Matter of Patricia Pinzon

Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 189 (BIA 2013) Interim Decision #3791

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 189 (BIA 2013) 临时决定 #3791

Decided August 19, 2013

2013年8月19日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室

Board of Immigration Appeals

移民上诉委员会

(1) An alien who enters the United States by falsely claiming United States citizenship is

(1) 通过虚假声称美国公民身份进入美国的外国人

not deemed to have been inspected by an immigration officer, so the entry is not an “admission” under section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012).

不被视为已接受移民官员检查，因此该入境不构成《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(13)(A)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012) 所指的“入境”

(2) The offense of knowingly and willfully making any materially false, fictitious, or

(2) 明知且故意作出任何重大虚假、虚构或

fraudulent statement to obtain a United States passport in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006) is a crime involving moral turpitude.

欺诈性陈述以获取美国护照，违反18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006) 的罪行，属于涉及道德败坏的犯罪。

FOR RESPONDENT: Linda Osberg-Braun, Esquire, Miami, Florida

被申请人代理律师：Linda Osberg-Braun, Esquire, Miami, Florida

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Margaret Nocero, Assistant Chief Counsel

国土安全部代理律师：Margaret Nocero, Assistant Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: GRANT, MALPHRUS, and MULLANE, Board Member.

审理：Board Panel: GRANT, MALPHRUS, and MULLANE, Board Member。

GRANT, Board Member:

GRANT, Board Member：

In a decision dated March 28, 2008, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable, pretermitted her application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006), and granted her request for voluntary departure. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has filed a cross-appeal from the Immigration Judge’s grant of voluntary departure. The respondent’s appeal will be dismissed. The DHS’s appeal will be sustained and the respondent will be ordered removed from the United States.

在2008年3月28日的决定中，一名移民法官认定被申请人可被驱逐，预先驳回了她根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)(1)条、8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006) 提出的取消驱逐申请，并批准了她的自愿离境请求。被申请人对该决定提出上诉。国土安全部（“DHS”）对移民法官批准自愿离境提出交叉上诉。被申请人的上诉将被驳回。DHS的上诉将获支持，被申请人将被命令驱逐出美国。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. 事实与程序历史

It is undisputed that the respondent is a native and citizen of Venezuela who first entered the United States in 1982 with a student visa. In 1985, she was issued a United States passport, which she applied for by presenting a false birth certificate from Florida. In 1997, the respondent applied for and was issued a renewal of the passport through the mail.

无争议的是，被申请人是委内瑞拉国民和公民，于1982年持学生签证首次进入美国。1985年，她通过提交佛罗里达州的虚假出生证明申请并获得美国护照。1997年，被申请人通过邮寄申请并获得了护照续期。

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According to the Immigration Judge, the respondent also falsely represented that she was a United States citizen when she registered to vote.

根据移民法官的说法，被申请人在登记投票时还虚假声称自己是美国公民。

The respondent last entered the United States on August 20, 2001, by presenting the United States passport that she procured with a false birth certificate. She was subsequently convicted in November 2002 of knowingly and willfully making false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements and representations to the Department of State in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2000). The respondent was placed in removal proceedings and was charged under sections 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (6)(A)(i), (C)(i), and (ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (6)(A)(i), (C)(i), and (ii) (2006), as an alien who was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, who was present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, who has procured immigration benefits by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact, and who has made a false claim of United States citizenship, respectively.

被申请人最后一次进入美国是在2001年8月20日，通过出示她以虚假出生证明获取的美国护照。她随后于2002年11月被判定明知且故意向国务院作出虚假、虚构或欺诈性陈述和表示，违反18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2000)。被申请人被置于驱逐程序中，并分别根据该法第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)、(6)(A)(i)、(C)(i)和(ii)条、8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)、(6)(A)(i)、(C)(i)和(ii) (2006) 被指控为：因涉及道德败坏的犯罪而被定罪的外国人、未经入境或假释而身在美国的外国人、通过欺诈或对重大事实的故意虚假陈述获取移民利益的外国人，以及虚假声称美国公民身份的外国人。

The Immigration Judge sustained all charges of removability against the respondent. He also pretermitted her application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, finding that she could not establish 10 years of continuous physical presence because of her commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. He further concluded that she was barred from showing statutory eligibility based on her conviction. However, the Immigration Judge granted her request for voluntary departure.

