Matter of Kelechi Gerald Nwozuzu

Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2008) Interim Decision #3621

引用为 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2008) 临时决定 #3621

File A046 651 723 - York

案卷 A046 651 723 - York

Decided September 10, 2008

2008年9月10日裁定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

To obtain derivative citizenship under former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1994), an alien must acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence while he or she is under the age of 18 years.

要依据《移民与国籍法》前第321(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1994)，取得派生公民身份，外国人必须在其未满18岁时取得合法永久居民身份。

FOR RESPONDENT: Troy J. Mattes, Esquire, Lancaster, Pennsylvania

被申请人代理律师：Troy J. Mattes 律师，宾夕法尼亚州兰开斯特

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Jon D. Staples, Assistant Chief Counsel

国土安全部代理：Jon D. Staples，助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: COLE, PAULEY, and HESS, Board Members.

审理法官：委员会合议庭成员 COLE、PAULEY 和 HESS。

PAULEY, Board Member:

PAULEY，委员会成员：

In a decision dated October 6, 2006, an Immigration Judge terminated the proceedings against the respondent, finding that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) failed to meet its burden of establishing the respondent’s alienage. The DHS has appealed from the Immigration Judge’s decision. 1 The appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings.

在2006年10月6日的决定中，一名移民法官终止了对被申请人的程序，认定国土安全部（“DHS”）未能履行证明被申请人外国人身份的举证责任。DHS 对该移民法官的决定提出上诉。1 上诉将获支持，案卷将发回移民法官进一步审理。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. 事实与程序历史

The respondent is a native and citizen of Nigeria who was born on March 8, 1977. He first entered the United States in 1982 at the age of 4 as the child of an F-1 nonimmigrant student. His father became a naturalized citizen of the United States on October 4, 1994, and his mother was naturalized on November 15, 1994. The respondent was 17 years old when his parents naturalized, but he was not admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident until December 1998, well after his 18th birthday.

被申请人是尼日利亚国民和公民，出生于1977年3月8日。他于1982年4岁时作为 F-1 非移民学生的子女首次进入美国。其父亲于1994年10月4日成为美国归化公民，其母亲于1994年11月15日归化。被申请人父母归化时他17岁，但他直到1998年12月才被接纳为美国合法永久居民，远在其18岁生日之后。

1 Although the Immigration Judge has also certified his decision for our review, we review the decision on appeal rather than on certification.

1 尽管移民法官也将其决定移送本委员会审查，我们审查的是上诉中的决定，而非移送审查的决定。

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Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2008) Interim Decision #3621

引用为 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2008) 临时决定 #3621

The respondent claims that he is entitled to derivative citizenship through his parents pursuant to former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1994), because he began to “reside permanently” in the United States while he was under the age of 18 years. The Immigration Judge agreed and found that although the respondent was not “residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent last naturalized,” he had submitted sufficient evidence to show that he began “to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years.” Section 321(a)(5) of the Act. The Immigration Judge therefore found that the DHS had not met its burden of establishing the respondent’s alienage and terminated the proceedings. On appeal, the DHS contends that the Immigration Judge erred in finding that the respondent had derived citizenship through his parents under former section 321(a) of the Act. Specifically, the DHS claims that the Immigration Judge erred in finding that the respondent had “resided permanently” in the United States while he was under the age of 18, because he had not been admitted as a lawful permanent resident during that time. The DHS maintains that an alien can derive citizenship pursuant to former section 321(a) of the Act only if three things occur while the alien is under the age of 18: (1) the naturalization of both parents, (2) the residence or presence of the alien in the United States, and (3) the lawful admission of the alien as a permanent resident. According to the DHS, interpreting the statute to allow the acquisition of citizenship when an alien has less than lawful permanent resident status essentially nullifies that portion of section 321(a)(5) that does require lawful permanent resident status. Moreover, the DHS contends that the fact that the language of former section 321(a)(5) tracks section 101(a)(20) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006), which defines the term “lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” demonstrates that Congress intended to require lawful permanent residence in both portions of section 321(a)(5). Therefore the DHS claims that the Immigration Judge’s ruling should be vacated and that the record should be remanded for further proceedings. 2

