Hearst. Neither Gray nor Hearst purported to refashion the longstanding judicial approach to questions of law. In Gray, after deferring to the agency’s determination that a particular entity was not a “producer” of coal, the Court went on to discern, based on its own reading of the text, whether another statutory term—“other disposal” of coal— encompassed a transaction lacking a transfer of title. See 314 U. S., at 416–417. The Court evidently perceived no basis for deference to the agency with respect to that pure legal question. And in Hearst, the Court proclaimed that “[u]ndoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation . . . are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute.” 322 U. S., at 130–131. At least with

然而，这种尊重性审查仅限于像Gray和Hearst案中所涉那样受事实约束的认定。Gray和Hearst均未声称要重塑长期以来对法律问题的司法处理方式。在Gray案中，法院在尊重行政机关关于某一特定实体不是煤炭“生产者”的认定后，继续根据其自身对文本的解读，判断另一法定术语——煤炭的“其他处置”——是否涵盖一项缺乏所有权转移的交易。See 314 U. S., at 416–417。法院显然认为，就该纯粹法律问题而言，没有尊重行政机关的依据。而在Hearst案中，法院宣告，“毫无疑问，法定解释问题……应由法院解决，并应给予那些负有执行所涉法规特殊职责者的判断以适当权重。”322 U. S., at 130–131。至少就

respect to questions it regarded as involving “statutory in­ terpretation,” the Court thus did not disturb the traditional rule. It merely thought that a different approach should apply where application of a statutory term was sufficiently intertwined with the agency’s factfinding.

法院认为涉及“法定解释”的问题而言，法院因此并未动摇传统规则。它只是认为，在法定术语的适用与行政机关的事实认定充分交织的情况下，应适用不同的处理方式。

In any event, the Court was far from consistent in review­ ing deferentially even such factbound statutory determina­ tions. Often the Court simply interpreted and applied the statute before it. See K. Davis, Administrative Law §248, p. 893 (1951) (“The one statement that can be made with confidence about applicability of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell is that sometimes the Supreme Court applies it and sometimes it does not.”); B. Schwartz, Gray vs. Powell and the Scope of Review, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 68 (1955) (noting an “embarrassingly large number of Supreme Court deci­ sions that do not adhere to the doctrine of Gray v. Powell”). In one illustrative example, the Court rejected the U. S. Price Administrator’s determination that a particular warehouse was a “public utility” entitled to an exemption from the Administrator’s General Maximum Price Regula­ tion. Despite the striking resemblance of that administra­ tive determination to those that triggered deference in Gray and Hearst, the Court declined to “accept the Administra­ tor’s view in deference to administrative construction.” Da­ vies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 144, 156 (1944). The Administrator’s view, the Court explained, had “hardly seasoned or broadened into a settled administrative prac­ tice,” and thus did not “overweigh the considerations” the Court had “set forth as to the proper construction of the statute.” Ibid.

无论如何，即使对此类受事实约束的法定认定，法院在给予尊重性审查方面也远非一致。法院常常只是解释和适用其面前的法规。See K. Davis, Administrative Law §248, p. 893 (1951)（“关于Gray v. Powell原则的适用性，可以有把握地作出的一项陈述是：有时最高法院适用它，有时则不适用。”）；B. Schwartz, Gray vs. Powell and the Scope of Review, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 68 (1955)（指出“数量多得令人尴尬的最高法院判决未遵循Gray v. Powell原则”）。在一个说明性例子中，法院拒绝了美国价格管理局局长的认定，即某一特定仓库是“公用事业”，有权豁免于局长的《一般最高价格条例》。尽管该行政认定与Gray和Hearst案中触发尊重的认定极为相似，法院仍拒绝“基于对行政解释的尊重而接受局长的观点”。Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 144, 156 (1944)。法院解释称，局长的观点“几乎尚未经过历练或扩展为已确立的行政实践”，因此并未“压倒法院就法规的正确解释所‘提出的考虑因素’”。Ibid.

Nothing in the New Deal era or before it thus resembled the deference rule the Court would begin applying decades later to all varieties of agency interpretations of statutes. Instead, just five years after Gray and two after Hearst, Congress codified the opposite rule: the traditional under­ standing that courts must “decide all relevant questions of

因此，在新政时期或其之前，没有任何东西类似于法院数十年后开始对所有类型的行政机关法规解释适用的尊重规则。相反，在Gray案之后仅五年、Hearst案之后仅两年，国会就将相反的规则编纂成法：即法院必须“决定所有相关法律问题”的传统理解

law.” 5 U. S. C. §706. 3

法律问题。”5 U. S. C. §706。3

C Congress in 1946 enacted the APA “as a check upon ad­ ministrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.” Morton Salt, 338 U. S., at 644. It was the culmi­ nation of a “comprehensive rethinking of the place of ad­ ministrative agencies in a regime of separate and divided powers.” Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physi­ cians, 476 U. S. 667, 670–671 (1986).

C 国会于1946年颁布《行政程序法》，“作为对行政官员的制约，否则他们的热情可能使其作出设立其职位的立法未曾预见的过度行为。”Morton Salt, 338 U. S., at 644。这是“对行政机关在分权分立体制中地位的全面重新思考”的顶点。Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670–671 (1986)。

In addition to prescribing procedures for agency action, the APA delineates the basic contours of judicial review of such action. As relevant here, Section 706 directs that “[t]o

除规定行政行为的程序外，《行政程序法》还勾勒了对该类行为进行司法审查的基本轮廓。就本案相关而言，第706条规定，“在

the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and de­ termine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” 5 U. S. C. §706. It further requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . not in accordance with law.” §706(2)(A).

作出裁判所必需的范围内且问题被提出时，审查法院必须决定所有相关法律问题，解释宪法和法定条款，并确定行政行为条款的含义或适用性。”5 U. S. C. §706。它还要求法院“认定行政行为、认定和结论……不符合法律”时，应“裁定其为非法并予以撤销”。§706(2)(A)。

The APA thus codifies for agency cases the unremarka­ ble, yet elemental proposition reflected by judicial practice dating back to Marbury: that courts decide legal questions by applying their own judgment. It specifies that courts, not agencies, will decide “all relevant questions of law” aris­ ing on review of agency action, §706 (emphasis added)— even those involving ambiguous laws—and set aside any such action inconsistent with the law as they interpret it. And it prescribes no deferential standard for courts to em­ ploy in answering those legal questions. That omission is telling, because Section 706 does mandate that judicial re­ view of agency policymaking and factfinding be deferential. See §706(2)(A) (agency action to be set aside if “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion”); §706(2)(E) (agency factfinding in formal proceedings to be set aside if “unsup­ ported by substantial evidence”).

因此，《行政程序法》为行政案件编纂了可追溯至Marbury案的司法实践所体现的平凡却基本的主张：法院通过运用自身判断来决定法律问题。它明确规定，法院而非行政机关将决定在审查行政行为时出现的“所有相关法律问题”，§706（着重号为原文所加）——甚至包括涉及模糊法律的问题——并撤销任何与其所解释的法律不一致的此类行为。而且，它未规定法院在回答这些法律问题时可采用任何尊重性标准。这一省略意味深长，因为第706条确实规定，对行政机关政策制定和事实认定的司法审查应是尊重性的。See §706(2)(A)（行政行为如“任意、反复无常[或]滥用裁量权”应予撤销）；§706(2)(E)（正式程序中的行政机关事实认定如“无实质性证据支持”应予撤销）。

In a statute designed to “serve as the fundamental char­ ter of the administrative state,” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. 558, 580 (2019) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted), Congress surely would have articulated a similarly deferential standard applicable to questions of law had it intended to depart from the settled pre-APA un­ derstanding that deciding such questions was “exclusively a judicial function,” American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S., at 544. But nothing in the APA hints at such a dramatic departure. On the contrary, by directing courts to “inter­ pret constitutional and statutory provisions” without differ­ entiating between the two, Section 706 makes clear that

在一部旨在“充当行政国家基本宪章”的法律中，Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. 558, 580 (2019)（复数意见）（内部引号省略），如果国会意图背离《行政程序法》之前已确立的理解，即决定此类问题是“专属于司法职能”，American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S., at 544，它肯定会阐明一项同样适用于法律问题的尊重性标准。但《行政程序法》中没有任何内容暗示如此重大的背离。相反，通过指示法院“解释宪法和法定条款”而不在两者之间作区分，第706条明确表明

agency interpretations of statutes—like agency interpreta­ tions of the Constitution—are not entitled to deference. Un­ der the APA, it thus “remains the responsibility of the court to decide whether the law means what the agency says.” Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 109 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 4

行政机关对法规的解释——如同行政机关对宪法的解释——无权获得尊重。因此，根据《行政程序法》，“决定法律是否如行政机关所言，仍然是法院的责任。”Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 109 (2015)（Scalia, J., concurring in judgment）。4

The text of the APA means what it says. And a look at its history if anything only underscores that plain meaning. According to both the House and Senate Reports on the leg­ islation, Section 706 “provide[d] that questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analy­ sis.” H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 44 (1946) (emphasis added); accord, S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (1945). Some of the legislation’s most prominent supporters articulated the same view. See 92 Cong. Rec. 5654 (1946) (statement of Rep. Walter); P. McCarran, Im­ proving “Administrative Justice”: Hearings and Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review, 32 A. B. A. J. 827, 831 (1946). Even the Department of Justice—an agency with every in­ centive to endorse a view of the APA favorable to the Exec­ utive Branch—opined after its enactment that Section 706 merely “restate[d] the present law as to the scope of judicial review.” Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the

《行政程序法》的文本就是它所说的意思。而审视其历史，如果说有什么作用的话，只会更加凸显这一平实含义。根据众议院和参议院关于该立法的报告，第706条“规定法律问题最终由法院而非行政机关裁决。”H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 44 (1946)（着重号为后加）；同见 S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (1945)。该立法一些最著名的支持者也表达了同样的观点。见 92 Cong. Rec. 5654 (1946)（Walter众议员的发言）；P. McCarran, Improving “Administrative Justice”: Hearings and Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review, 32 A. B. A. J. 827, 831 (1946)。甚至司法部——一个完全有动机支持有利于行政分支的《行政程序法》观点的机关——也在其颁布后认为，第706条仅仅“重述了关于司法审查范围的现行法律”。Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the

Administrative Procedure Act 108 (1947); see also Kisor, 588 U. S., at 582 (plurality opinion) (same). That “present law,” as we have described, adhered to the traditional con­ ception of the judicial function. See supra, at 9–13.

Administrative Procedure Act 108 (1947)；另见 Kisor, 588 U. S., at 582（复数意见）（同此）。正如我们所描述的，那一“现行法律”遵循了关于司法职能的传统观念。见上文第9–13页。

Various respected commentators contemporaneously maintained that the APA required reviewing courts to ex­ ercise independent judgment on questions of law. Professor John Dickinson, for example, read the APA to “impose a clear mandate that all [questions of law] shall be decided by the reviewing Court itself, and in the exercise of its own in­ dependent judgment.” Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounds of Broadened Judicial Review, 33 A. B. A. J. 434, 516 (1947). Professor Bernard Schwartz noted that §706 “would seem . . . to be merely a legislative restatement of the familiar review principle that questions of law are for the reviewing court, at the same time leaving to the courts the task of determining in each case what are questions of law.” Mixed Questions of Law and Fact and the Administrative Procedure Act, 19 Ford. L. Rev. 73, 84– 85 (1950). And Professor Louis Jaffe, who had served in several agencies at the advent of the New Deal, thought that §706 leaves it up to the reviewing “court” to “decide as a ‘question of law’ whether there is ‘discretion’ in the prem­ ises”—that is, whether the statute at issue delegates par­ ticular discretionary authority to an agency. Judicial Con­ trol of Administrative Action 570 (1965).

多位受尊敬的评论者当时同时主张，《行政程序法》要求审查法院对法律问题行使独立判断。例如，John Dickinson教授将《行政程序法》解读为“施加了一项明确授权，即所有[法律问题]均应由审查法院本身在行使其自身独立判断时予以裁决。”Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounds of Broadened Judicial Review, 33 A. B. A. J. 434, 516 (1947)。Bernard Schwartz教授指出，第706条“似乎……仅仅是对熟悉的审查原则——法律问题由审查法院负责——的立法重述，同时将逐案确定何为法律问题的任务留给法院。”Mixed Questions of Law and Fact and the Administrative Procedure Act, 19 Ford. L. Rev. 73, 84–85 (1950)。而Louis Jaffe教授——他在新政之初曾在多个机关任职——认为第706条将“作为‘法律问题’裁决前提中是否存在‘裁量权’”一事留给审查“法院”决定——也就是说，所涉制定法是否将特定裁量权授予行政机关。Judicial Control of Administrative Action 570 (1965)。

The APA, in short, incorporates the traditional under­ standing of the judicial function, under which courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the mean­ ing of statutory provisions. In exercising such judgment, though, courts may—as they have from the start—seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for imple­ menting particular statutes. Such interpretations “consti­ tute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance” con­ sistent with the APA. Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 140. And

简言之，《行政程序法》纳入了关于司法职能的传统理解，据此法院在确定制定法条款的含义时必须行使独立判断。然而，在行使此种判断时，法院可以——正如它们从一开始所做的那样——寻求负责实施特定制定法者的解释之助。此类解释“构成经验与明达判断的体系，法院和诉讼当事人可以正当地诉诸其指引”，这与《行政程序法》相一致。Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 140。而

interpretations issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the statute’s mean­ ing. See ibid.; American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S., at 549.

与所涉制定法同时发布、且随时间推移保持一致的解读，在确定该制定法的含义时可能特别有用。见 ibid.；American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S., at 549。

In a case involving an agency, of course, the statute’s meaning may well be that the agency is authorized to exer­ cise a degree of discretion. Congress has often enacted such statutes. For example, some statutes “expressly delegate[]” to an agency the authority to give meaning to a particular statutory term. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425 (1977) (emphasis deleted). 5 Others empower an agency to prescribe rules to “fill up the details” of a statutory scheme, Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (1825), or to regulate subject to the limits imposed by a term or phrase that “leaves agencies with flexibility,” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. 743, 752 (2015), such as “appropriate” or “reasona­ ble.” 6

当然，在涉及行政机关的案件中，制定法的含义很可能就是该机关被授权行使一定程度的裁量权。国会经常颁布此类制定法。例如，一些制定法“明确授予[]”行政机关赋予某一特定制定法术语含义的权力。Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425 (1977)（着重号已删除）。5 另一些则授权行政机关制定规则以“填补细节”，Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (1825)，或在“为行政机关留有灵活性”的术语或短语——如“适当”或“合理”——所施加的限制范围内进行规制，Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. 743, 752 (2015)。6

When the best reading of a statute is that it delegates

当对制定法的最佳解读是它授予

discretionary authority to an agency, the role of the review­ ing court under the APA is, as always, to independently in­ terpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress sub­ ject to constitutional limits. The court fulfills that role by recognizing constitutional delegations, “fix[ing] the bound­ aries of [the] delegated authority,” H. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1983), and ensuring the agency has engaged in “‘reasoned decisionmaking’ ” within those boundaries, Michigan, 576 U. S., at 750 (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U. S. 359, 374 (1998)); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto­ mobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29 (1983). By doing so, a court upholds the traditional conception of the judicial function that the APA adopts.

将裁量权授予行政机关时，审查法院在《行政程序法》下的角色一如既往，是独立解释制定法并在宪法限制范围内实现国会的意志。法院通过承认宪法性授权、“确定[被]授予权力的边界”，H. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1983)，并确保行政机关在这些边界内进行了“‘有理由的决策’”，Michigan, 576 U. S., at 750（引用 Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U. S. 359, 374 (1998)）来履行这一角色；另见 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29 (1983)。通过这样做，法院维护了《行政程序法》所采纳的关于司法职能的传统观念。

III The deference that Chevron requires of courts reviewing agency action cannot be squared with the APA.

III Chevron要求审查机关行为的法院所遵循的遵从，无法与《行政程序法》相协调。

A In the decades between the enactment of the APA and this Court’s decision in Chevron, courts generally continued to review agency interpretations of the statutes they admin­ ister by independently examining each statute to determine its meaning. Cf. T. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969, 972–975 (1992). As an early proponent (and later critic) of Chevron recounted, courts during this period thus identified delegations of discretion­ ary authority to agencies on a “statute-by-statute basis.” A. Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpreta­ tions of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511, 516. Chevron, decided in 1984 by a bare quorum of six Jus­ tices, triggered a marked departure from the traditional ap­ proach. The question in the case was whether an EPA reg­ ulation “allow[ing] States to treat all of the pollution­

A 在《行政程序法》颁布至本法院对Chevron作出裁决之间的数十年里，法院通常继续通过独立审查每部制定法以确定其含义，来审查行政机关对其所执行制定法的解释。参 T. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969, 972–975 (1992)。正如Chevron的一位早期支持者（后来的批评者）所述，这一时期的法院因此以“逐部制定法的方式”认定对行政机关的裁量权授予。A. Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511, 516。 Chevron于1984年由仅六名大法官的法定人数作出裁决，引发了对传统做法的显著偏离。该案的问题是，一项EPA条例“允许各州将同一工业类别内所有排放污染的设备视为被包裹在单一‘气泡’内”是否与《清洁空气法》所使用的“固定源”一词相一致。467 U. S., at 840。为回答这一制定法解释问题，法院阐述并采用了一种如今已为人熟知的、广泛适用于审查机关行为的两步法。

emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’” was con­ sistent with the term “stationary source” as used in the Clean Air Act. 467 U. S., at 840. To answer that question of statutory interpretation, the Court articulated and em­ ployed a now familiar two-step approach broadly applicable to review of agency action.

将同一工业类别内的排放装置视为包裹在单一“气泡”内，这与《清洁空气法》中所使用的“固定源”一词相一致。467 U. S., at 840。为回答该成文法解释问题，法院阐述并采用了一种如今已为人熟知的、广泛适用于机构行为审查的两步法。

The first step was to discern “whether Congress ha[d] di­ rectly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id., at 842. The Court explained that “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter,” ibid., and courts were therefore to “reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent,” id., at 843, n. 9. To discern such intent, the Court noted, a reviewing court was to “employ[] traditional tools of statutory construction.” Ibid.

第一步是辨别“国会是否已就所涉确切问题直接表态”。Id., at 842。法院解释说，“如果国会的意图是明确的，事情就到此为止”，ibid.，因此法院应“拒绝与明确的国会意图相悖的行政解释”，id., at 843, n. 9。法院指出，为辨别此种意图，审查法院应“运用[]制定法解释的传统工具”。Ibid.

Without mentioning the APA, or acknowledging any doc­ trinal shift, the Court articulated a second step applicable when “Congress ha[d] not directly addressed the precise question at issue.” Id., at 843. In such a case—that is, a case in which “the statute [was] silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” at hand—a reviewing court could not “simply impose its own construction on the stat­ ute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administra­ tive interpretation.” Ibid. (footnote omitted). A court in­ stead had to set aside the traditional interpretive tools and defer to the agency if it had offered “a permissible construc­ tion of the statute,” ibid., even if not “the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding,” ibid., n. 11. That directive was justi­ fied, according to the Court, by the understanding that ad­ ministering statutes “requires the formulation of policy” to fill statutory “gap[s]”; by the long judicial tradition of ac­ cording “considerable weight” to Executive Branch inter­ pretations; and by a host of other considerations, including the complexity of the regulatory scheme, EPA’s “detailed

法院未提及《行政程序法》，也未承认任何理论上的转变，却阐述了适用于“国会[未]直接处理争议中的确切问题”时的第二步。同上，第843页。在此类案件中——即“法规[在]具体问题上[沉默或含糊]”的案件——复审法院不能“简单地将自己的解释强加于法规，如同在没有行政解释的情况下所必需的那样”。同上（脚注省略）。法院反而必须搁置传统的解释工具，如果行政机关提供了“对法规的允许解释”，则服从该机关，同上，即使那不是“如果该问题最初出现在司法程序中法院本会得出的解读”，同上，第11页注。据法院称，该指令的正当性在于这样一种理解：执行法规“需要制定政策”以填补法规“空白”；在于长期司法传统赋予行政部门解释“相当分量”；以及在于其他一系列考量，包括监管方案的复杂性、环保署“详细的

and reasoned” consideration, the policy-laden nature of the judgment supposedly required, and the agency’s indirect ac­ countability to the people through the President. Id., at 843, 844, and n. 14, 865.

和有理有据的”考量、据称所要求的充满政策色彩的判断，以及该机关通过总统对人民承担的间接问责。同上，第843、844页及第14页注、第865页。

Employing this new test, the Court concluded that Con­ gress had not addressed the question at issue with the nec­ essary “level of specificity” and that EPA’s interpretation was “entitled to deference.” Id., at 865. It did not matter why Congress, as the Court saw it, had not squarely ad­ dressed the question, see ibid., or that “the agency ha[d] from time to time changed its interpretation,” id., at 863. The latest EPA interpretation was a permissible reading of the Clean Air Act, so under the Court’s new rule, that read­ ing controlled.

法院采用这一新标准，认定国会未以必要的“具体程度”处理争议中的问题，且环保署的解释“有权获得服从”。同上，第865页。在法院看来，国会为何未正面处理该问题，见同上，或者“该机关[曾]不时改变其解释”，同上，第863页，都无关紧要。环保署的最新解释是对《清洁空气法》的允许解读，因此根据法院的新规则，该解读具有控制力。

Initially, Chevron “seemed destined to obscurity.” T. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, 66 Admin. L. Rev. 253, 276 (2014). The Court did not at first treat it as the watershed decision it was fated to become; it was hardly cited in cases involving stat­ utory questions of agency authority. See ibid. But within a few years, both this Court and the courts of appeals were routinely invoking its two-step framework as the governing standard in such cases. See id., at 276–277. As the Court did so, it revisited the doctrine’s justifications. Eventually, the Court decided that Chevron rested on “a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambigu­ ity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess what­ ever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.” Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 740–741 (1996); see also, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U. S. 261, 276–277 (2016); Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 315 (2014); National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 982 (2005).

起初，Chevron“似乎注定默默无闻”。T. Merrill，《Chevron的故事：一个偶然里程碑的形成》，66 Admin. L. Rev. 253, 276（2014）。法院起初并未将其视为它注定要成为的分水岭判决；在涉及行政机关权限的法规问题的案件中，它几乎未被援引。见同上。但几年之内，本法院和各上诉法院便惯常援引其两步框架作为此类案件中的 governing 标准。见同上，第276–277页。法院在这样做时，重新审视了该理论的正当性理由。最终，法院认定Chevron建立在“一项推定之上，即国会在一部拟由行政机关实施的法规中留下含糊之处时，理解该含糊之处将首先且主要由行政机关解决，并希望行政机关（而非法院）拥有该含糊之处所允许的任何程度的裁量权”。Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 740–741（1996）；另见，例如，Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U. S. 261, 276–277（2016）；Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 315（2014）；National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 982（2005）。

B Neither Chevron nor any subsequent decision of this Court attempted to reconcile its framework with the APA. The “law of deference” that this Court has built on the foun­ dation laid in Chevron has instead been “[h]eedless of the original design” of the APA. Perez, 575 U. S., at 109 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

B 无论是Chevron还是本法院此后的任何判决，都未试图使其框架与《行政程序法》相协调。本法院建立在Chevron所奠定基础之上的“服从之法”，反而“[不]顾及”《行政程序法》的“原初设计”。Perez, 575 U. S., at 109（Scalia大法官，对判决意见的协同意见）。

1 Chevron defies the command of the APA that “the review­ ing court”—not the agency whose action it reviews—is to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret . . . statutory provisions.” §706 (emphasis added). It requires a court to ignore, not follow, “the reading the court would have reached” had it exercised its independent judgment as required by the APA. Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 11. And although exercising independent judgment is consistent with the “respect” historically given to Executive Branch in­ terpretations, see, e.g., Edwards’ Lessee, 12 Wheat., at 210; Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 140, Chevron insists on much more. It demands that courts mechanically afford binding defer­ ence to agency interpretations, including those that have been inconsistent over time. See 467 U. S., at 863. Still worse, it forces courts to do so even when a pre-existing ju­ dicial precedent holds that the statute means something else—unless the prior court happened to also say that the statute is “unambiguous.” Brand X, 545 U. S., at 982. That regime is the antithesis of the time honored approach the APA prescribes. In fretting over the prospect of “allow[ing]” a judicial interpretation of a statute “to override an agency’s” in a dispute before a court, ibid., Chevron turns the statutory scheme for judicial review of agency action up­ side down. Chevron cannot be reconciled with the APA, as the Gov­ ernment and the dissent contend, by presuming that statu­ tory ambiguities are implicit delegations to agencies. See

1 Chevron违背了《行政程序法》的指令，即“复审法院”——而非其行为受审查的行政机关——应“裁决所有相关法律问题”并“解释……法规条款”。§706（着重号为原文所加）。它要求法院忽视而非遵循“如果法院按《行政程序法》要求行使独立判断本会得出的解读”。Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 11。尽管行使独立判断与历史上给予行政部门解释的“尊重”相一致，见，例如，Edwards’ Lessee, 12 Wheat., at 210；Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 140，但Chevron坚持的要求远不止于此。它要求法院机械地给予行政机关解释以约束性服从，包括那些随时间推移前后不一致的解释。见467 U. S., at 863。更糟的是，它迫使法院这样做，即使既有的司法先例认定该法规含义不同——除非先前法院恰好也说过该法规“明确无误”。Brand X, 545 U. S., at 982。该制度与《行政程序法》所规定的历史悠久的做法截然相反。在法院审理的争议中，Chevron担忧“允许”对法规的司法解释“推翻行政机关的”解释，同上，从而将行政机关行为司法审查的法定制度颠倒过来。 正如政府和异议意见所主张的，不能通过推定法规含糊之处是对行政机关的默示授权来使Chevron与《行政程序法》相协调。见

Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, pp. 13, 37–38; post, at 4–15 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). Presumptions have their place in statutory interpretation, but only to the extent that they approximate reality. Chevron’s presumption does not, because “[a]n ambiguity is simply not a delegation of law- interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two.” C. Sun- stein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 445 (1989). As Chevron itself noted, am­ biguities may result from an inability on the part of Con­ gress to squarely answer the question at hand, or from a failure to even “consider the question” with the requisite precision. 467 U. S., at 865. In neither case does an ambi­ guity necessarily reflect a congressional intent that an agency, as opposed to a court, resolve the resulting inter­ pretive question. And many or perhaps most statutory am­ biguities may be unintentional. As the Framers recognized, ambiguities will inevitably follow from “the complexity of objects, . . . the imperfection of the human faculties,” and the simple fact that “no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea.” The Federalist No. 37, at 236.

第22–1219号案件被上诉人答辩状，第13、37–38页；后文，第4–15页（KAGAN大法官意见）。推定在法规解释中自有其位置，但仅限于其近似现实的程度。Chevron的推定并非如此，因为“含糊之处根本不是法律解释权的授权。Chevron混淆了二者。”C. Sunstein，《在监管型国家中解释法规》，103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 445（1989）。正如Chevron本身所指出的，含糊之处可能源于国会无法正面回答当前问题，或源于未能以必要的精确度甚至“考虑该问题”。467 U. S., at 865。在这两种情况下，含糊之处都不必然反映出国会意图由行政机关而非法院来解决由此产生的解释问题。而且许多或大多数法规含糊之处可能并非有意为之。正如制宪者所认识到的，含糊之处不可避免地源于“对象的复杂性……人类能力的不完善”，以及一个简单事实，即“没有任何语言丰富到能为每一个复杂观念提供词语和短语”。《联邦党人文集》第37篇，第236页。

Courts, after all, routinely confront statutory ambiguities in cases having nothing to do with Chevron—cases that do not involve agency interpretations or delegations of author­ ity. Of course, when faced with a statutory ambiguity in such a case, the ambiguity is not a delegation to anybody, and a court is not somehow relieved of its obligation to in­ dependently interpret the statute. Courts in that situation do not throw up their hands because “Congress’s instruc­ tions have” supposedly “run out,” leaving a statutory “gap.” Post, at 2 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). Courts instead under­ stand that such statutes, no matter how impenetrable, do— in fact, must—have a single, best meaning. That is the whole point of having written statutes; “every statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment.” Wisconsin Cen­

毕竟，法院在与Chevron无关的案件中——不涉及行政机关解释或权限授予的案件——经常面对法规含糊之处。当然，在此类案件中面对法规含糊之处时，该含糊之处并非对任何人的授权，法院也不会以某种方式被免除独立解释法规的义务。处于该情形的法院不会因为据称“国会的指示已经”用尽、留下法规“空白”而束手无策。后文，第2页（KAGAN大法官意见）。法院反而理解，此类法规无论多么晦涩难懂，事实上都——而且必须——具有单一的最佳含义。这正是成文法规的意义所在；“每部法规的含义在颁布时即已确定”。Wisconsin Cen­

tral Ltd. v. United States, 585 U. S. 274, 284 (2018) (empha­ sis deleted). So instead of declaring a particular party’s reading “permissible” in such a case, courts use every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the stat­ ute and resolve the ambiguity.

tral Ltd. v. United States, 585 U. S. 274, 284（2018）（着重号删除）。因此，在此类案件中，法院不会宣布某一特定当事人的解读“允许”，而是运用其掌握的一切工具来确定法规的最佳解读并解决含糊之处。

In an agency case as in any other, though, even if some judges might (or might not) consider the statute ambiguous, there is a best reading all the same—“the reading the court would have reached” if no agency were involved. Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 11. It therefore makes no sense to speak of a “permissible” interpretation that is not the one the court, after applying all relevant interpretive tools, con­ cludes is best. In the business of statutory interpretation, if it is not the best, it is not permissible.

然而，在行政机关案件中如同在任何其他案件中一样，即使某些法官可能（或可能不）认为法规含糊，也仍然存在一个最佳解读——“如果无行政机关介入法院本会得出的解读”。Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 11。因此，谈论一种并非法院在适用所有相关解释工具后认定最佳的“允许”解释是毫无意义的。在法规解释这一行当里，如果不是最佳的，就不是允许的。

Perhaps most fundamentally, Chevron’s presumption is misguided because agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities. Courts do. The Framers, as noted, anticipated that courts would often confront stat­ utory ambiguities and expected that courts would resolve them by exercising independent legal judgment. And even Chevron itself reaffirmed that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction” and recog­ nized that “in the absence of an administrative interpreta­ tion,” it is “necessary” for a court to “impose its own con­ struction on the statute.” Id., at 843, and n. 9. Chevron gravely erred, though, in concluding that the inquiry is fun­ damentally different just because an administrative inter­ pretation is in play. The very point of the traditional tools of statutory construction—the tools courts use every day— is to resolve statutory ambiguities. That is no less true when the ambiguity is about the scope of an agency’s own power—perhaps the occasion on which abdication in favor of the agency is least appropriate.

也许最根本的是，Chevron的推定之所以错误，是因为行政机关在解决法规含糊之处方面并无特殊能力。法院才有。如前所述，制宪者预见到法院将经常面对法规含糊之处，并期望法院通过行使独立法律判断来解决它们。甚至Chevron本身也重申“司法机关是法规解释问题的最终权威”，并承认“在没有行政解释的情况下”，法院“有必要”“将自己的解释强加于法规”。同上，第843页及第9页注。然而，Chevron在认定仅因存在行政解释调查就根本不同时犯了严重错误。传统法规解释工具——法院每天使用的工具——的核心要点正是解决法规含糊之处。当含糊之处涉及行政机关自身权限的范围时——这或许是最不适合让位于行政机关的场合——这一点同样成立。

2 The Government responds that Congress must generally

2 政府回应称，国会通常必须

intend for agencies to resolve statutory ambiguities because agencies have subject matter expertise regarding the stat­ utes they administer; because deferring to agencies pur­ portedly promotes the uniform construction of federal law; and because resolving statutory ambiguities can involve policymaking best left to political actors, rather than courts. See Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, pp. 16–19. The dissent offers more of the same. See post, at 9–14. But none of these considerations justifies Chevron’s sweeping pre­ sumption of congressional intent.

意图由行政机关解决法规含糊之处，因为行政机关对其执行的法规拥有主题专长；因为服从行政机关据称促进联邦法律的统一解释；以及因为解决法规含糊之处可能涉及最好留给政治行为者而非法院的政策制定。见第22–1219号案件被上诉人答辩状，第16–19页。异议意见提供了更多同样的内容。见后文，第9–14页。但这些考量都不能证成Chevron对国会意图的宽泛推定。

Beginning with expertise, we recently noted that inter­ pretive issues arising in connection with a regulatory scheme often “may fall more naturally into a judge’s baili­ wick” than an agency’s. Kisor, 588 U. S., at 578 (opinion of the Court). We thus observed that “[w]hen the agency has no comparative expertise in resolving a regulatory ambigu­ ity, Congress presumably would not grant it that author­ ity.” Ibid. Chevron’s broad rule of deference, though, de­ mands that courts presume just the opposite. Under that rule, ambiguities of all stripes trigger deference. Indeed, the Government and, seemingly, the dissent continue to de­ fend the proposition that Chevron applies even in cases hav­ ing little to do with an agency’s technical subject matter ex­ pertise. See Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, p. 17; post, at 10.

