Matter of D-R-

Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 445 (BIA 2011) Interim Decision #3708

引用为 25 I&N Dec. 445 (BIA 2011) 临时决定第3708号

Decided April 6, 2011

2011年4月6日裁定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

(1) The respondent’s deliberate omission from his refugee application that he was a special police officer during the Bosnian War, during which time he served in an entity that was part of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Srpska, could have affected or influenced the Government’s decision whether to grant him refugee status and was therefore a willful misrepresentation of a material fact.

(1) 被申请人在其难民申请中故意遗漏其曾在波斯尼亚战争期间担任特别警察的事实，在此期间他服役于塞族共和国武装部队下属的一个实体，该遗漏可能影响或左右政府是否给予其难民身份的决定，因此属于对重要事实的故意虚假陈述。

(2) The respondent is removable under section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (2006), where the totality of the record supported the conclusion that he assisted in the extrajudicial killing of 200 Bosnian Muslims that his unit was involved in capturing, including evidence of his command responsibility, his presence, his platoon’s active participation, and the finding that he must have been aware that many other Bosnian Muslims who were similarly situated had been executed nearby several days earlier.

(2) 根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(4)(D)条，8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (2006)，被申请人可被驱逐出境，因为全部记录支持以下结论：他协助了其所在部队参与抓捕的200名波斯尼亚穆斯林的法外处决，包括有关其指挥责任、其在场、其排的积极参与的证据，以及认定他必定知道许多其他处于类似情况的波斯尼亚穆斯林几天前已在附近被处决。

(3) An Immigration Judge may make reasonable inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence in the record as a whole and is not required to accept a respondent’s account where other plausible views of the evidence are supported by the record.

(3) 移民法官可以从整体记录中的直接证据和间接证据作出合理推断，并且当记录支持对证据的其他合理解读时，不必接受被申请人的说法。

(4) An expert witness is broadly defined as one who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education and who has specialized knowledge that will assist the Immigration Judge to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

(4) 专家证人的广义定义是：因知识、技能、经验、培训或教育而具备专家资格，并拥有将有助于移民法官理解证据或认定争议事实的专门知识的人。

FOR RESPONDENT: Richard A. Kulics, Esquire, Las Vegas, Nevada

被申请人代理律师：Richard A. Kulics，Esquire，内华达州拉斯维加斯

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Charles W. Baccus, Assistant Chief Counsel

国土安全部代理律师：Charles W. Baccus，助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: GRANT, MALPHRUS, and MULLANE, Board Members.

审理者：委员会合议庭成员：GRANT、MALPHRUS和MULLANE。

MALPHRUS, Board Member:

MALPHRUS，委员会成员：

The respondent, a native and citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina and lawful permanent resident of the United States, has appealed from a written decision of the Immigration Judge, dated November 24, 2009, finding the respondent removable based on conduct arising out of his service as a special police officer during the Bosnian War and ordering him removed from the United States to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Immigration Judge found that

被申请人系波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那国民及公民，并为美国合法永久居民，其就移民法官2009年11月24日作出的书面决定提出上诉，该决定认定被申请人因其在波斯尼亚战争期间担任特别警察的行为而可被驱逐出境，并命令将其从美国驱逐至波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那。移民法官认定，

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the respondent’s omission from his refugee application that he had served as a special police officer constituted a willful misrepresentation of a material fact, which rendered him removable under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2006), as an alien who was inadmissible at the time of entry under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2006). The Immigration Judge also concluded that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent “assisted, or otherwise participated” in an extrajudicial killing and is therefore removable under section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Act. Consequently, the Immigration Judge ordered the respondent removed from the United States. The respondent argues that his omission from the refugee application was not a material misrepresentation and that the Immigration Judge engaged in impermissible speculation to conclude that he assisted in an extrajudicial killing. He also argues that he was denied a fair hearing because counsel in the proceedings below did not object to the DHS’s documentary evidence and testimony, and he makes other arguments that he claims warrant a remand or termination of proceedings. The DHS has filed a brief in opposition to the appeal. The appeal will be sustained in part and dismissed in part, and the record will be remanded for further proceedings. We review the findings of fact made by the Immigration Judge to determine whether they are “clearly erroneous.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2010); see also Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002). We review de novo all questions of law, discretion, and judgment, including the question whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii); see also Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010).

被申请人在其难民申请中遗漏其曾担任特别警察的事实，构成对重要事实的故意虚假陈述，从而使其根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(1)(A)条，8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2006)，作为在入境时根据该法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2006)，不可入境的外国人而可被驱逐出境。移民法官还认定，国土安全部（“DHS”）已以明确且令人信服的证据证明被申请人“协助或以其他方式参与”了法外处决，因此根据该法第237(a)(4)(D)条可被驱逐出境。因此，移民法官命令将被申请人从美国驱逐出境。 被申请人主张，其在难民申请中的遗漏不构成重要事实的虚假陈述，且移民法官进行了不允许的推测以认定其协助了法外处决。他还主张，由于下级程序中的律师未对国土安全部的书面证据和证词提出异议，其被剥夺了公正的听证，并提出其他据称应发回重审或终止程序的主张。国土安全部提交了反对上诉的答辩状。上诉将部分获准、部分驳回，并将案件发回进一步审理。 我们审查移民法官作出的事实认定，以确定其是否“明显错误”。8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2010)；另见 Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002)。我们对所有法律、自由裁量和判断问题，包括当事人是否满足相关举证责任的问题，进行重新审查。8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii)；另见 Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010)。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. 事实与程序历史

The Bosnian War was a civil conflict arising from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. It was fought from 1991 to 1995 between the ethnic Serb-dominated Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was dominated by Bosnian Muslims. Prior to the war, the respondent served as a police officer for 21 years in the Republic of Srpska, where he specialized in training dogs to search for drugs and criminals. During the civil war, consistent with the Republic of Srpska Constitution, the Republic of Srpska Ministry of Internal Affairs police force, known as the “MUP,” became part of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Srpska. During this time, the respondent was employed as a special police officer, and in the summer of 1995, he was assigned to the Special Police Brigade at the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Jahorina Training Center, which was overseen by Dusko Jevic. While there, the respondent served as the leader

波斯尼亚战争是前南斯拉夫解体引发的内战。战争于1991年至1995年间在由塞族主导的塞族共和国与由波斯尼亚穆斯林主导的波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那联邦之间进行。战前，被申请人在塞族共和国担任警察21年，专门训练犬只搜寻毒品和罪犯。内战期间，根据塞族共和国宪法，塞族共和国内务部警察部队（称为“MUP”）成为塞族共和国武装部队的一部分。 在此期间，被申请人受雇为特别警察，并于1995年夏天被分配到内务部亚霍里纳训练中心的特别警察旅，该中心由Dusko Jevic监督。在那里，被申请人担任

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of the third platoon in the 2nd Company of the Training Center, where about 25 special police officers served under his command. His duties included being a dog training instructor and training police officers to secure or guard roads and regulate traffic. The respondent’s platoon and two others were under the command of Nedjo Ikonic. One of the final major events of the war concerned what became known as the Srebrenica massacre, where, in July 1995, the Serbian forces took control of a United Nations safe area in eastern Bosnia and, over the course of 1 week, executed between 5,000 and 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys. To prove its case, the DHS presented expert testimony and documents from the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague (“ICTY”) and the Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal. The documentary evidence, which the Immigration Judge found to be relevant and probative, included State Department reports, findings from ICTY trial judgments, and copies of real-time dispatch reports from field officers during the war that were seized by the ICTY after the war. It also included a 5-minute video compiled by the prosecutor for the ICTY as part of the proceedings in the prosecution of Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic and photographic images from a video taken by an independent Belgrade filmmaker, both of which primarily showed captured Bosnian Muslims along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road on July 13, 1995. See Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla-050117e.pdf. The record also included MUP records showing the respondent’s service with the Special Police Brigade during the war. Richard Butler, a criminal research specialist with the DHS who formerly worked as a military analyst for the ICTY, testified on military operations that occurred in Eastern Bosnia from 1992 to 1995, including those specifically related to the Srebrenica massacre. The Immigration Judge found his expert testimony to be credible and persuasive. The testimony and evidence showed that as the Serbian Army overtook Srebrenica and Bosnian Muslims fled the area, thousands were executed. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Radislav Kristic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf [hereinafter ICTY Kristic Trial Judgement] (“As thousands of them attempted to flee the area, they were taken prisoner, detained in brutal conditions and then executed.”). Butler testified that when the Serbian Army overtook Srebrenica, the Commander of the Jahorina Training Center received an urgent message to secure the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road between Konjevic Polje and the village of Kravika, a key escape route through the rugged mountainous terrain for fleeing Bosnian Muslims. Butler explained that the respondent’s platoon,

训练中心第2连第3排排长，约有25名特别警察在其指挥下。其职责包括担任犬只训练教官以及训练警察保卫或守卫道路和管制交通。被申请人的排和另外两个排由Nedjo Ikonic指挥。 战争最后的主要事件之一是后来被称为斯雷布雷尼察大屠杀的事件，1995年7月，塞尔维亚部队控制了波斯尼亚东部的一个联合国安全区，并在1周内处决了5,000至7,000名波斯尼亚穆斯林男子和男孩。为证明其案件，国土安全部提交了专家证词以及来自海牙联合国前南斯拉夫问题国际刑事法庭（“ICTY”）和波斯尼亚战争罪法庭的文件。 移民法官认定具有相关性和证明力的书面证据包括国务院报告、ICTY审判判决的认定，以及战争期间战地官员实时派遣报告的副本，这些报告在战后被ICTY查获。证据还包括ICTY检察官在起诉Vidoje Blagojevic和Dragan Jokic的程序中汇编的一段5分钟视频，以及一名贝尔格莱德独立电影制片人拍摄的视频中的照片图像，两者主要显示1995年7月13日布拉图纳茨-孔耶维奇波列公路沿线被俘的波斯尼亚穆斯林。见 Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla-050117e.pdf。 记录还包括MUP记录，显示被申请人在战争期间在特别警察旅服役。国土安全部刑事研究专家Richard Butler曾在ICTY担任军事分析师，他就1992年至1995年波斯尼亚东部发生的军事行动作证，包括与斯雷布雷尼察大屠杀具体相关的行动。移民法官认定其专家证词可信且有说服力。 证词和证据显示，当塞尔维亚军队占领斯雷布雷尼察、波斯尼亚穆斯林逃离该地区时，数千人被处决。见，例如，Prosecutor v. Radislav Kristic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf [以下简称 ICTY Kristic Trial Judgement]（“当他们数千人试图逃离该地区时，被俘、在残酷条件下被拘留，然后被处决。”）。 Butler作证称，当塞尔维亚军队占领斯雷布雷尼察时，亚霍里纳训练中心指挥官收到紧急消息，要求守卫孔耶维奇波列与Kravika村之间的布拉图纳茨-孔耶维奇波列公路，这是逃离的波斯尼亚穆斯林穿越崎岖山地地形的关键逃生路线。Butler解释说，被申请人的排，

