Matter of Castillo-Perez

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3965

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3965

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General (1) The Immigration and Nationality Act’s “good moral character” standard requires adherence to the generally accepted moral conventions of the community, and criminal activity is probative of non-adherence to those conventions. (2) Evidence of two or more convictions for driving under the influence during the relevant period establishes a presumption that an alien lacks good moral character under INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). (3) Because only aliens who possessed good moral character for a 10-year period are eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), such evidence also presumptively establishes that the alien’s application for that discretionary relief should be denied.

美国司法部 司法部长办公室 (1) 《移民与国籍法》的“良好道德品质”标准要求遵守社区普遍接受的道德惯例，而犯罪活动是证明不遵守这些惯例的证据。 (2) 在相关期间内有两项或以上酒后驾驶定罪证据，即确立根据《移民与国籍法》第101(f)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)，外国人缺乏良好道德品质的推定。 (3) 由于只有在一段10年期间内拥有良好道德品质的外国人才有资格根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)条、8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)获得取消递解，此类证据也推定确立该外国人的该项自由裁量救济申请应被拒绝。

BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

在司法部长面前

On December 3, 2018, Acting Attorney General Matthew G. Whitaker directed the Board of Immigration Appeals to refer this case to the Attorney General for review. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i). Acting Attorney General Whitaker invited the parties and interested amici to submit briefs addressing questions relevant to the disposition of the case. Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 495 (A.G. 2018). For the reasons set forth in the accompanying opinion, I affirm the Board’s order vacating the immigration judge’s decision to grant the respondent cancellation of removal. I hold that, when assessing an alien’s good moral character under section 101(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), evidence of two or more convictions for driving under the influence during the relevant period establishes a rebuttable presumption that the alien lacked good moral character during that time. Because only aliens who possessed good moral character for a 10-year period are eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), such evidence also presumptively establishes that the alien is not eligible for that relief. Section 240A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA” or “Act”) grants the Attorney General the discretion to cancel the removal and adjust the status of an inadmissible or deportable alien who shows that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his

2018年12月3日，代理司法部长Matthew G. Whitaker指示移民上诉委员会将此案提交司法部长审查。见 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i)。代理司法部长Whitaker邀请各方及有兴趣的法庭之友提交简报，讨论与案件处理相关的问题。Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 495 (A.G. 2018)。 基于随附意见中所述理由，我维持委员会撤销移民法官准予被申请人取消递解决定的命令。我认定，在根据《移民与国籍法》（“INA”）第101(f)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)评估外国人的良好道德品质时，相关期间内有两项或以上酒后驾驶定罪的证据，确立该外国人在该期间缺乏良好道德品质的可反驳推定。由于只有在一段10年期间内拥有良好道德品质的外国人才有资格根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)条、8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)获得取消递解，此类证据也推定确立该外国人不符合该救济资格。 《移民与国籍法》（“INA”或“该法”）第240A(b)(1)条授予司法部长自由裁量权，可以取消递解并调整不可入境或可递解外国人的身份，如果该外国人证明其递解将导致其

664

664

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3965

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3965

family and, among other things, that he has been “a person of good moral character” for the 10 years preceding his application. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). In this case, the immigration judge granted the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal despite the respondent’s multiple convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and other criminal history. 1 On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) vacated the immigration judge’s decision and ordered the respondent removed to Mexico. Acting Attorney General Matthew G. Whitaker subsequently directed the Board to refer this case to him for review. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i). He invited the parties and any interested amici to brief relevant points, including the correct standard for assessing good moral character under the INA and the impact of multiple convictions for DUI on whether an alien should be granted cancellation of removal. Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 495 (A.G. 2018). For the reasons set forth below, I affirm the Board’s order. I conclude that, when assessing an alien’s good moral character under INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), evidence of two or more DUI convictions during the relevant period establishes a rebuttable presumption that the alien lacked good moral character during that time. Because the Attorney General may only cancel removal of an alien who has been a person of good moral character during a 10-year period, see INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), such evidence also presumptively establishes that the alien is not eligible for that relief. Here, because the evidence of the respondent’s efforts to rehabilitate himself is insufficient to overcome this presumption, the Board correctly vacated the immigration judge’s decision to grant cancellation of removal.

