Zerezghi v. USCIS

No. 18-35344

案号 18-35344

GHILAMICHAEL ZEREZGHI; HURUIA MESKEL, husband and wife,

GHILAMICHAEL ZEREZGHI；HURUIA MESKEL，夫妻，

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

原告-上诉人，

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00879- JLR

哥伦比亚特区案号 2:17-cv-00879- JLR

OPINION

意见书

v. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; MICAH LYNN BROWN, Acting Field Office Director; BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS; WILLIAM P. BARR, United States Attorney General; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

诉 美国公民及移民服务局；MICAH LYNN BROWN，代理外地办事处 主任；移民上诉委员会；WILLIAM P. BARR，美国 司法部长；美利坚合众国，

Defendants-Appellees.

被告-被上诉人。

Appeal from the United States District Court

来自美国联邦地区法院的上诉

for the Western District of Washington James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

华盛顿西区 James L. Robart，地区法官，主持

Argued and Submitted July 11, 2019

辩论与提交于2019年7月11日

Seattle, Washington

华盛顿州西雅图

Filed April 14, 2020

归档于2020年4月14日

2 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS

2 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

以及 Paul J. Watford，巡回法官。

Opinion by Judge Boggs

Boggs 法官撰写意见书

In a case where the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) denied an I-130 immediate relative visa petition on the ground that the non-citizen’s prior marriage had been fraudulent, the panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government, and remanded, holding that the Board of Immigration Appeals violated due process by relying on undisclosed evidence and by applying too low a standard of proof.

在美国公民及移民服务局（“USCIS”）以非公民的先前婚姻系欺诈为由拒绝 I-130 直系亲属签证申请的案件中，合议庭撤销了地区法院准予政府简易判决的裁定，并发回重审，认定移民上诉委员会依赖未披露的证据并适用过低的证明标准，违反了正当程序。

Ghilamichael Zerezghi, a United States citizen, filed an I-130 petition on behalf of his non-citizen wife, Huruia Meskel. USCIS denied the I-130 petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c), which provides that “no petition shall be approved” if USCIS determines that the noncitizen spouse previously entered into a marriage “for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.” USCIS and the BIA relied, in part, on an apartment-rental application Meskel’s former husband had previously submitted to USCIS. The application required him to list his past addresses, and neither of the two he listed were the marital residence that Meskel listed on her immigration paperwork. However, the

美国公民 Ghilamichael Zerezghi 代表其非公民妻子 Huruia Meskel 提交了 I-130 申请。USCIS 依据 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) 拒绝了该 I-130 申请，该条规定，如果 USCIS 认定非公民配偶先前缔结婚姻是“为逃避移民法”，则“不得批准任何申请”。USCIS 和 BIA 部分依赖于 Meskel 的前夫先前向 USCIS 提交的一份公寓租赁申请。该申请要求他列出过去的住址，而他列出的两个住址均不是 Meskel 在其移民文件中列出的婚姻住所。然而，

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 3 agency never told Meskel and Zerezghi that it had used the application in making its fraud determination in their case.

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 3 该机构从未告知 Meskel 和 Zerezghi，其在该案中作出欺诈认定时使用了该申请。

The panel concluded that Zerezghi had a constitutionally protected interest in the grant of his I-130 petition, explaining that this court has previously held that a citizen petitioner has such a constitutionally protected interest because the approval of an I-130 petition is nondiscretionary.

合议庭认定，Zerezghi 对 I-130 申请的批准享有受宪法保护的利益，并解释称，本法院此前已裁定，公民申请人享有此种受宪法保护的利益，因为 I-130 申请的批准是非裁量性的。

Next, the panel held that the government’s use of undisclosed records in making its marriage-fraud finding violated procedural due process. The panel concluded that the first factor set out by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)—the private interest affected by the government’s action—favored the couple, explaining that: 1) a finding of past marriage fraud often means that the noncitizen spouse faces removal; 2) the right to marry and enjoy marriage are unquestionably liberty interests; and 3) the right to live with one’s immediate family ranks high among individual interests. The panel also concluded that the third Mathews factor—the government’s interest—favored the couple, explaining that the question here was not the government’s interest in immigration enforcement, but its interest in not disclosing information on which it based its decision.

接下来，合议庭认定，政府在作出婚姻欺诈认定时使用未披露的记录违反了程序性正当程序。合议庭认定，Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) 中列出的第一项因素——受政府行为影响的私人利益——有利于这对夫妇，并解释称：1）认定过去存在婚姻欺诈通常意味着非公民配偶面临驱逐；2）结婚和享有婚姻的权利无疑是自由利益；3）与直系亲属共同生活的权利在个人利益中位居前列。合议庭还认定，Mathews 第三项因素——政府利益——有利于这对夫妇，并解释称，此处的问题不是政府在移民执法方面的利益，而是其不披露据以作出决定的信息的利益。

Next, the panel concluded that the second Mathews factor—the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the constitutionally protected interest and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards—also favored the couple. The panel explained that the couple had maintained that, if they had been given the rental application, they would have been able to refute (or at least attempt to refute) the allegation that Meskel’s first husband lived at the addresses listed on the application instead of with her. Further, the panel concluded that the rental application was

接下来，合议庭认定，Mathews 第二项因素——受宪法保护的利益被错误剥夺的风险以及额外或替代性程序保障的可能价值（如有）——也有利于这对夫妇。合议庭解释称，这对夫妇坚持认为，如果给予他们该租赁申请，他们本能够反驳（或至少尝试反驳）关于 Meskel 的第一任丈夫住在申请所列地址而非与她同住的指控。此外，合议庭认定，该租赁申请是

4 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS the strongest piece of evidence against Meskel, and it was thus vital that Meskel and Zerezghi have been given an opportunity to rebut it.

4 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 对 Meskel 最有力的证据，因此给予 Meskel 和 Zerezghi 反驳该证据的机会至关重要。

Finally, the panel held that the BIA applied too low a standard of proof when it affirmed USCIS’s marriage fraud determination. Under 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii), the agency can deny any immigration petition if there is “substantial and probative evidence” that the noncitizen has attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage to evade the immigration laws. The government argued this standard is equivalent to how courts deferentially review an agency’s factual findings for “substantial evidence,” and insisted that USCIS could deny any immigration application as long as there was evidence of marriage fraud, even if it was more likely than not that the marriage was bona fide.

最后，合议庭认定，BIA 在维持 USCIS 的婚姻欺诈认定时适用了过低的证明标准。根据 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii)，如果有“实质性且具证明力的证据”表明非公民曾试图或共谋缔结婚姻以逃避移民法，该机构可以拒绝任何移民申请。政府主张，该标准等同于法院对机构事实认定进行“实质性证据”尊重复审的标准，并坚持认为，只要存在婚姻欺诈的证据，USCIS 就可以拒绝任何移民申请，即使婚姻更可能是真实的。

The panel disagreed, observing that the “substantial and probative evidence” language seems similar to the “substantial evidence” standard, but clarifying that the latter is a standard of review, while the other is a standard of proof. The panel also explained that the BIA had recently held that, to be “‘substantial and probative,’ the evidence must establish that it is more than probably true that the marriage is fraudulent.” Accordingly, the panel held that, given the seriousness of a marriage-fraud determination and the risk of a finding being made in error, the Constitution requires that the substantial-and-probative evidence standard be least as high as a preponderance of the evidence.

合议庭不同意，指出“实质性且具证明力的证据”的措辞似乎类似于“实质性证据”标准，但澄清后者是复审标准，而前者是证明标准。合议庭还解释称，BIA 最近裁定，要构成“‘实质性且具证明力’，证据必须证明婚姻欺诈比真实更有可能。”因此，合议庭认定，鉴于婚姻欺诈认定的严重性以及错误认定的风险，宪法要求实质性且具证明力的证据标准至少与优势证据标准一样高。

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 5 James J. Walker (argued), Trial Attorneyl Aaron S. Goldsmith, Senior Litigation Counsel; William C. Peachey, Director; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 5 James J. Walker（辩论），庭审律师；Aaron S. Goldsmith，高级诉讼律师；William C. Peachey，主任；Joseph H. Hunt，助理司法部长；美国司法部民事司，华盛顿哥伦比亚特区；代表被告-被上诉人。

BOGGS, Circuit Judge:

BOGGS，巡回法官：

Ghilamichael Zerezghi and Huruia Meskel used to be roommates. They lived in a shared house together but interacted little. After Zerezghi moved out, they became friends, and then started dating. Zerezghi proposed, but Meskel turned him down. A year later, Zerezghi tried again, and this time Meskel accepted. They married in 2013.

Ghilamichael Zerezghi 和 Huruia Meskel 曾是室友。他们同住在一所共享房屋中，但很少互动。Zerezghi 搬出后，他们成为朋友，然后开始约会。Zerezghi 求婚，但 Meskel 拒绝了他。一年后，Zerezghi 再次尝试，这次 Meskel 接受了。他们于2013年结婚。

Zerezghi is a United States citizen and Meskel is a citizen of Eritrea. After the wedding, Zerezghi attempted to sponsor Meskel for permanent residency but the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the application. This is Meskel’s second marriage, and USCIS found that her previous marriage had been a sham, entered into “for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c). This finding would make her ineligible for any immigration benefit from her current marriage. Ibid. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the prior- marriage-fraud finding and, reviewing the BIA’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act, so did the district court.

