Matter of Yanez

Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 390 (BIA 2002) Interim Decision #3473

引用为 23 I&N Dec. 390 (BIA 2002) 临时决定第3473号

File A91 334 042 - Chicago

案卷 A91 334 042 - 芝加哥

Decided May 13, 2002

2002年5月13日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

The determination whether a state drug offense constitutes a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2000), such that it may be considered an “aggravated felony” under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2000), shall be made by reference to decisional authority from the federal circuit courts of appeals, and not by reference to any separate legal standard adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Matter of K-V-D-, Interim Decision 3422 (BIA 1999), overruled. Matter of L-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 89 (BIA 1995), and Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1992), modified.

关于州毒品犯罪是否构成18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2000)项下的“毒品贩运犯罪”，从而可依据《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(43)(B)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2000)被视为“加重重罪”的认定，应当参照联邦巡回上诉法院的判例权威作出，而非参照移民上诉委员会采纳的任何单独法律标准。Matter of K-V-D-，临时决定第3422号（BIA 1999），被推翻。Matter of L-G-，21 I&N Dec. 89（BIA 1995）及Matter of Davis，20 I&N Dec. 536（BIA 1992），被修改。

FOR RESPONDENT: Carol A. Waldman, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois

被申请人代理人：Carol A. Waldman，律师，伊利诺伊州芝加哥

FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Amy C. Hoogasian, Assistant District Counsel

移民与归化局代理人：Amy C. Hoogasian，助理地区法律顾问

BEFORE: Board En Banc: SCIALABBA, Acting Chairman; DUNNE, Vice Chairman; SCHMIDT, HOLMES, HURWITZ, VILLAGELIU, FILPPU, COLE, GUENDELSBERGER, GRANT, MOSCATO, MILLER, BRENNAN, OSUNA, OHLSON, HESS, and PAULEY, Board Members. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: ROSENBERG and ESPENOZA, Board Members.

审理：全体委员会：SCIALABBA，代理主席；DUNNE，副主席；SCHMIDT、HOLMES、HURWITZ、VILLAGELIU、FILPPU、COLE、GUENDELSBERGER、GRANT、MOSCATO、MILLER、BRENNAN、OSUNA、OHLSON、HESS及PAULEY，委员会成员。协同与异议意见：ROSENBERG及ESPENOZA，委员会成员。

FILPPU, Board Member:

FILPPU，委员会成员：

In a decision dated March 14, 2000, an Immigration Judge sustained the charges of removability against the respondent, denied his requests for relief from removal, and directed that he be removed to Mexico. The respondent has appealed from that decision, arguing that the Immigration Judge erred as a matter of law in finding him removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony on the basis of his two state convictions for drug possession, and requesting that the record be remanded so that he may apply for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000).

在2000年3月14日的决定中，一名移民法官维持了对被申请人可驱逐性的指控，驳回了其免于驱逐的救济请求，并指令将其驱逐至墨西哥。被申请人对该决定提出上诉，主张移民法官在法律上错误地基于其两项州毒品持有定罪认定其因加重重罪而被驱逐，并请求将案卷发回以便其依据《移民与国籍法》第240A(a)条、8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000)申请取消驱逐。

We will dismiss the respondent’s appeal. 1 Moreover, we have reexamined our precedent decision in Matter of K-V-D-, Interim Decision 3422 (BIA

我们将驳回被申请人的上诉。1 此外，我们重新审查了我们在Matter of K-V-D-，临时决定第3422号（BIA

1 The respondent’s request for oral argument is denied pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e) (2001), and his request for a waiver of the appeal fee is granted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(c) (2001).

1 被申请人的口头辩论请求依据8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e) (2001)被驳回，其上诉费豁免请求依据8 C.F.R. § 3.8(c) (2001)被批准。

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1999), where we held that state drug offenses may be considered aggravated felonies for immigration law purposes only if they are “analogous” to offenses punishable as felonies under the federal drug laws. As explained below, we now withdraw from Matter of K-V-D-, supra, as well as from those portions of Matter of L-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 89 (BIA 1995), and Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1992), that are inconsistent with our present decision.

1999）中的先例决定，我们在该决定中认为，州毒品犯罪只有在与联邦毒品法律下可作为重罪处罚的犯罪“类似”时，才可出于移民法目的被视为加重重罪。如下文所述，我们现在退出Matter of K-V-D-，supra，并退出Matter of L-G-，21 I&N Dec. 89（BIA 1995）及Matter of Davis，20 I&N Dec. 536（BIA 1992）中与本决定不一致的部分。

A number of federal circuit courts of appeals have developed standards for answering the question whether a state felony drug conviction constitutes an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2000). We will now follow those standards in immigration cases arising within those circuits. Further, for reasons stated below, in immigration cases arising within circuits that have not yet had occasion to consider this question, we will apply the standards adopted by the majority of the circuit courts.

若干联邦巡回上诉法院已就州重罪毒品定罪是否构成《法》第101(a)(43)(B)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2000)项下加重重罪的问题制定了标准。我们现在将在这些巡回区内产生的移民案件中遵循这些标准。此外，基于下文所述理由，在尚未有机会考虑该问题的巡回区内产生的移民案件中，我们将适用多数巡回法院采纳的标准。

I. BACKGROUND

I. 背景

The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. The record reflects that he has been convicted twice in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, of the offense of possession of cocaine in violation of chapter 720, section 570/402(c) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes: (1) on January 5, 1998, for which he was fined and sentenced to 1 year of probation; and (2) on May 27, 1999, for which he was sentenced to 90 days of incarceration and 18 months of probation. His offenses are classified as “class 4 felonies” under Illinois law, and are therefore punishable by a term of imprisonment of between 1 and 3 years. See 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (West 1999). On the basis of these convictions, the Immigration and Naturalization Service charged the respondent with removability as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000), and as an alien convicted of an offense relating to a controlled substance under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. The Immigration Judge sustained both charges, and this timely appeal followed. 2

被申请人是墨西哥本土公民及公民，并为美国合法永久居民。案卷显示，他曾在伊利诺伊州库克县巡回法院两次被判犯有违反《伊利诺伊州汇编法规》第720章第570/402(c)条的持有可卡因罪：（1）1998年1月5日，被处以罚款并判处1年缓刑；（2）1999年5月27日，被判处90天监禁及18个月缓刑。其犯罪根据伊利诺伊州法律被归类为“4级重罪”，因此可处以1至3年监禁刑。见730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5-8-1(a)(7)（West 1999）。基于这些定罪，移民与归化局依据《法》第237(a)(2)(A)(iii)条、8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000)指控被申请人作为因加重重罪被定罪的外国人可被驱逐，并依据《法》第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条指控其作为因涉及受管制物质的犯罪被定罪的外国人可被驱逐。移民法官维持了这两项指控，随后提出本及时上诉。2

The respondent raises a variety of arguments on appeal. Two of these arguments challenge the conclusion that his Illinois offenses are analogous to an offense punishable as a felony under federal drug laws, as required by Matter of K-V-D-, supra. The respondent correctly notes that his state convictions, which were for simple possession of cocaine, can only be analogous to a federal felony if his first conviction was “final” when his

被申请人在上诉中提出多种主张。其中两项主张质疑如下结论：其伊利诺伊州犯罪与联邦毒品法律下可作为重罪处罚的犯罪类似，正如Matter of K-V-D-，supra所要求。被申请人正确指出，其州定罪系单纯持有可卡因，只有在其第一次定罪在其

2 The respondent does not challenge the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that he has been convicted of a controlled substance violation for which he is removable as charged under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act.

2 被申请人未质疑移民法官关于其因受管制物质违规被定罪并因此可依据《法》第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条如所指控被驱逐的结论。

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second possession offense occurred. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1) (2000). Consequently, he argues that his first conviction for cocaine possession— which resulted in a deferral of judgment and a sentence of probation under the Illinois first offender statute—was not “final” when he committed his second offense, and that the two convictions, taken together, are therefore not analogous to felony possession, which is punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1). Alternatively, the respondent contends that, even if his first conviction was final at the time of his second offense, that second offense is not truly analogous to a federal felony because he never received an “enhancement information” from a federal prosecutor, see 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (2000), as required for the imposition of enhanced punishment, based on prior convictions, under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1).

第二次持有犯罪发生时已“终局”的情况下，才可与联邦重罪类似。见21 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1) (2000)。因此，他主张其第一次可卡因持有定罪——该定罪导致根据伊利诺伊州初犯法规作出判决延期和缓刑判决——在其实施第二次犯罪时并非“终局”，因此两项定罪合并起来不与重罪持有类似，后者依据21 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1)可予处罚。或者，被申请人主张，即使其第一次定罪在第二次犯罪时已终局，该第二次犯罪也并非真正与联邦重罪类似，因为他从未收到联邦检察官的“加重信息”，见21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (2000)，而这是依据21 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1)基于先前定罪施加加重处罚所要求的。

The respondent’s appeal raises substantial legal questions and illustrates some of the difficulties that can arise when applying the analytical approach that we adopted in Matter of K-V-D-, supra. Specifically, when determining whether a state drug conviction is analogous to a federal felony conviction, we are confronted with the fact that any hypothetical federal prosecution would have been governed by procedural and sentencing requirements entirely different from those that were, in fact, employed by the convicting state. To resolve this dilemma, we would therefore need to develop a standard for determining whether state finality rules, which may themselves be ambiguous, are analogous to the finality rules governing felony drug prosecutions under federal law. Furthermore, we would need a standard to determine whether the mandatory procedural requirements governing such federal prosecutions are analogous to those that applied in the convicting state. 3

被申请人的上诉提出了重大法律问题，并说明了适用我们在Matter of K-V-D-，supra中采纳的分析方法时可能产生的一些困难。具体而言，在确定州毒品定罪是否与联邦重罪定罪类似时，我们面临的事实是，任何假设的联邦起诉都将受与定罪州实际采用的程序和量刑要求完全不同的规则约束。为解决这一困境，我们将因此需要制定一项标准，以确定州终局规则（其本身可能含糊不清）是否与联邦法律下管辖重罪毒品起诉的终局规则类似。此外，我们还需要一项标准，以确定管辖此类联邦起诉的强制性程序要求是否与定罪州适用的要求类似。3

Completely apart from these analytical difficulties, moreover, is the fact that Matter of K-V-D- interprets 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1994)—the federal criminal statute incorporated into the aggravated felony definition by section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act—in a manner that has not generally been followed by the federal criminal law courts. Indeed, in one criminal case, a circuit court explicitly rejected the legal rationale underlying Matter of K-V-D-. See United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505 (5th Cir.) (disagreeing with the Board’s interpretation of § 924(c)(2) and rejecting the notion that § 924(c)(2) may be interpreted differently in immigration and criminal cases), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 305 (2001). In response to Hernandez-Avalos, we

此外，完全撇开这些分析困难不谈，事实是Matter of K-V-D-对18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1994)——即通过《法》第101(a)(43)(B)条纳入加重重罪定义的联邦刑事法规——的解释方式并未被联邦刑事法院普遍遵循。事实上，在一个刑事案件中，一个巡回法院明确拒绝了Matter of K-V-D-所依据的法律理由。见United States v. Hernandez-Avalos，251 F.3d 505（5th Cir.）（不同意委员会对§ 924(c)(2)的解释，并拒绝§ 924(c)(2)在移民案件和刑事案件中可作不同解释的观点），cert. denied，122 S. Ct. 305 (2001)。针对Hernandez-Avalos，我们

In addition to these analytical problems, some courts have expressed concern that the hypothetical approach adopted in Matter of K-V-D- could, under certain circumstances, result in unduly harsh consequences for persons convicted of misdemeanors under state law. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 311 n.12 (3d Cir. 2002); Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 137 (3d Cir. 2001).

除这些分析问题外，一些法院还担心Matter of K-V-D-采纳的假设方法在某些情况下可能对根据州法律被定轻罪的人造成过于严厉的后果。Gerbier v. Holmes，280 F.3d 297，311 n.12（3d Cir. 2002）；Steele v. Blackman，236 F.3d 130，137（3d Cir. 2001）。

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issued a decision withdrawing from Matter of K-V-D- in cases arising within the Fifth Circuit. See Matter of Salazar, 23 I&N Dec. 223, 235 (BIA 2002).

发布了一项决定，在第五巡回区内产生的案件中退出Matter of K-V-D-。见Matter of Salazar，23 I&N Dec. 223，235（BIA 2002）。

II. ISSUE

II. 问题

The analytical difficulties inherent in the hypothetical felony approach, the broad adoption of a different approach by a substantial number of federal circuit courts, and the outright rejection of Matter of K-V-D- by one circuit all lead us to reexamine the question whether state drug convictions classified as felonies under applicable state law, but not necessarily under federal law, constitute “drug trafficking crimes” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), such that they may be considered aggravated felonies under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act.

假设重罪方法固有的分析困难、相当数量联邦巡回法院广泛采纳不同方法，以及一个巡回法院对Matter of K-V-D-的彻底拒绝，均促使我们重新审查以下问题：根据适用州法律被归类为重罪但未必根据联邦法律被归类为重罪的州毒品定罪，是否构成18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)项下的“毒品贩运犯罪”，从而可依据《法》第101(a)(43)(B)条被视为加重重罪。

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION

III. 法律讨论

A. Relevant Statutory Authority

A. 相关法定授权

Section 101(a)(43) of the Act defines the categories of offenses that merit treatment as “aggravated felonies” under the immigration laws and provides that the phrase “aggravated felony” “applies to an offense described in this paragraph, whether in violation of Federal or State law.” Included in the “aggravated felony” definition is

《法》第101(a)(43)条定义了根据移民法值得作为“加重重罪”处理的犯罪类别，并规定“加重重罪”一语“适用于本段所述犯罪，无论是否违反联邦或州法律”。“加重重罪”定义中包括

illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as described in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in § 924(c) of title 18, United States Code).

受管制物质（如《受管制物质法》第102条所述）的非法贩运，包括毒品贩运犯罪（如《美国法典》第18编第924(c)条所定义）。

Section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. 4 The term “drug trafficking crime” referenced in this portion of the aggravated felony definition is, in turn, defined as follows:

《法》第101(a)(43)(B)条。4 加重重罪定义该部分所提及的“毒品贩运犯罪”一语，反过来定义如下：

[T]he term “drug trafficking crime” means any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.).

[“]毒品贩运犯罪[”]一语指依据《受管制物质法》（21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.）、《受管制物质进出口法》（21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.）或《海上毒品执法法》（46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.）可予处罚的任何重罪。

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2).

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)。

The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) defines the term “felony” as “any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(13) (2000). This definition also applies to the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act and the Maritime Drug Law

《受管制物质法》（“CSA”）将“重罪”一语定义为“适用联邦或州法律归类为重罪的任何联邦或州犯罪”。21 U.S.C. § 802(13) (2000)。该定义也适用于《受管制物质进出口法》和《海上毒品法

4 The convictions at issue in this case do not fall clearly within the phrase “illicit trafficking,” and we therefore look to whether the convictions fall within the meaning of the phrase “drug trafficking crime.” See generally Matter of Davis, supra, at 540-41.

4 本案所涉定罪并未明确落入“非法贩运”这一表述的范围内，因此我们转而考察这些定罪是否属于“毒品贩运犯罪”这一表述的含义范围。参见 generally Matter of Davis, supra, 第540-41页。

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Enforcement Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 951(b) (2000); 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(i) (2000).

执行法。参见 21 U.S.C. § 951(b) (2000)；46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(i) (2000)。

B. Relevant Case Law

B. 相关判例法

The federal circuit courts of appeals and this Board agree that a state drug offense constitutes a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) if it is (1) punishable under one of the three enumerated federal drug statutes and (2) a “felony.” The first requirement is consistent with our decision in Matter of Barrett, 20 I&N Dec. 171 (BIA 1990), where we held that a state drug offense may be considered an aggravated felony only if it is analogous to an offense, such as possession, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance, that would be punishable under one of the three acts referenced in § 924(c)(2). To date, no circuit court of appeals has expressed disagreement with this conclusion.