家庭成员遭受特殊且极其不寻常的困难，并且除其他事项外，证明其在申请前10年一直是“良好道德品质的人”。8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)。 在本案中，尽管被申请人有多项酒后驾驶（“DUI”）定罪和其他犯罪记录，移民法官仍准予了被申请人的取消递解申请。1 在上诉中，移民上诉委员会（“委员会”）撤销了移民法官的决定，并命令将被申请人递解至墨西哥。代理司法部长Matthew G. Whitaker随后指示委员会将此案提交其审查。见 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i)。他邀请各方及任何有兴趣的法庭之友就相关要点提交简报，包括根据《移民与国籍法》评估良好道德品质的正确标准，以及多项DUI定罪对外国人是否应获准取消递解的影响。Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 495 (A.G. 2018)。 基于下述理由，我维持委员会的命令。我认定，在根据《移民与国籍法》第101(f)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)评估外国人的良好道德品质时，相关期间内有两项或以上DUI定罪的证据，确立该外国人在该期间缺乏良好道德品质的可反驳推定。由于司法部长只能取消在一段10年期间内一直是良好道德品质的人的递解，见《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)条、8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)，此类证据也推定确立该外国人不符合该救济资格。在此，由于被申请人自我改造的证据不足以推翻这一推定，委员会正确地撤销了移民法官准予取消递解的决定。

Section 240A(b)(1) of the INA authorizes the Attorney General to cancel removal and adjust the status of an alien who:

《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)(1)条授权司法部长取消递解并调整符合以下条件的外国人的身份：

1 This opinion uses the term “DUI” to mean all state and federal impaired-driving offenses, including “driving while intoxicated,” “operating under the influence,” and the like, that make it unlawful for an individual to operate a motor vehicle while impaired. This term does not include lesser included offenses, such as negligent driving, that do not require proof of impairment. Although DUIs are the offenses at issue here, nothing in this opinion prevents immigration judges or the Board of Immigration Appeals from taking into account other convictions, such as negligent driving, in determining whether to grant cancellation of removal.

1 本意见使用“DUI”一词指所有州和联邦的受损驾驶罪行，包括“醉酒驾驶”、“受影响驾驶”等，这些罪行使个人在受损时操作机动车成为非法。该术语不包括较轻的包含罪行，如过失驾驶，这些罪行不要求证明受损。尽管DUI是本案所涉罪行，本意见中的任何内容均不阻止移民法官或移民上诉委员会在决定是否准予取消递解时考虑其他定罪，如过失驾驶。

665

665

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3965

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3965

(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application; (B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (C) has not been convicted of an offense under [certain specified sections of the INA]; and (D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The Attorney General’s judgment on this matter is discretionary. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 204 (2013); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581 (2010). As with all discretionary forms of relief from removal, the alien bears the burden of proving that he both “satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements” for cancellation of removal and “merits a favorable exercise of discretion.” INA § 240(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A); see also, e.g., Matter of Gomez-Beltran, 26 I&N Dec. 765, 766 (BIA 2016); Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7, 10 (BIA 1998). In this case, the critical eligibility requirement concerns the Act’s “good moral character” provision. The concept of good moral character has been part of the United States’ immigration laws since the earliest days of the Republic. The first federal naturalization statute required that any alien applying for naturalization “mak[e] proof to the satisfaction of [a] court, that he is a person of good character.” Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 103. Congress rephrased the standard as “good moral character” in the second naturalization law, Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414, and it remains a requirement for naturalization to this day, INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). The good moral character standard has proliferated throughout the INA and is now a prerequisite to eligibility for numerous forms of immigration relief. See, e.g., INA § 240B(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B) (voluntary departure); INA § 245(l)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(l)(1)(B) (adjustment of status for trafficking victims). Despite the ubiquity of the good moral character standard, the INA “does not specifically define what ‘good moral character’ is”—but it does “quite explicitly state[] what it is not.” United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 395 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2005). Section 101(f) of the Act provides that “[n]o

(A) 在申请之日紧接之前的连续期间内，已在美国实际居住不少于10年； (B) 在该期间内一直是良好道德品质的人； (C) 未被判定犯有[《移民与国籍法》某些特定条款]下的罪行；且 (D) 证明递解将导致该外国人的配偶、父母或子女（该配偶、父母或子女是美国公民或合法永久居民外国人）遭受特殊且极其不寻常的困难。 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)。司法部长对此事项的判断是自由裁量的。见 Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 204 (2013)；Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581 (2010)。与所有自由裁量的递解救济形式一样，外国人负有举证责任，证明其既“满足取消递解的适用资格要求”，又“值得自由裁量的有利行使”。《移民与国籍法》第240(c)(4)(A)条、8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)；另见，例如，Matter of Gomez-Beltran, 26 I&N Dec. 765, 766 (BIA 2016)；Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7, 10 (BIA 1998)。 在本案中，关键的资格要求涉及该法的“良好道德品质”条款。良好道德品质的概念自共和国最早时期起就一直是美国移民法的一部分。第一部联邦归化法规要求任何申请归化的外国人“向法院证明令其满意，其是品行良好的人”。1790年3月26日法案，第3章，1 Stat. 103, 103。国会在第二部归化法中将该标准重新表述为“良好道德品质”，1795年1月29日法案，第20章，第1节，1 Stat. 414, 414，并且该要求至今仍是归化的条件，《移民与国籍法》第316(a)条、8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)。良好道德品质标准已在《移民与国籍法》中广泛存在，现已成为众多移民救济形式的资格前提。见，例如，《移民与国籍法》第240B(b)(1)(B)条、8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B)（自愿离境）；《移民与国籍法》第245(l)(1)(B)条、8 U.S.C. § 1255(l)(1)(B)（人口贩运受害者的身份调整）。 尽管良好道德品质标准无处不在，但《移民与国籍法》“并未具体定义什么是‘良好道德品质’”——但它确实“相当明确地陈述了它不是什么”。United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 395 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2005)。该法第101(f)条规定，“[无]