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along with others from the Training Center, arrived on the road on July 12 and stayed until at least July 19. During that week, they did not leave the area and even slept outdoors. While there, the respondent’s platoon and others secured or guarded segments of the road and conducted joint “sweep” operations with Army troops and other special police in the surrounding mountainous area to secure the road and nearby area from escaping Bosnian Muslims. Butler’s testimony referenced a real-time field report in evidence, which stated that “two MUP companies [including] part of the forces for the Dog Breeding and Training Center [led by the respondent] have sealed off the area and are fighting the remaining Muslim forces from Srebrenica.” Butler also testified that between July 12 and July 18, 1995, many Bosnian Muslims surrendered or were captured along various segments of this road and that field communications showed that the MUP were almost entirely responsible for securing the road. On the morning of July 13, 1995, a total of about 1,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys (as young as age 15) surrendered on different points of the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road, including in the area of Sandici-Novici, which is the area of the road where the respondent testified that he and his platoon were stationed. Evidence showed Bosnian Muslims being induced to come out of the rough terrain by promises of food and water and humane treatment. Those who surrendered were taken to a warehouse in the village of Kravica, traveling in a convoy of dozens of trucks and buses on the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road that the respondent and his men helped patrol. At the warehouse, which was less than 2 miles from the respondent’s position on the road, MUPs shot and killed approximately 1,000 men and boys within 2 hours. Butler testified that they were then buried in mass graves. On July 16 or 17, the 2nd Company Special Police Brigade under Ikonic’s command, which included the respondent’s platoon as well as two Army units from the Bratunac Brigade, were involved in a joint sweep operation that resulted in the capture of about 200 Bosnian Muslim men and boys and four young children along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road. Jevic, the commander of the Training Center where the 2nd Company Special Police Brigade was based, testified on behalf of the respondent by televideo. According to his own testimony, Jevic was responsible for having the men loaded onto the buses. Those under Jevic’s command, including the respondent’s platoon, loaded the men onto buses before they were driven away. Jevic said that it was his understanding that the men were to be taken to Zvornik and that he could not have known what would happen to them. Jevic also stated that he never ordered these or any other captured Bosnian Muslims to be killed. Furthermore, he said he had no knowledge that anyone under his command, including the respondent, ordered these or any other captured men to be killed.

与其他来自训练中心的人一起，于7月12日抵达该道路，并至少停留至7月19日。在那周期间，他们没有离开该地区，甚至睡在户外。 在那里期间，被告的排和其他人确保或守卫了道路的各路段，并与陆军部队和其他特种警察在周边山区联合开展“扫荡”行动，以确保道路及附近地区没有逃离的波斯尼亚穆斯林。巴特勒的证词引用了在案证据中的一份实时战地报告，该报告称“两支MUP连队[包括]养犬与训练中心的部分部队[由被告领导]已封锁该地区，正在与来自斯雷布雷尼察的剩余穆斯林部队作战。”巴特勒还作证称，在1995年7月12日至7月18日期间，许多波斯尼亚穆斯林在这条道路的各个路段投降或被俘，战地通讯显示MUP几乎完全负责确保道路安全。 1995年7月13日上午，总共约1,000名波斯尼亚穆斯林男子和男孩（年龄最小15岁）在布拉图纳茨-孔耶维奇波列道路的不同地点投降，包括桑迪奇-诺维齐地区，该地区正是被告作证称他和他的排驻扎的道路区域。证据显示，波斯尼亚穆斯林被食物、水和人道待遇的承诺引诱走出崎岖地形。投降者被带到克拉维察村的一个仓库，乘坐由数十辆卡车和公共汽车组成的车队，行驶在被告及其手下协助巡逻的布拉图纳茨-孔耶维奇波列道路上。在该仓库，距离被告在道路上的位置不到2英里，MUP在2小时内枪杀了约1,000名男子和男孩。巴特勒作证称，他们随后被埋入乱葬坑。 7月16日或17日，伊科尼奇指挥下的第2连特种警察旅，包括被告的排以及来自布拉图纳茨旅的两支陆军部队，参与了一次联合扫荡行动，导致在布拉图纳茨-孔耶维奇波列道路沿线俘获约200名波斯尼亚穆斯林男子和男孩以及4名幼童。 耶维奇是第2连特种警察旅驻地训练中心的指挥官，通过电视视频代表被告作证。根据其本人的证词，耶维奇负责将这些人装上公共汽车。耶维奇指挥下的人员，包括被告的排，在这些人被带走之前将他们装上公共汽车。耶维奇说，他的理解是这些人将被带到兹沃尔尼克，他不可能知道他们会发生什么。耶维奇还表示，他从未下令杀害这些或任何其他被俘的波斯尼亚穆斯林。此外，他说他不知道他指挥下的任何人，包括被告，曾下令杀害这些或任何其他被俘男子。

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It is undisputed that none of the 200 who were captured were ever heard from again. 1 According to Butler’s testimony, they were apparently killed unlawfully, probably in a manner similar to the men at the Kravica warehouse. Butler also testified that it was well known by the time these 200 were captured that mass executions of Bosnian Muslims were taking place. Four years later, in June 1999, the respondent was admitted to the United States as a refugee, and he subsequently adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident in January 2002. The respondent omitted from his application for refugee status that he served as a special police officer in the Republic of Srpska during the Bosnian War. 2 He testified that he omitted this information because an International Organization for Migration (“IOM”) agent who assisted him in completing his application told him that he would be disqualified for refugee status if he revealed his former employment as a police officer. The respondent argues that the evidence does not establish that this omission constitutes a willful misrepresentation of a material fact under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Act. In addition, the respondent asserts that the Immigration Judge engaged in improper speculation to conclude that he “assisted, or otherwise participated” in an extrajudicial killing and is therefore removable under section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Act. The respondent does not dispute that he was present at the time the 200 men, all of whom he said were adult soldiers, surrendered to the police and military units that were there at the time, and he said that the Army took them away on the buses. He said that he did not know where the men were being taken or what would happen to them. He also denied ever hearing about the Kravica warehouse killings or any other mass executions of Bosnian Muslims while he served in the special police during the war.

无可争议的是，被俘的200人此后均杳无音讯。1 根据巴特勒的证词，他们显然被非法杀害，方式可能与克拉维察仓库中的男子类似。巴特勒还作证称，在这200人被俘时，波斯尼亚穆斯林遭到大规模处决一事已广为人知。 四年后，即1999年6月，被申请人作为难民获准进入美国，随后于2002年1月将其身份调整為合法永久居民。被申请人在其难民身份申请中遗漏了他在波斯尼亚战争期间曾在塞族共和国担任特警的事实。2 他作证称，他遗漏这一信息是因为协助他完成申请的国际移民组织（“IOM”）工作人员告诉他，如果他披露曾担任警察的前职，他将失去难民资格。被申请人主张，证据不能证明这一遗漏构成《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(1)(A)条所指的对重要事实的故意虚假陈述。 此外，被申请人声称，移民法官进行了不当推测，认定他“协助或以其他方式参与”法外处决，因而根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(4)(D)条可被驱逐。被申请人不争辩，当200名男子（他称均为成年士兵）向当时在场的警察和军事部队投降时他在场，他说陆军用巴士将他们带走。他说他不知道这些人被带往何处或会遭遇什么。他还否认在战争期间担任特警时曾听说过克拉维察仓库杀戮或任何其他对波斯尼亚穆斯林的大规模处决。

1 The four children captured along with the others were taken elsewhere and were not harmed. 2 In response to the question regarding his employment on the refugee application Biographic Information sheet (Form G-325C), which he signed in September 1998, the respondent indicated that from May 1992 to the present, he was “unemployed (part time jobs).” Moreover, on his refugee application, the Form I-590 (Registration for Classification as Refugee), which he signed in October 1999, the respondent indicated that his military service was only as a private in a Yugoslavian guard unit from 1970 to 1971. Later, when completing his application for permanent residence, the respondent answered “none” to the question about military service on the Form I-485 (Application to Register Permanent Resident or Adjust Status), although the Immigration Judge did not address any issue of misrepresentations on that application.