被申请人主张，他有权依据《移民与国籍法》前第321(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1994)，通过其父母取得派生公民身份，因为他在未满18岁时开始在美国“永久居住”。移民法官同意并认定，尽管被申请人并非“在最后归化的父母归化时依据合法永久居民接纳而在美国居住”，但他已提交充分证据表明他在“未满18岁时开始在美国永久居住”。《法》第321(a)(5)条。因此，移民法官认定 DHS 未能履行证明被申请人外国人身份的举证责任，并终止了程序。 在上诉中，DHS 主张移民法官错误地认定被申请人依据《法》前第321(a)条通过其父母取得了公民身份。具体而言，DHS 主张移民法官错误地认定被申请人在未满18岁时在美国“永久居住”，因为他在该期间并未被接纳为合法永久居民。 DHS 主张，外国人只有在外国人未满18岁时发生三件事，才能依据《法》前第321(a)条取得公民身份：(1) 父母双方归化，(2) 外国人在美国的居住或存在，以及 (3) 外国人被合法接纳为永久居民。据 DHS 称，将法规解释为允许外国人在不具有合法永久居民身份时取得公民身份，实质上使第321(a)(5)条中确实要求合法永久居民身份的那部分规定归于无效。此外，DHS 主张，前第321(a)(5)条的措辞与《法》第101(a)(20)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006)（该条定义了“合法接纳为永久居民”一词）相一致，这表明国会意图在第321(a)(5)条的两个部分都要求合法永久居民身份。因此，DHS 主张应撤销移民法官的裁定，并将案卷发回进一步审理。2

2 The DHS also claims that even if former section 321(a)(5) of the Act allows something less than lawful permanent resident status, the respondent has not shown that he meets this lesser requirement. Because we find that the statute does require lawful permanent resident status, it is unnecessary to address the DHS’s alternate argument. We also find no need to remand for consideration of the new evidence the DHS has offered, which relates to the date on which the respondent filed his first application for adjustment of status. The parties did not dispute this date before the Immigration Judge, and the new evidence does not appear to impact the outcome of the proceedings before us.

2 DHS 还主张，即使《法》前第321(a)(5)条允许低于合法永久居民身份的情况，被申请人也未表明他符合这一较低要求。由于我们认定该法规确实要求合法永久居民身份，因此无需处理 DHS 的替代论点。我们还认为无需发回考虑 DHS 提供的新证据，该证据涉及被申请人提交其第一份调整身份申请的日期。双方在移民法官面前对该日期并无争议，且新证据似乎不影响本委员会面前程序的结果。

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Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2008) Interim Decision #3621

引用为 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2008) 临时决定 #3621

The respondent, on the other hand, contends that the Immigration Judge acted properly in terminating the proceedings. He maintains that the second half of former section 321(a)(5) of the Act does not require that a child be “residing” in the United States “lawfully” or with some form of authorized residence prior to his 18th birthday. Moreover, he argues that Congress would not have included the second clause in section 321(a)(5) unless it intended for something less than lawful permanent resident status to satisfy the requirements for derivative citizenship. Accordingly, he claims that his evidence shows that he resided here permanently for purposes of establishing that he is entitled to derivative citizenship.