移民法官维持了对被申请人的所有驱逐指控。他还预先驳回了她根据该法第240A(b)(1)条提出的取消驱逐申请，认定由于她实施了涉及道德败坏的犯罪，她无法证明连续实际居住10年。他进一步认定，基于她的定罪，她不得显示法定资格。然而，移民法官批准了她的自愿离境请求。

On appeal, the respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred in sustaining the charges of inadmissibility against her under section 212(a) of the Act, because she should have been charged instead as a deportable alien under section 237(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006). The respondent also challenges the Immigration Judge’s decision to pretermit her application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, contesting his determination that she was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The DHS has appealed from the Immigration Judge’s decision to grant the respondent voluntary departure.

在上诉中，被申请人主张移民法官维持根据该法第212(a)条对她提出的不可入境指控有误，因为她本应改为根据该法第237(a)条、8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006) 被指控为可驱逐的外国人。被申请人还质疑移民法官根据该法第240A(b)(1)条预先驳回其取消驱逐申请的决定，争议其认定她因涉及道德败坏的犯罪而被定罪。DHS对移民法官批准被申请人自愿离境的决定提出上诉。

II. ANALYSIS

II. 分析

A. Admission

A. 入境

There is no meaningful dispute regarding the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent last entered the country on August 20, 2001, by presenting a United States passport that she procured by submitting a false birth certificate from Florida. Contrary to the respondent’s assertions, her initial lawful entry into the United States with a student visa in 1982 did not

对于移民法官认定被申请人于2001年8月20日通过出示她以提交佛罗里达州虚假出生证明获取的美国护照最后一次进入该国，不存在有意义的争议。与被申请人的主张相反，她1982年持学生签证首次合法进入美国并未

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convert her subsequent reentries into the country, which were facilitated by the presentation of her United States passport, into “admissions.” See section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012) (providing that the term “admission” means “the lawful entry of [an] alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer”).

使她随后通过出示美国护照而便利的再入境转变为“入境”。见该法第101(a)(13)(A)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012)（规定“入境”一词指“外国人在移民官员检查和授权后合法进入美国”）。

Subsequent to the Immigration Judge’s decision, we held in Matter of Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. 285, 290 (BIA 2010), that an alien is “admitted” pursuant to section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act if his or her entry is shown to have been procedurally regular, that is, “the alien underwent an inspection by an immigration officer, who subsequently admitted the alien.” However, in that decision, we also reaffirmed Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308, 309 n.3 (BIA 1980), where we stated that an alien who gains admission to the United States upon a knowing false claim to citizenship cannot be deemed to have been “inspected and admitted.”

在移民法官决定之后，我们在 Matter of Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. 285, 290 (BIA 2010) 中认定，如果外国人的入境被证明在程序上是规范的，即“该外国人接受了移民官员的检查，该官员随后准许该外国人入境”，则该外国人根据该法第101(a)(13)(A)条被视为“入境”。然而，在该决定中，我们还重申了 Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308, 309 n.3 (BIA 1980)，其中我们指出，通过明知虚假声称公民身份而获得入境美国的外国人，不能被视为已“接受检查并入境”。

The Supreme Court has recognized that a United States citizen is not subject to the same scrutiny and requirements as an alien during the process of inspection and admission. Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619, 624–25 (1975). Immigration authorities more closely examine the right of aliens to enter the country and they require and obtain information and records, such as fingerprints and registration forms, to help keep track of aliens who have been admitted after they have entered the country. Id. at 625. Aliens who enter by falsely claiming to be a United States citizen significantly frustrate the process for inspecting incoming aliens and effectively put themselves in a position that is “comparable to that of a person who slips over the border and who has, therefore, clearly not been inspected.” Id. (quoting Goon Mee Heung v. INS, 380 F.2d 236, 237 (1st Cir. 1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