666

666

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3965

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3965

person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established is, or was,” a person falling within any of eight listed categories. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). Those categories include, among others, “a habitual drunkard,” “one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under [the INA],” and “one who at any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony.” Id. § 1101(f)(1), (6), (8). The provision’s so-called “catch-all clause” then explains: “The fact that any person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral character.” Id. § 1101(f). In other words, an alien may lack good moral character even if he is not within one of those eight enumerated classes. Long-standing judicial precedent holds that good moral character under the immigration laws requires adherence to, as Judge Learned Hand put it, “the generally accepted moral conventions” of the community. United States v. Francioso, 164 F.2d 163, 163 (2d Cir. 1947); see also Petition of De Leo, 75 F. Supp. 896, 900 (W.D. Pa. 1948) (good moral character “results from acts and conduct of an individual, and is of such a character as measures up to the standards of average citizens of the community in which the alien resides”); In re Spenser, 22 F. Cas. 921, 921 (C.C.D. Or. 1878) (No. 13,234) (“probably the average man of the country is as high as [the standard] can be set”); Black’s Law Dictionary 808 (10th ed. 2014) (defining good moral character as a “pattern of behavior that is consistent with the community’s current ethical standards and that shows an absence of deceit or morally reprehensible conduct”). Similarly, the regulation governing claims of good moral character for naturalization purposes requires the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to consider “the standards of the average citizen in the community of residence” in assessing such claims. 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2). Although a “moral conventions” test may sometimes be “difficult” to apply, Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.), that does not mean it lacks discernible content. An alien’s criminal record is highly probative of whether he possesses good moral character. “It is not open to doubt,” the Supreme Court has explained, “that the commission of crime . . . has some relation to the question of character.” Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898). At the same time, a criminal record is not an absolute prerequisite to concluding that an alien lacks good moral character. Congress has identified “habitual drunkard[s],” for example, as persons who lack good moral character even when they have no criminal convictions. INA § 101(f)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1).

任何人如在其需要确立良好道德品质的期间内属于或曾属于下列八类情形之一，即应被视为或被认定为不具备良好道德品质。8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)。这些类别包括但不限于“习惯性酗酒者”、“为取得[《移民与国籍法》]项下任何利益而提供虚假证言者”以及“在任何时候曾被判犯有加重重罪者”。Id. § 1101(f)(1)、(6)、(8)。该条款所谓的“兜底条款”随后解释道：“任何人不在上述任何类别之内这一事实，不应排除认定该人因其他原因现在或过去不具备良好道德品质。”Id. § 1101(f)。换言之，外国人即使不属于上述八类列举类别之一，也可以不具备良好道德品质。 长期存在的司法先例认为，移民法项下的良好道德品质要求遵守——用 Learned Hand 法官的话说——社区的“普遍接受的道德惯例”。United States v. Francioso, 164 F.2d 163, 163 (2d Cir. 1947)；另见 Petition of De Leo, 75 F. Supp. 896, 900 (W.D. Pa. 1948)（良好道德品质“源于个人的行为和操守，并且其性质达到该外国人所居住社区普通公民的标准”）；In re Spenser, 22 F. Cas. 921, 921 (C.C.D. Or. 1878) (No. 13,234)（“该国普通人的标准很可能已是[该标准]所能设定的最高水平”）；Black's Law Dictionary 808 (10th ed. 2014)（将良好道德品质定义为“与社区当前伦理标准相一致且表明不存在欺骗或道德上应受谴责行为的行为模式”）。同样，关于入籍目的良好道德品质主张的法规要求国土安全部（“DHS”）在评估此类主张时考虑“居住社区普通公民的标准”。8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2)。尽管“道德惯例”检验有时可能“难以”适用，Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.)，但这并不意味着它缺乏可辨识的内容。 外国人的犯罪记录对于其是否具备良好道德品质具有高度证明力。最高法院解释道：“毫无疑问，犯罪行为的实施……与品格问题有一定关系。”Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898)。与此同时，犯罪记录并非认定外国人缺乏良好道德品质的绝对前提条件。例如，国会已将“习惯性酗酒者”认定为缺乏良好道德品质的人，即使其没有犯罪定罪。INA § 101(f)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1)。