另一方面，被申请人主张移民法官终止程序的行为适当。他主张，《法》前第321(a)(5)条的后半部分并不要求子女在其18岁生日之前“合法”或凭某种形式的授权居留而在美国“居住”。此外，他主张，除非国会意图让低于合法永久居民身份的情况满足派生公民身份的要求，否则不会在第321(a)(5)条中加入第二句。因此，他主张其证据表明他永久居住于此，足以证明他有权取得派生公民身份。

II. STATUTE

II. 法规

Former section 321(a) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

《法》前第321(a)条的相关部分规定如下：

A child born outside the United States of alien parents, or of an alien parent and a citizen parent who has subsequently lost citizenship of the United States, becomes a citizen of the United States upon fulfillment of the following conditions: (1) The naturalization of both parents; . . . . . . . . . and if (4) Such naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen years; and (5) Such child is residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent last naturalized under clause (1) of this subsection . . . or thereafter begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years. 3

在美国境外出生、父母为外国人，或父母一方为外国人、另一方为后来丧失美国公民身份的美国公民的子女，在满足以下条件后成为美国公民： (1) 父母双方归化；…… …… ……并且如果 (4) 该归化发生在该子女未满18岁时；以及 (5) 该子女在最后依据本款第(1)项归化的父母归化时依据合法永久居民接纳而在美国居住……或此后在未满18岁时开始在美国永久居住。3

III. ISSUE

III. 争点

Both parties agree that the respondent’s parents naturalized while he was under 18 years of age. The parties also agree that the respondent was not residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of his mother, his last parent to naturalize. The key issue, then, is whether the respondent began to “reside permanently” in the United States while under the age of 18 years. To resolve

双方均同意被申请人的父母在其未满18岁时归化。双方还同意，被申请人在其母亲（最后归化的父母）归化时并非依据合法永久居民接纳而在美国居住。因此，关键问题是被申请人是否在未满18岁时开始在美国“永久居住”。为解决

3 Former section 321 of the Act was repealed by section 103(a) of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631, 1632. However, the statute still applies to the respondent because it was the law in effect both when he turned 18 and when he was admitted as a lawful permanent resident. See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. 153 (BIA 2001) (finding that the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 is not retroactive); Matter of L-, 7 I&N Dec. 512 (R.C. 1957) (noting that determinations involving derivative citizenship are controlled by the law in effect when the last material condition is met).

3 《法》前第321条已被《2000年儿童公民法》第103(a)条，Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631, 1632 废止。然而，该法规仍适用于被申请人，因为它在他年满18岁时以及他被接纳为合法永久居民时均为有效法律。参见，例如，Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. 153 (BIA 2001)（认定《2000年儿童公民法》不具有溯及力）；Matter of L-, 7 I&N Dec. 512 (R.C. 1957)（指出涉及派生公民身份的裁定受最后实质性条件满足时有效法律的支配）。

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引用为 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2008) 临时决定 #3621

this question, we must determine whether the phrase “begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years” in former section 321(a)(5) of the Act allows an alien to derive citizenship while in a status other than lawful permanent resident status. Because we find that it does not, we will sustain the DHS’s appeal.

这一问题，我们必须确定《法》前第321(a)(5)条中“在未满18岁时开始在美国永久居住”一语是否允许外国人在非合法永久居民身份下取得派生公民身份。由于我们认定不允许，我们将支持 DHS 的上诉。

IV. ANALYSIS

IV. 分析

Our interpretation of the phrase “begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years” starts with the terms of the statute itself. If these terms constitute a plain expression of congressional intent on their face, then they must be given effect. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). But when Congress’s intent is not plainly expressed, we must find a reasonable interpretation of the language and fill any gap left, either implicitly or explicitly. Id. at 843-44. The rules of statutory construction dictate that we take into account the design of the statute as a whole. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). Moreover, we must bear in mind that the paramount index of congressional intent is the plain meaning of the words used in the statute when they are taken as a whole. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987). Section 321 of the Act does not define the phrase “reside permanently,” and both the definition put forth by the respondent and that proposed by the DHS are plausible if the terms “reside” and “permanently” are considered in the abstract. However, we must consider the terms in the context of the Act as a whole. To do so, we must interpret the definitions of the terms “permanent,” “residence,” and “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” in section 101(a) of the Act, the structure of former section 321(a) of the Act, and the concept of permanent residence under the immigration laws. Taking these factors into consideration, we find that the phrase “begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years” is most reasonably interpreted to mean that an alien must obtain the status of lawful permanent resident while under the age of 18 years to acquire derivative citizenship. Section 101(a)(31) of the Act states that the term “permanent” “means a relationship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent even though it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the individual, in accordance with law.” The word “permanent” is also defined as “[l]asting or meant to last indefinitely,” “enduring,” and “[n]ot expected to change in status, condition, or place.” Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 875 (1994). Both of these definitions indicate that something is “permanent” if it is lasting or is at least intended to last indefinitely.