Zerezghi 是美国公民，Meskel 是厄立特里亚公民。婚礼后，Zerezghi 试图为 Meskel 担保永久居留权，但美国公民及移民服务局（USCIS）拒绝了该申请。这是 Meskel 的第二次婚姻，USCIS 认定她的前一段婚姻是虚假的，是“为逃避移民法”而缔结的。8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)。该认定将使她无资格从其当前婚姻中获得任何移民利益。同上。移民上诉委员会（BIA）维持了先前婚姻欺诈的认定，地区法院根据《行政程序法》审查 BIA 的决定后，也予以维持。

We reverse. We hold that the BIA violated due process by relying on undisclosed evidence that Zerezghi and Meskel did not have an opportunity to rebut. In making its

我们撤销。我们认定，BIA 依赖 Zerezghi 和 Meskel 没有机会反驳的未披露证据，违反了正当程序。在作出其

6 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS initial determination of marriage fraud, the BIA also violated due process by applying too low a standard of proof. On remand, it must establish marriage fraud by at least a preponderance of the evidence before it can deny any subsequent immigration petition based on such a finding.

6 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 初步婚姻欺诈认定时，BIA 还因适用过低的证明标准而违反了正当程序。在发回重审时，它必须至少以优势证据证明婚姻欺诈，然后才能基于该认定拒绝任何后续移民申请。

When an American citizen marries a noncitizen, the citizen may petition for lawful permanent residency for the spouse. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1154. To say that the process is complicated would be an understatement. The process begins when the citizen spouse files a Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative (I-130), which acts as a request for immigration authorities to formally recognize the validity of the marriage. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). USCIS then conducts “an investigation of the facts” and adjudicates the petition. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). Once the I-130 petition is approved, the noncitizen spouse may apply for permanent residency, which—if successful—she receives only “on a conditional basis,” and which can be revoked if the marriage is later found to be a fraud. See id. §§ 1255(a), 1186a(a)(1). The conditional permanent residency automatically expires after two years, and if the noncitizen wishes the status to become truly permanent, she must file a Form I-751 Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence (I-751). Id. §1186a(c)(1)(A). In addition to filing the I-751 petition, the couple must also appear together for an interview with USCIS. Id. § 1186a(c)(1)(B).

当美国公民与非公民结婚时，该公民可以为配偶申请合法永久居留权。见 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1154。说这一过程复杂都算是轻描淡写。该过程始于公民配偶提交 I-130 外籍亲属申请表（I-130），该表作为请求移民当局正式承认婚姻有效性的申请。8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1)。USCIS 随后进行“事实调查”并裁决该申请。8 U.S.C. § 1154(b)。一旦 I-130 申请获批，非公民配偶可以申请永久居留权，如果成功，她仅“以有条件 basis”获得该身份，并且如果后来发现婚姻是欺诈，该身份可被撤销。见同上 §§ 1255(a), 1186a(a)(1)。有条件永久居留权在两年后自动到期，如果非公民希望该身份成为真正的永久身份，她必须提交 I-751 解除居留条件申请表（I-751）。同上 §1186a(c)(1)(A)。除提交 I-751 申请外，夫妇还必须共同出席 USCIS 的面试。同上 § 1186a(c)(1)(B)。

The noncitizen spouse’s permanent residency becomes unconditional (truly permanent) at the end of two years if the I-751 petition is approved. See id. § 1186a(c)(3)(B). At all times during this process, the couple must maintain that they “married out of a bona fide desire to establish a life together,” and must not have entered the marriage “to evade

如果 I-751 申请获批，非公民配偶的永久居留权在两年结束时变为无条件（真正的永久）。见同上 § 1186a(c)(3)(B)。在此过程中的所有时间，夫妇必须坚持他们“结婚是出于建立共同生活的真实愿望”，并且不得为“逃避

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 7 immigration laws.” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 879 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1361.

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 7 移民法”而缔结婚姻。Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 879 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)；另见 8 U.S.C. § 1361。

Separately, regardless of the strength of the current marriage, “no petition shall be approved” if USCIS determines that the noncitizen spouse previously entered into a marriage “for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c). This is a severe penalty in several ways. First, it applies “[e]ven if [the] current marriage is unquestionably bona fide.” Matter of Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. 803, 805 n.2 (BIA 1988). Second, it is mandatory, not discretionary: If the noncitizen committed marriage fraud at any time in the past, “no petition shall be approved” at any time in the future. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c). The penalty applies regardless of whether the past sham marriage resulted in a successful immigration petition. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii). All that is required is that the noncitizen previously “sought” immigration benefits through a fraudulent marriage, or “attempted or conspired to” do so. Ibid. “[I]t is not necessary that the [noncitizen] have been convicted of, or even prosecuted for, the attempt or conspiracy.” Matter of Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166, 167 (BIA 1990).

另外，无论当前婚姻的牢固程度如何，如果 USCIS 认定非公民配偶先前缔结婚姻是“为逃避移民法”，“不得批准任何申请”。8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)。这在多个方面是严厉的惩罚。第一，它适用“[e]ven if [the] current marriage is unquestionably bona fide”（即使当前婚姻毫无疑问是真实的）。Matter of Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. 803, 805 n.2 (BIA 1988)。第二，它是强制性的，而非裁量性的：如果非公民在过去任何时候实施了婚姻欺诈，“不得批准任何申请”在未来任何时候。8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)。无论过去的虚假婚姻是否导致成功的移民申请，该惩罚均适用。8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii)。所要求的只是非公民先前通过欺诈性婚姻“寻求”移民利益，或“试图或共谋”这样做。同上。“[I]t is not necessary that the [noncitizen] have been convicted of, or even prosecuted for, the attempt or conspiracy.”（非公民不必因该试图或共谋而被定罪，甚至不必被起诉。）Matter of Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166, 167 (BIA 1990)。

How does USCIS determine whether there was marriage fraud? A USCIS regulation provides: “The director will deny a petition for immigrant visa classification filed on behalf of any alien for whom there is substantial and probative evidence of” an attempt or conspiracy “to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). The initial burden of proof is on the government. See Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 806–07. In making its initial determination, the government often uses documents in its possession, interviews with the couple, and observations made during

USCIS如何认定是否存在婚姻欺诈？USCIS的一项法规规定：“如果有实质且具证明力的证据表明”任何外国人企图或共谋“为规避移民法而缔结婚姻”，主任将驳回为该外国人提交的移民签证分类申请。8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii)（着重号为原文所加）。初始举证责任在政府一方。见Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 806–07。在作出初步认定时，政府通常使用其掌握的文件、与夫妻双方的访谈以及在

8 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS site visits to the couple’s marital residence. See Matter of Singh, 27 I. & N. Dec. 598, 600–01 (BIA 2019). If the government finds that there is “substantial and probative evidence” of marriage fraud, it issues a Notice of Intent to Deny the immigration petition. The burden then shifts to the petitioner to rebut that finding. Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 806–07. If the petitioner cannot rebut the charge to the BIA’s satisfaction, the petition is denied.

8 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 对夫妻婚姻住所进行实地走访期间所作的观察。见Matter of Singh, 27 I. & N. Dec. 598, 600–01 (BIA 2019)。如果政府认定存在婚姻欺诈的“实质且具证明力的证据”，则发出拒绝移民申请的意向通知。举证责任随后转移至申请人，由其反驳该认定。Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 806–07。如果申请人无法反驳该指控以使BIA满意，则申请被驳回。

There is no dispute over whether Meskel and Zerezghi’s current marriage is bona fide. Instead, the government insists that there is substantial and probative evidence that Meskel’s first marriage to an American citizen was a sham. The government used this determination of prior marriage fraud to deny Zerezghi’s I-130 petition that he filed on Meskel’s behalf.

对于Meskel与Zerezghi当前的婚姻是否真实，并无争议。相反，政府坚持认为存在实质且具证明力的证据表明Meskel与一名美国公民的第一次婚姻是虚假的。政府利用这一先前婚姻欺诈的认定，驳回了Zerezghi代表Meskel提交的I-130申请。

Meskel was born and raised in Eritrea. In 2003, when she was 21, her parents arranged for her to marry Tesfai Ghidei. Arranged marriages were common in their community, and Meskel and Ghidei married in Cairo in 2006. Ghidei, an American citizen, returned to the United States after the wedding, and Meskel followed a year later, after she obtained conditional permanent residency through the I-130 process. From here, accounts diverge.

Meskel在厄立特里亚出生并长大。2003年，她21岁时，父母安排她嫁给Tesfai Ghidei。包办婚姻在其社区中很常见，Meskel与Ghidei于2006年在开罗结婚。Ghidei是美国公民，婚礼后返回美国，Meskel一年后通过I-130程序获得有条件永久居留权后随之前往。此后，双方的说法出现分歧。

According to USCIS, Meskel and Ghidei’s marriage was a sham all along. It offered three reasons for this conclusion, which were accepted by the BIA in rejecting Meskel and Ghidei’s I-751 petition. These three reasons also form the basis for the BIA’s rejection of Meskel and Zerezghi’s current I-130 petition.