从专门知识入手，我们最近指出，与监管制度相关的解释问题往往“可能更自然地属于法官的职权范围”，而非行政机关的。Kisor, 588 U. S., at 578（法院意见）。因此我们观察到，“当行政机关在解决监管歧义方面没有比较性专门知识时，国会想必不会授予其该权力。”同上。然而，Chevron的宽泛遵从规则要求法院推定恰恰相反。根据该规则，各种类型的歧义都会触发遵从。事实上，政府和——似乎——异议方继续捍卫这一主张：即使在与行政机关技术性主题专门知识几乎无关的案件中，Chevron也适用。见第22–1219号案被上诉人简报第17页；post, at 10。

But even when an ambiguity happens to implicate a tech­ nical matter, it does not follow that Congress has taken the power to authoritatively interpret the statute from the courts and given it to the agency. Congress expects courts to handle technical statutory questions. “[M]any statutory cases” call upon “courts [to] interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law,” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U. S. 141, 161 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting), and courts did so without issue in agency cases before Chev­ ron, see post, at 30 (GORSUCH, J., concurring). Courts, after all, do not decide such questions blindly. The parties and

但即使歧义恰好涉及技术性事项，也不能由此推断国会已将权威解释制定法的权力从法院取走并交给行政机关。国会期望法院处理技术性制定法问题。“许多制定法案件”要求“法院解释作为法律日常食粮的大量技术性细节”，Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U. S. 141, 161 (2001)（Breyer大法官异议意见），而在Chevron之前的行政机关案件中，法院正是这样做的且未出现问题，见post, at 30（GORSUCH大法官协同意见）。毕竟，法院并非盲目裁决此类问题。当事人和

amici in such cases are steeped in the subject matter, and reviewing courts have the benefit of their perspectives. In an agency case in particular, the court will go about its task with the agency’s “body of experience and informed judg­ ment,” among other information, at its disposal. Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 140. And although an agency’s interpretation of a statute “cannot bind a court,” it may be especially in­ formative “to the extent it rests on factual premises within [the agency’s] expertise.” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 98, n. 8 (1983). Such ex­ pertise has always been one of the factors which may give an Executive Branch interpretation particular “power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 140; see, e.g., County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 590 U. S. 165, 180 (2020); Moore, 95 U. S., at 763.

此类案件中的法庭之友深谙主题事项，审理法院得以受益于其观点。尤其在行政机关案件中，法院将借助行政机关的“经验积累和知情判断”以及其他信息来完成任务。Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 140。尽管行政机关对制定法的解释“不能约束法院”，但“在其以[行政机关]专门知识范围内的事实前提为基础时”，可能特别具有参考价值。Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 98, n. 8 (1983)。这种专门知识一直是可能赋予行政部门解释特殊“说服力（如果缺乏控制力）”的因素之一。Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 140；另见，例如，County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 590 U. S. 165, 180 (2020)；Moore, 95 U. S., at 763。

For those reasons, delegating ultimate interpretive au­ thority to agencies is simply not necessary to ensure that the resolution of statutory ambiguities is well informed by subject matter expertise. The better presumption is there­ fore that Congress expects courts to do their ordinary job of interpreting statutes, with due respect for the views of the Executive Branch. And to the extent that Congress and the Executive Branch may disagree with how the courts have performed that job in a particular case, they are of course always free to act by revising the statute.

基于上述理由，将最终解释权授予行政机关，对于确保制定法歧义的解决充分吸收主题事项专门知识而言，根本没有必要。因此，更恰当的推定是，国会期望法院履行其解释制定法的通常职责，同时对行政部门的观点给予应有尊重。如果国会和行政部门在特定案件中不同意法院履行该职责的方式，他们当然始终可以通过修订制定法来采取行动。

Nor does a desire for the uniform construction of federal law justify Chevron. Given inconsistencies in how judges apply Chevron, see infra, at 30–33, it is unclear how much the doctrine as a whole (as opposed to its highly deferential second step) actually promotes such uniformity. In any event, there is little value in imposing a uniform interpre­ tation of a statute if that interpretation is wrong. We see no reason to presume that Congress prefers uniformity for uniformity’s sake over the correct interpretation of the laws it enacts.

对联邦法律统一解释的渴望也不能为Chevron提供正当理由。鉴于法官适用Chevron的方式不一致，见下文第30–33页，尚不清楚该原则整体上（而非其高度遵从的第二步骤）实际上在多大程度上促进了这种统一性。无论如何，如果对制定法的统一解释是错误的，那么强加这种解释几乎没有价值。我们认为没有理由推定国会偏好为统一而统一，而非对其所颁布法律的正确解释。

The view that interpretation of ambiguous statutory pro­ visions amounts to policymaking suited for political actors rather than courts is especially mistaken, for it rests on a profound misconception of the judicial role. It is reasonable to assume that Congress intends to leave policymaking to political actors. But resolution of statutory ambiguities in­ volves legal interpretation. That task does not suddenly be­ come policymaking just because a court has an “agency to fall back on.” Kisor, 588 U. S., at 575 (opinion of the Court). Courts interpret statutes, no matter the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory construction, not individ­ ual policy preferences. Indeed, the Framers crafted the Constitution to ensure that federal judges could exercise judgment free from the influence of the political branches. See The Federalist, No. 78, at 522–525. They were to con­ strue the law with “[c]lear heads . . . and honest hearts,” not with an eye to policy preferences that had not made it into the statute. 1 Works of James Wilson 363 (J. Andrews ed. 1896).

认为对歧义制定法条款的解释等同于适合政治行为者而非法院的决策，这种观点尤其错误，因为它建立在深刻误解司法角色之上。可以合理假定国会意图将决策留给政治行为者。但解决制定法歧义涉及法律解释。仅仅因为法院有“行政机关可以依靠”，该任务并不会突然变成决策。Kisor, 588 U. S., at 575（法院意见）。无论背景如何，法院都基于制定法解释的传统工具而非个人政策偏好来解释制定法。事实上，制宪者设计宪法正是为了确保联邦法官能够在不受政治部门影响的情况下行使判断力。见The Federalist, No. 78, at 522–525。他们应以“[清]醒的头脑……和诚实的心”来解释法律，而非着眼于未能进入制定法的政策偏好。1 Works of James Wilson 363 (J. Andrews ed. 1896)。

That is not to say that Congress cannot or does not confer discretionary authority on agencies. Congress may do so, subject to constitutional limits, and it often has. But to stay out of discretionary policymaking left to the political branches, judges need only fulfill their obligations under the APA to independently identify and respect such delega­ tions of authority, police the outer statutory boundaries of those delegations, and ensure that agencies exercise their discretion consistent with the APA. By forcing courts to in­ stead pretend that ambiguities are necessarily delegations, Chevron does not prevent judges from making policy. It prevents them from judging.

这并不是说国会不能或没有向行政机关授予自由裁量权。国会可以在宪法限制范围内这样做，而且经常这样做。但为了不介入留给政治部门的自由裁量决策，法官只需履行其在APA下的义务，独立识别并尊重此类权力授予，把守这些授权的外部制定法边界，并确保行政机关依照APA行使自由裁量权。Chevron迫使法院反而假装歧义必然是授权，这并不能阻止法官制定政策。它阻止的是法官进行裁判。

3 In truth, Chevron’s justifying presumption is, as Mem­ bers of this Court have often recognized, a fiction. See Buff­ ington v. McDonough, 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (GORSUCH,

3 事实上，正如本法院成员经常承认的那样，Chevron的正当化推定是一种拟制。见Buffington v. McDonough, 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2022)（GORSUCH大法官，

J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 11); Cuozzo, 579 U. S., at 286 (THOMAS, J., concurring); Scalia, 1989 Duke L. J., at 517; see also post, at 15 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). So we have spent the better part of four decades imposing one limitation on Chevron after another, pruning its presumption on the understanding that “where it is in doubt that Congress actually intended to delegate particu­ lar interpretive authority to an agency, Chevron is ‘inappli­ cable.’” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 230 (2001) (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 597 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)); see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U. S. 638, 649 (1990).

对拒绝调卷令的异议意见）（slip op., at 11）；Cuozzo, 579 U. S., at 286（THOMAS大法官协同意见）；Scalia, 1989 Duke L. J., at 517；另见post, at 15（KAGAN大法官意见）。因此，我们在过去四十年的大部分时间里，对Chevron施加了一个又一个限制，基于以下理解修剪其推定：“在国会是否实际意图将特定解释权授予行政机关存有疑问时，Chevron‘不适用’。”United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 230 (2001)（引用Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 597 (2000)（Breyer大法官异议意见））；另见Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U. S. 638, 649 (1990)。

Consider the many refinements we have made in an ef­ fort to match Chevron’s presumption to reality. We have said that Chevron applies only “when it appears that Con­ gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency inter­ pretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exer­ cise of that authority.” Mead, 533 U. S., at 226–227. In practice, that threshold requirement—sometimes called Chevron “step zero”—largely limits Chevron to “the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.” 533 U. S., at 230. But even when those processes are used, deference is still not warranted “where the regulation is ‘procedurally defective’—that is, where the agency errs by failing to follow the correct procedures in issuing the regu­ lation.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. 211, 220 (2016) (quoting Mead, 533 U. S., at 227).

试想我们为使Chevron的推定符合现实而作出的诸多细化。我们曾指出，Chevron仅适用于“当国会似乎授予行政机关一般性制定具有法律效力的规则的权力，且主张遵从的行政机关解释是在行使该权力时颁布的”。Mead, 533 U. S., at 226–227。在实践中，该门槛要求——有时称为Chevron“第零步”——在很大程度上将Chevron限于“通知-评论规则制定或正式裁决的成果”。533 U. S., at 230。但即使使用了这些程序，“在法规‘程序上有缺陷’——即行政机关因未遵循正确程序发布法规而犯错——时”，仍不应当给予遵从。Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. 211, 220 (2016)（引用Mead, 533 U. S., at 227）。

Even where those procedural hurdles are cleared, sub­ stantive ones remain. Most notably, Chevron does not ap­ ply if the question at issue is one of “deep ‘economic and political significance.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 486 (2015). We have instead expected Congress to delegate such authority “expressly” if at all, ibid., for “[e]xtraordi­ nary grants of regulatory authority are rarely accomplished through ‘modest words,’ ‘vague terms,’ or ‘subtle device[s],’”

即使清除了这些程序障碍，实质性障碍仍然存在。最值得注意的是，如果所涉问题是具有“重大‘经济和政治意义’”的问题，Chevron不适用。King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 486 (2015)。我们反而期望国会“明确”授予此类权力（如果有的话），同上，因为“监管权力的非常授予很少通过‘温和的词语’、‘模糊的术语’或‘微妙的装置’来实现”，

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022) (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001); alteration in original). Nor have we applied Chevron to agency interpretations of judicial review provi­ sions, see Adams Fruit Co., 494 U. S., at 649–650, or to stat­ utory schemes not administered by the agency seeking def­ erence, see Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 497, 519– 520 (2018). And we have sent mixed signals on whether Chevron applies when a statute has criminal applications. Compare Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S. 169, 191 (2014), with Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 704, n. 18 (1995).

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022)（引用Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001)；原文有改动）。我们也没有将Chevron适用于行政机关对司法审查条款的解释，见Adams Fruit Co., 494 U. S., at 649–650，或适用于非由寻求遵从的行政机关管理的制定法制度，见Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 497, 519–520 (2018)。对于制定法具有刑事适用时Chevron是否适用，我们发出了混杂的信号。比较Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S. 169, 191 (2014)，与Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 704, n. 18 (1995)。

Confronted with this byzantine set of preconditions and exceptions, some courts have simply bypassed Chevron, saying it makes no difference for one reason or another. 7 And even when they do invoke Chevron, courts do not al­ ways heed the various steps and nuances of that evolving doctrine. In one of the cases before us today, for example, the First Circuit both skipped “step zero,” see 62 F. 4th, at 628, and refused to “classify [its] conclusion as a product of Chevron step one or step two”—though it ultimately ap­ pears to have deferred under step two, id., at 634.

面对这套拜占庭式的前提条件和例外，一些法院干脆绕过了Chevron，称出于某种原因它无关紧要。7 而且即使它们确实援引Chevron，法院也并不总是遵守这一不断演变原则的各种步骤和细微差别。例如，在今日摆在我们面前的其中一个案件中，第一巡回法院既跳过了“第零步”，见62 F. 4th, at 628，又拒绝“将其结论归类为Chevron第一步或第二步的产物”——尽管它最终似乎是在第二步下给予了遵从，同上，at 634。

This Court, for its part, has not deferred to an agency in­ terpretation under Chevron since 2016. See Cuozzo, 579 U. S., at 280 (most recent occasion). But Chevron remains on the books. So litigants must continue to wrestle with it, and lower courts—bound by even our crumbling prece­ dents, see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 238 (1997)— understandably continue to apply it.

本院自2016年以来，在Chevron案下未曾遵从行政机关的解释。见Cuozzo案，579 U. S.，第280页（最近一次）。但Chevron案仍然有效。因此，诉讼当事人必须继续与之周旋，而下级法院——即使受我们日益衰败的先例约束，见Agostini诉Felton案，521 U. S. 203, 238（1997）——也理所当然地继续适用它。

The experience of the last 40 years has thus done little to rehabilitate Chevron. It has only made clear that Chevron’s fictional presumption of congressional intent was always unmoored from the APA’s demand that courts exercise in­ dependent judgment in construing statutes administered by agencies. At best, our intricate Chevron doctrine has been nothing more than a distraction from the question that matters: Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action? And at worst, it has required courts to vio­ late the APA by yielding to an agency the express responsi­ bility, vested in “the reviewing court,” to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret . . . statutory provisions.” §706 (emphasis added).

因此，过去40年的经验几乎未能使Chevron案恢复名誉。它只是清楚地表明，Chevron案关于国会意图的虚构推定，始终偏离了《行政程序法》的要求，即法院在解释由行政机关执行的法规时应行使独立判断。充其量，我们复杂的Chevron原则只不过是对重要问题的一种干扰：该法规是否授权被质疑的行政机关行为？而最坏的情况下，它要求法院违反《行政程序法》，将“审查法院”所享有的“决定所有相关法律问题”和“解释……法定条款”的明确职责让渡给行政机关。§706（着重号系原文所加）。

IV The only question left is whether stare decisis, the doc­ trine governing judicial adherence to precedent, requires us to persist in the Chevron project. It does not. Stare decisis is not an “inexorable command,” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991), and the stare decisis considerations most relevant here—“the quality of [the precedent’s] rea­ soning, the workability of the rule it established, . . . and reliance on the decision,” Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 203 (2019) (quoting Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. 878, 917 (2018))—all weigh in favor of letting Chevron go.

IV 剩下的唯一问题是，遵循先例原则——规范司法遵循先例的原则——是否要求我们继续坚持Chevron项目。它并不要求。遵循先例原则并非“不可动摇的命令”，Payne诉Tennessee案，501 U. S. 808, 828（1991），而此处最相关的遵循先例考量——“[先例]推理的质量、其确立规则的可操作性……以及对裁决的依赖”，Knick诉Township of Scott案，588 U. S. 180, 203（2019）（引用Janus诉State, County, and Municipal Employees案，585 U. S. 878, 917（2018））——均倾向于让Chevron案退出历史舞台。

Chevron has proved to be fundamentally misguided. De­ spite reshaping judicial review of agency action, neither it nor any case of ours applying it grappled with the APA—

Chevron案已被证明从根本上存在错误。尽管它重塑了对行政机关行为的司法审查，但无论是它还是我们适用它的任何案件，都未曾认真对待《行政程序法》——

the statute that lays out how such review works. Its flaws were nonetheless apparent from the start, prompting this Court to revise its foundations and continually limit its ap­ plication. It has launched and sustained a cottage industry of scholars attempting to decipher its basis and meaning. And Members of this Court have long questioned its prem­ ises. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U. S. 198, 219–221 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Michigan, 576 U. S., at 760–764 (THOMAS, J., concurring); Buffington, 598 U. S. ___ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.); B. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statu­ tory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150–2154 (2016). Even Justice Scalia, an early champion of Chevron, came to seriously doubt whether it could be reconciled with the APA. See Perez, 575 U. S., at 109–110 (opinion concur­ ring in judgment). For its entire existence, Chevron has been a “rule in search of a justification,” Knick, 588 U. S., at 204, if it was ever coherent enough to be called a rule at all.

该法规规定了此种审查如何运作。尽管如此，其缺陷从一开始就显而易见，促使本院修订其基础并不断限制其适用。它催生并维持了一个由学者组成的“家庭手工业”，试图解读其依据和含义。而本院的成员长期以来一直质疑其前提。见，例如，Pereira诉Sessions案，585 U. S. 198, 219–221（2018）（Kennedy大法官，协同意见）；Michigan案，576 U. S.，第760–764页（THOMAS大法官，协同意见）；Buffington案，598 U. S. ___（GORSUCH大法官意见）；B. Kavanaugh，Fixing Statutory Interpretation，129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150–2154（2016）。甚至Scalia大法官，作为Chevron案的早期拥护者，也开始严重怀疑它能否与《行政程序法》相协调。见Perez案，575 U. S.，第109–110页（判决协同意见）。在其整个存在期间，Chevron案一直是一项“寻求正当理由的规则”，Knick案，588 U. S.，第204页，如果它曾经足够连贯以至于能被称为规则的话。

Experience has also shown that Chevron is unworkable. The defining feature of its framework is the identification of statutory ambiguity, which requires deference at the doc­ trine’s second step. But the concept of ambiguity has al­ ways evaded meaningful definition. As Justice Scalia put the dilemma just five years after Chevron was decided: “How clear is clear?” 1989 Duke L. J., at 521.

经验还表明，Chevron案不可操作。其框架的决定性特征是识别法定模糊性，这要求在该原则的第二步予以遵从。但模糊性的概念始终逃避有意义的定义。正如Scalia大法官在Chevron案裁决后仅五年所指出的困境：“多清楚才算清楚？”1989 Duke L. J.，第521页。

We are no closer to an answer to that question than we were four decades ago. “‘[A]mbiguity’ is a term that may have different meanings for different judges.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. 546, 572 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). One judge might see ambiguity everywhere; another might never encounter it. Compare L. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 821, 822 (1990), with R. Kethledge, Am­ biguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 315, 323 (2017). A rule of law that is so wholly “in the eye of the

与四十年前相比，我们对这个问题的答案并没有更接近。“‘模糊性’是一个对不同法官可能有不同含义的术语。”Exxon Mobil Corp.诉Allapattah Services, Inc.案，545 U. S. 546, 572（2005）（Stevens大法官，异议意见）。一位法官可能处处看到模糊性；另一位法官可能从未遇到。比较L. Silberman，Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy，58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 821, 822（1990），与R. Kethledge，Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench，70 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 315, 323（2017）。一项法律规则如果完全“取决于观察者的眼光”，

beholder,” Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U. S., at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting), invites different results in like cases and is therefore “arbitrary in practice,” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 283 (1988). Such an impressionistic and malleable concept “cannot stand as an every-day test for allocating” interpretive authority be­ tween courts and agencies. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 125 (1965).

Exxon Mobil Corp.案，545 U. S.，第572页（Stevens大法官，异议意见），就会在类似案件中招致不同结果，因此“在实践中是任意的”，Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.诉Mayacamas Corp.案，485 U. S. 271, 283（1988）。这种印象主义的、可塑的概念“不能作为日常检验标准来分配”法院和行政机关之间的解释权。Swift & Co.诉Wickham案，382 U. S. 111, 125（1965）。

The dissent proves the point. It tells us that a court should reach Chevron’s second step when it finds, “at the end of its interpretive work,” that “Congress has left an am­ biguity or gap.” Post, at 1–2. (The Government offers a similar test. See Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, pp. 7, 10, 14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 113–114, 116.) That is no guide at all. Once more, the basic nature and meaning of a statute does not change when an agency happens to be in­ volved. Nor does it change just because the agency has hap­ pened to offer its interpretation through the sort of proce­ dures necessary to obtain deference, or because the other preconditions for Chevron happen to be satisfied. The stat­ ute still has a best meaning, necessarily discernible by a court deploying its full interpretive toolkit. So for the dis­ sent’s test to have any meaning, it must think that in an agency case (unlike in any other), a court should give up on its “interpretive work” before it has identified that best meaning. But how does a court know when to do so? On that point, the dissent leaves a gap of its own. It protests only that some other interpretive tools—all with pedigrees more robust than Chevron’s, and all designed to help courts identify the meaning of a text rather than allow the Execu­ tive Branch to displace it—also apply to ambiguous texts. See post, at 27. That this is all the dissent can come up with, after four decades of judicial experience attempting to identify ambiguity under Chevron, reveals the futility of the

异议意见证明了这一点。它告诉我们，当法院“在其解释工作结束时”发现“国会留下了模糊性或空白”时，就应进入Chevron案的第二步。Post，第1–2页。（政府提供了类似的检验标准。见Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219，第7、10、14页；Tr. of Oral Arg. 113–114, 116。）这根本不是什么指南。再次强调，法规的基本性质和含义不会仅仅因为恰好涉及行政机关而改变。也不会仅仅因为行政机关恰好通过获得遵从所必需的那类程序提供了其解释，或者因为Chevron案的其他前提条件恰好得到满足而改变。法规仍然具有最佳含义，法院运用其全部解释工具包必然能够辨识出来。因此，要使异议意见的检验标准具有任何意义，它必须认为在行政机关案件中（不同于任何其他案件），法院应在确定该最佳含义之前放弃其“解释工作”。但法院如何知道何时这样做？在这一点上，异议意见留下了自己的空白。它仅抗议说，某些其他解释工具——所有这些工具的谱系都比Chevron案更强大，且都旨在帮助法院识别文本的含义，而不是允许行政部门取代它——也适用于模糊文本。见Post，第27页。经过四十年试图在Chevron案下识别模糊性的司法经验，异议意见所能提出的全部内容不过如此，这揭示了该做法的徒劳。8

exercise. 8 Because Chevron in its original, two-step form was so in­ determinate and sweeping, we have instead been forced to clarify the doctrine again and again. Our attempts to do so have only added to Chevron’s unworkability, transforming the original two-step into a dizzying breakdance. See Ad­ ams Fruit Co., 494 U. S., at 649–650; Mead, 533 U. S., at 226–227; King, 576 U. S., at 486; Encino Motorcars, 579 U. S., at 220; Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at 519–520; on and on. And the doctrine continues to spawn difficult threshold questions that promise to further complicate the inquiry should Chevron be retained. See, e.g., Cargill v. Garland, 57 F. 4th 447, 465–468 (CA5 2023) (plurality opinion) (May the Government waive reliance on Chevron? Does Chevron apply to agency interpretations of statutes imposing crimi­ nal penalties? Does Chevron displace the rule of lenity?), aff ’d, 602 U. S. ___ (2024).

行使。8 由于Chevron最初的两步式结构如此不确定且宽泛，我们反而被迫一次又一次地澄清该原则。我们这样做的尝试只会加剧Chevron的不可操作性，将最初的两步变成了令人眼花缭乱的霹雳舞。见Adams Fruit Co., 494 U. S., at 649–650；Mead, 533 U. S., at 226–227；King, 576 U. S., at 486；Encino Motorcars, 579 U. S., at 220；Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at 519–520；等等。而且，如果保留Chevron，该原则继续衍生出棘手的门槛问题，这些问题预示着将进一步复杂化相关审查。见，例如，Cargill v. Garland, 57 F. 4th 447, 465–468 (CA5 2023)（复数意见）（政府可以放弃依赖Chevron吗？Chevron适用于机构对设定刑事处罚的法规的解释吗？Chevron取代宽宥规则吗？），维持原判，602 U. S. ___ (2024)。

Four decades after its inception, Chevron has thus be­ come an impediment, rather than an aid, to accomplishing the basic judicial task of “say[ing] what the law is.” Mar- bury, 1 Cranch, at 177. And its continuing import is far from clear. Courts have often declined to engage with the doctrine, saying it makes no difference. See n. 7, supra. And as noted, we have avoided deferring under Chevron since 2016. That trend is nothing new; for decades, we have often declined to invoke Chevron even in those cases where it might appear to be applicable. See W. Eskridge & L. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treat­ ment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1125 (2008). At this point, all

因此，在其诞生四十年后，Chevron案已成为完成“说明法律是什么”这一基本司法任务的障碍，而非助力。Marbury案，1 Cranch，第177页。而且其持续的重要性远非明确。法院经常拒绝适用该原则，称其没有区别。见前注7。并且如前所述，我们自2016年以来一直避免在Chevron案下遵从。这一趋势并不新鲜；几十年来，我们经常拒绝援引Chevron案，即使在那些它可能看似适用的案件中。见W. Eskridge & L. Baer，The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan，96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1125（2008）。至此，所有

that remains of Chevron is a decaying husk with bold pre­ tensions. Nor has Chevron been the sort of “‘stable background’ rule” that fosters meaningful reliance. Post, at 8, n. 1 (opin­ ion of KAGAN, J.) (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 261 (2010)). Given our constant tinkering with and eventual turn away from Chevron, and its inconsistent application by the lower courts, it instead is hard to see how anyone—Congress included—could reason­ ably expect a court to rely on Chevron in any particular case. And even if it were possible to predict accurately when courts will apply Chevron, the doctrine “does not pro­ vide ‘a clear or easily applicable standard, so arguments for reliance based on its clarity are misplaced.’” Janus, 585 U. S., at 927 (quoting South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U. S. 162, 186 (2018)). To plan on Chevron yielding a par­ ticular result is to gamble not only that the doctrine will be invoked, but also that it will produce readily foreseeable outcomes and the stability that comes with them. History has proved neither bet to be a winning proposition.

Chevron案所剩下的不过是一个腐朽的空壳，却有着大胆的野心。Chevron案也不是那种促进有意义依赖的“‘稳定背景’规则”。Post，第8页，注1（KAGAN大法官意见）（引用Morrison诉National Australia Bank Ltd.案，561 U. S. 247, 261（2010））。鉴于我们不断修补并最终背离Chevron案，以及下级法院对其适用不一致，反而很难看出任何人——包括国会——如何能合理预期法院在任何特定案件中依赖Chevron案。而且，即使能够准确预测法院何时会适用Chevron案，该原则“并未提供‘一个清晰或易于适用的标准，因此基于其清晰性的依赖论点是不恰当的。’”Janus案，585 U. S.，第927页（引用South Dakota诉Wayfair, Inc.案，585 U. S. 162, 186（2018））。指望Chevron案产生特定结果，就是赌该原则不仅会被援引，而且会产生可预见的结果以及随之而来的稳定性。历史证明这两个赌注都不是稳赢的命题。

Rather than safeguarding reliance interests, Chevron af­ firmatively destroys them. Under Chevron, a statutory am­ biguity, no matter why it is there, becomes a license author­ izing an agency to change positions as much as it likes, with “[u]nexplained inconsistency” being “at most . . . a reason for holding an interpretation to be . . . arbitrary and capri­ cious.” Brand X, 545 U. S., at 981. But statutory ambigu­ ity, as we have explained, is not a reliable indicator of ac­ tual delegation of discretionary authority to agencies. Chevron thus allows agencies to change course even when Congress has given them no power to do so. By its sheer breadth, Chevron fosters unwarranted instability in the law, leaving those attempting to plan around agency action in an eternal fog of uncertainty. Chevron accordingly has undermined the very “rule of law” values that stare decisis exists to secure. Michigan v.

Chevron案非但没有保障依赖利益，反而肯定性地摧毁了它们。在Chevron案下，法定模糊性，无论出于何种原因，都成为授权行政机关随意改变立场的许可证，“[未]解释的不一致”“至多……是认定解释……任意和反复无常的理由。”Brand X案，545 U. S.，第981页。但正如我们已经解释的，法定模糊性并不是向行政机关实际授予自由裁量权的可靠指标。因此，Chevron案允许行政机关在国会未赋予其权力的情况下改变方向。由于其绝对的广度，Chevron案助长了法律中不必要的不稳定性，使那些试图围绕行政机关行为进行规划的人陷入永恒的不确定性迷雾中。因此，Chevron案破坏了遵循先例原则旨在确保的“法治”价值。Michigan诉

Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 798 (2014). And it cannot be constrained by admonishing courts to be extra careful, or by tacking on a new batch of conditions. We would need to once again “revis[e] its theoretical basis . . . in order to cure its practical deficiencies.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. 778, 792 (2009). Stare decisis does not require us to do so, especially because any refinements we might make would only point courts back to their duties un­ der the APA to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret . . . statutory provisions.” §706. Nor is there any reason to wait helplessly for Congress to correct our mis­ take. The Court has jettisoned many precedents that Con­ gress likewise could have legislatively overruled. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U. S. 617, 618 (1988) (per curiam) (collecting cases). And part of “judicial humility,” post, at 3, 25 (opinion of KAGAN, J.,), is admitting and in certain cases correcting our own mistakes, especially when those mistakes are serious, see post, at 8–9 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.).

Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 798 (2014)。 而且，不能通过告诫法院要格外小心，或通过附加一批新条件来加以约束。 我们将需要再次“修订其理论基础……以弥补其实践缺陷。”Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. 778, 792 (2009)。遵循先例原则并不要求我们这样做，尤其是因为我们可能作出的任何改进只会将法院引回其在APA下的职责，即“裁决所有相关法律问题”并“解释……法定条款”。§706。也没有任何理由无助地等待国会纠正我们的错误。法院已经抛弃了许多国会同样本可以通过立法推翻的先例。参见，例如，Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U. S. 617, 618 (1988)（per curiam）（收集案例）。而“司法谦抑”的一部分，post, at 3, 25（KAGAN大法官意见），就是承认并在某些情况下纠正我们自己的错误，尤其是当这些错误严重时，参见post, at 8–9（GORSUCH大法官意见）。

This is one of those cases. Chevron was a judicial inven­ tion that required judges to disregard their statutory du­ ties. And the only way to “ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion,” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986), is for us to leave Chevron behind.

这是那些案件之一。Chevron是一项司法发明，要求法官无视其法定职责。而“确保法律不会仅仅 erratic 地变化，而是将以有原则且可理解的方式发展”的唯一方式，Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986)，就是让我们将Chevron抛在身后。

By doing so, however, we do not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework. The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—in­ cluding the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Hum­ phries, 553 U. S. 442, 457 (2008). Mere reliance on Chevron cannot constitute a “‘special justification’” for overruling such a holding, because to say a precedent relied on Chev­ ron is, at best, “just an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided.” Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,

然而，这样做，我们并不质疑依赖Chevron框架的先前案件。那些案件中关于特定机构行为合法的裁定——包括Chevron本身关于《清洁空气法》的裁定——尽管我们改变了解释方法，仍受法定遵循先例原则的约束。参见CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 457 (2008)。仅仅依赖Chevron不能构成推翻此类裁定的“‘特殊理由’”，因为说一个先例依赖Chevron，充其量只是“一个关于该先例被错误裁决的论点。”Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,

Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (2014) (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000)). That is not enough to justify overruling a statutory precedent.

Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (2014)（引用Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000)）。这不足以证明推翻法定先例是合理的。

* * * The dissent ends by quoting Chevron: “‘Judges are not experts in the field.’” Post, at 31 (quoting 467 U. S., at 865). That depends, of course, on what the “field” is. If it is legal interpretation, that has been, “emphatically,” “the province and duty of the judicial department” for at least 221 years. Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177. The rest of the dissent’s se­ lected epigraph is that judges “‘are not part of either politi­ cal branch.’” Post, at 31 (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865). Indeed. Judges have always been expected to apply their “judgment” independent of the political branches when interpreting the laws those branches enact. The Fed­ eralist No. 78, at 523. And one of those laws, the APA, bars judges from disregarding that responsibility just because an Executive Branch agency views a statute differently. Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their inde­ pendent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires. Careful attention to the judgment of the Executive Branch may help inform that inquiry. And when a particular statute dele­ gates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts must respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within it. But courts need not and un­ der the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous. Because the D. C. and First Circuits relied on Chevron in deciding whether to uphold the Rule, their judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceed­ ings consistent with this opinion.