联邦巡回上诉法院和本委员会一致认为，如果一项州毒品犯罪(1)可依据三部列举的联邦毒品法规之一予以处罚，且(2)属于“重罪”，则该州毒品犯罪构成18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)下的“毒品贩运犯罪”。第一项要求与我们in Matter of Barrett, 20 I&N Dec. 171 (BIA 1990)中的裁决一致，在该案中我们裁定，州毒品犯罪只有在与某项犯罪（例如持有、出售或分销受管制物质）相类似，且该犯罪可依据§ 924(c)(2)所引用的三部法律之一予以处罚时，才可被视为加重重罪。迄今为止，尚无任何巡回上诉法院对此结论表示异议。

The issue in this case turns on the second requirement identified above, i.e., whether the state offense is a “felony.” As previously noted, this is a question that we have addressed and attempted to resolve on several previous occasions. Most recently, in Matter of K-V-D-, supra, we affirmed our prior decisions in Matter of L-G-, supra, and Matter of Davis, supra, both of which held that a state drug conviction qualified as a “drug trafficking crime” for immigration purposes only if it was analogous to an offense that would be punishable as a felony under one of the three federal drug statutes referenced in § 924(c)(2). To be punishable as a federal felony under this standard, the analogous federal offense must be one that carries a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(5) (2000).

本案的争点取决于上述第二项要求，即该州犯罪是否属于“重罪”。如前所述，这是一个我们此前已在多个场合处理并试图解决的问题。最近，在Matter of K-V-D-, supra中，我们确认了此前在Matter of L-G-, supra和Matter of Davis, supra中的裁决，这两项裁决均认定，州毒品定罪只有在与某项犯罪相类似，且该犯罪可依据§ 924(c)(2)所引用的三部联邦毒品法规之一作为重罪予以处罚时，才符合移民目的下的“毒品贩运犯罪”。依据该标准作为联邦重罪予以处罚，相类似的联邦犯罪必须是可判处超过1年监禁的犯罪。参见 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(5) (2000)。

When we issued our decisions in Matter of Davis and Matter of L-G-, few of the federal circuit courts of appeals had interpreted the relevant language of § 924(c)(2). Therefore, in the absence of compelling circuit authority, we construed § 924(c)(2) in a manner that we believed would both fairly resolve the cases before us and provide a coherent “federal standard” that could be applied uniformly throughout the country, without regard to the idiosyncrasies of state law. During the 4 years following our decision in Matter of L-G-, however, an increasing number of federal circuit courts issued decisions, in the context of federal criminal law, interpreting § 924(c)(2) in a manner contrary to our approach. This development prompted us to revisit the issue in Matter of K-V-D-, supra.

当我们作出Matter of Davis和Matter of L-G-的裁决时，鲜有联邦巡回上诉法院对§ 924(c)(2)的相关语言作出解释。因此，在缺乏有约束力的巡回法院权威的情况下，我们对§ 924(c)(2)作出解释，我们认为该解释既能公平解决我们面前的案件，又能提供一个连贯的“联邦标准”，可在全国范围内统一适用，而不论州法的特殊性如何。然而，在我们作出Matter of L-G-裁决后的4年里，越来越多的联邦巡回法院在联邦刑法语境下作出了与我们的方法相反的解释§ 924(c)(2)的裁决。这一发展促使我们在Matter of K-V-D-, supra中重新审视该问题。

In Matter of K-V-D-, we concluded that, in the interest of a uniform immigration policy, our interpretation of § 924(c)(2) should be retained in cases arising under the federal immigration laws, even though the federal circuit court in whose jurisdiction the proceedings arose had adopted a different interpretation of the same statute in its criminal law cases. The clear trend among the circuit courts has been toward interpreting the term “felony,”

在Matter of K-V-D-中，我们得出结论认为，为了统一的移民政策利益，我们对§ 924(c)(2)的解释应在依据联邦移民法产生的案件中予以保留，即使程序所产生管辖区的联邦巡回法院在其刑法案件中已对同一法规采纳了不同的解释。巡回法院的明显趋势是朝向将“重罪”一词解释为

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as used in § 924(c)(2), by reference to the definition set forth at 21 U.S.C. § 802(13), which permits a state drug offense that is classified as a felony under the law of the convicting state to qualify as a felony under the CSA even if it could only be punished as a misdemeanor under federal law. See United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, supra; United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1102 (2001); United States v. Simon, 168 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 528 U.S. 844 (1999); United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Restrepo- Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361 (1st Cir. 1996).

§ 924(c)(2)中所使用的“重罪”，参照21 U.S.C. § 802(13)所载定义，该定义允许在定罪州法律下被归类为重罪的州毒品犯罪符合CSA下的重罪资格，即使该犯罪在联邦法律下只能作为轻罪予以处罚。参见 United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, supra；United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1102 (2001)；United States v. Simon, 168 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 528 U.S. 844 (1999)；United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1997)；United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1996)；United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361 (1st Cir. 1996)。

By contrast, two circuit courts have adopted an interpretation of § 924(c)(2) identical to that articulated in our decisions, at least in immigration cases. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2002); Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996). The Third Circuit has not yet had occasion to interpret the relevant language of § 924(c)(2) in the criminal context; however, it has concluded, both in the interest of national uniformity and as matter of proper statutory construction, that the Board’s interpretation should be adopted in immigration cases. See Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, at 308-12. As the Second Circuit made clear in Aguirre, however, it adopted the Board’s approach out of a desire for a uniform national rule, and not necessarily because it agreed with our interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). See Aguirre v. INS, supra, at 317 (stating that “[t]he statutory point [regarding the proper interpretation of § 924(c)(2)] is fairly debatable”). Indeed, the Second Circuit has subsequently confined Aguirre to cases arising in the immigration context; in criminal cases, it has adopted the approach of the majority of its sister circuits. See United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 880 (1999).

相比之下，两个巡回法院至少已在移民案件中采纳了与我们裁决中所阐述的相同的§ 924(c)(2)解释。参见 Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2002)；Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996)。第三巡回法院尚未有机会在刑事语境下解释§ 924(c)(2)的相关语言；然而，该法院已得出结论认为，为了国家统一利益并作为正确的法定解释问题，在移民案件中应采纳本委员会的解释。参见 Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, 第308-12页。然而，正如第二巡回法院在Aguirre案中所明确的，其采纳本委员会的方法出于对统一国家规则的期望，而不一定是因为其同意我们对18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)的解释。参见 Aguirre v. INS, supra, 第317页（称“〔关于§ 924(c)(2)正确解释的〕法定问题相当可争议”）。事实上，第二巡回法院随后将Aguirre案限于移民语境下产生的案件；在刑事案件中，其采纳了其多数姊妹巡回法院的方法。参见 United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 880 (1999)。

We recognize that Gerbier and Pornes-Garcia have either explicitly or implicitly endorsed our conclusion, adopted in Matter of K-V-D-, supra, that the language of § 924(c)(2) may, in the interest of a uniform immigration policy, be interpreted differently in immigration cases and criminal cases. Importantly, however, several circuits that adopt the dominant interpretation of § 924(c)(2) have either expressly rejected this “bifurcated” approach or cast it into serious doubt. See United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, supra, at 509 (rejecting Pornes-Garcia in the Fifth Circuit and stating, “We fail to see the validity of interpreting [§ 924(c)(2)] differently based on this distinction between sentencing and immigration cases; it is, after all, the same words of the same phrase from the same statute that is being interpreted in each instance.”); Ruiz-Romero v. Reno, 205 F.3d 837, 839-40 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, supra, at 1340 n.2 (stating in the Ninth Circuit that “we have never even suggested that we would interpret 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) differently in applying the Immigration and Nationality Act than we now interpret it in applying the Sentencing Guidelines”). Given

我们认识到，Gerbier和Pornes-Garcia已明确或默示地认可了我们在Matter of K-V-D-, supra中采纳的结论，即§ 924(c)(2)的语言可以为了统一的移民政策利益而在移民案件和刑事案件中作不同解释。然而，重要的是，若干采纳§ 924(c)(2)主流解释的巡回法院已明确拒绝这种“分叉”方法，或对其提出严重质疑。参见 United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, supra, 第509页（在第五巡回法院拒绝Pornes-Garcia并称，“我们看不出基于量刑案件与移民案件之间的这一区分而对〔§ 924(c)(2)〕作不同解释的有效性；毕竟，在每种情形下所解释的都是同一法规中同一短语的相同词语。”）；Ruiz-Romero v. Reno, 205 F.3d 837, 839-40 (5th Cir. 2000)（同）；United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, supra, 第1340页注2（在第九巡回法院称，“我们从未甚至暗示过我们在适用《移民与国籍法》时会以不同于我们现在适用《量刑指南》时的方式解释18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)”）。鉴于

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this division of authority among the circuits as to whether the language of § 924(c)(2) may be subject to variable interpretations, it appears that a truly uniform interpretation of section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act will remain an elusive goal. Because uniformity is presently unattainable in this context, we find that continued adherence to the standard adopted in Matter of K-V-D-, Matter of L-G-, and Matter of Davis, no longer makes sense, particularly in light of the interpretive problems with that “hypothetical” approach discussed previously. Consequently, we conclude that the best approach is one of deference to applicable circuit authority.

各巡回法院之间在§ 924(c)(2)的语言是否可作可变解释这一问题上存在权力分歧，看来对《法》第101(a)(43)(B)条真正统一的解释仍将是一个难以实现的目标。由于在此语境下统一性目前无法实现，我们认为继续遵循Matter of K-V-D-、Matter of L-G-和Matter of Davis中所采纳的标准不再合理，尤其是考虑到此前讨论的该“假设性”方法所存在的解释问题。因此，我们得出结论认为，最佳方法是尊重适用的巡回法院权威。

C. Reexamination of Matter of K-V-D-

C. 对Matter of K-V-D-的重新审视

The foregoing discussion shows that a majority of the federal circuit courts of appeals that have interpreted the pertinent language of § 924(c)(2) have, either explicitly or implicitly, disagreed with our rulings in Matter of K-V-D-, Matter of L-G-, and Matter of Davis. Moreover, they have done so for substantive legal reasons, based upon their interpretation of the relevant statutory language. While Pornes-Garcia and Gerbier indicate that there may be policy considerations that would justify the adoption of differing interpretations of § 924(c)(2) in the criminal and immigration contexts, we nonetheless conclude that, under the present circumstances, these policy considerations are superseded by our overriding obligation to follow the authoritative decisions of the federal circuit courts of appeals regarding interpretation of a provision of federal criminal law that is referenced in the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25 (BIA 1989). Accordingly, we withdraw from our decision in Matter of K-V-D-. We also withdraw from Matter of L-G- and Matter of Davis to the extent that they are inconsistent with our ruling today.

上述讨论表明，多数已解释§ 924(c)(2)相关语言的联邦巡回上诉法院已明确或默示地不同意我们在Matter of K-V-D-、Matter of L-G-和Matter of Davis中的裁决。此外，它们这样做是基于实质性法律理由，基于其对相关法定语言的解释。虽然Pornes-Garcia和Gerbier表明可能存在政策考量，可证明在刑事和移民语境下对§ 924(c)(2)采纳不同解释是合理的，但我们仍得出结论认为，在当前情况下，这些政策考量被我们遵循联邦巡回上诉法院关于《移民与国籍法》所引用的联邦刑法条款解释的权威裁决的首要义务所取代。参见 Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25 (BIA 1989)。据此，我们撤回Matter of K-V-D-中的裁决。我们亦撤回Matter of L-G-和Matter of Davis中与我们今日裁决不一致的部分。

IV. INTERPRETATION OF § 924(c)(2) IN CIRCUITS THAT HAVE SPOKEN

IV. 在已表态的巡回法院中对§ 924(c)(2)的解释

Specifically, we hold that because the meaning of the phrase “drug trafficking crime” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) is a matter of federal criminal law, we shall defer to the interpretation given that statute by the federal circuit courts of appeals that have spoken on the issue. Those courts need not defer to our reading of § 924(c)(2). See Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990) (explaining that deference does not extend to an agency’s interpretation of a judicially enforceable portion of a statute); see also Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting the Board’s interpretation of the phrase “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000) and section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act and stating that “[t]he BIA is not charged with administering 18 U.S.C. § 16, and that statute is not transformed into an

具体而言，我们裁定，由于18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)中“毒品贩运犯罪”一语的含义属于联邦刑法事项，我们将尊重已就该问题表态的联邦巡回上诉法院对该法规所作的解释。那些法院无需尊重我们对§ 924(c)(2)的解读。参见 Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990)（解释称尊重不延伸至机构对法规中可司法执行部分的解释）；另参见 Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2001)（拒绝本委员会对18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000)和《法》第101(a)(43)(F)条中“暴力犯罪”一语所作的解释，并称“BIA并不负责执行18 U.S.C. § 16，该法规并不因被§ 1101(a)(43)(F)纳入INA而转变为

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immigration law merely because it is incorporated into the INA by § 1101(a)(43)(F)”); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying de novo standard of review to the Board’s interpretation of the phrase “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act). Thus, in those circuits that have spoken, the determination whether a state drug conviction constitutes a “drug trafficking crime” under § 924(c)(2), and therefore an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, shall be made by reference to applicable circuit law, and not by reference to any legal standard articulated by this Board.

移民法，仅仅因为其被§ 1101(a)(43)(F)纳入《移民与国籍法》”）；Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 203-04（第2巡回法院2001年）（对委员会关于18 U.S.C. § 16和该法第101(a)(43)(F)条中“暴力犯罪”一语的解释适用de novo审查标准）。因此，在那些已经表态的巡回法院中，关于州毒品定罪是否构成§ 924(c)(2)下的“毒品贩运犯罪”、并因此构成该法第101(a)(43)(B)条下的加重重罪，必须参照适用的巡回法院法律作出，而不是参照本委员会阐述的任何法律标准。

V. INTERPRETATION OF § 924(c)(2) IN CIRCUITS THAT HAVE NOT YET SPOKEN

V. 在尚未表态的巡回法院中对§ 924(c)(2)的解释

Where, as here, a division of authority exists among the circuits with respect to a legal issue, there is no approach we can adopt that will achieve uniformity. For the reasons stated below, however, we hold that, where the relevant circuit court of appeals has not yet had occasion to interpret the phrase “drug trafficking crime” in § 924(c)(2), we will apply the interpretation of that phrase that has been adopted by the majority of the federal circuit courts.