根据USCIS的说法，Meskel与Ghidei的婚姻自始至终都是虚假的。USCIS为此结论提供了三项理由，BIA在驳回Meskel与Ghidei的I-751申请时采纳了这些理由。这三项理由也构成BIA驳回Meskel与Zerezghi当前I-130申请的基础。

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 9

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 9

First, there was documentary evidence that indicated that Meskel and Ghidei did not live together. Meskel submitted records indicating that after she came to the United States, she lived in Edmonds, Washington with her sister and brother-in-law (the “marital residence”). However, Ghidei did not submit records that could verify that he also lived there. Instead, Ghidei submitted records that linked him with different addresses, such as a tax return that listed a P.O. box and a rental application that listed two other addresses in Edmonds. 1 Although Meskel submitted a joint lease that was signed by her and Ghidei, USCIS found it to be unreliable because it included dates that had been altered with white-out. Second, Meskel provided inconsistent information regarding when she had last lived with Ghidei. At a joint interview with USCIS in December 2009, Meskel and Ghidei told interviewers that they had lived together for the past two years and that they were still living together. Then, in a follow-up April 2010 interview, Meskel— appearing without Ghidei—stated that she and Ghidei had been living separately since January 2010. 2 Yet once USCIS sent a Notice of Intent to Deny the I-751 application, Meskel responded with a statement acknowledging that she had misled USCIS at her previous interviews; asserting that Ghidei had actually left the marital residence before the couple’s December 2009 interview and that she had not had

第一，有书面证据表明Meskel与Ghidei并未共同居住。Meskel提交的记录表明，她来到美国后与其姐妹及姐夫居住在华盛顿州埃德蒙兹（“婚姻住所”）。然而，Ghidei未提交可证明他也居住于此的记录。相反，Ghidei提交的记录将其与不同地址相关联，例如一份列有邮政信箱的纳税申报表和一份列有埃德蒙兹另外两个地址的租赁申请。1 尽管Meskel提交了一份由她和Ghidei签署的共同租约，但USCIS认定其不可靠，因为其中包含用涂改液修改过的日期。第二，Meskel就她最后一次与Ghidei共同居住的时间提供了不一致的信息。在2009年12月与USCIS的联合访谈中，Meskel与Ghidei告诉访谈人员，他们在过去两年一直共同居住，且当时仍共同居住。随后，在2010年4月的后续访谈中，Meskel——未与Ghidei一同出席——称她与Ghidei自2010年1月起分居。2 然而，一旦USCIS发出拒绝I-751申请的意向通知，Meskel便以一份声明作出回应，承认她在先前的访谈中误导了USCIS；声称Ghidei实际上在夫妻双方2009年12月访谈之前就已离开婚姻住所，且她在

10 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS any contact with him after April 2010. Both of these statements, though, were inconsistent with information contained in the couple’s judgment for divorce, which indicated that Meskel and Ghidei had first separated on May 1, 2010. Finally, the BIA determined that Meskel had also given misleading information about whether she had any relatives living in the United States. In her December 2009 and April 2010 interviews, Meskel told investigators that she had no relatives in the United States and that her brother-in- law was merely her landlord. But Meskel’s brother-in-law had appeared with her at the April 2010 interview to act as her translator, and her family later acknowledged that her brother-in-law had helped arrange her marriage to Ghidei and had even traveled to Egypt to witness it. Given the weight of these inconsistencies, USCIS concluded that none of the statements that Meskel and Ghidei made about their marriage could be fully credited. It therefore concluded that the two had not lived together as husband and wife in the United States and that the marriage was fraudulent.

10 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 2010年4月之后与他没有任何联系。然而，这两份陈述均与夫妻双方离婚判决书中所载信息不一致，该判决书表明Meskel与Ghidei首次分居是在2010年5月1日。最后，BIA认定Meskel还就她是否有任何亲属居住在美国提供了误导性信息。在2009年12月和2010年4月的访谈中，Meskel告诉调查人员，她在美国没有亲属，她的姐夫仅仅是她的房东。但Meskel的姐夫曾于2010年4月访谈时与她一同出席担任她的翻译，且其家人后来承认，她的姐夫曾帮助安排她与Ghidei的婚姻，甚至前往埃及见证婚礼。鉴于这些不一致之处的分量，USCIS认定Meskel与Ghidei就其婚姻所作的陈述均不能完全采信。因此，USCIS认定二人在美国并未以夫妻身份共同居住，该婚姻具有欺诈性。

The USCIS narrative contrasts starkly with Meskel’s version of events. According to Meskel, a bona fide marriage swiftly deteriorated. According to her, she and Ghidei lived together and, in support, she submitted a joint tax return for 2008 and a voided check from a joint bank account. The couple also slept together, and Meskel wanted to have children. However, they began having problems only a few of months after moving in together in the United States. Ghidei would leave for several days or even weeks at a time and would not say where he had been when he returned. He began emotionally abusing Meskel by belittling her, often calling her stupid or criticizing her appearance. He withheld approval or affection as a form of punishment, and insulted Meskel’s friends and family, driving them away. He also threatened her with deportation,

USCIS的叙述与Meskel对事件的说法形成鲜明对比。据Meskel称，一段真实的婚姻迅速恶化。据她所述，她与Ghidei共同居住，并为此提交了2008年的联合纳税申报表和一份共同银行账户的作废支票。夫妻双方也同床共枕，Meskel想要孩子。然而，他们在美国共同居住仅几个月后便开始出现问题。Ghidei会一次离开数天甚至数周，回来后也不说去了哪里。他开始对Meskel进行情感虐待，贬低她，经常骂她愚蠢或批评她的外貌。他以不给予认可或关爱作为惩罚，并侮辱Meskel的朋友和家人，将他们赶走。他还以驱逐出境威胁她，

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 11 telling her that she was not an American citizen and had no rights. Eventually, Ghidei became physically abusive. Meskel stated that he would push and shove her and would even throw objects at her when he was unhappy. He would also refuse to help her when she needed medical attention.

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 11 告诉她她不是美国公民，没有任何权利。最终，Ghidei开始实施身体虐待。Meskel称，他会推搡她，不高兴时甚至向她扔东西。当她需要医疗救助时，他也拒绝帮助她。

Despite her situation, Meskel insists that she stayed with Ghidei after her arrival in the United States in 2007 and eventually, in 2009, she petitioned to remove the conditional status of her permanent residency. Ghidei helped her submit her application which, according to Meskel, indicated to her that he intended to stay in the marriage even though he had been talking about divorce. USCIS interviewed Meskel and Ghidei in December 2009 and visited the house listed as their marital residence in January 2010 as well as other addresses linked to Ghidei. However, as the BIA later noted in its opinion, USCIS officers observed no male belongings at the marital residence during their visit. Meskel explained that this was because Ghidei had left for a three-week trip to Eritrea earlier that month. When Ghidei returned from his trip in February, he told Meskel that he was no longer interested in her and the two then only saw each other a couple of times thereafter. Ghidei refused to go with Meskel to their follow-up interview with USCIS in April 2010, which explains why she attended the interview without him. Meskel also explained that many of her inconsistent statements made to USCIS investigators were made under pressure from Ghidei, who had told her to tell authorities that she did not have any relatives in the United States. She said that she deferred to Ghidei because he had handled all of her immigration paperwork since she arrived in the country, and because she had wanted the marriage to work out. However, given the abuse, Meskel and Ghidei formally separated in May 2010 and officially divorced on August 1, 2012 (though

尽管处境如此，Meskel坚称她在2007年来到美国后一直与Ghidei在一起，并最终于2009年申请解除其永久居留权的有条件身份。Ghidei帮助她提交了申请，据Meskel称，这向她表明他打算维持婚姻，尽管他一直在谈论离婚。USCIS于2009年12月访谈了Meskel与Ghidei，并于2010年1月走访了被列为婚姻住所的房屋以及与Ghidei相关的其他地址。然而，正如BIA后来在其意见中所指出的，USCIS官员在走访期间未在婚姻住所观察到男性物品。Meskel解释说，这是因为Ghidei当月早些时候已前往厄立特里亚进行为期三周的旅行。当Ghidei于2月旅行归来后，他告诉Meskel他对她已不再感兴趣，此后两人仅见过几次面。Ghidei拒绝与Meskel一同参加2010年4月与USCIS的后续访谈，这解释了她为何独自出席该访谈。Meskel还解释说，她向USCIS调查人员所作的许多不一致陈述是在Ghidei的压力下作出的，Ghidei曾让她告诉当局她在美国没有任何亲属。她说她听从Ghidei，是因为自她来到美国以来，他处理了她所有的移民文书，而且她希望婚姻能够维系。然而，鉴于虐待行为，Meskel与Ghidei于2010年5月正式分居，并于2012年8月1日正式离婚（尽管

12 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS the court backdated the decree nunc pro tunc to June 1, 2011).

12 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 法院将判决书溯及既往至2011年6月1日）。

Ultimately however, USCIS did not believe Meskel’s version of the events and it denied her petition for removal of conditional permanent residency. Because Meskel’s two years of conditional permanent residency had expired, she no longer had any legal status, and the Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings against her. The Department initially alleged that Meskel had committed marriage fraud, but later withdrew that charge. An immigration judge ordered Meskel removed to Eritrea, but granted her request for withholding of removal.