* * * 异议意见最后引用Chevron：“‘法官不是该领域的专家。’”Post, at 31（引用467 U. S., at 865）。当然，这取决于“领域”是什么。如果是法律解释，那至少221年来一直“明确地”是“司法部门的职责和本分”。Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177。异议意见所选题词的其余部分是，法官“‘不属于任何一个政治分支。’”Post, at 31（引用Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865）。确实如此。在解释政治分支颁布的法律时，法官一直应独立于政治分支运用其“判断”。《联邦党人文集》第78篇，at 523。而这些法律之一，即APA，禁止法官仅仅因为行政分支机构对法规有不同看法就无视该责任。 Chevron被推翻。法院在裁决机构是否在其法定权限内行事时，必须行使独立判断，正如APA所要求的那样。仔细关注行政分支的判断可能有助于为该调查提供信息。当特定法规在符合宪法限制的情况下将权力授予机构时，法院必须尊重该授权，同时确保机构在该授权范围内行事。但法院不必且根据APA不得仅仅因为法规含糊不清就遵从机构对法律的解释。 由于D. C. 巡回法院和第一巡回法院在决定是否维持该规则时依赖了Chevron，其判决被撤销，案件发回重审，以按照本意见进行进一步程序。

It is so ordered.

特此命令。

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES, ET AL., PETITIONERS 22–451 v. GINA RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES, ET AL., 申请人 22–451 v. GINA RAIMONDO，商务部长，等

RELENTLESS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 22–1219 v. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

RELENTLESS, INC., ET AL., 申请人 22–1219 v. 商务部，等

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. I join the Court’s opinion in full because it correctly con­ cludes that Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De­ fense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), must finally be overruled. Under Chevron, a judge was required to adopt an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, so long as the agency had a “permissible construction of the stat­ ute.” See id., at 843. As the Court explains, that deference does not comport with the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires judges to decide “all relevant questions of law” and “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions” when reviewing an agency action. 5 U. S. C. §706; see also ante, at 18–23; Baldwin v. United States, 589 U. S. ___, ___– ___ (2020) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 4–5).

THOMAS大法官，协同意见。 我完全加入法院意见，因为它正确得出结论，Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984)，必须最终被推翻。根据Chevron，法官被要求采纳机构对含糊法规的解释，只要该机构有“对法规的允许建构”。参见id., at 843。正如法院所解释的，这种遵从不符合《行政程序法》，该法要求法官在审查机构行为时裁决“所有相关法律问题”并“解释宪法和法定条款”。5 U. S. C. §706；另见ante, at 18–23；Baldwin v. United States, 589 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020)（THOMAS大法官，反对拒绝调卷令）（slip op., at 4–5）。

I write separately to underscore a more fundamental problem: Chevron deference also violates our Constitution’s separation of powers, as I have previously explained at length. See Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___–___ (dissenting opin­ ion) (slip op., at 2–4); Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. 743, 761– 763 (2015) (concurring opinion); see also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 115–118 (2015) (opinion con­ curring in judgment). And, I agree with JUSTICE GORSUCH that we should not overlook Chevron’s constitutional de­ fects in overruling it.* Post, at 15–20 (concurring opinion). To provide “practical and real protections for individual lib­ erty,” the Framers drafted a Constitution that divides the legislative, executive, and judicial powers between three branches of Government. Perez, 575 U. S., at 118 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Chevron deference compromises this sepa­ ration of powers in two ways. It curbs the judicial power afforded to courts, and simultaneously expands agencies’ executive power beyond constitutional limits.

我单独撰写意见，以强调一个更根本的问题：Chevron遵从也违反了我们宪法中的权力分立，正如我此前详细解释的那样。参见Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___–___（反对意见）（slip op., at 2–4）；Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. 743, 761–763 (2015)（协同意见）；另见Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 115–118 (2015)（对判决的协同意见）。而且，我同意GORSUCH大法官的意见，即在推翻Chevron时我们不应忽视其宪法缺陷。* Post, at 15–20（协同意见）。 为了“为个人自由提供实际而真实的保护”，制宪者起草了一部将立法、行政和司法权分立于政府三个分支之间的宪法。Perez, 575 U. S., at 118（THOMAS大法官意见）。Chevron遵从以两种方式损害这种权力分立。它限制了赋予法院的司法权，同时将机构的行政权扩展到宪法限制之外。

Chevron compels judges to abdicate their Article III “ju­ dicial Power.” §1. “[T]he judicial power, as originally un­ derstood, requires a court to exercise its independent judg­ ment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.” Perez, 575 U. S., at 119 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); accord, post, at 17–18 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). The Framers under­ stood that “legal texts . . . often contain ambiguities,” and that the judicial power included “the power to resolve these ambiguities over time.” Perez, 575 U. S., at 119 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); accord, ante, at 7–9. But, under Chevron, a judge must accept an agency’s interpretation of an ambigu­ ous law, even if he thinks another interpretation is correct. Ante, at 19. Chevron deference thus prevents judges from

Chevron迫使法官放弃其第三条“司法权”。§1。“[司]法权，按最初理解，要求法院在解释和阐述法律时行使独立判断。”Perez, 575 U. S., at 119（THOMAS大法官意见）；一致，post, at 17–18（GORSUCH大法官意见）。制宪者理解“法律文本……常常包含含糊之处”，而司法权包括“随着时间推移解决这些含糊之处的权力”。Perez, 575 U. S., at 119（THOMAS大法官意见）；一致，ante, at 7–9。但是，根据Chevron，法官必须接受机构对含糊法律的解释，即使他认为另一种解释是正确的。Ante, at 19。因此，Chevron遵从阻止法官

exercising their independent judgment to resolve ambigui­ ties. Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 3); see also Michigan, 576 U. S., at 761 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Perez, 575 U. S., at 123 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). By tying a judge’s hands, Chevron prevents the Judiciary from serving as a constitutional check on the Executive. It allows “the Executive . . . to dictate the out­ come of cases through erroneous interpretations.” Bald­ win, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 4); Michigan, 576 U. S., at 763, n. 1 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Perez, 575 U. S., at 124 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Be­ cause the judicial power requires judges to exercise their independent judgment, the deference that Chevron re­ quires contravenes Article III’s mandate.

行使独立判断以解决含糊之处。Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___（THOMAS大法官意见）（slip op., at 3）；另见Michigan, 576 U. S., at 761（THOMAS大法官意见）；另见Perez, 575 U. S., at 123（THOMAS大法官意见）。通过束缚法官的手脚，Chevron阻止司法部门作为对行政部门的宪法制约。它允许“行政部门……通过错误解释来决定案件结果。”Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___（THOMAS大法官意见）（slip op., at 4）；Michigan, 576 U. S., at 763, n. 1（THOMAS大法官意见）；另见Perez, 575 U. S., at 124（THOMAS大法官意见）。因为司法权要求法官行使独立判断，Chevron所要求的遵从违反第三条的授权。

Chevron deference also permits the Executive Branch to exercise powers not given to it. “When the Government is called upon to perform a function that requires an exercise of legislative, executive, or judicial power, only the vested recipient of that power can perform it.” Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 68 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). Because the Constitution gives the Executive Branch only “[t]he executive Power,” executive agencies may constitu­ tionally exercise only that power. Art. II, §1, cl. 1. But, Chevron gives agencies license to exercise judicial power. By allowing agencies to definitively interpret laws so long as they are ambiguous, Chevron “transfer[s]” the Judici­ ary’s “interpretive judgment to the agency.” Perez, 575 U. S., at 124 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 4); Michi­ gan, 576 U. S., at 761–762 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); post, at 18 (GORSUCH, J., concurring).

Chevron遵从还允许行政分支行使未赋予它的权力。“当政府被要求履行需要行使立法、行政或司法权的职能时，只有该权力的既受授予者才能履行。”Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 68 (2015)（THOMAS大法官，对判决协同意见）。因为宪法只赋予行政分支“[行]政权”，行政机构在宪法上只能行使该权力。Art. II, §1, cl. 1。但是，Chevron给予机构行使司法权的许可。通过允许机构对含糊法律作出最终解释，Chevron“将司法部门的解释判断转移给机构”。Perez, 575 U. S., at 124（THOMAS大法官意见）；另见Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___（THOMAS大法官意见）（slip op., at 4）；Michigan, 576 U. S., at 761–762（THOMAS大法官意见）；post, at 18（GORSUCH大法官，协同意见）。

Chevron deference “cannot be salvaged” by recasting it as deference to an agency’s “formulation of policy.” Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (slip op., at 3). If that were true, Chevron

Chevron遵从“无法通过”将其重新表述为对机构“政策制定”的遵从来“挽救”。Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___（THOMAS大法官意见）（内部引号省略）（slip op., at 3）。如果那是真的，Chevron

would mean that “agencies are unconstitutionally exercis­ ing ‘legislative Powers’ vested in Congress.” Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 3) (quoting Art. I, §1). By “giv[ing] the force of law to agency pro­ nouncements on matters of private conduct as to which Congress did not actually have an intent,” Chevron “per­ mit[s] a body other than Congress to perform a function that requires an exercise of legislative power.” Michigan, 576 U. S., at 762 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). No matter the gloss put on it, Chevron ex­ pands agencies’ power beyond the bounds of Article II by permitting them to exercise powers reserved to another branch of Government.

将意味着“机构违宪地行使了赋予国会的‘立法权’。”Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___（THOMAS大法官意见）（slip op., at 3）（引用Art. I, §1）。通过“赋予机构关于国会实际上并无意图的私人行为事项的声明以法律效力”，Chevron“允许国会以外的机构履行需要行使立法权的职能。”Michigan, 576 U. S., at 762（THOMAS大法官意见）（内部引号省略）。无论对其作何粉饰，Chevron都通过允许机构行使保留给政府另一分支的权力，将机构权力扩展到第二条边界之外。

Chevron deference was “not a harmless transfer of power.” Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 3). “The Constitution carefully imposes struc­ tural constraints on all three branches, and the exercise of power free of those accompanying restraints subverts the design of the Constitution’s ratifiers.” Ibid. In particular, the Founders envisioned that “the courts [would] check the Executive by applying the correct interpretation of the law.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 4). Chevron was thus a fundamental disruption of our separation of powers. It improperly strips courts of judicial power by simultaneously increasing the power of executive agencies. By overruling Chevron, we re­ store this aspect of our separation of powers. To safeguard individual liberty, “[s]tructure is everything.” A. Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1417, 1418 (2008). Although the Court finally ends our 40-year misadventure with Chevron deference, its more profound problems should not be overlooked. Regardless of what a statute says, the type of deference required by Chevron violates the Consti­ tution.

Chevron尊重“并非无害的权力转移”。Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___（THOMAS大法官意见）（slip op., at 3）。“宪法精心对所有三个分支施加结构性约束，而在不受这些伴随约束的情况下行使权力，颠覆了宪法批准者的设计。”同上。特别是，制宪者设想“法院[将]通过适用法律的正确解释来制约行政分支。”Id., at ___（slip op., at 4）。因此，Chevron是对我们权力分立的根本性破坏。它同时增加行政机构的权力，从而不当剥夺法院的司法权力。通过推翻Chevron，我们恢复了我们权力分立的这一方面。为保障个人自由，“[结]构就是一切。”A. Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1417, 1418 (2008)。尽管本院最终结束了我们与Chevron尊重长达40年的错误冒险，但其更深刻的问题不应被忽视。无论法规如何规定，Chevron所要求的那种尊重都违反宪法。

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES, ET AL., PETITIONERS 22–451 v. GINA RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES, ET AL., 申请人 22–451 v. GINA RAIMONDO, 商务部长, ET AL.

RELENTLESS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 22–1219 v. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

RELENTLESS, INC., ET AL., 申请人 22–1219 v. 商务部, ET AL.

JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring.

GORSUCH大法官，协同意见。

In disputes between individuals and the government about the meaning of a federal law, federal courts have tra­ ditionally sought to offer independent judgments about “what the law is” without favor to either side. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). Beginning in the mid­ 1980s, however, this Court experimented with a radically different approach. Applying Chevron deference, judges be­ gan deferring to the views of executive agency officials about the meaning of federal statutes. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). With time, the error of this approach became widely appreciated. So much so that this Court has refused to apply Chevron deference since 2016. Today, the Court places a tombstone on Chevron no one can miss. In doing

在个人与政府之间关于联邦法律含义的争议中，联邦法院传统上寻求就“法律是什么”提供独立判断，而不偏袒任何一方。Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)。然而，从1980年代中期开始，本院试验了一种截然不同的方法。适用Chevron尊重，法官开始遵从行政机构官员关于联邦法规含义的观点。见Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984)。随着时间推移，这种方法的错误被广泛认识。以至于本院自2016年以来一直拒绝适用Chevron尊重。今天，本院在Chevron上立起了一块无人能错过的墓碑。在这样做时，本院使法官回归自国家建国以来一直指导联邦法院的解释规则。我另行撰写意见，讨论为何正确适用遵循先例原则支持这一路径。

so, the Court returns judges to interpretive rules that have guided federal courts since the Nation’s founding. I write separately to address why the proper application of the doc­ trine of stare decisis supports that course.

时，本院使法官回归自国家建国以来一直指导联邦法院的解释规则。我另行撰写意见，讨论为何正确适用遵循先例原则支持这一路径。

I A Today, the phrase “common law judge” may call to mind a judicial titan of the past who brilliantly devised new legal rules on his own. The phrase “stare decisis” might conjure up a sense that judges who come later in time are strictly bound to follow the work of their predecessors. But neither of those intuitions fairly describes the traditional common- law understanding of the judge’s role or the doctrine of stare decisis.

I A 今天，“普通法法官”一词可能让人想到过去一位凭借自身才华出色设计新法律规则的司法巨擘。“遵循先例”一词可能让人产生一种感觉，即后来在时间上出现的法官严格受制于遵循其前任的工作。但这两种直觉都没有公正地描述传统普通法对法官角色的理解或遵循先例原则。

At common law, a judge’s charge to decide cases was not usually understood as a license to make new law. For much of England’s early history, different rulers and different le­ gal systems prevailed in different regions. As England con­ solidated into a single kingdom governed by a single legal system, the judge’s task was to examine those pre-existing legal traditions and apply in the disputes that came to him those legal rules that were “common to the whole land and to all Englishmen.” F. Maitland, Equity, Also the Forms of Action at Common Law 2 (1929). That was “common law” judging.

在普通法上，法官裁决案件的职责通常不被理解为制定新法律的许可。在英格兰早期历史的许多时期，不同的统治者和不同的法律体系在不同地区占主导地位。随着英格兰巩固为一个由单一法律体系治理的单一王国，法官的任务是审查那些先前存在的法律传统，并在提交给他的争议中适用那些“为整个土地和所有英格兰人所共有”的法律规则。F. Maitland, Equity, Also the Forms of Action at Common Law 2 (1929)。那就是“普通法”审判。

This view of the judge’s role had consequences for the au­ thority due judicial decisions. Because a judge’s job was to find and apply the law, not make it, the “opinion of the judge” and “the law” were not considered “one and the same thing.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 71 (1765) (Blackstone) (emphasis deleted). A judge’s decision might bind the parties to the case at hand. M. Hale, The History and Analysis of the Common Law of England 68 (1713) (Hale). But none of that meant the judge had the power to “make a Law properly so called” for society

这种对法官角色的看法对司法判决应有的权威产生了后果。因为法官的工作是发现和适用法律，而不是制定法律，“法官的意见”和“法律”不被视为“同一回事”。1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 71 (1765)（Blackstone）（强调删除）。法官的判决可能约束手头案件的当事人。M. Hale, The History and Analysis of the Common Law of England 68 (1713)（Hale）。但这一切都不意味着法官有权为社会大众“制定真正意义上的法律”，“因为只有国王和议会才能这样做。”同上。

at large, “for that only the King and Parliament can do.” Ibid.

为社会大众，“因为只有国王和议会才能这样做。”同上。

Other consequences followed for the role precedent played in future judicial proceedings. Because past deci­ sions represented something “less than a Law,” they did not bind future judges. Ibid. At the same time, as Matthew Hale put it, a future judge could give a past decision “Weight” as “Evidence” of the law. Ibid. Expressing the same idea, William Blackstone conceived of judicial prece­ dents as “evidence” of “the common law.” 1 Blackstone 69, 71. And much like other forms of evidence, precedents at common law were thought to vary in the weight due them. Some past decisions might supply future courts with con­ siderable guidance. But others might be entitled to lesser weight, not least because judges are no less prone to error than anyone else and they may sometimes “mistake” what the law demands. Id., at 71 (emphasis deleted). In cases like that, both men thought, a future judge should not rotely repeat a past mistake but instead “vindicate” the law “from misrepresentation.” Id., at 70.

先例在未来司法程序中所起的作用还带来了其他后果。因为过去的判决代表某种“低于法律”的东西，它们不约束未来的法官。同上。同时，正如Matthew Hale所说，未来的法官可以给予过去的判决“权重”作为法律的“证据”。同上。表达同样的想法，William Blackstone将司法先例视为“普通法”的“证据”。1 Blackstone 69, 71。而且与其他形式的证据非常相似，普通法上的先例被认为其应有的权重各不相同。一些过去的判决可能为未来的法院提供相当大的指导。但另一些可能只应获得较小的权重，尤其是因为法官并不比其他人更不容易犯错，他们有时可能“误解”法律的要求。Id., at 71（强调删除）。在那样的情况下，两人都认为，未来的法官不应机械地重复过去的错误，而应“从虚假陈述中”“维护”法律。Id., at 70。

When examining past decisions as evidence of the law, common law judges did not, broadly speaking, afford over­ whelming weight to any “single precedent.” J. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 209–210 (5th ed. 2019). Instead, a prior decision’s persuasive force depended in large measure on its “Consonancy and Congruity with Resolutions and Decisions of former Times.” Hale 68. An individual decision might reflect the views of one court at one moment in time, but a consistent line of decisions rep­ resenting the wisdom of many minds across many genera­ tions was generally considered stronger evidence of the law’s meaning. Ibid.

在将过去的判决作为法律的证据进行审查时，普通法法官广义上说并没有给予任何“单一先例”压倒性的权重。J. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 209–210 (5th ed. 2019)。相反，先前判决的说服力在很大程度上取决于其“与以往时代的决议和判决的一致性和契合性”。Hale 68。单个判决可能反映一个法院在某一时刻的观点，但代表许多世代许多头脑智慧的一致判决路线通常被认为是对法律含义更强的证据。同上。

With this conception of precedent in mind, Lord Mans­ field cautioned against elevating “particular cases” above the “general principles” that “run through the cases, and govern the decision of them.” Rust v. Cooper, 2 Cowp. 629,

带着这种先例概念，Mansfield勋爵告诫不要将“具体案件”置于“贯穿案件并支配其裁决的一般原则”之上。Rust v. Cooper, 2 Cowp. 629,

632, 98 Eng. Rep. 1277, 1279 (K. B. 1777). By discarding aberrational rulings and pursuing instead the mainstream of past decisions, he observed, the common law tended over time to “wor[k] itself pure.” Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 22, 33, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch. 1744) (emphasis deleted). Re­ flecting similar thinking, Edmund Burke offered five prin­ ciples for the evaluation of past judicial decisions: “They ought to be shewn; first, to be numerous and not scattered here and there;—secondly, concurrent and not contradic­ tory and mutually destructive;—thirdly, to be made in good and constitutional times;—fourthly, not to be made to serve an occasion;—and fifthly, to be agreeable to the general tenor of legal principles.” Speech of Dec. 23, 1790, in 3 The Speeches of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke 513 (1816).

632, 98 Eng. Rep. 1277, 1279 (K. B. 1777)。他观察到，通过摒弃异常裁决并转而追求过去判决的主流，普通法随着时间的推移倾向于“使自身纯化”。Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 22, 33, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch. 1744)（强调删除）。反映类似思想，Edmund Burke提出了评估过去司法判决的五项原则：“它们应当被表明：第一，数量众多而非零散分布；——第二，相互一致而非相互矛盾、相互破坏；——第三，是在良好和宪政时期作出的；——第四，不是为应付某一场合而作出的；——第五，符合法律原则的总体要旨。”Speech of Dec. 23, 1790, in 3 The Speeches of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke 513 (1816)。

Not only did different decisions carry different weight, so did different language within a decision. An opinion’s hold­ ing and the reasoning essential to it (the ratio decidendi) merited careful attention. Dicta, stray remarks, and di­ gressions warranted less weight. See N. Duxbury, The In­ tricacies of Dicta and Dissent 19–24 (2021) (Duxbury). These were no more than “the vapours and fumes of law.” F. Bacon, The Lord Keeper’s Speech in the Exchequer (1617), in 2 The Works of Francis Bacon 478 (B. Montagu ed. 1887) (Bacon).

不仅不同判决具有不同权重，判决内不同语言也是如此。意见的判决要旨及对其必不可少的推理（ratio decidendi）值得仔细关注。附带意见、零散言论和离题话应获得较小权重。见N. Duxbury, The Intricacies of Dicta and Dissent 19–24 (2021)（Duxbury）。这些不过是“法律的蒸汽和烟雾”。F. Bacon, The Lord Keeper’s Speech in the Exchequer (1617), in 2 The Works of Francis Bacon 478 (B. Montagu ed. 1887)（Bacon）。

That is not to say those “vapours” were worthless. Often dicta might provide the parties to a particular dispute a “fuller understanding of the court’s decisional path or re­ lated areas of concern.” B. Garner et al., The Law of Judi­ cial Precedent 65 (2016) (Precedent). Dicta might also pro­ vide future courts with a source of “thoughtful advice.” Ibid. But future courts had to be careful not to treat every “hasty expression . . . as a serious and deliberate opinion.” Steel v. Houghton, 1 Bl. H. 51, 53, 126 Eng. Rep. 32, 33 (C. P. 1788). To do so would work an “injustice to [the] memory” of their predecessors who could not expect judicial

这并不是说那些“蒸汽”毫无价值。通常附带意见可能为特定争议的当事人提供“对法院裁决路径或相关关注领域的更充分理解”。B. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 65 (2016)（Precedent）。附带意见也可能为未来的法院提供“深思熟虑的建议”的来源。同上。但未来的法院必须小心，不要将每一“草率表达……视为严肃和深思熟虑的意见”。Steel v. Houghton, 1 Bl. H. 51, 53, 126 Eng. Rep. 32, 33 (C. P. 1788)。这样做将“不公正地对待”其前任的“记忆”，他们不能期望司法

remarks issued in one context to apply perfectly in others, perhaps especially ones they could not foresee. Ibid. Also, the limits of the adversarial process, a distinctive feature of English law, had to be borne in mind. When a single judge or a small panel reached a decision in a case, they did so based on the factual record and legal arguments the parties at hand have chosen to develop. Attuned to those con­ straints, future judges had to proceed with an open mind to the possibility that different facts and different legal argu­ ments might dictate different outcomes in later disputes. See Duxbury 19–24.

言论在一个语境中发表就能完全适用于其他语境，也许尤其是他们无法预见的语境。同上。此外，必须牢记对抗制程序的局限，这是英国法的一个显著特征。当一名法官或一个小合议庭在一案件中作出裁决时，他们是基于手头当事人选择发展的事实记录和法律论据这样做的。考虑到这些限制，未来的法官必须保持开放心态，认识到不同事实和不同法律论据可能在后来争议中导致不同结果。见Duxbury 19–24。

B Necessarily, this represents just a quick sketch of tradi­ tional common-law understandings of the judge’s role and the place of precedent in it. It focuses, too, on the horizon­ tal, not vertical, force of judicial precedents. But there are good reasons to think that the common law’s understand­ ings of judges and precedent outlined above crossed the At­ lantic and informed the nature of the “judicial Power” the Constitution vests in federal courts. Art. III, §1. Not only was the Constitution adopted against the back­ drop of these understandings and, in light of that alone, they may provide evidence of what the framers meant when they spoke of the “judicial Power.” Many other, more spe­ cific provisions in the Constitution reflect much the same distinction between lawmaking and lawfinding functions the common law did. The Constitution provides that its terms may be amended only through certain prescribed democratic processes. Art. V. It vests the power to enact federal legislation exclusively in the people’s elected repre­ sentatives in Congress. Art. I, §1. Meanwhile, the Consti­ tution describes the judicial power as the power to resolve cases and controversies. Art. III, §2, cl. 1. As well, it dele­ gates that authority to life-tenured judges, see §1, an as­ signment that would have made little sense if judges could

B 当然，这只是对传统普通法关于法官角色及先例在其中地位之理解的快速勾勒。它同样聚焦于司法先例的水平效力，而非垂直效力。但有充分理由认为，上文概述的普通法对法官与先例的理解横跨大西洋，并塑造了宪法赋予联邦法院的“司法权”之性质。Art. III, §1. 不仅宪法是在这些理解的背景下获得通过的，而且仅凭这一点，它们便可作为证据，说明制宪者在论及“司法权”时所指为何。宪法中许多其他更为具体的规定，也反映了普通法在造法与寻法职能之间所作的极为相似的区分。宪法规定，其条款只能通过某些规定的民主程序予以修正。Art. V. 它将制定联邦立法的权力专属授予国会中由人民选举产生的代表。Art. I, §1. 同时，宪法将司法权描述为解决案件与争议的权力。Art. III, §2, cl. 1. 此外，它将该权力授予终身任职的法官，见§1，而如果法官能够

usurp lawmaking powers vested in periodically elected rep­ resentatives. But one that makes perfect sense if what is sought is a neutral party “to interpret and apply” the law without fear or favor in a dispute between others. 2 The Works of James Wilson 161 (J. Andrews ed. 1896) (Wilson); see Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 866 (1824).

篡夺授予定期选举产生的代表的造法权力，这一指派就几乎没有意义。但如果所寻求的是一位中立的当事方，在他人之间的争议中“解释和适用”法律而不畏不偏，那么这一指派就完全合理。2 The Works of James Wilson 161 (J. Andrews ed. 1896) (Wilson)；见 Osborn 诉 Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 866 (1824)。

The constrained view of the judicial power that runs through our Constitution carries with it familiar implica­ tions, ones the framers readily acknowledged. James Mad­ ison, for example, proclaimed that it would be a “fallacy” to suggest that judges or their precedents could “repeal or al­ ter” the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Let­ ter to N. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 9 The Writings of James Mad­ ison 477 (G. Hunt ed. 1910). A court’s opinion, James Wilson added, may be thought of as “effective la[w]” “[a]s to the parties.” Wilson 160–161. But as in England, Wilson said, a prior judicial decision could serve in a future dispute only as “evidence” of the law’s proper construction. Id., at 160; accord, 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 442–443 (1826).

贯穿我国宪法的对司法权的受限看法带有一些熟悉的含义，制宪者对此欣然承认。例如，James Madison 宣称，认为法官或其先例可以“废除或改变”宪法或美国法律，将是一种“谬误”。Letter to N. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 9 The Writings of James Madison 477 (G. Hunt ed. 1910)。James Wilson 补充说，法院的意见可以被视为“对[于]当事人”的“有效法[律]”。Wilson 160–161。但 Wilson 说，如同在英格兰一样，先前的司法判决在未来的争议中只能作为法律应有解释的“证据”。同上，第160页；参见 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 442–443 (1826)。

The framers also recognized that the judicial power de­ scribed in our Constitution implies, as the judicial power did in England, a power (and duty) of discrimination when it comes to assessing the “evidence” embodied in past deci­ sions. So, for example, Madison observed that judicial rul­ ings “repeatedly confirmed” may supply better evidence of the law’s meaning than isolated or aberrant ones. Letter to C. Ingersoll (June 1831), in 4 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 184 (1867) (emphasis added). Extending the thought, Thomas Jefferson believed it would often take “numerous decisions” for the meaning of new statutes to be­ come truly “settled.” Letter to S. Jones (July 1809), in 12 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 299 (A. Bergh ed. 1907).

制宪者还认识到，我国宪法所描述的司法权，如同英格兰的司法权一样，意味着在评估过去判决中所体现的“证据”时，拥有（并负有）区分的权力（和义务）。因此，例如，Madison 指出，被“反复确认”的司法裁决可能比孤立的或异常的裁决提供更好的法律含义证据。Letter to C. Ingersoll (June 1831), in 4 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 184 (1867)（着重号为后加）。推而广之，Thomas Jefferson 认为，新制定法的含义往往需要“众多判决”才能真正“确定”。Letter to S. Jones (July 1809), in 12 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 299 (A. Bergh ed. 1907)。

From the start, too, American courts recognized that not everything found in a prior decision was entitled to equal

同样从一开始，美国法院就认识到，先前判决中的一切并非都享有同等

weight. As Chief Justice Marshall warned, “It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821). To the extent a past court offered views “beyond the case,” those expressions “may be respected” in a later case “but ought not to control the judgment.” Ibid. One “obvious” reason for this, Marshall continued, had to do with the limits of the adversarial process we inherited from England: Only “[t]he question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom com­ pletely investigated.” Id., at 399–400.

权重。正如 Marshall 首席大法官所警告的，“这是一条不可忽视的格言：每一意见中的一般性表述，都必须结合使用这些表述的案件来理解。”Cohens 诉 Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821)。如果过去的法院提出了“超出案件范围”的观点，这些表述在以后的案件中“可以受到尊重”，“但不应当控制判决”。同上。Marshall 继续说，这样做的一个“明显”原因与我们继承自英格兰的对抗制程序的局限有关：只有“[]法院实际审理的问题才受到仔细调查，并得到全面考虑。其他可能有助于说明该问题的原则，是结合已决案件来考虑的，但它们对所有其他案件可能具有的意义则很少得到完全调查。”同上，第399–400页。

Abraham Lincoln championed these traditional under­ standings in his debates with Stephen Douglas. Douglas took the view that a single decision of this Court—no mat­ ter how flawed—could definitively resolve a contested issue for everyone and all time. Those who thought otherwise, he said, “aim[ed] a deadly blow to our whole Republican sys­ tem of government.” Speech at Springfield, Ill. (June 26, 1857), in 2 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 401 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (Lincoln Speech). But Lincoln knew better. While accepting that judicial decisions “absolutely deter­ mine” the rights of the parties to a court’s judgment, he re­ fused to accept that any single judicial decision could “fully settl[e]” an issue, particularly when that decision departs from the Constitution. Id., at 400–401. In cases such as these, Lincoln explained, “it is not resistance, it is not fac­ tious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat [the decision] as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country.” Id., at 401.

Abraham Lincoln 在与 Stephen Douglas 的辩论中拥护这些传统理解。Douglas 认为，本法院的单一判决——无论多么有缺陷——都可以为所有人且永远最终解决一个有争议的问题。他说，那些持不同想法的人“旨在对我们整个共和政体给予致命一击”。Speech at Springfield, Ill. (June 26, 1857), in 2 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 401 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (Lincoln Speech)。但 Lincoln 更清楚。虽然他接受司法判决“绝对确定”法院判决当事人的权利，但他拒绝接受任何单一司法判决可以“完全解决”一个问题，尤其是当该判决偏离宪法时。同上，第400–401页。Lincoln 解释说，在此类案件中，“将[该判决]视为尚未为国家确立确定的学说，并不是抵抗，不是煽动，甚至不是不尊重。”同上，第401页。

After the Civil War, the Court echoed some of these same points. It stressed that every statement in a judicial opin­

内战后，本法院呼应了其中一些相同观点。它强调，司法意见中的每一陈述

ion “must be taken in connection with its immediate con­ text,” In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 488 (1887), and stray “re­ marks” must not be elevated above the written law, see The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 641 (1869); see also, e.g., Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687, 692–693 (1872); Mason v. Eldred, 6 Wall. 231, 236–238 (1868). During Chief Justice Chase’s tenure, it seems a Justice writing the Court’s majority opin­ ion would generally work alone and present his work orally and in summary form to his colleagues at conference, which meant that other Justices often did not even review the opinion prior to publication. 6 C. Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States 69–70 (1971). The Court could proceed in this way because it understood that a single judicial opinion may resolve a “case or controversy,” and in so doing it may make “effective law” for the parties, but it does not legislate for the whole of the country and is not to be confused with laws that do.

