Matter of Lenning

Interim Decision #2817

临时决定第2817号

The petitioner has appealed from the decision of a District Director, dated February 21, 1980, denying the visa petition filed on behalf of the beneficiary as his spouse under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1151(4 The appeal will be dismissed. The petitioner is a 65-year-old native and citizen of the United States. The beneficiary is a 61-year-old native and citizen of New Zea- land and is the wife of the petitioner. They were married on July 13, 1974, in Nev York City. That the marriage was valid at its inception and entered into in good faith has not been put into question. However, on September 27, 1979, the petitioner and beneficiary entered into and executed a formal, written separation agreement in which they settled financial, property, and other rights between the parties. The visa peti- tion was not filed until October 16, 1979, after the separation agreement took effect. It was solely on the basis of this separation agreement that the District Director denied the visa petition. The petitioner appeals from that finding, citing Chan v. Bell, 464 F.Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978) from which. he asserts that a marriage entered into in good faith an Still "legally unterrninated" is sufficient to support a spouse's visa pe' tion and eligibility for section 245 adjustment We disagree.

申请人就地区主任1980年2月21日的决定提出上诉，该决定拒绝了依据《移民与国籍法》第201(b)条、8 U.S.C. 1151(4) 为受益人作为其配偶提交的签证申请。上诉将被驳回。 申请人是65岁的美国本土出生公民。受益人是61岁的新西兰本土出生公民，系申请人之妻。他们于1974年7月13日在纽约市结婚。该婚姻在缔结时有效且系善意缔结，这一点未受质疑。然而，1979年9月27日，申请人与受益人订立并签署了一份正式书面分居协议，其中解决了双方之间的财务、财产及其他权利。签证申请直至1979年10月16日、即分居协议生效后才提交。地区主任正是仅依据该分居协议拒绝了签证申请。申请人就该认定提出上诉，援引 Chan v. Bell, 464 F.Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978)，据此主张善意缔结且仍"在法律上未终止"的婚姻足以支持配偶签证申请及第245条调整身份的资格。我们不同意。

476

476

Interim Decision #2817

临时决定第2817号

In visa petition proceedings, the petitioner has the burden of estab- lishing proof of the claimed relationship under which benefits are being sought. Matter of Branagan, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). Under section 204(b) of the Act, if an alien can show that the facts stated in a petition filed in his behalf as an immediate relative as defined in section 201(b) are true, he is entitled to admission in that status without regard to numerical limitations. This provision was included in the Act in order to prevent the separation of families and to preserve the family unit. H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1680 (1952). Previous Board decisions attempting to carry out the Congressional intent to retain and unite family relationships led the Board to apply a "viability" test to any marital relationship being put forth as the basis for conferral of immediate relative status as the spouse of a United States citizen. See Matter of Lew, 11 I&N Dec. 148 (D.D. 1965), Matter of Sosa, 15 I&N Dec. 572 (BIA 1976). However, the ability of the Board and Service to fairly determine which marriages are viable and which are not has been seriously questioned. See Dabaghiavi, v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868 (9 Cir. 1979), Chan v. Bell, supra. Accordingly, we expressly overrode the viability test of Matter of Sosa, supra, within the Ninth Circuit, Matter of Kondo, Interim Decision 2781 (RTA 1980), and effec- tively put an end to the test as applied in Matter of Sosa in Matter of McKee, Interim Decision 2782 (BIA 1980). There we adopted the reasoning of the Chan court and held that where the parties enter into a valid marriage, and there is nothing to show that they have since obtained a legal separation or dissolution of that marriage, a visa petition filed on behalf of the alien spouse should not be denied solely because the parties are nut residing together. Physical separation from one another had long been one of the key factors used in determining the viability of the marital relationship. At this time, physical separation after the marriage is a relevant factor only insofar as it bears upon the intent of the parties at the time of their marriage, i.e., whether the marriage is a sham. See Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9 Cir. 1975). However, the existence of a valid legal separation presents an al- together different set of considerations. The problems noted in Chan, supra, concerning the application of a viability standard for marriages are not present when there is presented a legal separation in which, with precise language, the appropriate documentation (i.e., a separa- tion agreement or separation decree from a court) renders the rela- tionship of the parties as if they were not married at all. The separa- tion agreement in the, record before us presents us with such a situation. The petitioner and beneficiary were married in the state of New

