Matter of Rivers

Interim Decision #2802

临时决定第2802号

In Visa Petition Proceedings

在签证申请程序中

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE Wojciech P. Makowski, Esquire Janice Podolny Legal Services of the Virgin Islands Acting Appellate Trial 17 Estate Orange Grove Attorney Christiansted, St. Croix U.S. Virgin Islands 00820

代表申请人： 代表移民局 Wojciech P. Makowski, Esquire Janice Podolny 维尔京群岛法律服务处 代理上诉审判 17 Estate Orange Grove 律师 Christiansted, St. Croix U.S. Virgin Islands 00820

This is an appeal from a decision of the District Director, dated May 14, 1979, dewing a visa petition filed on behalf of the beneficiary as the petitioner's unmarried daughter under section 203(a)(2) of the Im- migration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2). Oral argument was heard before this Board on October 4, 1979. The appeal will be sustained. The petitioner is a 31-year-old native of St. Kitts, and is a lawful

这是对地区主任1979年5月14日决定的上诉，该决定拒绝了代表受益人作为申请人未婚女儿根据《移民与国籍法》第203(a)(2)条、8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2)提交的签证申请。1979年10月4日在本委员会进行了口头辩论。上诉将获支持。 申请人是31岁的圣基茨本地人，并且是合法

Interim Decision #2802

临时决定第2802号

permanent resident of the United States. The beneficiary is an 11-year- old native and citizen of St. Kitts, and was born out of wedlock to the petitioner and a woman he never married. The instant visa petition was filed on February 2, 1979. It was denied on the basis of the District Director's finding that the beneficiary could not qualify as the peti- tioner's legitimated child under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(C). The beneficiary of a visa petition can qualify as a petitioner's "un- married daughter" for preference purposes only if the beneficiary qualifies (or could once have qualified) as a "child" of the petitioner under section 101(b)(1) of the Act. Section 101(b)(1) includes within the definition of "child": a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation. (section 101(b)(1)(C)).. In the present case, the District Director did not dispute, and at oral argument the Immigration and Naturalization Service conceded, that the beneficiary had been legitimated under the law of the Virgin Islands, where the petitioner resides. Transcript at 13. However, the District Director determined that the beneficiary could not qualify as the petitioner's child under 101(b)(1)(C) because the legal custody requirement of that section had not been satisfied. He relied for that finding on this Board's prior decisions in Matter of Harris, 15 I&N Dec. 39 (BIA 1970) and Matter of Dela Rosa, 14 I&N Dec. 728 (BIA 1974). Iri Dela Rosa and Harris, we strictly interpreted the legal custody requirement of section 101 (h)(1)(C), holding that legal custody would vest only "by virtue of either a natural right or a court decree." We further stated in those cases, the general rule that the mother of an illegitimate child has the primary right to the custody of that child. Based upon this we found that the fathers in the two cases had not met the legal custody requirement. Strong dissents by two Board members were registered in both of these cases. After careful consideration, we have determined that the legal custody rule set forth in Dela Rosa and Harris requires modification. While it is true that the mother of an illegitimate child is presumed to have custody of that child, the same is not true where the child has been legitimated. Cases construing the prior California law regarding legitimation (Section 230 of the California Civil Code) hold that once the natural father has legitimated. his child, the child's status becomes that of the legitimate child of both of its natural parents, and the ... rights of the child and of the, parents thenceforth are the same as they would be had the child been born of the marriage of its natural parents ... neither of such