“都必须结合其直接上下文来理解”，In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 488 (1887)，零散的“评论”不得被抬高到成文法之上，见 The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 641 (1869)；另见，例如，Trebilcock 诉 Wilson, 12 Wall. 687, 692–693 (1872)；Mason 诉 Eldred, 6 Wall. 231, 236–238 (1868)。在 Chase 首席大法官任期内，撰写法院多数意见的大法官似乎通常独自工作，并在会议上以口头和摘要形式向同僚提交其成果，这意味着其他大法官在发表前往往甚至没有审阅该意见。6 C. Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States 69–70 (1971)。法院可以这样做，因为它理解单一司法意见可以解决“案件或争议”，并在此过程中为当事人制定“有效法”，但它不为整个国家立法，也不应与立法相混淆。

C From all this, I see at least three lessons about the doc­ trine of stare decisis relevant to the decision before us today. Each concerns a form of judicial humility. First, a past decision may bind the parties to a dispute, but it provides this Court no authority in future cases to depart from what the Constitution or laws of the United States ordain. Instead, the Constitution promises, the American people are sovereign and they alone may, through democratically responsive processes, amend our foundational charter or revise federal legislation. Une­ lected judges enjoy no such power. Part I–B, supra. Recognizing as much, this Court has often said that stare decisis is not an “‘inexorable command.’” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997). And from time to time it has found it necessary to correct its past mistakes. When it comes to correcting errors of constitutional interpretation, the Court has stressed the importance of doing so, for they

C 从这一切中，我看到至少三条关于遵循先例原则的教训，与今天摆在我们面前的判决相关。每一条都涉及一种司法谦抑。 第一，过去的判决可以约束争议的当事人，但它在未来案件中不赋予本法院任何偏离宪法或美国法律所规定的权威。 相反，宪法承诺，美国人民是主权者，只有他们可以通过民主回应程序修正我们的基础宪章或修改联邦立法。未经选举的法官不享有这种权力。见上文第一部分B。 认识到这一点，本法院经常说遵循先例并非“‘不可动摇的命令’”。State Oil Co. 诉 Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997)。它不时认为有必要纠正过去的错误。在纠正宪法解释错误方面，本法院强调了这样做的重要性，因为这些

can be corrected otherwise only through the amendment process. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. 230, 248 (2019). When it comes to fixing errors of stat­ utory interpretation, the Court has proceeded perhaps more circumspectly. But in that field, too, it has overruled even longstanding but “flawed” decisions. See, e.g., Leegin Crea­ tive Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 904, 907 (2007).

错误只能通过修正程序来纠正。见，例如，Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. 诉 Hyatt, 587 U. S. 230, 248 (2019)。在纠正制定法解释错误方面，本法院或许更为谨慎。但在该领域，它也推翻了甚至长期存在但“有缺陷”的判决。见，例如，Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. 诉 PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 904, 907 (2007)。

Recent history illustrates all this. During the tenures of Chief Justices Warren and Burger, it seems this Court over­ ruled an average of around three cases per Term, including roughly 50 statutory precedents between the 1960s and 1980s alone. See W. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Prec­ edents, 76 Geo. L. J. 1361, 1427–1434 (1988) (collecting cases). Many of these decisions came in settings no less consequential than today’s. In recent years, we have not approached the pace set by our predecessors, overruling an average of just one or two prior decisions each Term. 1 But the point remains: Judicial decisions inconsistent with the written law do not inexorably control.

近期历史说明了这一切。在 Warren 和 Burger 首席大法官任期内，本法院似乎平均每开庭期推翻约3个案件，仅1960年代至1980年代就包括约50个制定法先例。见 W. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L. J. 1361, 1427–1434 (1988)（收集案件）。其中许多判决所处的背景与今天同样重要。近年来，我们尚未接近前任设定的速度，平均每开庭期仅推翻一两个先前判决。1 但要点仍然存在：与成文法不一致的司法判决并不必然具有控制力。

Second, another lesson tempers the first. While judicial decisions may not supersede or revise the Constitution or federal statutory law, they merit our “respect as embodying the considered views of those who have come before.” Ra­ mos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83, 105 (2020). As a matter of professional responsibility, a judge must not only avoid con­ fusing his writings with the law. When a case comes before him, he must also weigh his view of what the law demands against the thoughtful views of his predecessors. After all, “[p]recedent is a way of accumulating and passing down the learning of past generations, a font of established wisdom

第二，另一条教训缓和了第一条。虽然司法判决不能取代或修改宪法或联邦制定法，但它们值得我们“尊重，因为它们体现了先人的深思熟虑”。Ramos 诉 Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83, 105 (2020)。作为职业责任问题，法官不仅必须避免将自己的著作与法律相混淆。当案件摆在他面前时，他还必须将自己的法律要求观点与前任的深思熟虑观点相权衡。毕竟，“[先]例是积累和传承过去世代学识的一种方式，是既定智慧的源泉

richer than what can be found in any single judge or panel of judges.” Precedent 9.

比任何单个法官或法官合议庭所能提供的都更丰富。”Precedent 9。

Doubtless, past judicial decisions may, as they always have, command “greater or less authority as precedents, ac­ cording to circumstances.” Lincoln Speech 401. But, like English judges before us, we have long turned to familiar considerations to guide our assessment of the weight due a past decision. So, for example, as this Court has put it, the weight due a precedent may depend on the quality of its reasoning, its consistency with related decisions, its worka­ bility, and reliance interests that have formed around it. See Ramos, 590 U. S., at 106. The first factor recognizes that the primary power of any precedent lies in its power to persuade—and poorly reasoned decisions may not provide reliable evidence of the law’s meaning. The second factor reflects the fact that a precedent is more likely to be correct and worthy of respect when it reflects the time-tested wis­ dom of generations than when it sits “unmoored” from sur­ rounding law. Ibid. The remaining factors, like workability and reliance, do not often supply reason enough on their own to abide a flawed decision, for almost any past decision is likely to benefit some group eager to keep things as they are and content with how things work. See, e.g., id., at 108. But these factors can sometimes serve functions similar to the others, by pointing to clues that may suggest a past de­ cision is right in ways not immediately obvious to the indi­ vidual judge.

毫无疑问，过去的司法判决可能——正如它们一直以来那样——根据具体情况，作为先例具有或多或少的权威。Lincoln Speech 401。但是，如同我们之前的英国法官一样，我们长期以来一直借助熟悉的考量因素来指导我们对过去判决应给予多大权重的评估。因此，例如，正如本法院所言，先例应得的权重可能取决于其推理的质量、其与相关判决的一致性、其可操作性以及围绕其形成的信赖利益。参见 Ramos, 590 U. S., at 106。第一个因素承认，任何先例的主要力量在于其说服力——推理拙劣的判决可能无法提供关于法律含义的可靠证据。第二个因素反映了一个事实：当先例体现了世代相传、久经考验的智慧时，比其脱离周围法律而“悬空”时，更可能是正确的、更值得尊重。同上。其余因素，如可操作性和信赖，通常不足以单独提供充分理由来维持一个有缺陷的判决，因为几乎任何过去的判决都可能有利于某个渴望维持现状、对现状感到满意的群体。参见，例如，同上，at 108。但这些因素有时可以发挥与其他因素类似的功能，通过指向可能表明过去判决在法官个人尚未立即察觉的方面是正确的线索。

When asking whether to follow or depart from a prece­ dent, some judges deploy adverbs. They speak of whether or not a precedent qualifies as “demonstrably erroneous,” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 711 (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring), or “egregiously wrong,” Ramos, 590 U. S., at 121 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part). But the emphasis the adverb imparts is not meant for dramatic effect. It seeks to serve instead as a reminder of a more substantive lesson. The lesson that, in assessing the weight

在询问是否遵循或背离先例时，一些法官会使用副词。他们谈论先例是否构成“明显错误”，Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 711 (2019)（THOMAS 大法官，协同意见），或“严重错误”，Ramos, 590 U. S., at 121（KAVANAUGH 大法官，部分协同意见）。但副词所传达的强调并非为了戏剧效果。它试图充当对更实质性教训的提醒。这一教训是，在评估权重时

due a past decision, a judge is not to be guided by his own impression alone, but must self-consciously test his views against those who have come before, open to the possibility that a precedent might be correct in ways not initially ap­ parent to him.

对于过去的判决，法官不应仅凭自己的印象行事，而必须有意识地用前人的观点来检验自己的看法，并对先例可能在其最初看来不明显的方面是正确的这一可能性保持开放。

Third, it would be a mistake to read judicial opinions like statutes. Adopted through a robust and democratic process, statutes often apply in all their particulars to all persons. By contrast, when judges reach a decision in our adversar­ ial system, they render a judgment based only on the fac­ tual record and legal arguments the parties at hand have chosen to develop. A later court assessing a past decision must therefore appreciate the possibility that different facts and different legal arguments may dictate a different outcome. They must appreciate, too, that, like anyone else, judges are “innately digressive,” and their opinions may sometimes offer stray asides about a wider topic that may sound nearly like legislative commands. Duxbury 4. Often, enterprising counsel seek to exploit such statements to maximum effect. See id., at 25. But while these digressions may sometimes contain valuable counsel, they remain “va­ pours and fumes of law,” Bacon 478, and cannot “control the judgment in a subsequent suit,” Cohens, 6 Wheat., at 399.

第三，将司法意见当作制定法来解读将是一个错误。制定法通过强有力的民主程序获得通过，通常其所有细节适用于所有人。相比之下，当法官在我们的对抗制中作出裁决时，他们仅基于当事人所选择发展的案件事实记录和法律论据作出判决。因此，后来评估过去判决的法院必须认识到，不同的事实和不同的法律论据可能导致不同的结果。他们还必须认识到，与任何其他人一样，法官“天生具有离题倾向”，他们的意见有时可能会对更广泛的话题提供一些听起来几乎像立法命令的附带议论。Duxbury 4。通常，有进取心的律师会寻求最大限度地利用此类陈述。参见同上，at 25。但是，尽管这些离题议论有时可能包含有价值的建议，它们仍然是“法律的蒸汽和烟雾”，Bacon 478，不能“控制后续诉讼中的判决”，Cohens, 6 Wheat., at 399。

These principles, too, have long guided this Court and others. As Judge Easterbrook has put it, an “opinion is not a comprehensive code; it is just an explanation for the Court’s disposition. Judicial opinions must not be confused with statutes, and general expressions must be read in light of the subject under consideration.” United States v. Skoien, 614 F. 3d 638, 640 (CA7 2010) (en banc); see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 341 (1979) (stress­ ing that an opinion is not “a statute,” and its language should not “be parsed” as if it were); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U. S. 353, 372 (2001) (same). If stare decisis counsels re­ spect for the thinking of those who have come before, it also counsels against doing an “injustice to [their] memory” by

这些原则长期以来也指导着本法院和其他法院。正如 Easterbrook 法官所言，“意见不是一部综合法典；它只是对法院处理决定的解释。司法意见不得与制定法混淆，一般性表述必须结合所审议的主题来理解。”United States v. Skoien, 614 F. 3d 638, 640 (CA7 2010)（全体庭审）；另见 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 341 (1979)（强调意见不是“制定法”，其语言不应像制定法那样被“解析”）；Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U. S. 353, 372 (2001)（同上）。如果遵循先例原则要求尊重前人的思考，它也告诫不要通过

overreliance on their every word. Steel, 1 Bl. H., at 53, 126 Eng. Rep., at 33. As judges, “[w]e neither expect nor hope that our successors will comb” through our opinions, searching for delphic answers to matters we never fully ex­ plored. Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 141 (2022). To proceed otherwise risks “turn[ing] stare decisis from a tool of judicial humility into one of judicial hubris.” Ibid.

过度依赖他们的每一句话而“对[他们的]记忆造成不公”。Steel, 1 Bl. H., at 53, 126 Eng. Rep., at 33。作为法官，“我们既不期望也不希望我们的继任者梳理”我们的意见，寻找对我们从未充分探索的事项的神谕式答案。Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 141 (2022)。否则就有“将遵循先例原则从司法谦逊的工具变成司法傲慢的工具”的风险。同上。

II Turning now directly to the question what stare decisis effect Chevron deference warrants, each of these lessons seem to me to weigh firmly in favor of the course the Court charts today: Lesson 1, because Chevron deference contra­ venes the law Congress prescribed in the Administrative Procedure Act. Lesson 2, because Chevron deference runs against mainstream currents in our law regarding the sep­ aration of powers, due process, and centuries-old interpre­ tive rules that fortify those constitutional commitments. And Lesson 3, because to hold otherwise would effectively require us to endow stray statements in Chevron with the authority of statutory language, all while ignoring more considered language in that same decision and the teach­ ings of experience.

II 现在直接转向遵循先例原则赋予 Chevron 尊重的效力问题，在我看来，这些教训中的每一个都坚定地支持本法院今天所规划的路线：教训1，因为 Chevron 尊重违背了国会在《行政程序法》中规定的法律。教训2，因为 Chevron 尊重与我国法律中关于权力分立、正当程序以及巩固这些宪法承诺的数百年解释规则的主流趋势相悖。教训3，因为若不如此认定，将实际上要求我们赋予 Chevron 中的附带陈述以制定法语言的权威，同时忽视同一判决中更为审慎的语言以及经验的教训。

A Start with Lesson 1. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) directs a “reviewing court” to “decide all rel­ evant questions of law” and “interpret” relevant “constitu­ tional and statutory provisions.” 5 U. S. C. §706. When ap­ plying Chevron deference, reviewing courts do not interpret all relevant statutory provisions and decide all relevant questions of law. Instead, judges abdicate a large measure of that responsibility in favor of agency officials. Their in­ terpretations of “ambiguous” laws control even when those interpretations are at odds with the fairest reading of the law an independent “reviewing court” can muster. Agency

A 从教训1开始。1946年《行政程序法》（APA）指示“复审法院”“裁决所有相关法律问题”并“解释”相关“宪法和制定法条款”。5 U. S. C. §706。在适用 Chevron 尊重时，复审法院并不解释所有相关制定法条款并裁决所有相关法律问题。相反，法官将这一责任的很大一部分让渡给行政机关官员。他们对“模糊”法律解释的控制力，即使这些解释与独立的“复审法院”所能得出的最公正的法律解读相悖。行政机关

officials, too, may change their minds about the law’s mean­ ing at any time, even when Congress has not amended the relevant statutory language in any way. National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 982–983 (2005). And those officials may even dis­ agree with and effectively overrule not only their own past interpretations of a law but a court’s past interpretation as well. Ibid. None of that is consistent with the APA’s clear mandate.

官员也可以随时改变他们对法律含义的看法，即使国会未以任何方式修改相关制定法语言。National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 982–983 (2005)。而且这些官员甚至可以不同意并实际上推翻不仅他们自己过去对法律的解释，还有法院过去的解释。同上。这一切都不符合 APA 的明确授权。

The hard fact is Chevron “did not even bother to cite” the APA, let alone seek to apply its terms. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissent­ ing). Instead, as even its most ardent defenders have con­ ceded, Chevron deference rests upon a “fictionalized state­ ment of legislative desire,” namely, a judicial supposition that Congress implicitly wishes judges to defer to executive agencies’ interpretations of the law even when it has said nothing of the kind. D. Barron & E. Kagan, Chevron’s Non- delegation Doctrine, 2001 S. Ct. Rev. 201, 212 (Kagan) (em­ phasis added). As proponents see it, that fiction represents a “policy judgmen[t] about what . . . make[s] for good gov­ ernment.” Ibid. 2 But in our democracy unelected judges possess no authority to elevate their own fictions over the laws adopted by the Nation’s elected representatives. Some might think the legal directive Congress provided in the APA unwise; some might think a different arrangement preferable. See, e.g., post, at 9–11 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). But it is Congress’s view of “good government,” not ours, that controls.

严酷的事实是，Chevron“甚至懒得引用”APA，更不用说寻求适用其条款。United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 241 (2001)（Scalia 大法官，异议意见）。相反，正如其最热心的捍卫者所承认的那样，Chevron 尊重建立在“虚构的立法意愿陈述”之上，即司法推定国会隐含地希望法官遵从行政机关对法律的解释，即使国会从未说过此类话。D. Barron & E. Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 S. Ct. Rev. 201, 212 (Kagan)（着重号为原文所加）。在支持者看来，这一虚构代表了“关于什么……构成良好政府的政策判断”。同上。2 但在我们的民主制度中，未经选举的法官无权将他们自己的虚构凌驾于国家民选代表所通过的法律之上。有些人可能认为国会在 APA 中提供的法律指令不明智；有些人可能认为不同的安排更可取。参见，例如，post, at 9–11（KAGAN 大法官，异议意见）。但控制的是国会对“良好政府”的看法，而不是我们的看法。

Much more could be said about Chevron’s inconsistency with the APA. But I have said it in the past. See Buffington v. McDonough, 598 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (opinion dis­ senting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 5–6); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F. 3d 1142, 1151–1153 (CA10 2016) (concurring opinion). And the Court makes many of the same points at length today. See ante, at 18– 22. For present purposes, the short of it is that continuing to abide Chevron deference would require us to transgress the first lesson of stare decisis—the humility required of judges to recognize that our decisions must yield to the laws adopted by the people’s elected representatives. 3

关于 Chevron 与 APA 的不一致，还可以说很多。但我过去已经说过。参见 Buffington v. McDonough, 598 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022)（对调卷令驳回的异议意见）（slip op., at 5–6）；Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F. 3d 1142, 1151–1153 (CA10 2016)（协同意见）。而且本法院今天也详细提出了许多相同的观点。参见 ante, at 18–22。就目前而言，简而言之，继续遵循 Chevron 尊重将要求我们违背遵循先例原则的第一课——要求法官谦逊地认识到我们的判决必须服从于人民民选代表所通过的法律。3

B Lesson 2 cannot rescue Chevron deference. If stare deci­ sis calls for judicial humility in the face of the written law, it also cautions us to test our present conclusions carefully against the work of our predecessors. At the same time and as we have seen, this second form of humility counsels us to remember that precedents that have won the endorsement of judges across many generations, demonstrated coherence with our broader law, and weathered the tests of time and experience are entitled to greater consideration than those that have not. See Part I, supra. Viewed by each of these lights, the case for Chevron deference only grows weaker still.

B 教训2无法挽救 Chevron 尊重。如果遵循先例原则要求在成文法面前保持司法谦逊，它也告诫我们要仔细用前人的工作来检验我们当前的结论。同时，正如我们所见，这第二种形式的谦逊告诫我们要记住，那些赢得许多世代法官认可、表现出与更广泛法律的一致性的先例，以及经受住时间和经验考验的先例，比那些没有的先例应得到更多考虑。参见上文第一部分。从这些角度来看，Chevron 尊重的理由只会变得更加薄弱。

1 Start with a look to how our predecessors traditionally understood the judicial role in disputes over a law’s mean­ ing. From the Nation’s founding, they considered “[t]he in­ terpretation of the laws” in cases and controversies “the proper and peculiar province of the courts.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 467 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). Perhaps the Court’s most famous early decision reflected exactly that view. There, Chief Justice Marshall declared it “em­ phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177. For judges “have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judg­ ment”—and an obligation to exercise that judgment inde­ pendently. The Federalist No. 78, at 465. No matter how “disagreeable that duty may be,” this Court has said, a judge “is not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.” United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 162 (1841) (Story, J.). This duty of independent judgment is perhaps “the defining characteristi[c] of Article III judges.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 483 (2011).

1 首先看看我们的先辈传统上如何理解司法在解释法律含义争议中的角色。从国家建立之初，他们就认为在案件和争议中“法律的解释”是“法院的适当和特有领域”。《联邦党人文集》第78篇，第467页（C. Rossiter编，1961年）（A.汉密尔顿）。也许法院最著名的早期判决正是反映了这一观点。在那里，马歇尔首席大法官宣布“明确属于司法部门的职责和义务是说出法律是什么”。马伯里案，1 Cranch，第177页。因为法官“既没有武力也没有意志，而只有判断”——并且有义务独立行使该判断。《联邦党人文集》第78篇，第465页。无论“该职责可能多么令人不快”，本院曾表示，法官“无权放弃或豁免它”。美国诉迪克森案，15 Pet. 141, 162（1841年）（斯托里大法官）。这种独立判断的职责也许是“第三条法官的定义性特征”。斯特恩诉马歇尔案，564 U. S. 462, 483（2011年）。

To be sure, this Court has also long extended “great re­ spect” to the “contemporaneous” and consistent views of the coordinate branches about the meaning of a statute’s terms. Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210 (1827); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819); Stu­ art v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309 (1803). 4 But traditionally, that did not mean a court had to “defer” to any “reasonable”

诚然，本院也长期对协调分支关于法规术语含义的“同时期”和一致观点给予“极大尊重”。爱德华兹承租人诉达比案，12 Wheat. 206, 210（1827年）；另见麦卡洛克诉马里兰州案，4 Wheat. 316, 401（1819年）；斯图尔特诉莱尔德案，1 Cranch 299, 309（1803年）。4 但传统上，这并不意味着法院必须“遵从”任何“合理的”

construction of an “ambiguous” law that an executive agency might offer. It did not mean that the government could propound a “reasonable” view of the law’s meaning one day, a different one the next, and bind the judiciary al­ ways to its latest word. Nor did it mean the executive could displace a pre-existing judicial construction of a statute’s terms, replace it with its own, and effectively overrule a ju­ dicial precedent in the process. Put simply, this Court was “not bound” by any and all reasonable “administrative con- struction[s]” of ambiguous statutes when resolving cases and controversies. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. 1, 16 (1932). While the executive’s consistent and contem­ poraneous views warranted respect, they “by no means con­ trol[led] the action or the opinion of this court in expound­ ing the law with reference to the rights of parties litigant before them.” Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558, 567 (1858); see also A. Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Ex­ ecutive Interpretation, 126 Yale L. J. 908, 987 (2017).

对“模糊”法律的解释，行政机构可能提供。这并不意味着政府可以某一天提出法律含义的“合理”观点，第二天提出不同的观点，并始终约束司法机构服从其最新说法。也不意味着行政部门可以取代先前存在的对法规术语的司法解释，用自己的解释取而代之，并在此过程中有效地推翻司法先例。简而言之，在解决案件和争议时，本院“不受”对模糊法规的任何和所有合理“行政解释”的“约束”。伯内特诉芝加哥肖像公司案，285 U. S. 1, 16（1932年）。虽然行政部门的一致和同时期观点值得尊重，但它们“绝不控制本法院在阐述法律时关于当事人权利的行动或意见”。欧文诉马歇尔案，20 How. 558, 567（1858年）；另见A.巴姆扎伊，《司法尊重行政解释的起源》，126 Yale L. J. 908, 987（2017年）。

Sensing how jarringly inconsistent Chevron is with this Court’s many longstanding precedents discussing the na­ ture of the judicial role in disputes over the law’s meaning, the government and dissent struggle for a response. The best they can muster is a handful of cases from the early 1940s in which, they say, this Court first “put [deference] principles into action.” Post, at 21 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). And, admittedly, for a period this Court toyed with a form of deference akin to Chevron, at least for so-called mixed questions of law and fact. See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 411–412 (1941); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 131 (1944). But, as the Court details, even that limited experiment did not last. See ante, at 10– 12. Justice Roberts, in his Gray dissent, decried these de­ cisions for “abdicat[ing our] function as a court of review” and “complete[ly] revers[ing] . . . the normal and usual method of construing a statute.” 314 U. S., at 420–421. And just a few years later, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323

意识到雪佛龙案与本院许多长期先例讨论司法在法律含义争议中的角色性质是多么不协调，政府和异议意见努力寻求回应。他们所能拼凑的最好的是1940年代初的几个案件，他们说，本院首次“将[尊重]原则付诸行动”。后文第21页（卡根大法官，异议意见）。而且，诚然，有一段时间本院尝试了一种类似于雪佛龙案的尊重形式，至少对于所谓的法律和事实混合问题。见，例如，格雷诉鲍威尔案，314 U. S. 402, 411–412（1941年）；全国劳资关系委员会诉赫斯特出版公司案，322 U. S. 111, 131（1944年）。但是，正如本院详细说明的，即使那个有限的实验也没有持续。见前文第10–12页。罗伯茨大法官在其格雷案异议中谴责这些判决“放弃[我们]作为复审法院的职能”并“完全颠倒……解释法规的正常和通常方法”。314 U. S.，第420–421页。而仅仅几年后，在斯基德莫尔诉斯威夫特公司案，323

U. S. 134 (1944), the Court returned to its time-worn path.

U. S. 134（1944年），本院回到了其久经考验的道路。

Echoing themes that had run throughout our law from its start, Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote for the Court in Skidmore. There, he said, courts may extend respectful consideration to another branch’s interpretation of the law, but the weight due those interpretations must always “de­ pend upon the[ir] thoroughness . . . , the validity of [their] reasoning, [their] consistency with earlier and later pro­ nouncements, and all those factors which give [them] power to persuade.” Id., at 140. In another case the same year, and again writing for the Court, Justice Jackson expressly rejected a call for a judge-made doctrine of deference much like Chevron, offering that, “[i]f Congress had deemed it necessary or even appropriate” for courts to “defe[r] to ad­ ministrative construction[,] . . . it would not have been at a loss for words to say so.” Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 144, 156 (1944).

呼应从我国法律开始就贯穿始终的主题，罗伯特·H·杰克逊大法官在斯基德莫尔案中为法院写道。在那里，他说，法院可以对另一分支对法律的解释给予尊重的考虑，但那些解释应得的权重必须始终“取决于其[的]彻底性……，其[的]推理的有效性，其[的]与先前和后来声明的 consistency，以及所有赋予其[的]说服力的因素”。同上，第140页。同年另一个案件中，再次为法院写作，杰克逊大法官明确拒绝了类似于雪佛龙案的法官制定尊重原则的呼吁，提出，“如果国会认为有必要甚至适当”让法院“遵从行政解释……，它不会找不到话说”。戴维斯仓库公司诉鲍尔斯案，321 U. S. 144, 156（1944年）。

To the extent proper respect for precedent demands, as it always has, special respect for longstanding and main­ stream decisions, Chevron scores badly. It represented not a continuation of a long line of decisions but a break from them. Worse, it did not merely depart from our precedents. More nearly, Chevron defied them.

在适当尊重先例要求（一如既往）特别尊重长期和主流判决的范围内，雪佛龙案表现糟糕。它代表的不是一长串判决的延续，而是与它们的决裂。更糟的是，它不仅仅偏离了我们的先例。更近乎，雪佛龙案违抗了它们。

2 Consider next how uneasily Chevron deference sits along­ side so many other settled aspects of our law. Having wit­ nessed first-hand King George’s efforts to gain influence and control over colonial judges, see Declaration of Inde­ pendence ¶ 11, the framers made a considered judgment to build judicial independence into the Constitution’s design. They vested the judicial power in decisionmakers with life tenure. Art. III, §1. They placed the judicial salary beyond political control during a judge’s tenure. Ibid. And they rejected any proposal that would subject judicial decisions to review by political actors. The Federalist No. 81, at 482;

2 接下来考虑雪佛龙尊重与我们法律许多其他既定方面是多么不协调。亲眼目睹乔治国王努力获得对殖民地法官的影响和控制，见《独立宣言》第11段，制宪者做出了深思熟虑的判断，将司法独立构建到宪法设计中。他们将司法权授予终身任职的决策者。第三条，第1款。他们在法官任期内将司法薪水置于政治控制之外。同上。他们拒绝了任何使司法判决受政治行为者审查的提议。《联邦党人文集》第81篇，第482页；

United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 786–791 (2023) (THOMAS, J., concurring). All of this served to ensure the same thing: “A fair trial in a fair tribunal.” In re Murchi­ son, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955). One in which impartial judges, not those currently wielding power in the political branches, would “say what the law is” in cases coming to court. Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177.

美国诉汉森案，599 U. S. 762, 786–791（2023年）（托马斯大法官，协同意见）。所有这些都服务于确保同一件事：“公平法庭中的公平审判”。关于默奇森案，349 U. S. 133, 136（1955年）。在法庭上，公正的法官，而不是当前在政治分支掌权的人，将在提交法院的案件中“说出法律是什么”。马伯里案，1 Cranch，第177页。

Chevron deference undermines all that. It precludes courts from exercising the judicial power vested in them by Article III to say what the law is. It forces judges to aban­ don the best reading of the law in favor of views of those presently holding the reins of the Executive Branch. It re­ quires judges to change, and change again, their interpre­ tations of the law as and when the government demands. And that transfer of power has exactly the sort of conse­ quences one might expect. Rather than insulate adjudica­ tion from power and politics to ensure a fair hearing “with­ out respect to persons” as the federal judicial oath demands, 28 U. S. C. §453, Chevron deference requires courts to “place a finger on the scales of justice in favor of the most powerful of litigants, the federal government.” Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). Along the way, Chevron deference guarantees “systematic bias” in favor of which­ ever political party currently holds the levers of executive power. P. Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187, 1212 (2016).

雪佛龙尊重破坏了这一切。它阻止法院行使第三条赋予它们的司法权来说出法律是什么。它迫使法官放弃对法律的最佳解读，转而支持当前掌握行政分支缰绳的人的观点。它要求法官根据政府的要求改变，再改变他们对法律的解释。而这种权力转移正好具有人们可能预期的那种后果。雪佛龙尊重不是将裁决与权力和政治隔离开来以确保“不考虑个人”的公平听证（如联邦司法誓言所要求，28 U. S. C. §453），而是要求法院“将手指放在正义的天平上，偏向最强大的诉讼当事人，联邦政府”。布芬顿案，598 U. S.，第___页（滑行意见，第9页）。在此过程中，雪佛龙尊重保证了“系统性偏见”，偏向于当前掌握行政权力的任何政党。P.汉堡，《雪佛龙偏见》，84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187, 1212（2016年）。

Chevron deference undermines other aspects of our set­ tled law, too. In this country, we often boast that the Con­ stitution’s promise of due process of law, see Amdts. 5, 14, means that “‘no man can be a judge in his own case.’” Wil­ liams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U. S. 1, 8–9 (2016); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). That principle, of course, has even deeper roots, tracing far back into the common law where it was known by the Latin maxim nemo iudex in causa sua. See 1 E. Coke, Institutes

Chevron尊重原则也损害了我们既定法律的其他方面。在这个国家，我们常常夸耀宪法对正当法律程序的承诺，见第5、14修正案，意味着“‘没有人可以在自己的案件中担任法官。’”Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U. S. 1, 8–9 (2016)；Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798)（Chase大法官意见）。当然，这一原则有着更深的根源，可追溯至普通法，在那里它以拉丁格言nemo iudex in causa sua而闻名。见1 E. Coke, Institutes

of the Laws of England §212, *141a. Yet, under the Chev­ ron regime, all that means little, for executive agencies may effectively judge the scope of their own lawful powers. See, e.g., Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 296–297 (2013).

第212节，*141a。然而，在雪佛龙制度下，这一切意义不大，因为行政机构可以有效地判断自己合法权力的范围。见，例如，阿灵顿诉联邦通信委员会案，569 U. S. 290, 296–297（2013年）。

Traditionally, as well, courts have sought to construe statutes as a reasonable reader would “when the law was made.” Blackstone 59; see United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805). Today, some call this “textualism.” But really it’s a very old idea, one that constrains judges to a lawfinding rather than lawmaking role by focusing their work on the statutory text, its linguistic context, and vari­ ous canons of construction. In that way, textualism serves as an essential guardian of the due process promise of fair notice. If a judge could discard an old meaning and assign a new one to a law’s terms, all without any legislative revi­ sion, how could people ever be sure of the rules that bind them? New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. 105, 113 (2019). Were the rules otherwise, Blackstone warned, the people would be rendered “slaves to their magistrates.” 4 Blackstone 371.

传统上，法院也寻求像“法律制定时”的合理读者那样解释法规。布莱克斯通第59页；见美国诉费希尔案，2 Cranch 358, 386（1805年）。今天，有些人称之为“文本主义”。但实际上这是一个非常古老的想法，它通过将法官的工作集中在法规文本、其语言上下文和各种解释规则上，约束法官成为法律发现者而非法律制定者。这样，文本主义作为正当程序承诺的公平通知的基本守护者。如果法官可以丢弃旧含义并赋予法律术语新含义，而没有任何立法修订，人们如何能确保约束他们的规则？ 新普莱姆公司诉奥利维拉案，586 U. S. 105, 113（2019年）。如果规则相反，布莱克斯通警告说，人民将沦为“他们地方法官的奴隶”。4布莱克斯通371。

Yet, replace “magistrates” with “bureaucrats,” and Black­ stone’s fear becomes reality when courts employ Chevron deference. Whenever we confront an ambiguity in the law, judges do not seek to resolve it impartially according to the best evidence of the law’s original meaning. Instead, we re­ sort to a far cruder heuristic: “The reasonable bureaucrat always wins.” And because the reasonable bureaucrat may change his mind year-to-year and election-to-election, the people can never know with certainty what new “interpre­ tations” might be used against them. This “fluid” approach to statutory interpretation is “as much a trap for the inno­ cent as the ancient laws of Caligula,” which were posted so high up on the walls and in print so small that ordinary people could never be sure what they required. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U. S. 174, 176 (1952).

