Matter of L-G-H-

Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 365 (BIA 2014) Interim Decision #3809

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 365 (BIA 2014) 临时决定 #3809

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室

Board of Immigration Appeals

移民上诉委员会

Sale of a controlled substance in violation of section 893.13(1)(a)(1) of the Florida Statutes, which lacks a mens rea element with respect to the illicit nature of the substance but requires knowledge of its presence and includes an affirmative defense for ignorance of its unlawful nature, is an “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012). FOR RESPONDENT: Jesus Novo, Esquire, Miami, Florida FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Elizabeth A. S. Thaler, Associate Legal Advisor BEFORE: Board Panel: PAULEY, MALPHRUS, and MULLANE, Board Members. PAULEY, Board Member: In a decision dated September 4, 2013, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable and denied his application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012). The Immigration Judge also denied the respondent’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal under sections 208(a) and 241(b)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1231(b)(3) (2012), as well as his request for protection pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988) (“Convention Against Torture”). The respondent has filed a timely appeal from that decision. The respondent’s request for a waiver of the filing fee associated with the filing of an appeal is granted. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.3(a)(1), 1003.8(a)(3) (2014). The appeal will be dismissed in part, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge.

违反《佛罗里达州法规》第893.13(1)(a)(1)条出售受管制物质，该条对于物质的非法性质缺乏犯罪意图要件，但要求知道其存在，并包含对不知其非法性质的肯定性抗辩，属于《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(43)(B)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012) 项下的“非法贩运”加重重罪。 被申请人代理律师：Jesus Novo，Esquire，佛罗里达州迈阿密 国土安全部代理律师：Elizabeth A. S. Thaler，副法律顾问 审理：委员会合议庭：PAULEY、MALPHRUS 和 MULLANE，委员会成员。 PAULEY，委员会成员： 在2013年9月4日的决定中，一名移民法官认定被申请人可被驱逐，并驳回了其根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(a)条、8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012) 提出的取消驱逐申请。该移民法官还驳回了被申请人根据该法第208(a)和241(b)(3)条、8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 和 1231(b)(3) (2012) 提出的庇护和暂缓驱逐申请，以及其根据《禁止酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚公约》（1984年12月10日通过并开放供签署，G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984)（1987年6月26日生效；对美国于1988年4月18日生效）（“《禁止酷刑公约》”）提出的保护请求。被申请人已就该决定及时提出上诉。被申请人关于免除与提交上诉相关的提交费的请求获准。8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.3(a)(1), 1003.8(a)(3) (2014)。上诉部分驳回，案件记录发回移民法官重审。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The respondent is a native and citizen of Venezuela who was first admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor on April 28, 1989.

I. 事实与程序历史 被申请人是委内瑞拉国民和公民，于1989年4月28日首次作为非移民访客获准进入美国。

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引用为 26 I&N Dec. 365 (BIA 2014) 临时决定 #3809

On June 21, 2003, he adjusted his status to that of a conditional permanent resident. He became a lawful permanent resident when the conditions were removed on July 24, 2006. On December 1, 2006, the respondent was convicted of selling cocaine in violation of section 893.13(1)(a)(1) of the Florida Statutes. On the same day, he was convicted of possession of cocaine in violation of section 893.13(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes. Again on January 9, 2009, the respondent was convicted of both possession of cannabis with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver in violation of section 893.13(1)(a)(2) of the Florida Statutes and of use or possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of section 893.147(1). Based on these convictions, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a notice to appear, charging that the respondent was removable under sections 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (B)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (B)(i) (2012), as an alien who was convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude and of a controlled substance violation. The DHS subsequently lodged an additional charge under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, charging that the respondent was convicted of illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, which is an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012). At his removal hearing, the respondent admitted the factual allegations and conceded the charges in the notice to appear, but he denied the lodged charge that he was convicted of an aggravated felony. Based on the respondent’s convictions and his concession of removability, the Immigration Judge found him removable as an alien convicted of a controlled substance violation. 1 He further determined that the respondent was convicted of an aggravated felony based on his conviction for selling cocaine. The Immigration Judge also denied each of the respondent’s applications for relief from removal. On appeal, the respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred in finding that his convictions were for aggravated felonies and in denying his applications for relief. A panel of the Board held oral argument on March 6, 2014. 2