667

667

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3965

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3965

II. The respondent, a native and national of Mexico, has lived in the United States without admission or parole since 1997. He is married, has three U.S.- citizen children, and works as a mason for a construction company. He also has a criminal record. On two separate occasions in 2001, and again in 2006, he was arrested for assault and battery of his wife. In 2004, he was charged with public drunkenness, and in 2005, he was convicted of negligent driving. Most relevant for present purposes, he was convicted of DUI in 2010 and 2012. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266. The respondent admitted in the immigration court that his excessive consumption of alcohol was a major factor in each of these episodes. Immig. Ct. Ex. 3, Tab L, Resp.’s Aff. ¶ 8 (“I have been involved in several incidents that resulted in criminal charges being filed against me. In each case, the excessive consumption of alcohol was a major factor.”). The respondent stopped drinking and completed an alcohol-safety program after his last DUI conviction, and he regularly attends Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. DHS initiated removal proceedings against the respondent in February 2010. He conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal, which the immigration judge granted in 2016. In a written opinion, the immigration judge concluded that the respondent had shown good moral character. The immigration judge first stated that the respondent was not subject to any “automatic bar” to a finding of good moral character. Then the immigration judge explained that, while he was “troubled by [the respondent’s] alcohol-related convictions,” they were outweighed by his work history, his support for his family, and especially his “rehabilitation efforts” related to his previous alcohol abuse. The immigration judge further held that the respondent satisfied the other statutory requirements for cancellation of removal and warranted relief as a matter of discretion. The Board disagreed, holding that the respondent had failed to establish that his removal would result in the requisite “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). More pertinently, it held in the alternative that the respondent had not demonstrated good moral character and did not warrant cancellation of removal as an exercise of the Board’s discretion. The Board therefore vacated the immigration judge’s ruling and ordered the respondent removed to Mexico. Acting Attorney General Whitaker subsequently directed the Board to refer the case for review.

II. 被申请人系墨西哥本土出生和国民，自1997年以来未经入境许可或假释居住在美国。他已婚，有三名美国公民子女，在一家建筑公司担任泥瓦匠。他也有犯罪记录。2001年两次不同的场合以及2006年再次，他因殴打和 battering 其妻子而被捕。2004年，他被控公共醉酒，2005年，他被判犯有疏忽驾驶罪。就目前目的而言最相关的是，他于2010年和2012年被判犯有酒驾罪。见 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266。被申请人在移民法庭承认，其过度饮酒是每一起事件的主要因素。Immig. Ct. Ex. 3, Tab L, Resp.'s Aff. ¶ 8（“我卷入了几起导致对我提起刑事指控的事件。每一起案件中，过度饮酒都是主要因素。”）。被申请人在最后一次酒驾定罪后停止饮酒并完成了酒精安全课程，且定期参加匿名戒酒会会议。 DHS于2010年2月对被申请人启动驱逐程序。他承认可被驱逐并申请取消驱逐，移民法官于2016年批准。在一份书面意见中，移民法官认定被申请人已证明良好道德品质。移民法官首先指出，被申请人不受任何认定良好道德品质的“自动障碍”约束。然后移民法官解释称，尽管他“对被申请人与酒精相关的定罪感到不安”，但这些定罪被其工作经历、对家庭的支持，尤其是其与先前酒精滥用相关的“康复努力”所抵消。移民法官进一步认定，被申请人满足取消驱逐的其他法定要求，并作为自由裁量事项值得给予救济。 委员会不同意，认定被申请人未能证明其驱逐将给符合条件的亲属造成必要的“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”。INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)。更相关的是，委员会在替代性认定中认为，被申请人未证明良好道德品质，且作为委员会自由裁量权的行使不值得取消驱逐。委员会因此撤销移民法官的裁决并命令将被申请人驱逐至墨西哥。代理司法部长Whitaker随后指示委员会将案件提交审查。

668

668

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3965

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3965

III. Cancellation of removal is a coveted and scarce form of relief. Under the INA, the Attorney General may cancel the removal of only 4,000 aliens per year. INA § 240A(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1). As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “[i]n 1997, the first year that the quota was in effect, the limit was reached in the month of February.” Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1029 n.9 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012). Because immigration judges continued to “reach[] the annual 4,000 limitation early in the fiscal year,” they began “reserving” decisions on many applications until subsequent fiscal years, contributing to backlogs and delays in the immigration adjudication system. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Procedures Further Implementing the Annual Limitation on Suspension of Deportation and Cancellation of Removal, 81 Fed. Reg. 86,291, 86,294 (Nov. 30, 2016). As a result, according to the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 3,500 cancellation of removal slots have been filled on the first day of each of the last five fiscal years. The other 500 slots are set aside to be granted to detained aliens throughout the year. With demand for cancellation of removal well outstripping supply, immigration judges should grant such relief, in an evenhanded way, only to the most deserving candidates. Cf. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115(1), 100 Stat. 3359, 3384 (“the immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly”). This case presents an opportunity to promote the uniform and fair enforcement of the immigration laws by clarifying how an alien’s DUI convictions affect his eligibility for cancellation of removal.