然而，将“地方法官”替换为“官僚”，当法院采用雪佛龙尊重时，布莱克斯通的恐惧成为现实。每当我们面对法律中的歧义时，法官并不寻求根据法律原意的最佳证据公正地解决它。相反，我们诉诸一个更粗糙的启发式：“合理的官僚总是赢。”而且因为合理的官僚可能年复一年、选举接选举地改变主意，人们永远无法确切知道哪些新的“解释”可能被用来对付他们。这种“流动”的法规解释方法“对无辜者来说就像卡利古拉的古代法律一样是个陷阱”，那些法律张贴在墙上如此之高，印刷如此之小，以至于普通人永远无法确定它们要求什么。美国诉卡迪夫案，344 U. S. 174, 176（1952年）。

The ancient rule of lenity is still another of Chevron’s vic­ tims. Since the founding, American courts have construed ambiguities in penal laws against the government and with lenity toward affected persons. Wooden v. United States, 595 U. S. 360, 388–390 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment). That principle upholds due process by safe­ guarding individual liberty in the face of ambiguous laws. Ibid. And it fortifies the separation of powers by keeping the power of punishment firmly “‘in the legislative, not in the judicial department.’” Id., at 391 (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820)). But power begets power. And pressing Chevron deference as far as it can go, the government has sometimes managed to leverage “ambiguities” in the written law to penalize conduct Con­ gress never clearly proscribed. Compare Guedes v. ATF, 920 F. 3d 1, 27–28, 31 (CADC 2019), with Garland v. Car- gill, 602 U. S. 604 (2024).

古老的从宽解释规则（rule of lenity）仍是 Chevron 的又一个受害者。自建国以来，美国法院一直对刑法中的歧义作不利于政府的解释，并对受影响的人从宽处理。Wooden 诉 United States，595 U. S. 360，388–390（2022）（GORSUCH 大法官，对判决结果协同）。该原则在面对含义模糊的法律时保障个人自由，从而维护正当程序。Ibid. 它还通过将惩罚权牢牢地“‘留在立法部门，而非司法部门’”来巩固权力分立。Id.，at 391（引 United States 诉 Wiltberger，5 Wheat. 76，95（1820））。但权力滋生权力。而政府将 Chevron 遵从推至其极限，有时设法利用成文法中的“歧义”来惩罚国会从未明确禁止的行为。比较 Guedes 诉 ATF，920 F. 3d 1，27–28，31（CADC 2019），与 Garland 诉 Cargill，602 U. S. 604（2024）。

In all these ways, Chevron’s fiction has led us to a strange place. One where authorities long thought reserved for Ar­ ticle III are transferred to Article II, where the scales of jus­ tice are tilted systematically in favor of the most powerful, where legal demands can change with every election even though the laws do not, and where the people are left to guess about their legal rights and responsibilities. So much tension with so many foundational features of our legal or­ der is surely one more sign that we have “taken a wrong turn along the way.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. 558, 607 (2019) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment). 5

在所有这些方面，Chevron 的拟制将我们引向了一个奇怪的地方。在那里，长期以来被认为保留给第三条的权限被移交给第二条，正义的天平系统性地向最有权势者倾斜，法律要求可以随每次选举而改变，即使法律本身并未改变，人民则被留下猜测自己的法律权利和责任。与我们的法律秩序如此众多基础性特征存在如此多的紧张关系，无疑又是一个迹象，表明我们“在途中走错了方向”。Kisor 诉 Wilkie，588 U. S. 558，607（2019）（GORSUCH 大法官，对判决结果协同）。5

3 Finally, consider workability and reliance. If, as I have sought to suggest, these factors may sometimes serve as useful proxies for the question whether a precedent com­ ports with the historic tide of judicial practice or represents an aberrational mistake, see Part I–C, supra, they certainly do here.

3 最后，考虑可操作性和信赖。如果如我所试图指出的，这些因素有时可以作为有用的替代指标，用来判断某一先例是否符合司法实践的历史潮流，或者是否代表一种异常的失误，见上文第一部分至第三部分，那么它们在这里当然确实如此。

Take Chevron’s “workability.” Throughout its short life, this Court has been forced to supplement and revise Chev­ ron so many times that no one can agree on how many “steps” it requires, nor even what each of those “steps” en­ tails. Some suggest that the analysis begins with “step zero” (perhaps itself a tell), an innovation that traces to United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218. Mead held that, before even considering whether Chevron applies, a court must determine whether Congress meant to delegate to the agency authority to interpret the law in a given field. 533 U. S., at 226–227. But that exercise faces an immediate challenge: Because Chevron depends on a judicially im­ plied, rather than a legislatively expressed, delegation of interpretive authority to an executive agency, Part II–A, su­ pra, when should the fiction apply and when not? Mead fashioned a multifactor test for judges to use. 533 U. S., at

以 Chevron 的“可操作性”为例。在其短暂的生命中，本法院被迫多次补充和修订 Chevron，以至于没有人能就它需要多少“步骤”达成一致，甚至不能就每个“步骤”包含什么达成一致。有人建议分析从“第零步”开始（这本身或许就是一个提示），这一创新可追溯至 United States 诉 Mead Corp.，533 U. S. 218。Mead 裁定，在甚至考虑 Chevron 是否适用之前，法院必须确定国会是否意图将某一领域解释法律的权力委托给行政机关。533 U. S.，at 226–227。但这一作业面临一个直接挑战：因为 Chevron 依赖于司法上默示的、而非立法上明示的、将解释权委托给行政机关，见上文第二部分至第一部分，那么该拟制何时应适用、何时不应适用？Mead 为法官设计了一种多因素检验。533 U. S.，at

229–231. But that test has proved as indeterminate in ap­ plication as it was contrived in origin. Perhaps for these reasons, perhaps for others, this Court has sometimes ap­ plied Mead and often ignored it. See Brand X, 545 U. S., at 1014, n. 8 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

229–231。但该检验在适用中已被证明与其在起源上的刻意设计一样不确定。或许由于这些原因，或许由于其他原因，本法院有时适用 Mead，而常常忽视它。见 Brand X，545 U. S.，at 1014，n. 8（Scalia 大法官，异议意见）。

Things do not improve as we move up the Chevron ladder. At “step one,” a judge must defer to an executive official’s interpretation when the statute at hand is “ambiguous.” But even today, Chevron’s principal beneficiary—the fed­ eral government—still cannot say when a statute is suffi­ ciently ambiguous to trigger deference. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. in American Hospital Assn. v. Becerra, O. T. 2021, No. 20–1114, pp. 71–72. Perhaps thanks to this particular confusion, the search for ambiguity has devolved into a sort of Snark hunt: Some judges claim to spot it almost every­ where, while other equally fine judges claim never to have seen it. Compare L. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 821, 826 (1990), with R. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 315, 323 (2017).

当我们沿着 Chevron 的阶梯向上移动时，情况并没有改善。在“第一步”，当手头的法律“含义模糊”时，法官必须遵从行政官员的解释。但即使在今天，Chevron 的主要受益人——联邦政府——仍然说不出法律何时足够模糊以触发遵从。见，例如，American Hospital Assn. 诉 Becerra 案口头辩论记录，O. T. 2021，No. 20–1114，pp. 71–72。或许由于这一特定的混乱，对歧义的寻找已演变成一种 Snark 狩猎：一些法官声称几乎到处都能发现它，而另一些同样优秀的法官则声称从未见过它。比较 L. Silberman，Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy，58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 821，826（1990），与 R. Kethledge，Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench，70 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 315，323（2017）。

Nor do courts agree when it comes to “step two.” There, a judge must assess whether an executive agency’s inter­ pretation of an ambiguous statute is “reasonable.” But what does that inquiry demand? Some courts engage in a comparatively searching review; others almost reflexively defer to an agency’s views. Here again, courts have pursued “wildly different” approaches and reached wildly different conclusions in similar cases. See B. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2152 (2016) (Kavanaugh).

法院在“第二步”上也不一致。在那里，法官必须评估行政机关对含义模糊法律的解释是否“合理”。但该调查要求什么？一些法院进行相对深入的审查；另一些法院几乎条件反射地遵从行政机关的观点。在这里，法院再次在类似案件中采取了“截然不同”的方法并得出了截然不同的结论。见 B. Kavanaugh，Fixing Statutory Interpretation，129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118，2152（2016）（Kavanaugh）。

Today’s cases exemplify some of these problems. We have before us two circuit decisions, three opinions, and at least as many interpretive options on the Chevron menu. On the one hand, we have the D. C. Circuit majority, which deemed the Magnuson-Stevens Act “ambiguous” and upheld the

今天的案件体现了其中一些问题。我们面前有两个巡回法院的判决、三份意见，以及 Chevron 菜单上至少同样多的解释选项。一方面，我们有 D. C. 巡回法院多数意见，其认为 Magnuson-Stevens 法“含义模糊”并维持了

agency’s regulation as “‘permissible.’” 45 F. 4th 359, 365 (2022). On the other hand, we have the D. C. Circuit dis­ sent, which argues the statute is “unambiguou[s]” and that it plainly forecloses the agency’s new rule. Id., at 372 (opin­ ion of Walker, J.). And on yet a third hand, we have the First Circuit, which claimed to have identified “clear tex­ tual support” for the regulation, yet refused to say whether it would “classify [its] conclusion as a product of Chevron step one or step two.” 62 F. 4th 621, 631, 634 (2023). As these cases illustrate, Chevron has turned statutory inter­ pretation into a game of bingo under blindfold, with parties guessing at how many boxes there are and which one their case might ultimately fall in.

行政机关的法规为“‘可允许的’”。45 F. 4th 359，365（2022）。另一方面，我们有 D. C. 巡回法院异议意见，其主张该法“含义明确”并且明确排除了行政机关的新规则。Id.，at 372（Walker 大法官的意见）。还有第三个方面，我们有第一巡回法院，其声称已为该法规找到了“明确的文本支持”，却拒绝说明它是否会“将[其]结论归类为 Chevron 第一步或第二步的产物”。62 F. 4th 621，631，634（2023）。正如这些案件所表明的，Chevron 已将法律解释变成了一场蒙眼玩宾果的游戏，各方猜测有多少个格子以及他们的案件最终可能落入哪一个。

Turn now from workability to reliance. Far from engen­ dering reliance interests, the whole point of Chevron defer­ ence is to upset them. Under Chevron, executive officials can replace one “reasonable” interpretation with another at any time, all without any change in the law itself. The re­ sult: Affected individuals “can never be sure of their legal rights and duties.” Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12).

现在从可操作性转向信赖。Chevron 遵从远非产生信赖利益，其全部要点就是破坏信赖利益。在 Chevron 之下，行政官员可以随时用一个“合理”的解释替换另一个，而法律本身没有任何变化。结果是：受影响的个人“永远无法确定自己的法律权利和义务”。Buffington，598 U. S.，at ___（slip op.，at 12）。

How bad is the problem? Take just one example. Brand X concerned a law regulating broadband internet services. There, the Court upheld an agency rule adopted by the ad­ ministration of President George W. Bush because it was premised on a “reasonable” interpretation of the statute. Later, President Barack Obama’s administration rescinded the rule and replaced it with another. Later still, during President Donald J. Trump’s administration, officials re­ placed that rule with a different one, all before President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s administration declared its intention to reverse course for yet a fourth time. See Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet, 88 Fed. Reg. 76048 (2023); Brand X, 545 U. S., at 981–982. Each time, the government claimed its new rule was just as “reasonable” as the last. Rather than promoting reliance by fixing the meaning of

问题有多严重？仅举一个例子。Brand X 涉及一部规范宽带互联网服务的法律。在那里，法院维持了乔治·W·布什总统政府通过的一项行政机关规则，因为该规则以对法律的“合理”解释为前提。后来，巴拉克·奥巴马总统的政府废除了该规则并以另一规则取而代之。再后来，在唐纳德·J·特朗普总统的政府期间，官员们又用不同的规则替换了该规则，这一切都发生在约瑟夫·R·拜登总统的政府宣布其打算第四次改变方向之前。见 Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet，88 Fed. Reg. 76048（2023）；Brand X，545 U. S.，at 981–982。每一次，政府都声称其新规则与上一个同样“合理”。Chevron 遵从非但没有通过固定法律的含义来促进信赖，

the law, Chevron deference engenders constant uncertainty and convulsive change even when the statute at issue itself remains unchanged.

反而即使在所涉法律本身保持不变的情况下，也造成了持续的不确定性和剧烈变化。

Nor are these antireliance harms distributed equally. So­ phisticated entities and their lawyers may be able to keep pace with rule changes affecting their rights and responsi­ bilities. They may be able to lobby for new “‘reasonable’” agency interpretations and even capture the agencies that issue them. Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 8, 13). But ordinary people can do none of those things. They are the ones who suffer the worst kind of regulatory whip­ lash Chevron invites.

这些反信赖损害也并非平均分配。成熟的实体及其律师或许能够跟上影响其权利和义务的规则变化。他们或许能够游说争取新的“‘合理的’”行政机关解释，甚至俘获发布这些解释的行政机关。Buffington，598 U. S.，at ___，___（slip op.，at 8，13）。但普通人做不到这些。他们才是承受 Chevron 所招致的最严重监管急转弯的人。

Consider a couple of examples. Thomas Buffington, a vet­ eran of the U. S. Air Force, was injured in the line of duty. For a time after he left the Air Force, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) paid disability benefits due him by law. But later the government called on Mr. Buffington to reenter active service. During that period, everyone agreed, the VA could (as it did) suspend his disability payments. After he left active service for a second time, however, the VA turned his patriotism against him. By law, Congress permitted the VA to suspend disability pay only “for any period for which [a servicemember] receives active service pay.” 38 U. S. C. §5304(c). But the VA had adopted a self- serving regulation requiring veterans to file a form asking for the resumption of their disability pay after a second (or subsequent) stint in active service. 38 CFR §3.654(b)(2) (2021). Unaware of the regulation, Mr. Buffington failed to reapply immediately. When he finally figured out what had happened and reapplied, the VA agreed to resume pay­ ments going forward but refused to give Mr. Buffington all of the past disability payments it had withheld. Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 1–4).

考虑几个例子。美国空军退伍军人托马斯·巴芬顿在执行任务时受伤。离开空军后的一段时间里，退伍军人事务部（VA）依法向他支付了应得的伤残福利。但后来政府要求巴芬顿先生重新服役。在此期间，大家都同意，VA可以（也确实）暂停他的伤残津贴。然而，在他第二次离开现役后，VA却将他的爱国心反过来对付他。根据法律，国会仅允许VA在“服役人员领取现役薪资的任何期间”暂停伤残津贴。38 U. S. C. §5304(c)。但VA通过了一项有利于自身的法规，要求退伍军人在第二次（或后续）服役后提交表格申请恢复伤残津贴。38 CFR §3.654(b)(2) (2021)。巴芬顿先生不知道该法规，未能立即重新申请。当他终于弄清楚发生了什么并重新申请时，VA同意恢复未来的支付，但拒绝向巴芬顿先生支付其扣留的全部过往伤残津贴。Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 1–4)。

Mr. Buffington challenged the agency’s action as incon­ sistent with Congress’s direction that the VA may suspend disability payments only for those periods when a veteran

巴芬顿先生对该机构的行为提出质疑，认为其与国会的指示不一致，即VA仅可在退伍军人

returns to active service. But armed with Chevron, the agency defeated Mr. Buffington’s claim. Maybe the self- serving regulation the VA cited as justification for its action was not premised on the best reading of the law, courts said, but it represented a “‘permissible’” one. 598 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). In that way, the Executive Branch was able to evade Congress’s promises to someone who took the field repeatedly in the Nation’s defense.

重返现役的期间暂停伤残津贴。但凭借Chevron，该机构击败了巴芬顿先生的诉求。法院表示，VA援引作为其行为正当理由的利己法规或许并非基于对法律的最佳解读，但它代表了一种“‘可允许的’”解读。598 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7)。通过这种方式，行政部门得以规避国会向一位多次为国效力的人所作出的承诺。

In another case, one which I heard as a court of appeals judge, De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1165 (CA10 2015), the Board of Immigration Appeals invoked Chevron to over­ rule a judicial precedent on which many immigrants had relied, see In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 370 (BIA 2007) (purporting to overrule Padilla–Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F. 3d 1294 (CA10 2005)). The agency then sought to apply its new interpretation retroactively to punish those immi­ grants—including Alfonzo De Niz Robles, who had relied on that judicial precedent as authority to remain in this coun­ try with his U. S. wife and four children. See 803 F. 3d, at 1168–1169. Our court ruled that this retrospective applica­ tion of the BIA’s new interpretation of the law violated Mr. De Niz Robles’s due process rights. Id., at 1172. But as a lower court, we could treat only the symptom, not the dis­ ease. So Chevron permitted the agency going forward to overrule a judicial decision about the best reading of the law with its own different “reasonable” one and in that way deny relief to countless future immigrants.

在另一起案件中，即我担任上诉法院法官时审理的De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1165 (CA10 2015)，移民上诉委员会援引Chevron推翻了许多移民所依赖的司法先例，见In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 370 (BIA 2007)（意图推翻Padilla–Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F. 3d 1294 (CA10 2005)）。该机构随后试图追溯适用其新解释来惩罚那些移民——包括阿方索·德尼兹·罗布尔斯，他曾依赖该司法先例作为与其美国妻子和四个孩子留在本国的依据。见803 F. 3d, at 1168–1169。我们法院裁定，追溯适用BIA对法律的新解释侵犯了德尼兹·罗布尔斯先生的正当程序权利。Id., at 1172。但作为下级法院，我们只能治标，不能治本。因此，Chevron允许该机构今后以其自身不同的“合理”解释推翻关于法律最佳解读的司法判决，并以此方式拒绝给予无数未来移民救济。

Those are just two stories among so many that federal judges could tell (and have told) about what Chevron defer­ ence has meant for ordinary people interacting with the fed­ eral government. See, e.g., Lambert v. Saul, 980 F. 3d 1266, 1268–1276 (CA9 2020); Valent v. Commissioner of Social Security, 918 F. 3d 516, 525–527 (CA6 2019) (Kethledge, J., dissenting); Gonzalez v. United States Atty. Gen., 820 F. 3d 399, 402–405 (CA11 2016) (per curiam).

这些只是联邦法官能够讲述（且已经讲述）的众多故事中的两个，关于Chevron尊重对与联邦政府打交道的普通人意味着什么。见，例如，Lambert v. Saul, 980 F. 3d 1266, 1268–1276 (CA9 2020)；Valent v. Commissioner of Social Security, 918 F. 3d 516, 525–527 (CA6 2019)（Kethledge法官异议）；Gonzalez v. United States Atty. Gen., 820 F. 3d 399, 402–405 (CA11 2016)（per curiam）。

What does the federal government have to say about this?

联邦政府对此有何说法？

It acknowledges that Chevron sits as a heavy weight on the scale in favor of the government, “oppositional” to many “categories of individuals.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22–1219, p. 133 (Relentless Tr.). But, according to the government, Chevron deference is too important an innovation to undo. In its brief reign, the government says, it has become a “fun­ damenta[l] . . . ground rul[e] for how all three branches of the government are operating together.” Relentless Tr. 102. But, in truth, the Constitution, the APA, and our longstanding precedents set those ground rules some time ago. And under them, agencies cannot invoke a judge-made fiction to unsettle our Nation’s promise to individuals that they are entitled to make their arguments about the law’s demands on them in a fair hearing, one in which they stand on equal footing with the government before an independ­ ent judge.

它承认，Chevron在天平上作为有利于政府的沉重砝码，与许多“个人类别”“相对立”。Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22–1219, p. 133 (Relentless Tr.)。但据政府称，Chevron尊重是一项过于重要的创新，不能撤销。政府说，在其短暂的统治期间，它已成为“政府三个分支如何共同运作的基本……基本规则”。Relentless Tr. 102。但实际上，宪法、APA和我们长期以来的先例早已设定了这些基本规则。根据这些规则，机构不能援引法官创造的虚构来动摇我们国家对个人的承诺，即他们有权在公正的听证会上就法律对他们的要求提出论点，在听证会上他们与政府在独立法官面前享有平等地位。

C How could a Court, guided for 200 years by Chief Justice Marshall’s example, come to embrace a counter-Marbury revolution, one at war with the APA, time honored prece­ dents, and so much surrounding law? To answer these questions, turn to Lesson 3 and witness the temptation to endow a stray passage in a judicial decision with extraordi­ nary authority. Call it “power quoting.” Chevron was an unlikely place for a revolution to begin. The case concerned the Clean Air Act’s requirement that States regulate “stationary sources” of air pollution in their borders. See 42 U. S. C. §7401 et seq. At the time, it was an open question whether entire industrial plants or their constituent polluting parts counted as “stationary sources.” The Environmental Protection Agency had defined entire plants as sources, an approach that allowed companies to replace individual plant parts without automatically trig­ gering the permitting requirements that apply to new sources. Chevron, 467 U. S., at 840.

C 一个法院，在200年来以马歇尔首席大法官为榜样指引下，怎么会接受一场反马伯里的革命，一场与APA、历史悠久的先例以及如此多相关法律相冲突的革命？要回答这些问题，请转向第3课，见证将司法判决中的一段孤立文字赋予特殊权威的诱惑。称之为“权力引用”。 Chevron本来不太可能成为革命的起点。该案涉及《清洁空气法》要求各州在其边界内监管空气污染的“固定来源”。见42 U. S. C. §7401 et seq.。当时，整个工业工厂还是其组成部分的污染部分算作“固定来源”是一个悬而未决的问题。环境保护局将整个工厂定义为来源，这种方法允许公司更换单个工厂部件而不会自动触发适用于新来源的许可要求。Chevron, 467 U. S., at 840。

This Court upheld the EPA’s definition as consistent with the governing statute. Id., at 866. The decision, issued by a bare quorum of the Court, without concurrence or dissent, purported to apply “well-settled principles.” Id., at 845. “If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construc­ tion, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the pre­ cise question at issue,” Chevron provided, then “that inten­ tion is the law and must be given effect.” Id., at 843, n. 9. Many of the cases Chevron cited to support its judgment stood for the traditional proposition that courts afford re­ spectful consideration, not deference, to executive interpre­ tations of the law. See, e.g., Burnet, 285 U. S., at 16; United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763 (1878). And the decision’s sole citation to legal scholarship was to Roscoe Pound, who long championed de novo judicial review. 467 U. S., at 843, n. 10; see R. Pound, The Place of the Judiciary in a Demo­ cratic Polity, 27 A. B. A. J. 133, 136–137 (1941).

本法院维持EPA的定义，认为其与适用法规一致。Id., at 866。该判决由法院的法定人数不足作出，没有协同意见或异议意见，声称适用“公认原则”。Id., at 845。“如果法院运用传统法律解释工具，查明国会对所涉具体问题有意图，”Chevron规定，“那么该意图就是法律，必须予以实施。”Id., at 843, n. 9。Chevron为支持其判决而引用的许多案例都支持传统主张，即法院对行政解释给予尊重性考虑，而非尊重。见，例如，Burnet, 285 U. S., at 16；United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763 (1878)。该判决唯一引用的法律学术著作是罗斯科·庞德，他长期倡导重新审查司法审查。467 U. S., at 843, n. 10；见R. Pound, The Place of the Judiciary in a Democratic Polity, 27 A. B. A. J. 133, 136–137 (1941)。

At the same time, of course, the opinion contained bits and pieces that spoke differently. The decision also said that, “if [a] statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 467 U. S., at 843. But it seems the govern­ ment didn’t advance this formulation in its brief, so there was no adversarial engagement on it. T. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, 66 Ad­ min. L. Rev. 253, 268 (2014) (Merrill). As we have seen, too, the Court did not pause to consider (or even mention) the APA. See Part II–A, supra. It did not discuss contrary prec­ edents issued by the Court since the founding, let alone pur­ port to overrule any of them. See Part II–B–1, supra. Nor did the Court seek to address how its novel rule of deference might be squared with so much surrounding law. See Part II–B–2, supra. As even its defenders have acknowledged, “Chevron barely bothered to justify its rule of deference, and the few brief passages on this matter pointed in disparate

当然，与此同时，该意见包含了一些不同的片段。该判决还说，“如果[法规]对[具体问题]沉默或含糊，法院的问题是机构的答案是否基于对法规的可允许解释。”467 U. S., at 843。但政府似乎没有在其简报中提出这一表述，因此没有就此进行对抗性交锋。T. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, 66 Admin. L. Rev. 253, 268 (2014)（Merrill）。正如我们所见，法院也没有停下来考虑（甚至提及）APA。见上文第二部分-A。它没有讨论自建国以来法院作出的相反先例，更不用说意图推翻任何先例。见上文第二部分-B-1。法院也没有试图解决其新颖的尊重规则如何与如此多相关法律相协调。见上文第二部分-B-2。正如甚至其辩护者也承认的，“Chevron几乎懒得为其尊重规则辩护，关于此事的少数简短段落指向不同

directions.” Kagan 212–213. “[T]he quality of the reason­ ing,” they acknowledge, “was not high,” C. Sunstein, Chev­ ron as Law, 107 Geo. L. J. 1613, 1669 (2019).

方向。”Kagan 212–213。他们承认，“推理的质量不高，”C. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 Geo. L. J. 1613, 1669 (2019)。

If Chevron meant to usher in a revolution in how judges interpret laws, no one appears to have realized it at the time. Chevron’s author, Justice Stevens, characterized the decision as a “simpl[e] . . . restatement of existing law, noth­ ing more or less.” Merrill 255, 275. In the “19 argued cases” in the following Term “that presented some kind of question about whether the Court should defer to an agency inter­ pretation of statutory law,” this Court cited Chevron just once. Merrill 276. By some accounts, the decision seemed “destined to obscurity.” Ibid.

如果Chevron意在开启法官解释法律的革命，当时似乎没有人意识到这一点。Chevron的作者史蒂文斯大法官将该判决描述为“对现有法律的简单……重述，不多不少。”Merrill 255, 275。在接下来的开庭期“提出了某种关于法院是否应尊重机构对成文法解释的问题的19个辩论案件”中，本法院仅引用Chevron一次。Merrill 276。根据某些说法，该判决似乎“注定默默无闻”。Ibid.

It was only three years later when Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence that a revolution began to take shape. Buff­ ington, 598 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). There, he argued for a new rule requiring courts to defer to executive agency interpretations of the law whenever a “‘statute is silent or ambiguous.’” NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U. S. 112, 133–134 (1987) (opinion of Scalia, J.). Even­ tually, a majority of the Court followed his lead. Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). But from the start, Justice Scalia made no secret about the scope of his ambitions. See Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511, 521 (1989) (Scalia). The rule he advocated for represented such a sharp break from prior practice, he explained, that many judges of his day didn’t yet “understand” the “old criteria” were “no longer rele­ vant.” Ibid. Still, he said, overthrowing the past was worth it because a new deferential rule would be “easier to follow.” Ibid.

仅仅三年后，斯卡利亚大法官撰写了一份协同意见，革命才开始成形。Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8)。在那里，他主张一项新规则，要求法院在“‘法规沉默或含糊’”时尊重行政机构对法律的解释。NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U. S. 112, 133–134 (1987)（斯卡利亚大法官意见）。最终，法院多数遵循了他的引导。Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8)。但从一开始，斯卡利亚大法官就毫不掩饰其雄心范围。见Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511, 521 (1989)（Scalia）。他解释说，他所主张的规则与先前实践如此决裂，以至于他那个时代的许多法官还不“理解”“旧标准”“不再相关”。Ibid.。尽管如此，他说，推翻过去是值得的，因为新的尊重规则将“更容易遵循”。Ibid.

Events proved otherwise. As the years wore on and the Court’s new and aggressive reading of Chevron gradually exposed itself as unworkable, unfair, and at odds with our separation of powers, Justice Scalia could have doubled down on the project. But he didn’t. He appreciated that

事实证明并非如此。随着岁月流逝，法院对Chevron的新颖且激进的解读逐渐暴露其不可行、不公平且与我们的分权原则相悖，斯卡利亚大法官本可以加倍投入该项目。但他没有。他认识到

stare decisis is not a rule of “if I thought it yesterday, I must think it tomorrow.” And rather than cling to the pride of personal precedent, the Justice began to express doubts over the very project that he had worked to build. See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 109–110 (2015) (opinion concurring in judgment); cf. Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 568 U. S. 597, 617–618, 621 (2013) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). If Chevron’s ascent is a testament to the Justice’s ingenuity, its demise is an even greater tribute to his humility. 6

遵循先例不是“如果我昨天这么想，明天也必须这么想”的规则。而不是固守个人先例的骄傲，大法官开始对他曾努力建立的该项目表示怀疑。见Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 109–110 (2015)（对判决的协同意见）；参见Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 568 U. S. 597, 617–618, 621 (2013)（部分协同、部分异议意见）。如果Chevron的崛起证明了大法官的独创性，那么它的消亡则是对他谦逊的更大致敬。6

Justice Scalia was not alone in his reconsideration. After years spent laboring under Chevron, trying to make sense of it and make it work, Member after Member of this Court came to question the project. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U. S. 198, 219–221 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. 743, 760–764 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring); Kisor, 588 U. S., at 591 (ROBERTS, C. J., con­ curring in part); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F. 3d, at 1153; Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 14–15); Ka­ vanaugh 2150–2154. Ultimately, the Court gave up. De­ spite repeated invitations, it has not applied Chevron def­ erence since 2016. Relentless Tr. 81; App. to Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, p. 68a. So an experiment that began only in the mid-1980s effectively ended eight years ago. Along the way, an unusually large number of federal appellate judges voiced their own thoughtful and extensive

斯卡利亚大法官并非唯一重新考虑的人。在Chevron案下辛勤工作多年，试图理解它并使其发挥作用后，本法院一位又一位成员开始质疑这一工程。参见，例如，Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U. S. 198, 219–221 (2018)（肯尼迪大法官，协同意见）；Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. 743, 760–764 (2015)（托马斯大法官，协同意见）；Kisor, 588 U. S., at 591（罗伯茨首席大法官，部分协同意见）；Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F. 3d, at 1153；Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___–___（slip op., at 14–15）；Kavanaugh 2150–2154。最终，法院放弃了。尽管一再邀请，自2016年以来它从未适用Chevron尊重。Relentless Tr. 81；App. to Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, p. 68a。因此，一项仅始于1980年代中期的实验实际上在八年前就结束了。在此过程中，异常大量的联邦上诉法官表达了他们自己深思熟虑且广泛的

criticisms of Chevron. Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 14–15) (collecting examples). A number of state courts did, too, refusing to import Chevron deference into their own administrative law jurisprudence. See 598 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15).

对Chevron的批评。Buffington, 598 U. S., at ___–___（slip op., at 14–15）（收集例子）。许多州法院也是如此，拒绝将Chevron尊重引入他们自己的行政法判例。参见598 U. S., at ___（slip op., at 15）。

Even if all that and everything else laid out above is true, the government suggests we should retain Chevron defer­ ence because judges simply cannot live without it; some statutes are just too “technical” for courts to interpret “in­ telligently.” Post, at 9, 32 (dissenting opinion). But that objection is no answer to Chevron’s inconsistency with Con­ gress’s directions in the APA, so much surrounding law, or the challenges its multistep regime have posed in practice. Nor does history counsel such defeatism. Surely, it would be a mistake to suggest our predecessors before Chevron’s rise in the mid-1980s were unable to make their way intel­ ligently through technical statutory disputes. Following their lead, over the past eight years this Court has managed to resolve even highly complex cases without Chevron def­ erence, and done so even when the government sought def­ erence. Nor, as far as I am aware, did any Member of the Court suggest Chevron deference was necessary to an intel­ ligent resolution of any of those matters. 7 If anything, by affording Chevron deference a period of repose before ad­ dressing whether it should be retained, the Court has ena­ bled its Members to test the propriety of that precedent and reflect more deeply on how well it fits into the broader ar­ chitecture of our law. Others may see things differently, see post, at 26–27 (dissenting opinion), but the caution the

即使上述所有内容及其他一切均为真实，政府建议我们应保留Chevron尊重，因为法官简直离不开它；有些法规对于法院“明智地”解释来说过于“技术性”。Post, at 9, 32（反对意见）。但这一反对意见并不能回答Chevron与国会在APA中的指示、如此多的相关法律或其实践中多步骤制度所构成的挑战之间的不一致。历史也不支持这种失败主义。当然，暗示1980年代中期Chevron兴起之前的前辈们无法明智地处理技术性法定争议将是一个错误。遵循他们的先例，在过去八年中，本法院在没有Chevron尊重的情况下设法解决了甚至高度复杂的案件，而且即使在政府寻求尊重时也是如此。据我所知，法院任何成员都没有建议Chevron尊重对于明智解决任何这些事项是必要的。7 如果说有什么不同，通过在处理是否应保留Chevron尊重之前给予其一段休眠期，法院使其成员能够检验该先例的适当性，并更深入地反思它如何融入我们法律的更广泛架构。其他人可能有不同看法，参见post, at 26–27（反对意见），但谨慎

Court has exhibited before overruling Chevron may illus­ trate one of the reasons why the current Court has been slower to overrule precedents than some of its predecessors, see Part I–C, supra.