1 与其他人员一起被俘的四名儿童被带往别处，未受伤害。 2 在回答难民申请生物信息表（G-325C表）中关于其就业的问题时——他于1998年9月签署该表——被申请人表示，从1992年5月至今，他“失业（兼职工作）”。此外，在其于1999年10月签署的难民申请I-590表（难民分类登记表）上，被申请人表示其兵役仅为1970年至1971年在南斯拉夫卫队部队担任列兵。后来，在填写永久居留申请时，被申请人在I-485表（登记永久居民或调整身份申请表）中关于兵役的问题上回答“无”，尽管移民法官未处理该申请中任何虚假陈述问题。

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II. ANALYSIS

二、分析

A. Material Misrepresentation

A. 重要事实的虚假陈述

We agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent’s omission from his application for refugee status that he served as a special police officer in the Republic of Srpska constitutes a willful misrepresentation of a material fact, which renders him removable under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Act as an alien who was inadmissible at the time of entry. Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act renders inadmissible any alien who, “by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act.” The test for whether “concealments or misrepresentations were material is whether they had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.” Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988); see also Mwongera v. INS, 187 F.3d 323, 330 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. 288, 289 (BIA 1975)); Matter of Bosuego, 17 I&N Dec. 125, 130 (BIA 1979, 1980) (stating that a misrepresentation is material if it “tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the alien’s eligibility and which might well have resulted in a proper determination that he be excluded”). It is not necessary for the Government to show that the statement actually influenced the agency, only that the misrepresentation was capable of affecting or influencing the governmental decision. United States v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2001). The respondent admits that he failed to disclose his former employment as a police officer during the Bosnian War on his refugee application but argues that it was not a material misrepresentation. We do not agree. Todd Gardner, a Special Assistant with the Refugee Affairs Division of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, who is also an attorney and an expert in refugee processing, testified that failure to disclose police and military service during the Bosnian War would have prevented an appropriate line of inquiry regarding whether the applicant was barred from refugee status as a persecutor. He said that including this information would have prompted further questioning because of the human rights abuses that occurred during the war, although it would not have caused an automatic rejection of an application. Contrary to the respondent’s argument, the DHS does not need to establish that but for the misrepresentation, the respondent would have been denied refugee status. See United States v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d at 1101; see also, e.g., Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 812-13 (11th Cir. 2006). The respondent’s deliberate omission from his refugee application that he was a special police officer in the Republic of Srpska during the Bosnian War

我们同意移民法官的意见，即被申请人在其难民身份申请中遗漏了他在塞族共和国担任特警的事实，构成对重要事实的故意虚假陈述，这使他作为入境时不可入境的外国人，根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(1)(A)条可被驱逐。《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条规定，任何外国人“通过欺诈或故意虚假陈述重要事实，寻求获得（或已寻求获得或已获得）签证、其他文件或进入美国的许可或本法案规定的其他利益”，即为不可入境。“隐瞒或虚假陈述是否重要的检验标准是，它们是否具有影响移民和归化局决定的自然倾向。”Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988)；另见 Mwongera v. INS, 187 F.3d 323, 330 (3d Cir. 1999)（引用 Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. 288, 289 (BIA 1975)）；Matter of Bosuego, 17 I&N Dec. 125, 130 (BIA 1979, 1980)（指出如果虚假陈述“倾向于切断与外国人资格相关且很可能导致正确裁定其应被排除的询问线索”，则该陈述具有重要性）。政府无需证明该陈述实际影响了该机构，只需证明该虚假陈述能够影响或左右政府决定。United States v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2001)。 被申请人承认他在难民申请中未披露其在波斯尼亚战争期间曾担任警察的前职，但主张这不属于重要事实的虚假陈述。我们不同意。美国公民及移民服务局难民事务司特别助理托德·加德纳——同时也是律师和难民处理专家——作证称，未披露波斯尼亚战争期间的警察和兵役情况，将阻止就申请人是否作为迫害者被禁止获得难民身份进行适当的询问。他说，提供这一信息会引发进一步询问，因为战争期间发生了侵犯人权行为，尽管这不会导致申请自动被拒。 与被申请人的主张相反，国土安全部无需证明若非虚假陈述，被申请人将被拒绝给予难民身份。见 United States v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d at 1101；另见，例如，Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 812-13 (11th Cir. 2006)。被申请人在其难民申请中故意遗漏其在波斯尼亚战争期间曾担任塞族共和国特警的事实

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could have influenced the Government’s decision whether to grant him refugee status. Accordingly, the respondent’s concealment constitutes a willful misrepresentation of a material fact, which renders him removable under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Act. 3

可能影响政府是否给予其难民身份的决定。因此，被申请人的隐瞒构成对重要事实的故意虚假陈述，这使他根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(1)(A)条可被驱逐。3

B. Extrajudicial Killing

B. 法外处决

We also agree with the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that the DHS has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent “committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated” in an extrajudicial killing and therefore is removable under section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Act. This section cross-references section 212(a)(3)(E), which was amended by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (“IRTPA”), to make aliens who have committed torture or extrajudicial killings inadmissible to, and removable from, the United States. 4 Specifically, section 5501(a) of the IRTPA, 118 Stat. at 3740, amended section 212(a)(3)(E) of the Act by adding the following provision:

我们还同意移民法官的结论，即国土安全部已以明确且令人信服的证据证明，被申请人“实施、下令、煽动、协助或以其他方式参与”了法外处决，因此根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(4)(D)条可被驱逐。该条交叉引用第212(a)(3)(E)条，该条经《2004年情报改革与恐怖主义预防法》（Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638，“IRTPA”）修订，使实施酷刑或法外处决的外国人不可入境美国并可被驱逐出境。4 具体而言，IRTPA第5501(a)条，118 Stat. at 3740，修订了《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(3)(E)条，增加了以下规定：

(iii) Commission of Acts of Torture or Extrajudicial Killings

(iii) 实施酷刑或法外处决行为

Any alien who, outside the United States, has committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the commission of— (I) any act of torture, as defined in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code; or (II) under color of law of any foreign nation, any extrajudicial killing, as defined in section 3(a) of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350 note), is inadmissible. 5

任何外国人在美国境外实施、下令、煽动、协助或以其他方式参与实施—— (I) 任何酷刑行为，定义见《美国法典》第18编第2340条；或 (II) 以任何外国法律名义实施的任何法外处决，定义见《1991年酷刑受害者保护法》第3(a)条（28 U.S.C. 1350注），即为不可入境。5

3 To the extent the respondent implies that his failure to disclose his service as a police officer should be excused based on the advice he claimed to have received from the IOM officer who assisted him in completing his application, we do not agree. “‘The element of willfulness is satisfied by a finding that the misrepresentation was deliberate and voluntary.’ The INS does not need to show intent to deceive; rather, knowledge of the falsity of the representation will suffice.” Mwongera v. INS, 187 F.3d at 330 (quoting Witter v. INS, 113 F.3d 549, 554 (5th Cir 1997)); see also Espinoza-Espinoza v. INS, 554 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1977). The respondent does not dispute that his failure to disclose the information was intentional. We therefore conclude that the willfulness element has been met. 4 Section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Act was also amended by section 5501(b) of the IRTPA, 118 Stat. at 3740. 5 According to 28 U.S.C. § 1350(3)(a) (2006), the term “extrajudicial killing” means “a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.”

3 如果被申请人暗示，他未披露其担任警察的情况应基于他声称从协助他填写申请的IOM官员处获得的建议而得到原谅，我们不同意。“‘故意要件通过认定虚假陈述是蓄意和自愿的而得到满足。’INS不需要证明欺骗意图；相反，知道陈述的虚假性就足够了。”Mwongera v. INS, 187 F.3d at 330（引用Witter v. INS, 113 F.3d 549, 554 (5th Cir 1997)）；另见Espinoza-Espinoza v. INS, 554 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1977)。被申请人不争辩其未披露信息是有意的。因此，我们认定故意要件已得到满足。 4 该法第237(a)(4)(D)条也由IRTPA第5501(b)条修订，118 Stat. at 3740。 5 根据28 U.S.C. § 1350(3)(a) (2006)，“法外杀人”一词是指“未经依法组成的法院先前判决授权的蓄意杀人，该法院提供文明民族公认不可或缺的一切司法保障。但是，该词不包括根据国际法在外国授权下合法实施的任何此类杀人。”

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To determine whether the respondent is subject to removability under section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Act, the DHS must establish that he acted “under color of law” and that he “committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated” in the commission of an extrajudicial killing. The respondent’s actions during this period were clearly under color of law. His service with the Jahorina Training Center Special Police Brigade in 1995 was under the authority of the commander of the Center, and under the Constitution of the Republic of Srpska, the special police answered to the military command during wartime. However, even if he had been a police officer who was not under the control of the military in 1995, for purposes of this statute, he would have been acting under the color of law in his employment as a police officer for the Republic of Srpska. The respondent challenges the Immigration Judge’s determination that the DHS proved by clear and convincing evidence that he “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated” in an extrajudicial killing. While the Act does not define the phrase “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated,” the Attorney General has interpreted this phrase in the context of the persecutor bar, saying that “[t]he plain meaning of the relevant words in the statute is broad enough to encompass aid and support provided by a political leader to those who carry out the goals of his group, including statements of incitement or encouragement and actions that result in advancing the violent activities of the group.” Matter of A-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 774, 784 (A.G. 2005). The terms “are to be given broad application” and “do not require direct personal involvement in the acts of persecution.” Id. “It is appropriate to look at the totality of the relevant conduct in determining whether the bar to eligibility applies.” Id. at 785. The United States Senate Report for the proposed Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act of 2003, S.710, 108th Cong. (2003), explains the role of command authority as a form of assistance or participation in persecution and indicates the intended broad reach of the legislation. S. Rep. No. 108-209, at 10, 2003 WL 22846178, at *10 (Leg. Hist.). The Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act of 2003 was not passed as separate legislation, but the statutory language from this bill was incorporated into the IRTPA, which was enacted into law. The report states that the proposed act was “intended to close loopholes in U.S. immigration laws that have allowed aliens who have committed serious forms of human rights abuses abroad to enter and remain in the country.” Id. at 1-2, 2003 WL 22846178, at *1-2. It further provides as follows:

为确定被申请人是否根据该法第237(a)(4)(D)条可被驱逐，DHS必须证明他“以法律名义”行事，并且他“实施、命令、煽动、协助或以其他方式参与”法外杀人。被申请人在此期间的行为显然是以法律名义。他1995年在Jahorina培训中心特别警察旅的服役是在该中心指挥官授权下，并且根据塞族共和国宪法，特别警察在战时服从军事指挥。然而，即使他在1995年是一名不受军方控制的警察，就本法规而言，他在受雇为塞族共和国警察时也会是以法律名义行事。 被申请人质疑移民法官的裁定，即DHS以明确和令人信服的证据证明他“命令、煽动、协助或以其他方式参与”法外杀人。虽然该法未定义“命令、煽动、协助或以其他方式参与”这一短语，但司法部长在迫害者禁令的背景下解释了该短语，称“法规中相关词语的通常含义足够宽泛，涵盖政治领袖向执行其团体目标的人提供的援助和支持，包括煽动或鼓励的声明以及导致推进该团体暴力活动的行动。”Matter of A-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 774, 784 (A.G. 2005)。这些术语“应给予宽泛适用”并且“不要求直接个人参与迫害行为。”同上。“在确定资格禁令是否适用时，适当考虑相关行为的整体。”同上 at 785。 美国参议院关于2003年拟议的《反暴行外国人驱逐法》S.710, 108th Cong. (2003)的报告解释了指挥权作为协助或参与迫害的一种形式的作用，并表明该立法意图具有广泛范围。S. Rep. No. 108-209, at 10, 2003 WL 22846178, at *10 (Leg. Hist.)。2003年《反暴行外国人驱逐法》未作为单独立法通过，但该法案的法定语言被纳入IRTPA，后者已颁布成为法律。报告指出，拟议法案“旨在堵塞美国移民法中的漏洞，这些漏洞允许在国外实施严重形式人权侵犯的外国人进入并留在该国。”同上 at 1-2, 2003 WL 22846178, at *1-2。它还进一步规定如下：

The statutory language—“committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in”—is intended to reach the behavior of persons directly or personally associated with the covered acts, including those with command responsibility. Command responsibility holds a commander responsible for unlawful acts when (1) the forces who committed the abuses were subordinates of the commander (i.e.,

法定语言——“实施、命令、煽动、协助或以其他方式参与”——旨在涵盖与所涵盖行为直接或亲自相关的人的行为，包括负有指挥责任的人。指挥责任在以下情况下使指挥官对非法行为负责：(1) 实施暴行的部队是该指挥官的下属（即，

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the forces were under his control either as a matter of law or as a matter of fact); (2) the commander knew, or, in light of the circumstances at the time, should have known, that subordinates had committed, were committing, or were about to commit unlawful acts; and (3) the commander failed to prove that he had taken the necessary and reasonable measures to (a) prevent or stop subordinates from committing such acts, or (b) investigate the acts committed by subordinates in a genuine effort to punish the perpetrators. Attempts and conspiracies to commit these crimes are encompassed in the “otherwise participated in” language. This language addresses an appropriate range of levels of complicity for which aliens should be held accountable, and has been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation and construction. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 514 (1981); Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d 441, 444 (7th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253, 1257–59 (7th Cir. 1991); Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1192 (7th Cir. 1987).

这些部队在法律上或事实上处于其控制之下）；(2) 指挥官知道，或根据当时情况应当知道，下属已实施、正在实施或即将实施非法行为；以及(3) 指挥官未能证明他已采取必要和合理措施以(a) 防止或停止下属实施此类行为，或(b) 调查下属实施的行为以真正努力惩罚肇事者。实施这些罪行的未遂和共谋包含在“以其他方式参与”的语言中。该语言涉及外国人应被追究责任的适当共谋程度范围，并且一直是广泛司法解释和构建的主题。见Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 514 (1981); Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d 441, 444 (7th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253, 1257–59 (7th Cir. 1991); Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1192 (7th Cir. 1987)。

Id. at 10, 2003 WL 22846178, at *10. The cases cited in this provision indicate that there is a continuum of conduct ranging from passive acceptance, which does not meet the legal standard, to active, personal participation, which clearly does. See United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d at 1258 (citing Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34). See generally Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 208, 213-14 (BIA 2007) (discussing the particular significance of cases that Congress cited with approval in legislative history). These cited cases also make clear that one can be found to have “assisted” in persecution even if he has not “personally engaged in acts of violence.” Id.; see also Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d at 444 (stating that “assistance” in persecution is an independent basis for deportation, which “may be inferred from the general nature of the person’s role in the war, so the atrocities committed by a unit may be attributed to the individual based on his membership and seeming participation”). In light of this legislative history, we conclude that inadmissibility under section 212(a)(3)(E) of the Act is established where it is shown that an alien with command responsibility knew or should have known that his subordinates committed unlawful acts covered by the statute and failed to prove that he took reasonable measures to prevent or stop such acts or investigate in a genuine effort to punish the perpetrators. The Immigration Judge made reasonable inferences from the totality of the record to conclude that the respondent assisted in the commission of extrajudicial killings because he knew that the 200 Bosnian Muslims would be killed unlawfully, and even if he did not, he should have known that they would. We find no clear error in these factual findings. See Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 215 (finding no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s fact-finding as to the persecutors’ motive); Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486, 489-90 (BIA 1996) (noting that the motivation of the persecutor involves questions of fact). The respondent argues that he did not know what would happen to the 200 captured Bosnian Muslims and that the Immigration Judge’s conclusions to the

同上 at 10, 2003 WL 22846178, at *10。 本条款引用的案件表明，存在一个行为连续体，从不符合法律标准的被动接受，到明显符合的主动个人参与。见United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d at 1258（引用Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34）。一般见Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 208, 213-14 (BIA 2007)（讨论国会以批准方式在立法历史中引用的案件的特殊意义）。这些引用的案件也明确表明，即使一个人没有“亲自参与暴力行为”，也可以被认定“协助”迫害。同上；另见Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d at 444（指出迫害中的“协助”是驱逐的独立依据，其“可以从该人在战争中所扮演角色的一般性质推断，因此一个单位实施的暴行可以基于个人的成员身份和看似参与而归因于该个人”）。鉴于这一立法历史，我们认定，如果表明负有指挥责任的外国人知道或应当知道其下属实施了法规所涵盖的非法行为，并且未能证明他采取了合理措施防止或停止此类行为或调查以真正努力惩罚肇事者，则根据该法第212(a)(3)(E)条确立不可入境。 移民法官从记录整体中作出合理推断，认定被申请人协助实施法外杀人，因为他知道200名波斯尼亚穆斯林将被非法杀害，即使他不知道，他也应当知道他们会被杀害。我们在这些事实认定中没有发现明显错误。见Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 215（在移民法官关于迫害者动机的事实认定中没有发现明显错误）；Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486, 489-90 (BIA 1996)（指出迫害者的动机涉及事实问题）。 被申请人争辩说，他不知道200名被俘波斯尼亚穆斯林会发生什么，并且移民法官的结论

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contrary were speculative. However, the Immigration Judge’s findings were based on reasonable inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence of the record as a whole, not on speculation. It is clear that “rank speculation and conjecture ‘cannot be substituted for objective and substantial evidence.’” Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bandari v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Salaam v. INS, 229 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that factual findings cannot be based on an “unsupported assumption”). However, an “inference is not a suspicion or a guess. It is a reasoned, logical decision to conclude that a disputed fact exists on the basis of another fact that is known to exist.” Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 448 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). An inference is not impermissible as long as it is supported by “record facts, or even a single fact, viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary experience.” Id. at 169. “Drawing inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence is a routine and necessary task of any factfinder,” and “[i]n the immigration context, the IJ is the factfinder.” Id. at 167. The Immigration Judge reasonably found, based on the testimony and evidence, that the respondent was aware of the Kravica warehouse killings before his unit was involved in capturing the 200 men and boys in question several days later. For example, the ICTY Krstic Trial Judgment, which was introduced as evidence in these proceedings, concluded that the Drina Corps Command “must have been well aware of the fact that the executions had taken place at the Kravica Warehouse” by the evening of July 13, 1995, given their proximity to the area and the noise and high levels of activity associated with the massive scale of the executions. ICTY Krstic Trial Judgment, supra, at ¶ 215. Butler indicated that it was implausible that the respondent would not have heard the mass executions, based on his close proximity to the Kravika warehouse. Moreover, an International Warrant for the respondent’s arrest issued by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was also admitted into evidence, states that the respondent “knew that his subordinates took part in the execution of detainees at Kravica.” Given that the respondent must have been aware of the Kravica warehouse killings, it was also reasonable for the Immigration Judge to infer that the respondent assisted in the unlawful killing of the 200 Bosnian Muslims that his unit was involved in capturing on the same stretch of road a few days later because he knew or should have known that they would face a similar fate. As Butler testified, it was well known at this time that Serbians were committing mass killings of Bosnian Muslims. While there is no evidence that the respondent ordered any extrajudicial killing, the totality of the record supports the conclusion that he assisted in such killing. This includes his command responsibility, his presence, his platoon’s active participation, and the finding that he must have been aware that mass killings of other similarly

相反的说法是推测性的。然而，移民法官的认定是基于对整个记录的直接证据和间接证据所作的合理推论，而非基于推测。显然，“纯粹的推测和臆断‘不能替代客观和实质性的证据。’”Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005)（引用Bandari v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2000)）；另见Salaam v. INS, 229 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000)（指出事实认定不能基于“无支持的假设”）。然而，“推论不是怀疑或猜测。它是基于已知存在的另一事实而得出争议事实存在的有理由的、合乎逻辑的决定。”Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2007)（引用Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 448 (2d Cir. 1999)（内部引号和括号省略））。只要推论得到“记录事实，甚至单一事实，以常识和普通经验的角度来看”的支持，该推论就不是不允许的。Id. at 169。“从直接证据和间接证据中得出推论是任何事实认定者的一项常规和必要的任务”，并且“[在]移民背景下，移民法官是事实认定者。”Id. at 167。 移民法官基于证词和证据合理认定，被申请人在其部队于数日后参与抓获所涉200名男子和男孩之前，就已知道Kravica仓库杀戮事件。例如，作为这些程序中的证据引入的ICTY Krstic审判判决认定，鉴于Drina Corps Command靠近该地区以及与大规模处决相关的噪音和高强度活动，该指挥部到1995年7月13日晚“必定已充分知晓处决发生在Kravica仓库这一事实”。ICTY Krstic Trial Judgment, supra, at ¶ 215。Butler表示，鉴于被申请人紧邻Kravika仓库，他不可能没有听到大规模处决。此外，波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那法院对被申请人发出的国际逮捕令（也已作为证据采纳）称，被申请人“知道其下属参与了在Kravica处决被拘留者”。 鉴于被申请人必定知道Kravica仓库杀戮事件，移民法官也有理由推断，被申请人协助了数日后其部队在同一路段参与抓获的200名波斯尼亚穆斯林被非法杀害，因为他知道或应当知道他们将面临类似的命运。正如Butler作证的那样，当时众所周知塞尔维亚人正在对波斯尼亚穆斯林实施大规模杀戮。虽然没有证据表明被申请人下令实施任何法外杀戮，但记录的整体支持他协助了此类杀戮的结论。这包括他的指挥责任、他在场、他排的积极参与，以及认定他必定知道当时对其他处境类似的