最高法院已确认，美国公民在检查和入境过程中不受与外国人相同的审查和要求。Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619, 624–25 (1975)。移民当局更仔细地审查外国人进入该国的权利，并要求并获得信息和记录，如指纹和登记表，以帮助跟踪已入境的外国人入境后的情况。Id. at 625。通过虚假声称美国公民身份入境的外国人严重阻碍了检查入境外国人的程序，并实际上将自己置于“与偷越边境、因而显然未经检查的人相当”的地位。Id.（引用 Goon Mee Heung v. INS, 380 F.2d 236, 237 (1st Cir. 1967)）（内部引号省略）。

Moreover, we noted in Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. at 293, that an immigration officer is not empowered to inspect a United States citizen in the same manner as an alien. Acknowledging this difference in treatment between citizens and aliens, we held there that an alien who entered the United States under a false claim of United States citizenship cannot be considered to have been inspected. Id. (citing Reid v. INS, 492 F.2d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 1974); Matter of S-, 9 I&N Dec. 599, 600 (BIA 1962)).

此外，我们在 Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. at 293 中指出，移民官员无权以与外国人相同的方式检查美国公民。承认公民与外国人之间的这种待遇差异，我们在该案中认定，通过虚假声称美国公民身份进入美国的外国人不能被视为已接受检查。Id.（引用 Reid v. INS, 492 F.2d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 1974); Matter of S-, 9 I&N Dec. 599, 600 (BIA 1962)）。

We find no reason to diverge from the long-standing rule that an alien who enters the United States by falsely claiming United States citizenship effectively eludes the procedural regularity of inspection by an immigration officer. See Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. at 624–25; Matter of F-, 9 I&N Dec. 54 (Reg’l Comm’r, Ass’t Comm’r 1960) (“It is well established that aliens who knowingly made a false claim to United States citizenship for the purpose of evading inspection under the immigration laws gained entry

我们认为没有理由偏离长期规则，即通过虚假声称美国公民身份进入美国的外国人实际上规避了移民官员检查的程序规范性。见 Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. at 624–25; Matter of F-, 9 I&N Dec. 54 (Reg’l Comm’r, Ass’t Comm’r 1960)（“公认的是，为逃避移民法下的检查而明知虚假声称美国公民身份的外国人获得了入境

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without inspection.” (citations omitted)); Matter of E-, 6 I&N Dec. 275 (BIA 1954). We therefore hold that such an entry does not constitute an admission as that term is defined in section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act.

而未经检查。”（引文省略））；Matter of E-, 6 I&N Dec. 275 (BIA 1954)。因此，我们认定此类入境不构成该法第101(a)(13)(A)条所定义的入境。

The Immigration Judge properly denied the respondent’s motion to terminate removal proceedings based on her argument that she should be subject to the deportability grounds under section 237(a) of the Act rather than inadmissibility grounds under section 212(a). Moreover, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent is removable as an alien who is inadmissible under sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i), (C)(i), and (ii) of the Act.

移民法官正确地驳回了被申请人基于其应受该法第237(a)条可驱逐理由而非第212(a)条不可入境理由约束的论点而提出的终止驱逐程序的动议。此外，我们同意移民法官的认定，即被申请人作为根据该法第212(a)(6)(A)(i)、(C)(i)和(ii)条不可入境的外国人，可被驱逐。

B. Crime Involving Moral Turpitude

B. 涉及道德败坏的犯罪

The respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred in pretermitting her application for cancellation of removal based on his finding that her conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. The respondent was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), which, at the time of her 2002 conviction, provided in pertinent part as follows:

被申请人主张，移民法官基于其认定她的定罪属于该法第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条下涉及道德败坏的犯罪而预先驳回其取消驱逐申请有误。被申请人根据18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) 被定罪，该条在她2002年定罪时相关部分规定如下：

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfullyC

(a) 除本条另有规定外，任何人在美国联邦政府行政、立法或司法部门管辖范围内的任何事项中，明知且故意C

. . . (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation . . .

. . . (2) 作出任何重大虚假、虚构或欺诈性陈述或 表示 . . .

. . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

. . . 应依本编处以罚款或不超过5年的监禁，或两者并罚。

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)。

The respondent bears the burden of establishing both that she is not inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act and that she is statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1). 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c)–(d) (2013). She therefore must show that she has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. We have considered the respondent’s arguments and conclude that she has not satisfied her burden of proof.

被申请人承担举证责任，证明她根据该法第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条不可入境美国，并且她根据第240A(b)(1)条具有取消驱逐的法定资格。8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c)–(d) (2013)。因此，她必须证明她未被判定犯有涉及道德败坏的犯罪。我们已考虑被申请人的论点，并认定她未满足其举证责任。

The respondent argues that the minimum conduct required for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) is making a false statement to a Government official, which she contends does not involve moral turpitude. According to the respondent, unlike the act of providing a “fraudulent” statement, making a “false” statement does not involve moral turpitude

被申请人主张，根据18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) 定罪所需的最低行为是向政府官员作出虚假陈述，她认为这不涉及道德败坏。据被申请人称，与提供“欺诈性”陈述的行为不同，作出“虚假”陈述不涉及道德败坏

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because it requires no evil intent. We are unpersuaded by her attempt to make this distinction.

因为它不要求邪恶意图。我们不被她试图作出这一区分所说服。

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, has held that for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), “the word ‘false’ requires an intent to deceive or mislead.” United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 2010). The Eleventh Circuit has also recently reaffirmed that proof of a specific intent to deceive by making a false or fraudulent statement is a prerequisite for a conviction under § 1001. United States v. House, 684 F.3d 1173, 1203 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 503 (11th Cir. 1982)).

美国第十一巡回上诉法院（本案即发生在其管辖范围内）裁定，就18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)而言，“‘虚假’一词要求具有欺骗或误导的意图。”United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 2010)。第十一巡回法院近期还重申，证明通过作出虚假或欺诈性陈述进行欺骗的具体意图是依据§ 1001定罪的前提条件。United States v. House, 684 F.3d 1173, 1203 (11th Cir. 2012)（引用United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 503 (11th Cir. 1982)）。

The respondent also suggests that a conviction can be obtained under § 1001(a)(2) even if the misrepresentation was not material. However, this is contrary to the plain language of the statute, which includes as an element of the offense the requirement that the offender made a “materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation.” 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d at 740; United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit has held that a statement is “material” under § 1001(a)(2) if it has a “natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.” United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d at 741 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court found that the Government need not prove that the statement had actual influence, only that “[t]he false statement must simply have the capacity to impair or pervert the functioning of a government agency.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 450 (BIA 2011).

respondent还提出，即使虚假陈述不具有实质性，也可以依据§ 1001(a)(2)获得定罪。然而，这与该法规的明确语言相悖，该法规将犯罪人作出“实质性虚假、虚构或欺诈性陈述或表示”的要求作为犯罪要件之一。18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)（强调为后加）；另见United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d at 740；United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996)。第十一巡回法院裁定，依据§ 1001(a)(2)，如果陈述具有“影响或能够影响其针对的决策机构决定的自然倾向”，则该陈述具有“实质性”。United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d at 741（引用United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)）（内部引号省略）。法院认定，政府无需证明该陈述具有实际影响，只需证明“[该]虚假陈述必须仅仅具有损害或扭曲政府机构运作的能力。”Id.（引用United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1980)）（内部引号省略）；另见Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 450 (BIA 2011)。

We find no merit to the respondent’s assertions, even if we accept her proposition that she was only convicted of making a materially false statement or representation, which she claims is the least culpable conduct required for a conviction under § 1001(a)(2). To obtain a conviction, the Government was required to show that she made a false statement that had the capacity to impair or pervert the functioning of a Government agency and that the statement was made with the intent to deceive or mislead. We have long held that crimes involving fraud or making false statements involve moral turpitude. See Matter of Correa-Garces, 20 I&N Dec. 451, 454 (1992) (“Convictions for making false statements have been found to involve moral turpitude.”); see also Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Generally, a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is considered to be one involving moral turpitude.”).