在像本案这样，各巡回法院之间对某一法律问题存在分歧的情况下，我们无法采取任何能够实现统一性的方法。然而，基于下文所述理由，我们裁定，在相关巡回上诉法院尚未有机会解释§ 924(c)(2)中“毒品贩运犯罪”一语的情况下，我们将适用多数联邦巡回法院已采纳的对该短语的解释。

In doing so, we do not intend to articulate a rule of general applicability for resolving issues which have been the subject of judicial interpretation but which have not yet been addressed in the jurisdiction of immediate concern. We have, however, four principal reasons, unique to the narrow circumstances before us, for applying the majority interpretation of § 924(c)(2) in circuits that have not yet had occasion to interpret that statute for themselves. First, the dominant interpretation has been adopted by a solid majority of the circuits that have addressed it, including several whose precedents govern a very significant proportion of federal immigration cases. Second, the majority interpretation of § 924(c)(2) bears considerable logical force and flows coherently and intuitively from the relevant statutory language. 5 Third, the contrary view, which has only been embraced as a matter of statutory construction by a divided panel of the Third Circuit, 6 requires adjudicators to engage in an often-convoluted hypothetical analysis that can be difficult to

在这样做时，我们无意阐明一项普遍适用的规则，用以解决那些已成为司法解释主题但尚未在直接相关司法管辖区得到处理的问题。然而，基于我们面前狭窄情况所特有的四个主要理由，我们将在尚未有机会自行解释该法规的巡回法院中适用对§ 924(c)(2)的多数解释。第一，主导性解释已被处理该问题的绝对多数巡回法院采纳，其中包括若干其判例管辖着非常显著比例的联邦移民案件的法院。第二，对§ 924(c)(2)的多数解释具有相当的说服力，并从相关法定语言中连贯而直觉地流出。5 第三，相反的观点，仅被第三巡回法院一个意见分歧的合议庭作为法定解释问题所采纳，6 要求裁决者进行往往错综复杂的假设性分析，这在实践中可能难以

5 A number of circuits that have adopted the majority interpretation have found it significant that § 924(c)(2), by its terms, defines a “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony punishable under” the CSA and other enumerated federal laws, rather than as “any offense punishable as a felony under” those laws. See United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, supra, at 1339; United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, supra, at 366 n.9. 6 As previously noted, the Second Circuit adopted the Board’s decision in Matter of L-G-, supra, for immigration cases only, out of a desire for nationwide uniformity, and not necessarily because it agreed with our interpretation of § 924(c)(2) as a matter of statutory construction. See Aguirre v. INS, supra; United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra.

5 许多采纳多数解释的巡回法院认为具有重要意义的是，§ 924(c)(2)按其条款将“毒品贩运犯罪”定义为“根据”《管制物质法》及其他列举的联邦法律“可惩罚的任何重罪”，而非“根据那些法律可作为重罪惩罚的任何罪行”。见 United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, supra, at 1339; United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, supra, at 366 n.9。 6 如前所述，第二巡回法院在移民案件中采纳了委员会在 Matter of L-G-, supra 中的决定，是出于实现全国统一性的愿望，而不一定是因为它同意我们作为法定解释问题对§ 924(c)(2)的解释。见 Aguirre v. INS, supra; United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra。

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apply in practice. Fourth, the Attorney General has not, to our knowledge, espoused an interpretation of § 924(c)(2), in the context of federal criminal prosecutions, that is different from that embraced by the majority of the circuit courts.

适用。第四，据我们所知，司法部长在联邦刑事起诉的背景下，并未支持与多数巡回法院所采纳的解释不同的对§ 924(c)(2)的解释。

VI. APPLICATION TO RESPONDENT’S CASE

六、对 respondent 案件（respondent's case）的适用

The respondent’s removal hearing was held in Chicago, Illinois. Our determination whether the respondent’s Illinois drug offenses constitute “drug trafficking crimes” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) must be made by reference to standards articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit has not yet had occasion to interpret the relevant language of § 924(c)(2) in any precedent decision. 7 Consequently, pursuant to our previous discussion, we will apply the standard embraced by the majority of those circuits that have had occasion to interpret it.

respondent 的驱逐听证会在伊利诺伊州芝加哥举行。我们判定 respondent 的伊利诺伊州毒品犯罪是否构成 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 下的“毒品贩运犯罪”，必须参照美国第七巡回上诉法院所阐明的标准。第七巡回法院在任何先例判决中尚未有机会解释§ 924(c)(2)的相关语言。7 因此，根据我们之前的讨论，我们将适用那些有机会解释该条款的多数巡回法院所采纳的标准。

As a threshold matter, we find that the respondent’s state convictions for possession of cocaine are analogous to offenses punishable under the CSA. See Matter of Barrett, supra. Cocaine is a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), sch. II(a)(4) (2000), and possession of a controlled substance violates 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). We now turn to the second relevant inquiry under section 101(a)(43)(B), i.e., whether the respondent’s state offenses are “felonies” within the meaning of § 924(c)(2).

作为门槛事项，我们认定 respondent 因持有可卡因而被州定罪的罪行，与根据《管制物质法》可惩罚的罪行类似。见 Matter of Barrett, supra。可卡因是 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), sch. II(a)(4) (2000) 下的管制物质，持有管制物质违反 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)。我们现在转向第 101(a)(43)(B) 条下的第二个相关调查，即 respondent 的州罪行是否属于§ 924(c)(2)意义上的“重罪”。

As previously noted, the respondent’s offenses are classified as felonies under Illinois law. Under the interpretation of § 924(c)(2) adopted by the majority of circuit courts, an offense classified as a felony under the law of the convicting jurisdiction is deemed to be “classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 802(13). Moreover, because the respondent’s offenses carried a maximum term of imprisonment of more than 1 year under Illinois law, they are also encompassed within the federal definitions of a “felony” and a “felony drug offense” set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(5) and 21 U.S.C. § 802(44), respectively. There is thus no question that the respondent’s offenses constitute felonies punishable under the CSA, such that they may be considered “drug trafficking crimes” under § 924(c)(2) and aggravated felonies under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. Hence, we need not now be concerned with how the Seventh Circuit would resolve potential issues arising by virtue of a particular state’s felony/misdemeanor classification system.

如前所述，respondent 的罪行根据伊利诺伊州法律被归类为重罪。根据多数巡回法院采纳的对§ 924(c)(2)的解释，根据定罪司法管辖区法律归类为重罪的罪行，被视为符合 21 U.S.C. § 802(13) 的“由适用的联邦或州法律归类为重罪”。此外，由于 respondent 的罪行根据伊利诺伊州法律可判处超过 1 年的最高监禁刑期，它们也分别属于 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(5) 和 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) 所规定的“重罪”和“重罪毒品犯罪”的联邦定义范围。因此毫无疑问，respondent 的罪行构成根据《管制物质法》可惩罚的重罪，从而可被视为§ 924(c)(2)下的“毒品贩运犯罪”和该法第 101(a)(43)(B) 条下的加重重罪。因此，我们现在无需关注第七巡回法院将如何解决因特定州的重罪/轻罪分类制度而产生的潜在问题。

The concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that our application of the majority interpretation of § 924(c)(2) is impermissibly retroactive in this case

concurring and dissenting opinion 主张，我们对§ 924(c)(2)多数解释的适用在本案中具有不允许的溯及力

7 See United States v. Santillan-Garcia, No. 00 C 6873, 2001 WL 1442396, at *3 & n.2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2001) (adopting the majority interpretation of § 924(c)(2) in a denaturalization case arising within the Seventh Circuit and predicting that the Seventh Circuit would adopt the same approach).

7 见 United States v. Santillan-Garcia, No. 00 C 6873, 2001 WL 1442396, at *3 & n.2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2001)（在第七巡回法院辖区内产生的撤销国籍案件中采纳对§ 924(c)(2)的多数解释，并预测第七巡回法院将采纳相同方法）。

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because the respondent relied on the Board’s prior decisions when he entered his guilty pleas. Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390, 417 (BIA 2002) (Rosenberg and Espenoza, concurring and dissenting). We do not agree. On the contrary, we find that the respondent has not demonstrated, and cannot demonstrate, any such reliance.

因为 respondent 在认罪时依赖了委员会先前的决定。Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390, 417 (BIA 2002)（Rosenberg 和 Espenoza，同意并反对）。我们不同意。相反，我们认定 respondent 未证明、也无法证明任何此类依赖。

The record contains no evidence that the respondent in the present case actually relied upon our decisions when he entered his guilty pleas. Indeed, the respondent could not possibly have relied upon Matter of K-V-D- because that decision was not issued until December 1999, more than 6 months after his second and final guilty plea in May 1999. 8 Although Matter of L-G- was issued in 1995, the respondent cannot seriously argue that he reasonably relied upon that decision when entering his guilty pleas. First, it is entirely possible that the respondent’s second Illinois conviction for drug possession would have rendered him removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony even under the “analogous federal felony” approach embraced by Matter of L-G-. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1) (indicating that a second possession offense is punishable as a felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act). The success of the respondent’s appeal depended not upon our following the Matter of L-G- standard, but rather upon our acceptance of his attempt to distinguish Matter of L-G- based on technical arguments regarding the finality of his first drug possession conviction. 9 The respondent could not reasonably have assumed that we would accept those arguments when he entered his guilty pleas. Our recognition that those arguments raise “substantial legal questions” does not imply that we find them persuasive. Matter of Yanez, supra, at 392.

记录中无证据表明本案 respondent 在认罪时实际依赖了我们的决定。事实上，respondent 不可能依赖 Matter of K-V-D-，因为该决定直到 1999 年 12 月才发布，即在他 1999 年 5 月第二次也是最后一次认罪之后超过 6 个月。8 尽管 Matter of L-G- 于 1995 年发布，但 respondent 无法严肃地主张他在认罪时合理依赖了该决定。第一，完全可能的是，即使根据 Matter of L-G- 所采纳的“类似联邦重罪”方法，respondent 的第二次伊利诺伊州毒品持有定罪也会使他作为被判加重重罪的外国人而被驱逐。见 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1)（表明第二次持有罪行根据联邦《管制物质法》可作为重罪惩罚）。respondent 上诉的成功不取决于我们遵循 Matter of L-G- 标准，而取决于我们接受他基于关于其第一次毒品持有定罪终局性的技术性论点来区分 Matter of L-G- 的尝试。9 respondent 在认罪时无法合理假设我们会接受这些论点。我们承认这些论点提出了“实质性法律问题”，并不意味着我们认为它们有说服力。Matter of Yanez, supra, at 392。

Second, and equally important, Matter of L-G- stands in part for the very principle that informs our decision today—that we must follow applicable

第二，同样重要的是，Matter of L-G- 部分代表了指导我们今天决定的同一原则——即我们必须遵循适用的

8 Although the concurring and dissenting opinion speculates that the respondent relied upon unpublished decisions of this Board that predated Matter of K-V-D-, such reliance would have been unwarranted under Seventh Circuit law. See Guillen-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 340, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that “[u]npublished opinions of the Board of Immigration Appeals have no precedential value” and do not necessarily reflect the policy of the Board). 9 Both the respondent and the concurring and dissenting opinion argue that the respondent’s first conviction for cocaine possession was not “final” at the time of his second possession offense—within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1)—because he was still on probation at that time. Yet our reading of applicable Illinois law suggests that expiration of the 30-day appeal period provided under Rule 604(d) of the Rules of the Illinois Supreme Court placed the legal validity of the respondent’s first conviction beyond legal challenge, despite the imposition of probation. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 1180, 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (citing People v. Stueve, 361 N.E.2d 579, 580-81 (Ill. 1977), and holding that “[w]hen no direct appeal is taken from an order of probation and the time for appeal has expired, a reviewing court is precluded from reviewing the propriety of that order in an appeal from a subsequent revocation of that probation, unless the underlying judgment of conviction is void” for lack of jurisdiction).

8 尽管 concurring and dissenting opinion 推测 respondent 依赖了委员会在 Matter of K-V-D- 之前未发布的决定，但根据第七巡回法院法律，这种依赖将是不合理的。见 Guillen-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 340, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1995)（裁定“[移民上诉委员会]未发布的意见不具有先例价值”，且不一定反映委员会的政策）。 9 respondent 和 concurring and dissenting opinion 均主张，respondent 的第一次可卡因持有定罪在其第二次持有罪行时并非“终局”——在 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1) 意义上——因为他当时仍处于缓刑期。然而，我们对适用伊利诺伊州法律的解读表明，伊利诺伊州最高法院规则第 604(d) 条规定的 30 天上诉期届满，使 respondent 第一次定罪的法律有效性超出法律挑战，尽管施加了缓刑。见，例如，People v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 1180, 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)（引用 People v. Stueve, 361 N.E.2d 579, 580-81 (Ill. 1977)，并裁定“[当未对缓刑命令提起直接上诉且上诉期已届满时，复审法院在后续撤销缓刑的上诉中被禁止审查该命令的适当性，除非基本定罪判决因缺乏管辖权而无效”）。

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circuit authority when adjudicating cases involving the definition of a “drug trafficking crime” set forth in § 924(c)(2). Specifically, we acknowledged in Matter of L-G- that we were bound to follow the Second Circuit’s decision in Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1994), in cases arising within that court’s jurisdiction despite the fact that Jenkins conflicted with our interpretation of § 924(c)(2). Matter of L-G-, supra, at 101-02. Although we determined that our contrary reading of § 924(c)(2) would continue to be applied outside the Second Circuit, our approach to the Jenkins case strongly suggested that our reading of § 924(c)(2) was not authoritative, and that it would give way in the face of other circuit cases rejecting our approach. Id. Between our decision in Matter of L-G- and the respondent’s second guilty plea in May 1999, four additional circuits issued decisions agreeing with Jenkins and implicitly or explicitly rejecting our contrary approach. See United States v. Simon, 168 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361 (1st Cir. 1996).

在裁决涉及§ 924(c)(2)中“毒品贩运犯罪”定义的案件时，遵循适用的巡回法院权威。具体而言，我们在 Matter of L-G- 中承认，在第二巡回法院辖区内产生的案件中，我们必须遵循第二巡回法院在 Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1994) 中的决定，尽管 Jenkins 与我们对§ 924(c)(2)的解释相冲突。Matter of L-G-, supra, at 101-02。尽管我们确定我们对§ 924(c)(2)的相反解读将继续在第二巡回法院之外适用，但我们对 Jenkins 案的处理方式强烈表明，我们对§ 924(c)(2)的解读并非权威性的，并且将在其他拒绝我们方法的巡回法院案件面前让步。Id。在我们对 Matter of L-G- 的决定与 respondent 于 1999 年 5 月第二次认罪之间，另外四个巡回法院发布了同意 Jenkins 并隐含或明确拒绝我们相反方法的决定。见 United States v. Simon, 168 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361 (1st Cir. 1996)。

Given the manifest absence of actual reliance by the respondent, as well as the lack of clear legal authority warranting such reliance at the time of his pleas, we find nothing inappropriate about applying the majority interpretation of § 924(c)(2) in the respondent’s removal proceedings. 10

鉴于 respondent 明显缺乏实际依赖，以及在他认罪时缺乏 warranting 此类依赖的明确法律权威，我们认定在 respondent 的驱逐程序中适用对§ 924(c)(2)的多数解释并无不当。10

10 It is also not clear to us how a reviewing court would approach the retroactivity question raised by the concurring and dissenting opinion in a case where an alien provides persuasive evidence of actual detrimental reliance. In the first instance, it is questionable whether our construction of § 924(c)(2) may properly be designated a “rule,” as asserted by the concurring and dissenting opinion. Matter of Yanez, supra, at 413 (Rosenberg and Espenoza, concurring and dissenting). As the concurring and dissenting opinion concedes, the circuit courts need not accord deference to our “interpretation” of § 924(c)(2) because “[s]ection 924(c)(2) is a criminal statute over which we, as an agency, have no particular expertise.” Id. at 409. In light of this fact, it is not apparent to us how our deference to the circuit courts’ authoritative interpretation of federal criminal law can constitute a retroactive application of federal immigration law. The concurring and dissenting opinion also suggests that our decision today runs afoul of the “presumption against retroactivity” embodied in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), and Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). Matter of Yanez, supra, at 415 (Rosenberg and Espenoza, concurring and dissenting). Yet it is by no means clear that the presumption against retroactivity of legislative enactments applies in the context of administrative adjudications. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 293-95 (1974) (acknowledging the NLRB’s power to announce a new rule through adjudication rather than formal rulemaking and placing the burden of proving detrimental reliance on the opponents of the rule); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (acknowledging the SEC’s power to announce a new rule through adjudication and noting that the likely retroactive effect of such an adjudication was “not necessarily fatal to its validity”). Indeed, at least one court has observed that “retroactive application of new principles in adjudicatory proceedings is the rule,

10 我们也不清楚，在外国人提供了有说服力的实际不利依赖证据的案件中，审查法院将如何处理协同和异议意见提出的溯及力问题。首先，我们根据§ 924(c)(2)的解释是否可以适当地被指定为协同和异议意见所主张的“规则”，是有疑问的。Matter of Yanez, supra, at 413 (Rosenberg and Espenoza, concurring and dissenting)。正如协同和异议意见所承认的，巡回法院不必对我们的§ 924(c)(2)“解释”给予尊重，因为“[s]ection 924(c)(2)是一部刑事法规，我们作为一个机构对此没有特别的专业知识。”Id. at 409。鉴于这一事实，我们不清楚我们对巡回法院对联邦刑法的权威解释的尊重如何构成联邦移民法的溯及适用。 协同和异议意见还暗示，我们今天的裁决违反了INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)和Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994)中体现的“反对溯及力的推定”。Matter of Yanez, supra, at 415 (Rosenberg and Espenoza, concurring and dissenting)。然而，立法行为反对溯及力的推定是否适用于行政裁决的背景，绝非明确。See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 293-95 (1974)（承认NLRB有权通过裁决而非正式规则制定宣布新规则，并将证明不利依赖的责任置于规则的反对者身上）；SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)（承认SEC有权通过裁决宣布新规则，并指出此类裁决可能的溯及效力“对其有效性并非必然致命”）。事实上，至少有一个法院观察到，“在裁决程序中新原则的溯及适用是规则，

(continued...)