我们对“在未满18岁时开始在美国永久居留”这一表述的解释，始于该法条本身的用语。如果这些用语在字面上构成国会意图的明确表达，则必须赋予其效力。参见Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)。但当国会的意图未被明确表达时，我们必须为该语言寻找合理的解释，并填补隐含或明示留下的任何空白。同上，第843-44页。法条解释规则要求我们考虑整部法律的设计。K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)。此外，我们必须牢记，国会意图的首要指标是法律所用词语作为整体理解时的平实含义。参见INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)。 该法第321条并未界定“永久居留”这一表述，而如果将“居留”和“永久”这两个词作抽象考虑，被上诉人提出的定义与DHS提出的定义都言之成理。然而，我们必须结合整部法律来考虑这些用语。为此，我们必须解释该法第101(a)条中“永久”、“居留”和“合法获准永久居留”等术语的定义、原第321(a)条的结构，以及移民法下永久居留的概念。综合考虑这些因素，我们认为“在未满18岁时开始在美国永久居留”这一表述最合理的解释是，外国人必须在未满18岁时取得合法永久居民身份，才能获得派生公民身份。 该法第101(a)(31)条规定，“永久”一词“指持续或持久性质的关系，与临时相区别，但即使该关系最终可能应美国或个人的请求依法解除，该关系仍可以是永久的”。“永久”一词也被定义为“[持]久或意在无限期持续”、“持久”以及“[预]期在身份、状况或地点上不会改变”。Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 875 (1994)。这两项定义都表明，某事物如果持久或至少意在无限期持续，即为“永久”。

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Section 101(a)(33) of the Act states that the term “residence” means “the place of general abode; the place of general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent.” The concept of “residing permanently” would therefore seem to require the maintenance of a lasting principal dwelling place. At first glance, it might appear that an alien could maintain a lasting principal dwelling place without obtaining lawful permanent resident status. A dwelling place, however, cannot be “permanent” or lasting under the immigration laws if it is unauthorized. An alien who entered this country illegally or remains without authorization might maintain a home or residence here, but there is no guarantee that he or she will be able to do so for any length of time. 4 The concept of “residing permanently” therefore includes an implied requirement that the residence be lawful. An alien cannot reside in this country in a permanent, lasting sense unless the residence is lawful. Similarly, an alien admitted for a temporary period cannot be considered to be residing permanently in this country, even if he or she maintains lawful status. Accordingly, we find that the phrase “begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years,” when considered in light of the definitions of “permanent” and “residence” and the realities of the immigration laws of this country, is most reasonably interpreted to mean that the alien must acquire lawful permanent resident status while under the age of 18 years. This finding is bolstered by the similarity between the language contained in the phrase “begins to reside permanently” and that in the definition of “lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” which means “the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.” Section 101(a)(20) of the Act (emphasis added). As the DHS notes, the “residing permanently” language of section 101(a)(20) closely tracks the phrase “begins to reside permanently” that Congress employed in former section 321(a)(5) of the Act. This similarity strongly