美国永久居民。受益人是11岁的圣基茨本地人和公民，系申请人与他从未结婚的一名女子非婚所生。本签证申请于1979年2月2日提交。地区主任认定受益人不能根据该法第101(b)(1)(C)条、8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(C)作为申请人的经准正子女取得资格，据此拒绝了申请。 签证申请的受益人只有在根据该法第101(b)(1)条符合（或曾经符合）申请人“子女”资格时，才能为优先目的符合申请人“未婚女儿”的资格。第101(b)(1)条在“子女”定义中包括： 根据子女居住地或住所地法律，或根据父亲居住地或住所地法律，在美国境内或境外经准正的子女，如果该准正发生在子女年满18岁之前，且该子女在准正时处于准正父母一方的法定监护下。（第101(b)(1)(C)条）。 在本案中，地区主任没有争议，且移民与归化局在口头辩论中承认，受益人已根据申请人居住地维尔京群岛的法律被准正。庭审记录第13页。然而，地区主任认定受益人不能根据101(b)(1)(C)符合申请人子女资格，因为该条的法定监护要求未得到满足。他依据本委员会先前在Matter of Harris, 15 I&N Dec. 39 (BIA 1970)和Matter of Dela Rosa, 14 I&N Dec. 728 (BIA 1974)中的裁决作出该认定。 在Dela Rosa和Harris中，我们严格解释了第101(b)(1)(C)条的法定监护要求，认为法定监护仅“凭借自然权利或法院判令”归属。我们在那些案件中进一步指出，非婚生子女的母亲对该子女的监护享有主要权利的一般规则。据此，我们认定两案中的父亲未满足法定监护要求。两名委员会成员在两案中均提出了强烈异议。经仔细考虑，我们认定Dela Rosa和Harris中确立的法定监护规则需要修改。 虽然非婚生子女的母亲被推定对该子女享有监护权确实如此，但在子女已被准正的情况下则不然。解释加利福尼亚州关于准正的先前法律（《加利福尼亚州民法典》第230条）的判例认为，一旦自然父亲准正其子女，该子女的地位即成为其自然父母双方的婚生子女，且……该子女及父母此后的权利与子女若生于其自然父母婚姻时相同……父母双方均无权优先于对方获得[该子女的]监护…… In Re Navarro, 77 Cal. App.2d 500, 505, 175 P.2d 896, 899 (Dist. Ct. Ap. Cal. 1946)。另见In Re Richard, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531, 537 P.2d 363 (1975)；Donnally v. Blackenstein, 167 Cal. App.2d 282, 334 P.2d 260 (Dist. Ct. Ap. Cal. 1959)。1 申请人的律师在口头辩论中主张，在维尔京群岛同样如此，经准正子女的父母双方对该子女享有平等权利和义务。为支持该主张，律师在上诉中提交了维尔京群岛一名法官在子女监护案件中的未公布裁决。该法官在其裁决中明确表示，“在非婚生子女的母亲和父亲之间”，双方享有平等的监护权。我们同意所引案件中的推理，因此认定，在非婚生子女已被适当准正的情况下，不推定任何一方父母比另一方对该子女的法定监护享有更大权利。 如前所述，Dela Rosa案和Harris案要求存在法院命令或某种监护“自然权利”，才能认定父亲为第101(b)(1)(C)条目的具有“法定监护”。我们认定，我们先前对“自然权利”的看法过于限制，因为它仅承认母亲对子女的自然权利。我们现在认定，除非当地法律另有规定（即通过成文法或判例法赋予一方父母比另一方更大的权利），父亲对其已准正子女的监护“自然权利”与母亲对子女监护的“自然权利”相等。就Dela Rosa案和Harris案表明相反意见而言，它们特此被修改。通过准正其子女，父亲已表明其对自然子嗣的关心和利益。此时，我们看不出母亲为何应比父亲对该子女享有更大权利。最重要的考虑应始终是子女的最大利益。见Donnally案。这不应由我们或由

parents has a superior right to [the child's] custody... In Re Navarro, 77 Cal. App.2d 500, 505,175 P.2d 896, 899 (Dist. Ct. Ap. Cal. 1946). See also In Re Richard, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531, 537 P.2d 363 (1975); Donnally v. Blackenstein, 167 Cal. App.2d 282, 334 P.2d 260 (Dist. Ct. Ap. Cal. 1959).1 The petitioner's attorney at oral argument contended that it is also true in the Virgin Islands that each parent of a legitimated child had equal rights in and obligations to the child. In support of this contention, counsel has submitted on appeal the unpub- lished decision of a Virgin Islands judge in a child custody case. The judge makes clear in his decision that "as between the mother and father" of a child born out of wedlock, each has an equal right to custody.' We agree with the reasoning expressed in the cited cases, and we therefore hold that where a child born out of wedlock has been properly legitimated, neither parent will be presumed to have a greater right than the other to the legal custody of that child. As previously stated, Dela Rosa, supra, and Harris, supra, require either a court order or some "natural right" of custody to exist before a finding can be made that a father has "legal custody" for purposes of section 101(b)(1)(C). We have determined that our prior view of "natural right" was too restrictive in that it recognized only a mother's natural right in a child. We now hold that unless the local law otherwise dictates (i.e. through statutory or case law giving greater rights to one parent than to the other), the father's "natural right" to the custody of a child he has legitimated is equal to the "natural right" of the mother to the child's custody. To the extent that Dela Rosa, supra, and Harris, supra, indicated otherwise, they are hereby modi- fied. By legitimating his child, the father has evinced his concern for and interest in his natural offspring. At that point, we can see no reason why the mother should have a greater right to the child than the father. The paramount consideration should then be, as always, the best interest of the child. See Dcmnally, supra. It is not for us, or for the

