Matter of McKee

Interim Decision #2782

临时决定第2782号

In Visa Petition Proceedings

在签证申请程序中

A-22354345

A-22354345

Decided by Board March 11, 1980

由委员会于1980年3月11日裁定

The petitioner has appealed from the decision of a District Director, dated December 12, 1978, denying the visa petition filed on behalf of the beneficiary as his spouse under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b). The record will be remanded. The petitioner, a 24-year-old United States citizen, married the beneficiary, a 25 -year-old native and citizen of Australia, on August 12, 1977 in Pensacola, Florida. On October 12, 1977, the petitioner filed a visa petition on the beneficiary's behalf, seeking to accord her im- mediate relative status. In his decision, the District Director found that the parties had separated, and, on that basis, he denied the petition. On appeal, the petitioner has raised several arguments in support of his claim that the District Director erred in considering the unsworn statement of the beneficiary that she and the petitioner had separated, in not affording the petitioner an opportunity to rebut this adverse evidence, and in considering the separation of the parties as a

申请人已就地区主任1978年12月12日的决定提出上诉，该决定拒绝了为受益人作为其配偶依据《移民与国籍法》第201(b)条、8 U.S.C. 1151(b)提交的签证申请。案件记录将发回重审。 申请人是一名24岁的美国公民，于1977年8月12日在佛罗里达州彭萨科拉与受益人结婚，受益人是一名25岁的澳大利亚本土出生公民。1977年10月12日，申请人为受益人提交了签证申请，寻求给予其直系亲属身份。在其决定中，地区主任认定双方当事人已分居，并据此拒绝了申请。在上诉中，申请人提出了若干论点，以支持其主张，即地区主任在考虑受益人关于其与申请人已分居的未经宣誓陈述方面、在未给予申请人反驳该不利证据的机会方面，以及在将双方当事人分居视为

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Interim Decision #2782

临时决定第2782号

valid basis upon which to deny the petition. In connection with the petitioner's last argument, we requested the position of the Immigration and Naturalization Service on April 24, 1979. In a memorandum dated June 22, 1979, the Service indicated their agreement with the rationale of the recent decision of Chan v. Bell, 464 F.Supp. 125 (D. D.C. 1978), thereby accepting the court's ruling that, where the parties to a marriage were living apart, but there was no contention that the marriage was a sham at its inception in that it had been entered into for the purpose of evading the im- migration laws, the Service could not deny the visa petition solely because the parties were no longer living together. In the past, this Board has held that a visa petition would only be approved where the petitioner established that he and the beneficiary had entered into a bona fide marriage which is presently viable and ongoing. See Matter of Mintah, 15 I&N Dee. 540 (BIA 1975). We found support for our position in the Congressional objective of preservation of the family unit through the immigration laws. See generally Matter of Lew,11 I&N Dec. 148 (D.D. 1965). A marriage that is entered into for the primary purpose of circumventing the immigration laws, referred to as a fraudulent or sham marriage, has not been recognized as enabling an alien spouse to obtain immigration benefits. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 T.T..S. 604 (1953); MeLat v. Longo, 412 F.Supp. 1021 (D. V.I. 1976); Matter of M—, 8 I&N Dec. 118 (BIA 1958); see generally Johl v. United States, 370 F.2d 174 (9 Cir. 1967). However, we have always recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage is intrinsically differ- ent from a nonviable or nonsubsisting one, see, e.g., Matter of Rahmati, 16 I&N Dec. 538 (BIA 1978), although we have denied visa petition approval in both instances. Chan v. Bell, supra, involved an appeal from the denial of a visa petition filed by a United States citizen petitioner on behalf of her husband. The parties in that case had known each other for several years prior to their marriage on January 10, 1975. The couple lived together for several months subsequent to their marriage during which time they jointly purchased property. In July 1975, they sepa- rated, but continued an amicable relationship and their joint property ownership. In May 1976, the petitioner informed the District Director by letter that she and her husband had separated. Based upon this separation, the District Director denied the visa petition on June 14, 1976. A subsequent appeal to the Board was denied on November 9, 1977. In its decision, the Chan court characterized the Attorney General's role in the adjudication of immediate relative visa petitions under section 201(b) of the Act as "limited: he is required to approve any true petition of a spouse of an American citizen in order that such spouse