2003年6月21日，他调整身份为有条件永久居民。2006年7月24日条件解除后，他成为合法永久居民。 2006年12月1日，被申请人因违反《佛罗里达州法规》第893.13(1)(a)(1)条出售可卡因而被定罪。同日，他因违反《佛罗里达州法规》第893.13(6)(a)条持有可卡因而被定罪。2009年1月9日，被申请人再次因违反《佛罗里达州法规》第893.13(1)(a)(2)条持有大麻并意图出售、制造或交付，以及因违反第893.147(1)条使用或持有毒品用具而被定罪。 基于这些定罪，国土安全部（“DHS”）签发了出庭通知，指控被申请人根据该法第237(a)(2)(A)(ii)和(B)(i)条、8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) 和 (B)(i) (2012)，作为被定罪两项或以上涉及道德败坏犯罪和一项受管制物质违规的外国人，可被驱逐。DHS随后根据该法第237(a)(2)(A)(iii)条追加指控，指控被申请人被定罪非法贩运受管制物质，该罪根据该法第101(a)(43)(B)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012) 属于加重重罪。 在驱逐听证中，被申请人承认事实指控并认可出庭通知中的指控，但他否认了关于其被定罪加重重罪的追加指控。基于被申请人的定罪及其对可驱逐性的认可，移民法官认定其作为被定罪受管制物质违规的外国人可被驱逐。1 移民法官进一步认定，基于其出售可卡因的定罪，被申请人被定罪加重重罪。移民法官还驳回了被申请人提出的每一项免于驱逐的救济申请。在上诉中，被申请人主张移民法官错误地认定其定罪为加重重罪并错误地驳回其救济申请。委员会合议庭于2014年3月6日举行了口头辩论。2

1 The Immigration Judge did not sustain the charge relating to crimes involving moral turpitude under section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act. The DHS has not contested the Immigration Judge’s finding on that charge, and we consider the issue waived. Matter of R-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 657, 658 n.2 (BIA 2012). 2 The parties agreed during oral argument that the issues on appeal in this case did not involve any factual disputes. We review de novo the question of law presented on appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2014).

1 移民法官未维持与该法第237(a)(2)(A)(ii)条项下涉及道德败坏犯罪相关的指控。DHS未对移民法官关于该指控的认定提出异议，我们认为该问题已被放弃。Matter of R-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 657, 658 n.2 (BIA 2012)。 2 双方在口头辩论中一致认为，本案上诉问题不涉及任何事实争议。我们对上诉中提出的法律问题进行重新审查。8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2014)。

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引用为 26 I&N Dec. 365 (BIA 2014) 临时决定 #3809

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND Section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act includes within the definition of an aggravated felony

II. 法律背景 该法第101(a)(43)(B)条将以下行为纳入加重重罪的定义：

illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18, United States Code). Prior to the enactment of section 893.101 of the Florida Statutes, the Florida Supreme Court held that the “guilty knowledge” element of the crime of possession of a controlled substance contained two aspects: knowledge of the presence of the substance and knowledge of its illicit nature. Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166, 169–70 (Fla. 2002); Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736, 738, 745–46 (Fla. 1996). In 2002, the Florida legislature found those cases to be contrary to legislative intent and expressly eliminated knowledge of the substance’s illicit nature as an element of controlled substance offenses. Fla. Stat. § 893.101 (2002). The statute did not, however, eliminate the element of knowledge of the presence of the substance, and it created an affirmative defense of lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance. State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 415−16 (Fla. 2012). This change was evidently intended to help facilitate the prosecution of drug offenses in Florida. However, for purposes of the immigration laws, the amendment had the effect of preventing drug trafficking offenses in Florida from qualifying as aggravated felonies under the “drug trafficking crime” clause of section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. See Donawa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013). In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that because Florida law eliminated knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance as a required element of the offense of drug trafficking under section 893.13(1)(a), that statute is now broader than the corresponding Federal crime at 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012), which requires such knowledge for conviction. 3 Id. at 1281−82. Consequently, this offense cannot qualify as an aggravated felony under the “drug trafficking crime” clause of 3 At the time of the respondent’s conviction under section 893.13(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, it was “unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance.” By contrast, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which is among the drug trafficking offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” (Emphasis added.)

非法贩运受管制物质（定义见《受管制物质法》第102条），包括毒品贩运犯罪（定义见《美国法典》第18编第924(c)条）。 在《佛罗里达州法规》第893.101条颁布之前，佛罗里达州最高法院裁定，持有受管制物质犯罪的“明知”要件包含两个方面：知道物质的存在和知道其非法性质。Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166, 169–70 (Fla. 2002); Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736, 738, 745–46 (Fla. 1996)。2002年，佛罗里达州立法机关认定这些判例与立法意图相悖，并明确取消了知道物质非法性质作为受管制物质犯罪要件的要求。Fla. Stat. § 893.101 (2002)。然而，该法规并未取消知道物质存在的要件，并创设了不知物质非法性质的肯定性抗辩。State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 415−16 (Fla. 2012)。 这一变化显然旨在帮助促进佛罗里达州对毒品犯罪的起诉。然而，就移民法而言，该修正案的后果是使佛罗里达州的毒品贩运犯罪无法根据该法第101(a)(43)(B)条的“毒品贩运犯罪”条款构成加重重罪。见 Donawa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013)。在该案中，美国第11巡回上诉法院裁定，由于佛罗里达州法律取消了知道受管制物质非法性质作为第893.13(1)(a)条项下毒品贩运犯罪的必备要件，该法规现在比对应的联邦犯罪21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012) 更宽泛，后者要求具备该明知才能定罪。3 Id. at 1281−82。因此，该犯罪不能根据该法第101(a)(43)(B)条的“毒品贩运犯罪”条款构成加重重罪。 3 在被申请人根据《佛罗里达州法规》第893.13(1)(a)条被定罪时，该条规定“任何人出售、制造或交付，或持有并意图出售、制造或交付受管制物质，均为非法”。相比之下，21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)（属于18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)所列毒品贩运犯罪之一）规定“任何人明知或故意……制造、分发或配发，或持有并意图制造、分发或配发受管制物质，均为非法”。（强调为后加。）