III. 取消驱逐是一种令人觊觎且稀缺的救济形式。根据《移民与国籍法》，司法部长每年只能取消4,000名外国人的驱逐。INA § 240A(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1)。正如第9巡回所承认的，“1997年，即配额生效的第一年，限额在2月份即已达到。”Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1029 n.9 (2005)，因其他理由被 Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012) 废止。由于移民法官继续“在财政年度早期就达到每年4,000人的限制”，他们开始将许多申请的裁决“保留”至后续财政年度，导致移民裁决系统的积压和延误。拟议规则制定通知，进一步实施暂停驱逐和取消驱逐年度限制的程序，81 Fed. Reg. 86,291, 86,294（2016年11月30日）。因此，据移民审查执行办公室称，过去五个财政年度中每个财政年度的第一天就填满了3,500个取消驱逐名额。其余500个名额留出用于全年授予被拘留的外国人。 由于取消驱逐的需求远远超过供给，移民法官应以公平的方式仅将此类救济授予最值得的候选人。参见《1986年移民改革与控制法》，Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115(1), 100 Stat. 3359, 3384（“美国的移民法应得到有力且统一的执行”）。本案提供了一个机会，通过澄清外国人的酒驾定罪如何影响其取消驱逐的资格，来促进移民法的统一和公平执行。

Multiple DUI convictions during the relevant period are strong evidence that an alien lacked good moral character during that time and is thus not eligible for cancellation of removal. An alien with multiple DUI convictions likely lacks good moral character under the catch-all clause of section 101(f) of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (“The fact that any person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral character.”). Good moral character requires adherence to the generally accepted moral conventions of the community, and criminal activity is probative of non-adherence to those conventions. See supra Part I. This country has spoken clearly on the morality of DUI. All 50 States have

相关期间内的多次酒驾定罪是外国人在该期间缺乏良好道德品质的有力证据，因此不符合取消驱逐的资格。 有多次酒驾定罪的外国人很可能根据《移民与国籍法》第101(f)条的兜底条款缺乏良好道德品质。8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)（“任何人不在上述任何类别之内这一事实，不应排除认定该人因其他原因现在或过去不具备良好道德品质。”）。良好道德品质要求遵守社区普遍接受的道德惯例，而犯罪活动对于证明不遵守这些惯例具有证明力。见上文第一部分。我国已就酒驾的道德性明确表态。所有50个州均已

669

669

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3965

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3965

criminalized it, Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016), reflecting a national consensus that drunk and other forms of impaired driving are unacceptable conduct that imposes intolerable harms on society, see id. (“Drunk drivers take a grisly toll on the Nation’s roads, claiming thousands of lives, injuring many more victims, and inflicting billions of dollars in property damage every year.”); Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 (2019) (plurality opinion) (noting “the country’s efforts over the years to address the terrible problem of drunk driving”); Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“Driving under the influence is, self-evidently, a public harm.”). Multiple DUI convictions represent a repeated failure to meet the community’s moral standards, rather than a “single lapse” that would be less probative of moral character. Matter of B-, 1 I&N Dec. 611, 612 (BIA 1943). 2 Even setting good moral character aside, an alien with multiple DUI convictions would likely be denied cancellation of removal as a purely discretionary matter. See Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 204 (“The Attorney General may, in his discretion, . . . deny relief if he concludes the negative equities outweigh the positive equities of the noncitizen’s case[.]”). Multiple DUI convictions are a serious blemish on a person’s record and reflect disregard for the safety of others and for the law. Although “there is no inflexible standard for determining who should be granted discretionary relief,” the Board has identified an array of factors that should be considered in deciding whether to grant cancellation of removal and other forms of

将其入罪，Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016)，反映了全国共识，即醉酒及其他形式的受损驾驶是不可接受的行为，对社会造成不可容忍的伤害，见 id.（“醉酒司机在全国道路上造成惨重伤亡，每年夺去数千人的生命，伤害更多受害者，并造成数十亿美元的财产损失。”）；Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 (2019)（复数意见）（指出“国家多年来为解决醉酒驾驶这一可怕问题所做的努力”）；Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017)（全体庭审）（“酒后驾驶不言自明是一种公共危害。”）。多次酒驾定罪代表了对社区道德标准的反复未能遵守，而非对道德品质证明力较弱的“单一失误”。Matter of B-, 1 I&N Dec. 611, 612 (BIA 1943)。2 即使将良好道德品质搁置一旁，有多次酒驾定罪的外国人也很可能作为纯粹自由裁量事项被拒绝取消驱逐。见 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 204（“司法部长可以自行裁量……如果他认为负面因素超过非公民案件的正面因素，则拒绝救济[。]”）。多次酒驾定罪是个人记录上的严重污点，反映了对他人安全和法律的漠视。尽管“在确定谁应获得自由裁量救济方面没有僵化的标准”，委员会已确定了一系列在决定是否授予取消驱逐和其他形式的