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situated Bosnian Muslims were ongoing at this time, particularly the nearby mass execution at the Kravica warehouse several days earlier. The Immigration Judge was not required to credit the respondent’s wholesale denial of any knowledge or culpability related to the mass executions of Bosnian Muslims captured on the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road. 6 She did not commit clear error in crediting the version of events that the DHS presented through expert testimony and documentary evidence. An Immigration Judge is not required to accept a respondent’s assertions, even if plausible, where there are other permissible views of the evidence based on the record. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”); see also Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that it was not error for the Immigration Judge to reject the applicant’s plausible account of the circumstances based on contrary evidence); Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that the Immigration Judge is not required to interpret the evidence in the manner advocated by the applicant). The Immigration Judge reasonably rejected the respondent’s claims of “ignorance” about the circumstances, finding that his testimony “was contradicted on multiple occasions by the testimony of other witnesses and the documents.” For example, the respondent testified that he was not aware of any mass executions taking place while he was involved in guarding and patrolling the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road and claimed that he had never heard of the Kravica warehouse killings. However, Butler testified that it was not plausible that the respondent would have been unaware of the Kravica warehouse killings at the time they happened. The respondent claimed that he and his men were stationed on the road for only 3 or 4 days on dates that he could not remember, while Butler testified that they were there from July 12 until at least July 19. The respondent also claimed his platoon’s only interaction with Bosnian Muslims was upon the surrender of the 100 to 200 men, that he never saw buses travel along the road other than the three buses for these men, and that when his platoon was involved in joint sweep operations, they were not looking for “anything specific.” However, Butler testified that there was much traffic on the road during this period, including on July 12 and 13 when thousands of women and children who had been taken out of Srebrenica after

波斯尼亚穆斯林的大规模杀戮正在进行，尤其是数日前在Kravica仓库附近的集体处决。 移民法官不必采信被申请人完全否认对在Bratunac-Konjevic Polje路上抓获的波斯尼亚穆斯林遭大规模处决一事有任何知情或罪责的说法。6 她采信DHS通过专家证词和书证所呈现的事件版本，并未犯下明显错误。在记录中存在其他可允许的证据观点时，移民法官不必接受被申请人的主张，即使该主张看似合理。见Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)（“在存在两种可允许的证据观点时，事实认定者在其间作出的选择不能是明显错误的。”）；另见Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 2008)（认定移民法官基于相反证据拒绝申请人看似合理的情况陈述并无错误）；Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2007)（指出移民法官不必以申请人主张的方式解释证据）。 移民法官合理驳回了被申请人关于对相关情况“不知情”的主张，认定其证词“多次被其他证人的证词和文件所反驳”。例如，被申请人作证称，他在参与守卫和巡逻Bratunac-Konjevic Polje路期间不知道发生任何大规模处决，并声称他从未听说过Kravica仓库杀戮事件。然而，Butler作证称，被申请人在Kravica仓库杀戮事件发生时不可能不知情。被申请人声称他和他的手下在路上的驻扎时间仅为3或4天，具体日期他记不清，而Butler作证称他们从7月12日一直驻扎到至少7月19日。 被申请人还声称，其排与波斯尼亚穆斯林的唯一接触是100至200名男子投降之时，他从未看到除运送这些男子的三辆巴士外还有其他巴士沿该路行驶，并且当其排参与联合扫荡行动时，他们并未寻找“任何特定目标”。然而，Butler作证称，在此期间该路上交通繁忙，包括7月12日和13日，当时数千名从Srebrenica被带出后

6 The respondent testified that when he saw Bosnian Muslims surrender on the road, “they would take off their weapons and put them together, and on the other side, [would put their] documents” before they were taken away in buses. Butler testified in a different context that, in general, the separation of Bosnian Muslims from their identity documents was common and was an indication that they would be executed.

6 被申请人作证称，当他看到波斯尼亚穆斯林在路上投降时，“他们会卸下武器并放在一起，在另一边，[会放]他们的文件”，然后他们被巴士带走。Butler在另一背景下作证称，一般而言，将波斯尼亚穆斯林与其身份证件分离是常见的，并且表明他们将被处决。

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being separated from men and boys were transported along this road in dozens of convoys of buses. In addition, Jevic testified in a transcribed interview for the ICTY, which was included in the record in this case, that the respondent’s platoon encountered dead Bosnian Muslims while conducting sweep operations along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road on July 16 and 17. 7 Jevic also indicated that the purpose of the sweep operations was to find escaping Bosnian Muslims. The need for a fact-finder to consider both direct and circumstantial evidence in the persecutor bar context is well established. See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992) (holding that persecutors’ motives may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence). It is often the case that there is not direct evidence that the respondent persecuted anyone, in part because of the lack of victim witnesses. See Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d at 444. The fact-finding in the persecutor bar context is analogous to the fact-finding in the context of extrajudicial killing. Also, contrary to the respondent’s assertions, the evidence here establishes more than a simple case of men dying incident to the military objectives inherent in a civil war. Instead, many men and boys who surrendered, often under the guise of humane treatment, were captured and later executed. Moreover, the respondent does not claim to have even asked what happened to the 200 who surrendered to his unit and others, at that time or any later time. Given the testimony and evidence as a whole, the Immigration Judge made reasonable inferences from the record to conclude that the respondent knew or should have known that the 200 men and boys would be unlawfully killed. Consequently, the DHS met its burden to establish that the respondent is removable under section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Act. The respondent alternatively argues that the application of this ground of removability to him would be impermissibly retroactive. It is true that the conduct in dispute occurred in 1995, years prior to the enactment of the IRTPA in 2004. However, the IRTPA provides that the amendments to sections 212(a)(3)(E) and 237(a)(4)(D) of the Act shall apply to “offenses committed before, on, or after the date of enactment” of the IRTPA. IRTPA § 5501(c), 118 Stat. at 3740. Thus, his argument is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. See Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37 (2006). In any event, “neither the Immigration Judge nor this Board may rule on the constitutionality of the statutes that we administer.” Matter of Rodriguez-Carrillo, 22 I&N Dec. 1031, 1035 (BIA 1999).

与男子和男孩分离的妇女和儿童被数十个巴士车队沿此路运送。此外，Jevic在为ICTY所作的转录访谈中作证（该访谈已纳入本案记录），被申请人的排于7月16日和17日沿Bratunac-Konjevic Polje路进行扫荡行动时遇到了死亡的波斯尼亚穆斯林。7 Jevic还表示，扫荡行动的目的是寻找逃跑的波斯尼亚穆斯林。 在迫害者条款背景下，事实认定者需要考虑直接证据和间接证据，这一点已确立。见，例如，INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992)（认定迫害者的动机可通过直接或间接证据确立）。通常情况下，没有直接证据表明被申请人迫害了任何人，部分原因是缺乏受害者证人。见Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d at 444。迫害者条款背景下的事实认定类似于法外杀戮背景下的事实认定。此外，与被申请人的主张相反，这里的证据确立的不仅仅是男子在内战固有军事目标中 incidental 死亡的简单情形。相反，许多投降的男子和男孩（往往是在人道待遇的幌子下）被抓获并随后被处决。此外，被申请人并未声称他当时或之后曾询问过向其部队和其他人投降的200人发生了什么。 鉴于整体证词和证据，移民法官从记录中作出合理推论，认定被申请人知道或应当知道这200名男子和男孩将被非法杀害。因此，DHS履行了其举证责任，确立被申请人根据该法第237(a)(4)(D)条可被驱逐。 被申请人另主张，将这一驱逐理由适用于他将构成不允许的溯及既往。确实，争议行为发生在1995年，即2004年IRTPA颁布之前数年。然而，IRTPA规定，对该法第212(a)(3)(E)条和第237(a)(4)(D)条的修正应适用于IRTPA“颁布日期之前、当日或之后实施的犯罪”。IRTPA § 5501(c), 118 Stat. at 3740。因此，他的主张与法规的明确语言不一致。见Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37 (2006)。 无论如何，“移民法官和本委员会均不得裁决我们所执行法规的合宪性。”Matter of Rodriguez-Carrillo, 22 I&N Dec. 1031, 1035 (BIA 1999)。

7 When he testified in the respondent’s case, Jevic said that his testimony before the ICTY was accurate.

7 在被申请人案件中作证时，Jevic表示他在ICTY面前的证词是准确的。

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C. Documentary Evidence and Expert Testimony

C. 书证和专家证词

The respondent alternatively argues that the documentary evidence and expert testimony that the Immigration Judge relied on to conclude that he assisted in extrajudicial killings was “obviously inadmissible and unreliable evidence.” Even though his prior counsel eventually stipulated at the hearing that he had no objection to the admissibility of any of the Government’s evidence, the respondent asserts that the attorney’s failure to object to this evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, deprived him of due process, and warrants a remand. First, the respondent’s failure to object to the admission of the evidence before the Immigration Judge constituted a waiver, and the issue was not preserved for our review on appeal. See Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260, 261 n.1 (BIA 2007); Matter of Garcia-Reyes, 19 I&N Dec. 830, 832 (BIA 1988); see also, e.g., Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1022-23 (10th Cir. 2007). It appears that after initially making some evidentiary objections, counsel below made a tactical decision to focus his arguments on the sufficiency of the evidence to establish whether the respondent was involved in an extrajudicial killing, given his denials. See Matter of Gawaran, 20 I&N Dec. 938, 942 (BIA 1995) (noting that “in the absence of egregious circumstances, an alien is bound by the ‘reasonable tactical actions’ of . . . counsel” (quoting Matter of Velasquez, 19 I&N Dec. 377, 383 (BIA 1986)). As a general rule, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the respondent must satisfy the requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), aff’d, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988). In addition to substantially complying with these requirements, the respondent must also show prejudice as a result of his attorney’s ineffectiveness. Id. at 640. In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, prejudice exists when the performance of counsel is so inadequate that there is a reasonable probability that but for the attorney’s negligence, the outcome of the proceedings may have been different. See Maravilla Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 2004). “To prevail, the respondent[] must show that the conduct of former counsel was so egregious that it rendered [the] hearing unfair.” Matter of B-B-, 22 I&N Dec. 309, 311 (BIA 1998). The Ninth Circuit has held that an alien need not strictly comply with all the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada when the record reflects a “clear and obvious case of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Ray v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 2006). 8 The respondent, through new counsel on appeal,