然而，USCIS最终不相信Meskel对事件的说法，驳回了她解除有条件永久居留权的申请。由于Meskel的两年有条件永久居留权已到期，她不再拥有任何合法身份，国土安全部对她启动了驱逐程序。国土安全部最初指控Meskel实施婚姻欺诈，但后来撤回了该指控。一名移民法官下令将Meskel驱逐至厄立特里亚，但批准了她暂缓驱逐的请求。

Meskel and Zerezghi began dating shortly after her divorce with Ghidei was finalized, and they married on May 24, 2013. Zerezghi then filed an I-130 petition so that Meskel could make a new application for permanent residency. USCIS concluded that Meskel’s first marriage had been a sham, and it denied the petition. 3

Meskel与Zerezghi在她与Ghidei的离婚最终确定后不久开始约会，并于2013年5月24日结婚。Zerezghi随后提交了I-130申请，以便Meskel能够重新申请永久居留权。USCIS认定Meskel的第一次婚姻是虚假的，并驳回了该申请。3

Meskel and Zerezghi appealed to the BIA, which affirmed USCIS’s denial of the I-130 petition, holding that there was substantial and probative evidence of “fraud in [Meskel’s] first marriage.” Meskel and Zerezghi then went to the district court, where they sought review of the BIA’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, holding that the BIA applied the correct standard of proof,

Meskel与Zerezghi向BIA提出上诉，BIA维持了USCIS对I-130申请的驳回，认定存在“Meskel第一次婚姻中欺诈”的实质且具证明力的证据。Meskel与Zerezghi随后向地区法院提起诉讼，依据《行政程序法》寻求对BIA决定的审查。地区法院批准了政府的简易判决，认定BIA适用了正确的证明标准，

3 USCIS also found that Meskel and Zerezghi failed to establish that their current marriage is genuine. The BIA and the district court declined to reach this issue, so it is beyond the scope of our review. Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.”).

3 USCIS还认定Meskel与Zerezghi未能证明他们当前的婚姻是真实的。BIA和地区法院拒绝处理该问题，因此它超出我们的审查范围。Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004)（“在审查BIA的决定时，我们仅考虑该机构所依据的理由。”）。

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 13 that the proceedings before the agency complied with due process, and that substantial evidence supported its marriage-fraud finding. Meskel and Zerezghi timely appealed the district court’s order.

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 13 认定该机构之前的程序符合正当程序，且有实质证据支持其婚姻欺诈的认定。Meskel与Zerezghi及时对地区法院的命令提出上诉。

Our review of the BIA’s decision to impose a marriage- fraud penalty is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. We must set aside the BIA’s decision if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). We review de novo whether the BIA violated procedural due process in adjudicating an I-130 petition (thereby acting “not in accordance with law”). See Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1155–59 (9th Cir. 2013).

我们审查BIA施加婚姻欺诈处罚的决定，适用《行政程序法》。如果BIA的决定“任意、反复无常、滥用自由裁量权或在其他方面不符合法律”，我们必须撤销该决定。5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)。我们de novo审查BIA在裁决I-130申请时是否违反程序性正当程序（从而“不符合法律”）。见Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1155–59 (9th Cir. 2013)。

Zerezghi and Meskel contend that the government violated procedural due process when it determined that Meskel’s prior marriage was fraudulent. First, they argue that USCIS’s use of an apartment-rental application from Meskel’s first husband to support its determination without first disclosing it to them was unconstitutional. Second, they argue that the BIA applied too low a standard of proof in making its determination of marriage fraud and that, on remand, the agency must apply a higher standard of proof.

Zerezghi和Meskel主张，政府在认定Meskel的先前婚姻系欺诈时违反了程序性正当程序。第一，他们主张，USCIS使用Meskel第一任丈夫的公寓租赁申请来支持其认定，却未先向其披露，此举违宪。第二，他们主张，BIA在认定婚姻欺诈时适用了过低的证明标准，且发回重审时，该机关必须适用更高的证明标准。

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In determining whether a person’s rights under that clause have been violated, the “standard analysis

《第五修正案》的正当程序条款要求：“任何人不得……未经正当法律程序而被剥夺生命、自由或财产。”U.S. Const. amend. V. 在确定一个人的权利根据该条款是否受到侵犯时，“标准分析

14 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS . . . proceeds in two steps: We first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the [government] were constitutionally sufficient.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011).

14 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS ……分两步进行：我们首先询问是否存在一个人被剥夺的自由或财产利益，如果存在，我们再询问[政府]所遵循的程序在宪法上是否充分。”Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011)。

The “threshold requirement” for Meskel and Zerezghi’s claim to succeed is that they have “a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution.” Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, Ariz., 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994). We have held that a citizen petitioner has a constitutionally protected interest in the grant of an I-130 petition. Ching, 725 F.3d at 1156. This is because approval of an I-130 petition is nondiscretionary. By statute, the Secretary of Homeland Security “shall, if he determines that the facts stated in the petition are true and that the alien in behalf of whom the petition is made is an immediate relative . . . approve the petition[.]” Id. at 1155 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (emphasis added)). “[D]eterminations that ‘require application of law to factual determinations’ are nondiscretionary,” meaning that USCIS must approve an I- 130 petition if the facts stated in the application are true and the beneficiary is an immediate relative. Ibid. (quoting Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 833–34 (9th Cir. 2003)). This administrative framework thus creates a “legitimate claim of entitlement” that is “grounded in the statute defining eligibility,” rather than on a mere “unilateral expectation” for the petition’s approval. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). As we explained in Ching, “as long as the petitioner and spouse beneficiary meet the statutory and regulatory requirements for eligibility” an “[i]mmediate relative status for an alien spouse is a right to which citizen applicants are entitled[.]” Ching, 725 F.3d at 1156 (emphasis added).

Meskel和Zerezghi的主张要获得成功，其“门槛要求”是他们拥有“受宪法保护的自由或财产利益”。Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, Ariz., 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994)。我们曾认定，公民申请人对于I-130申请的批准享有受宪法保护的利益。Ching, 725 F.3d at 1156。这是因为I-130申请的批准并非自由裁量性质。根据法规，国土安全部部长“如果其认定申请中陈述的事实属实，且申请所代表的非公民是直系亲属……则必须批准该申请[。]”Id. at 1155（引用8 U.S.C. § 1154(b)（着重号为原文所加））。“‘要求将法律适用于事实认定’的认定”并非自由裁量性质，这意味着如果申请中陈述的事实属实且受益人是直系亲属，USCIS必须批准I-130申请。Ibid.（引用Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 833–34 (9th Cir. 2003)）。因此，这一行政框架创设了一种“合法享有的权利主张”，其“以界定资格的法规为基础”，而非仅仅是对申请获批的“单方面期望”。Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)。正如我们在Ching中所解释的，“只要申请人和配偶受益人符合资格所需的法定和监管要求”，则“[非公民配偶的直系亲属身份是公民申请人有权享有的权利[。]”Ching, 725 F.3d at 1156（着重号为原文所加）。

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 15

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 15

The government contends that the grant of an immigration petition is a privilege, and that because it has determined that Meskel committed marriage fraud on a prior occasion, Zerezghi is statutorily ineligible from succeeding on the I-130 petition on her behalf. However, we squarely rejected this argument in Ching, noting that it “confuses the question of whether there is a protected interest in a benefit with the question of eligibility for that benefit.” Ibid. Because Ching established that the grant of an I-130 petition is a nondiscretionary, statutory, entitlement, Zerezghi is “entitled to the protections of due process” in insuring that the government determination of ineligibility was properly made. Ibid.

政府主张，移民申请的批准是一种特权，且由于其已认定Meskel在先前场合实施了婚姻欺诈，Zerezghi在为其提交的I-130申请中依法不具备成功资格。然而，我们在Ching中明确驳回了这一论点，指出它“混淆了是否存在受保护的福利利益的问题与该福利的资格问题。”Ibid. 由于Ching确立了I-130申请的批准是一项非自由裁量的法定权利，Zerezghi在确保政府关于不合格的认定得到适当作出方面“有权获得正当程序的保护”。Ibid.

Individuals are necessarily entitled to a proper procedure to contest a government determination of ineligibility because “[v]irtually no government benefit is available to individuals without a requirement that certain conditions are met.” Ibid. For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court held that welfare recipients held an interest in the continued receipt of their benefits even if the government determined that they had become statutorily ineligible for them. 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970). Because the “benefits [were] a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them,” the recipients were entitled to the protections of due process (in the form of a pre-deprivation hearing) to contest the government’s determination of ineligibility. Id. at 262; see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (holding that the Goldberg plaintiffs “had not yet shown that they were, in fact, within the statutory terms of eligibility” but that the Court nonetheless “held that they had a right to a hearing at which they might attempt to do so”). In sum, because Zerezghi has a constitutionally protected interest in the grant of his I-130 petition, the main issue for us to decide

个人必然有权获得适当程序以质疑政府关于不合格的认定，因为“[v]irtually没有任何政府福利是在不要求满足某些条件的情况下向个人提供的。”Ibid. 例如，在Goldberg v. Kelly中，最高法院认定，福利领取人对其福利的持续领取享有利益，即使政府认定他们已依法不再具备领取资格。397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970)。由于“福利[是]合格领取人的法定权利事项”，领取人有权获得正当程序的保护（以剥夺前听证的形式）以质疑政府关于不合格的认定。Id. at 262；另见Roth, 408 U.S. at 577（认定Goldberg案原告“尚未证明他们事实上处于法定资格范围内”，但法院仍“认定他们有权获得听证，在听证中他们可以尝试证明这一点”）。总之，由于Zerezghi对于其I-130申请的批准享有受宪法保护的利益，我们需要决定的主要问题

16 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS is whether the procedures followed by the government in not granting the petition were constitutionally sufficient.