即使我们接受 respondent 的主张，即她仅因作出实质性虚假陈述或表示而被定罪，而她声称这是依据§ 1001(a)(2)定罪所需的最低限度的可责行为，我们仍认为她的主张没有依据。为获得定罪，政府必须证明她作出了一项具有损害或扭曲政府机构运作能力的虚假陈述，并且该陈述是出于欺骗或误导的意图而作出的。我们长期以来一直认为，涉及欺诈或作出虚假陈述的犯罪涉及道德败坏。见Matter of Correa-Garces, 20 I&N Dec. 451, 454 (1992)（“作出虚假陈述的定罪已被认定涉及道德败坏。”）；另见Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2002)（“一般而言，涉及不诚实或虚假陈述的犯罪被视为涉及道德败坏的犯罪。”）。

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Moreover, an offense that involves impairing or obstructing a function of the Government by deceit, graft, trickery, or dishonest means is a crime involving moral turpitude. See Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that “intentionally deceiving the government involves moral turpitude”); Matter of Jurado 24 I&N Dec. 29, 35 (BIA 2006) (holding that making unsworn falsifications to authorities is a crime involving moral turpitude); Matter of Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 225, 230 (BIA 1980) (holding that the “crime of uttering or selling false or counterfeit paper relating to registry of aliens with knowledge of their counterfeit nature” involves moral turpitude, because it “inherently involves a deliberate deception of the government and an impairment of its lawful functions”). We therefore conclude that the minimum conduct criminalized by 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) involves moral turpitude.

此外，涉及通过欺骗、贪污、诡计或不诚实手段损害或妨碍政府职能的犯罪属于涉及道德败坏的犯罪。见Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 262 (5th Cir. 2002)（指出“故意欺骗政府涉及道德败坏”）；Matter of Jurado 24 I&N Dec. 29, 35 (BIA 2006)（裁定向当局作出未经宣誓的虚假陈述属于涉及道德败坏的犯罪）；Matter of Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 225, 230 (BIA 1980)（裁定“明知伪造性质而使用或出售与外国人登记有关的虚假或伪造文件的犯罪”涉及道德败坏，因为它“本质上涉及对政府的故意欺骗和对其合法职能的损害”）。因此，我们认定18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)所刑事处罚的最低限度行为涉及道德败坏。

The respondent has cited cases from the Ninth Circuit in support of her argument that making a false statement does not involve moral turpitude. However, as previously discussed, her case arises in the Eleventh Circuit, which has determined that an intent to deceive or mislead is a required element for a conviction under § 1001(a)(2).

respondent 引用了第九巡回法院的案例来支持其论点，即作出虚假陈述不涉及道德败坏。然而，如前所述，她的案件发生在第十一巡回法院，该法院已认定欺骗或误导的意图是依据§ 1001(a)(2)定罪的必要要件。

Moreover, the decisions the respondent relies on addressed an earlier version of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and are therefore distinguishable. Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962); Matter of Marchena, 12 I&N Dec. 355 (Reg’l Comm’r 1967); Matter of Espinosa, 10 I&N Dec. 98 (BIA 1962); Matter of G-, 8 I&N Dec. 315 (BIA 1959). In 1996, § 1001 was amended to explicitly add the element of materiality to each clause of the statute, including the one under which the respondent was convicted. False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, § 2, 110 Stat. 3459, 3459 (effective Oct. 11, 1996). 1 Thus, § 1001(a)(2) now criminalizes the making of any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation. Consequently, an important issue that was raised in the earlier rulings as to whether materiality necessarily inheres in all parts of § 1001 is no longer in question.