父母对[子女]的监护享有优先权利…… In Re Navarro, 77 Cal. App.2d 500, 505,175 P.2d 896, 899 (Dist. Ct. Ap. Cal. 1946)。另见 In Re Richard, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531, 537 P.2d 363 (1975)；Donnally v. Blackenstein, 167 Cal. App.2d 282, 334 P.2d 260 (Dist. Ct. Ap. Cal. 1959)。1 申请人的律师在口头辩论中主张，在维尔京群岛，经准正子女的每一位父母对该子女也享有平等的权利和义务。为支持这一主张，律师在上诉时提交了维尔京群岛一名法官在一宗子女监护案件中的未公布判决。该法官在其判决中明确表示，对于非婚生子女，“在母亲与父亲之间”，双方享有平等的监护权。我们同意所引案件中所表达的推理，因此裁定：非婚生子女经适当准正后，任何一方父母均不被推定比另一方对该子女的法定监护享有更大的权利。 如前所述，Dela Rosa, supra 和 Harris, supra 要求，在认定父亲为第 101(b)(1)(C) 条之目的享有“法定监护”之前，必须存在法院命令或某种监护的“自然权利”。我们已认定，我们此前对“自然权利”的看法过于限制，因为它仅承认母亲对子女的自然权利。我们现在裁定，除非当地法律另有规定（即通过成文法或判例法赋予一方父母比另一方更大的权利），父亲对其已准正子女的监护所享有的“自然权利”与母亲对该子女监护所享有的“自然权利”相等。Dela Rosa, supra 和 Harris, supra 若表明相反意见，特此予以修改。通过准正其子女，父亲已表明其对其亲生子女的关心和利益。此时，我们看不出母亲为何应比父亲对该子女享有更大的权利。最重要的考量应当一如既往，是子女的最佳利益。见 Donnally, supra。这不应由我们，也不应由

Immigration and Naturalization Service, to say what that is. The determination of whether, for example, such a child would be better off in the United States or in his native country, is to be made by the child's natural parents, or if necessary by a probate court, not by immigration officials. We do not by our decision in this case write the legal custody requirement out of the statute. What we do is change the presumption: rather than require affirmative evidence that the mother of a legiti- mated child has been deprived of custody, we will presume that the father has not been divested of his natural right to equal custody in the absence of affirmative evidence indicating otherwise. We believe that this interpretation of the legal custody requirement will give better effect to Congress' humane and remedial intent in including a legiti- mated child within the definition of child. See generally Matter of K—W—S—, 9 I&N Dec. 396, 409 (BIA 1958,1961; A.G. 1961). The primary purpose behind the legitimation requirements of sec- tion 101(b)(1)(C) is to prevent the circumvention of the immigration laws. We do not see how today's ruling will in any way promote or encourage fraud. The requirement that the child be legitimated under the applicable law remains in full force. By taking , the steps necessary to legitimate his child, prior to a time when any immigration benefit was sought, the beneficiary's natural father has shown the existence of a genuine parental relationship to his daughter. This is not a situation where there has been an ad hoc legitimation of a child solely to secure immigration benefits. Moreover, where there has been ad hoc legitima- tion in order to circumvent the immigration laws, a visa petition could still be properly denied. This situation would generally occur when the - rights of other parties, such as adoptive parents, stepparents, or a natural mother who has been awarded custody, have intervened. Such is not the situation here, or in the majority of cases. Under our prior interpretation of legal custody, it was difficult for a father who had gone to the trouble of legitimating his child, and who undoubtedly was the child's natural father, to qualify as the child's father under the immigration laws. Previously, if a father, as in this case, legitimated his child at an early age, but long before seeking immigration benefits through or on behalf of that child, he would be likely to find himself unable to satisfy the legal custody requirement when he later sought an immigration benefit. In a rare case, the mother may have abandoned the child, or otherwise relinquished all custody. (See e.g. Matter of Buenaventura,16 I&N Dec. 456 (BIA 1977)). In the usual case, however, this would not have occurred, and the father would find that it was simply too late to satisfy the require- ments of 101(b)(1)(C), as he had long ago legitimated the child but had not at that time had legal custody under Dela Rosa, supra, and Harris,