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VII. RESPONDENT’S REMAINING ARGUMENTS

VII. 答辩人的其余论点

In addition to the arguments previously discussed, the respondent contends on appeal that his first cocaine possession offense did not result in a “conviction” for immigration purposes. Instead, he argues that it merely resulted in a conditional deferral of judgment and sentence of probation under a state rehabilitative statute. We find that the respondent’s January 5, 1998, plea of guilty, which was followed by the imposition of a fine and a restraint on his liberty in the form of probation, meets the definition of a “conviction” set forth at section 101(a)(48)(A)(ii) of the Act. See Matter of Punu, Interim Decision 3364 (BIA 1998). In any event, the respondent’s second state conviction for felony possession of cocaine is sufficient, standing alone, to render him removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under the majority interpretation of § 924(c)(2) that has been applied in this case.

除了先前讨论的论点外，答辩人在上诉中主张，他的第一次可卡因持有罪没有导致移民目的下的“定罪”。相反，他辩称，这仅导致根据州康复法规有条件地推迟判决和缓刑刑罚。我们认定，答辩人1998年1月5日的认罪答辩，随后处以罚款和以缓刑形式对其自由的限制，符合该法第101(a)(48)(A)(ii)条规定的“定罪”定义。See Matter of Punu, Interim Decision 3364 (BIA 1998)。无论如何，答辩人第二次因重罪持有可卡因而被州定罪的判决，单独就足以使其作为根据本案适用的§ 924(c)(2)多数解释而被定有加重重罪的外国人而被驱逐。

Further, the respondent asserts that an interpretation of § 924(c)(2) that permits his simple possession offenses to constitute “drug trafficking crimes” is violative of his right to due process of law. We are aware of no constitutional doctrine that prohibits Congress from defining criminal law terms of art, such as “drug trafficking crime,” in whatever manner it sees fit. In any event, however, this Board lacks authority to pass judgment on the constitutionality of the Immigration and Nationality Act or any provision thereof. See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Carrillo, Interim Decision 3413 (BIA 1999); Matter of C-, 20 I&N Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992).

此外，答辩人声称，允许其简单持有罪行构成“毒品贩运犯罪”的§ 924(c)(2)解释侵犯了其正当法律程序权利。我们不知道有任何宪法原则禁止国会以其认为合适的任何方式定义刑法术语，如“毒品贩运犯罪”。然而，无论如何，本委员会无权对《移民和国籍法》或其任何条款的合宪性作出判断。See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Carrillo, Interim Decision 3413 (BIA 1999); Matter of C-, 20 I&N Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992)。

VIII. CONCLUSION

VIII. 结论

In conclusion, we find that either of the respondent’s Illinois convictions for felony possession of cocaine renders him removable as an alien convicted of

总之，我们认定，答辩人的任一伊利诺伊州重罪持有可卡因定罪均使其作为被定有

10 (...continued) not the exception.” Molina v. INS, 981 F.2d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 1992) (upholding the Board’s “retroactive” application of the definition of a “conviction” adopted in Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988)).

10 （...续） 不是例外。”Molina v. INS, 981 F.2d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 1992)（维持委员会对Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988)中采用的“定罪”定义的“溯及”适用）。

Finally, even assuming that our statements regarding the meaning of § 924(c)(2) constitute “rules” with potential retroactive effect, we disagree with the concurring and dissenting opinion that our present adjudication is impermissibly retroactive under the five-part test referenced by the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Wayne Transp., 776 F.2d 745, 751 & n.8 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding NLRB’s retroactive application of a new labor law rule in adjudicatory proceedings). While the issue in this case is admittedly not one of first impression, we reiterate our prior finding that the respondent did not, and could not, rely on our prior decisions when he entered his guilty pleas in Illinois because those cases did not represent a “well-established practice” at that time. See Matter of Yanez, supra, at 417 (Rosenberg and Espenoza, concurring and dissenting). In light of the respondent’s possible removability even under the Matter of L-G- standard, moreover, it is not clear how he is “burdened” by our current decision. See id.

最后，即使假设我们关于§ 924(c)(2)含义的陈述构成具有潜在溯及效力的“规则”，我们不同意协同和异议意见的观点，即我们当前的裁决根据第七巡回法院在NLRB v. Wayne Transp., 776 F.2d 745, 751 & n.8 (7th Cir. 1985)中引用的五部分测试（维持NLRB在裁决程序中对新劳动法规则的溯及适用）是不可允许的溯及。虽然本案的问题公认不是首次印象的问题，但我们重申我们先前的认定，即答辩人在伊利诺伊州认罪时没有、也不可能依赖我们先前的裁决，因为那些案件在当时并不代表“既定实践”。See Matter of Yanez, supra, at 417 (Rosenberg and Espenoza, concurring and dissenting)。此外，鉴于答辩人即使在Matter of L-G-标准下也可能被驱逐，不清楚他如何被我们当前的裁决“负担”。See id.

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an aggravated felony under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act and precludes him from applying for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act. The respondent has not requested any other form of relief from removal. Accordingly, the Immigration Judge properly ordered the respondent removed to Mexico.

该法第237(a)(2)(A)(iii)条下的加重重罪，并阻止其根据该法第240A(a)条申请取消驱逐。答辩人未请求任何其他形式的驱逐救济。因此，移民法官正确地命令将答辩人驱逐至墨西哥。

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Lory Diana Rosenberg and Cecelia M. Espenoza, Board Members

协同和异议意见：Lory Diana Rosenberg 和 Cecelia M. Espenoza，委员会成员

We respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. The statutory language classifying a “drug trafficking crime” as an aggravated felony offense can accommodate either the reading we have given it for the past 12 years or the changed reading that the majority now has determined to impose. See section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2000) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2000)). At issue, in practical terms, is whether a state felony conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance should be interpreted so as to render a respondent removable based on a conviction for an aggravated felony, whether it should preclude an otherwise qualified refugee from being granted asylum or withholding of removal, and whether it should disqualify a lawful permanent resident from establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal, prevent him from demonstrating good moral character, and, ultimately, foreclose him from eligibility for naturalization. 1 See, e.g., sections 101(f)(8), 208(b)(2)(B), 240A(a)(3), 241(b)(3)(B), 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(8), 1158(b)(2)(B), 1229b(a)(3), 1231(b)(3)(B), 1427 (2000).

我们恭敬地部分协同、部分异议。 将“毒品贩运犯罪”归类为加重重罪罪行的法定语言，可以容纳我们过去12年所赋予的解读，也可以容纳多数派现在决定强加的改变后的解读。See section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2000)（引用18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2000)）。实际上，问题在于，对简单持有管制物质的州重罪定罪是否应被解释为使得答辩人因加重重罪定罪而被驱逐，是否应阻止原本合格的难民获得庇护或暂缓驱逐，以及是否应取消合法永久居民证明取消驱逐资格的资格，阻止其展示良好道德品质，并最终使其无法入籍。1 See, e.g., sections 101(f)(8), 208(b)(2)(B), 240A(a)(3), 241(b)(3)(B), 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(8), 1158(b)(2)(B), 1229b(a)(3), 1231(b)(3)(B), 1427 (2000)。

The resolution of these questions turns, in large part, on the values we accord the various factors militating in favor of one reading or the other. The majority emphasizes the interests of expediency and acquiescence, and de-emphasizes the interests of narrow construction, uniformity, and due process.

这些问题的解决在很大程度上取决于我们对支持一种解读或另一种解读的各种因素所赋予的价值。多数派强调权宜和默许的利益，而不强调狭义解释、统一性和正当程序的利益。

We do not contend that the interpretation posited by the majority is unsupported or unsupportable. We are concerned, however, that the majority has simply abandoned a long-standing and defensible interpretation, which is legitimate for immigration law purposes, for a seemingly more straightforward

我们不主张多数派提出的解释没有支持或无法支持。然而，我们担心多数派只是放弃了一个长期存在且可辩护的解释，该解释对移民法目的是合法的，而采用了一个看似更直接的

1 The determination that a conviction for possession of a controlled substance is an aggravated felony also will render the lawful permanent resident ineligible for voluntary departure under section 240B(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2000); bar the lawful permanent resident from reentering the United States for 20 years without the permission of the Attorney General under sections 212(a)(9)(A)(i) and (ii)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) and (ii)(II) (2000); and penalize the alien with imprisonment of up to 20 years under section 276(b)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2000).

1 认定持有管制物质的定罪为加重重罪还将使合法永久居民根据该法第240B(a)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2000)，无资格自愿离境；根据该法第212(a)(9)(A)(i)和(ii)(II)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(i)和(ii)(II) (2000)，未经司法部长许可，禁止合法永久居民在20年内重新进入美国；并根据该法第276(b)(2)条，8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2000)，对外国人处以最高20年监禁的刑罚。

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reading that does not require the Board to engage in any analysis of whether a conviction constitutes an immigration violation. Although the rationale posed by the majority may be attractive, in fact, the circuit court decisions interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) are not as clear cut as the majority opinion would lead one to believe. Moreover, the majority’s new interpretation has a significantly adverse impact on every respondent convicted of state felony possession of a controlled substance. At the very least, our modification of a rule that, for over a decade, determined whether a conviction for possession of a controlled substance constitutes an aggravated felony should be applied only prospectively.

解读，该解读不要求委员会对定罪是否构成移民违规进行任何分析。尽管多数派提出的理由可能具有吸引力，但实际上，解释18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)的巡回法院裁决并不像多数派意见所让人相信的那样明确。此外，多数派的新解释对每个因州重罪持有管制物质而被定罪的答辩人产生重大不利影响。至少，我们对一个十多年来决定持有管制物质定罪是否构成加重重罪的规则的修改，应仅适用于未来。

I. SECTION 101(a)(43)(B) OF THE ACT

I. 该法第101(a)(43)(B)条

The statutory language defining an aggravated felony offense under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act, quoted in full in the majority opinion, accommodates more than one reading. See, e.g., Matter of L-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 89 (BIA 1995); cf. Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1994), overruled by Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996). It is undisputed that this language is subject to judicial interpretation. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 309 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Finding the phrase to be ambiguous, we must look to legislative history.”).

多数派意见中全文引用的该法第101(a)(43)(B)条定义加重重罪罪行的法定语言，可以容纳不止一种解读。See, e.g., Matter of L-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 89 (BIA 1995); cf. Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1994), overruled by Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996)。无可争议的是，该语言受司法解释的约束。Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 309 (3d Cir. 2002)（“发现该短语含糊不清，我们必须查看立法历史。”）。

Indeed, over the years, the reference to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act has been subject to differing interpretations at the federal court level. See, e.g., United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361, 365 (1st Cir. 1996) (“There is no reason to suppose that either Congress or the Sentencing Commission, in defining ‘aggravated felony’ by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), which in turn specifically relies on the CSA, was unaware of or chose to dismiss the definition of ‘felony’ provided there.”); cf. Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, at 310 (“Although § 924(c)(2) directs us to the Controlled Substances Act, § 924(c)(2) does not reference § 802(13) and, moreover, that section defines “felony” only for purposes of sentence enhancements.”). In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has followed our ruling in Matter of L-G-, supra, that “for purposes of the discretionary waiver, an offense qualifies as an ‘aggravated felony’ only if . . . it is analogous to a felony under the federal statutes enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2).” United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d 142, 145-46 (2d Cir.) (distinguishing sentence enhancement cases in which an offense is deemed a “drug trafficking crime” under section 101(a)(43)(B) if “(1) the offense is punishable under the Controlled Substances Act, and (2) it is a felony under either state or federal law” (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 880 (1999).

的确，多年来，该法第101(a)(43)(B)条中引用《美国法典》第18编第924(c)条的做法在联邦法院层面一直受到不同解释。参见，例如，United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361, 365 (1st Cir. 1996)（“没有理由认为国会或量刑委员会在通过引用《美国法典》第18编第924(c)(2)条（该条又具体依赖《受控物质法》）来界定‘加重重罪’时，不知道或选择忽视该条对‘重罪’的定义。”）；比较 Gerbier v. Holmes, 前引, 第310页（“尽管第924(c)(2)条指引我们适用《受控物质法》，但第924(c)(2)条并未引用第802(13)条，而且，该条仅出于量刑加重目的界定‘重罪’。”）。此外，美国第二巡回上诉法院遵循了我们在 Matter of L-G- 案（前引）中的裁决，即“为酌情豁免之目的，一罪行只有在……与《美国法典》第18编第924(c)(2)条所列联邦法规下的重罪相类似时，才构成‘加重重罪’。” United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d 142, 145-46 (2d Cir.)（区分了量刑加重案件，在该类案件中，如果“(1) 该罪行可根据《受控物质法》处罚，且 (2) 根据州或联邦法律均属重罪”，则该罪行被视为第101(a)(43)(B)条下的“毒品贩运犯罪”（着重号为原文所加）），调卷令被驳回，528 U.S. 880 (1999)。

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A. Board Interpretation of the Term “Drug Trafficking Crime” as Defined in § 924(c)(2)

A. 委员会对第924(c)(2)条所定义“毒品贩运犯罪”一词的解释

The Board’s prior interpretation of § 924(c)(2) as applied to immigration violations is long-standing. In Matter of Barrett, 20 I&N Dec. 171 (BIA 1990), we examined the term “aggravated felony” relating to a drug offense 2 and concluded that the definition of a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) was broad enough to encompass state drug convictions. Id. at 175 (observing that “Congress referred to felonies ‘punishable under’ not ‘convictions obtained under’” the Controlled Substances Act). 3 Subsequently, in Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1992), we concluded that a state drug conviction either had to be a felony under the law of the convicting state and contain a “trafficking element,” i.e., involve “the unlawful trading or dealing of a controlled substance,” or had to be for a crime “analogous to an offense punishable under one of the federal acts specified in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), and the offense to which it is analogous is a ‘felony’ under federal law.” Id. at 543 (emphasis added).