法院在推翻Chevron之前所表现出的谨慎可能说明了当前法院比某些前任法院更慢推翻先例的原因之一，参见上文第一部分–C。

None of this, of course, discharges any Member of this Court from the task of deciding for himself or herself today whether Chevron deference itself warrants deference. But when so many past and current judicial colleagues in this Court and across the country tell us our doctrine is mis­ guided, and when we ourselves managed without Chevron for centuries and manage to do so today, the humility at the core of stare decisis compels us to pause and reflect carefully on the wisdom embodied in that experience. And, in the end, to my mind the lessons of experience counsel wisely against continued reliance on Chevron’s stray and uncon­ sidered digression. This Court’s opinions fill over 500 vol­ umes, and perhaps “some printed judicial word may be found to support almost any plausible proposition.” R. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A. B. A. J. 334 (1944). It is not for us to pick and choose passages we happen to like and demand total obedience to them in per­ petuity. That would turn stare decisis from a doctrine of humility into a tool for judicial opportunism. Brown, 596 U. S., at 141.

当然，这一切都不能免除本法院任何成员今天为自己决定Chevron尊重本身是否值得尊重的任务。但当本法院和全国如此多过去和现在的司法同僚告诉我们我们的学说是错误的，并且当我们自己几个世纪以来没有Chevron也应付自如，今天也是如此，遵循先例核心的谦逊迫使我们停下来仔细反思那一经验中蕴含的智慧。而且，最终，在我看来，经验的教训明智地劝诫不要继续依赖Chevron的偏离和未经深思的离题。本法院的意见书填满了超过500卷，也许“可以找到一些印刷的司法文字来支持几乎任何看似合理的命题。”R. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A. B. A. J. 334 (1944)。我们不应挑选我们碰巧喜欢的段落并要求永远完全服从它们。那将把遵循先例从谦逊的学说变成司法机会主义的工具。Brown, 596 U. S., at 141。

III Proper respect for precedent helps “keep the scale of jus­ tice even and steady,” by reinforcing decisional rules con­ sistent with the law upon which all can rely. 1 Blackstone 69. But that respect does not require, nor does it readily tolerate, a steadfast refusal to correct mistakes. As early as 1810, this Court had already overruled one of its cases. See Hudson v. Guestier, 6 Cranch 281, 284 (overruling Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241 (1808)). In recent years, the Court may have overruled precedents less frequently than it did during the Warren and Burger Courts. See Part I–C, supra.

III 对先例的适当尊重有助于“保持正义的天平平稳”，通过强化与所有人可依赖的法律相一致的裁判规则。1 Blackstone 69。但这种尊重既不要求，也不轻易容忍，顽固拒绝纠正错误。早在1810年，本法院就已经推翻了自己的一个案件。参见Hudson v. Guestier, 6 Cranch 281, 284（推翻Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241 (1808)）。近年来，法院推翻先例的频率可能低于沃伦法院和伯格法院时期。参见上文第一部分–C。

But the job of reconsidering past decisions remains one every Member of this Court faces from time to time. 8

但重新考虑过去判决的工作仍然是本法院每位成员不时面临的任务。8

Justice William O. Douglas served longer on this Court than any other person in the Nation’s history. During his tenure, he observed how a new colleague might be inclined initially to “revere” every word written in an opinion issued before he arrived. W. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735, 736 (1949). But, over time, Justice Douglas re­ flected, his new colleague would “remembe[r] . . . that it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have put on it.” Ibid. And “[s]o he [would] com[e] to formulate his own views, re­ jecting some earlier ones as false and embracing others.” Ibid. This process of reexamination, Justice Douglas ex­ plained, is a “necessary consequence of our system” in which each judge takes an oath—both “personal” and bind­ ing—to discern the law’s meaning for himself and apply it faithfully in the cases that come before him. Id., at 736– 737.

威廉·O·道格拉斯大法官在本法院任职时间比国家历史上任何人都长。在他的任期内，他观察到一位新同事可能最初倾向于“崇敬”在他到任之前发布的意见中的每一个字。W. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735, 736 (1949)。但道格拉斯大法官反思道，随着时间的推移，他的新同事会“记得……他宣誓支持和捍卫的是宪法，而不是他的前任可能对宪法所作的注释。”同上。并且“[所以]他[会]逐渐形成自己的观点，拒绝一些早期的观点为错误并接受其他观点。”同上。道格拉斯大法官解释说，这种重新审查的过程是“我们制度的必然结果”，在这个制度中，每位法官都宣誓——既是“个人的”也是有约束力的——为自己辨别法律的含义，并在提交给他的案件中忠实地适用它。Id., at 736–737。

Justice Douglas saw, too, how appeals to precedent could be overstated and sometimes even overwrought. Judges, he reflected, would sometimes first issue “new and startling decision[s],” and then later spin around and “acquire an acute conservatism” in their aggressive defense of “their

道格拉斯大法官也看到，对先例的诉诸可能被夸大，有时甚至过度紧张。他反思道，法官们有时会首先发布“新的和令人吃惊的判决”，然后后来转而“获得一种敏锐的保守主义”，积极捍卫“他们的

new status quo.” Id., at 737. In that way, even the most novel and unlikely decisions became “coveted anchor- age[s],” defended heatedly, if ironically, under the banner of “stare decisis.” Ibid.; see also Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. 255, 294, n. 7 (2021) (GORSUCH, J., concurring).

新的现状。”Id., at 737。通过这种方式，即使是最新颖和最不可能的判决也变成了“令人垂涎的锚地”，在“遵循先例”的旗帜下被激烈地、如果讽刺地捍卫。同上；另见Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. 255, 294, n. 7 (2021)（GORSUCH大法官，协同意见）。

That is Chevron’s story: A revolution masquerading as the status quo. And the defense of it follows the same course Justice Douglas described. Though our dissenting colleagues have not hesitated to question other precedents in the past, they today manifest what Justice Douglas called an “acute conservatism” for Chevron’s “startling” de­ velopment, insisting that if this “coveted anchorage” is abandoned the heavens will fall. But the Nation managed to live with busy executive agencies of all sorts long before the Chevron revolution began to take shape in the mid­ 1980s. And all today’s decision means is that, going for­ ward, federal courts will do exactly as this Court has since 2016, exactly as it did before the mid-1980s, and exactly as it had done since the founding: resolve cases and controver­ sies without any systemic bias in the government’s favor.

这就是Chevron的故事：一场伪装成现状的革命。对其的辩护遵循道格拉斯大法官所描述的相同过程。尽管我们的反对派同僚过去毫不犹豫地质疑其他先例，但他们今天对Chevron的“惊人”发展表现出道格拉斯大法官所称的“敏锐的保守主义”，坚持认为如果这个“令人垂涎的锚地”被放弃，天就会塌下来。但在1980年代中期Chevron革命开始形成之前很久，国家就设法与各种繁忙的行政机构共存。而今天裁决的全部意义在于，今后，联邦法院将完全像本法院自2016年以来所做的那样，完全像1980年代中期之前所做的那样，完全像建国以来所做的那样：解决案件和争议，而不对政府有任何系统性的偏袒。

Proper respect for precedent does not begin to suggest otherwise. Instead, it counsels respect for the written law, adherence to consistent teachings over aberrations, and re­ sistance to the temptation of treating our own stray re­ marks as if they were statutes. And each of those lessons points toward the same conclusion today: Chevron defer­ ence is inconsistent with the directions Congress gave us in the APA. It represents a grave anomaly when viewed against the sweep of historic judicial practice. The decision undermines core rule-of-law values ranging from the prom­ ise of fair notice to the promise of a fair hearing. Even on its own terms, it has proved unworkable and operated to undermine rather than advance reliance interests, often to the detriment of ordinary Americans. And from the start, the whole project has relied on the overaggressive use of snippets and stray remarks from an opinion that carried

对先例的适当尊重并不开始表明相反。相反，它建议尊重成文法，坚持一致的教学而非异常，并抵制将我们自己的偏离言论视为法规的诱惑。而每一个教训今天都指向同一个结论：Chevron尊重与国会在APA中给我们的指示不一致。 与历史司法实践的总体相比，它代表了一个严重的异常。该裁决破坏了从公平通知的承诺到公平听证的承诺的核心法治价值。即使就其本身而言，它已被证明不可行，并且运作起来破坏而非促进依赖利益，往往损害普通美国人的利益。而且从一开始，整个工程就依赖于过度积极地使用一个意见中的片段和偏离言论，该意见承载了

mixed messages. Stare decisis’s true lesson today is not that we are bound to respect Chevron’s “startling develop­ ment,” but bound to inter it.

混杂的信息。遵循先例原则在今天真正的教训并非我们必须尊重Chevron案那“令人震惊的发展”，而是必须将其埋葬。

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES, ET AL., PETITIONERS 22–451 v. GINA RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES等， 申请人 22–451 诉 GINA RAIMONDO， 商务部长等

RELENTLESS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 22–1219 v. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

RELENTLESS, INC.等，申请人 22–1219 诉 商务部等

JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE JACKSON join,* dissenting.

KAGAN大法官，与SOTOMAYOR大法官和JACKSON大法官共同加入，* 持异议。

For 40 years, Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), has served as a cornerstone of administrative law, allocating responsibility for statutory construction between courts and agencies. Under Chevron, a court uses all its normal interpretive tools to determine whether Congress has spoken to an is­ sue. If the court finds Congress has done so, that is the end of the matter; the agency’s views make no difference. But if the court finds, at the end of its interpretive work, that

40年来，Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984)一直是行政法的基石，在法院和行政机关之间分配法定解释的责任。根据Chevron案，法院使用其所有正常的解释工具来确定国会是否已就某一问题表态。如果法院认定国会已表态，则此事到此为止；行政机关的意见无关紧要。但如果法院在解释工作结束时认定

Congress has left an ambiguity or gap, then a choice must be made. Who should give content to a statute when Con­ gress’s instructions have run out? Should it be a court? Or should it be the agency Congress has charged with admin­ istering the statute? The answer Chevron gives is that it should usually be the agency, within the bounds of reason­ ableness. That rule has formed the backdrop against which Congress, courts, and agencies—as well as regulated par­ ties and the public—all have operated for decades. It has been applied in thousands of judicial decisions. It has be­ come part of the warp and woof of modern government, sup­ porting regulatory efforts of all kinds—to name a few, keep­ ing air and water clean, food and drugs safe, and financial markets honest.

国会留下了歧义或空白，则必须作出选择。当国会的指示用尽时，谁应为法规赋予内容？应该是法院吗？还是应该是国会委托负责执行该法规的行政机关？Chevron案给出的答案是，通常应该是行政机关，在合理性的范围内。该规则数十年来构成了国会、法院和行政机关——以及受监管各方和公众——共同运作的背景。它已被适用于数千项司法裁决中。它已成为现代政府结构的一部分，支持各种监管努力——仅举几例，保持空气和水清洁、食品和药品安全、以及金融市场诚信。

And the rule is right. This Court has long understood Chevron deference to reflect what Congress would want, and so to be rooted in a presumption of legislative intent. Congress knows that it does not—in fact cannot—write per­ fectly complete regulatory statutes. It knows that those statutes will inevitably contain ambiguities that some other actor will have to resolve, and gaps that some other actor will have to fill. And it would usually prefer that actor to be the responsible agency, not a court. Some interpretive issues arising in the regulatory context involve scientific or technical subject matter. Agencies have expertise in those areas; courts do not. Some demand a detailed understand­ ing of complex and interdependent regulatory programs. Agencies know those programs inside-out; again, courts do not. And some present policy choices, including trade-offs between competing goods. Agencies report to a President, who in turn answers to the public for his policy calls; courts have no such accountability and no proper basis for making policy. And of course Congress has conferred on that ex­ pert, experienced, and politically accountable agency the authority to administer—to make rules about and other­ wise implement—the statute giving rise to the ambiguity or

而且该规则是正确的。本法院长期以来一直将Chevron尊重理解为反映国会所愿，因而植根于立法意图的推定。国会知道它不会——事实上不能——写出完美完整的监管法规。它知道这些法规将不可避免地包含歧义，须由其他行为者解决，以及空白，须由其他行为者填补。而且它通常更希望该行为者是负责的行政机关，而非法院。监管背景下产生的一些解释问题涉及科学或技术主题。行政机关在这些领域具有专业知识；法院则没有。有些问题需要对复杂且相互依存的监管项目有详细理解。行政机关对这些项目了如指掌；同样，法院则不然。还有些问题呈现政策选择，包括相互竞争的善之间的权衡。行政机关向总统负责，总统又就其政策决定向公众负责；法院没有这种问责性，也没有制定政策的适当基础。当然，国会已将该专家性、经验丰富且政治上负责的行政机关授予管理——制定规则以及以其他方式实施——产生歧义或

gap. Put all that together and deference to the agency is the almost obvious choice, based on an implicit congres­ sional delegation of interpretive authority. We defer, the Court has explained, “because of a presumption that Con­ gress” would have “desired the agency (rather than the courts)” to exercise “whatever degree of discretion” the stat­ ute allows. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 740–741 (1996).

空白的法规的权力。将所有这些结合起来，对行政机关的尊重几乎是显而易见的选择，基于隐含的国会解释权委托。本法院解释说，我们予以尊重，“因为存在一项推定，即国会”会“希望行政机关（而非法院）”行使法规所允许的“任何程度的自由裁量权”。Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 740–741 (1996)。

Today, the Court flips the script: It is now “the courts (ra­ ther than the agency)” that will wield power when Congress has left an area of interpretive discretion. A rule of judicial humility gives way to a rule of judicial hubris. In recent years, this Court has too often taken for itself decision-mak­ ing authority Congress assigned to agencies. The Court has substituted its own judgment on workplace health for that of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; its own judgment on climate change for that of the Environ­ mental Protection Agency; and its own judgment on student loans for that of the Department of Education. See, e.g., National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109 (2022); West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697 (2022); Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477 (2023). But evidently that was, for this Court, all too piecemeal. In one fell swoop, the majority today gives itself exclusive power over every open issue—no matter how expertise-driven or policy-laden—in­ volving the meaning of regulatory law. As if it did not have enough on its plate, the majority turns itself into the coun­ try’s administrative czar. It defends that move as one (sud­ denly) required by the (nearly 80-year-old) Administrative Procedure Act. But the Act makes no such demand. To­ day’s decision is not one Congress directed. It is entirely the majority’s choice.

今天，本法院翻转了剧本：现在当国会留下解释自由裁量领域时，将是“法院（而非行政机关）”行使权力。司法谦抑的规则让位于司法傲慢的规则。近年来，本法院过于频繁地将国会分配给行政机关的决策权据为己有。本法院以自己对工作场所健康的判断取代了职业安全与健康管理局的判断；以自己对气候变化的判断取代了环境保护局的判断；以自己对学生贷款的判断取代了教育部的判断。参见，例如，National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109 (2022); West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697 (2022); Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477 (2023)。但显然，对本法院来说，那都太过零碎了。今天，多数意见一举将涉及监管法律含义的每一个未决问题——无论多么专业驱动或充满政策——的专属权力赋予自己。仿佛它盘子里的东西还不够多，多数意见将自己变成了该国的行政沙皇。它辩称这一举动是（突然）由（近80年历史的）《行政程序法》所要求的。但该法并未提出此类要求。今天的裁决不是国会所指示的。它完全是多数意见的选择。

And the majority cannot destroy one doctrine of judicial humility without making a laughing-stock of a second. (If opinions had titles, a good candidate for today’s would be Hubris Squared.) Stare decisis is, among other things, a

而且多数意见不能在不使第二个原则成为笑柄的情况下摧毁一个司法谦抑原则。（如果意见有标题，今天的一个好候选标题将是《傲慢的平方》。）遵循先例原则，除其他事项外，是一种

way to remind judges that wisdom often lies in what prior judges have done. It is a brake on the urge to convert “every new judge’s opinion” into a new legal rule or regime. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U. S. 215, 388 (2022) (joint opinion of Breyer, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting) (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Com­ mentaries on the Laws of England 69 (7th ed. 1775)). Chev­ ron is entrenched precedent, entitled to the protection of stare decisis, as even the majority acknowledges. In fact, Chevron is entitled to the supercharged version of that doc­ trine because Congress could always overrule the decision, and because so many governmental and private actors have relied on it for so long. Because that is so, the majority needs a “particularly special justification” for its action. Ki­ sor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. 558, 588 (2019) (opinion of the Court). But the majority has nothing that would qualify. It barely tries to advance the usual factors this Court invokes for overruling precedent. Its justification comes down, in the end, to this: Courts must have more say over regula­ tion—over the provision of health care, the protection of the environment, the safety of consumer products, the efficacy of transportation systems, and so on. A longstanding prec­ edent at the crux of administrative governance thus falls victim to a bald assertion of judicial authority. The major­ ity disdains restraint, and grasps for power.

提醒法官智慧往往在于前任法官所做之事的方式。它是对将“每一位新法官的意见”转化为新法律规则或制度的冲动的制动。Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U. S. 215, 388 (2022)（Breyer、SOTOMAYOR和KAGAN大法官共同异议意见）（引用1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 69 (7th ed. 1775)）。Chevron案是根深蒂固的先例，有权获得遵循先例原则的保护，正如多数意见也承认的那样。事实上，Chevron案有权获得该原则的加强版本，因为国会始终可以推翻该裁决，而且如此多的政府和私人行为者长期以来一直依赖它。正因为如此，多数意见需要为其行动提供“特别特殊的理由”。Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. 558, 588 (2019)（法院意见）。但多数意见没有任何合格的理由。它几乎未尝试推进本法院为推翻先例而援引的通常因素。其理由最终归结为：法院必须对监管——对医疗保健的提供、环境的保护、消费品的安全、交通系统的效能等等——有更多发言权。因此，处于行政治理核心的长期先例沦为司法权威的赤裸裸主张的牺牲品。多数意见蔑视克制，攫取权力。

I Begin with the problem that gave rise to Chevron (and also to its older precursors): The regulatory statutes Con­ gress passes often contain ambiguities and gaps. Some­ times they are intentional. Perhaps Congress “consciously desired” the administering agency to fill in aspects of the legislative scheme, believing that regulatory experts would be “in a better position” than legislators to do so. Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865. Or “perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side” of a question, and the contending

I 从产生Chevron案（以及其更早的前身）的问题开始：国会通过的监管法规往往包含歧义和空白。有时它们是有意的。也许国会“有意识地希望”执行机关填补立法方案的某些方面，认为监管专家比立法者“处于更好的位置”来这样做。Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865。或者“也许国会无法就某一问题的任何一方形成联盟”，而争论的

parties “decided to take their chances with” the agency’s resolution. Ibid. Sometimes, though, the gaps or ambigui­ ties are what might be thought of as predictable accidents. They may be the result of sloppy drafting, a not infrequent legislative occurrence. Or they may arise from the well- known limits of language or foresight. Accord, ante, at 7, 22. “The subject matter” of a statutory provision may be too “specialized and varying” to “capture in its every detail.” Kisor, 588 U. S., at 566 (plurality opinion). Or the provision may give rise, years or decades down the road, to an issue the enacting Congress could not have anticipated. Which­ ever the case—whatever the reason—the result is to create uncertainty about some aspect of a provision’s meaning.

各方“决定碰碰运气”，交由行政机关解决。同上。然而，有时空白或歧义可能是可预见的事故。它们可能是草率起草的结果，这是立法中并不罕见的现象。或者它们可能源于语言或预见力的众所周知局限。参见，前文，第7、22页。“法定条款的”“主题事项”可能过于“专业化和多变”，以至于无法“捕捉其每一个细节”。Kisor, 588 U. S., at 566（复数意见）。或者该条款可能在数年或数十年后引发制定该法的国会无法预见的问题。无论哪种情况——无论原因如何——结果都是对条款含义的某些方面产生不确定性。

Consider a few examples from the caselaw. They will help show what a typical Chevron question looks like—or really, what a typical Chevron question is. Because when choosing whether to send some class of questions mainly to a court, or mainly to an agency, abstract analysis can only go so far; indeed, it may obscure what matters most. So I begin with the concrete:

考虑判例法中的几个例子。它们将有助于展示典型的Chevron问题是什么样子——或者说，典型的Chevron问题实际上是什么。因为在选择是否将某类问题主要交给法院，还是主要交给行政机关时，抽象分析只能走到这一步；事实上，它可能掩盖最重要的事情。因此我从具体例子开始：

 Under the Public Health Service Act, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates “biological prod- uct[s],” including “protein[s].” 42 U. S. C. §262(i)(1). When does an alpha amino acid polymer qualify as such a “protein”? Must it have a specific, defined se­ quence of amino acids? See Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. FDA, 514 F. Supp. 3d 66, 79–80, 93–106 (DC 2020).

根据《公共卫生服务法》，食品和药物管理局（FDA）监管“生物制品”，包括“蛋白质”。42 U. S. C. §262(i)(1)。α-氨基酸聚合物何时有资格作为此类“蛋白质”？它必须具有特定、确定的氨基酸序列吗？参见Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. FDA, 514 F. Supp. 3d 66, 79–80, 93–106 (DC 2020)。

 Under the Endangered Species Act, the Fish and Wild­

根据《濒危物种法》，鱼类和野

life Service must designate endangered “vertebrate fish or wildlife” species, including “distinct population seg­ ment[s]” of those species. 16 U. S. C. §1532(16); see §1533. What makes one population segment “distinct” from another? Must the Service treat the Washington State population of western gray squirrels as “distinct”

生动物管理局必须指定濒危的“脊椎鱼类或野生动物”物种，包括这些物种的“独特种群片段”。16 U. S. C. §1532(16)；参见§1533。是什么使一个种群片段与另一个“独特”？管理局是否必须将华盛顿州西部灰松鼠种群视为“独特”

because it is geographically separated from other west­ ern gray squirrels? Or can the Service take into ac­ count that the genetic makeup of the Washington pop­ ulation does not differ markedly from the rest? See Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 475 F. 3d 1136, 1140–1145, 1149 (CA9 2007).

因为它在地理上与其他西部灰松鼠隔离？还是管理局可以考虑华盛顿种群的基因构成与其余种群没有显著差异？参见Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 475 F. 3d 1136, 1140–1145, 1149 (CA9 2007)。

 Under the Medicare program, reimbursements to hos­

根据联邦医疗保险计划，向医院

pitals are adjusted to reflect “differences in hospital wage levels” across “geographic area[s].” 42 U. S. C. §1395ww(d)(3)(E)(i). How should the Department of Health and Human Services measure a “geographic area”? By city? By county? By metropolitan area? See Bellevue Hospital Center v. Leavitt, 443 F. 3d 163, 174– 176 (CA2 2006).

医院资本经过调整，以反映跨“地理区域”的“医院工资水平差异”。42 U. S. C. §1395ww(d)(3)(E)(i)。卫生与公众服务部应如何衡量“地理区域”？按城市？按县？按大都市区？见Bellevue Hospital Center v. Leavitt, 443 F. 3d 163, 174–176 (CA2 2006)。

 Congress directed the Department of the Interior and the Federal Aviation Administration to reduce noise from aircraft flying over Grand Canyon National Park—specifically, to “provide for substantial restora­ tion of the natural quiet.” §3(b)(1), 101 Stat. 676; see §3(b)(2). How much noise is consistent with “the natu­ ral quiet”? And how much of the park, for how many hours a day, must be that quiet for the “substantial res­ toration” requirement to be met? See Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F. 3d 455, 466–467, 474–475 (CADC 1998).

国会指示内政部和联邦航空管理局减少飞越科罗拉多大峡谷国家公园的飞机噪音——具体而言，是“为自然宁静的实质性恢复作出规定”。§3(b)(1), 101 Stat. 676；见§3(b)(2)。多少噪音才符合“自然宁静”？公园的多少面积、每天多少小时，必须保持这种宁静，才能满足“实质性恢复”的要求？见Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F. 3d 455, 466–467, 474–475 (CADC 1998)。

 Or take Chevron itself. In amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress told States to require permits for modifying or constructing “stationary sources” of air pollution. 42 U. S. C. §7502(c)(5). Does the term “sta­ tionary source[]” refer to each pollution-emitting piece of equipment within a plant? Or does it refer to the entire plant, and thus allow escape from the permitting requirement when increased emissions from one piece of equipment are offset by reductions from another? See 467 U. S., at 857, 859.

或者以Chevron案本身为例。在《清洁空气法》修正案中，国会要求各州对改造或建造空气污染“固定源”实行许可。42 U. S. C. §7502(c)(5)。“固定源[]”一词是指工厂内每一台排放污染的设备？还是指整个工厂，从而当一台设备的排放增加被另一台设备的减排所抵消时，可以逃避许可要求？见467 U. S., at 857, 859。

In each case, a statutory phrase has more than one reason­ able reading. And Congress has not chosen among them: It has not, in any real-world sense, “fixed” the “single, best meaning” at “the time of enactment” (to use the majority’s phrase). Ante, at 22. A question thus arises: Who decides which of the possible readings should govern?

在每一个案件中，一个法定短语都有不止一种合理的解读。而国会并未在其中作出选择：它没有在“现实意义上”于“颁布之时”“固定”下“唯一、最佳的含义”（用多数意见的措辞）。Ante, at 22。于是产生一个问题：谁来决定哪一种可能的解读应当适用？

This Court has long thought that the choice should usu­ ally fall to agencies, with courts broadly deferring to their judgments. For the last 40 years, that doctrine has gone by the name of Chevron deference, after the 1984 decision that formalized and canonized it. In Chevron, the Court set out a simple two-part framework for reviewing an agency’s in­ terpretation of a statute that it administers. First, the re­ viewing court must determine whether Congress has “di­ rectly spoken to the precise question at issue.” 467 U. S., at 842. That inquiry is rigorous: A court must exhaust all the “traditional tools of statutory construction” to divine statu­ tory meaning. Id., at 843, n. 9. And when it can find that meaning—a “single right answer”—that is “the end of the matter”: The court cannot defer because it “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Kisor, 588 U. S., at 575 (opinion of the Court); Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842–843. But if the court, after using its whole legal toolkit, concludes that “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” in dispute—for any of the not-uncommon reasons discussed above—then the court must cede the primary interpretive role. Ibid.; see supra, at 4–5. At that second step, the court asks only whether the agency construction is within the sphere of “reasonable” readings. Chevron, 467 U. S., at 844. If it is, the agency’s interpretation of the statute that it every day implements will control.

本法院长期以来认为，这一选择通常应归于行政机关，法院则广泛尊重其判断。过去40年来，这一原则被称为Chevron遵从，得名于1984年将其正式化并奉为经典的判决。在Chevron案中，法院为审查行政机关对其所执行法律的解释设定了一个简单的两步框架。首先，审查法院必须确定国会是否“已就所涉确切问题直接表态”。467 U. S., at 842。这一探究是严格的：法院必须穷尽所有“传统法律解释工具”以探明法定含义。Id., at 843, n. 9。而当法院能够找到该含义——一个“唯一正确答案”——那便是“事情的终结”：法院不能遵从，因为它“必须使国会明确表达的意图生效”。Kisor, 588 U. S., at 575 (opinion of the Court)；Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842–843。但如果法院在使用其全部法律工具包之后，得出结论认为“该法律就争议的具体问题保持沉默或存在歧义”——出于上文讨论的任何并非不常见的原因——那么法院必须让出首要解释角色。Ibid.；见supra, at 4–5。在第二步，法院只问行政机关的建构是否处于“合理”解读的范围之内。Chevron, 467 U. S., at 844。如果是，则行政机关对其日常执行的法律的解释将起支配作用。

That rule, the Court has long explained, rests on a pre­ sumption about legislative intent—about what Congress wants when a statute it has charged an agency with imple­ menting contains an ambiguity or a gap. See id., at 843–

法院长期以来解释说，该规则基于一种关于立法意图的推定——即当国会委托行政机关执行的法律包含歧义或空白时，国会想要什么。见id., at 843–

845; Smiley, 517 U. S., at 740–741. An enacting Congress, as noted above, knows those uncertainties will arise, even if it does not know what they will turn out to be. See supra, at 4–5. And every once in a while, Congress provides an explicit instruction for dealing with that contingency—as­ signing primary responsibility to the courts, or else to an agency. But much more often, Congress does not say. Thus arises the need for a presumption—really, a default rule— for what should happen in that event. Does a statutory si­ lence or ambiguity then go to a court for resolution? Or to an agency? This Court has long thought Congress would choose an agency, with courts serving only as a backstop to make sure the agency makes a reasonable choice among the possible readings. Or said otherwise, Congress would select the agency it has put in control of a regulatory scheme to exercise the “degree of discretion” that the statute’s lack of clarity or completeness allows. Smiley, 517 U. S., at 741. Of course, Congress can always refute that presumptive choice—can say that, really, it would prefer courts to wield that discretionary power. But until then, the presumption cuts in the agency’s favor. 1 The next question is why.

845；Smiley, 517 U. S., at 740–741。如上所述，颁布法律的国会知道这些不确定性会出现，即使它不知道它们最终会是什么。见supra, at 4–5。而国会偶尔会针对这种或有情况提供明确指示——将首要责任分配给法院，或者分配给行政机关。但更多时候，国会并不明说。于是就需要一种推定——实际上是一种默认规则——来规定在这种情况下应当发生什么。法定的沉默或歧义是交由法院解决？还是交由行政机关？本法院长期以来认为国会会选择行政机关，法院仅作为后备，确保行政机关在可能的解读中作出合理选择。换言之，国会会选择其已置于监管体系控制之下的行政机关，来行使法律的不清晰或不完整所允许的“自由裁量程度”。Smiley, 517 U. S., at 741。当然，国会始终可以推翻这一推定选择——可以说，实际上它更希望由法院来行使该自由裁量权。但在那之前，推定有利于行政机关。1 下一个问题是为什么。

For one, because agencies often know things about a stat­ ute’s subject matter that courts could not hope to. The point is especially stark when the statute is of a “scientific or technical nature.” Kisor, 588 U. S., at 571 (plurality opin­ ion). Agencies are staffed with “experts in the field” who can bring their training and knowledge to bear on open stat­ utory questions. Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865. Consider, for example, the first bulleted case above. When does an alpha amino acid polymer qualify as a “protein”? See supra, at 5. I don’t know many judges who would feel confident resolv­ ing that issue. (First question: What even is an alpha amino acid polymer?) But the FDA likely has scores of sci­ entists on staff who can think intelligently about it, maybe collaborate with each other on its finer points, and arrive at a sensible answer. Or take the perhaps more accessible- sounding second case, involving the Endangered Species Act. See supra, at 5–6. Deciding when one squirrel popu­ lation is “distinct” from another (and thus warrants protec­ tion) requires knowing about species more than it does con­ sulting a dictionary. How much variation of what kind— geographic, genetic, morphological, or behavioral—should be required? A court could, if forced to, muddle through that issue and announce a result. But wouldn’t the Fish and Wildlife Service, with all its specialized expertise, do a better job of the task—of saying what, in the context of spe­ cies protection, the open-ended term “distinct” means? One idea behind the Chevron presumption is that Congress—

其一，因为行政机关往往了解有关法律主题的事项，而法院无法企及。当法律具有“科学或技术性质”时，这一点尤为明显。Kisor, 588 U. S., at 571 (plurality opinion)。行政机关配备有“该领域的专家”，他们能够将自己的训练和知识运用于开放的法定问题。Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865。例如，考虑上面第一个项目符号案件。α-氨基酸聚合物何时有资格作为“蛋白质”？见supra, at 5。我不认识多少法官会有信心解决该问题。（第一个问题：α-氨基酸聚合物到底是什么？）但FDA很可能有数十名科学家在编，他们能够对此进行明智思考，也许就细节相互协作，并得出一个合理的答案。或者以听起来或许更易理解的第二个案件为例，涉及《濒危物种法》。见supra, at 5–6。判定一个松鼠种群何时与另一个“不同”（从而值得保护），需要的是关于物种的知识，而不是查阅字典。应要求何种、多少变异——地理的、遗传的、形态的或行为的？法院如果被迫，也可以勉强处理该问题并宣布一个结果。但鱼类和野生动物管理局凭借其全部专业专长，难道不会把这项任务——说出在物种保护语境下，开放式术语“不同”意味着什么——做得更好吗？Chevron推定背后的一个理念是，国会——

the same Congress that charged the Service with imple­ menting the Act—would answer that question with a re­ sounding “yes.”