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section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. Id. at 1281–83; 4 see also Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624, 630−31 (5th Cir. 2014) (concurring with the reasoning in Donawa). See generally Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283–86 (2013); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683−85 (2013); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 52−55 (2006). However, the court expressly declined to consider the possibility that such an offense could be an aggravated felony under the “illicit trafficking” clause of section 101(a)(43)(B), and it remanded the case to the Board to consider the question. Donawa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d at 1283−84. See generally Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I&N Dec. 273, 274 (BIA 2010) (stating that under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, the “illicit trafficking” clause of the aggravated felony definition is distinct from the “drug trafficking crime” clause). This case addresses that question. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the respondent’s conviction for selling cocaine in violation of section 893.13(1)(a)(1) of the Florida Statutes is for an aggravated felony under the illicit trafficking clause of section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act.

该法第101(a)(43)(B)条。Id. at 1281–83; 4 另见 Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624, 630−31 (5th Cir. 2014)（赞同 Donawa 案的推理）。一般参见 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283–86 (2013); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683−85 (2013); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 52−55 (2006)。 然而，法院明确拒绝考虑此类犯罪是否可能根据该法第101(a)(43)(B)条的“非法贩运”条款构成加重重罪，并将案件发回委员会审议该问题。Donawa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d at 1283−84。一般参见 Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I&N Dec. 273, 274 (BIA 2010)（指出根据该法第101(a)(43)(B)条，加重重罪定义中的“非法贩运”条款与“毒品贩运犯罪”条款不同）。本案即审议该问题。基于以下理由，我们认定被申请人违反《佛罗里达州法规》第893.13(1)(a)(1)条出售可卡因的定罪，属于该法第101(a)(43)(B)条非法贩运条款项下的加重重罪。

III. ANALYSIS

III. 分析

A. “Illicit Trafficking” The phrase “illicit trafficking” is not defined in the Act, but we have determined that Congress used the term to include “any state, federal, or qualified foreign felony conviction involving the unlawful trading or dealing” in a controlled substance as defined by Federal law. Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536, 540−41 (BIA 1992) (emphasis added), modified on other grounds, Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390 (BIA 2002). The record establishes that the respondent was convicted of a State felony involving cocaine, a federally controlled substance. 5 Thus, the conviction

A. “非法贩运” “非法贩运”一词在该法中未作定义，但我们已认定国会使用该术语包括“任何州、联邦或合格外国重罪定罪，涉及非法交易或经营”联邦法律定义的受管制物质。Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536, 540−41 (BIA 1992)（强调为后加），因其他理由被修改，Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390 (BIA 2002)。记录证明被申请人被定罪一项涉及可卡因（一种联邦受管制物质）的州重罪。5 因此，该定罪

4 Under Florida law, a violation is a felony of the second degree under section 893.13(1)(a)(1) if drugs such as cocaine are involved, but it is a felony of the third degree under section 893.13(1)(a)(2) for other substances, including cannabis. In Donawa, the Eleventh Circuit specifically addressed section 893.13(1)(a)(2). However, we conclude that its holding applies to the statute more broadly since the only difference between sections 893.13(1)(a)(1) and (2) is the controlled substance described. 5 The respondent’s conviction expressly indicates that it was for a felony of the second degree, and he has not disputed that the controlled substance was cocaine. Therefore, we need not consider whether the substances covered as second degree felonies under Florida law are broader than those under Federal law, and thus whether section 893.13(1)(a) is divisible as to the substance involved, because we conclude that

4 根据佛罗里达州法律，如果涉及可卡因等毒品，违反第893.13(1)(a)(1)条的行为属于二级重罪，但对于包括大麻在内的其他物质，根据第893.13(1)(a)(2)条属于三级重罪。在Donawa案中，第11巡回法院专门处理了第893.13(1)(a)(2)条。然而，我们认定其裁决更广泛地适用于该法规，因为第893.13(1)(a)(1)条与第(2)条之间唯一的区别在于所描述的管制物质。 5 被申请人的定罪明确表明其属于二级重罪，且他未对管制物质为可卡因提出异议。因此，我们无需考虑佛罗里达州法律下作为二级重罪涵盖的物质是否比联邦法律下的物质更宽泛，从而无需考虑第893.13(1)(a)条在涉及物质方面是否可分，因为我们认定

(continued . . .)