此外， respondent 所依赖的裁决针对的是18 U.S.C. § 1001的早期版本，因此可以区分。Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962)；Matter of Marchena, 12 I&N Dec. 355 (Reg’l Comm’r 1967)；Matter of Espinosa, 10 I&N Dec. 98 (BIA 1962)；Matter of G-, 8 I&N Dec. 315 (BIA 1959)。1996年，§ 1001被修订，明确将实质性要件添加到法规的每个条款中，包括 respondent 被定罪所依据的条款。False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, § 2, 110 Stat. 3459, 3459（1996年10月11日生效）。1 因此，§ 1001(a)(2)现在将作出任何实质性虚假、虚构或欺诈性陈述或表示的行为定为犯罪。 consequently，早期裁决中提出的关于实质性是否必然内在于§ 1001所有部分的重要问题已不再有疑问。

1 Prior to October 11, 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) provided as follows:

1 在1996年10月11日之前，18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)规定如下：

Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

任何人在美国任何部门或机构管辖范围内的任何事项中，明知且故意以任何诡计、方案或手段伪造、隐瞒或掩盖重大事实，或作出任何虚假、虚构或欺诈性陈述或表示，或制作或使用任何明知包含任何虚假、虚构或欺诈性陈述或条目的虚假文书或文件，应根据本编处以罚款或不超过五年的监禁，或两者并罚。

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The Seventh Circuit, which specifically addressed whether the amended version of § 1001 proscribes a crime involving moral turpitude, has unequivocally stated, “There can be no question that a violation of section 1001 is a crime involving moral turpitude.” Ghani v. Holder, 557 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted that almost every court that has considered the issue has concluded that crimes involving willful false statements are turpitudinous. Id. at 840–41.

第七巡回法院专门讨论了修订后的§ 1001是否规定了涉及道德败坏的犯罪，并明确表示：“毫无疑问，违反第1001条是涉及道德败坏的犯罪。”Ghani v. Holder, 557 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 2009)。此外，第七巡回法院指出，几乎所有考虑过该问题的法院都认定涉及故意虚假陈述的犯罪是道德败坏的。Id. at 840–41。

In sum, we conclude that the respondent’s 2002 conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) is for a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge properly found that the respondent is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act and that she is therefore also precluded from establishing statutory eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1). See section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed.

总之，我们认定 respondent 2002年因违反18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)而被定罪属于涉及道德败坏的犯罪。移民法官正确地认定 respondent 依据《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条不可入境，因此她也无法依据第240A(b)(1)条确立取消递解出境的法定资格。见《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)(1)(C)条。 accordingly， respondent 的上诉将被驳回。

C. Voluntary Departure

C. 自愿离境

The DHS first argues that the respondent is ineligible for voluntary departure under section 240B(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2012), which is the type that may only be granted prior to the completion of removal proceedings, because she did not concede removability, did not withdraw her application for cancellation of removal, and did not waive her right to appeal. See Matter of C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. 888, 891–92 (BIA 2012); Matter of Arguelles, 22 I&N Dec. 811, 815–17 (BIA 1999); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(1)(i)(B)–(D) (2013). It is not clear whether the Immigration Judge intended to grant the respondent voluntary departure under section 240B(a)(1), but any such grant would be improper for the reasons advanced by the DHS. 2

DHS首先主张， respondent 依据《移民与国籍法》第240B(a)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2012)，不符合自愿离境资格，因为该类型的自愿离境只能在递解出境程序完成前批准，而她没有承认可递解性，没有撤回其取消递解出境的申请，也没有放弃上诉权。见Matter of C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. 888, 891–92 (BIA 2012)；Matter of Arguelles, 22 I&N Dec. 811, 815–17 (BIA 1999)；8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(1)(i)(B)–(D) (2013)。目前尚不清楚移民法官是否打算依据第240B(a)(1)条批准 respondent 自愿离境，但基于DHS提出的理由，任何此类批准都是不当的。2

However, an alien may be eligible for voluntary departure under section 240B(b)(1) of the Act at the conclusion of removal proceedings if certain statutory requirements for eligibility are met and the alien is deserving of relief as a matter of discretion. See Matter of Arguelles, 22 I&N Dec. at 816–17. The Immigration Judge found no statutory bars to voluntary departure in this case and concluded that the respondent merited a grant of relief in the exercise of discretion. The DHS argues that this favorable exercise of discretion was unwarranted.