该法第101(a)(33)条规定，“居留”一词指“一般住所地；个人的一般住所地指其主要的、实际的事实居住地，不考虑意图”。因此，“永久居留”的概念似乎要求维持一个持久的主要居住地。乍看之下，外国人似乎可以在未取得合法永久居民身份的情况下维持一个持久的主要居住地。然而，根据移民法，如果居住地未经授权，就不能是“永久的”或持久的。 非法进入我国或未经授权滞留的外国人可能在此维持住所或居所，但无法保证他或她能够在一段时间内这样做。4 因此，“永久居留”的概念包含一项隐含要求，即居留必须是合法的。除非居留合法，外国人不能以永久、持久的意义在我国居留。同样，获准临时入境的外国人不能被视为在我国永久居留，即使他或她维持合法身份。据此，我们认为，结合“永久”和“居留”的定义以及我国移民法的现实来考虑，“在未满18岁时开始在美国永久居留”这一表述最合理的解释是，外国人必须在未满18岁时取得合法永久居民身份。 这一认定得到以下事实的支持：“开始永久居留”这一表述中的语言与“合法获准永久居留”定义中的语言相似，后者指“作为移民依照移民法被合法赋予在美国永久居留特权的身份，该身份未发生改变”。该法第101(a)(20)条（着重号为后加）。正如DHS所指出的，第101(a)(20)条中“永久居留”的用语与国会在原第321(a)(5)条中使用的“开始永久居留”这一表述密切对应。这种相似性强烈

4 The definition of the term “permanent” in section 101(a)(31) of the Act does acknowledge that a permanent relationship “may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the individual, in accordance with law,” but this dissolution is distinct from the termination of an alien’s unlawful presence. An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence is guaranteed that status, provided he or she complies with the laws of this country. Thus, an alien will lose permanent resident status only if he or she violates the law or voluntarily elects to abandon the status. An alien residing in this country without authorization, on the other hand, may be required to leave at any time.

4 该法第101(a)(31)条中“永久”一词的定义确实承认，永久关系“最终可能应美国或个人的请求依法解除”，但这种解除与外国人非法居留的终止不同。合法获准永久居留的外国人只要遵守我国法律，其身份即得到保障。因此，外国人只有在违反法律或自愿选择放弃身份时才会失去永久居民身份。另一方面，未经授权在我国居留的外国人可能随时被要求离境。

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Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2008) Interim Decision #3621

引用为 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2008) 临时决定 #3621

suggests that Congress intended to impose a requirement that an alien must obtain lawful permanent residence before the age of 18 to acquire derivative citizenship. 5 Interpreting the second clause of section 321(a)(5) of the Act as requiring an alien to have lawful permanent resident status before the age of 18 does not render it surplusage, as the Immigration Judge implied. When read to require lawful permanent residence, the second clause clarifies that an alien does not have to be a lawful permanent resident at the time his or her parent naturalizes to qualify for derivative citizenship. Instead, it establishes that as long as the alien is admitted as a lawful permanent resident before he or she turns 18, citizenship may be derived from a naturalized parent. Therefore, the second clause is not surplusage but is necessary to explain the time by which the lawful permanent residence requirement of section 321(a)(5) must be satisfied. On the other hand, if we were to allow something less than lawful permanent residence to satisfy the requirements for derivative citizenship, the second clause would effectively negate the lawful permanent residence requirement of the first clause. An alien would rarely if ever need to be “residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence” because he or she could simply show that some lesser form of residence was “thereafter” acquired before the alien reached the age of 18. We cannot conclude that Congress intended this result. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (stating that it is a court’s “duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute’” (quoting Inhabitants of Montclair Tp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))); see also 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 104 (4th ed. 1984) (indicating that a statute or regulation should be construed to give effect to all its provisions so that no part of it will be inoperative, superfluous, void, or insignificant). Accordingly, we find that the second clause of former section 321(a)(5) of the Act is most reasonably read to require that an alien must acquire lawful permanent resident status while he or she is under the age of 18 years. In reaching our conclusion, we note that this interpretation of section 321(a)(5) is not inconsistent with the historical approach to derivative citizenship. Federal court cases reviewing earlier versions of the Act that used