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meets two of the three criteria we developed in Matter of Davis for determining whether a crime qualifies as illicit trafficking. The remaining issue is whether the respondent’s conviction under section 893.13(1)(a)(1) of the Florida Statutes necessarily involved the “unlawful trading or dealing” in cocaine. To make that assessment, we must first decide whether, unlike the Florida statute, the “illicit trafficking” clause of section 101(a)(43)(B) of Act includes a specific mens rea requirement. There is no express mens rea requirement included in the term “illicit trafficking” in section 101(a)(43)(B). Since the phrase “including a drug trafficking crime” in section 101(a)(43)(B) is set forth as a subset of “illicit trafficking,” Congress must have intended that “illicit trafficking” would encompass other controlled substance offenses beyond those defined to be a “drug trafficking crime” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 6 Thus, the term “illicit trafficking” need not be limited to crimes in Federal, State, or foreign laws that require the defendant’s knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance involved for conviction. It is clear that when Congress revised the Act in 1990, it intended to expand, rather than limit, the removal of aliens convicted of drug offenses. See Matter of Esqueda, 20 I&N Dec. 850, 853−54 & n.3 (BIA 1994). We have no reason to believe that Congress intended to impose a specific knowledge requirement, and thus exclude a State drug trafficking crime from the aggravated felony definition, solely because it does not require knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance involved. The Supreme Court has long recognized the constitutional validity of statutes related to public welfare offenses, such as the illegal dealing of narcotics, even though they lack a mens rea requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922) (holding that the general rule requiring proof of criminal intent has been modified for certain statutes that would otherwise be rendered ineffective by such a rule); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 67−68 (1910) (holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a State to prove intent for statutes implicating the “public welfare”); see also United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1068−69 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that to require a mens rea element contrary to the plain language of a statute and its legislative history could “functionally eliminate” its purpose); State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d at 422−23 (upholding the

符合我们在Matter of Davis案中为判定某项犯罪是否构成非法贩运而制定的三项标准中的两项。剩余问题是， respondent根据《佛罗里达州法规》第893.13(1)(a)(1)条被定罪，是否必然涉及可卡因的“非法交易或买卖”。为作出该评估，我们必须首先裁定，与佛罗里达州法规不同，《法案》第101(a)(43)(B)条的“非法贩运”条款是否包含特定的犯罪意图要求。 第101(a)(43)(B)条中“非法贩运”一词并未包含明示的犯罪意图要求。由于第101(a)(43)(B)条中“包括毒品贩运犯罪”一语是作为“非法贩运”的子集规定的，国会必然意图使“非法贩运”涵盖除18 U.S.C. § 924(c)所界定“毒品贩运犯罪”之外的其他受管制物质犯罪。6 因此，“非法贩运”一词不必限于联邦、州或外国法律中要求被告人对所涉物质非法性质具有明知方可定罪的那些犯罪。 显然，国会在1990年修订《法案》时，意图扩大而非限制对因毒品犯罪被定罪的外国人的驱逐。见Matter of Esqueda, 20 I&N Dec. 850, 853−54 & n.3 (BIA 1994)。我们没有理由认为，国会意图仅因某项州毒品贩运犯罪不要求对所涉物质非法性质的明知，便施加特定的明知要求，从而将该犯罪排除在加重重罪定义之外。 最高法院早已承认与公共福利犯罪（例如非法买卖麻醉品）相关的法规具有宪法效力，即使这些法规缺乏犯罪意图要求。见，例如，United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922)（裁定要求证明犯罪意图的一般规则已针对某些法规作出修改，否则该规则将使这些法规失效）；Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 67−68 (1910)（裁定《第14修正案》的正当程序条款并不要求州对涉及“公共福利”的法规证明意图）；另见United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1068−69 (11th Cir. 2011)（裁定，要求犯罪意图要件而违背法规的明确文义及其立法史，可能“在功能上消除”其目的）；State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d at 422−23（维持

_______________________________ the issue has been waived on appeal. See United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414 (2014) (finding that the defendant waived the issue of divisibility). 6 We recognize that the “drug trafficking crime” clause is not a subset in the usual sense, because that phrase includes some offenses that do not involve a commercial aspect. Thus, the “subset” is both broader and narrower than “illicit trafficking.”

_______________________________ 该问题已在上诉中被放弃。见United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414 (2014)（认定被告放弃了可分割性问题）。 6 我们认识到“毒品贩运犯罪”条款并非通常意义上的子集，因为该短语包括一些不涉及商业方面的犯罪。因此，该“子集”既比“非法贩运”更宽又更窄。