然而，如果满足某些法定资格要求且外国人作为自由裁量事项值得获得救济，外国人在递解出境程序结束时可以依据《移民与国籍法》第240B(b)(1)条有资格获得自愿离境。见Matter of Arguelles, 22 I&N Dec. at 816–17。移民法官认定本案中没有自愿离境的法定障碍，并得出结论认为 respondent 在行使自由裁量权时值得获得救济。DHS主张这种有利的自由裁量权行使是没有依据的。

The Immigration Judge’s factual findings regarding the positive and negative factors in the respondent’s case are not clearly erroneous.

移民法官关于 respondent 案件中积极和消极因素的事实认定没有明显错误。

2 Despite the Immigration Judge’s error, given our determination that the respondent does not merit a grant of voluntary departure in the exercise of discretion, we find no reason to remand the record.

2 尽管移民法官存在错误，但鉴于我们认定 respondent 在行使自由裁量权时不应获得自愿离境，我们认为没有理由发回记录。

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See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2013). However, upon our de novo review of these facts, we conclude that the adverse factors in this case outweigh the respondent’s equities and that she therefore does not merit a favorable exercise of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).

见8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2013)。然而，在我们对这些事实进行重新审查后，我们认定本案中的不利因素超过了 respondent 的衡平因素，因此她在行使自由裁量权时不应获得有利对待。见8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii)。

In exercising discretion on a voluntary departure application, we weigh the applicant’s equities against such factors as his or her immigration history, the nature of all entries, any violations of the immigration and other laws, and evidence of unfavorable conduct, including criminal conduct that has not culminated in a final conviction for purposes of the Act. Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 22–23 (BIA 1995). The respondent’s equities include her family ties in the United States, her positive contribution to the community, and her payment of taxes. However, as the Immigration Judge found, the respondent procured a United States passport by fraud and she used the fraudulent passport to gain multiple entries into the United States and to register to vote. See generally Matter of Barcenas-Barrera, 25 I&N Dec. 40, 44 (BIA 2009) (discussing benefits afforded by a United States passport). These are very significant adverse factors, which weigh heavily against a discretionary grant of the privilege of voluntary departure.

在行使关于自愿离境申请的自由裁量权时，我们权衡申请人的衡平因素与诸如其移民历史、所有入境的性质、任何违反移民法和其他法律的行为，以及不利行为的证据，包括尚未构成《移民与国籍法》所指最终定罪的犯罪行为等因素。Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 22–23 (BIA 1995)。 respondent 的衡平因素包括她在美国的家庭关系、她对社区的积极贡献以及她缴纳税款。然而，正如移民法官所认定的， respondent 通过欺诈手段获得了美国护照，并使用该欺诈性护照多次进入美国并登记投票。参见Matter of Barcenas-Barrera, 25 I&N Dec. 40, 44 (BIA 2009)（讨论美国护照提供的福利）。这些是非常重大的不利因素，严重不利于自由裁量给予自愿离境特权。

We are not persuaded that the respondent’s equities outweigh the very serious adverse factors of her protracted and repeated fraudulent conduct arising from her false claim of United States citizenship. This conduct reflects a clear willingness to violate the immigration laws and circumvent lawful authority. See Matter of Rojas, 15 I&N Dec. 492, 493 (BIA 1975) (finding that the manner in which an alien gains entry is relevant to the exercise of discretion in adjudicating an application for voluntary departure). Accordingly, we will sustain the DHS’s appeal, vacate the Immigration Judge’s grant of voluntary departure, and order the respondent removed from the United States.

我们不相信 respondent 的衡平因素超过了因她虚假声称美国公民身份而产生的长期和反复欺诈行为的非常严重的不利因素。这种行为反映出明显愿意违反移民法并规避合法权威。见Matter of Rojas, 15 I&N Dec. 492, 493 (BIA 1975)（认定外国人获得入境的方式与裁决自愿离境申请时行使自由裁量权相关）。 accordingly，我们将支持DHS的上诉，撤销移民法官批准的自愿离境，并命令 respondent 从美国递解出境。

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