委员会此前对 § 924(c)(2) 适用于移民违规行为的解释由来已久。在 Matter of Barrett, 20 I&N Dec. 171 (BIA 1990) 中，我们审查了与毒品犯罪有关的“加重重罪”一词 2，并得出结论：18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 下“毒品贩运犯罪”的定义足够宽泛，足以涵盖州毒品定罪。Id. at 175（指出“国会提及的是‘可依’《管制物质法》‘处罚的重罪’，而非‘依’该法‘获得的定罪’”）。3 随后，在 Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1992) 中，我们得出结论：州毒品定罪要么必须是定罪州法律下的重罪，并包含“贩运要素”，即涉及“非法交易或买卖管制物质”，要么必须是为“类似于可依 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 所列联邦法案之一处罚的犯罪，且其所类似的犯罪是联邦法律下的‘重罪’”。Id. at 543（着重号为原文所加）。

In Matter of L-G-, supra, we considered whether the definition of a “felony” in the Controlled Substances Act at 21 U.S.C. § 802(13) (1994) indicated that every state felony was included in the definition of a “drug trafficking crime” under § 924(c)(2), and we rejected that approach. Id. at 93 (“[W]e do not find that . . . ‘drug trafficking crime’. . . encompasses all of the state, as well as federal, felony offenses that are punishable under the federal drug laws, regardless of whether the offenses are punishable as felonies or misdemeanors under those federal laws.”). We reasoned that because the definition of the term “felony” in 21 U.S.C. § 802 is specifically limited to its use “in this subchapter,” and 18 U.S.C. § 924 does not incorporate the definitions of 21 U.S.C. § 802, it was more appropriate to look to the definition of a “felony” within Title 18, where § 924(c)(2) is located. Matter of L-G-, supra, at 94; see also id. at 104 (Holmes, concurring). Specifically, we found that the term “any felony” under § 924(c)(2) refers to any class of felony found under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (1994), and, accordingly, a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) “is therefore any felony

在 Matter of L-G- 案（前引）中，我们审议了《受控物质法》第21编第802(13)条（1994年）对“重罪”的定义是否表明每个州重罪都包含在第924(c)(2)条“毒品贩运犯罪”的定义中，我们驳回了该方法。同上，第93页（“[W]e 不认为……‘毒品贩运犯罪’……涵盖所有可根据联邦毒品法律处罚的州及联邦重罪罪行，无论这些罪行根据那些联邦法律是作为重罪还是轻罪处罚。”）。我们的理由是，由于《美国法典》第21编第802条中“重罪”一词的定义明确限于“在本分章”中使用，而《美国法典》第18编第924条并未纳入《美国法典》第21编第802条的定义，因此更适当的做法是参照第18编（第924(c)(2)条所在之处）中“重罪”的定义。Matter of L-G-，前引，第94页；另见同上，第104页（Holmes 协同意见）。具体而言，我们认为第924(c)(2)条下的“任何重罪”一词指《美国法典》第18编第3559(a)条（1994年）所规定的任何类别的重罪，因此，《美国法典》第18编第924(c)(2)条下的“毒品贩运犯罪”“因此是任何重罪

2 The classification of a conviction for certain drug offenses as an “aggravated felony” was incorporated into the Act by section 7342 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70 (effective Nov. 18, 1988) (“ADAA”). 3 The definition of an “aggravated felony” was amended by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, to include the phrase “any illicit trafficking in any controlled substance” and to make clear that the term “aggravated felony” applies to offenses “whether in violation of Federal or State law.” See Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, at 305 (“This change, in effect, codified the BIA’s holding in Barrett.”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 681, pt. 1, at 147 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6553).

2 将某些毒品犯罪的定罪归类为“加重重罪”是由《1988年反毒品滥用法》第7342条纳入该法的，Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70（1988年11月18日生效）（“ADAA”）。 3 “加重重罪”的定义由《1990年移民法》修订，Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978，以纳入“任何非法贩运任何受控物质”的表述，并明确“加重重罪”一词适用于“无论是违反联邦还是州法律”的罪行。参见 Gerbier v. Holmes，前引，第305页（“这一变化实际上编纂了 BIA 在 Barrett 案中的裁决。”）（引用 H.R. Rep. No. 681, pt. 1, 第147页（1990年），重印于 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6553）。

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violation of the federal drug laws, i.e., any offense . . . where the maximum term of imprisonment authorized exceeds 1 year.” Id. at 94.

违反联邦毒品法律，即任何……授权最高监禁刑期超过1年的罪行。”同上，第94页。

The fundamental elements of our prior interpretation, set forth in Matter of Barrett, Matter of Davis, and Matter of L-G-, have not been disturbed by the Attorney General at any time during the 12-year period in which we have applied them. Our interpretation in those cases has been applied to literally thousands of cases adjudicated in the period since Matter of L-G- was decided 7 years ago. Moreover, our interpretation of § 924(c)(2) has been implicitly reaffirmed by Congress, which took no action in its comprehensive revisions of the Act in 1996 to amend section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act or to alter our interpretation of that provision.

我们在 Matter of Barrett、Matter of Davis 和 Matter of L-G- 案中提出的先前解释的基本要素，在我们适用它们的12年期间，从未在任何时候受到司法部长的干扰。我们在那些案件中的解释已被适用于自 Matter of L-G- 案7年前裁决以来所裁判的数千起案件。此外，我们对第924(c)(2)条的解释已被国会默示确认，国会在1996年对该法的全面修订中未采取任何行动来修订该法第101(a)(43)(B)条或改变我们对那一规定的解释。

In contrast, in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (“IIRIRA”), Congress specifically examined our precedents, addressing what constitutes a conviction and imposition of a sentence, and expressly modified our interpretation of these removal-relevant concepts. In doing so, Congress specifically singled out Board interpretations that it disapproved. See, e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 (1996) (“Joint Explanatory Statement”). However, Congress did not object to our reasoning in Matter of L-G-, supra,

相比之下，在《1996年非法移民改革和移民责任法》（Pub. L. No. 104-208 的 C 部分，110 Stat. 3009-546，“IIRIRA”）中，国会专门审查了我们的先例，处理了何为定罪和判处刑罚的问题，并明确修改了我们对这些与驱逐相关概念的解释。在这样做时，国会特别指出了它不赞成的委员会解释。参见，例如，H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 (1996)（“联合解释声明”）。然而，国会并未反对我们在 Matter of L-G- 案（前引）中的推理，

4 and did not modify section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act.

4 也没有修改该法第101(a)(43)(B)条。

It is axiomatic that Congress is deemed to be aware when it acts, not only of prior interpretations of a statute, but also of preexisting case law. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute.”); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 49.09 (4th ed. 1973). The presumption that Congress acted with such knowledge is particularly appropriate where Congress “exhibited both a detailed knowledge of the [incorporated] provisions and their judicial interpretation and a willingness to depart from those provisions regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for incorporation.” Lorillard v. Pons, supra, at 581. Equally important, Congress is not presumed to change well-established legal precedent by silence. American Hosp. Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 499 U.S. 606, 613-14 (1991) (“If this amendment had been intended to place the importation limitation on the scope of the Board’s rulemaking powers . . . we would expect to find some expression of that intent in the legislative history.”). 5 Congress’ selectivity

不言自明的是，国会在其行动时被视为不仅知晓法规的先前解释，而且知晓既存的判例法。Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)（“推定国会知晓对法规的行政或司法解释。”）；2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 49.09 (4th ed. 1973)。在国会“表现出对[纳入的]规定及其司法解释的详细了解，以及愿意偏离那些被认为不适合或不宜纳入的规定”的情况下，推定国会以此种知晓行事尤为适当。Lorillard v. Pons，前引，第581页。同样重要的是，不推定国会通过沉默改变既定的法律先例。American Hosp. Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 499 U.S. 606, 613-14 (1991)（“如果这一修正案旨在对委员会规则制定权的范围施加进口限制……我们期望在立法历史中找到该意图的某种表达。”）。5 国会的选择性

4 This situation is inapposite to that in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), where the Court declared that later immigration enactments did not provide a basis for construing prior provisions of section 276(b) of the Act. Id. at 237. Here, by contrast, Congress did not disturb an existing agency interpretation published in a controlling precedent. 5 As was the case in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), the legislative history is significant because, despite its comprehensive character, it contains no evidence that Congress specifically considered the interpretation of section 101(a)(42)(B) of the Act. Cf. Harrison v. PPG (continued...)

4 这种情况与 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) 中的情况不同，在该案中，法院宣布后来的移民立法未为解释该法第276(b)条的先前规定提供依据。同上，第237页。相比之下，在此，国会未干扰在具有控制力的先例中公布的现有机构解释。 5 正如 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) 案中的情况一样，立法历史具有重要意义，因为尽管其具有全面性，但其中没有证据表明国会具体审议了对该法第101(a)(42)(B)条的解释。比较 Harrison v. PPG（续……）

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in modifying our interpretation of certain key definitions relating to criminal convictions, but leaving other interpretations intact, “strongly suggests that but for those changes Congress expressly made, it intended to incorporate fully the [existing] remedies and procedures.” Lorillard v. Pons, supra, at 582. Although the fact that Congress did not expressly address and reverse our interpretation of the term “drug trafficking crime” in § 924(c)(2) does not preclude the majority from reconsidering the bases for our original interpretation and modifying our reading of the statute, Congress’ inaction certainly signaled that our existing interpretation was a valid one.

在修改我们对与刑事定罪有关的某些关键定义的解释，同时保持其他解释不变时，“强烈表明，若非国会明确作出的那些改变，它意图完全纳入[现有的]救济和程序。” Lorillard v. Pons，前引，第582页。尽管国会未明确处理并推翻我们对第924(c)(2)条中“毒品贩运犯罪”一词的解释这一事实并不妨碍多数意见重新考虑我们原解释的依据并修改我们对法规的解读，但国会的无所作为确实表明我们现有的解释是有效的。

B. Circuit Court Interpretation of the Term “Drug Trafficking Crime” as Defined in § 924(c)(2)

B. 巡回法院对第924(c)(2)条所定义“毒品贩运犯罪”一词的解释

It cannot be denied that a majority of circuit courts have differed with our interpretation of § 924(c)(2) and have concluded that the statute requires only that the offense be either a state or federal “felony punishable” under the Controlled Substances Act. United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, supra, at 364; see also Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, at 307 (“To date, in addition to the First Circuit, the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have also espoused this view in the Sentencing Guidelines context.”). However, with the exception of the Fifth Circuit, none have explicitly extended their sentencing guidelines rulings to cases arising in the immigration context. See United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505, 509 (5th Cir.) (ruling that “[w]e fail to see the validity of interpreting this statute differently based on this distinction”), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 305 (2001). Moreover, at the present time, two circuit courts have expressly left room for a different interpretation in the immigration context. Nevertheless, in the face of these varying interpretations and varying considerations, the majority abdicates to the rulings of circuit courts of appeals in criminal sentencing guidelines cases interpreting § 924(c)(2).

不可否认，多数巡回法院不同意我们对第924(c)(2)条的解释，并得出结论认为该法规仅要求罪行是根据《受控物质法》可处罚的州或联邦“重罪”。United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar，前引，第364页；另见 Gerbier v. Holmes，前引，第307页（“迄今为止，除第一巡回法院外，第二、第五、第八、第九、第十和第十一巡回法院在量刑指南背景下也支持这一观点。”）。然而，除第五巡回法院外，没有一个法院明确将其量刑指南裁决扩展到移民背景下产生的案件。参见 United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505, 509 (5th Cir.)（裁定“[w]e 未能看出基于这一区别而对本法规作不同解释的有效性”），调卷令被驳回，122 S. Ct. 305 (2001)。此外，目前有两个巡回法院明确为移民背景下的不同解释留有余地。尽管如此，面对这些不同的解释和不同的考量，多数意见却让位于巡回上诉法院在刑事量刑指南案件中解释第924(c)(2)条的裁决。

In Matter of K-V-D-, Interim Decision 3422 (BIA 1999), decided before United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, supra, we recognized that none of the circuit courts that differed with our interpretation in Matter of L-G-, supra, had expressly adopted a contrary interpretation in a case arising in the

在 Matter of K-V-D-, 临时决定3422 (BIA 1999)（在 United States v. Hernandez-Avalos 案（前引）之前裁决）中，我们认识到，在 Matter of L-G- 案（前引）中与我们解释不同的巡回法院中，没有一个在移民背景下产生的案件中明确采纳相反解释，

5 (...continued) Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In a case where the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night.”), cited in Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (citing A. Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes 335 (1927)).

5（……续） Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980)（Rehnquist 大法官持异议）（“在像本案这样，对立法语言的解释作出了如此广泛且相对非正统的改变的案件中，我认为法官和侦探一样，都可以考虑这样一个事实：看门狗在夜间没有叫。”），引用于 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991)（引用 A. Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes 335 (1927)）。

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immigration context. 6 For instance, in United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra, the Second Circuit recognized that “[t]he issue here is whether that same narrow construction [which was adopted by the Board] applies to section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) of the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. at 143 (emphasis added). Although the Second Circuit did reconsider its ruling in Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1994), deciding to defer to Matter of L-G-, supra, the court did not merely defer without a reasoned opinion. See Aguirre v. INS, supra; see also United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra; cf. Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390, 400 (BIA 2002).

移民语境。6 例如，在 United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra 中，第二巡回法院认识到，“这里的问题是，同样的狭义解释[即委员会所采纳的解释]是否适用于《量刑指南》第2L1.2(b)(1)(A)条。”Id. at 143（着重号为原文所加）。尽管第二巡回法院确实在 Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1994) 中重新考虑了其裁决，决定遵从 Matter of L-G-, supra，但该法院并非在没有说理意见的情况下仅仅予以遵从。见 Aguirre v. INS, supra；另见 United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra；比较 Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390, 400 (BIA 2002)。

Rather, in Pornes-Garcia, the Second Circuit explained clearly that the basis for the court’s reconsidered ruling in Aguirre was its interest in nationwide uniformity. Id. at 147. The court acknowledged that the rule that the same term appearing in different portions of a single act is taken to have the same meaning in each appearance is not without its exceptions. Id. (citations omitted). Quoting the United States Supreme Court in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932), the Pornes-Garcia court reasoned that “[w]here the subject matter to which the words refer is not the same . . . or the conditions are different, . . . the meaning well may vary to meet the purposes of the law.” United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra, at 147 (finding that the differing interpretations of § 924(c)(2) were warranted by the differing purposes of the provisions incorporating that term). Thus, in the face of government arguments that it should reconsider its deferential ruling in Aguirre v. INS, the Second Circuit expressly concluded that the phrase “any felony” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) may be interpreted differently for purposes of applying the sentencing guidelines as opposed to enforcing the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 147-48.

相反，在 Pornes-Garcia 中，第二巡回法院明确解释，该法院在 Aguirre 中重新考虑裁决的依据是其对全国统一性的关注。Id. at 147。该法院承认，同一术语出现在单一法案的不同部分时被赋予相同含义这一规则并非没有例外。Id.（引注省略）。Pornes-Garcia 法院引用美国最高法院在 Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) 中的论述，推理称：“当词语所指的标的并不相同……或者条件不同时……其含义完全可以有所不同，以符合法律的目的。”United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra, at 147（认定对§ 924(c)(2)的不同解释因纳入该术语的各条款目的不同而有正当理由）。因此，面对政府关于应重新考虑其在 Aguirre v. INS 中遵从性裁决的论点，第二巡回法院明确认定，18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 中的“任何重罪”一语，在适用量刑指南与执行《移民与国籍法》条款时，可以作不同解释。Id. at 147-48。

In addition, in Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, the Third Circuit endorsed the Board’s analysis in Barrett, Davis, and L-G-, ruling that “[w]e find that the language in § 924(c)(2), which by its own terms is a federal sentence enhancement based on a firearms offense, applies only to federal crimes of violence or drug trafficking crimes.” Id. at 308. The Gerbier court explained that “[w]hatever may be the proper construction in a Sentencing Guidelines case, we do not agree that the plain meaning of ‘drug trafficking crime’ under § 924(c) in the deportation context encompasses state felony convictions that would merely be misdemeanors under federal law when there is otherwise no trafficking component to the state law conviction.” Id. at 307. The court concluded that a “hypothetical federal felony” analysis was appropriate, meaning that the court should examine whether the conviction

此外，在 Gerbier v. Holmes, supra 中，第三巡回法院认可了委员会在 Barrett、Davis 和 L-G- 中的分析，裁定：“我们认为，§ 924(c)(2)的措辞，按其自身条款系基于枪支犯罪的联邦量刑加重规定，仅适用于联邦暴力犯罪或毒品贩运犯罪。”Id. at 308。Gerbier 法院解释称：“无论在量刑指南案件中正确的解释可能是什么，我们不同意在驱逐出境语境下§ 924(c)中‘毒品贩运犯罪’的平义包括州重罪定罪，而该定罪在联邦法律下仅属轻罪，且该州法律定罪本来没有贩运成分。”Id. at 307。该法院认定“假设的联邦重罪”分析是适当的，即法院应审查该定罪

Following the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, supra, we specifically acquiesced to its interpretation in cases arising in that circuit. Matter of Salazar, 23 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 2002).