移民与归化局，来说明那是什么。例如，判定这样一个孩子在美国还是在原籍国会更好，应由孩子的亲生父母作出，必要时由遗嘱认证法院作出，而不是由移民官员作出。 我们本案的裁决并未将法定监护要求从法规中删除。我们所做的是改变推定：我们不再要求提供肯定性证据证明合法化子女的母亲已被剥夺监护权，而是在没有相反肯定性证据的情况下，推定父亲未被剥夺其平等监护的自然权利。我们认为，对法定监护要求的这一解释将更好地实现国会在将合法化子女纳入子女定义时所持的人道和补救意图。参见 generally Matter of K—W—S—, 9 I&N Dec. 396, 409 (BIA 1958,1961; A.G. 1961)。 第101(b)(1)(C)条合法化要求背后的主要目的是防止规避移民法。我们认为今天的裁决不会以任何方式促进或鼓励欺诈。子女须根据适用法律合法化的要求仍然完全有效。受益人的生父在任何移民福利被寻求之前，采取了使其子女合法化所必需的步骤，表明其与女儿之间存在真实的亲子关系。这不是仅为获得移民福利而对子女进行临时合法化的情形。此外，如果存在为规避移民法而进行的临时合法化，签证申请仍可被适当拒绝。这种情况通常发生在其他当事人的权利，如养父母、继父母或已被判予监护权的生母的权利，已经介入之时。本案或大多数案件中并非此种情况。 根据我们先前对法定监护的解释，一个不辞辛劳使其子女合法化、且无疑是该子女的生父的父亲，很难根据移民法符合该子女父亲的条件。以前，如果一位父亲如本案中那样在子女年幼时即将其合法化，但远在通过该子女或为该子女寻求移民福利之前，他很可能发现在后来寻求移民福利时无法满足法定监护要求。在极少数案件中，母亲可能已遗弃子女，或以其他方式放弃全部监护权。（参见 e.g. Matter of Buenaventura,16 I&N Dec. 456 (BIA 1977)）。 然而，在通常案件中，这种情况不会发生，父亲会发现满足第101(b)(1)(C)条的要求为时已晚，因为他早已将子女合法化，但当时根据 Dela Rosa, supra, 和 Harris,

supra, perhaps only because he did not then know of that requirement, and of our strict interpretation of it. We believe that Congress, whose overriding purpose has been to encourage family unity, would prefer a rule that does not make legitimation under the immigration laws so burdensome. Under Dela Rosa, supra, and Harris, supra, legal custody for pur- poses of section 101(b)(1)(C) required, in effect, actual physical custody of a child, and custody to the exclusion of everyone else, including the child's mother. Yet we have not had such a restrictive definition of legal custody under section 101(b)(1)(E), which defines adopted chil- dren. The cases have been clear that a parent may have legal custody of an adopted child while not residing with that child, and where in fact the parent and child may be thousands of miles apart. See Matter of Cho,16 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 1977); Matter ofM—, 8 MN Dec. 118 (BIA 1958; A.G. 1959). Moreover, in light of our holding that the natural parents of a child who has been legitimated have equal rights to the custody of that child, the exclusive custody aspect of our prior holdings is inappropriate. In sum, today's decision recognizes the natural rights of a legiti- mated child's father. We are not saying that the father's rights are now paramount, only that his rights together with the equal rights of the mother are paramount to the rights of any other party. Under our decision today, a father of an illegitimate child will no longer have to know in advance of section 101(b)(1)(C)'s legal custody requirement in order to satisfy that requirement. Unless there is evidence to show that the father of a legitimated child has been deprived of his natural right to custody, he will be presumed to share custody with the mother, and to satisfy the legal custody requirement of section 101(b)(1)(C). In the present case, the petitioner has indisputably legitimated the beneficiary under the applicable law, and there is nothing whatsoever to indicate that his natural right to custody has vested in someone else. He therefore qualifies as the father of the beneficiary for immigration purposes. His appeal will accordingly be sustained, and the visa peti- tion will be approved_ ORDER, The appeal is sustained, and the visa petition is approved.

supra，或许只是因为他当时不知道该要求以及我们对该要求的严格解释。我们认为，国会的主要目的一直是鼓励家庭团聚，它会倾向于一种不会使移民法下的合法化如此繁重的规则。 根据 Dela Rosa, supra, 和 Harris, supra，为第101(b)(1)(C)条之目的的法定监护实际上要求对子女的实际人身监护，且监护须排除其他所有人，包括子女的母亲。然而，我们在第101(b)(1)(E)条（该条界定收养子女）下并未对法定监护有如此限制性的定义。案件已明确，父母可以对收养子女拥有法定监护权，即使不与子女同住，且事实上父母与子女可能相隔数千英里。参见 Matter of Cho,16 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 1977); Matter ofM—, 8 MN Dec. 118 (BIA 1958; A.G. 1959)。此外，鉴于我们裁定已合法化子女的亲生父母对该子女的监护享有平等权利，我们先前裁决中的排他监护方面已不适当。 总之，今天的裁决承认合法化子女父亲的天然权利。我们并非说父亲的权利现在是至高无上的，只是说他的权利连同母亲的平等权利高于任何其他当事人的权利。根据我们今天的裁决，非婚生子女的父亲不再需要事先知道第101(b)(1)(C)条的法定监护要求才能满足该要求。除非有证据表明合法化子女的父亲已被剥夺其自然监护权，否则将推定他与母亲共享监护权，并满足第101(b)(1)(C)条的法定监护要求。 在本案中，申请人无可争议地根据适用法律使受益人合法化，且没有任何迹象表明其自然监护权已归属于他人。因此，他为移民目的符合受益人父亲的条件。其上诉将相应获准，签证申请将获批准。 命令，上诉获准，签证申请获批准。