16 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 是政府在未批准该申请时所遵循的程序在宪法上是否充分。

1. Background

1. 背景

When Meskel first applied for an I-751 petition (during her marriage with Ghidei) to remove the conditional status of her permanent residency, USCIS denied her petition based, in part, on an apartment-rental application that Ghidei had submitted in 2008. The application had required Ghidei to list his past addresses, and neither of the two that he listed were the marital residence that Meskel had put as her address on her immigration paperwork. Yet USCIS never made the rental application available to Meskel. When Zerezghi later applied for the couple’s I-130 petition, USCIS apparently again relied on the application as a basis for concluding that Meskel’s first marriage was a sham. However, the agency never told Meskel and Zerezghi that it used the application in concluding that there was “substantial and probative evidence” of marriage fraud. USCIS’s Notice of Intent to Deny stated, in relevant part:

当Meskel首次申请I-751申请（在其与Ghidei婚姻期间）以解除其永久居民身份的条件时，USCIS部分基于Ghidei于2008年提交的一份公寓租赁申请驳回了她的申请。该申请要求Ghidei列出其过去的地址，而他列出的两个地址均不是Meskel在其移民文书上填写的婚姻住所。然而，USCIS从未向Meskel提供该租赁申请。当Zerezghi后来申请夫妻二人的I-130申请时，USCIS显然再次依赖该申请作为认定Meskel第一次婚姻系虚假婚姻的依据。然而，该机关从未告知Meskel和Zerezghi，其在认定存在婚姻欺诈的“实质性和证明性证据”时使用了该申请。USCIS的拒绝意向通知的相关部分写道：

[A]lthough [Meskel] claims that her [first] marriage was in good faith and that she and Mr. Ghidei did live together at her sister’s house prior to their separation, USCIS records do not support such a finding, as Mr. Ghidei is not connected to the claimed address . . . . Rather, records indicate that Mr. Ghidei was living with his sister at another location during the relevant time period.

[A]尽管[Meskel]声称其[第一次]婚姻是善意的，且她和Ghidei先生在分居前确实一起住在她的姐姐家，但USCIS的记录不支持这一认定，因为Ghidei先生与所主张的地址没有关联……相反，记录表明Ghidei先生在相关时间段内与其姐姐住在另一地点。

USCIS said nothing about the source or contents of these “records” and it refused Zerezghi and Meskel’s request for

USCIS对这些“记录”的来源或内容只字未提，并且拒绝了Zerezghi和Meskel关于

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 17 copies or more time to respond. 4 It simply denied the I-130 petition. Indeed, Meskel and Zerezghi only learned that these “records” referred to Ghidei’s rental application from the BIA’s opinion affirming USCIS’s denial of the I-130 petition, well after any opportunity for them to respond had passed. See Matter of Soriano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 764, 766 (BIA 1988). Even then, the government did not actually produce a copy of the application until it filed the administrative record in the district court in this current proceeding.

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 17 副本或更多回应时间的请求。4 它只是驳回了I-130申请。事实上，Meskel和Zerezghi直到BIA维持USCIS驳回I-130申请的裁定意见中，才得知这些“记录”指的是Ghidei的租赁申请，而此时他们回应的任何机会早已过去。见Matter of Soriano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 764, 766 (BIA 1988)。即使在那时，政府直到在本当前程序中向地区法院提交行政记录时，才实际出示该申请的副本。

2. Procedural-Due-Process Analysis

2. 程序性正当程序分析

Meskel and Zerezghi contend that the government’s use of undisclosed records like the rental application in making a determination of marriage fraud was unconstitutional. We agree.

Meskel和Zerezghi主张，政府使用未披露的记录（如租赁申请）作出婚姻欺诈认定，此举违宪。我们同意。

Since Zerezghi has a constitutionally protected interest in the grant of the I-130 petition, “we must then determine whether additional process was due.” Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157. Three factors guide the analysis:

由于Zerezghi对于I-130申请的批准享有受宪法保护的利益，“我们必须继而确定是否应有额外的程序。”Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157。三项因素指导该分析：

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

第一，官方行为将影响的私人利益；第二，通过所使用程序错误剥夺该利益的风险，以及额外或替代程序保障的可能价值（如有）；最后，政府的利益，包括所涉职能以及额外或

4 The formal denial letter included a bit more information about the “records” in the form of a vague reference to the “testimony of the manager of Mr. Ghidei’s previously associated address.” But it still did not mention the rental application, name the manager, describe his “testimony” in any way, or specify the “previously associated address.”

4 正式拒绝信中包含了关于这些“记录”的稍多信息，形式是含糊提及“Ghidei先生先前关联地址的经理的证词”。但它仍未提及租赁申请、未指明经理姓名、未以任何方式描述其“证词”，也未指明“先前关联地址”。

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18 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

替代程序要求将带来的财政和行政负担。

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). All three of these factors favor Meskel and Zerezghi.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)。这三项因素均有利于Meskel和Zerezghi。

Ching held that the first Mathews factor—the private interest affected by the government’s action—favors the couple that filed an I-130 petition, for three reasons. First, a finding of past marriage fraud often means that the noncitizen spouse “faces imminent removal from the United States, thus undoubtedly causing immense hardship to herself and her husband.” Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157. Second, “[t]he right to marry and to enjoy marriage are unquestionably liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause.” Ibid. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). Third, “[t]he right to live with and not be separated from one’s immediate family is ‘a right that ranks high among the interests of the individual’ and that cannot be taken away without procedural due process.” Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34–35 (1982)). All three rationales apply with equal force in this case, and so the first Mathews factor favors Meskel and Zerezghi.

Ching认定，第一项Mathews因素——政府行为所影响的私人利益——有利于提交I-130申请的夫妻，理由有三。第一，认定存在过往婚姻欺诈通常意味着非公民配偶“面临即将被驱逐出美国，无疑给她本人及其丈夫造成巨大困难。”Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157。第二，“结婚和享受婚姻的权利无疑是受正当程序条款保护的自由利益。”Ibid.（引用Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)）。第三，“与直系亲属共同生活且不被分离的权利是‘在个人利益中位居前列的权利’，未经程序性正当程序不得剥夺。”Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157（引用Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34–35 (1982)）。三项理由在本案中同等适用，因此第一项Mathews因素有利于Meskel和Zerezghi。

The third Mathews factor—“the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail”—similarly favors the couple. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The government interest in immigration enforcement in general is surely substantial. But the question here is not the government’s interest in immigration enforcement but its interest in not disclosing the information on which it based its decision. As to that

第三项Mathews因素——“政府的利益，包括所涉职能以及额外或替代程序要求将带来的财政和行政负担”——同样有利于该夫妻。Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335。政府在移民执法方面的一般利益无疑是重大的。但此处的问题不是政府在移民执法中的利益，而是其不披露作为决定依据的信息的利益。至于该

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 19 interest, the government does not assert that the rental application is confidential or that its disclosure would be even minimally expensive. Indeed, the government’s briefing does not contest that its interest in withholding the document would be quite low. Thus this factor, too, favors the couple.

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 19 利益，政府并未主张该租赁申请属于机密，也未主张其披露哪怕会带来最低限度的费用。事实上，政府的书面陈述并未质疑其扣留该文件的利益会相当低。因此，这一因素也有利于这对夫妇。

The most contested Mathews factor in this case is the second one—“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the constitutionally protected] interest” and “the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Ibid. Meskel and Zerezghi argue that USCIS’s nondisclosure of the rental application during its decisionmaking process violated due process, and that the agency should have shared with them all documents upon which it based its determinations of marriage fraud prior to issuing its decision. The couple maintains that if they had known about the rental application, they would have researched the listed addresses, interviewed building managers, and used other methods to establish that Ghidei had not actually been living outside of the marital residence, but had only occasionally appeared at or patronized the other addresses.

本案中争议最大的 Mathews 因素是该案中的第二个因素——“错误剥夺[受宪法保护的]利益的风险”以及“额外或替代性程序保障的可能价值（如有）”。同上。Meskel 和 Zerezghi 主张，USCIS 在其决策过程中不披露该租赁申请违反了正当程序，且该机构本应在作出决定之前与他们共享其据以认定婚姻欺诈的所有文件。这对夫妇坚持认为，如果他们当时知道该租赁申请，他们本会调查所列地址、询问楼宇管理人员，并使用其他方法证明 Ghidei 实际上并未居住在婚姻住所之外，而只是偶尔出现在其他地址或光顾其他地址。

We agreed with a very similar argument in ASSE Int’l, Inc. v. Kerry, 803 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2015). The case involved a State Department program that allowed foreign citizens to visit the United States on cultural and educational exchanges. ASSE was an organization that found qualifying visitors, sponsored them for visas, and placed them with third-party host organizations. Id. at 1064–65. Under the program’s rules, the State Department could sanction ASSE for any misconduct committed by the third-party host. Id. at 1065. One of the program’s participants complained to the State Department about the conditions at her host

我们在 ASSE Int’l, Inc. 诉 Kerry, 803 F.3d 1059（第9巡回，2015）中对一个非常相似的论点表示赞同。该案涉及国务院的一项允许外国公民以文化和教育交流目的访问美国的项目。ASSE 是一家寻找合格访问者、为其担保签证并将其安置到第三方接待组织的机构。同上，第1064–65页。根据该项目规则，国务院可以因第三方接待方实施的任何不当行为而制裁 ASSE。同上，第1065页。该项目的一名参与者向国务院投诉其接待方的条件，并且在调查之后，国务院“向 ASSE 提供了一份书面制裁意向通知”。同上，第1067页。该通知列明了接待组织和投诉的项目参与者，并概述称该参与者报告“遭受了近30起单独的骚扰事件、关于其移民身份的威胁，以及如果她不就[接待方]强加的工作条件保持沉默便对其家人进行威胁”。同上，第1077页。然而，国务院从未提供其与该参与者面谈的记录或任何笔记。同上。

20 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS organization and, after an investigation, the Department “provided ASSE with a written Notice of Intent to impose sanctions.” Id. at 1067. The notice named the host organization and the complaining program participant, and summarized that the participant reported “having endured almost 30 separate instances of harassment, threats regarding her immigration status, and threats to her family if she did not remain silent about the working conditions imposed by” the host. Id. at 1077. However, the Department never produced a transcript nor any notes from its interview with the participant. Ibid.