在第五巡回法院于 United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, supra 中作出裁决后，我们在该巡回法院辖区内产生的案件中明确默许了其解释。Matter of Salazar, 23 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 2002)。

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was for a state drug possession offense that, if prosecuted under federal law, would amount to a felony. Id. at 308-10. The Gerbier court specifically looked to the 1988 amendments to § 924(c)(2), which “did nothing to change the fact that the felony violation must be of federal, not state, law.” Id. at 309.

是否属于州毒品持有犯罪，若依联邦法律起诉，将构成重罪。Id. at 308-10。Gerbier 法院特别考察了1988年对§ 924(c)(2)的修正，该修正“并未改变重罪违反必须是违反联邦法律而非州法律这一事实。”Id. at 309。

Furthermore, while the majority relies on the reasoning of the First Circuit in United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, supra, at 366, that court recognized outright that “[t]he decision in L-G- did not involve any consideration of the aggravated felony sentence enhancement at issue here.” The court observed, “At stake in L-G- was, instead, the petitioner’s right to apply for asylum and request withholding of deportation under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 & 1253(h).” Id. Although the court acknowledged that our L-G- decision turned on the definition of an “aggravated felony” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), which, in relevant part, is the same as that provided in application note 7 to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, it ruled that “the relevant context was different.” Id. (emphasis added). The First Circuit concluded that our recognition of the particular policy considerations underlying asylum and withholding determinations “does not convince us that Congress, in creating the aggravated felony sentence enhancement . . . intended the same result.” Id. (emphasis added).

此外，尽管多数意见依赖第一巡回法院在 United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, supra, at 366 中的推理，但该法院明确承认，“L-G- 案的裁决并未涉及本案所争议的加重重罪量刑加重规定的任何考量。”该法院指出，“L-G- 案中争议的，反而是申请人依据 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 和 1253(h) 申请庇护和要求暂缓驱逐出境的权利。”Id. 尽管该法院承认我们的 L-G- 裁决取决于 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) 中“加重重罪”的定义，而该定义在相关部分与 U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 适用注释7所规定的相同，但它裁定“相关语境不同。”Id.（着重号为原文所加）。第一巡回法院认定，我们承认庇护和暂缓驱逐出境裁决背后的特定政策考量，“并不能使我们相信国会在创设加重重罪量刑加重规定时……意图达到相同结果。”Id.（着重号为原文所加）。

C. Majority Opinion and Board Values

C. 多数意见与委员会价值观

The majority abjures making any independent interpretation and insists it is only acquiescing to the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals. In fact, however, the majority elects to interpret the statutory language so that the term “felony,” as defined in the Controlled Substances Act at 21 U.S.C. § 802(13), requires treating any state felony offense that is punishable under the statutes enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) as an aggravated felony, without regard to whether the offense would be punishable as a felony under federal law. In justification of this change, the majority essentially relies on three points. First, the majority raises concerns that “[t]he respondent’s appeal raises substantial legal questions and illustrates some of the difficulties that can arise when applying the analytical approach we adopted in Matter of K-V-D-, supra.” Matter of Yanez, supra, at 392 (emphasis added). Second, the majority articulates its concerns that Matter of K-V-D- interprets 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) “in a manner that has not generally been followed by the federal criminal law courts.” Id. Third, the majority concludes that because “uniformity is presently unattainable in this context . . . continued adherence to the standard adopted in Matter of K-V-D-, Matter of L-G-, and Matter of Davis, no longer makes sense.” Id. at 396.

多数意见放弃作出任何独立解释，并坚称其只是默许上诉巡回法院的裁决。然而，事实上，多数意见选择如此解释法定语言，以致《受管制物质法》21 U.S.C. § 802(13) 所定义的“重罪”一语，要求将任何依 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 所列举法规可予处罚的州重罪犯罪视为加重重罪，而不论该犯罪依联邦法律是否可作为重罪处罚。为证明这一改变正当，多数意见基本上依赖三点。第一，多数意见提出关切称，“ respondent 的上诉提出了重大法律问题，并说明了适用我们在 Matter of K-V-D-, supra 中所采纳的分析方法时可能出现的一些困难。”Matter of Yanez, supra, at 392（着重号为原文所加）。第二，多数意见表达其关切称，Matter of K-V-D- 对 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 的解释“并未普遍被联邦刑事法院遵循。”Id. 第三，多数意见认定，由于“在此语境下目前无法实现统一性……继续遵循 Matter of K-V-D-、Matter of L-G- 和 Matter of Davis 所采纳的标准不再合理。”Id. at 396。

In short, the majority points out that the legal issues raised by the respondent are troublesome if we must construe them under our prior law. It would be much easier to simply follow the rulings of the federal circuit

简言之，多数意见指出，如果必须依我们先前的法律来解释 respondent 提出的法律问题，这些问题很棘手。直接遵循联邦巡回

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courts of appeals in a related but not identical context, and the countervailing policy goal of applying a federal standard resulting in a uniform enforcement of the immigration law cannot be achieved anyway. We cannot agree with these reasons for abandoning our prior interpretation. If we are going to opt for a changed interpretation, we need better reasons.

法院在相关但并非相同语境中的裁决会容易得多，而适用联邦标准以实现移民法统一执行的相反政策目标无论如何也无法实现。我们不能同意这些放弃先前解释的理由。如果我们要选择改变解释，就需要更好的理由。

As indicated above, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is a sentence enhancement statute, which elevates the penalty that may be imposed in the criminal context for certain offenses committed with firearms. We do not dispute that the circuit courts owe our prior interpretation, made in the deportation and removal context, little or no deference. Section 924(c)(2) is a criminal statute over which we, as an agency, have no particular expertise. Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, at 302 n.2 (citing Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2001)); cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). However, a majority of the federal circuit courts that have interpreted the phrase “drug trafficking crime” have done so in the context of sentence enhancement cases addressing the definition of an “aggravated felony” as defined in section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, at 308 n.9.

如上所述，18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 是一项量刑加重法规，它提高了在刑事语境中某些伴随枪支实施的犯罪可施加的刑罚。我们不争辩，各巡回法院对我们先前在驱逐出境和遣返语境中作出的解释几乎或完全不欠遵从。§ 924(c)(2) 是一项刑事法规，我们作为机构对此并无特别专长。Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, at 302 n.2（引用 Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2001)）；比较 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)。然而，多数解释“毒品贩运犯罪”一语的联邦巡回法院是在量刑加重案件中这样做的，处理的是《法》第101(a)(43)(B)条所定义的“加重重罪”的定义。Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, at 308 n.9。

Notably, in Matter of L-G-, supra, we stated that “[w]e find this less expansive interpretation of ‘drug trafficking crime’ consistent with the statutory history of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2).” Id. at 94 (emphasis added). In altering this long-standing interpretation of section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act for immigration enforcement purposes, the majority gives no consideration to the principle that in construing the statute, our role is to apply the removal provisions of the Act narrowly. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (recognizing that “deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile” (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947))); see also United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra, at 146-47 (recognizing the Board’s “narrow” construction); Reyes-Hernandez v. INS, 89 F.3d 490, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing the harsh consequences of deportation).

值得注意的是，在 Matter of L-G-, supra 中，我们指出：“我们认为对‘毒品贩运犯罪’的这一较不宽泛的解释符合 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 的立法史。”Id. at 94（着重号为原文所加）。在出于移民执法目的改变对《法》第101(a)(43)(B)条的这一长期解释时，多数意见未考虑这样一项原则：在解释该法规时，我们的职责是狭义适用《法》的遣返条款。见 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)（承认“驱逐出境是一项严厉措施，有时等同于放逐或流放”（引用 Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947)））；另见 United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra, at 146-47（承认委员会的“狭义”解释）；Reyes-Hernandez v. INS, 89 F.3d 490, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1996)（承认驱逐出境的严厉后果）。

The Supreme Court has stated clearly that “we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on [the immigrant’s] freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, supra, at 10 (emphasis added). 7 The Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), reflects that this rule applies

最高法院已明确指出，“我们不会假定国会意图侵犯[移民的]自由，超出所用词语若干可能含义中最狭义者所要求的范围。”Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, supra, at 10（着重号为原文所加）。7 最高法院在 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) 中的裁决表明，该规则适用于

7 We have followed this rule in more than 30 precedent decisions issued since 1949. See, e.g., Matter of Farias, 21 I&N Dec. 269, 274 (BIA 1996; A.G., BIA 1997); Matter of Tiwari, 19 I&N Dec. 875 (BIA 1989); Matter of Andrade, 14 I&N Dec. 651 (BIA 1974); Matter of G-, 9 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1960; A.G. 1961); Matter of K-, 3 I&N Dec. 575 (BIA 1949). In so doing, we have consistently found that questions of deportability must be resolved in the alien’s favor. Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579, 586 (BIA 1992); Matter of Chartier, 16 I&N Dec. 284, 287 (BIA 1977).

7 自1949年以来，我们在30多项先例裁决中遵循了该规则。见，例如，Matter of Farias, 21 I&N Dec. 269, 274 (BIA 1996; A.G., BIA 1997)；Matter of Tiwari, 19 I&N Dec. 875 (BIA 1989)；Matter of Andrade, 14 I&N Dec. 651 (BIA 1974)；Matter of G-, 9 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1960; A.G. 1961)；Matter of K-, 3 I&N Dec. 575 (BIA 1949)。在这样做时，我们一贯认定，可驱逐性问题必须作有利于外国人的解决。Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579, 586 (BIA 1992)；Matter of Chartier, 16 I&N Dec. 284, 287 (BIA 1977)。

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even to interpretations of the plain language of the statute under the first prong of the test prescribed in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra, at 842. INS v. St. Cyr, supra, at 320 (recognizing “‘the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien’” (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987))). Thus, we are obliged to opt for the more narrow reading, i.e., the one that will result in less harsh removal consequences.

甚至包括对Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra, at 842一案所规定检验标准第一分支下法规平实语言解释的质疑。INS v. St. Cyr, supra, at 320（承认“‘对驱逐法规中任何遗留歧义作有利于外籍人解释的长期原则’”（引用INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)））。因此，我们有义务选择更狭窄的解读，即导致较少严厉驱逐后果的解读。

Moreover, the majority decision dismisses the uniformity concerns expressed in Matter of L-G-, supra, as unattainable. 8 In fact, however, the lack of uniformity created by the majority’s interpretation will be equal to or greater than that currently existing under our interpretation in L-G- and K-V-D-. Under our most recent ruling in Matter of K-V-D- we acknowledged that we were required by principles of acquiescence to follow those circuit court decisions interpreting § 924(c)(2) in the context of immigration enforcement, and we have adhered to these principles. See Matter of Salazar, 23 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 2002). Accordingly, we must acquiesce to the rulings of the Second and Third Circuits, which, to date, have followed our interpretation in Matter of L-G-. See Matter of K-V-D-, supra; Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25 (BIA 1989).

此外，多数意见将Matter of L-G-, supra一案中表达的统一性关切视为无法实现而予以驳回。8 然而，事实上，多数意见的解释所造成的不统一将等于或大于我们目前在L-G-和K-V-D-案解释下存在的不统一。在我们最近于Matter of K-V-D-案中的裁决中，我们承认，根据默许原则，我们必须遵循那些在移民执法背景下解释§ 924(c)(2)的巡回法院判决，并且我们一直遵守这些原则。见Matter of Salazar, 23 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 2002)。因此，我们必须默许第二和第三巡回法院的裁决，这些法院迄今遵循了我们在Matter of L-G-案中的解释。见Matter of K-V-D-, supra; Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25 (BIA 1989)。

In other circuits, however, the majority has ruled that we will apply the approach followed by the majority of circuit courts in sentencing guidelines decisions. Matter of Yanez, supra, at 397. The undesirable result will be that whether an individual is subject to removal and disqualified from virtually all forms of relief will turn on either state labels or circuit court jurisdiction, or both. Cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990) (citing United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969)).

然而，在其他巡回法院，多数意见裁定我们将采用多数巡回法院在量刑指南判决中遵循的方法。Matter of Yanez, supra, at 397。不可取的结果将是，个人是否面临驱逐以及是否被取消几乎所有形式的救济资格，将取决于州标签或巡回法院管辖权，或两者兼有。Cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990)（引用United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969)）。

Because state court labels vary significantly, the same possession offense, committed in different jurisdictions, will yield widely varying immigration consequences. For example, simple possession of a controlled substance in Maryland is labeled as a misdemeanor and will not trigger aggravated felony consequences. See Md. Code Ann., Crimes and Punishments, § 287 (2001) (punishing unlawful possession or administering of a dangerous substance as a misdemeanor with the potential for imprisonment of up to 4 years). In contrast, just across the Potomac River, Virginia penalizes possession of most controlled substances as a Class 5 felony. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-250 (Michie 2001). The same conduct in California could result in either a misdemeanor or a felony conviction, depending on the circumstances. See Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11350 (West 2002) (penalizing possession with imprisonment

由于州法院标签差异显著，在不同司法管辖区实施的相同持有罪行将产生广泛不同的移民后果。例如，在马里兰州，简单持有受管制物质被标记为轻罪，不会触发加重重罪后果。见Md. Code Ann., Crimes and Punishments, § 287 (2001)（将非法持有或施用危险物质作为轻罪处罚，最高可判处4年监禁）。相比之下，就在波托马克河对岸，弗吉尼亚州将持有大多数受管制物质定为5级重罪。Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-250 (Michie 2001)。在加利福尼亚州，相同行为可能导致轻罪或重罪定罪，取决于具体情况。见Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11350 (West 2002)（处罚持有行为，可判处监禁

8 We have consistently sought to achieve uniformity in recent decisions interpreting various provisions of the Act. See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, Interim Decision 3411 (BIA 1999); Matter of Roldan, Interim Decision 3377 (BIA 1999); Matter of A-P-, Interim Decision 3375, at 9 n.6 (BIA 1999). But see Matter of Salazar, supra.

8 我们在最近解释该法各条款的裁决中一直寻求实现统一性。见，例如，Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, Interim Decision 3411 (BIA 1999); Matter of Roldan, Interim Decision 3377 (BIA 1999); Matter of A-P-, Interim Decision 3375, at 9 n.6 (BIA 1999)。但见Matter of Salazar, supra。

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in either the county jail or state prison and defining a “felony offense” and “offense punishable as a felony” under § 11356 as an offense for which the law prescribes imprisonment in the state prison).

在县监狱或州监狱，并根据§ 11356将“重罪罪行”和“可作为重罪处罚的罪行”定义为法律规定的可判处州监狱监禁的罪行）。

These disparities extend even to possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana, an offense that Congress expressly found would not be a deportable offense under the ground involving convictions relating to a controlled substance. See section 237(a)(2)(B)(I) of the Act; Matter of L-G-, supra, at 104 (Holmes, concurring). As the Third Circuit noted in Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, a person convicted of a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana in North Dakota, where the offense is punishable as a felony, would be subject to removal on the basis of a conviction for an aggravated felony, without even the possibility of applying for cancellation of removal. Id. at 312 (citing N.D. Cent. Code § 19.03.1-23(6) (2000)). But a person convicted of the same offense in Montana, where the offense is only a misdemeanor, would not be subject to deportation under the aggravated felony classification without an opportunity to seek cancellation. Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 45-102(2) (2001)).