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constitutionality of section 893.13(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes). Although we are not aware of any legislative history pertinent to the mens rea issue in this case, given the Supreme Court’s view of public welfare offenses lacking a mens rea requirement, it does not appear likely that Congress was unaware of the issue when it expanded the aggravated felony definition to include illicit trafficking. As we held in Matter of Davis, the term “illicit” is defined as “not permitted or allowed; prohibited; unlawful; as an illicit trade.” 20 I&N Dec. at 541 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 673 (5th ed. 1979)). Thus, we gave effect to this plain meaning to construe the term “illicit” as simply referencing the illegality of the trafficking activity. Id. In deciding this aspect of Matter of Davis, we referred without further explanation to the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Bassett v. U.S. INS, 581 F.2d 1385, 1388 (10th Cir. 1978), which set forth a similar definition for the term “illicit,” although the State statute of conviction required some level of intentional conduct. However, Davis did not decide whether an “illicit” act requires knowledge of the unlawful nature of the controlled substance. It also did not suggest such a mens rea requirement, because a person can engage in the unlawful or illicit trading or dealing in a controlled substance without knowing that the controlled substance that is the subject of the transaction is illegal. We now expressly hold that there is no such mens rea required by the term “illicit,” at least not within the context of the statutory scheme established by Florida, where knowledge of the substance is still required and an affirmative defense is available to show lack of knowledge of the illegal nature of the substance. To the extent there may have been ambiguity in our prior holdings with regard to whether the term “illicit” implies an intentional state of mind, we explicitly hold that it does not. See Matter of Esqueda, 20 I&N Dec. at 862 (withdrawing from prior precedent decisions “to the extent they indicate that aliens convicted under a statute without any element of scienter are not subject to exclusion or deportation”). The DHS has argued that even a purely strict liability offense would qualify as an “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony. We need not address that question because the Florida statute involved in this case does not go that far. 7 Section 893.13(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes includes an affirmative defense for a person who possesses a controlled substance

《佛罗里达州法规》第893.13(1)(a)条的合宪性）。尽管我们不知道本案中与犯罪意图问题相关的任何立法历史，但鉴于最高法院对缺乏犯罪意图要求的公共福利犯罪的看法，国会似乎在将加重重罪定义扩大至包括非法贩运时不太可能不知道该问题。 正如我们在Matter of Davis案中所裁定的，“非法”一词被定义为“不被允许或准许的；禁止的；非法的；如非法交易。”20 I&N Dec. at 541（引用Black's Law Dictionary 673 (5th ed. 1979)）。因此，我们赋予该普通含义以效力，将“非法”一词解释为仅指贩运活动的违法性。Id. 在裁定Matter of Davis案的这一方面时，我们未作进一步解释即提及第10巡回法院在Bassett v. U.S. INS, 581 F.2d 1385, 1388 (10th Cir. 1978)中的裁决，该裁决为“非法”一词设定了类似定义，尽管定罪所依据的州法规要求某种程度的故意行为。然而，Davis案并未裁定“非法”行为是否要求知悉管制物质的非法性质。它也未暗示这样的犯罪意图要求，因为一个人可以在不知悉交易标的管制物质为非法的情况下从事管制物质的非法或违法交易或买卖。 我们现在明确裁定，“非法”一词不要求这样的犯罪意图，至少在佛罗里达州所建立的法规体系背景下不要求，该体系仍要求知悉物质，并提供肯定性抗辩以表明不知悉物质的非法性质。就我们先前的裁决中关于“非法”一词是否暗示故意心理状态可能存在模糊之处而言，我们明确裁定其不暗示。见Matter of Esqueda, 20 I&N Dec. at 862（从先前判例裁决中撤回“在它们表明根据没有任何犯罪意图要素的法规定罪的外国人不受排斥或驱逐的范围内”）。 DHS主张，即使是纯粹的严格责任犯罪也符合“非法贩运”加重重罪。我们无需处理该问题，因为本案所涉佛罗里达州法规并未走得那么远。7 《佛罗里达州法规》第893.13(1)(a)条为持有管制物质的人提供了肯定性抗辩

7 Thus, we need not determine whether, for example, an offense would satisfy the definition of “illicit trafficking” if the statute attached criminal liability for sale of drugs to a person who thought he was delivering stolen diamonds but the package contained a controlled substance.

7 因此，我们无需确定，例如，如果法规将毒品销售的刑事责任附加于一个自认为在运送被盗钻石但包裹中含有管制物质的人，该犯罪是否满足“非法贩运”的定义。

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without knowledge of its illegal nature. Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court has held that although the statute eliminated the prior mens rea requirement as to the illicit nature of the controlled substance, it still requires that the person be aware of the presence of the substance itself. State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d at 422−23 (expressly rejecting the argument that innocent conduct would be punished because “[i]n the unusual circumstance where an individual has actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance but has no knowledge that the substance is illicit, the defendant may present such a defense to the jury”); see also Matter of Esqueda, 20 I&N Dec. at 855−56 (noting that where a defense premised on a lack of knowledge is available, the statute is not one of “strict liability”). Because section 893.13(1)(a) retains a mens rea requirement regarding the presence of a controlled substance and includes an affirmative defense for ignorance of its unlawful nature, we do not consider it to be a “strict liability” statute. We therefore conclude that “illicit trafficking” offenses do not require a mens rea element with respect to knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, at least when accompanied, as here, by an affirmative defense permitting a defendant to show that he or she had no such awareness, as well as by a requirement that the defendant be aware of the presence of the substance (apart from its illegality). Next, we must decide if section 893.13(1)(a)(1) is otherwise a categorical match to the illicit trafficking clause of the Act. 8 To determine if a State crime is a categorical match to the analogous Federal offense, the Eleventh Circuit follows the analytical approach established in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and recently set forth in Descamps v. United States, and Moncrieffe v. Holder. See Donawa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d at 1280−81 & n.3. On this point, we are guided by our holding in Davis, which, as noted earlier, held that to meet the definition of “illicit trafficking” under the Act, the offense must involve a commercial transaction. 9 Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. at 541 (concluding that