20 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 组织，并且在调查之后，国务院“向 ASSE 提供了一份书面制裁意向通知”。同上，第1067页。该通知列明了接待组织和投诉的项目参与者，并概述称该参与者报告“遭受了近30起单独的骚扰事件、关于其移民身份的威胁，以及如果她不就[接待方]强加的工作条件保持沉默便对其家人进行威胁”。同上，第1077页。然而，国务院从未提供其与该参与者面谈的记录或任何笔记。同上。

We held that the Department violated procedural due process by not providing ASSE with “complete interview notes” associated with the participant’s complaint, because withholding such documents precluded ASSE from having “an opportunity to rebut the details of the harassment.” Ibid. We reasoned that “had the Department given ASSE more details about [the] accusations” then ASSE “may have been able to produce evidence refuting them” and the evidence could “have affected the Department’s decision as to the severity of sanctions, or whether to even impose sanctions at all.” Ibid.

我们认定，国务院未向 ASSE 提供与该参与者投诉相关的“完整面谈笔记”，违反了程序性正当程序，因为扣留此类文件使 ASSE 无法拥有“对骚扰细节进行反驳的机会”。同上。我们的理由是，“如果国务院向 ASSE 提供了关于[这些]指控的更多细节”，那么 ASSE“或许能够提出反驳这些指控的证据”，并且该证据可能“影响国务院关于制裁严重程度的决定，甚至影响是否施加任何制裁”。同上。

Meskel and Zerezghi’s claim is similar to ASSE’s. The couple contends that if they had been given the rental application, they would have been able to refute (or at least attempt to refute) the allegation that Meskel’s first husband lived at the addresses listed on the application instead of with her. Importantly, the summary that the State Department issued in ASSE was much more specific than the one that USCIS issued to Meskel and Zerezghi, yet it was still constitutionally deficient. The State Department’s summary provided details about the identity of the complainant, the parties involved, and the general contents of the allegations.

Meskel 和 Zerezghi 的主张与 ASSE 的主张相似。这对夫妇主张，如果向他们提供了该租赁申请，他们本能够反驳（或至少尝试反驳）关于 Meskel 的第一任丈夫居住在申请所列地址而非与她同住的指控。重要的是，国务院在 ASSE 中发布的摘要比 USCIS 向 Meskel 和 Zerezghi 发布的摘要具体得多，但它在宪法上仍然存在缺陷。国务院的摘要提供了关于投诉人身份、所涉当事方以及指控一般内容的细节。

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 21 Here, by contrast, USCIS’s Notice of Intent to Deny provided no crucial details and did not even list specific documents that USCIS had in its possession other than a vague reference to certain “records.” If the ASSE notice violated due process, then the much vaguer notice in this case did as well, especially in light of the harsh marriage- fraud penalty.

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 21 相比之下，在本案中，USCIS 的拒绝意向通知未提供任何关键细节，甚至未列出 USCIS 所持有的具体文件，而只是含糊提及某些“记录”。如果 ASSE 中的通知违反了正当程序，那么本案中含糊得多的通知也同样如此，尤其是考虑到严厉的婚姻欺诈处罚。

Kaur v. Holder, 561 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009), reinforces this conclusion. In Kaur, the BIA denied the plaintiff asylum by relying on classified information submitted by the Department of Homeland Security. Id. at 960. The Department gave Kaur a short summary of the classified evidence which stated, in part, that “reliable confidential sources have reported that Kaur has conspired to engage in alien smuggling; has attempted to obtain fraudulent documents; and has engaged in immigration fraud by conspiring to supply false documents for others.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the BIA’s “use of the secret evidence without giving Kaur a proper summary of that evidence was fundamentally unfair and violated her due process rights,” noting that “Kaur cannot rebut what has not been alleged.” Id. at 961, 962. Again, the same situation exists in our case: Zerezghi and Meskel, back in 2011, received a “conclusory and opaque” statement rather than “a proper summary” of the rental application. Id. at 961–62.

Kaur 诉 Holder, 561 F.3d 957（第9巡回，2009）强化了这一结论。在 Kaur 案中，BIA 依据国土安全部提交的机密信息驳回了原告的庇护申请。同上，第960页。该部向 Kaur 提供了一份关于机密证据的简短摘要，其中部分内容称“可靠机密来源报告称，Kaur 密谋从事外国人走私；试图获取欺诈性文件；并通过密谋为他人提供虚假文件从事移民欺诈。”同上（内部引号省略）。我们认定，BIA“使用秘密证据而未向 Kaur 提供该证据的适当摘要，从根本上不公平，并侵犯了她的正当程序权利”，并指出“Kaur 无法反驳未被指控的内容”。同上，第961、962页。同样，我们的案件中存在相同情况：Zerezghi 和 Meskel 早在2011年收到的是关于该租赁申请的“结论性且不透明”的陈述，而非“适当摘要”。同上，第961–62页。

The government has three responses. First, USCIS had apparently informed Meskel back in 2011 about the rental application when it denied her application to remove the conditional status of her permanent residency during her marriage to Ghidei. USCIS’s denial of that application, dated December 10, 2011—approximately four years before Zerezghi filed the I-130 petition in this case—stated that

政府有三项回应。第一，USCIS 显然曾在2011年告知 Meskel 该租赁申请，当时它在她与 Ghidei 婚姻期间驳回了她解除永久居留权条件身份的申请。USCIS 对该申请的驳回日期为2011年12月10日——大约在 Zerezghi 在本案中提交 I-130 申请的四年前——其中称

22 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS “officers visited the management office of the Alderwood Heights apartment complex” and that “[t]he manager of the apartment complex provided USCIS” with a copy of Ghidei’s rental application. The denial then listed the previous addresses provided on the 2008 rental application. Thus, according to the government, Meskel and Zerezghi essentially had notice about the 2008 rental application and simply chose to not act on it.

22 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS “官员们走访了 Alderwood Heights 公寓综合楼的管理办公室”，并且“该公寓综合楼经理向 USCIS 提供了”Ghidei 租赁申请的副本。该驳回决定随后列出了2008年租赁申请中提供的先前地址。因此，据政府称，Meskel 和 Zerezghi 实质上已获得关于2008年租赁申请的通知，只是选择不采取行动。

However, the government’s contention misconstrues Meskel and Zerezghi’s argument. Even if the couple— actually only Meskel, as Zerezghi was not a party to the earlier proceeding—had access to a short description of the rental application buried within the files of a different proceeding that had ended years earlier, they still never had access to the actual document. The couple also had no way of knowing that the application summarized by USCIS in the previous proceeding was also what the agency had relied on in the current proceeding, because USCIS noted only that it had “records indicat[ing] that Mr. Ghidei was living . . . at another location during the relevant time period.” It never specified what those “records” were, and did not specifically connect that statement to a specific rental application which, though mentioned in a previous proceeding, the couple had never been given. Put simply, USCIS’s statement did not allow the couple to know what to investigate or what to rebut against. “Procedural due process requires that a party against whom an agency has proceeded be allowed to rebut evidence offered by the agency if that evidence is relevant.” Carnation Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 641 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1981).

然而，政府的主张曲解了 Meskel 和 Zerezghi 的论点。即使这对夫妇——实际上只有 Meskel，因为 Zerezghi 并非较早程序的当事方——能够接触到埋藏在多年前已结束的另一程序档案中的关于该租赁申请的简短描述，他们仍然从未接触过实际文件。这对夫妇也无从知道 USCIS 在先前程序中概述的该申请也是该机构在当前程序中所依赖的内容，因为 USCIS 仅指出其有“记录表明 Ghidei 先生在相关时间段内居住……在另一地点”。它从未具体说明这些“记录”是什么，也未将该陈述具体联系到某份特定的租赁申请，而该申请尽管在先前程序中被提及，却从未提供给这对夫妇。简言之，USCIS 的陈述未能让这对夫妇知道应调查什么或应反驳什么。“程序性正当程序要求，机构对其启动程序的当事方应被允许反驳机构提供的证据，如果该证据具有相关性。”Carnation Co. 诉劳工部长, 641 F.2d 801, 803（第9巡回，1981）。

Next, the government contends the Notice of Intent to Deny put the couple on notice of the agency’s conclusion that Ghidei had not been living at the marital home during

接下来，政府主张，拒绝意向通知使这对夫妇注意到该机构的结论，即 Ghidei 在

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 23 Meskel’s first marriage. But this argument contradicts Kaur and ASSE, for in both cases the government had issued documents that simply summarized findings without disclosing the underlying documents themselves. In Kaur, the summary issued by USCIS put the asylum applicant on notice of the alleged smuggling and fraud, and the State Department document in ASSE put the company on notice of the accusations of misconduct against its host organization, but in neither case did the government agency divulge specific, rebuttable details about the situation or produce the underlying documents. We held that the notices provided in both cases were constitutionally insufficient. An agency cannot satisfy due process merely by giving notice of the conclusion it intends to reach. In our case, the Notice of Intent to Deny was, “at best, conclusory and opaque.” Kaur, 561 F.3d at 961. Since Meskel and Zerezghi did not have access to the rental application until after the administrative record had been filed in the district court, they “did not have a meaningful opportunity to rebut” the BIA’s allegations, and thus the agency “did not afford [them] adequate procedural protections.” ASSE, 803 F.3d at 1079.