这些差异甚至延伸到持有少于30克大麻的罪行，国会明确认定该罪行在涉及受管制物质定罪的驱逐理由下不构成可驱逐罪行。见该法第237(a)(2)(B)(I)条；Matter of L-G-, supra, at 104（Holmes, 同意意见）。正如第三巡回法院在Gerbier v. Holmes, supra案中指出的，在北达科他州，因单一简单持有30克或以下大麻罪行被定罪的人，该罪行可作为重罪处罚，将因加重重罪定罪而面临驱逐，甚至没有申请取消驱逐的可能性。Id. at 312（引用N.D. Cent. Code § 19.03.1-23(6) (2000)）。但在蒙大拿州，因相同罪行被定罪的人，该罪行仅为轻罪，则不会在加重重罪分类下面临驱逐，且有机会寻求取消。Id.（引用Mont. Code Ann. § 45-102(2) (2001)）。

Consequently, an alien in one state might be ineligible for cancellation of removal even though he committed the same exact crime as an alien in a different state, simply because the two states punish the same crime differently. As these disparate results are a real possibility, the majority interpretation completely undermines any effort to achieve a uniform immigration law. See United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra, at 147 (stating that “‘the interests of nationwide uniformity outweigh our adherence to Circuit precedent in this instance’” (quoting Aguirre v. INS, supra, at 317)); see also Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, at 311 (“Indeed, the policy favoring uniformity in the immigration context is rooted in the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.”).

因此，一个州的外籍人可能无资格获得取消驱逐，即使他实施了与另一个州的外籍人完全相同的罪行，仅仅因为两个州对同一罪行的处罚不同。由于这些不同结果是真实可能性，多数意见的解释完全破坏了实现统一移民法的任何努力。见United States v. Pornes-Garcia, supra, at 147（指出“‘全国统一性的利益胜过我们在此情况下对巡回法院先例的遵循’”）（引用Aguirre v. INS, supra, at 317）；另见Gerbier v. Holmes, supra, at 311（“事实上，移民背景下有利于统一性的政策植根于宪法。见U.S. Const. art. I, § 8。”）。

II. EFFECT OF THE BOARD’S CHANGED INTERPRETATION

II. 委员会改变解释的影响

Whether or not an alien convicted of possession of a controlled substance is subject to removal is not at issue. Any alien convicted of an offense relating to a controlled substance, regardless of whether his status is lawful or whether he is admitted for a temporary or permanent period, is subject to removal under section 237(a)(2)(B)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I) (2000). Furthermore, we have made certain that a state prosecution for first-time simple possession of a controlled substance will not be construed as constituting an exception to that rule by overruling our prior decision in Matter of Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58 (BIA 1995). Matter of Salazar, supra; Matter of Roldan, Interim Decision 3377 (BIA 1999), overruled in part by Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 745-49 (9th Cir. 2000).

因持有受管制物质被定罪的外籍人是否面临驱逐不是问题所在。任何因涉及受管制物质的罪行被定罪的外籍人，无论其身份是否合法，或是否被临时或永久接纳，均根据该法第237(a)(2)(B)(I)条，8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I) (2000)面临驱逐。此外，我们已通过推翻先前在Matter of Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58 (BIA 1995)案中的裁决，确保首次简单持有受管制物质的州起诉不会被解释为该规则的例外。Matter of Salazar, supra; Matter of Roldan, Interim Decision 3377 (BIA 1999)，部分被Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 745-49 (9th Cir. 2000)推翻。

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Therefore, we concur in the majority’s conclusion that the respondent remains removable from the United States under section 237(a)(2)(B)(I) of the Act as an alien convicted of a controlled substance violation. We also agree with the majority that, under Matter of Punu, Interim Decision 3364 (BIA 1998), the respondent was originally “convicted” on January 5, 1998. However, that is not the end of the matter.

因此，我们同意多数意见的结论，即答辩人作为因受管制物质违规被定罪的外籍人，根据该法第237(a)(2)(B)(I)条仍可被驱逐出美国。我们也同意多数意见，根据Matter of Punu, Interim Decision 3364 (BIA 1998)，答辩人最初于1998年1月5日被“定罪”。然而，事情并未到此结束。

A. Effect of the New Rule on Removability and Relief from Removal

A. 新规则对可驱逐性和驱逐救济的影响

Under federal law, a first possession offense (for a controlled substance other than 5 grams or more of crack cocaine) is treated not as a felony, but as a misdemeanor. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2000). However, a second possession offense committed after a “final conviction” for possession of a controlled substance may be treated as a felony under certain circumstances. Id. Therefore, construing the respondent’s case under our “hypothetical federal felony” rulings in Matter of L-G-, supra, and Matter of K-V-D-, supra, the respondent’s removability would not be dependent on “technical arguments” regarding the finality of his first drug possession conviction, as the majority suggests, but on a straightforward examination of that conviction as it would be treated under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). 9 Cf. Matter of Yanez, supra, at 399.

根据联邦法律，首次持有罪行（除5克或以上快克可卡因外的受管制物质）不被视为重罪，而是轻罪。21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2000)。然而，在因持有受管制物质“最终定罪”后实施的第二次持有罪行，在某些情况下可作为重罪处理。Id. 因此，根据我们在Matter of L-G-, supra和Matter of K-V-D-, supra案中的“假设联邦重罪”裁决来解释答辩人的案件，答辩人的可驱逐性将不取决于多数意见所暗示的关于其首次毒品持有定罪终局性的“技术性论点”，而取决于对该定罪根据21 U.S.C. § 844(a)将如何处理的直接审查。9 Cf. Matter of Yanez, supra, at 399。

The respondent’s preadjudication probation for a 1997 Illinois drug possession violation was “terminated” and the respondent was “discharged” by the Illinois state court on May 27, 1999. Therefore, under Illinois law, the respondent did not have a final conviction for possession of a controlled substance at the time he committed the second drug possession offense, because he pled guilty to, and actually was convicted of, both his first and second offenses on May 27, 1999. See People v. Sherrod, 664 N.E.2d1066,1070 (1996) (McCuskey, J., specially concurring) (“Proceedings are not final until the trial court either: (1) makes a determination that the defendant successfully completed probation . . . or (2) makes a finding that the defendant violated the terms or conditions of probation, in which case a judgment of conviction may be entered and sentence imposed.”). Under federal law, without a prior final conviction existing at the time the second possession offense was committed, the respondent’s second offense could only be punished as a misdemeanor and would not qualify as an aggravated felony. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).

答辩人因1997年伊利诺伊州毒品持有违规而接受的审前缓刑于1999年5月27日被伊利诺伊州法院“终止”，答辩人被“释放”。因此，根据伊利诺伊州法律，答辩人在实施第二次毒品持有罪行时没有持有受管制物质的最终定罪，因为他于1999年5月27日对第一次和第二次罪行均认罪并实际被定罪。见People v. Sherrod, 664 N.E.2d1066,1070 (1996)（McCuskey, J., 特别同意意见）（“程序直到初审法院要么：(1) 裁定被告成功完成缓刑……要么 (2) 认定被告违反缓刑条款或条件，在此情况下可作出定罪判决并判处刑罚，才为终局。”）。根据联邦法律，如果在实施第二次持有罪行时不存在先前最终定罪，答辩人的第二次罪行只能作为轻罪处罚，不构成加重重罪。见21 U.S.C. § 844(a)。

9 Pursuant to our precedent ruling in Matter of L-G-, supra, we had consistently required a prior conviction to be “final” before the second offense of possession of a controlled substance was committed in order for the second offense to be considered a “hypothetical federal felony.” See, e.g., Matter of Matic, A72 446 565 (Nov. 9, 1998); see also Matter of Villagrana, A41 329 243 (July 19, 2001).

9 根据我们在Matter of L-G-, supra案中的先例裁决，我们一直要求在实施第二次持有受管制物质罪行之前，先前定罪必须是“最终”的，以便第二次罪行被视为“假设联邦重罪”。见，例如，Matter of Matic, A72 446 565 (Nov. 9, 1998)；另见Matter of Villagrana, A41 329 243 (July 19, 2001)。

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The effect of reading the statute as the majority does arguably changes the result in the respondent’s case. According to the reading announced today, by virtue of a guilty plea entered in 1998 to the charge of possession of cocaine, a “class 4 felony” under Illinois law, the respondent has been convicted of an aggravated felony. Matter of Yanez, supra, at 391. If the offense is construed as an aggravated felony, an individual convicted of a single offense of drug possession is ineligible for most forms of discretionary relief such as asylum, cancellation of removal, and voluntary departure. He also may not apply for readmission to the United States without the consent of the Attorney General, and he is ineligible for a waiver. See Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 737 (7th Cir.), reh’g denied, 256 F.3d 546 (2001). In addition, an individual convicted of a crime relating to a controlled substance is most likely to be classified as having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal. See Matter of Y-L-, A-G- & R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002). Moreover, if convicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1324 for unauthorized reentry into the United States, such an individual is subject to a substantial sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. See United States v. Martinez-Carillo, 250 F.3d 1101, 1102 (7th Cir. 2001). These consequences, which will now flow from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, or a second offense committed before a first conviction became final, could not possibly have been anticipated.

按照多数意见解读该法规，可以说改变了respondent案件的结果。根据今天宣布的解读，由于1998年对持有可卡因的指控——根据伊利诺伊州法律属于“class 4 felony”——作出的认罪答辩，respondent已被判定犯有加重重罪。Matter of Yanez, supra, at 391。如果该罪行被解释为加重重罪，因单一毒品持有罪行被定罪的个人没有资格获得大多数形式的自由裁量救济，如庇护、取消递解和自愿离境。未经司法部长同意，他也不能申请重新入境美国，并且没有资格获得豁免。见Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 737 (7th Cir.), reh’g denied, 256 F.3d 546 (2001)。此外，因涉及受管制物质的犯罪被定罪的个人最有可能被归类为已被判定犯有特别严重罪行，从而使其没有资格获得暂缓递解。见Matter of Y-L-, A-G- & R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002)。而且，如果根据8 U.S.C. § 1324因未经授权重新入境美国而被定罪，此类个人将根据U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2受到大幅加重刑罚。见United States v. Martinez-Carillo, 250 F.3d 1101, 1102 (7th Cir. 2001)。这些后果——现在将因持有受管制物质的定罪，或在首次定罪成为终局前实施的第二次犯罪而产生——根本不可能被预见。

B. Due Process Concerns Relating to the New Rule

B. 与新规则相关的正当程序关切

Our decision today significantly alters the Board’s interpretation of section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. It changes the rules so that a respondent convicted of simple possession of a controlled substance now is removable based on an aggravated felony offense. It changes the consequences of removal so that he is ineligible for most forms of relief, is disqualified from naturalization, and is subject to far greater penalties if he returns to the United States without the permission of the Attorney General.

我们今天的裁决显著改变了Board对《法案》第101(a)(43)(B)条的解释。它改变了规则，使得因简单持有受管制物质而被定罪的respondent现在基于加重重罪罪行而可被递解。它改变了递解的后果，使其没有资格获得大多数形式的救济，被取消归化资格，并且如果未经司法部长许可返回美国，将受到远为严厉的处罚。

The majority’s suggestion that our decision in Matter of L-G-, supra, did not set forth an authoritative interpretation of § 924(c)(2) on which a respondent could rely in a case arising in the immigration context is both contrary to regulation and at odds with practical reality. 10 Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (2001). Even after a number of circuit courts issued alternative

多数意见认为，我们在Matter of L-G-, supra中的裁决并未对§ 924(c)(2)作出权威性解释，respondent在移民语境中产生的案件中不能依赖该解释，这种说法既违反法规，也与现实情况不符。10 参见8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (2001)。即使在多个巡回法院在刑事量刑指南案件中发布了替代性

10 The majority’s contention that our acquiescence in Matter of L-G- to the Second Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Jenkins, supra, “strongly suggested that our reading of § 924(c)(2) was not authoritative,” is simply an expression of wishful thinking on the majority’s part. Matter of Yanez, supra, at 400. Within 6 months of our August 27, 1995, ruling, on March 22, 1996, the Second Circuit deferred to our ruling in Matter of L-G-, finding the rationale for our interpretation of the statute to be persuasive. See Aguirre v. INS, supra.

10 多数意见声称，我们在Matter of L-G-中对第二巡回法院在United States v. Jenkins, supra中裁决的默许，“强烈表明我们对§ 924(c)(2)的解读并非权威性的”，这不过是多数意见一厢情愿的想法。Matter of Yanez, supra, at 400。在我们1995年8月27日裁决后的6个月内，即1996年3月22日，第二巡回法院遵从了我们在Matter of L-G-中的裁决，认为我们对法规解释的理由具有说服力。见Aguirre v. INS, supra。

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interpretations of § 924(c)(2) in criminal sentencing guidelines cases, we continued to invoke the reasoning in Matter of L-G- for our interpretation of the law. 11

对§ 924(c)(2)的解释后，我们继续援引Matter of L-G-中的推理作为我们对法律的解释。11

The Board’s adjudicatory rulings are binding on Immigration Judges, officials of the Service, and the respondents who come before us in removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g). As early as 1947, the Supreme Court held that administrative agencies may properly use adjudication to “announc[e] and apply[] a new standard of conduct.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). As an administrative tribunal, our adjudicatory rulings constitute an authoritative construction of the statute and are tantamount to regulations. 12 Accordingly, litigants have every reason to look to our precedents to govern their conduct and decisions made in relation to potential bases of removability and relief from removal.

Board的裁决性裁定对移民法官、Service官员以及在我们递解程序中出庭的respondent具有约束力。8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g)。早在1947年，最高法院就裁定，行政机构可以适当地利用裁决来“宣布和适用新的行为标准”。SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)；另见NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969)。作为行政法庭，我们的裁决性裁定构成对法规的权威性解释，等同于法规。12 因此，诉讼当事人完全有理由参照我们的先例来指导其行为以及与潜在递解依据和递解救济相关的决定。

We acknowledge that the “adjudicative forum can often be used to announce new principles applicable to the specific parties . . . even if the principles involve a change from past policies.” Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir. 1978); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974). There is no dispute that “‘regulatory agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (quoting American Trucking Assoc., Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.

我们承认，“裁决论坛经常可以被用来宣布适用于特定当事人的新原则……即使这些原则涉及对过去政策的改变。”Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir. 1978)；另见NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974)。毫无疑问，“‘监管机构不会制定永恒的行为规则。’”Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)（引用American Trucking Assoc., Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.

11 Contrary to the majority’s contention that the respondent could not have relied on our adherance to Matter of L-G-, supra, because Matter of K-V-D-, supra, was decided after he entered his May 1999 guilty pleas, our reading of § 924(c)(2) was uniformly applied. We consistently issued unpublished decisions indicating that we would not follow circuit court sentencing guidelines decisions construing section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act and would adhere to our ruling in Matter of L-G-. See, e.g., Matter of Zuniga, A41 268 067 (Mar. 17, 1999); Matter of Garcia, A90 266 293 (Feb. 24, 1999); Matter of Martinez, A91 275 632 (Feb. 22, 1999); Matter of Valle, A39 089 782 (Feb. 19, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/libindex.html. All of these decisions, and others like them, predated the respondent’s second guilty plea and final conviction, and several of them discussed the limitation imposed by the absence of a final conviction when a second offense was committed. See, e.g., Matter of Matic, supra; see also Matter of Valle, supra. Unlike Guillen-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 340, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1995), in which the Seventh Circuit found that the facts were sufficiently distinguishable from those in an unpublished decision “to allow us to conclude that there was no inconsistency in the decisions,” the “indexed” decisions listed on our website involved a common question of law. 12 Our “‘(a)djudicated cases may and do, of course, serve as vehicles for the formulation of agency policies, which are applied and announced therein. See H. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies 36-52 (1962).’” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973) (quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., supra, at 765-66); see also Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39, 44 n.6 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that “the ‘agency’ is the Department of Justice, because both the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Board of Immigration Appeals are arms of the Department”).