被申请人另主张，移民法官据以认定其协助实施法外处决的书面证据和专家证言属于“明显不可采纳且不可靠的证据”。尽管其先前律师最终在听证时表示对政府任何证据的可采性均无异议，被申请人仍主张该律师未对该证据提出异议构成律师无效协助，剥夺了其正当程序权利，并应发回重审。 第一，被申请人在移民法官面前未对证据的可采性提出异议，构成放弃，该问题未予保留以供本院上诉审查。见 Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260, 261 n.1 (BIA 2007)；Matter of Garcia-Reyes, 19 I&N Dec. 830, 832 (BIA 1988)；另见，例如，Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1022-23 (10th Cir. 2007)。看来，下级律师在最初提出一些证据异议后，作出了战术性决定，鉴于被申请人的否认，将其论点集中于证据是否足以证明被申请人是否参与法外处决。见 Matter of Gawaran, 20 I&N Dec. 938, 942 (BIA 1995)（指出“在无恶劣情形的情况下，外国人受……律师‘合理战术行为’的约束”（引用 Matter of Velasquez, 19 I&N Dec. 377, 383 (BIA 1986)））。 作为一般规则，要就律师无效协助主张获得支持，被申请人必须满足 Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), aff’d, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988) 中规定的要求。除实质遵守这些要求外，被申请人还必须证明因律师无效而受到损害。Id. at 640。在审理本案的美国第9巡回上诉法院辖区内，当律师的表现如此不充分，以致若非律师的过失，诉讼结果有合理可能不同时，即存在损害。见 Maravilla Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 2004)。“要获得支持，被申请人[]必须表明前律师的行为如此恶劣，以致[使]听证不公平。”Matter of B-B-, 22 I&N Dec. 309, 311 (BIA 1998)。 第9巡回法院已裁定，当记录反映出“明显且显而易见的律师无效协助情形”时，外国人无需严格遵守 Matter of Lozada 的所有程序要求。Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000)；另见 Ray v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 2006)。8 被申请人通过上诉新律师，

8 We do not intend to suggest that this exception to the Lozada requirements should be applied outside of this circuit.

8 我们无意暗示对 Lozada 要求的这一例外应适用于本巡回区之外。

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seeks to invoke this exception because he has not fulfilled the requirements of Lozada, including affording prior counsel an opportunity to respond to the allegations and filing a complaint with the appropriate disciplinary authorities. We do not agree that ineffective assistance of prior counsel was clear and obvious in this case. In immigration proceedings, the “sole test for admission of evidence is whether the evidence is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair.” Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, e.g., Nyama v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 2004); Matter of DeVera, 16 I&N Dec. 266, 268-69 (BIA 1977). It is well settled that the Federal Rules of Evidence are not binding in immigration proceedings and that Immigration Judges have broad discretion to admit and consider relevant and probative evidence. Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010); Matter of DeVera, 16 I&N Dec. at 268; see also section 240(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2006); Navarrette-Navarrette v. Landon, 223 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1955) (stating that “administrative tribunals may receive evidence which a court would regard as legally insufficient”). 9 The respondent argues that the DHS’s documentary evidence was inherently unreliable because it was not authenticated and there was no proper chain of custody. 10 In the Ninth Circuit, official records and public documents from foreign governments may be authenticated either through the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6 (2010) or through any recognized procedure, including the Federal Rules of Evidence. Vatyan v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2007). The method of authentication that the party submitting the evidence utilizes may affect the weight of the evidence, and Immigration Judges “retain broad discretion to accept a document as authentic or not based on the particular factual showing presented.”

试图援引该例外，因为他未满足 Lozada 的要求，包括给予前律师对指控作出回应的机会，以及向适当的纪律主管机构提出投诉。我们不同意本案中前律师的无效协助是明显且显而易见的。 在移民程序中，“采纳证据的唯一检验标准是证据是否具有证明力及其采纳是否基本公平。”Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995)；另见，例如，Nyama v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 2004)；Matter of DeVera, 16 I&N Dec. 266, 268-69 (BIA 1977)。众所周知，联邦证据规则在移民程序中不具有约束力，移民法官在采纳和考虑相关且具有证明力的证据方面拥有广泛裁量权。Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010)；Matter of DeVera, 16 I&N Dec. at 268；另见该法第240(b)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2006)；Navarrette-Navarrette v. Landon, 223 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1955)（指出“行政法庭可以接收法院会视为法律上不充分的证据”）。9 被申请人主张，DHS 的书面证据本质上不可靠，因为未经认证且没有适当的保管链。10 在第9巡回法院，外国政府的官方记录和公共文件可以通过 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6 (2010) 的要求或通过任何公认程序（包括联邦证据规则）进行认证。Vatyan v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2007)。提交证据的当事方所采用的认证方法可能影响证据的权重，移民法官“保留广泛裁量权，根据所呈现的具体事实认定文件是否真实”。

9 The Federal Rules of Evidence, while not binding, may provide helpful guidance in immigration proceedings because the fact that specific evidence would be admissible under the Federal Rules “lends strong support to the conclusion that admission of the evidence comports with due process.” Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1996); see also, e.g., Malkandi v. Holder, 576 F.3d 906, 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that while strict rules of evidence do not apply in immigration proceedings, the report in question would have been admissible under the Federal Rules); Matter of DeVera, 16 I&N Dec. at 270-71 (finding that a document was properly given full weight where its reliability was ensured because it fell within an express hearsay exception under the Federal Rules of Evidence). 10 The respondent also argues that he is not fluent in English, so the DHS’s documentary evidence was inadmissible because it had not been translated into his native language. However, no such requirement exists in immigration proceedings. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.33 (2010) (providing that any foreign language document must be translated into English to be admissible in Immigration Court). In any event, the respondent used a court-provided interpreter at the hearing.

9 联邦证据规则虽无约束力，但可在移民程序中提供有益指导，因为特定证据根据联邦证据规则可采纳这一事实“有力支持了采纳该证据符合正当程序的结论”。Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1996)；另见，例如，Malkandi v. Holder, 576 F.3d 906, 916 (9th Cir. 2009)（指出虽然严格证据规则不适用于移民程序，但所涉报告根据联邦证据规则本可采纳）；Matter of DeVera, 16 I&N Dec. at 270-71（认定一份文件被适当赋予完全权重，因为其可靠性因属于联邦证据规则下的明示传闻例外而得到保证）。 10 被申请人还主张其英语不流利，因此 DHS 的书面证据不可采纳，因为未翻译成其母语。然而，移民程序中不存在此类要求。比较 8 C.F.R. § 1003.33 (2010)（规定任何外文文件必须翻译成英文方可在移民法院采纳）。无论如何，被申请人在听证时使用了法院提供的口译员。

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Id. at 1185. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, authentication “is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims,” and may be accomplished through testimony of a “witness with knowledge.” See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)–(b)(1). In this case, Butler testified specifically about how the ICTY seized records from the archives of military and police installations, noting his own participation in some investigative search teams and operations. He also discussed the ICTY certification process for court proceedings, including how documents were identified, catalogued, and stored. While he was not involved in seizing or storing specific documents entered into evidence in this case, he recognized the indexing and control numbers that were placed on them in the certification process. He specifically discussed various documents in evidence, including MUP records of the respondent’s service during the war, ICTY trial judgments, the International Arrest Warrant, the video, and photographic images from the video footage. 11 In United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2009), which involved a criminal prosecution in Federal district court for false statements related to immigration documents arising out of the Bosnian War, the Fourth Circuit upheld the admission of some similar evidence based on testimony by Butler. 12 Also, as the Vidacak court discussed, issues regarding authentication and chain of custody generally go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Id. at 350 (citing United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.3d 1528, 1531 (10th Cir. 1989)). The respondent also argues that his counsel should have objected to Butler’s qualifications as an expert witness and alleges that Butler’s testimony should have been deemed inadmissible hearsay. We do not agree. An expert witness is broadly defined as someone who is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enterprises, 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994). An expert has “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also Matter of Marcal Neto, 25 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (BIA 2010) (stating that Immigration Judges may rely on experts “regarding matters on which they possess little or no knowledge or substantive expertise”). Butler was clearly qualified to testify as an expert on military operations during the Bosnian War. Butler worked for 7 years with

Id. at 1185。根据联邦证据规则，认证“通过足以支持认定所涉事项即其提出者所主张之事项的证据即得到满足”，并可通过“知悉情况的证人”的证言完成。见 Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)–(b)(1)。 在本案中，Butler 具体作证说明了 ICTY 如何从军事和警察设施的档案中扣押记录，并指出其本人参与了一些调查搜查组和行动。他还讨论了 ICTY 为法庭程序进行的认证过程，包括文件如何被识别、编目和存储。尽管他未参与扣押或存储本案中作为证据提交的具体文件，但他认出了在认证过程中加于这些文件上的索引和控制编号。他具体讨论了证据中的各种文件，包括被申请人在战争期间服役的 MUP 记录、ICTY 审判判决、国际逮捕令、视频以及视频片段中的照片图像。11 在 United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2009) 中，该案涉及因波斯尼亚战争引起的与移民文件有关的虚假陈述而在联邦地区法院提起的刑事起诉，第4巡回法院基于 Butler 的证言维持了一些类似证据的采纳。12 此外，正如 Vidacak 法院所讨论的，关于认证和保管链的问题一般涉及证据的权重，而非其可采性。Id. at 350（引用 United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.3d 1528, 1531 (10th Cir. 1989)）。 被申请人还主张其律师本应反对 Butler 作为专家证人的资格，并声称 Butler 的证言应被视为不可采纳的传闻。我们不同意。专家证人的定义很宽泛，即“因知识、技能、经验、培训或教育而有资格成为专家”的人。Fed. R. Evid. 702；另见 Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enterprises, 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994)。专家拥有“科学、技术或其他专门知识[，]将协助事实认定者理解证据或确定争议事实。”Fed. R. Evid. 702；另见 Matter of Marcal Neto, 25 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (BIA 2010)（指出移民法官可以就专家“在其知之甚少或没有知识或实质专长的领域”依赖专家）。Butler 显然有资格作为波斯尼亚战争期间军事行动的专家作证。Butler 在……工作了7年

11 One of the DHS exhibits contained a certificate of authenticity from the ICTY and a written declaration signed by the custodian of the records, which would have established the admissibility of this document without testimony. 12 While Butler did not separately reference every piece of evidence the DHS submitted, the respondent’s attorney later withdrew his objections to any of the DHS’s evidence, making further explanation of specific documents unnecessary.