拒绝申请的有效依据方面存在错误。 关于申请人的最后一项论点，我们于1979年4月24日征求了移民和归化局的意见。在1979年6月22日的备忘录中，该局表示同意近期Chan v. Bell, 464 F.Supp. 125 (D. D.C. 1978)判决的理由，从而接受法院的裁定，即如果婚姻双方当事人分居生活，但无人主张该婚姻在缔结时即为虚假婚姻、系为规避移民法之目的而缔结，则该局不能仅因双方当事人不再共同生活而拒绝签证申请。 过去，本委员会曾裁定，只有在申请人证明其与受益人缔结了真实婚姻且该婚姻目前可存续并持续的情况下，签证申请才会被批准。见Matter of Mintah, 15 I&N Dec. 540 (BIA 1975)。我们通过移民法维护家庭单位的国会目标中找到了对我们立场的支持。一般见Matter of Lew, 11 I&N Dec. 148 (D.D. 1965)。为规避移民法的主要目的而缔结的婚姻，被称为欺诈性或虚假婚姻，未被承认能使外籍配偶获得移民福利。见Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953)；MeLat v. Longo, 412 F.Supp. 1021 (D. V.I. 1976)；Matter of M—, 8 I&N Dec. 118 (BIA 1958)；一般见Johl v. United States, 370 F.2d 174 (9 Cir. 1967)。然而，我们一直承认，欺诈性或虚假婚姻与不可存续或不持续的婚姻在本质上是不同的，例如见Matter of Rahmati, 16 I&N Dec. 538 (BIA 1978)，尽管我们在两种情形下都拒绝了签证申请批准。 Chan v. Bell, supra，涉及对一名美国公民申请人为其丈夫提交的签证申请被拒一事提出的上诉。该案双方当事人于1975年1月10日结婚前已相识数年。婚后，这对夫妇共同生活了数月，其间共同购置了财产。1975年7月，他们分居，但继续保持友好关系及共同财产所有权。1976年5月，申请人致函地区主任，告知其与丈夫已分居。基于该分居，地区主任于1976年6月14日拒绝了签证申请。随后向本委员会提出的上诉于1977年11月9日被驳回。 在其判决中，Chan法院将司法部长在依据该法第201(b)条裁定直系亲属签证申请中的角色描述为“有限的：他必须批准美国公民配偶的任何真实申请，以便该配偶

may secure immediate relative status." Id. at 127. Compare Menezes v. INS 601 F.2d 1028 (9 Cir. 1979). See also Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868 (9 Cir. 1979). The court noted that, at the time the visa petition was filed, the parties were lawfully married and that no divorce or legal separation had taken place, nor had any proceedings for divorce or legal separation been instituted. The court then went on to state its reasons for rejection of our decision affirming the District Director's denial of the visa petition based upon our characterization of the Chans' marriage as "nonviable." The Chan court addressed the distinction between a sham and a nonviable marriage, recognizing that the Service is not precluded "from refusing to recognize fraudulent marriages." Id. at n. 8. How- ever, the court found no support in the statute or regulations for our refusal to approve a visa petition based on a finding that the parties to a valid marriage did not have a subsisting relationship. We find the reasoning of the court's decision in this regard persuasive. In the present case, the DiStrict Director denied the visa petition based upon his determination that-

可以获得直系亲属身份。”Id. at 127。比较Menezes v. INS 601 F.2d 1028 (9 Cir. 1979)。另见Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868 (9 Cir. 1979)。法院指出，在提交签证申请时，双方当事人合法结婚，且未发生离婚或合法分居，也未启动任何离婚或合法分居程序。法院随后阐述了其理由，说明为何拒绝我们维持地区主任拒绝签证申请的决定，该决定基于我们将Chan夫妇的婚姻定性为“不可存续”。 Chan法院论述了虚假婚姻与不可存续婚姻之间的区别，承认该局并非“不得拒绝承认欺诈性婚姻”。Id. at n. 8。然而，法院认为，在我们以有效婚姻双方当事人不存在持续关系为由拒绝批准签证申请方面， statute或法规中并无支持。我们认定法院判决在此方面的推理具有说服力。 在本案中，地区主任基于其认定拒绝了签证申请，即——