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 23 Meskel 第一次婚姻期间并未居住在婚姻住所。但这一论点与 Kaur 和 ASSE 相矛盾，因为在这两案中，政府发布的文件只是概述调查结果，而未披露 underlying 文件本身。在 Kaur 中，USCIS 发布的摘要使庇护申请人注意到所指控的走私和欺诈，而在 ASSE 中，国务院文件使该公司注意到对其接待组织不当行为的指控，但在这两案中，政府机构均未披露关于该情况的具体、可反驳的细节，也未出示 underlying 文件。我们认定，两案中提供的通知在宪法上均不充分。机构不能仅通过通知其打算达成的结论来满足正当程序。在我们的案件中，拒绝意向通知“充其量是结论性且不透明的”。Kaur, 561 F.3d 第961页。由于 Meskel 和 Zerezghi 直到行政记录提交至地区法院后才接触到该租赁申请，他们“没有 meaningful 机会反驳”BIA 的指控，因此该机构“未向他们提供充分的程序保护”。ASSE, 803 F.3d 第1079页。

Finally, the government argues that the rental application was not the only evidence of Meskel and Ghidei living at different addresses while they were married. But the evidence on this issue was mixed. Unlike other marriage- fraud cases, there was no direct evidence indicating that Meskel and Ghidei’s marriage was a sham. See Singh, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 610; Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 805; cf. Simko v. B.I.A., 156 F. Supp. 3d 300, 312 (D. Conn. 2015) (noting that where there was “no direct evidence that Simko’s marriage . . . was fraudulent,” it was arbitrary and capricious to conclude that there was “substantial and probative evidence” of marriage fraud). Instead, numerous declarants swore that although Ghidei would often leave for long periods of time,

最后，政府主张，该租赁申请并非 Meskel 和 Ghidei 在婚姻期间居住在不同地址的唯一证据。但关于此问题的证据是混杂的。与其他婚姻欺诈案件不同，没有直接证据表明 Meskel 和 Ghidei 的婚姻是虚假的。见 Singh, 27 I. & N. Dec. 第610页；Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. 第805页；比较 Simko 诉 B.I.A., 156 F. Supp. 3d 300, 312（D. Conn. 2015）（指出在“没有直接证据表明 Simko 的婚姻……是欺诈性的”的情况下，认定存在“实质性且具证明力的证据”证明婚姻欺诈是任意且反复无常的）。相反，众多声明人宣誓称，尽管 Ghidei 经常长时间离开，

24 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS he and Meskel lived together as husband and wife. Meskel also submitted joint rent receipts and a joint lease agreement. Granted, Meskel made inconsistent statements during the immigration process, but she explained that they were made at the instruction of Ghidei and in deference of his desire to supervise the process. With the rest of the record equivocal, the rental application was the strongest piece of evidence that Meskel and her first husband lived separately. It was thus vital that Meskel and Zerezghi have been given an opportunity to rebut it.

24 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 他和 Meskel 作为夫妻共同生活。Meskel 还提交了共同租金收据和共同租赁协议。诚然，Meskel 在移民过程中作出了不一致的陈述，但她解释称这些陈述是在 Ghidei 的指示下并遵从他希望监督该过程的意愿作出的。在记录其余部分模棱两可的情况下，该租赁申请是证明 Meskel 与其第一任丈夫分居的最有力证据。因此，给予 Meskel 和 Zerezghi 反驳该证据的机会至关重要。

All three Mathews factors favor Zerezghi and Meskel. We hold that the BIA violated due process by not disclosing the rental application to the couple before denying the I-130 petition on the basis that Meskel had committed prior marriage fraud. Given the harsh effects of a marriage-fraud determination, Zerezghi and Meskel are entitled to at least the complete administrative record on which USCIS and the BIA relied in reaching its determinations, including any and all documents that the couple were not given prior to the agency making its decisions. Indeed, it is an “immutable” principle of due process “that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.” Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); see also Am.- Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the “use of undisclosed information in adjudications should be presumptively unconstitutional”). Because Meskel and Zerezghi received only a vague reference to unspecified “records,” they had no meaningful opportunity to respond to the apartment-rental application before USCIS made its determination. This violated procedural due process.

所有三个Mathews因素都支持Zerezghi和Meskel。我们认定，BIA在基于Meskel曾实施婚姻欺诈而否决I-130申请之前未向这对夫妇披露租赁申请，违反了正当程序。鉴于婚姻欺诈认定的严厉后果，Zerezghi和Meskel至少有权获得USCIS和BIA在作出其认定时所依赖的完整行政记录，包括在机构作出决定之前未提供给这对夫妇的任何及所有文件。事实上，正当程序的一项“不可动摇”原则是，“当政府行为严重损害个人，且该行为的合理性取决于事实认定时，用于证明政府案件的证据必须向个人披露，以便其有机会证明该证据不实。”Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)；另见Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir. 1995)（认定“在裁决中使用未披露的信息应推定为违宪”）。由于Meskel和Zerezghi仅收到对未指明“记录”的模糊提及，他们在USCIS作出认定之前没有对公寓租赁申请作出回应的有意义机会。这违反了程序性正当程序。

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 25

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 25

Meskel and Zerezghi also contend that the BIA applied too low a standard of proof when it affirmed USCIS’s marriage-fraud determination and that, on remand, the agency must apply a more stringent standard. We agree.

Meskel和Zerezghi还主张，BIA在维持USCIS的婚姻欺诈认定时适用的证明标准过低，并且在发回重审时，机构必须适用更严格的标准。我们同意。

Under a USCIS regulation, the agency can deny any immigration petition if there is “substantial and probative evidence” that the noncitizen “has attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii). The government acknowledges that it bears the initial burden of proof. If it produces substantial and probative evidence of marriage fraud, the burden shifts to the petitioner to rebut the allegation. Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 806–07. In the government’s view, “substantial and probative evidence” requires much less than a preponderance of the evidence. In its briefing and at oral argument, the government argued that the standard is equivalent to how courts deferentially review an agency’s factual findings for “substantial evidence,” only that in this instance, it is applicable to initial determinations of marriage fraud. 5 The government insists that this

根据USCIS的一项法规，如果有“实质性且具有证明力的证据”表明非公民“曾试图或共谋为规避移民法而缔结婚姻”，机构可以否决任何移民申请。8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii)。政府承认其承担初始举证责任。如果其提出婚姻欺诈的实质性且具有证明力的证据，举证责任转移至申请人以反驳该指控。Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 806–07。在政府看来，“实质性且具有证明力的证据”的要求远低于优势证据。在其书面陈述和口头辩论中，政府主张该标准等同于法院对机构事实认定进行“实质性证据”的尊重性审查，只是在本案中，它适用于婚姻欺诈的初始认定。5 政府坚持认为这

5 To support its position, the government cited several district court opinions that have seemingly used the “substantial and probative evidence” and the “substantial evidence” standards interchangeably. See Yu An v. Napolitano, 15 F. Supp. 3d 976, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Zemeka v. Holder, 989 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130–31 (D.D.C. 2013). However, these cases involved situations in which the evidence of marriage fraud was so overwhelming that a precise articulation of the standard of proof was unnecessary. For example, in Yu An, the petitioner signed an affidavit admitting that his marriage to the beneficiary was a sham, and that he had never had a relationship with his purported wife. Yu An, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 979. In Zemeka, USCIS denied an I-130 petition after it determined

5 为支持其立场，政府引用了若干地区法院意见，这些意见似乎将“实质性且具证明力的证据”标准与“实质性证据”标准互换使用。见 Yu An v. Napolitano, 15 F. Supp. 3d 976, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2014)；Zemeka v. Holder, 989 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130–31 (D.D.C. 2013)。然而，这些案件所涉及的情形中，婚姻欺诈的证据如此压倒性，以至于无需对证明标准作出精确表述。例如，在 Yu An 案中，申请人签署了一份宣誓书，承认其与受益人的婚姻是虚假的，且其从未与所谓的妻子有过关系。Yu An, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 979。在 Zemeka 案中，USCIS 在认定后拒绝了 I-130 申请

26 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS empowers USCIS to deny any immigration application as long as there was evidence of marriage fraud, even if it was more likely than not that the marriage was bona fide. This is incorrect.

26 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 授权USCIS只要有婚姻欺诈的证据就可以否决任何移民申请，即使婚姻更可能是真实的。这是不正确的。

Although the “substantial and probative evidence” language in the USCIS regulation seems similar to how courts review formal agency adjudications for “substantial evidence,” the two are not the same. One is a standard of review, while the other is a standard of proof. 6 Further background on the two standards makes this clear.

尽管USCIS法规中的“实质性且具有证明力的证据”措辞似乎类似于法院对正式机构裁决进行“实质性证据”审查的方式，但两者并不相同。一个是审查标准，另一个是证明标准。6 关于这两种标准的进一步背景使这一点变得清晰。

“The phrase ‘substantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’ used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citing T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2015)) (emphasis added). It is an

“‘实质性证据’一词是一个‘术语’，在整个行政法中用于描述法院应如何审查机构的事实认定。”Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)（引用T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2015)）（着重号为原文所加）。它是一个

that the beneficiary had previously been married to an American woman who had married a different noncitizen in the same month that she married the beneficiary. Zemeka, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 131. That woman filed immigration petitions for both noncitizens, but then failed to appear for any subsequent hearings and also failed to respond to the agency’s Notice of Intent to Deny. Ibid. The facts in these cases indicate that even if the correct standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, the government would have met it. Thus, the need for a clear articulation of the substantial-and-probative-evidence standard was low. However, the facts in our case present a much closer call.