11 DHS 的一份证物包含 ICTY 的真实性证书和记录保管人签署的书面声明，该证书和声明本可在无证言的情况下确立该文件的可采性。 12 尽管 Butler 未逐一提及 DHS 提交的每一份证据，但被申请人的律师后来撤回了对 DHS 任何证据的异议，使得对具体文件的进一步解释不再必要。

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the ICTY as a military analyst, specifically assisted in war crimes prosecutions, is a retired U.S. Army intelligence officer, and previously testified as an expert on the Srebrenica massacre before the ICTY at the Hague, the Bosnian War Crimes Court, and Federal courts in the United States. 13 See, e.g., United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d at 347-49. Further, since Butler was an expert witness, his testimony would not constitute inadmissible hearsay, even under the Federal Rules. “An expert is permitted to base his opinion on hearsay evidence and need not have personal knowledge of the facts underlying his opinion.” Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 706 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010). Also, an expert opinion may include reasonable inferences that the expert draws from the available facts and data. See Fed. R. Evid. 703. Thus, Butler’s testimony was not inadmissible, and it was proper for him to testify as to his inferences from the facts in evidence. 14 Also, his testimony was clearly adequate to support the admission of the DHS’s evidence in Immigration Court. 15 Moreover, to the extent that any of the DHS’s testimonial or documentary evidence, such as the transcript of Jevic’s testimony at the ICTY, could have

作为前南问题国际法庭的军事分析师，具体协助战争罪起诉，是一名退休的美国陆军情报官员，此前曾在海牙的前南问题国际法庭、波斯尼亚战争罪法院和美国联邦法院作为斯雷布雷尼察大屠杀问题的专家作证。13 参见，例如，United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d at 347-49。此外，由于Butler是专家证人，他的证词即使根据《联邦证据规则》也不构成不可采纳的传闻。“专家被允许将其意见建立在传闻证据之上，且无需对意见所依据的事实有亲身知识。”Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 706 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010)。此外，专家意见可以包括专家从现有事实和数据中得出的合理推论。参见Fed. R. Evid. 703。因此，Butler的证词是可采纳的，他根据证据中的事实作出推论并作证是适当的。14 此外，他的证词显然足以支持移民法庭采纳DHS的证据。15 此外，即使DHS的任何证词或书证，例如Jevic在前南问题国际法庭作证的笔录，在联邦法院可能构成不可采纳的传闻，仅此事实也不会使该证据在移民程序中不可采纳。

13 An Immigration Judge who finds an expert witness qualified to testify may give different weight to the testimony, depending on the extent of the expert’s qualifications or based on other issues regarding the relevance, reliability, and overall probative value of the testimony as to the specific facts in issue in the case. For example, the fact that Butler was employed by the DHS and had worked for the prosecutor at the ICTY could have affected the weight that the Immigration Judge chose to give to his testimony, but it would not have made the testimony inadmissible. See Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that involvement in an advocacy organization may affect the weight of an expert’s testimony but is not an adequate basis to exclude it); see also Akinfolarin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that the reasons that an expert’s affidavit was found to lack reliability, which were held to be sufficient to exclude the evidence, could have alternatively been applied to lessen the weight the evidence was given after admitting it). See generally Fed.R.Evid. 702 (discussing relevance of the expert testimony, qualifications of the expert witness, and reliability of the expert opinion). 14 The Fourth Circuit has held that the foreign government documents that Butler testified about in the Federal court case were not inadmissible hearsay because they fell within the hearsay exception of Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which concerns records and reports of public agencies. United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d at 351. 15 The respondent also argues that Gardner, who testified regarding the respondent’s omission on his refugee application, should not have been permitted to testify because he did not process the respondent’s application and had no knowledge of the respondent’s case, other than reviewing his refugee application at the hearing. However, as a United States Government official with significant experience in refugee processing, Gardner was qualified to testify as an expert and to give an opinion as to whether certain facts, if known, would have influenced the Government’s decision whether to grant the application. See United States v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d at 1101-02.

13 认定专家证人有资格作证的移民法官可以对证词给予不同的权重，取决于专家资格的程度，或基于与证词对案件中所涉具体事实的相关性、可靠性和整体证明价值有关的其他问题。例如，Butler受雇于DHS并曾为前南问题国际法庭的检察官工作这一事实，可能影响移民法官选择给予其证词的权重，但不会使该证词不可采纳。参见Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2007)（指出参与倡导组织可能影响专家证词的权重，但不构成排除该证词的充分依据）；另参见Akinfolarin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2005)（指出认定专家宣誓书缺乏可靠性的理由——该理由被认定足以排除证据——也可以替代性地用于在采纳证据后减轻给予该证据的权重）。一般参见Fed.R.Evid. 702（讨论专家证词的相关性、专家证人的资格以及专家意见的可靠性）。14 第四巡回法院认定，Butler在联邦法院案件中作证所涉及的外国政府文件不属于不可采纳的传闻，因为它们属于《联邦证据规则》第803(8)条的传闻例外，该条涉及公共机构的记录和报告。United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d at 351。15 答辩人还主张，就答辩人难民申请中的遗漏作证的Gardner不应被允许作证，因为他没有处理答辩人的申请，且除在听证会上审查其难民申请外，对答辩人的案件一无所知。然而，作为在难民处理方面具有丰富经验的美国政府官员，Gardner有资格作为专家作证，并就某些事实若被知悉是否会影响政府决定是否批准申请发表意见。参见United States v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d at 1101-02。

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constituted inadmissible hearsay in Federal court, this fact alone would not make the evidence inadmissible in immigration proceedings. Hearsay is admissible in immigration proceedings if it is reliable and probative. See, e.g., Kim v. Holder, 560 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2009); Matter of Grijalva, 19 I&N Dec. 713, 722 (BIA 1988); see also Duad v. United States, 556 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that any rule prohibiting hearsay evidence in immigration proceedings would be very detrimental to many asylum seekers). However, the hearsay nature may affect the weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006); Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 2005); Matter of Kwan, 14 I&N Dec. 175, 177 (BIA 1972). The Immigration Judge found the evidence presented by the DHS to be relevant and probative, and she properly considered it in making her factual findings. We do not agree that this is a case which involves clear and obvious ineffective assistance resulting from prior counsel’s failure to object to that evidence. Accordingly, we find no merit to the respondent’s arguments in this regard.

在联邦法院构成不可采纳的传闻，这一事实本身不会使该证据在移民程序中不可采纳。如果传闻可靠且具有证明力，则在移民程序中可以采纳。参见，例如，Kim v. Holder, 560 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2009)；Matter of Grijalva, 19 I&N Dec. 713, 722 (BIA 1988)；另参见Duad v. United States, 556 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009)（指出任何禁止移民程序中传闻证据的规则将对许多寻求庇护者非常不利）。然而，传闻的性质可能影响证据的权重。参见，例如，Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006)；Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 2005)；Matter of Kwan, 14 I&N Dec. 175, 177 (BIA 1972)。移民法官认定DHS提交的证据具有相关性和证明力，并在作出事实认定时适当考虑了这些证据。我们不同意本案涉及因先前律师未对该证据提出异议而导致的明显且显而易见的无效协助。因此，我们认为答辩人在这方面的主张没有依据。

D. Interpretation Issues

D. 口译问题

The respondent next generally challenges the competency of the interpreter and properly notes that “a competent translation is fundamental to a full and fair hearing.” Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Matter of Tomas, 19 I&N Dec. 464, 465 (BIA 1987). In such a challenge, the respondent must show both that the interpreter did not perform competently and that his hearing was prejudiced by that failure. Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th Cir. 1994). The respondent has not met either requirement here. On appeal, the respondent quotes some passages of imperfect English that he assumes are based on inaccurate translations and a few examples of confusion in the transcript, such as where the interpreter asked the witness to repeat some of his answers and to shorten them to allow her to interpret them verbatim. However, the respondent has not cited specific examples of material testimony that was not translated or was translated incorrectly. In general, interpretations are more challenging when a witness is testifying by televideo, as was the case here. An interpreter asking for clarification or making a correction to an interpretation does not necessarily show that the interpretation was inadequate and may instead indicate an effort to be as accurate as possible. Moreover, the respondent has not shown how “a better translation would have made any difference in the hearing’s outcome.” Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004). The respondent has not identified where the Immigration Judge relied on incomplete or incorrectly translated testimony

答辩人接下来概括地质疑口译员的胜任能力，并正确地指出“胜任的翻译是充分和公平听证的基础。”Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000)；另参见Matter of Tomas, 19 I&N Dec. 464, 465 (BIA 1987)。在此类质疑中，答辩人必须证明口译员未胜任地履行职责，且其听证因该失败而受到损害。Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th Cir. 1994)。答辩人在此未满足任一要求。在上诉中，答辩人引用了一些不完美英语的段落，他假定这些段落基于不准确的翻译，以及笔录中一些混乱的例子，例如口译员要求证人重复其部分回答并缩短回答以便她逐字口译。然而，答辩人未举出具体例子说明实质性证词未被翻译或翻译错误。一般而言，当证人通过电视视频作证时，口译更具挑战性，本案即是如此。口译员要求澄清或对口译作出更正并不必然表明口译不充分，反而可能表明其力求尽可能准确。此外，答辩人未表明“更好的翻译会对听证结果产生任何影响。”Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004)。答辩人未指明移民法官在何处依赖不完整或错误翻译的证词

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in reaching her decision, and he has not shown that the outcome would have been any different, particularly given the Immigration Judge’s finding that the DHS’s evidence met the Government’s burden in this case.