而不知悉其非法性质。此外，佛罗里达州最高法院已裁定，尽管该法规取消了先前关于管制物质非法性质的犯罪意图要求，但它仍要求该人知悉物质本身的存在。State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d at 422−23（明确驳回无辜行为将受惩罚的论点，因为“在个人对管制物质拥有实际或推定持有但不知悉该物质为非法的特殊情况下，被告可以向陪审团提出此类抗辩”）；另见Matter of Esqueda, 20 I&N Dec. at 855−56（指出在可获得以缺乏知悉为前提的抗辩时，该法规不属于“严格责任”法规）。 由于第893.13(1)(a)条保留了关于管制物质存在的犯罪意图要求，并包括对不知悉其非法性质的肯定性抗辩，我们不认为它是“严格责任”法规。因此，我们裁定“非法贩运”犯罪不要求关于知悉管制物质非法性质的犯罪意图要素，至少在此处伴随有允许被告表明其无此类知悉的肯定性抗辩，以及要求被告知悉物质存在（与其违法性无关）的情况下是如此。 接下来，我们必须裁定第893.13(1)(a)(1)条是否在其他方面与《法案》的非法贩运条款类别匹配。8 为确定州犯罪是否与类似联邦犯罪类别匹配，第11巡回法院遵循Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)中确立的分析方法，以及最近在Descamps v. United States和Moncrieffe v. Holder中阐述的方法。见Donawa v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 735 F.3d at 1280−81 & n.3。在这一点上，我们以Davis案中的裁决为指导，如前所述，该裁决认定，为满足《法案》下“非法贩运”的定义，犯罪必须涉及商业交易。9 Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. at 541（裁定

8 As previously noted, there is no question that a violation of section 893.13(1)(a)(1) is a felony, which we have found is required to fall within the “illicit trafficking” clause of the aggravated felony definition in section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. See Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I&N Dec. at 274−75. It therefore follows that the Florida statute and the “illicit trafficking” clause of the Act are a categorical match insofar as both are only punishable as felonies. 9 Our interpretation that “trafficking” involves a commercial transaction, or passing of goods from one person to another for money or other consideration, has been adopted by the courts of appeal that have addressed it. See, e.g., Soto-Hernandez v. Holder, 729 F.3d 1, 4−5 (1st Cir. 2013) (affirming the “merchant nature” of the Board’s definition of “trafficking”); Rendon v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967, 974–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell contains a “trafficking element”

8 如前所述，毫无疑问违反第893.13(1)(a)(1)条是重罪，我们认定这是属于《法案》第101(a)(43)(B)条加重重罪定义中“非法贩运”条款所要求的。见Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I&N Dec. at 274−75。因此，佛罗里达州法规与《法案》的“非法贩运”条款在两者均仅可作为重罪处罚的范围内属于类别匹配。 9 我们将“贩运”解释为涉及商业交易，或为金钱或其他对价将货物从一人转移至另一人，这一解释已被处理该问题的上诉法院采纳。见，例如，Soto-Hernandez v. Holder, 729 F.3d 1, 4−5 (1st Cir. 2013)（确认委员会对“贩运”定义的“商人性质”）；Rendon v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967, 974–76 (9th Cir. 2008)（裁定持有管制物质并意图出售包含“贩运要素”

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a “business or merchant” element or the commonly understood aspect of “trading or dealing” must be involved for an offense to be “illicit trafficking”); see also Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 54 (noting that “ordinarily ‘trafficking’ means some sort of commercial dealing”). Applying this “commercial transaction” test, we first find that section 893.13(1)(a) is divisible as to the offenses it prohibits. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 2284 (stating that a statute is divisible where it “comprises multiple, alternative versions of the crime”); Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 349, 352−53 (BIA 2014). As the generally applicable jury instructions for a drug trafficking offense in Florida make clear, section 893.13(1)(a) lists multiple discrete offenses, which may or may not categorically match the “illicit trafficking” clause of section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. Fla. Standard Jury Instr. (Crim.) 25.2 (2013) (stating that to prove an offense under section 893.13(1)(a) or (2)(a), the State must prove that the defendant “[sold] [purchased] [manufactured] [delivered] [possessed with intent to sell] [possessed with the intent to purchase] [possessed with intent to manufacture] [possessed with intent to deliver] a certain substance”). For example, since it is illegal to manufacture a controlled substance under the statute, a person could potentially be convicted of manufacturing only a small amount of marijuana or another controlled substance for personal use or with no remuneration. However, we need not decide whether such conduct fits within the scope of “illicit trafficking” because the statute is clearly divisible, and the modified categorical approach applies. 10 See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 2283−85 (stating that the modified categorical approach is appropriate to assist courts in applying the categorical approach when assessing a “divisible” criminal statute). Employing the modified categorical approach, we look to the record of conviction to determine if the respondent’s offense is categorically “illicit trafficking.” Evidence that may be considered in applying the modified categorical approach includes the charging document, the terms of a plea