——委托该局执行该法的同一个国会——会以响亮的“是”回答该问题。

A second idea is that Congress would value the agency’s experience with how a complex regulatory regime func­ tions, and with what is needed to make it effective. Let’s stick with squirrels for a moment, except broaden the lens. In construing a term like “distinct” in a case about squir­ rels, the Service likely would benefit from its “historical fa­ miliarity” with how the term has covered the population segments of other species. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144, 153 (1991); see, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F. 3d 1053, 1060–1062 (CA9 2018) (arctic grayling); Center for Biologi­ cal Diversity v. Zinke, 868 F. 3d 1054, 1056 (CA9 2017) (de­ sert eagle). Just as a common-law court makes better deci­ sions as it sees multiple variations on a theme, an agency’s construction of a statutory term benefits from its unique ex­ posure to all the related ways the term comes into play. Or consider, for another way regulatory familiarity matters, the example about adjusting Medicare reimbursement for geographic wage differences. See supra, at 6. According to a dictionary, the term “geographic area” could be as large as a multi-state region or as small as a census tract. How to choose? It would make sense to gather hard information about what reimbursement levels each approach will pro­ duce, to explore the ease of administering each on a nation­ wide basis, to survey how regulators have dealt with simi­ lar questions in the past, and to confer with the hospitals themselves about what makes sense. See Kisor, 588 U. S., at 571 (plurality opinion) (noting that agencies are able to “conduct factual investigations” and “consult with affected parties”). Congress knows the Department of Health and Human Services can do all those things—and that courts cannot. Still more, Chevron’s presumption reflects that resolving

第二个理念是，国会会重视行政机关关于复杂监管体系如何运作以及需要什么才能使其有效的经验。让我们暂时继续谈松鼠，但把镜头放宽。在关于松鼠的案件中解释“不同”这样的术语时，该局很可能受益于其对该术语如何涵盖其他物种种群片段的“历史熟悉度”。Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144, 153 (1991)；见，例如，Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F. 3d 1053, 1060–1062 (CA9 2018)（北极茴鱼）；Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 868 F. 3d 1054, 1056 (CA9 2017)（沙漠鹰）。正如普通法法院在见到同一主题的多种变体时作出更好的裁判，行政机关对法定术语的建构也受益于其对该术语所有相关适用方式的独特接触。或者，作为监管熟悉度重要的另一种方式，考虑关于调整医疗保险报销以反映地理工资差异的例子。见supra, at 6。根据字典，“地理区域”一词可以大到多州区域，也可以小到人口普查区。如何选择？合理的做法是收集关于每种方法将产生何种报销水平的硬信息，探究在全国范围内实施每种方法的难易程度，调查监管者过去如何处理类似问题，并与医院本身协商什么合理。见Kisor, 588 U. S., at 571 (plurality opinion)（指出行政机关能够“进行事实调查”并“咨询受影响各方”）。国会知道卫生与公众服务部能做所有这些事情——而法院不能。 更进一步，Chevron的推定反映了解决

statutory ambiguities, as Congress well knows, is “often more a question of policy than of law.” Pauley v. BethEn­ ergy Mines, Inc., 501 U. S. 680, 696 (1991). The task is less one of construing a text than of balancing competing goals and values. Consider the statutory directive to achieve “substantial restoration of the [Grand Canyon’s] natural quiet.” See supra, at 6. Someone is going to have to decide exactly what that statute means for air traffic over the can­ yon. How many flights, in what places and at what times, are consistent with restoring enough natural quiet on the ground? That is a policy trade-off of a kind familiar to agen­ cies—but peculiarly unsuited to judges. Or consider Chev­ ron itself. As the Court there understood, the choice be­ tween defining a “stationary source” as a whole plant or as a pollution-emitting device is a choice about how to “recon­ cile” two “manifestly competing interests.” 467 U. S., at 865. The plantwide definition relaxes the permitting re­ quirement in the interest of promoting economic growth; the device-specific definition strengthens that requirement to better reduce air pollution. See id., at 851, 863, 866. Again, that is a choice a judge should not be making, but one an agency properly can. Agencies are “subject to the supervision of the President, who in turn answers to the public.” Kisor, 588 U. S., at 571–572 (plurality opinion). So when faced with a statutory ambiguity, “an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities” may rely on an accountable actor’s “views of wise policy to inform its judgments.” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865.

正如国会深知的那样，法定模糊性“往往更多是政策问题而非法律问题”。Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U. S. 680, 696 (1991)。这项任务与其说是解释文本，不如说是平衡相互竞争的目标和价值。试想实现“大幅恢复[大峡谷]自然宁静”的法定指令。见上文第6页。总得有人来决定该法规对峡谷上空空中交通的确切含义。多少架次航班、在什么地点和什么时间，才与恢复地面足够的自然宁静相一致？这是一种机构所熟悉的政策权衡——但特别不适合法官来做。或者想想Chevron案本身。正如该院在那里所理解的，将“固定源”定义为整个工厂还是定义为污染排放装置，是关于如何“调和”两种“明显相互竞争的利益”的选择。467 U. S., at 865。全厂定义为了促进经济增长而放宽许可要求；装置特定定义则加强该要求以更好地减少空气污染。见同上，第851、863、866页。这同样是一个法官不应做出的选择，但机构可以适当地做出。机构“受总统监督，而总统又对公众负责”。Kisor, 588 U. S., at 571–572（复数意见）。因此，当面对法定模糊性时，“国会已授予政策制定职责的机构”可以依赖一位可问责行为者的“明智政策观点来为其判断提供依据”。Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865。

None of this is to say that deference to agencies is always appropriate. The Court over time has fine-tuned the Chev­ ron regime to deny deference in classes of cases in which Congress has no reason to prefer an agency to a court. The majority treats those “refinements” as a flaw in the scheme, ante, at 27, but they are anything but. Consider the rule that an agency gets no deference when construing a statute it is not responsible for administering. See Epic Systems

这一切并不是说对机构的遵从总是适当的。该院多年来已对Chevron制度进行了微调，在国会没有理由偏好机构而非法院的各类案件中拒绝给予遵从。多数意见将这些“微调”视为该制度的一个缺陷，见上文第27页，但它们绝非如此。试想这样一条规则：机构在解释其不负责执行的法规时得不到遵从。见Epic Systems

Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 497, 519–520 (2018). Well, of course not—if Congress has not put an agency in charge of implementing a statute, Congress would not have given the agency a special role in its construction. Or take the rule that an agency will not receive deference if it has reached its decision without using—or without using properly—its rulemaking or adjudicatory authority. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 226–227 (2001); Encino Motor­ cars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. 211, 220 (2016). Again, that should not be surprising: Congress expects that authorita­ tive pronouncements on a law’s meaning will come from the procedures it has enacted to foster “fairness and delibera­ tion” in agency decision-making. Mead, 533 U. S., at 230. Or finally, think of the “extraordinary cases” involving questions of vast “economic and political significance” in which the Court has declined to defer. King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 485–486 (2015). The theory is that Congress would not have left matters of such import to an agency, but would instead have insisted on maintaining control. So the Chevron refinements proceed from the same place as the original doctrine. Taken together, they give interpretive primacy to the agency when—but only when—it is acting, as Congress specified, in the heartland of its delegated au­ thority.

Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 497, 519–520 (2018)。嗯，当然不是——如果国会没有让某个机构负责实施某部法规，国会就不会赋予该机构在其解释中的特殊角色。或者拿这样一条规则来说：如果机构在未使用——或未适当使用——其规则制定或裁决权的情况下作出决定，则不会获得遵从。见United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 226–227 (2001); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. 211, 220 (2016)。这同样不应令人惊讶：国会期望关于法律含义的权威性宣告将来自其为促进机构决策中的“公平与审议”而制定的程序。Mead, 533 U. S., at 230。或者最后，想想涉及具有巨大“经济和政治意义”问题的“特殊案件”，该院在这些案件中拒绝给予遵从。King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 485–486 (2015)。其理论是，国会不会将如此重要的事项留给机构，而会坚持保持控制。因此，Chevron的微调与原始学说起源于同一处。合在一起，它们在机构——但仅在机构——如国会所规定的那样在其被授权权限的核心地带行事时，赋予机构解释优先权。

That carefully calibrated framework “reflects a sensitiv­ ity to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches.” Pauley, 501 U. S., at 696. Where Congress has spoken, Con­ gress has spoken; only its judgments matter. And courts alone determine when that has happened: Using all their normal interpretive tools, they decide whether Congress has addressed a given issue. But when courts have decided that Congress has not done so, a choice arises. Absent a legislative directive, either the administering agency or a court must take the lead. And the matter is more fit for the agency. The decision is likely to involve the agency’s sub­ ject-matter expertise; to fall within its sphere of regulatory

这一精心校准的框架“反映了对政治分支和司法分支适当角色的敏感”。Pauley, 501 U. S., at 696。在国会已发言之处，就是国会已发言；只有其判断才重要。而只有法院确定这种情况何时发生：运用其所有正常的解释工具，它们裁定国会是否已处理某一特定问题。但当法院裁定国会未这样做时，就出现了一个选择。在缺乏立法指令的情况下，要么由执行机构、要么由法院来牵头。而该事项更适合由机构处理。该决定很可能涉及机构的主题事项专长；属于其监管

experience; and to involve policy choices, including cost- benefit assessments and trade-offs between conflicting val­ ues. So a court without relevant expertise or experience, and without warrant to make policy calls, appropriately steps back. The court still has a role to play: It polices the agency to ensure that it acts within the zone of reasonable options. But the court does not insert itself into an agency’s expertise-driven, policy-laden functions. That is the ar­ rangement best suited to keep every actor in its proper lane. And it is the one best suited to ensure that Congress’s stat­ utes work in the way Congress intended.

经验的范畴；并涉及政策选择，包括成本效益评估以及相互冲突价值之间的权衡。因此，一个没有相关专长或经验、也没有作出政策决定授权的法院，适当地退后一步。法院仍可发挥作用：它监督机构以确保其在合理选项的范围内行事。但法院不会将自己插入机构由专长驱动、充满政策的职能之中。那是最适合让每个行为者各守其位的安排。也是最适合确保国会法规以国会意图的方式运作的安排。

The majority makes two points in reply, neither convinc­ ing. First, it insists that “agencies have no special compe­ tence” in filling gaps or resolving ambiguities in regulatory statutes; rather, “[c]ourts do.” Ante, at 23. Score one for self-confidence; maybe not so high for self-reflection or -knowledge. Of course courts often construe legal texts, hopefully well. And Chevron’s first step takes full ad­ vantage of that talent: There, a court tries to divine what Congress meant, even in the most complicated or abstruse statutory schemes. The deference comes in only if the court cannot do so—if the court must admit that standard legal tools will not avail to fill a statutory silence or give content to an ambiguous term. That is when the issues look like the ones I started off with: When does an alpha amino acid polymer qualify as a “protein”? How distinct is “distinct” for squirrel populations? What size “geographic area” will ensure appropriate hospital reimbursement? As between two equally feasible understandings of “stationary source,” should one choose the one more protective of the environ­ ment or the one more favorable to economic growth? The idea that courts have “special competence” in deciding such questions whereas agencies have “no[ne]” is, if I may say, malarkey. Answering those questions right does not mainly demand the interpretive skills courts possess. In­ stead, it demands one or more of: subject-matter expertise,

多数意见在答复中提出两点，都不令人信服。第一，它坚称“机构在填补监管法规的空白或解决其模糊性方面没有特殊能力”；相反，“[法]院有”。见上文第23页。自信得一分；也许自我反思或自我认识就没那么高分了。当然，法院经常解释法律文本，但愿解释得好。而Chevron的第一步充分利用了这种才能：在那里，法院试图推断国会的意思，即使是在最复杂或最深奥的法定方案中。只有当法院无法做到时——当法院必须承认标准法律工具无法填补法定沉默或赋予模糊术语以内容时——才会出现遵从。那时问题就像我一开始提出的那些：α-氨基酸聚合物何时符合“蛋白质”的资格？对于松鼠种群，“独特”有多独特？多大的“地理区域”才能确保适当的医院报销？在对“固定源”两种同样可行的理解之间，应当选择更保护环境的那一种，还是更有利于经济增长的那一种？认为法院在裁决此类问题上有“特殊能力”而机构“没有”的想法，如果我可以这么说的话，是胡扯。正确回答这些问题主要并不需要法院所拥有的解释技能。相反，它需要以下一项或多项：主题事项专长、

long engagement with a regulatory scheme, and policy choice. It is courts (not agencies) that “have no special com­ petence”—or even legitimacy—when those are the things a decision calls for.

对监管方案的长期参与，以及政策选择。当一项决定需要这些东西时，“没有特殊能力”——甚至没有正当性——的是法院（而非机构）。

Second, the majority complains that an ambiguity or gap does not “necessarily reflect a congressional intent that an agency” should have primary interpretive authority. Ante, at 22. On that score, I’ll agree with the premise: It doesn’t “necessarily” do so. Chevron is built on a presumption. The decision does not maintain that Congress in every case wants the agency, rather than a court, to fill in gaps. The decision maintains that when Congress does not expressly pick one or the other, we need a default rule; and the best default rule—agency or court?—is the one we think Con­ gress would generally want. As to why Congress would gen­ erally want the agency: The answer lies in everything said above about Congress’s delegation of regulatory power to the agency and the agency’s special competencies. See su­ pra, at 9–11. The majority appears to think it is a show- stopping rejoinder to note that many statutory gaps and ambiguities are “unintentional.” Ante, at 22. But to begin, many are not; the ratio between the two is uncertain. See supra, at 4–5. And to end, why should that matter in any event? Congress may not have deliberately introduced a gap or ambiguity into the statute; but it knows that pretty much everything it drafts will someday be found to contain such a “flaw.” Given that knowledge, Chevron asks, what would Congress want? The presumed answer is again the same (for the same reasons): The agency. And as with any default rule, if Congress decides otherwise, all it need do is say.

第二，多数意见抱怨说，模糊性或空白并不“必然反映国会意图由机构”拥有主要解释权。见上文第22页。在这一点上，我同意这个前提：它并不“必然”如此。Chevron建立在一种推定之上。该决定并不主张国会在每个案件中都希望由机构而非法院来填补空白。该决定主张，当国会没有明确选择其中之一时，我们需要一条默认规则；而最佳的默认规则——机构还是法院？——是我们认为国会一般会想要的那一条。至于为什么国会一般会想要机构：答案在于上文关于国会将监管权力授予机构以及机构特殊能力的所有论述。见上文第9–11页。多数意见似乎认为，指出许多法定空白和模糊性是“无意的”就是一个决定性的反驳。见上文第22页。但首先，许多并非无意；两者之间的比例并不确定。见上文第4–5页。最后，这无论如何为什么重要？国会可能并非故意将空白或模糊性引入法规；但它知道它起草的几乎一切有朝一日都会被认定含有这样的“缺陷”。鉴于这种认识，Chevron问，国会会想要什么？推定的答案再次相同（出于相同理由）：机构。而如同任何默认规则一样，如果国会另有决定，它只需说出来即可。

In that respect, the proof really is in the pudding: Con­ gress basically never says otherwise, suggesting that Chev­ ron chose the presumption aligning with legislative intent (or, in the majority’s words, “approximat[ing] reality,” ante, at 22). Over the last four decades, Congress has authorized

在这方面，证据确实在于布丁之中：国会基本上从未另有表示，这表明Chevron选择了与立法意图相一致的推定（或者，用多数意见的话说，“近似现实”，见上文第22页）。在过去四十年里，国会已授权

or reauthorized hundreds of statutes. The drafters of those statutes knew all about Chevron. See A. Gluck & L. Bress­ man, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An Empir­ ical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 928 (fig. 2), 994 (2013). So if they had wanted a different assignment of interpretive responsibility, they would have inserted a provision to that effect. With just a pair of exceptions I know of, they did not. See 12 U. S. C. §25b(b)(5)(A) (exception #1); 15 U. S. C. §8302(c)(3)(A) (exception #2). Similarly, Congress has de­ clined to enact proposed legislation that would abolish Chevron across the board. See S. 909, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (2019) (still a bill, not a law); H. R. 5, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., §202 (2017) (same). So to the extent the majority is worried that the Chevron presumption is “fiction[al],” ante, at 26—as all legal presumptions in some sense are— it has gotten less and less so every day for 40 years. The congressional reaction shows as well as anything could that the Chevron Court read Congress right.

或重新授权了数百部法规。这些法规的起草者完全了解Chevron。见A. Gluck & L. Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 928 (fig. 2), 994 (2013)。因此，如果他们想要不同的解释职责分配，他们就会插入一条为此目的的规定。据我所知，除了两项例外，他们并没有这样做。见12 U. S. C. §25b(b)(5)(A)（例外#1）；15 U. S. C. §8302(c)(3)(A)（例外#2）。同样，国会已拒绝颁布将全面废除Chevron的拟议立法。见S. 909, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (2019)（仍是一项法案，不是法律）；H. R. 5, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., §202 (2017)（同上）。因此，就多数意见担心Chevron推定是“虚构的”而言，见上文第26页——正如所有法律推定在某种意义上都是虚构的一样——它在40年里每一天都越来越不那么虚构了。国会的反应最能表明Chevron案法院对国会的理解是正确的。

II The majority’s principal arguments are in a different vein. Around 80 years after the APA was enacted and 40 years after Chevron, the majority has decided that the for­ mer precludes the latter. The APA’s Section 706, the ma­ jority says, “makes clear” that agency interpretations of statutes “are not entitled to deference.” Ante, at 14–15 (em­ phasis in original). And that provision, the majority contin­ ues, codified the contemporaneous law, which likewise did not allow for deference. See ante, at 9–13, 15–16. But nei­ ther the APA nor the pre-APA state of the law does the work that the majority claims. Both are perfectly compatible with Chevron deference. Section 706, enacted with the rest of the APA in 1946, provides for judicial review of agency action. It states: “To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the

II 多数派的主要论点另辟蹊径。在《行政程序法》颁布约80年后、Chevron案判决40年后，多数派认定前者排除了后者。多数派称，《行政程序法》第706条“明确表明”行政机关对法律的解释“无权获得遵从”。见前文第14–15页（原文强调）。多数派接着称，该条款编纂了当时的法律，而当时的法律同样不允许遵从。见前文第9–13页、第15–16页。但无论是《行政程序法》还是《行政程序法》之前法律的状态，都不能支撑多数派的主张。二者均与Chevron遵从完全兼容。 第706条与《行政程序法》其余部分于1946年一同颁布，规定对行政机关行为的司法审查。该条规定：“在作出裁判所必需的范围内，且在相关事项被提出时，

reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and de­ termine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” 5 U. S. C. §706.

审查法院应当裁决所有相关法律问题，解释宪法条款和法定条款，并确定行政机关行为条款的含义或适用性。”5 U. S. C. §706。

That text, contra the majority, “does not resolve the Chev­ ron question.” C. Sunstein, Chevron As Law, 107 Geo. L. J. 1613, 1642 (2019) (Sunstein). Or said a bit differently, Sec­ tion 706 is “generally indeterminate” on the matter of def­ erence. A. Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 207 (2006) (Vermeule). The majority highlights the phrase “de­ cide all relevant questions of law” (italicizing the “all”), and notes that the provision “prescribes no deferential stand­ ard” for answering those questions. Ante, at 14. But just as the provision does not prescribe a deferential standard of review, so too it does not prescribe a de novo standard of review (in which the court starts from scratch, without giv­ ing deference). In point of fact, Section 706 does not specify any standard of review for construing statutes. See Kisor, 588 U. S., at 581 (plurality opinion). And when a court uses a deferential standard—here, by deciding whether an agency reading is reasonable—it just as much “decide[s]” a “relevant question[] of law” as when it uses a de novo stand­ ard. §706. The deferring court then conforms to Section 706 “by determining whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its assigned discretion—that is, whether the agency has construed [the statute it administers] reasona­ bly.” J. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (2014); see Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 317 (2013) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (“We do not ignore [Section 706’s] command when we afford an agency’s statutory interpretation Chevron deference; we re­ spect it”). 2

与多数派相反，该文本“并未解决Chevron问题”。C. Sunstein, Chevron As Law, 107 Geo. L. J. 1613, 1642 (2019)（Sunstein）。或者换个稍有不同的说法，第706条在遵从问题上“总体上是不确定的”。A. Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 207 (2006)（Vermeule）。多数派强调“裁决所有相关法律问题”这一短语（将“所有”以斜体标出），并指出该条款“未规定任何遵从性标准”来回答这些问题。见前文第14页。但正如该条款未规定遵从性审查标准一样，它也未规定重新审查标准（即法院从头开始、不给予遵从）。事实上，第706条并未规定任何解释法律的审查标准。见Kisor, 588 U. S., at 581（复数意见）。而当法院使用遵从性标准时——在此即通过判断行政机关的解读是否合理来裁决——它与使用重新审查标准时一样，都是在“裁决”“相关法律问题”。§706。给予遵从的法院随后通过“确定行政机关是否在其被授予的裁量权范围内行事——即行政机关是否合理地解释了[其执行的法律]”来遵守第706条。J. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (2014)；见Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 317 (2013)（罗伯茨首席大法官，异议）（“当我们对行政机关的法律解释给予Chevron遵从时，我们并未忽视[第706条]的命令；我们是在尊重它”）。2

Section 706’s references to standards of review in other contexts only further undercut the majority’s argument. The majority notes that Section 706 requires deferential re­ view for agency fact-finding and policy-making (under, re­ spectively, a substantial-evidence standard and an arbi­ trary-and-capricious standard). See ante, at 14. Congress, the majority claims, “surely would have articulated a simi­ larly deferential standard applicable to questions of law had it intended to depart” from de novo review. Ibid. Surely? In another part of Section 706, Congress explicitly referred to de novo review. §706(2)(F). With all those ref­ erences to standards of review—both deferential and not— running around Section 706, what is “telling” (ante, at 14) is the absence of any standard for reviewing an agency’s statutory constructions. That silence left the matter, as noted above, “generally indeterminate”: Section 706 neither mandates nor forbids Chevron-style deference. Vermeule 207. 3

第706条在其他语境中对审查标准的提及，只会进一步削弱多数派的论点。多数派指出，第706条要求对行政机关的事实认定和政策制定给予遵从性审查（分别依据实质性证据标准和任意且反复无常标准）。见前文第14页。多数派称，国会“如果打算偏离”重新审查，“就肯定会阐明一个同样适用于法律问题的遵从性标准”。同上。肯定会吗？在第706条的另一部分，国会明确提到了重新审查。§706(2)(F)。在所有这些对审查标准的提及——既有遵从性的也有非遵从性的——散布于第706条各处的情况下，真正“说明问题”的（前文第14页）是缺乏任何审查行政机关法律解释的标准。如上所述，这种沉默使该问题“总体上不确定”：第706条既未强制也未禁止Chevron式遵从。Vermeule 207。3

And contra the majority, most “respected commentators” understood Section 706 in that way—as allowing, even if not requiring, deference. Ante, at 16. The finest adminis­ trative law scholars of the time (call them that generation’s Manning, Sunstein, and Vermeule) certainly did. Professor Louis Jaffe described something very like the Chevron two- step as the preferred method of reviewing agency interpre­ tations under the APA. A court, he said, first “must decide as a ‘question of law’ whether there is ‘discretion’ in the premises.” Judicial Control of Administrative Action 570 (1965). That is akin to step 1: Did Congress speak to the issue, or did it leave openness? And if the latter, Jaffe con­ tinued, the agency’s view “if ‘reasonable’ is free of control.” Ibid. That of course looks like step 2: defer if reasonable. And just in case that description was too complicated, Jaffe conveyed his main point this way: The argument that courts “must decide all questions of law”—as if there were no agency in the picture—“is, in my opinion, unsound.” Id., at 569. Similarly, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, author of the then-preeminent treatise on administrative law, noted with approval that “reasonableness” review of agency inter­ pretations—in which courts “refused to substitute judg­ ment”—had “survived the APA.” Administrative Law 880, 883, 885 (1951) (Davis). Other contemporaneous scholars and experts agreed. See R. Levin, The APA and the Assault on Deference, 106 Minn. L. Rev. 125, 181–183 (2021) (Levin) (listing many of them). They did not see in their own time what the majority finds there today. 4

与多数意见相反，大多数“受尊重的评论者”是以那种方式理解第706条的——即允许、即使不要求遵从。Ante，第16页。当时最杰出的行政法学者（不妨称他们为那一代的马宁、桑斯坦和弗米勒）当然是这样理解的。路易斯·贾菲教授将非常类似于Chevron两步法的做法描述为根据APA审查行政机关解释的首选方法。他说，法院首先“必须作为‘法律问题’决定该前提中是否存在‘裁量权’。”Judicial Control of Administrative Action 570（1965）。这类似于第1步：国会是否就该问题表态，还是留下了开放性？如果是后者，贾菲继续写道，行政机关的观点“如果‘合理’，就不受控制。”Ibid. 这当然看起来像第2步：如果合理就遵从。而万一那种描述过于复杂，贾菲这样传达了他的要点：法院“必须决定所有法律问题”——仿佛画面中不存在行政机关——这一论点“在我看来是不成立的。”Id.，第569页。同样，当时行政法权威论著的作者肯尼斯·卡尔普·戴维斯教授赞同地指出，对行政机关解释的“合理性”审查——其中法院“拒绝以自己的判断取而代之”——“在APA之后存续了下来”。Administrative Law 880, 883, 885（1951）（Davis）。其他同时代的学者和专家也同意。See R. Levin, The APA and the Assault on Deference, 106 Minn. L. Rev. 125, 181–183（2021）（Levin）（列举了许多此类学者）。他们在自己的时代并没有看到多数意见今天在那里发现的东西。4

Nor, evidently, did the Supreme Court. In the years after the APA was enacted, the Court “never indicated that sec­ tion 706 rejected the idea that courts might defer to agency interpretations of law.” Sunstein 1654. Indeed, not a single Justice so much as floated that view of the APA. To the contrary, the Court issued a number of decisions in those years deferring to an agency’s statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Unemployment Compensation Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153–154 (1946); NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U. S. 398, 403 (1947); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469, 478–479 (1947). And that con­ tinued right up until Chevron. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U. S. 473, 480 (1956); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978). To be clear: Deference in those years was not always given to interpretations that would receive it under Chevron. The practice then was more inconsistent and less fully elaborated than it later be­ came. The point here is only that the Court came nowhere close to accepting the majority’s view of the APA. Take the language from Section 706 that the majority most relies on: “decide all relevant questions of law.” See ante, at 14. In the decade after the APA’s enactment, those words were used only four times in Supreme Court opinions (all in foot­ notes)—and never to suggest that courts could not defer to agency interpretations. See Sunstein 1656.

显然，最高法院也没有。在《行政程序法》颁布后的数年里，法院“从未表示第706条否定了法院可以遵从行政机关法律解释的观点”。Sunstein 1654。事实上，没有一位大法官哪怕提出过这种对《行政程序法》的看法。相反，法院在那几年作出了若干判决，遵从行政机关的法律解释。见，例如，Unemployment Compensation Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153–154 (1946)；NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U. S. 398, 403 (1947)；Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469, 478–479 (1947)。这种情况一直持续到Chevron案。见，例如，Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U. S. 473, 480 (1956)；Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978)。需要明确的是：那些年的遵从并不总是给予根据Chevron本应获得遵从的解释。当时的做法比后来更为不一致，也远未充分阐述。这里的要点仅仅是，法院远未接受多数派对《行政程序法》的看法。以多数派最依赖的第706条措辞为例：“裁决所有相关法律问题”。见前文第14页。在《行政程序法》颁布后的十年里，这些措辞在最高法院意见中仅被使用过四次（均在脚注中）——且从未暗示法院不能遵从行政机关的解释。见Sunstein 1656。

The majority’s view of Section 706 likewise gets no sup­ port from how judicial review operated in the years leading up to the APA. That prior history matters: As the majority recognizes, Section 706 was generally understood to “re­ state[] the present law as to the scope of judicial review.”

多数派对第706条的看法同样得不到《行政程序法》颁布前数年司法审查运作方式的支持。那段先前历史很重要：正如多数派所承认的，第706条通常被理解为“重述了关于司法审查范围的现行法律”。

Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Admin­ istrative Procedure Act 108 (1947); ante, at 15–16. The problem for the majority is that in the years preceding the APA, courts became ever more deferential to agencies. New Deal administrative programs had by that point come into their own. And this Court and others, in a fairly short time, had abandoned their initial resistance and gotten on board. Justice Breyer, wearing his administrative-law-scholar hat, characterized the pre-APA period this way: “[J]udicial re­ view of administrative action was curtailed, and particular agency decisions were frequently sustained with judicial obeisance to the mysteries of administrative expertise.” S. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 21 (7th ed. 2011). And that description extends to review of an agency’s statutory constructions. An influential study of administrative practice, published five years before the APA’s enactment, described the state of play: Judicial “re­ view may, in some instances at least, be limited to the in­ quiry whether the administrative construction is a permis­ sible one.” Final Report of Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941), reprinted in Adminis­ trative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 78 (1941). Or again: “[W]here the statute is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpre­ tation, the court may accept that of the administrative body.” Id., at 90–91. 5

司法部，《司法部长行政程序法手册》108（1947）；前引，第15–16页。多数意见面临的问题是，在《行政程序法》颁布之前的年代，法院对行政机关越来越顺从。新政行政项目到那时已经确立了自己的地位。而本法院和其他法院在相当短的时间内，就放弃了最初的抵制并加入了这一行列。布雷耶大法官以行政法学者的身份，这样描述《行政程序法》之前的时期：“对行政行为的司法审查被削减，具体的行政机关决定常常因司法对行政专门知识之奥秘的顺从得以维持。”S. Breyer等，《行政法与监管政策》21（第7版2011）。这一描述也延伸至对行政机关制定法解释的审查。一项在《行政程序法》颁布前五年出版的、有影响力的行政实践研究描述了当时的状况：司法“审查在某些情形下至少可能限于询问行政解释是否是一个可允许的解释。”《司法部长行政程序委员会最终报告》（1941），重印于《政府机构中的行政程序》，S. Doc. No. 8，第77届国会第1会期，78（1941）。或者又说：“[在]制定法合理容许一种以上解释时，法院可以接受行政机关的解释。”同上，第90–91页。5

Two prominent Supreme Court decisions of the 1940s put those principles into action. Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402 (1941), was then widely understood as “the leading case” on review of agency interpretations. Davis 882; see ibid. (not­ ing that it “establish[ed] what is known as ‘the doctrine of Gray v. Powell’”). There, the Court deferred to an agency construction of the term “producer” as used in a statutory exemption from price controls. Congress, the Court ex­ plained, had committed the scope of the exemption to the agency because its “experience in [the] field gave promise of a better informed, more equitable, adjustment of the con­ flicting interests.” Gray, 314 U. S., at 412. Accordingly, the Court concluded that it was “not the province of a court” to “substitute its judgment” for the agency’s. Ibid. Three years later, the Court decided NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944), another acknowledged “leading case.” Davis 882; see id., at 884. The Court again deferred, this time to an agency’s construction of the term “employee” in the National Labor Relations Act. The scope of that term, the Court explained, “belong[ed] to” the agency to an­ swer based on its “[e]veryday experience in the administra­ tion of the statute.” Hearst, 322 U. S., at 130. The Court therefore “limited” its review to whether the agency’s read­ ing had “warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in

1940年代两项著名的最高法院判决将这些原则付诸实践。Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402 (1941)，当时被广泛理解为关于审查行政机关解释的“主要判例”。Davis 882；见同上（指出它“确立了所谓的‘Gray v. Powell原则’”）。在该案中，法院顺从行政机关对制定法价格管制豁免中所用“生产者”一词的解释。法院解释说，国会已将豁免范围交由行政机关决定，因为其“在该领域的经验有望带来对相互冲突利益的更知情、更公平的调整。”Gray, 314 U. S., 第412页。因此，法院得出结论，“替代其判断”并非“法院的职责”。同上。三年后，法院判决了NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944)，这是另一个公认的“主要判例”。Davis 882；见同上，第884页。法院再次顺从，这次是顺从行政机关对《国家劳动关系法》中“雇员”一词的解释。法院解释说，该词的范围“属于”行政机关根据其“在制定法日常管理中的经验”来回答。Hearst, 322 U. S., 第130页。因此，法院将其审查“限于”行政机关的解读是否有“记录中的根据以及合理的依据

law.” Id., at 131. 6 Recall here that even the majority ac­ cepts that Section 706 was meant to “restate[] the present law” as to judicial review. See ante, at 15–16; supra, at 19– 20. Well then? It sure would seem that the provision allows a deference regime.