受益人此前曾与一名美国女子结婚，而该女子在与受益人结婚的同一个月又与另一名不同的非公民结婚。Zemeka, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 131。该女子为两名非公民提交了移民申请，但随后未出席任何后续听证，也未回应机构的拒绝意向通知。同上。这些案件中的事实表明，即使正确的证明标准是优势证据，政府也会满足该标准。因此，明确阐述实质性且具有证明力的证据标准的必要性较低。然而，我们案件中的事实呈现出更为接近的判断。

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 27 extremely lenient standard that asks courts to consider only whether the administrative record “contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Ibid. (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It requires “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence, but a court will sustain a determination as long as there is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Ibid. (citation omitted). “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Ibid. In the immigration context, the substantial- evidence standard means that a reviewing court “must affirm the BIA’s order when there is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support it, even if it is possible to reach a contrary result on the basis of the evidence.” Oropeza-Wong v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1135, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 27 极为宽松的标准，要求法院仅考虑行政记录是否“包含‘充分证据’以支持机构的事实认定”。同上（引用Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)）。它要求“不仅仅是些许”证据，但只要存在“一个理性的人可能接受为足以支持结论的相关证据”，法院就会维持该认定。同上（引用省略）。“‘实质性’在其他语境中无论含义如何，这种证据充分性的门槛并不高。”同上。在移民语境中，实质性证据标准意味着审查法院“必须在存在理性的人可能接受为足以支持BIA命令的相关证据时维持该命令，即使根据该证据可能得出相反结果。”Oropeza-Wong v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1135, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005)（着重号为原文所加）。

In contrast, the substantial-and-probative-evidence standard is a standard of proof, not of review. Although the phrase has never been included in any immigration statute, it is stated in the agency regulation governing eligibility for immigration petitions as the evidentiary standard for establishing marriage fraud. 7 See 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1)(ii). The phrase first appeared in a 1978 BIA opinion that held that a denial of an immigration application based on a finding of marriage fraud “must be based on evidence that is substantial and probative.” Matter of Agdinaoay, 16 I. & N. Dec. 545, 546 (BIA 1978). The opinion did not elaborate on what level of proof—or what type of evidence (direct or circumstantial)—would satisfy the standard, stating only

相比之下，实质性且具有证明力的证据标准是证明标准，而非审查标准。尽管该措辞从未被纳入任何移民法规，但它在规定移民申请资格的机构法规中被表述为认定婚姻欺诈的证据标准。7 见8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1)(ii)。该措辞首次出现在1978年BIA的一份意见中，该意见认定，基于婚姻欺诈认定而否决移民申请“必须基于实质性且具有证明力的证据”。Matter of Agdinaoay, 16 I. & N. Dec. 545, 546 (BIA 1978)。该意见未详细说明何种证明水平——或何种类型的证据（直接或间接）——能满足该标准，仅说明

7 The phrase was first included in the regulation governing Section 204 of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1992, two years after the BIA decided Matter of Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166 (BIA 1990).

7 该措辞于1992年首次被纳入管辖《移民与国籍法》第204条的法规中，即在BIA裁决Matter of Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166 (BIA 1990)两年之后。

28 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS that “a factual determination based on clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence” would suffice. Id. at 547; see also Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 805 (concluding that “clear and convincing” evidence is enough to sustain a finding of marriage fraud).

28 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS “基于明确、令人信服且毫不含糊的证据的事实认定”即可满足。Id. at 547；另见Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 805（认定“明确且令人信服”的证据足以维持婚姻欺诈认定）。

The standard was again invoked in Matter of Tawfik, which held that a mere “reasonable inference [of marriage fraud] does not rise to the level of substantial and probative evidence[.]” 20 I. & N. Dec. at 168. In Tawfik, the only evidence that indicated marriage fraud was that the beneficiary had divorced his first citizen wife a little over a year after they had married. Id. at 169. Despite the existence of a divorce decree that averred that the couple were married and had lived together, the factfinder apparently relied on inferences from facts that were not in the record when denying the petition. Id. at 170. On appeal, the BIA held that this inference alone was insufficient for establishing “substantial and probative” evidence of fraud and thus vacated the finding. Id. at 167.

该标准在Matter of Tawfik中再次被援引，该案认定仅仅“对婚姻欺诈的合理推断并不达到实质性且具有证明力的证据水平[。]”20 I. & N. Dec. at 168。在Tawfik案中，表明婚姻欺诈的唯一证据是受益人在与其第一任公民妻子结婚一年多后离婚。Id. at 169。尽管存在一份离婚判决书，其中声明这对夫妇已婚并曾共同生活，但事实认定者显然在否决申请时依赖于对不在记录中的事实的推断。Id. at 170。在上诉中，BIA认定仅凭这一推断不足以确立欺诈的“实质性且具有证明力”证据，因此撤销了该认定。Id. at 167。

After oral argument in our case, the BIA recently again addressed the standard in Matter of Singh, which held that “to be ‘substantial and probative,’ the evidence must establish that it is more than probably true that the marriage is fraudulent.” 27 I. & N. Dec. 598, 607 (BIA 2019). Importantly, the BIA explained that “substantial and probative evidence” is a “standard of proof” which “refers to the quality and quantity of competent, credible, and objective evidence.” Id. at 606. “Whether the evidence in any given case is sufficiently substantial and probative to support a finding of marriage fraud will depend upon the factual circumstances of each case.” Id. at 607.

在我们案件的口头辩论之后，BIA最近在Matter of Singh中再次处理了该标准，该案认定“要成为‘实质性且具有证明力的’，证据必须确立婚姻欺诈更可能是真实的。”27 I. & N. Dec. 598, 607 (BIA 2019)。重要的是，BIA解释说“实质性且具有证明力的证据”是一种“证明标准”，其“指的是有资格、可信且客观的证据的质量和数量”。Id. at 606。“任何特定案件中的证据是否足够实质性和具有证明力以支持婚姻欺诈认定，将取决于每个案件的事实情况。”Id. at 607。

In Singh—a situation in which the beneficiary was the petitioner’s father, and who, at the time of filing for

在Singh案中——该案的情形是受益人为申请人的父亲，且其在提交申请时

ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 29 immigration benefits, was married to the petitioner’s maternal grandmother—the BIA determined that there was “substantial and probative evidence” of marriage fraud based on a variety of factors. For example, during an interview with the beneficiary’s wife, at the marital residence, the wife “admitted that she married the beneficiary as a favor to her daughter,” the petitioner’s mother, “to allow [the beneficiary] to remain in the United States.” Id. at 600. The BIA held that “[a] sworn statement by the parties admitting that the marriage is fraudulent . . . is direct evidence of fraud that is ‘substantial and probative.’” Id. at 607. But that was not the only evidence to support its finding. Observations made by USCIS officers during the visit also indicated that the beneficiary slept in the master bedroom with his wife’s daughter, rather than with his wife. Id. at 610. The BIA held that, together, these facts served to constitute substantial and probative evidence of marriage fraud.

ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 29 移民福利，与申请人的外祖母结婚——BIA认定，基于多种因素，存在婚姻欺诈的“实质性且具证明力的证据”。例如，在婚姻住所对受益人妻子的面谈中，妻子“承认她是为了帮女儿——即申请人的母亲——的忙才与受益人结婚，‘以便让[受益人]留在美国’”。同上，第600页。BIA认为，“当事人承认婚姻具有欺诈性的宣誓陈述……是欺诈的‘实质性且具证明力的’直接证据。”同上，第607页。但这并非支持其认定的唯一证据。USCIS官员在走访期间的观察还表明，受益人与妻子的女儿而非妻子睡在主卧室。同上，第610页。BIA认为，这些事实合在一起构成婚姻欺诈的实质性且具证明力的证据。

The exegeses offered by these BIA opinions makes it clear that the substantial-and-probative-evidence standard is a standard of proof, which is at least as high as a preponderance of the evidence. We see no reason for departing from this conclusion. Although a determination of marriage fraud does not implicate as fundamental a right as, for example a civil commitment, see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983); a loss of parental rights, see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000); or an order of removal, see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010), it is nevertheless a harsh penalty, limiting the noncitizen’s ability to obtain future immigration benefits and putting her at risk of removal. On remand, the BIA can reexamine the permissible interpretation of the words of its regulation. We hold only that, given the seriousness of a marriage-fraud determination and the risk of a finding being made in error,

这些BIA意见所提供的解释清楚表明，实质性且具证明力的证据标准是一项证明标准，其至少与优势证据标准一样高。我们认为没有理由偏离这一结论。尽管婚姻欺诈的认定并不像例如民事收容（见Jones诉United States，463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)）、丧失父母权利（见Troxel诉Granville，530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000)）或驱逐令（见Padilla诉Kentucky，559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010)）那样涉及如此根本的权利，但它仍是一项严厉的惩罚，限制了非公民获得未来移民福利的能力，并使其面临被驱逐的风险。在发回重审时，BIA可以重新审查其条例用语的可允许解释。我们仅认定，鉴于婚姻欺诈认定的严重性以及认定可能出错的风险，

30 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS the Constitution requires at least a preponderance of the evidence before imposing this sanction.

30 ZEREZGHI 诉 USCIS 宪法要求至少达到优势证据标准才能施加这一制裁。