必须涉及“商业或商人”要素或通常理解的“交易或买卖”方面，行为才构成“非法贩运”）；另见Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 54（指出“通常‘贩运’指某种商业交易”）。 适用这一“商业交易”检验标准，我们首先认定第893.13(1)(a)条就其禁止的各项罪行而言具有可分性。见Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 2284（指出当法规“包含犯罪的多个替代版本”时即具有可分性）；Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 349, 352−53 (BIA 2014)。正如佛罗里达州毒品贩运罪普遍适用的陪审团指示所表明的，第893.13(1)(a)条列举了多个独立罪行，这些罪行可能或可能不当然符合该法第101(a)(43)(B)条的“非法贩运”条款。Fla. Standard Jury Instr. (Crim.) 25.2 (2013)（指出为证明第893.13(1)(a)条或(2)(a)条项下的罪行，州必须证明被告“[出售][购买][制造][交付][持有并意图出售][持有并意图购买][持有并意图制造][持有并意图交付]某种物质”）。 例如，由于根据该法规制造受管制物质属违法行为，一个人可能仅因制造少量大麻或其他受管制物质供个人使用或无报酬而被定罪。然而，我们无需裁定此类行为是否属于“非法贩运”的范围，因为该法规明显具有可分性，且修正的类别方法适用。10 见Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 2283−85（指出修正的类别方法适合在评估“可分”刑事法规时协助法院适用类别方法）。 采用修正的类别方法，我们审查定罪记录以确定答辩人的罪行是否当然属于“非法贩运”。在适用修正的类别方法时可考虑的证据包括起诉文件、认罪协议条款

_______________________________ and is therefore “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”); Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 305, 313 (3d Cir. 2002) (following our holding in Davis that the two elements required to establish that a crime is “illicit trafficking” are (1) the offense is a felony under the law of the convicting sovereign and (2) it contains a “trafficking element,” such as the unlawful trading or dealing of a controlled substance); Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 107−10 (2d Cir. 2001) (deferring to the Board’s definition in Davis as reasonable); Navarro-Macias v. INS, 16 F. App’x 468, 471 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying the “trading or dealing” test in Davis). 10 We note that there would also have to be a realistic probability of conviction for such an offense under the statute. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 1684−85.

_______________________________ 因此属于“受管制物质的非法贩运”）；Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 305, 313 (3d Cir. 2002)（遵循我们在Davis案中的裁定，即认定犯罪为“非法贩运”所需的两项要素是：(1)该罪行根据定罪主权法律属重罪；(2)其包含“贩运要素”，例如受管制物质的非法交易或买卖）；Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 107−10 (2d Cir. 2001)（尊重委员会在Davis案中的定义，认为其合理）；Navarro-Macias v. INS, 16 F. App’x 468, 471 (7th Cir. 2001)（适用Davis案中的“交易或买卖”检验标准）。 10 我们注意到，对于该法规项下的此类罪行，还必须存在定罪的现实可能性。见Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 1684−85。

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agreement or transcript of colloquy between the judge and the defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or “some comparable judicial record of this information.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); see also Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011); Matter of Sanudo, 23 I&N Dec. 968, 974−75 (BIA 2006). Count One of the information contained in the record states that the respondent sold cocaine to a confidential informant in violation of section 893.13(1)(a)(1) of the Florida Statutes. The judicial order containing a finding of guilt confirms that the respondent was convicted of selling cocaine under Count One of the information. 11 The Florida courts have consistently held that for purposes of section 893.13(1)(a), “consideration is part of every sale.” State v. Stewart, 374 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. 1979). Thus, selling cocaine in violation of section 893.13(1)(a) is categorically an offense involving a “commercial transaction” and therefore meets the “illicit trafficking” definition in Matter of Davis. Based on the documents in the record, we conclude that the respondent’s conviction for the sale of cocaine under section 893.13(1)(a)(1) is for an aggravated felony as defined by section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. 12 Accordingly, his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s finding of removability will be dismissed.

认罪协议或法官与被告之间对话的记录，其中被告确认了认罪的事实基础，或“此类信息的某些可比司法记录”。Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005)；另见Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011)；Matter of Sanudo, 23 I&N Dec. 968, 974−75 (BIA 2006)。 记录中所含起诉书第一项指控称，答辩人违反《佛罗里达州法规》第893.13(1)(a)(1)条向一名秘密线人出售可卡因。包含有罪认定的司法命令确认，答辩人因起诉书第一项指控下的出售可卡因而被定罪。11 佛罗里达州法院一贯裁定，就第893.13(1)(a)条而言，“对价是每次出售的组成部分”。State v. Stewart, 374 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. 1979)。因此，违反第893.13(1)(a)条出售可卡因当然属于涉及“商业交易”的罪行，因而符合Matter of Davis案中的“非法贩运”定义。基于记录中的文件，我们认定答辩人根据第893.13(1)(a)(1)条因出售可卡因而被定罪，属于该法第101(a)(43)(B)条所定义的加重重罪。12 因此，其对移民法官可驱逐性认定的上诉将被驳回。