表明国会意图施加一项要求，即外国人必须在未满18岁前取得合法永久居留权，才能获得派生公民身份。5 将该法第321(a)(5)条第二句解释为要求外国人在未满18岁前具有合法永久居民身份，并不像移民法官所暗示的那样使其成为多余内容。当被解读为要求合法永久居留时，第二句澄清了外国人不必在其父母归化时已是合法永久居民才有资格获得派生公民身份。相反，它确立的是，只要外国人在年满18岁前获准成为合法永久居民，即可从归化的父母处派生公民身份。因此，第二句并非多余，而是解释第321(a)(5)条合法永久居留要求必须得到满足的时间所必需的。 另一方面，如果我们允许以低于合法永久居留的条件来满足派生公民身份的要求，第二句实际上将否定第一句的合法永久居留要求。外国人将很少甚至永远不需要“依照合法获准永久居留而在美国居留”，因为他或她只需表明在年满18岁之前“此后”取得了某种较低形式的居留即可。我们不能认定国会意图产生这一结果。参见United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)（指出法院有“义务‘在可能的情况下赋予法律每一条款和每一词语效力’”（引用Inhabitants of Montclair Tp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)））；另见2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 104 (4th ed. 1984)（指出法律或法规应被解释为使其所有条款均产生效力，从而其任何部分都不会失效、多余、无效或无意义）。据此，我们认为原第321(a)(5)条第二句最合理的解读是要求外国人必须在其未满18岁时取得合法永久居民身份。 在得出我们的结论时，我们注意到，对第321(a)(5)条的这一解释与派生公民身份的历史处理方式并不矛盾。审查该法早期版本、使用了

5 The respondent suggests that Congress’s use of the phrase “begins to reside permanently” in the second clause of section 321(a)(5), rather than a phrase specifically including the lawful permanent residence requirement, implies that it intended to allow something less than lawful permanent residence. However, the similarity in language between the second clause and section 101(a)(20) strongly indicates that Congress intended to carry the lawful permanent residence requirement into the second clause, whose phraseology is best explained as a shorthand reference to the requirement of the first clause.

5 被上诉人提出，国会在第321(a)(5)条第二句中使用了“开始永久居留”这一表述，而非明确包含合法永久居留要求的表述，这暗示其意图允许低于合法永久居留的条件。然而，第二句与第101(a)(20)条在语言上的相似性强烈表明，国会意图将合法永久居留要求纳入第二句，该句的措辞最好解释为对第一句要求的简略指代。

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引用为 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2008) 临时决定 #3621

the phrases “dwelling in the United States” or “begins to reside permanently in the United States” found that, at the very least, an alien had to be lawfully admitted to this country before he or she could be considered to be dwelling or residing here permanently. See Schneider v. U.S. INS, 65 F. Supp. 377, 379-80 (D. Wash. 1946); United States ex rel. Goldman v. Tod, 3 F.2d 836, 838-40 (N.D.N.Y. 1924). Moreover, in Matter of T-, 7 I&N Dec. 679 (R.C. 1958), the regional commissioner implied that former section 321 of the Act required lawful permanent residence. Id. at 680-81 (stating that “[o]ne of the conditions of section 321 set forth in subsection 5 is that the child must begin to reside permanently in the United States or must have been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence while under the age of 16 years” and finding that the alien in that case “was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, which accorded her the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant”). In Matter of C-, 8 I&N Dec. 421, 422 (R.C. 1959), the regional commissioner also stated that “[l]awful permanent residence has always been a prerequisite to derivative citizenship.” Morever, our ruling is not controlled by the statements of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Ashton v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2005), which was cited by the Immigration Judge and the respondent. In that case the Second Circuit found that Ashton did not meet the requirements for derivative citizenship under former section 321(a) of the Act because his subjective intent to reside permanently in the United States, coupled with his presence here, was not sufficient to establish that he began to reside permanently in the United States while he was under the age of 18 years. Id. at 98. The court went on to express doubts regarding the Government’s contentions that section 321(a)(5) required lawful permanent residence but concluded its discussion of this issue by stating that “[u]ltimately, the proper interpretation of INA § 321(a) is a question we need not reach.” Id. at 99. Therefore the court did not specifically hold that the conditions of section 321(a) can be satisfied by something other than lawful permanent residence. Even if the Second Circuit had reached this issue, however, its ruling would not be binding on us because the respondent’s case arises within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit, and because Ashton did not purport to treat the statute as unambiguous. See Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25 (BIA 1989) (stating that we historically follow the precedent of the circuit in which a case arises); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (finding that a court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction that is otherwise entitled to