法律。”同上，第131页。6 这里回顾一下，甚至多数意见也接受第706条意在就司法审查“重述现行法律”。见前引，第15–16页；前文，第19–20页。那么呢？看来该条款确实允许一种顺从制度。

The majority has no way around those two noteworthy decisions. It first appears to distinguish between “pure le­ gal question[s]” and the so-called mixed questions in Gray and Hearst, involving the application of a legal standard to a set of facts. Ante, at 11. If in drawing that distinction, the majority intends to confine its holding to the pure type of legal issue—thus enabling courts to defer when law and facts are entwined—I’d be glad. But I suspect the majority has no such intent, because that approach would preserve Chevron in a substantial part of its current domain. Cf. Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U. S. 209, 230 (2024) (ALITO, J., dissenting) (noting, in the immigration context, that the universe of mixed questions swamps that of pure legal ones). It is frequently in the consideration of mixed ques­ tions that the scope of statutory terms is established and their meaning defined. See H. Monaghan, Marbury and the

多数意见无法绕开那两项值得注意的判决。它首先似乎区分“纯法律问题”与Gray和Hearst中所谓的混合问题，后者涉及将法律标准适用于一组事实。前引，第11页。如果多数意见在作出这一区分时，意图将其裁决限于纯法律问题类型——从而使法院在法律与事实交织时可以顺从——我会很高兴。但我怀疑多数意见并无此意图，因为那种做法将在Chevron当前领域的很大一部分保留Chevron。参Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U. S. 209, 230 (2024)（ALITO, J.，异议）（在移民语境中指出，混合问题的范围远远超过纯法律问题）。正是在考虑混合问题时，制定法术语的范围才得以确立，其含义才得以界定。见H. Monaghan, Marbury and the

Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1983) (“Ad­ ministrative application of law is administrative formula­ tion of law whenever it involves elaboration of the statutory norm”). How does a statutory interpreter decide, as in Hearst, what an “employee” is? In large part through cases asking whether the term covers people performing specific jobs, like (in that case) “newsboys.” 322 U. S., at 120. Or consider one of the examples I offered above. How does an interpreter decide when one population segment of a spe­ cies is “distinct” from another? Often by considering that requirement with respect to particular species, like western gray squirrels. So the distinction the majority offers makes no real-world (or even theoretical) sense. If the Hearst Court was deferring to an agency on whether the term “em­ ployee” covered newsboys, it was deferring to the agency on the scope and meaning of the term “employee.”

行政国家，83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1983)（“只要涉及对制定法规范的阐述，法律在行政上的适用就是法律在行政上的形成”）。制定法解释者如何像在Hearst中那样决定什么是“雇员”？在很大程度上是通过询问该词是否涵盖从事特定工作的人，例如（在该案中）“报童”。322 U. S., 第120页。或者考虑我上面提供的一个例子。解释者如何决定一个物种的一个种群片段何时与另一个“不同”？通常是通过考虑该要求与特定物种的关系，例如西部灰松鼠。因此，多数意见提供的区分在现实世界（甚至理论上）都没有意义。如果Hearst法院在“雇员”一词是否涵盖报童的问题上顺从行政机关，那么它就是在该词的范围和含义上顺从行政机关。

The majority’s next rejoinder—that “the Court was far from consistent” in deferring—falls equally flat. Ante, at 12. I am perfectly ready to acknowledge that in the pre- APA period, a deference regime had not yet taken complete hold. I’ll go even further: Let’s assume that deference was then an on-again, off-again function (as the majority seems to suggest, see ante, at 11–12, and 13, n. 3). Even on that assumption, the majority’s main argument—that Section 706 prohibited deferential review—collapses. Once again, the majority agrees that Section 706 was not meant to change the then-prevailing law. See ante, at 15–16. And even if inconsistent, that law cannot possibly be thought to have prohibited deference. Or otherwise said: “If Section 706 did not change the law of judicial review (as we have long recognized), then it did not proscribe a deferential standard then known and in use.” Kisor, 588 U. S., at 583 (plurality opinion).

多数意见的下一个反驳——即“法院远非一致”地顺从——同样站不住脚。前引，第12页。我完全愿意承认，在《行政程序法》之前的时期，顺从制度尚未完全确立。我甚至更进一步：让我们假设顺从当时是一种时有时无的功能（正如多数意见似乎暗示的那样，见前引，第11–12页，以及第13页，注3）。即使在这一假设下，多数意见的主要论点——即第706条禁止顺从性审查——也崩溃了。再一次，多数意见同意第706条并非意在改变当时通行的法律。见前引，第15–16页。而且即使不一致，该法律也不可能被认为禁止顺从。或者换句话说：“如果第706条没有改变司法审查的法律（正如我们长期以来所承认的），那么它就没有禁止当时已知并使用的顺从标准。”Kisor, 588 U. S., 第583页（复数意见）。

The majority’s whole argument for overturning Chevron relies on Section 706. But the text of Section 706 does not support that result. And neither does the contemporaneous

多数意见推翻Chevron的全部论证都依赖第706条。但第706条的文本并不支持这一结果。同时期的

practice, which that text was supposed to reflect. So today’s decision has no basis in the only law the majority deems relevant. It is grounded on air.

实践——该文本本应反映的实践——也不支持。因此，今天的裁决在多数意见认为相关的唯一法律中毫无根据。它建立在空气之上。

III And still there is worse, because abandoning Chevron subverts every known principle of stare decisis. Of course, respecting precedent is not an “inexorable command.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991). But over­ throwing it requires far more than the majority has offered up here. Chevron is entitled to stare decisis’s strongest form of protection. The majority thus needs an exceptionally strong reason to overturn the decision, above and beyond thinking it wrong. And it has nothing approaching such a justification, proposing only a bewildering theory about Chevron’s “unworkability.” Ante, at 32. Just five years ago, this Court in Kisor rejected a plea to overrule Auer v. Rob­ bins, 519 U. S. 452 (1997), which requires judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations. See 588 U. S., at 586–589 (opinion of the Court). The case against overruling Chevron is at least as strong. In partic­ ular, the majority’s decision today will cause a massive shock to the legal system, “cast[ing] doubt on many settled constructions” of statutes and threatening the interests of many parties who have relied on them for years. 588 U. S., at 587 (opinion of the Court). Adherence to precedent is “a foundation stone of the rule of law.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 798 (2014). Stare decisis “promotes the even­ handed, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 827. It enables people to order their lives in reliance on judicial decisions. And it “contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the ju­ dicial process,” by ensuring that those decisions are founded in the law, and not in the “personal preferences” of judges. Id., at 828; Dobbs, 597 U. S., at 388 (dissenting opinion).

III 更糟的是，因为放弃Chevron颠覆了遵循先例原则的每一项已知原则。当然，尊重先例并非“不可动摇的命令”。Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991)。但推翻先例所需的条件远超多数意见在此提出的内容。Chevron有权获得遵循先例原则最强形式的保护。因此，多数意见需要远超于认为该判决错误的特殊强力理由来推翻该判决。而它没有任何接近此类理由的东西，仅提出了一个关于Chevron“不可行性”的令人困惑的理论。Ante, at 32。就在五年前，本法院在Kisor案中驳回了一项推翻Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 (1997)的请求，该案要求对行政机关对其自身法规的解释给予司法尊重。见588 U. S., at 586–589（法院意见）。反对推翻Chevron的理由至少同样有力。特别是，多数意见今天的判决将对法律体系造成巨大冲击，“对许多已确立的法律解释投下疑问”，并威胁到许多多年来依赖这些解释的当事人的利益。588 U. S., at 587（法院意见）。 遵循先例是“法治的基石”。Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 798 (2014)。遵循先例“促进法律原则的公平、可预测和一致的发展”。Payne, 501 U. S., at 827。它使人们能够依赖司法判决来安排自己的生活。它“有助于司法程序的实际和感知的完整性”，确保这些判决建立在法律之上，而非法官的“个人偏好”之上。Id., at 828; Dobbs, 597 U. S., at 388（反对意见）。

Perhaps above all else, stare decisis is a “doctrine of judicial modesty.” Id., at 363. In that, it shares something im­ portant with Chevron. Both tell judges that they do not know everything, and would do well to attend to the views of others. So today, the majority rejects what judicial hu­ mility counsels not just once but twice over.

也许最重要的是，遵循先例是“一种司法谦抑的学说”。Id., at 363。在这一点上，它与Chevron有重要的共同之处。两者都告诉法官，他们并非无所不知，最好关注他人的观点。因此，今天，多数意见不仅一次而是两次拒绝了司法谦抑所建议的做法。

And Chevron is entitled to a particularly strong form of stare decisis, for two separate reasons. First, it matters that “Congress remains free to alter what we have done.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989); see Kisor, 588 U. S., at 587 (opinion of the Court) (making the same point for Auer deference). In a constitu­ tional case, the Court alone can correct an error. But that is not so here. “Our deference decisions are balls tossed into Congress’s court, for acceptance or not as that branch elects.” 588 U. S., at 587–588 (opinion of the Court). And for generations now, Congress has chosen acceptance. Throughout those years, Congress could have abolished Chevron across the board, most easily by amending the APA. Or it could have eliminated deferential review in dis­ crete areas, by amending old laws or drafting new laws to include an anti-Chevron provision. Instead, Congress has “spurned multiple opportunities” to do a comprehensive re­ jection of Chevron, and has hardly ever done a targeted one. Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015); see supra, at 14–15. Or to put the point more af­ firmatively, Congress has kept Chevron as is for 40 years. It maintained that position even as Members of this Court began to call Chevron into question. See ante, at 30. From all it appears, Congress has not agreed with the view of some Justices that they and other judges should have more power.

而Chevron有权获得特别强有力的遵循先例保护，原因有两个。第一，“国会仍然可以自由改变我们已做的事情”，这一点很重要。Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989); 见Kisor, 588 U. S., at 587（法院意见）（就Auer尊重提出相同观点）。在宪法案件中，只有本法院可以纠正错误。但此处并非如此。“我们的尊重判决是抛入国会法庭的球，由该分支选择接受与否。”588 U. S., at 587–588（法院意见）。而几代人以来，国会选择了接受。 在那些年里，国会本可以全面废除Chevron，最容易的方式是修改APA。或者它可以通过修改旧法律或起草包含反Chevron条款的新法律，在特定领域消除尊重性审查。相反，国会“多次拒绝了”全面否定Chevron的机会，而且几乎从未进行过有针对性的否定。Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015); 见supra, at 14–15。或者更肯定地说，国会40年来一直保持Chevron原样。即使本法院成员开始质疑Chevron，它仍维持该立场。见ante, at 30。从一切迹象来看，国会并不同意某些大法官的观点，即他们和其他法官应拥有更多权力。

Second, Chevron is by now much more than a single deci­ sion. This Court alone, acting as Chevron allows, has up­ held an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute at least 70 times. See Brief for United States in No. 22–1219,

第二，Chevron如今远不止是一个单一判决。仅本法院，按照Chevron所允许的方式行事，就至少70次维持了行政机关对法规的合理解释。见Brief for United States in No. 22–1219,

p. 27; App. to id., at 68a–72a (collecting cases). Lower courts have applied the Chevron framework on thousands upon thousands of occasions. See K. Barnett & C. Walker, Chevron and Stare Decisis, 31 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 475, 477, and n. 11 (2024) (noting that at last count, Chevron was cited in more than 18,000 federal-court decisions). The Ki­ sor Court observed, when upholding Auer, that “[d]eference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous rules pervades the whole corpus of administrative law.” 588 U. S., at 587 (opinion of the Court). So too does deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous stat­ utes—except more so. Chevron is as embedded as embed­ ded gets in the law.

p. 27; App. to id., at 68a–72a（收集案例）。下级法院已在成千上万次场合适用Chevron框架。见K. Barnett & C. Walker, Chevron and Stare Decisis, 31 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 475, 477, and n. 11 (2024)（指出据最新统计，Chevron在超过18,000份联邦法院判决中被引用）。Kisor法院在维持Auer时指出，“对行政机关对模糊规则合理解释的尊重遍及整个行政法体系。”588 U. S., at 587（法院意见）。对行政机关对模糊法规合理解释的尊重也是如此——只是更甚。Chevron在法律中的嵌入程度已无以复加。

The majority says differently, because this Court has ig­ nored Chevron lately; all that is left of the decision is a “de­ caying husk with bold pretensions.” Ante, at 33. Tell that to the D. C. Circuit, the court that reviews a large share of agency interpretations, where Chevron remains alive and well. See, e.g., Lissack v. Commissioner, 68 F. 4th 1312, 1321–1322 (2023); Solar Energy Industries Assn. v. FERC, 59 F. 4th 1287, 1291–1294 (2023). But more to the point: The majority’s argument is a bootstrap. This Court has “avoided deferring under Chevron since 2016” (ante, at 32) because it has been preparing to overrule Chevron since around that time. That kind of self-help on the way to re­ versing precedent has become almost routine at this Court. Stop applying a decision where one should; “throw some gratuitous criticisms into a couple of opinions”; issue a few separate writings “question[ing the decision’s] premises” (ante, at 30); give the whole process a few years . . . and voila!—you have a justification for overruling the decision. Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. 878, 950 (2018) (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (discussing the over­ ruling of Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977)); see also, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 571–572 (2022) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (similar

多数意见说法不同，因为本法院近来忽视了Chevron；该判决所剩下的只是一个“带有大胆妄称的腐朽空壳”。Ante, at 33。把这话告诉D. C. Circuit——审查大量行政机关解释的法院，在那里Chevron依然生机勃勃。见，例如，Lissack v. Commissioner, 68 F. 4th 1312, 1321–1322 (2023); Solar Energy Industries Assn. v. FERC, 59 F. 4th 1287, 1291–1294 (2023)。但更重要的是：多数意见的论点是循环论证。本法院“自2016年以来一直避免根据Chevron给予尊重”（ante, at 32），因为它大约从那时起就一直在准备推翻Chevron。这种在推翻先例之路上的自助行为在本法院已几乎成为常规。在应当适用判决时停止适用；“在几份意见中塞入一些无端批评”；发表几份单独意见“质疑[该判决的]前提”（ante, at 30）；给整个过程几年时间……瞧！——你就有了推翻该判决的理由。Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. 878, 950 (2018)（KAGAN, J.，反对意见）（讨论推翻Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977)）；另见，例如，Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 571–572 (2022)（SOTOMAYOR, J.，反对意见）（类似

for Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971)); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U. S. 529, 587–588 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (similar for South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966)). I once remarked that this overruling­ through-enfeeblement technique “mock[ed] stare decisis.” Janus, 585 U. S., at 950 (dissenting opinion). I have seen no reason to change my mind.

针对Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971)）；Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U. S. 529, 587–588 (2013)（Ginsburg, J.，反对意见）（类似针对South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966)）。我曾评论说，这种通过削弱来推翻的技术“嘲弄了遵循先例”。Janus, 585 U. S., at 950（反对意见）。我没有看到改变想法的理由。

The majority does no better in its main justification for overruling Chevron—that the decision is “unworkable.” Ante, at 30. The majority’s first theory on that score is that there is no single “answer” about what “ambiguity” means: Some judges turn out to see more of it than others do, lead­ ing to “different results.” Ante, at 30–31. But even if so, the legal system has for many years, in many contexts, dealt perfectly well with that variation. Take contract law. It is hornbook stuff that when (but only when) a contract is ambiguous, a court interpreting it can consult extrinsic ev­ idence. See CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese, 583 U. S. 133, 139 (2018) (per curiam). And when all interpretive tools still leave ambiguity, the contract is construed against the drafter. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. 176, 186– 187 (2019). So I guess the contract rules of the 50 States are unworkable now. Or look closer to home, to doctrines this Court regularly applies. In deciding whether a govern­ ment has waived sovereign immunity, we construe “[a]ny ambiguities in the statutory language” in “favor of immun­ ity.” FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 290 (2012). Similarly, the rule of lenity tells us to construe ambiguous statutes in favor of criminal defendants. See United States v. Cas­ tleman, 572 U. S. 157, 172–173 (2014). And the canon of constitutional avoidance instructs us to construe ambigu­ ous laws to avoid difficult constitutional questions. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001). I could go on, but the point is made. There are ambiguity triggers all over the law. Some­ how everyone seems to get by.

多数意见在推翻Chevron的主要理由——该判决“不可行”——方面也未见更好。Ante, at 30。多数意见在这方面的第一个理论是，关于“模糊性”的含义没有单一“答案”：一些法官比其他人看到更多模糊性，导致“不同结果”。Ante, at 30–31。但即便如此，法律体系多年来在许多情境下已完美应对这种差异。以合同法为例。当（且仅当）合同模糊时，解释合同的法院可以查阅外部证据，这是教科书内容。见CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese, 583 U. S. 133, 139 (2018)（per curiam）。而当所有解释工具仍留下模糊性时，合同应作不利于起草人的解释。见Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. 176, 186–187 (2019)。所以我猜50个州的合同规则现在都不可行了。或者看看更近的、本法院经常适用的学说。在裁定政府是否放弃主权豁免时，我们将“法定语言中的任何模糊性”作“有利于豁免”的解释。FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 290 (2012)。同样，宽宥规则告诉我们作有利于刑事被告的解释。见United States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. 157, 172–173 (2014)。而宪法回避准则指示我们解释模糊法律以避免困难的宪法问题。见United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001)。我可以继续列举，但要点已明。法律中到处都是模糊性触发条件。不知何故，每个人似乎都能应付。

And Chevron is an especially puzzling decision to criticize on the ground of generating too much judicial divergence. There’s good empirical—meaning, non-impressionistic—ev­ idence on exactly that subject. And it shows that, as com­ pared with de novo review, use of the Chevron two-step framework fosters agreement among judges. See K. Bar­ nett, C. Boyd, & C. Walker, Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 1463, 1502 (2018) (Barnett). More particularly, Chevron has a “powerful constraining ef­ fect on partisanship in judicial decisionmaking.” Barnett 1463 (italics deleted); see Sunstein 1672 (“[A] predictable effect of overruling Chevron would be to ensure a far greater role for judicial policy preferences in statutory interpreta­ tion and far more common splits along ideological lines”). So if consistency among judges is the majority’s lodestar, then the Court should not overrule Chevron, but return to using it.

而Chevron是一个特别令人费解的判决，若以产生过多司法分歧为由加以批评的话。关于这一主题有良好的实证——即非印象式的——证据。它表明，与de novo审查相比，使用Chevron两步框架促进了法官之间的一致。见K. Barnett, C. Boyd, & C. Walker, Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 1463, 1502 (2018)（Barnett）。更具体地说，Chevron对司法决策中的党派性具有“强大的约束效果”。Barnett 1463（斜体删除）；见Sunstein 1672（“推翻Chevron的一个可预测效果将是确保司法政策偏好在法规解释中发挥更大作用，以及更常见的意识形态分歧”）。因此，如果法官之间的一致性是多数意见的指路明灯，那么本法院不应推翻Chevron，而应恢复使用它。

The majority’s second theory on workability is likewise a makeweight. Chevron, the majority complains, has some exceptions, which (so the majority says) are “difficult” and “complicate[d]” to apply. Ante, at 32. Recall that courts are not supposed to defer when the agency construing a statute (1) has not been charged with administering that law; (2) has not used deliberative procedures—i.e., notice-and-com­ ment rulemaking or adjudication; or (3) is intervening in a “major question,” of great economic and political signifi­ cance. See supra, at 11–12; ante, at 27–28. As I’ve ex­ plained, those exceptions—the majority also aptly calls them “refinements”—fit with Chevron’s rationale: They de­ fine circumstances in which Congress is unlikely to have wanted agency views to govern. Ante, at 27; see supra, at 11–12. And on the difficulty scale, they are nothing much. Has Congress put the agency in charge of administering the statute? In 99 of 100 cases, everyone will agree on the an­ swer with scarcely a moment’s thought. Did the agency use notice-and-comment or an adjudication before rendering an

多数意见关于可行性的第二个理论同样是凑数的。多数意见抱怨说，Chevron有一些例外，这些例外（据多数意见说）“难以”适用且“复杂化”。Ante, at 32。回想一下，当解释法规的行政机关（1）未被赋予执行该法律的职责；（2）未使用审议程序——即通知评论规则制定或裁决；或（3）介入具有重大经济和政治意义的“重大问题”时，法院不应给予尊重。见supra, at 11–12; ante, at 27–28。正如我所解释的，这些例外——多数意见也恰当地称之为“改进”——符合Chevron的理由：它们界定了国会不太可能希望行政机关观点主导的情形。Ante, at 27; 见supra, at 11–12。而在困难程度上，它们没什么大不了的。国会是否让行政机关负责执行该法规？在100个案例中的99个，每个人几乎不假思索就会同意答案。行政机关在作出裁决前是否使用了通知评论或裁决？

interpretation? Once again, I could stretch my mind and think up a few edge cases, but for the most part, the answer is an easy yes or no. The major questions exception is, I acknowledge, different: There, many judges have indeed disputed its nature and scope. Compare, e.g., West Vir­ ginia, 597 U. S., at 721–724, with id., at 764–770 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). But that disagreement concerns, on every­ one’s view, a tiny subset of all agency interpretations. For the most part, the exceptions that so upset the majority re­ quire merely a rote, check-the-box inquiry. If that is the majority’s idea of a “dizzying breakdance,” ante, at 32, the majority needs to get out more.

解释？再一次，我可以绞尽脑汁想出几个边缘案例，但大体上，答案不过是简单的“是”或“否”。我承认，重大问题的例外有所不同：在那里，许多法官确实对其性质和范围提出了争议。比较，例如，West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 721–724, 与 id., at 764–770 (KAGAN, J., dissenting)。但按照所有人的观点，这一分歧涉及的只是所有机关解释中极小的一部分。大体上，那些令多数派如此不安的例外仅需一种机械的、逐项勾选的审查。如果这就是多数派所谓的“令人眩晕的霹雳舞”，ante, at 32，那多数派真该多出去走走。

And anyway, difficult as compared to what? The major­ ity’s prescribed way of proceeding is no walk in the park. First, the majority makes clear that what is usually called Skidmore deference continues to apply. See ante, at 16–17. Under that decision, agency interpretations “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment” that may be “entitled to respect.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). If the majority thinks that the same judges who argue today about where “ambiguity” resides (see ante, at 30) are not going to argue tomorrow about what “respect” requires, I fear it will be gravely disappointed. Second, the majority directs courts to comply with the varied ways in which Congress in fact “delegates discretionary authority” to agencies. Ante, at 17–18. For example, Congress may authorize an agency to “define[]” or “delimit[]” statutory terms or concepts, or to “fill up the details” of a statutory scheme. Ante, at 17, and n. 5. Or Congress may use, in describing an agency’s regulatory authority, inherently “flexib[le]” language like “appropriate” or “reasonable.” Ante, at 17, and n. 6. Attending to every such delegation, as the majority says, is necessary in a world without Chev­ ron. But that task involves complexities of its own. Indeed, one reason Justice Scalia supported Chevron was that it re­

而且无论如何，与什么相比算困难？多数派规定的行事方式绝非闲庭信步。首先，多数派明确表示，通常所称的Skidmore遵从仍然适用。见ante, at 16–17。根据该判决，机关解释“构成经验与明智判断的集合”，可能“值得尊重”。Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)。如果多数派认为，今天争论“歧义”所在（见ante, at 30）的同一批法官明天不会争论“尊重”要求什么，我担心它会大失所望。其次，多数派指示法院遵守国会实际上“授予机关自由裁量权”的各种方式。Ante, at 17–18。例如，国会可以授权机关“界定”或“划定”法定术语或概念，或“填补”某一法定方案的“细节”。Ante, at 17, and n. 5。或者国会在描述机关的监管权时，可以使用本质上“灵活”的措辞，如“适当”或“合理”。Ante, at 17, and n. 6。如多数派所言，在一个没有Chevron的世界里，关注每一项此类授权是必要的。但这项任务本身也包含复杂性。事实上，Scalia大法官支持Chevron的一个原因就是它取

placed such a “statute-by-statute evaluation (which was as­ suredly a font of uncertainty and litigation) with an across­ the-board presumption.” A. Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511, 516. As a lover of the predictability that rules create, Justice Scalia thought the latter “unquestionably better.” Id., at 517.

代了这种“逐法评估（这无疑是不确定性和诉讼的源泉），代之以一项全面适用的推定。”A. Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511, 516。作为规则所创造的可预测性的爱好者，Scalia大法官认为后者“无疑更好”。Id., at 517。

On the other side of the balance, the most important stare decisis factor—call it the “jolt to the legal system” issue— weighs heavily against overruling Chevron. Dobbs, 597 U. S., at 357 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). Congress and agencies alike have relied on Chevron—have assumed its existence—in much of their work for the last 40 years. Statutes passed during that time reflect the ex­ pectation that Chevron would allocate interpretive author­ ity between agencies and courts. Rules issued during the period likewise presuppose that statutory ambiguities were the agencies’ to (reasonably) resolve. Those agency inter­ pretations may have benefited regulated entities; or they may have protected members of the broader public. Either way, private parties have ordered their affairs—their busi­ ness and financial decisions, their health-care decisions, their educational decisions—around agency actions that are suddenly now subject to challenge. In Kisor, this Court refused to overrule Auer because doing so would “cast doubt on” many longstanding constructions of rules, and thereby upset settled expectations. 588 U. S., at 587 (opinion of the Court). Overruling Chevron, and thus raising new doubts about agency constructions of statutes, will be far more dis­ ruptive.

在天平的另一端，最重要的遵循先例因素——称之为“对法律体系的冲击”问题——强烈不利于推翻Chevron。Dobbs, 597 U. S., at 357 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment)。在过去40年的大部分工作中，国会和机关都依赖Chevron——都假定其存在。在此期间通过的法规反映了这样一种预期：Chevron将在机关与法院之间分配解释权。该期间发布的规则同样预设，法定歧义应由机关（合理地）解决。那些机关解释可能有利于受监管实体；也可能保护了更广泛公众的成员。无论哪种情况，私人当事方都已围绕机关行为安排了自己的事务——其商业和财务决策、其医疗保健决策、其教育决策——而这些行为如今突然受到质疑。在Kisor案中，本法院拒绝推翻Auer，因为这样做会“使人们怀疑”许多长期存在的规则解释，从而扰乱已确定的预期。588 U. S., at 587 (opinion of the Court)。推翻Chevron，从而对机关的法条解释产生新的怀疑，将更具破坏性。

The majority tries to alleviate concerns about a piece of that problem: It states that judicial decisions that have up­ held agency action as reasonable under Chevron should not be overruled on that account alone. See ante, at 34–35. That is all to the good: There are thousands of such deci­ sions, many settled for decades. See supra, at 26. But first,

多数派试图缓解对该问题一部分的担忧：它指出，根据Chevron维持机关行为合理的司法判决，不应仅因此而被推翻。见ante, at 34–35。这完全值得欢迎：此类判决有数千件，许多已确定数十年。见supra, at 26。但首先，

reasonable reliance need not be predicated on a prior judi­ cial decision. Some agency interpretations never chal­ lenged under Chevron now will be; expectations formed around those constructions thus could be upset, in a way the majority’s assurance does not touch. And anyway, how good is that assurance, really? The majority says that a decision’s “[m]ere reliance on Chevron” is not enough to counter the force of stare decisis; a challenger will need an additional “special justification.” Ante, at 34. The majority is sanguine; I am not so much. Courts motivated to over­ rule an old Chevron-based decision can always come up with something to label a “special justification.” Maybe a court will say “the quality of [the precedent’s] reasoning” was poor. Ante, at 29. Or maybe the court will discover something “unworkable” in the decision—like some excep­ tion that has to be applied. Ante, at 30. All a court need do is look to today’s opinion to see how it is done.

合理依赖无需以先前的司法判决为前提。一些从未在Chevron下受到质疑的机关解释现在将受到质疑；围绕那些解释形成的预期因此可能被扰乱，而多数派的保证并未触及这一点。而且无论如何，那个保证到底有多大价值？多数派说，判决“仅仅依赖Chevron”不足以对抗遵循先例的效力；挑战者需要额外的“特殊理由”。Ante, at 34。多数派很乐观；我没那么乐观。有动机推翻旧Chevron判决的法院总能想出点什么来贴上“特殊理由”的标签。也许法院会说“[先例]推理的质量”很差。Ante, at 29。或者法院会在判决中发现某种“不可行”之处——比如某个必须适用的例外。Ante, at 30。法院只需看看今天的意见书，就知道该怎么做。

IV

IV

Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government.

法官不是该领域的专家，也不属于政府的任何一个政治分支。

— Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 865 (1984)

—— Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 865 (1984)

Those were the days, when we knew what we are not. When we knew that as between courts and agencies, Con­ gress would usually think agencies the better choice to re­ solve the ambiguities and fill the gaps in regulatory stat­ utes. Because agencies are “experts in the field.” And because they are part of a political branch, with a claim to making interstitial policy. And because Congress has charged them, not us, with administering the statutes con­ taining the open questions. At its core, Chevron is about respecting that allocation of responsibility—the conferral of primary authority over regulatory matters to agencies, not courts.

那是过去的日子，那时我们知道我们不是什么。那时我们知道，在法院与机关之间，国会通常认为机关是解决监管法规中的歧义和填补空白更好的选择。因为机关是“该领域的专家”。因为它们属于政治分支，有权制定填补空隙的政策。因为国会已委托它们——而非我们——执行包含未决问题的法规。Chevron的核心在于尊重这种责任分配——将监管事项的主要权力授予机关，而非法院。

Today, the majority does not respect that judgment. It gives courts the power to make all manner of scientific and technical judgments. It gives courts the power to make all manner of policy calls, including about how to weigh com­ peting goods and values. (See Chevron itself.) It puts courts at the apex of the administrative process as to every con­ ceivable subject—because there are always gaps and ambi­ guities in regulatory statutes, and often of great import. What actions can be taken to address climate change or other environmental challenges? What will the Nation’s health-care system look like in the coming decades? Or the financial or transportation systems? What rules are going to constrain the development of A.I.? In every sphere of current or future federal regulation, expect courts from now on to play a commanding role. It is not a role Congress has given to them, in the APA or any other statute. It is a role this Court has now claimed for itself, as well as for other judges.

今天，多数派不尊重这一判断。它赋予法院作出各种科学和技术判断的权力。它赋予法院作出各种政策决定的权力，包括如何权衡相互竞争的善与价值。（见Chevron案本身。）它使法院处于行政程序的顶点，涉及每一个可以想象的主题——因为监管法规中总是存在空白和歧义，而且往往极为重要。可以采取什么行动来应对气候变化或其他环境挑战？未来几十年，国家的医疗保健系统会是什么样子？或者金融或交通系统？什么规则将约束A.I.的发展？在当前或未来的联邦监管的每个领域，从现在起，可以预期法院将发挥主导作用。这不是国会通过APA或任何其他法规赋予它们的角色。这是本法院现在为自己以及其他法官主张的角色。

And that claim requires disrespecting, too, this Court’s precedent. There are no special reasons, of the kind usually invoked for overturning precedent, to eliminate Chevron deference. And given Chevron’s pervasiveness, the decision to do so is likely to produce large-scale disruption. All that backs today’s decision is the majority’s belief that Chevron was wrong—that it gave agencies too much power and courts not enough. But shifting views about the worth of regulatory actors and their work do not justify overhauling a cornerstone of administrative law. In that sense too, to­ day’s majority has lost sight of its proper role.

而这一主张还要求不尊重本法院的先例。没有通常用于推翻先例的那种特殊理由来消除Chevron遵从。鉴于Chevron的普遍性，这样做很可能造成大规模混乱。支持今天判决的只是多数派的信念：Chevron错了——它给了机关太多权力，给了法院太少。但关于监管行为者及其工作价值的观点变化，并不能成为彻底改革行政法基石的理由。在这个意义上，今天的多数派也忘记了自己的适当角色。

And it is impossible to pretend that today’s decision is a one-off, in either its treatment of agencies or its treatment of precedent. As to the first, this very Term presents yet another example of the Court’s resolve to roll back agency authority, despite congressional direction to the contrary. See SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S. ___ (2024); see also supra, at 3. As to the second, just my own defenses of stare decisis—

而且，无论在对机关的处理还是在对先例的处理上，都不可能假装今天的判决是一次性的。关于第一点，本任期就提供了又一个例子，表明本法院决心削减机关权力，尽管国会指示相反。见SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S. ___ (2024)；另见supra, at 3。关于第二点，仅我本人对遵循先例的辩护——

my own dissents to this Court’s reversals of settled law—by now fill a small volume. See Dobbs, 597 U. S., at 363–364 (joint opinion of Breyer, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.); Ed­ wards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. 255, 296–297 (2021); Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 207–208 (2019); Janus, 585 U. S., at 931–932. Once again, with respect, I dissent.

我本人对本法院推翻既定法律的异议——如今已可汇成一小卷。见Dobbs, 597 U. S., at 363–364 (joint opinion of Breyer, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.)；Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. 255, 296–297 (2021)；Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 207–208 (2019)；Janus, 585 U. S., at 931–932。再次，我谨此提出异议。