作出其决定，且他未表明结果会有任何不同，特别是考虑到移民法官认定DHS的证据满足了本案中政府的举证责任。

E. Termination of Removal Proceedings

E. 终止驱逐程序

The respondent also seeks termination of the proceedings, arguing that the Immigration Judge lacked jurisdiction to address the issues in this case and that even if she did, the proceedings should be barred, because the respondent had been granted lawful permanent resident status more than 5 years prior to the commencement of these proceedings in March 2008. The respondent’s contention that many of the underlying issues in this case involve international law and war crimes, over which the Immigration Court does not have jurisdiction or competency, is wholly without merit. Contrary to the respondent’s assertions, these are civil immigration proceedings whose purpose is to determine his eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish him for criminal or other conduct in his home country. See generally INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (noting that the purpose of deportation or removal proceedings is not to punish past transgressions and that “[p]ast conduct is relevant only insofar as it may shed light on the respondent’s right to remain” in the United States). As discussed above, it is the respondent who chose to apply for and obtain refugee status in the United States and who was not truthful in the representations he made in that regard. The gravamen of these proceedings concerns whether he is entitled to maintain the privilege of the lawful permanent resident status that he later received in the United States. The Immigration Court clearly has the legal authority to adjudicate these matters. See section 240(b)(1) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1240.1(a)(1) (2010). We also do not agree that these proceedings are barred by a statute of limitations to revoke a grant of lawful permanent resident status. To revoke a grant of adjustment of status, the DHS can commence either rescission proceedings under section 246(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (2006), or removal proceedings under section 240. See Biggs v. INS, 55 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995). Rescission proceedings must be instituted within 5 years of the alien’s adjustment of status. See section 246(a) of the Act. However, the Act places no such time restriction on removal proceedings, which can be instituted at any time. See Biggs v. INS, 55 F.3d at 1401 & n.3. Contrary to the respondent’s assertions, the DHS had authority to initiate these removal proceedings, and a 5-year statute of limitations is not applicable. See Matter of Belenzo, 17 I&N Dec. 374 (BIA 1981). The respondent urges us to change our interpretation in light of Garcia v. Attorney General of the United States, 553 F.3d 724 (3d Cir. 2009), which held that a 5-year statute of limitations for seeking to rescind a grant of adjustment of status under

答辩人还寻求终止程序，主张移民法官缺乏处理本案问题的管辖权，且即使她有管辖权，程序也应被禁止，因为答辩人在2008年3月这些程序启动前5年多已获得合法永久居民身份。答辩人主张本案许多基本问题涉及国际法和战争罪，移民法院对此没有管辖权或权限，这完全缺乏依据。与答辩人的主张相反，这些是民事移民程序，其目的是确定他是否有资格留在我国，而非因他在母国的犯罪或其他行为惩罚他。一般参见INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)（指出驱逐或移除程序的目的是惩罚过去的违法行为，且“[过去的行为只有在可能说明答辩人留在美国的权利时才具有相关性”）。如上所述，是答辩人选择在美国申请并获得难民身份，且他在此方面的陈述不真实。这些程序的要点在于他是否有权维持他后来在美国获得的合法永久居民身份的特权。移民法院显然具有裁决这些事项的法律权限。参见该法第240(b)(1)条；8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1240.1(a)(1) (2010)。我们也不认为这些程序因撤销合法永久居民身份授予的诉讼时效而被禁止。要撤销调整身份的授予，DHS可以根据该法第246(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (2006)，启动撤销程序，或根据第240条启动移除程序。参见Biggs v. INS, 55 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995)。撤销程序必须在外国人调整身份后5年内提起。参见该法第246(a)条。然而，该法对移除程序没有此类时间限制，移除程序可以在任何时候提起。参见Biggs v. INS, 55 F.3d at 1401 & n.3。与答辩人的主张相反，DHS有权启动这些移除程序，且5年诉讼时效不适用。参见Matter of Belenzo, 17 I&N Dec. 374 (BIA 1981)。答辩人敦促我们根据Garcia v. Attorney General of the United States, 553 F.3d 724 (3d Cir. 2009)改变我们的解释，该案认定根据该法寻求撤销调整身份授予的5年诉讼时效

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section 246(a) of the Act also applies to removal proceedings. See also Bamidele v. INS, 99 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1996). However, this authority is not consistent with the law of the Ninth Circuit, where the case at hand arises. See Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 553 F.3d at 728 n.4; see also Monet v. INS, 791 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1986); Oloteo v. INS, 643 F.2d 679, 681-83 (9th Cir. 1981). We generally follow a circuit court’s precedent in adjudicating a case arising in that circuit. Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25, 31 (BIA 1989). Moreover, we continue to view our longstanding approach to this issue as consistent with the overall statutory scheme and congressional intent. See Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I&N Dec. 341 (BIA 2010) (applying Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)). Removal proceedings are different from rescission proceedings and have greater procedural safeguards for the alien. Stolaj v. Holder, 577 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, Congress amended section 246(a) of the Act to clarify that it is not necessary to rescind an alien’s permanent resident status before commencing removal proceedings. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 378(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-649; Kim v. Holder, 560 F.3d 833, 836-38 (8th Cir. 2009). We are aware of no circuit that has adopted the Third’s Circuit’s view regarding a 5-year statute of limitations on the commencement of removal proceedings. See Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 553 F.3d at 729-31 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Stolaj v. Holder, 577 F.3d at 655-56; Asika v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2004). Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Immigration Judge’s determination that removal proceedings were properly instituted against the respondent.

《移民与国籍法》第246(a)条也适用于遣返程序。另见Bamidele v. INS, 99 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1996)。然而，该判例与本案所在的第9巡回法院的法律不一致。见Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 553 F.3d at 728 n.4；另见Monet v. INS, 791 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1986)；Oloteo v. INS, 643 F.2d 679, 681-83 (9th Cir. 1981)。我们在裁决发生于某一巡回法院的案件时，通常遵循该巡回法院的判例。Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25, 31 (BIA 1989)。 此外，我们仍然认为，我们对这一问题长期以来的处理方式与整体法定体系和国会意图相一致。见Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I&N Dec. 341 (BIA 2010)（适用Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)）。遣返程序不同于撤销程序，并且对外国人提供了更大的程序保障。Stolaj v. Holder, 577 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 2009)。此外，国会修订了《移民与国籍法》第246(a)条，以澄清在启动遣返程序之前无需撤销外国人的永久居民身份。见Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 378(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-649；Kim v. Holder, 560 F.3d 833, 836-38 (8th Cir. 2009)。 我们不知道有任何巡回法院采纳了第三巡回法院关于启动遣返程序适用5年诉讼时效的观点。见Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 553 F.3d at 729-31 (Fuentes, J., dissenting)；另见，例如，Stolaj v. Holder, 577 F.3d at 655-56；Asika v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2004)。基于上述理由，我们维持移民法官关于对 respondent 适当启动遣返程序的裁定。

F. Other Relief from Removal

F. 其他免于遣返的救济

Finally, the respondent requests that the record be remanded to allow him to seek asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46. 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988) (“Convention Against Torture”), on account of his fear of criminal prosecution for war crimes based on his service during the war. Inasmuch as the respondent is removable under section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Act, he is statutorily ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the Convention Against Torture. Sections 208(b)(2)(A)(i), 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(c), 1208.16(d)(2) (2010).

最后，respondent 请求将案卷发回，以便他能够寻求庇护、暂缓遣返以及《禁止酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚公约》下的保护，该公约于1984年12月10日通过并开放供签署，G.A. Res. 39/46. 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984)（1987年6月26日生效；对美国于1988年4月18日生效）（“《禁止酷刑公约》”），理由是他担心因其在战争期间的服务而因战争罪受到刑事起诉。鉴于 respondent 根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(4)(D)条可被遣返，他在法律上不符合庇护、暂缓遣返以及《禁止酷刑公约》下暂缓遣返的资格。《移民与国籍法》第208(b)(2)(A)(i)条、第241(b)(3)(B)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B) (2006)；8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(c), 1208.16(d)(2) (2010)。

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However, the respondent is statutorily eligible to seek deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, and the Immigration Judge did not consider this issue in the first instance. We will therefore remand the record to the Immigration Judge for the sole purpose of providing the respondent the opportunity to establish his eligibility for such protection. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), 1208.16(c)(4). In remanding the record, we render no judgment on the merits of the respondent’s claim for protection. See Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. at 266. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be sustained in part and dismissed in part, and the record will be remanded. ORDER: The appeal is sustained in part and dismissed in part. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.

然而，respondent 在法律上有资格根据《禁止酷刑公约》寻求暂缓遣返，而移民法官未在一审中考虑这一问题。因此，我们将案卷发回移民法官，唯一目的是为 respondent 提供机会以证明其有资格获得此类保护。见8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), 1208.16(c)(4)。在发回案卷时，我们对 respondent 保护请求的实体问题不作任何判断。见Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. at 266。据此，respondent 的上诉将部分获准、部分驳回，案卷将发回。 命令：上诉部分获准，部分驳回。 进一步命令：案卷发回移民法官，以便按照上述意见进行进一步程序并作出新决定。

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