在签证申请程序中，申请人负有举证责任，证明其所寻求利益所依据的所主张关系。Matter of Branagan, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966)。根据该法第204(b)条，如果外国人能够证明以其名义作为第201(b)条所定义的直系亲属提交的申请中所述事实属实，则该外国人有权以该身份入境，不受数量限制。该条款被纳入该法是为了防止家庭分离并维护家庭单元。H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1680 (1952)。 委员会此前为落实国会保留并团聚家庭关系的意图而作出的决定，使委员会对任何作为授予美国公民配偶直系亲属身份依据而提出的婚姻关系适用"存续性"检验。见 Matter of Lew, 11 I&N Dec. 148 (D.D. 1965)、Matter of Sosa, 15 I&N Dec. 572 (BIA 1976)。然而，委员会和移民局公平判定哪些婚姻具有存续性、哪些不具有的能力受到了严重质疑。见 Dabaghiavi, v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868 (9 Cir. 1979)、Chan v. Bell, 前引。因此，我们在第9巡回区内明确推翻了 Matter of Sosa, 前引中的存续性检验，Matter of Kondo, 临时决定第2781号 (RTA 1980)，并在 Matter of McKee, 临时决定第2782号 (BIA 1980) 中有效终止了 Matter of Sosa 中所适用的该检验。我们在该案中采纳了 Chan 法院的推理，并裁定：若双方缔结有效婚姻，且无任何证据表明其此后已获得合法分居或解除该婚姻，则不得仅因双方未共同居住而拒绝为外籍配偶提交的签证申请。彼此身体分居长期以来一直是用于判定婚姻关系存续性的关键因素之一。目前，婚后的身体分居仅在涉及双方结婚时的意图（即该婚姻是否为虚假婚姻）时才是相关因素。见 Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9 Cir. 1975)。 然而，存在有效的合法分居则引出一套完全不同的考量。Chan, 前引中所述关于对婚姻适用存续性标准的问题，在存在合法分居的情形下并不存在，因为在此情形下，以精确的语言和适当的文件（即分居协议或法院分居判决）使双方关系如同未曾结婚一般。我们面前的记录中的分居协议正是向我们呈现了此种情形。 申请人与受益人于1974年7月13日在纽约州结婚。

Interim Decision #2817

临时决定第2817号

York on July 13, 1974. At the time their separation agreement was executed, they were both residents of the state of New York.' Under the law of New York, a married couple can 'obtain a divorce if (b) The husband and wife have lived separate and apart pursuant to a written agreement of separation, subscribed by the parties thereto and acknowledged or proved in the form required to entitle a deed to be recorded, for a period of one or more years after the execution of such agreement and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff that he or she has substantially performed all the terms and conditions of such agreement... . [14 McKinney, Domestic Relations Law t ri0(b)]' A divorce obtained on grounds of living apart pursuant to a written separation agreement is referred to as a "conversion divorce" in that it is permissible to convert the separation agreement into an absolute divorce decree. Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 865 N.E.2d 849 (1977). The separation agreement here states that the parties

约克，1974年7月13日。在他们的分居协议签署时，双方均为纽约州居民。根据纽约州法律，已婚夫妇可以‘在以下情况下获得离婚：(b) 夫妻双方根据一份经双方签署并以符合契据登记所需形式确认或证明的书面分居协议，在该协议签署后连续分居1年或以上，且原告已提交令法院满意的证据，证明其已实质履行该协议的所有条款和条件……[14 McKinney, Domestic Relations Law t ri0(b)]’。以根据书面分居协议分居为由获得的离婚被称为“转换离婚”，因为允许将分居协议转换为绝对离婚判决。Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 865 N.E.2d 849 (1977)。此处的分居协议规定，双方

The agreement contains a division and settlement of their property, both real and personal, which shall be enjoyed "by him or separately as if he or she were unmarried." (Separation Agreement, p. 8). The husband -petitoner's obligation for maintenance and support is not to extend beyond a period of five years from the date the agreement took effect (p. 9). And while neither party is precluded from seeking an absolute divorce, the agreement is not to be merged with any divorce decree and instead, "shall survive the same and shall be binding and conclusive upon the parties for all time." (P. 15) The agreement also addresses matters concerning taxes, estates and its ultimate finality insofar as other jurisdictions and any heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators and other personal representatives are concerned. The petitioner, through counsel, asserts that since the marriage has