[lit must be established that a viable marriage exists both at the time of filing of the petition and at this time. On October 16, 191S, the beneficiary of the petition related to an officer of this Service that you and she were no longer residing together as man and wife. He, therefore, based his denial of the petition on the sole basis that the parties were not residing together. The record indicates that the parties entered into a marriage valid under the laws of Florida, the plage of celebration; there is no evidence that they have since obtained a legal separation or dissolution of that marriage under the laws of any state. Accordingly, we find that it was error for the District Director to deny the instant visa petition based solely on the separation of the parties. To the extent the Matter of Mintah, supra, indicates otherwise, it is hereby modified. However, it is important to recognize that, although a separation in and of itself is no longer a valid basis for denial of a visa petition based upon a determination that the marriage is not viable, it is a relevant factor in determining the parties' intent at the time of their marriage, i.e., whether the marriage is a sham. See Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9 Cir. 1975). In Bark, the court held that a marriage was a "sham" if "the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married." 511 F.2d at 1201. The court there found that the duration of a separation is relevant, but not dispositive, on the issue of intent, stating that— Conduct of the parties after marriage is relevant only to the extent that it bears upon their subjective state of mind at the time they were married. Evidence that the parties separated after their wedding is relevant in ascertaining whether they intended to

必须确立在提交申请时以及此时均存在有效婚姻。191S年10月16日，与本案申请相关的受益人向本局一名官员表示，您与她不再以夫妻身份共同居住。因此，他仅以双方未共同居住为唯一依据驳回了该申请。记录显示，双方缔结的婚姻根据婚礼举行地佛罗里达州的法律有效；没有证据表明他们此后根据任何州的法律获得了合法分居或解除该婚姻。据此，我们认定，地区主任仅以双方分居为由驳回本签证申请属于错误。就Matter of Mintah, supra表明相反意见的范围而言，特此予以修改。然而，必须认识到，尽管分居本身不再是以认定婚姻不具真实性为由驳回签证申请的有效依据，但它是判断双方在结婚时的意图（即该婚姻是否为虚假婚姻）的相关因素。参见Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9 Cir. 1975)。在Bark案中，法院认定，如果“新娘和新郎在结婚时无意共同建立生活”，则该婚姻为“虚假婚姻”。511 F.2d at 1201。该法院认定，分居的持续时间对意图问题具有相关性，但不具有决定性，并指出——双方在婚后的行为，仅在其与双方结婚时的主观心理状态相关的范围内具有相关性。双方在婚礼后分居的证据，在查明他们是否打算

establish a life together when they exchanged marriage vows. But evidence of separa- tion, standing alone, cannot support a finding that a marriage was not bona fide when it was entered.. .. Of course, the time and extent of separation, combined with other facts and circumstances, can and have adequately supported the conclusion that a marriage was not bona fide. 511 F.2d at 1202 (citations omitted). See also Matter of Phillis,15 I&N Dec. 385 (BIA. 1975). In the present case, no determination has been made regarding the parties' intent at the time of their marriage. Additionally, there is go evidence concerning the present status of the petitioner's marriage, i.e., whether the parties are legally separated or have dissolved their marriage, nor has there been compliance with the regulation requiring the Service to give the petitioner an opportunity to rebut any adverse evidence before rendering a decision. See 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(2); Matter of Holmes, 14 I&N Dec. 647 (BIA 1974). Accordingly, we will remand the record for further consideration and the entry of a new decision. Sec generally Matter of To, 14 I&N Dec. 679 (BIA 1974). The petition c should be given an opportunity on remand to submit any additional evidence he may have in support of the petition. • ORDER, The record is remanded.

共同建立生活方面具有相关性。但仅凭分居证据本身，不能支持认定婚姻在缔结时并非真实……当然，分居的时间与程度，结合其他事实和情况，能够且已经充分支持婚姻并非真实的结论。 511 F.2d at 1202（引注省略）。另见Matter of Phillis, 15 I&N Dec. 385 (BIA 1975)。 在本案中，尚未就双方当事人在结婚时的意图作出任何认定。此外，没有关于申请人婚姻现状的证据，即双方当事人是否合法分居或已解除婚姻，也未遵守要求该局在作出决定前给予申请人反驳任何不利证据机会的法规。见8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(2)；Matter of Holmes, 14 I&N Dec. 647 (BIA 1974)。因此，我们将把案件记录发回重审，以进一步审议并作出新决定。一般见Matter of To, 14 I&N Dec. 679 (BIA 1974)。应给予申请人机会，在发回重审时提交其可能拥有的任何支持申请的其他证据。 命令：案件记录发回重审。