11 与多数意见声称respondent不可能依赖我们对Matter of L-G-, supra的坚持相反——因为Matter of K-V-D-, supra是在他1999年5月认罪答辩之后裁决的——我们对§ 924(c)(2)的解读被统一适用。我们一贯发布未公布的裁决，表明我们不会遵循巡回法院在量刑指南案件中解释《法案》第101(a)(43)(B)条的裁决，并将坚持我们在Matter of L-G-中的裁决。见，例如，Matter of Zuniga, A41 268 067 (Mar. 17, 1999)；Matter of Garcia, A90 266 293 (Feb. 24, 1999)；Matter of Martinez, A91 275 632 (Feb. 22, 1999)；Matter of Valle, A39 089 782 (Feb. 19, 1999)，可在http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/libindex.html获取。所有这些裁决以及其他类似裁决均早于respondent的第二次认罪答辩和最终定罪，其中若干裁决讨论了在实施第二次犯罪时缺乏最终定罪所施加的限制。见，例如，Matter of Matic, supra；另见Matter of Valle, supra。与Guillen-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 340, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1995)不同——在该案中第七巡回法院认定事实与未公布裁决中的事实有足够区别，“使我们能够得出结论，裁决之间不存在不一致”——我们网站上列出的“索引”裁决涉及共同的法律问题。 12 我们的“‘裁决案件可以并且确实当然地作为制定机构政策的载体，这些政策在其中被适用和宣布。见H. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies 36-52 (1962)。’”Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973)（引用NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., supra, at 765-66）；另见Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39, 44 n.6 (9th Cir. 1978)（指出“‘机构’是司法部，因为移民和归化局与移民上诉委员会都是该部的分支”）。

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Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967)). Likewise, an agency must be given ample latitude to “‘adapt [its] rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968)).

Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967)）。同样，必须给予机构充分的自由裁量权以“‘使其规则和政策适应不断变化的情况的要求。’”Id.（引用Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968)）。

Although we may modify our interpretation, however, a change may be arbitrary or capricious when it is more than a mere refinement of an existing standard and an affected party has detrimentally relied on the old standard. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 294-95; see also Ruangswang v. INS, supra, at 44-45. A change in interpretation made through “adjudication might also be inappropriate where ‘some new liability’ results from ‘past actions which were taken in good-faith reliance on Board pronouncements.’” Ruangswang v. INS, supra, at 44 (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 295). That is the case here.

然而，尽管我们可以修改我们的解释，但当变更不仅仅是现有标准的纯粹完善，且受影响的当事人已对旧标准产生不利依赖时，该变更可能是任意或反复无常的。见NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 294-95；另见Ruangswang v. INS, supra, at 44-45。通过“裁决”作出的解释变更“在‘某些新责任’源于‘基于善意信赖Board声明而采取的过去行动’时也可能是不适当的。”Ruangswang v. INS, supra, at 44（引用NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 295）。本案就是这种情况。

These limitations reflect the now-familiar presumption against retroactivity recently affirmed and applied to immigration cases by the Supreme Court. INS v. St. Cyr, supra. That is, the retroactive application of a new rule should be informed and guided by “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994); see also Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 352 (1999); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-68 (1954). By now, it is universally accepted that “[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.” INS v. St. Cyr, supra, at 316 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 265-66); see also Jideonwo v. INS, 224 F.3d 692, 696-97 (7th Cir. 2000).

这些限制反映了如今熟悉的反对溯及既往的推定，最高法院最近在移民案件中确认并适用了该推定。INS v. St. Cyr, supra。也就是说，新规则的溯及适用应以“公平通知、合理信赖和既定期望的熟悉考量”为依据和指导。Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)；另见Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 352 (1999)；United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-68 (1954)。时至今日，普遍接受的是，“[公]平的基本考量要求个人有机会知道法律是什么并相应地调整其行为；既定期望不应被轻易打破。”INS v. St. Cyr, supra, at 316（引用Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 265-66）；另见Jideonwo v. INS, 224 F.3d 692, 696-97 (7th Cir. 2000)。

Thus, the “principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal” and should govern here. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”). Similarly, in SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra, the Court declared that any retroactivity resulting from the introduction of a new standard through adjudication “must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and

因此，“行为通常应根据行为发生时存在的法律来评估其法律效果的原则具有永恒和普遍的人类吸引力”，并应在此适用。Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990)（Scalia, J., 同意意见）；另见BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)（“我们宪法判例所珍视的基本公平观念要求个人不仅获得关于将使其受到惩罚的行为的公平通知，而且获得关于州可能施加的处罚严重程度的公平通知。”）。同样，在SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra中，法院宣布，通过裁决引入新标准所产生的任何溯及力“必须与产生违反法定设计或法律与

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equitable principles.” Id. at 203 (emphasis added); 13 see also Gill v. INS, 666 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1982).

衡平原则的结果的危害相权衡。”Id. at 203（强调添加）；13 另见Gill v. INS, 666 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1982)。

The Supreme Court has noted that although “the strict constitutional safeguards afforded to criminal defendants are not applicable to civil cases, the basic protection against ‘judgments without notice’ afforded by the Due Process Clause is implicated by civil penalties.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, while Congress may enact laws having retroactive effect, due process requires that there be a separate justification for retroactivity. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1984).

最高法院指出，尽管“赋予刑事被告的严格宪法保障不适用于民事案件，但正当程序条款所提供的免于‘未经通知的判决’的基本保护涉及民事处罚。”Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977)（Stevens, J., 对判决结果同意意见）。因此，虽然国会可以颁布具有溯及力的法律，但正当程序要求对溯及力有单独的理由。Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1984)。

Furthermore, even where an appellate court applies “the law in effect at the time that it renders its decision,” applying a law retroactively such that it results in “manifest injustice” violates the Due Process Clause. Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 716 (1974). Manifest injustice may occur where a new law changes existing rights or imposes unanticipated obligations on a party without providing appropriate notice. Id. at 720; see also Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894, 904 n.7 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the “judicial default” rules employed in determining whether a statute should be applied retroactively include the “manifest injustice” test).

此外，即使上诉法院适用“其作出裁判时有效的法律”，溯及适用法律以致产生“明显不公”，亦违反正当程序条款。Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 716 (1974)。当新法律改变既有权利或对一方施加未经预见的义务而未提供适当通知时，即可能产生明显不公。Id. at 720；另见 Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894, 904 n.7 (7th Cir. 1999)（指出用于判断制定法是否应溯及适用的“司法默认”规则包括“明显不公”标准）。

In the Seventh Circuit, in which this case arises, the court has held that retrospective changes in deportation laws violated the due process rights of affected aliens. Jideonwo v. INS, supra; see also Reyes-Hernandez v. INS, supra, at 493 (disapproving of “mouse-trapping” respondents who conceded deportability in reliance on the opportunity to apply for a waiver). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that the “‘function of filling in the interstices of regulatory statutes should be performed, as much as possible, through [the] quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.’” NLRB v. Federal Sec., Inc., 154 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra, at 202).

本案所在的第7巡回区法院已裁定，驱逐出境法律的溯及变更侵犯了受影响外国人的正当程序权利。Jideonwo v. INS, supra；另见 Reyes-Hernandez v. INS, supra, at 493（不赞成对依赖申请豁免机会而承认可驱逐性的被申请人进行“诱捕”）。事实上，第7巡回区已承认，“‘填补规制性法律空隙的职能应尽可能通过准立法性的规则颁布来完成，以便适用于未来。’”NLRB v. Federal Sec., Inc., 154 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 1998)（原文有改动）（引用 SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra, at 202）。

13 The majority appears to miss the point that the Supreme Court’s concerns relating to notice and an individual’s ability to conform his conduct to what the law is make up the “legal and equitable principles” that warrant an exception to an agency’s power to announce a new rule through adjudication. SEC v. Chenery Corp, supra, at 203; cf. Matter of Yanez, supra, at 400 n.10. In fact, in Molina v. INS, 981 F.2d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 1992), the First Circuit intimated that it might accept amici’s argument that the agency’s failure to change the pre-Ozkok definition through rulemaking or “by overruling its prior case with prospective effect only” was unlawful, but that it could not find reasonable reliance on Molina’s part because the standards in the Board’s prior decision “were, at best, ambiguous with respect to a person in Molina’s situation.” That is not the case here. Moreover, since the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr, supra, at 322-23, the necessity of showing actual reliance by a respondent who entered a plea is questionable.

13 多数意见似乎忽略了这一点：最高法院关于通知以及个人使其行为符合法律现状的能力的关切，构成了“法律与衡平原则”，从而构成对行政机关通过裁判宣布新规则之权力的例外。SEC v. Chenery Corp, supra, at 203；参见 Matter of Yanez, supra, at 400 n.10。事实上，在 Molina v. INS, 981 F.2d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) 中，第1巡回区暗示其可能接受法庭之友的论点，即行政机关未通过规则制定或“仅以具有未来效力的方式推翻其先前判例”来改变 Ozkok 之前的定义属违法，但无法认定 Molina 一方存在合理依赖，因为委员会先前裁决中的标准“对于处于 Molina 情形的人而言，充其量是模糊的”。本案并非如此。此外，自最高法院在 INS v. St. Cyr, supra, at 322-23 作出裁决以来，对于已作出认罪答辩的被申请人，是否必须证明实际依赖已存疑问。

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Accordingly, before we apply a new rule to past conduct resulting in removal consequences, we should look to the five factors articulated in Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972), which have been adopted by the Seventh Circuit and six other circuit courts of appeals. See NLRB v. Wayne Transp., 776 F.2d 745, 751 (7th Cir. 1985). This five-factor test examines (1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well-established practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the burden that a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard.

因此，在我们对导致驱逐后果的过往行为适用新规则之前，我们应参照 Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 中阐明的五项因素，该五项因素已被第7巡回区及其他六个巡回上诉法院采纳。见 NLRB v. Wayne Transp., 776 F.2d 745, 751 (7th Cir. 1985)。该五因素检验审查：(1) 特定案件是否属首次印象案件；(2) 新规则是否代表对既定实践的突然背离，或仅试图填补法律未定领域的空白；(3) 新规则所适用的一方对先前规则的依赖程度；(4) 溯及性命令对一方施加的负担；以及 (5) 尽管一方依赖旧标准，适用新规则的法定利益。

Applying this five-factor test, we must conclude that the change resulting from the majority opinion is retroactive and should not be applied to the respondent’s case or to any case in which a respondent pled guilty to simple possession of a controlled substance in reliance on our decisions in Matter of L-G-, supra, and Matter of K-V-D-, supra. In INS v. St. Cyr, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]here can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions.” Id. at 322 (citations omitted). The court also noted that “preserving the possibility of such relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.” Id. at 323. Contrary to the majority’s contention, the question is not one of actual reliance, but one of presumptive reliance.

适用该五因素检验，我们必须认定多数意见所导致的变更具有溯及性，不应适用于被申请人的案件，也不应适用于任何被申请人依赖我们在 Matter of L-G-, supra 和 Matter of K-V-D-, supra 中的裁决，对单纯持有受管制物质作出认罪答辩的案件。在 INS v. St. Cyr, supra 中，最高法院承认，“毫无疑问，一般而言，考虑是否达成认罪协议的外国人被告对其定罪的移民后果有敏锐认识。”Id. at 322（引文省略）。法院还指出，“保留此类救济的可能性，本应是被告在决定是否接受认罪提议或转而接受审判时所寻求的主要利益之一。”Id. at 323。与多数意见的主张相反，问题不在于实际依赖，而在于推定依赖。

The majority’s interpretation of a “drug trafficking crime” is not a matter of first impression, but represents a departure from the reading we applied for over a decade. Moreover, we expressly considered the differing interpretation applied in many circuit court sentencing guidelines cases and specifically reaffirmed Matter of L-G-, supra, indicating we would continue to follow our reading unless expressly instructed to do otherwise as the result of a circuit court ruling. The respondent, and other aliens like him, in deciding whether to forego their right to a trial, almost certainly relied upon our decisions in Matter of L-G- and Matter of K-V-D- and depended on the likelihood that conviction for possession of a controlled substance would not be treated as an aggravated felony, or bar their opportunity to seek cancellation relief or naturalization.

多数意见对“毒品贩运犯罪”的解释并非首次印象问题，而是背离了我们十余年来所适用的解读。此外，我们明确考虑了在许多巡回法院量刑指南案件中适用的不同解释，并特别重申了 Matter of L-G-, supra，表明除非因巡回法院裁决而明确指示另有规定，我们将继续遵循我们的解读。被申请人及其他类似外国人，在决定是否放弃审判权时，几乎必然依赖我们在 Matter of L-G- 和 Matter of K-V-D- 中的裁决，并依赖持有受管制物质定罪不会被视作加重重罪、或阻碍其寻求取消救济或归化机会的可能性。

Undoubtedly, once again, “‘[a]ll of these people, and no doubt many others, had settled expectations to which they conformed their conduct.’” INS v. St. Cyr, supra, at 324 n.52 (quoting Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516, 528 (Rosenberg, concurring and dissenting)). Therefore, we must conclude that the majority exceeds the bounds of fairness in issuing this decision. See INS v. St. Cyr, supra; Ruangswang v. INS, supra, at 44 (“We are, however,

毫无疑问，再一次，“‘所有这些人，无疑还有许多其他人，都有其已调整行为以与之相符的既定期待。’”INS v. St. Cyr, supra, at 324 n.52（引用 Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516, 528 (Rosenberg, 同意并反对意见)）。因此，我们必须认定多数意见在作出本裁决时超出了公平的界限。见 INS v. St. Cyr, supra；Ruangswang v. INS, supra, at 44（“然而，我们

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convinced that what the Board seeks to do . . . is beyond the bounds of that which is permissible under Bell. The adverse consequences voluntary departure at best, and deportation at worst are certainly substantial.”).

确信委员会试图做的事情……超出了 Bell 案所允许的界限。自愿离境的最坏后果和驱逐出境的最坏后果无疑是重大的。”）。

In the end, if there is “any unease with the policy implications of the statute in question,” the Seventh Circuit has ruled that such matters are “within the province of Congress and not the judicial branch.” Guerrero-Perez v. INS, supra, at 737. Perhaps this unprecedented ruling of the Board, overturning a 12-year-old interpretation, provides a basis on which Congress should be asked to speak specifically as to the way in which it wishes us to determine the fate of lawful residents and other respondents who have been convicted of simple possession of a controlled substance.

最终，如果“对有关制定法的政策影响有任何不安”，第7巡回区已裁定此类事项“属于国会而非司法部门的职权范围”。Guerrero-Perez v. INS, supra, at 737。或许委员会这一史无前例的裁决——推翻了一项存在12年的解释——为以下做法提供了依据：应请国会专门就它希望我们如何裁定合法居民及其他因单纯持有受管制物质而被定罪的被申请人的命运作出规定。

III. CONCLUSION

III. 结论

Our adjudication changing the interpretation of a statutory provision that carries such extreme consequences cannot be based on expediency. We therefore cannot agree that the easiest reading is the correct one. Moreover, we view the majority’s interpretation of the statute as unnecessarily imposing a retroactive interpretation on thousands of respondents who have been convicted of simple possession of controlled substances. This is an excessive and unwarranted reading of the statute. Accordingly, we concur in part and dissent in part.

我们改变对一项带来如此极端后果的制定法条款之解释的裁决，不能基于权宜之计。因此，我们不能同意最简单的解读就是正确的解读。此外，我们认为多数意见对该制定法的解释，不必要地对数千名因单纯持有受管制物质而被定罪的被申请人施加了溯及性解释。这是对该制定法过度且不当的解读。据此，我们部分同意、部分反对。

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