该协议包含对其财产（包括不动产和个人财产）的分割和解决，该等财产应"由其本人享有或分别享有，如同其未婚一样"。（分居协议，第8页）。丈夫即申请人的扶养和赡养义务不超过自协议生效之日起五年（第9页）。虽然任何一方均不被禁止寻求绝对离婚，但该协议不得与任何离婚判决合并，而是"应在该判决后继续存续，并应始终对双方具有约束力和终局性。"（第15页）该协议还涉及税务、遗产事项及其在其他司法管辖区以及任何继承人、近亲属、遗嘱执行人、遗产管理人和其他个人代表方面的最终终局性。 申请人通过律师主张，由于该婚姻尚未

not yet been legally terminated the visa petition should have been approved. He cites Chan, supra, in support of that view. His reliance on that case is misplaced. The pertinent language in Chan states

在法律上终止，签证申请本应获得批准。他援引 Chan, 前引以支持该观点。他对该案的依赖是错误的。Chan 中的相关表述称

We are not confronted here with the problem associated in applying an untenable standard of "inherent unworkability" in which the Service attempts "to establish the vague and elusive concept of marriage viability .. .." Chan, at 130. Courts routinely review the terms of separation agreements and therefore Service decisions based on such agreements may be subject to review by the courts on appeal. Hence, the fears of unreviewability alluded to in Chan are not present in the instant case. And in New York, where there has been full disclosure of all relevant facts in proper context and no inequitable conduct or other infirmity which might vitiate the execution of the agreement, the courts are encouraged to fully uphold the agreement. Christian v. Christian, supra. It is also of no small import that Chan made reference to the distinctions we have noted here. There, it was pointed out that

我们在此并未面临适用"固有不可行性"这一站不住脚的标准所关联的问题，即移民局试图"确立模糊而难以捉摸的婚姻存续性概念……"Chan, 第130页。法院例行审查分居协议的条款，因此基于此类协议的移民局决定在上诉时可受法院审查。因此，Chan 中所暗示的对不可审查性的担忧在本案中并不存在。而在纽约州，若已在适当背景下充分披露所有相关事实，且不存在可能使协议签署无效的不公平行为或其他瑕疵，法院被鼓励完全维护该协议。Christian v. Christian, 前引。 同样重要的是，Chan 提及了我们在此指出的区别。在该案中指出，

Thus, our holding here today is not based upon any notion of the viability of the marriage, but rather is determined on the basis of the separation agreement between the petitioner and beneficiary. Since it is clear that the Congressional policy of retaining and uniting family relationships will not be furthered through the issuance of an im- migrant visa to the beneficiary, the decision of the District Director to deny the visa petition was correct and the appeal shall be dismissed. ORDERS The appeal is dismissed.

因此，我们今日在此的裁决并非基于婚姻是否存续的任何观念，而是依据申请人（petitioner）与受益人（beneficiary）之间的分居协议作出。既然显然无法通过向受益人签发移民签证来推进国会保留并团聚家庭关系的政策，地区主任拒绝签证申请的决定是正确的，上诉应予驳回。 命令 上诉驳回。

I respectfully dissent. The Board, which only recently declared in Matter of McKee, In- terim Decision 2782 (BIA 1980), that it would no longer deny a visa petition solely because the spouses were separated under conditions making the marriage appear to be no longer viable, has backslided_ Seizing on two aspects. of this particular New York case, the Board pretends to distinguish Chan v. Bell, 464 F.Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978), from which McKee is derived.

我谨此提出异议。 董事会不久前才在Matter of McKee, Interim Decision 2782 (BIA 1980)中宣布，其将不再仅因配偶在使婚姻看似不再存续的条件下分居而拒绝签证申请，如今却已倒退。董事会抓住这一特定纽约案件的两个方面，佯称将Chan v. Bell, 464 F.Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978)（McKee即源于该案）与本案区分开来。

Although we said in McKee that the separation of spouses is a relevant fact only as evidence, and that the only ultimate fact for petitioner to establish is that the marriage was bona fide in its incep- tion, the Board is once again fatally attracted to the proposition that it will be carrying out the will of Congress if it strikes down petitions when granting them would not serve to retain and unite family rela- tions. It justifies this by suggesting that a written separation agree- ment is a big step closer to dissolution of a marriage than uncontraeted separation is. It also points to a peculiarity of New York law that when parties have been separated for over one year following execution of a separation agreement either may sue for divorce on that ground alone. Domestic Relations Law, section 170(6). New York, after being the last of the 50 states to permit divorce on only one ground, adultery, has now gone to the other extreme. Of the six permitted grounds for divorce in section 170, two are "no-fault." To show how far New York has gone in liberality, I quote from American Jurisprudence 2d, Divorce and Separation, section 148:

尽管我们在McKee案中说过，配偶分居仅作为证据才是相关事实，且申请人（petitioner）需要证明的唯一最终事实是婚姻在其缔结之初是善意的，但董事会再次被以下主张致命地吸引：如果驳回申请（petition）而批准申请无助于保留并团聚家庭关系，它就是在执行国会的意志。董事会为此辩称，书面分居协议比未订立合同的分居更接近于婚姻的解除。它还指出纽约法律的一项特殊之处：当事人在签署分居协议后分居超过一年，任何一方均可仅以此为由提起离婚诉讼。Domestic Relations Law, section 170(6)。 纽约曾是50个州中最后一个仅允许以通奸这一唯一理由离婚的州，如今却走向了另一极端。在section 170允许的六项离婚理由中，有两项是“无过错”理由。为说明纽约在宽松程度上已走得多远，我引用American Jurisprudence 2d, Divorce and Separation, section 148：

It is significant that unlike the norm next stated in American Jurisprudence, that divorce based on separation usually requires at least double the period of waiting specified for divorce based on deser- tion, New York will permit a suit after a waiting period of one year on either of these grounds. All the same, the marital bond is not dissolved by mere separation, either with or without a separation agreement. The premise on which the Board's interpretation rests, that people who execute separation agreements are set irreversibly on a permanent course away from each other is unsound. There are cases both ways. Sometimes the parties will reconcile and resume marital relations. From this a court may even infer an intent to abandon the separation agreement. In re Whiteford's Estate, 35 A.D.2d 751, 314 N.Y.S.2d 811, App. Div. 3d Dept. (1970); cf. Will of Granchelli, 90 Mise2d 103, 393 N.Y.S.2d 894, Surro- gates Ct. Monroe Cty. (1977). Even if the separation agreement herein were in existence for over a year, there would be no normal and natural inference that the parties will never effect a reconciliation as married partners. The court in Chan questioned both our right and our wisdom in speculating on that.

值得注意的是，与American Jurisprudence接下来所述的标准不同——以分居为由的离婚通常要求至少两倍于以遗弃为由的离婚所规定的等待期——纽约允许以这两项理由中的任一理由在一年等待期后提起诉讼。 尽管如此，婚姻关系并不会仅因分居而解除，无论是否订立分居协议。董事会解释所依据的前提——即订立分居协议的人不可逆转地走上永久彼此远离的道路——是不成立的。两种情况都有案例。有时当事人会和解并恢复夫妻关系。法院甚至可以由此推断出放弃分居协议的意图。In re Whiteford's Estate, 35 A.D.2d 751, 314 N.Y.S.2d 811, App. Div. 3d Dept. (1970); cf. Will of Granchelli, 90 Mise2d 103, 393 N.Y.S.2d 894, Surrogates Ct. Monroe Cty. (1977)。 即使本案中的分居协议已存在超过一年，也不能正常且自然地推断当事人作为已婚伴侣永远不会实现和解。Chan案中的法院对我们推测这一点的权利和智慧均提出质疑。

So did the Court in Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9 Cir. 1975). Nothing in the statute suggests a "viability" test. The key statement in Chan is, "In the first place, an agency's interpretation cannot vary the plain words of a statute ..." 464 F.Supp. at 181. The fact that New York State has reduced the waiting period for a divorce based on a separation agreement to as little as one year should have the cautionary effect of inhibiting inferences that the parties to any separation agreement intend never to resume marital relations. Such short-term data as is found here is clearly insufficient for any "viability" conclusion. Instead, dazzled by the cleverness of the phrase "conversion divorce," the Board blunders into a repetition of its pre- McKee error. I would sustain the appeal and grant the petition. •

Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9 Cir. 1975)案中的法院也是如此。成文法中没有任何内容暗示存在“存续性”检验。Chan案的关键陈述是：“首先，行政机关的解释不能改变成文法的明文规定……”464 F.Supp. at 181。 纽约州将以分居协议为由的离婚等待期缩短至最短一年，这一事实应具有警示作用，抑制以下推断：任何分居协议的当事人意图永不恢复夫妻关系。此处所见的此类短期数据显然不足以得出任何“存续性”结论。相反，董事会为“转换离婚”这一措辞的巧妙所迷惑，重蹈其McKee案之前的错误。 我将支持上诉并批准申请（petition）。•