“居住在美国”或“开始在美国永久居住”等短语的认定是，外国人至少必须被合法准许进入美国，然后才能被视为在美国居住或永久居住。见 Schneider v. U.S. INS, 65 F. Supp. 377, 379-80 (D. Wash. 1946)；United States ex rel. Goldman v. Tod, 3 F.2d 836, 838-40 (N.D.N.Y. 1924)。此外，在 Matter of T-, 7 I&N Dec. 679 (R.C. 1958) 中，区域专员暗示该法原第321条要求合法永久居留。Id. at 680-81（称“第5款所规定的第321条条件之一是，子女必须开始在美国永久居住，或者必须在16岁以下时被合法准许进入美国永久居留”，并认定该案中的外国人“被合法准许进入美国永久居留，这赋予其作为移民在美国永久居住的特权”）。在 Matter of C-, 8 I&N Dec. 421, 422 (R.C. 1959) 中，区域专员还称“合法永久居留一直是派生公民身份的前提条件”。 此外，我们的裁决不受美国第二巡回上诉法院在 Ashton v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2005) 中陈述的约束，该案被移民法官和答辩人援引。在该案中，第二巡回法院认定，Ashton 不符合该法原第321(a)条规定的派生公民身份要求，因为其在美国永久居住的主观意图，加上其在美国境内的实际存在，不足以证明其在18岁以下时开始在美国永久居住。Id. at 98。法院接着对政府关于第321(a)(5)条要求合法永久居留的主张表示怀疑，但通过声明“最终，对 INA § 321(a) 的正确解释是一个我们无需触及的问题”结束了对此问题的讨论。Id. at 99。因此，法院并未明确裁定第321(a)条的条件可以通过合法永久居留以外的方式满足。 然而，即使第二巡回法院触及了这一问题，其裁决也不会对我们具有约束力，因为答辩人的案件发生在第三巡回法院的管辖范围内，而且 Ashton 并未将该法规视为含义明确。见 Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25 (BIA 1989)（称我们历来遵循案件发生所在巡回法院的先例）；另见 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)（认定法院先前对法规的司法解释优先于原本有权获得

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引用为 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2008) 临时决定 #3621

deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra, only if the prior court decision holds that the construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion).

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra 项下尊重的机构解释，但前提是先前法院判决认定该解释源自法规的明确条款，从而没有给机构留下自由裁量空间）。

V. CONCLUSION

V. 结论

In conclusion, we find that to satisfy former section 321(a)(5) of the Act and obtain derivative citizenship, an alien must acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence while he or she is under 18 years of age. The respondent did not meet this requirement. He therefore does not qualify for derivative citizenship and appears to be subject to removal proceedings. Accordingly, the DHS’s appeal from the Immigration Judge’s decision terminating the proceedings against the respondent will be sustained, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for completion of removal proceedings. ORDER: The appeal of the Department of Homeland Security is sustained, the decision of the Immigration Judge is vacated, and the removal proceedings against the respondent are reinstated. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.

总之，我们认定，为满足该法原第321(a)(5)条并获得派生公民身份，外国人必须在18岁以下时取得合法准许永久居留的外国人身份。答辩人未满足这一要求。因此，其不符合派生公民身份资格，并似乎应受驱逐程序约束。据此，DHS 对移民法官终止针对答辩人程序的决定所提出的上诉将获支持，案件记录将发回移民法官以完成驱逐程序。 命令：国土安全部的上诉获支持，移民法官的决定被撤销，针对答辩人的驱逐程序恢复。 进一步命令：案件记录发回移民法官，以便按照上述意见进行进一步程序并作出新决定。

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