2 Multiple DUI convictions that involve alcohol should also prompt an immigration judge to assess whether the alien is or was a “habitual drunkard” categorically lacking good moral character under section 101(f)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1). A habitual drunkard is “a person who regularly drinks alcoholic beverages to excess.” Ledezma-Cosino, 857 F.3d at 1046. DHS presents uncontroverted, publicly available data showing that DUI arrests account for only a small fraction of all driving-while-impaired episodes, and that the average DUI arrestee drives impaired dozens of times before ever being arrested. DHS Br. 11–14. Other studies further support the conclusion that a typical person with multiple DUI convictions drinks to excess with regularity. See, e.g., Howard J. Shaffer et al., The Epidemiology of Psychiatric Disorders Among Repeat DUI Offenders Accepting a Treatment-Sentencing Option, 75 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 795, 802 (2007) (“Almost 100% of our repeat DUI sample qualified for a lifetime diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence, and three quarters of the sample met criteria for one of those diagnoses within the past year.”); Ralph K. Jones & John H. Lacey, State of Knowledge of Alcohol-Impaired Driving: Research on Repeat DWI Offenders 18 (2000) (repeat offenders “often have alcohol problems” and “commonly suffer from alcohol addiction”); cf. Amy Jewett et al., Alcohol-Impaired Driving Among Adults — United States, 2012, 64 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 814, 814 (2015) (“the 4% of the adult population who reported binge drinking at least four times per month accounted for 61% of all alcohol-impaired driving episodes”).

2 涉及酒精的多次DUI定罪也应促使移民法官评估该外国人是否属于或曾经属于“习惯性醉酒者”，从而根据《移民与国籍法》第101(f)(1)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1)，当然缺乏良好道德品质。习惯性醉酒者是“经常过量饮用酒精饮料的人”。Ledezma-Cosino, 857 F.3d at 1046。DHS提交了无可争辩的、公开可获取的数据，显示DUI逮捕仅占所有酒后驾驶事件的一小部分，且平均每名DUI被捕者在首次被捕前已数十次酒后驾驶。DHS Br. 11–14。其他研究进一步支持这一结论：有多次DUI定罪的典型人员经常过量饮酒。See, e.g., Howard J. Shaffer et al., The Epidemiology of Psychiatric Disorders Among Repeat DUI Offenders Accepting a Treatment-Sentencing Option, 75 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 795, 802 (2007)（“我们的重复DUI样本中几乎100%符合酒精滥用或依赖的终生诊断，且样本中四分之三在过去一年内符合其中一种诊断的标准。”）；Ralph K. Jones & John H. Lacey, State of Knowledge of Alcohol-Impaired Driving: Research on Repeat DWI Offenders 18 (2000)（重复犯罪者“常有酒精问题”且“通常患有酒精成瘾”）；cf. Amy Jewett et al., Alcohol-Impaired Driving Among Adults — United States, 2012, 64 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 814, 814 (2015)（“报告每月至少四次暴饮的4%成年人口占所有酒后驾驶事件的61%”）。

670

670

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3965

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3965

discretionary relief under the Act. C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. at 11. An alien’s criminal record—including its “nature, recency, and seriousness”—is a key factor. Id. In that analysis, “[m]ore serious misconduct necessarily weighs more heavily against an exercise of discretion than does less serious misconduct. Therefore, an alien must present ‘additional offsetting favorable evidence’ to counterbalance an adverse factor such as serious criminal activity.” Matter of Sotelo-Sotelo, 23 I&N Dec. 201, 203 (BIA 2001) (en banc) (quoting Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 585 (BIA 1978)). Given the reckless and dangerous nature of the crime of DUI and the limited number of aliens who may be granted cancellation of removal each year, aliens with multiple DUI convictions are likely undeserving of such discretionary relief. Multiple DUI convictions during the relevant period are thus strong evidence that the alien was not a person of good moral character during that time and is ineligible for cancellation of removal. But I do not hold that they are conclusive evidence. There could be an unusual case in which an alien can establish that the multiple convictions were an aberration and can show good moral character. To do so, the respondent must overcome the strong evidence attributable to those multiple convictions by establishing good moral character. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). But a respondent may not make this showing merely by demonstrating that he reformed himself after those convictions by, for instance, addressing a problem with substance abuse. The statute requires that good moral character be shown over the “continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding” the application. INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The alien thus must show that he had good moral character even during the period within which he committed the DUI offenses. An alien’s efforts to reform or rehabilitate himself after multiple DUI convictions are commendable, but they do not themselves demonstrate good moral character during the period that includes the convictions. Absent substantial relevant and credible contrary evidence, multiple DUI convictions require that the immigration judge deny cancellation of removal.