B. Relief From Removal As an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, the respondent is ineligible for cancellation of removal and asylum. See sections 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i), 240A(a)(3) of the Act. Moreover, aggravated felonies involving unlawful trafficking in controlled substances are presumptively “particularly serious crimes,” and the Immigration Judge properly found that the respondent’s aggravated felony conviction rendered him ineligible for withholding of removal under both section 241(b)(3) of the Act and the Convention Against Torture. See section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii)

B. 免于驱逐的救济 作为被定有加重重罪的外国人，答辩人不符合取消驱逐和庇护的资格。见该法第208(b)(2)(A)(ii)、(B)(i)、240A(a)(3)条。此外，涉及非法贩运受管制物质的加重重罪被推定为“特别严重罪行”，移民法官正确地认定答辩人的加重重罪定罪使其不符合该法第241(b)(3)条和《禁止酷刑公约》项下暂缓驱逐的资格。见该法第241(b)(3)(B)(ii)条

11 This document also states that Count One includes the alleged offense of “Cocaine/Sell/Man/Deliver/Possess W/Intent.” Therefore the order not only identifies the statute of conviction as section 893.13(1)(a)(1), but it also establishes that the specific controlled substance is cocaine. The relevant evidence for our purposes is the judicial order’s reference to Count One, which clearly demonstrates that the specific statutory element of conviction was the sale of the controlled substance. 12 In view of this conclusion, we need not reach the question whether the respondent’s 2009 conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell in violation of section 893.13(1)(a)(2) of the Florida Statutes is also for an aggravated felony as either “illicit trafficking” or attempted “illicit trafficking.”

11 该文件还指出，第一项指控包括所指控的“可卡因/出售/制造/交付/持有并意图”罪行。因此，该命令不仅将定罪法规确定为第893.13(1)(a)(1)条，还确认了具体受管制物质为可卡因。就我们的目的而言，相关证据是司法命令对第一项指控的提及，这清楚表明具体的定罪法定要素是出售受管制物质。 12 鉴于这一结论，我们无需触及答辩人2009年因违反《佛罗里达州法规》第893.13(1)(a)(2)条持有并意图出售受管制物质而被定罪是否也属于“非法贩运”或未遂“非法贩运”的加重重罪这一问题。

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Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 365 (BIA 2014) Interim Decision #3809

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 365 (BIA 2014) 临时决定 #3809

of the Act; Matter of Y-L-, A-G- & R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270, 276−77 (A.G. 2002); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(c)(1), 1208.16(d)(2) (2014). The respondent may, however, be eligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The respondent’s claim to deferral of removal is based on his alleged fear of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Venezuela. The Immigration Judge found that the respondent did not adequately establish that “he would be tortured by the present government of Venezuela.” However, under the proper standard for establishing eligibility for deferral of removal, the respondent needs to show that it is “more likely than not” that he will be subjected to torture “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1) (2014); see also Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912, 917−18 (A.G. 2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). Therefore the Immigration Judge’s decision, which contained minimal explanation or analysis, did not properly analyze the respondent’s application for deferral of removal. See generally Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1145−46 (11th Cir. 2010) (addressing the applicable burden of proof); Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1242−43 (11th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge. On remand, the parties should be given an opportunity to present additional evidence pertaining to the respondent’s application for deferral of removal, including, but not limited to, testimony and updated country conditions materials. The Immigration Judge should then further consider the respondent’s request for that relief, including all necessary findings of fact. ORDER: The respondent’s appeal from the Immigration Judge’s finding of removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act is dismissed.

；Matter of Y-L-, A-G- & R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270, 276−77 (A.G. 2002)；8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(c)(1), 1208.16(d)(2) (2014)。然而，答辩人可能符合《禁止酷刑公约》项下暂缓驱逐的资格。 答辩人暂缓驱逐的申请基于其声称在委内瑞拉对哥伦比亚革命武装力量（FARC）的恐惧。移民法官认定，答辩人未能充分证明“他会被委内瑞拉现政府酷刑折磨”。然而，根据认定暂缓驱逐资格的适当标准，答辩人需要证明“更有可能”他将遭受“由公职人员或以官方身份行事的其他人实施、唆使或经其同意或默许”的酷刑。8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1) (2014)；另见Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912, 917−18 (A.G. 2006)；8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)。因此，移民法官的决定（其解释或分析极少）未能适当分析答辩人的暂缓驱逐申请。一般见Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1145−46 (11th Cir. 2010)（讨论适用的举证责任）；Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1242−43 (11th Cir. 2004)。因此，记录将被发回移民法官重审。 发回重审时，应给予双方机会提交与答辩人暂缓驱逐申请相关的额外证据，包括但不限于证言和更新的国情材料。移民法官随后应进一步考虑答辩人对此项救济的请求，包括所有必要的事实认定。 命令：答辩人对移民法官根据该法第237(a)(2)(A)(iii)条所作可驱逐性认定的上诉被驳回。

FURTHER ORDER: The respondent’s appeal from the denial of his applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, and withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act and the Convention Against Torture is dismissed.

进一步命令：答辩人对驳回其根据该法第241(b)(3)条和《禁止酷刑公约》提出的取消驱逐、庇护和暂缓驱逐申请的上诉被驳回。

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