《移民与国籍法》下的酌情救济。C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. at 11。外国人的犯罪记录——包括其“性质、近期性和严重性”——是关键因素。Id. 在该分析中，“[更]严重的失当行为必然比不那么严重的失当行为在权衡是否行使酌情权时权重更大。因此，外国人必须提出‘额外的抵消性有利证据’以平衡严重犯罪活动等不利因素。”Matter of Sotelo-Sotelo, 23 I&N Dec. 201, 203 (BIA 2001) (en banc)（引用 Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 585 (BIA 1978)）。鉴于DUI犯罪的鲁莽和危险性质，以及每年可能获得取消递解的外国人数量有限，有多次DUI定罪的外国人很可能不值得获得此类酌情救济。 因此，相关期间内的多次DUI定罪是外国人在该期间不是具有良好道德品质之人且不符合取消递解资格的强有力证据。但我并不裁定它们是决定性证据。可能存在不寻常的案件，外国人能够证明多次定罪属于反常情况，并能证明良好道德品质。为此，答辩人必须通过证明良好道德品质来克服因这些多次定罪而产生的强有力证据。See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d)。但答辩人不能仅通过证明其在那些定罪之后改过自新（例如解决药物滥用问题）来作出这一证明。法规要求在申请“紧接之前的连续不少于10年期间”内证明良好道德品质。INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)。因此，外国人必须证明其甚至在其实施DUI犯罪的期间内也具有良好道德品质。外国人在多次DUI定罪后努力改过自新或康复值得赞扬，但这些努力本身并不能证明在包括定罪在内的期间内具有良好道德品质。在缺乏实质性相关且可信的相反证据的情况下，多次DUI定罪要求移民法官驳回取消递解。

B. Imposing the foregoing presumption is an appropriate exercise of my authority under the INA. The Attorney General has recognized similar presumptions in the past to channel the discretion of immigration judges and promote the uniform administration of the immigration laws. In Matter of Jean, for example, Attorney General Ashcroft established that aliens who have committed violent or dangerous crimes may not be granted discretionary waivers under section 209(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c),

B. 施加上述推定是我根据《移民与国籍法》行使权力的适当方式。司法部长过去曾承认类似推定，以引导移民法官的酌情权并促进移民法律的统一实施。例如，在Matter of Jean中，司法部长Ashcroft确立：实施暴力或危险犯罪的外国人不得根据《移民与国籍法》第209(c)条、8 U.S.C. § 1159(c)获得酌情豁免，

671

671

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3965

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3965

except in “extraordinary circumstances.” 23 I&N Dec. 373, 383 (2002); see also Mejia v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding a regulation codifying the Matter of Jean presumption). Along the same lines, in Matter of Y-L-, Attorney General Ashcroft concluded that “aggravated felonies involving unlawful trafficking in controlled substances presumptively constitute ‘particularly serious crimes’” for purposes of section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), and that “[o]nly under the most extenuating circumstances that are both extraordinary and compelling would departure from this interpretation be warranted or permissible.” 23 I&N Dec. 270, 274 (2002). The Board also regularly employs rebuttable presumptions. See, e.g., Matter of Valdez, 27 I&N Dec. 496, 499 (2018) (“an alien’s signature on an immigration application establishes a strong presumption that he or she knows the contents of the application and has assented to them”); Matter of Acosta, 27 I&N Dec. 420, 432 (2018) (“once the DHS has established that a respondent has a criminal conviction at the trial level and that the time for filing a direct appeal has passed, a presumption arises that the conviction is final for immigration purposes”). Like those decisions, this opinion recognizes a rebuttable presumption that will promote the consistent application of the immigration laws.

除非存在“特殊情况”。23 I&N Dec. 373, 383 (2002)；see also Mejia v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2007)（维持将Matter of Jean推定编纂为法规的条例）。同样，在Matter of Y-L-中，司法部长Ashcroft认定：“涉及非法贩运受管制物质的加重重罪推定构成《移民与国籍法》第241(b)(3)(B)(ii)条、8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)所指的‘特别严重犯罪’”，且“只有在既特殊又令人信服的最可减轻情节下，偏离这一解释才是有理由或被允许的。”23 I&N Dec. 270, 274 (2002)。 移民上诉委员会也经常采用可反驳的推定。See, e.g., Matter of Valdez, 27 I&N Dec. 496, 499 (2018)（“外国人在移民申请上的签名确立了一项强有力的推定，即其知道申请内容并已同意该内容”）；Matter of Acosta, 27 I&N Dec. 420, 432 (2018)（“一旦DHS确立答辩人在审判层面有刑事定罪且直接上诉期限已过，即产生该定罪就移民目的而言为终局的推定”）。与那些决定一样，本意见承认一项可反驳的推定，该推定将促进移民法律的统一适用。

IV. Under the principles set forth above, the Board’s order vacating the immigration judge’s decision was correct. The respondent’s multiple DUI convictions warrant a presumption that he was not a person of good moral character during the requisite 10-year period and is not eligible for cancellation of removal. Nothing in the record rebuts that presumption. In determining that the respondent’s positive attributes outweighed his criminal history, the immigration judge “place[d] particular weight [on] the respondent’s rehabilitation efforts.” But as noted above, rehabilitative efforts, standing alone, do not overcome the presumption that an alien with multiple DUI convictions is ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board was right to hold that the respondent’s criminal record, along with his “longstanding alcohol abuse and negative immigration history,” foreclosed him from establishing the good moral character required for cancellation of removal. The record shows that the respondent failed to adhere to the community’s moral standards during the decade at issue. The respondent’s failure to satisfy the good moral character requirement forecloses cancellation of removal, and the Board correctly vacated the immigration judge’s decision to grant the respondent relief.

IV. 根据上述原则，移民上诉委员会撤销移民法官决定的命令是正确的。答辩人的多次DUI定罪足以推定其在规定的10年期间内不是具有良好道德品质之人，且不符合取消递解资格。记录中没有任何内容反驳该推定。在认定答辩人的积极特质重于其犯罪历史时，移民法官“特别重视答辩人的康复努力”。但如上所述，仅凭康复努力本身并不能克服有多次DUI定罪的外国人不符合取消递解资格的推定。移民上诉委员会正确地认定，答辩人的犯罪记录连同其“长期酗酒和不良移民历史”使其无法证明取消递解所需的良好道德品质。记录显示，答辩人在所涉十年期间未能遵守社会道德标准。答辩人未能满足良好道德品质要求，这使其无法获得取消递解，移民上诉委员会正确地撤销了移民法官准予答辩人救济的决定。

672

672

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3965

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3965

Congress has required a showing of good moral character as a condition of eligibility for cancellation of removal. A person who consumes drugs or alcohol and then repeatedly gets behind the wheel of a vehicle while impaired demonstrates a character inconsistent with the Nation’s moral standards, because he places not only his life but the lives of innocents on the road in grave danger. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178. An alien’s DUI record is critically important in assessing whether he is eligible for discretionary relief from removal, especially when the alien is seeking to be one of the mere 4,000 aliens who may receive cancellation of removal per year. A record of multiple DUIs should presumptively foreclose this relief. In accordance with the foregoing, I hold that evidence of two or more DUI convictions during the relevant period establishes a presumption that an alien lacks good moral character under INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). Because only aliens who possessed good moral character for a 10-year period are eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), such evidence also presumptively establishes that the alien’s application for that discretionary relief should be denied. The DUI convictions of the respondent in this case establish such a presumption that is not overcome by the respondent’s subsequent efforts at rehabilitation. The Board correctly held that the respondent is ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board’s decision is therefore affirmed. I decline to address in the first instance the respondent’s argument that he is eligible for adjustment of status, without precluding the Board from considering this question on remand in connection with the respondent’s pending request to reopen or reconsider. 3

国会已将证明良好道德品质规定为取消递解资格的条件。一个人消费毒品或酒精后反复在醉酒状态下驾驶车辆，表现出与我国道德标准不符的品格，因为他不仅将自己的生命，而且将道路上无辜者的生命置于严重危险之中。See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178。外国人的DUI记录对于评估其是否符合获得递解酌情救济的资格至关重要，尤其是当该外国人寻求成为每年仅4,000名可获得取消递解的外国人之一时。多次DUI的记录应推定排除此种救济。 根据上述内容，我认定：相关期间内两次或以上DUI定罪的证据确立一项推定，即外国人根据《移民与国籍法》第101(f)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)缺乏良好道德品质。由于只有连续10年期间具有良好道德品质的外国人才有资格根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)条、8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)获得取消递解，此类证据也推定确立该外国人对此项酌情救济的申请应予驳回。本案答辩人的DUI定罪确立了这一推定，且答辩人随后的康复努力未能克服该推定。移民上诉委员会正确地认定答辩人不符合取消递解资格。因此，移民上诉委员会的决定予以维持。我拒绝在一审中处理答辩人关于其符合调整身份资格的主张，但不阻止移民上诉委员会在发回重审时结合答辩人待决的重新开案或重新考虑请求审议此问题。3

3 I note, however, that adjustment of status is similarly a discretionary benefit that may be granted to an applicant who meets general statutory qualifications. See INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Although not specifically at issue here, any decision to grant or deny adjustment of status, or a remand to pursue an application for adjustment of status, should include a careful analysis of whether an applicant with multiple DUI convictions merits such relief as a matter of discretion.

3 但我注意到，调整身份同样是一项酌情福利，可以授予符合一般法定资格的申请人。See INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)。尽管此处并非具体争议点，但任何准予或拒绝调整身份的决定，或为寻求调整身份申请而发回重审的决定，都应仔细分析有多次DUI定罪的申请人是否在酌情权上值得获得此类救济。

673

673