Matter of Rivera-Valencia

Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 484 (BIA 2008) Interim Decision #3607

引用为 24 I&N Dec. 484 (BIA 2008) 临时决定第3607号

File A43 643 008 - Chicago

案卷 A43 643 008 - 芝加哥

Decided April 2, 2008

2008年4月2日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

A judgment of guilt that has been entered by a general court-martial of the United States Armed Forces qualifies as a “conviction” within the meaning of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2000).

由美国武装部队普通军事法庭作出的有罪判决，符合《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)(A)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2000) 所指的“定罪”。

FOR RESPONDENT: Christopher A. Clausen, Esquire, Marshalltown, Iowa

被申请人代理律师：Christopher A. Clausen 律师，爱荷华州马歇尔敦

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Brendan Curran, Assistant Chief Counsel

国土安全部代理：Brendan Curran，助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: FILPPU, COLE, and PAULEY, Board Members.

审理法官：委员会成员 FILPPU、COLE 和 PAULEY。

FILPPU, Board Member:

FILPPU，委员会成员：

In a decision dated September 13, 2007, an Immigration Judge sustained the charges of deportability against the respondent and ordered him removed from the United States. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The Department of Homeland Security opposes the appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

在2007年9月13日的决定中，一名移民法官维持了对被申请人的驱逐出境指控，并命令将其驱逐出美国。被申请人对该决定提出上诉。国土安全部反对该上诉。上诉将被驳回。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

一、事实与程序历史

The respondent is a native and citizen of El Salvador and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. On February 14, 1997, he was convicted by a general court-martial in Fort Bliss, Texas, of “carnal knowledge” in violation of Article 120(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), 10 U.S.C. § 920(b) (Supp. II 1996). 1 In 1996, when the

被申请人是萨尔瓦多国民和公民，也是美国合法永久居民。1997年2月14日，他在德克萨斯州布利斯堡被普通军事法庭判定犯有“肉体认识”罪，违反了《统一军事司法法典》（“UCMJ”）第120(b)条，10 U.S.C. § 920(b) (Supp. II 1996)。1 在1996年，当

1 The respondent was also adjudged guilty of “indecent acts or liberties” with a person under 16, which constitutes a violation of Article 134 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1994).

1 被申请人还被判定犯有与未满16岁的人进行“猥亵行为或自由行为”罪，该行为构成违反UCMJ第134条，10 U.S.C. § 934 (1994)。

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Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 484 (BIA 2008) Interim Decision #3607

引用为 24 I&N Dec. 484 (BIA 2008) 临时决定第3607号

respondent committed his offense, Article 120 of the UCMJ provided as follows, in pertinent part:

被申请人实施犯罪时，UCMJ第120条的相关部分规定如下：

Rape and carnal knowledge

强奸和肉体认识

. . . . (b) Any person subject to this chapter who, under circumstances not amounting to rape, commits an act of sexual intercourse with a person—

…… (b) 受本章约束的任何人，在未构成强奸的情况下，与下列人员实施性交行为——

(1) who is not that person’s spouse; and (2) who has not attained the age of sixteen years; is guilty of carnal knowledge and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(1) 该人不是该人的配偶；且 (2) 该人未满16岁； 犯有肉体认识罪，并应受军事法庭可能指示的处罚。

. . . . (d) (1) In a prosecution under subsection (b), it is an affirmative defense that—

…… (d) (1) 在根据(b)款提起的起诉中，以下为积极抗辩——

(A) the person with whom the accused committed the act of sexual intercourse had at the time of the alleged offense attained the age of twelve years; and

(A) 与被告人实施性交行为的人在所指控犯罪发生时已满12岁；且

(B) the accused reasonably believed that that person had at the time of the alleged offense attained the age of sixteen years. (2) The accused has the burden of proving a defense under paragraph (1) by a preponderance of the evidence.

(B) 被告人合理相信该人在所指控犯罪发生时已满16岁。 (2) 被告人负有以优势证据证明第(1)款抗辩的责任。

Removal proceedings ensued, and in September 2007 the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent’s conviction by court-martial rendered him deportable from the United States as an alien “convicted” of a crime involving moral turpitude, an aggravated felony, and a crime of child abuse. Sections 237(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii), (E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii), (E)(i) (2000). In particular, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent’s carnal knowledge offense constituted “sexual abuse of a minor,” an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2000), that precluded him from qualifying for most forms of relief from removal.

驱逐程序随后进行，2007年9月，移民法官认定，被申请人被军事法庭定罪使其作为“被定罪”犯有涉及道德败坏罪、加重重罪和虐待儿童罪的外国人而可被驱逐出美国。《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(2)(A)(i)、(iii)、(E)(i)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)、(iii)、(E)(i) (2000)。特别是，移民法官认为，被申请人的肉体认识罪构成“对未成年人的性虐待”，属于该法第101(a)(43)(A)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2000) 下的加重重罪，这使他无法获得大多数形式的驱逐救济资格。

On appeal, the respondent does not challenge the Immigration Judge’s denial of his applications for relief. Nor does he dispute that the elements of the offense defined by Article 120(b) of the UCMJ are sufficient to support the charges of deportability. Instead, he asserts that the removal proceedings must be terminated because a judgment of guilt entered by a general court-martial does not qualify as a “conviction” for immigration purposes. In the alternative, the respondent argues that his particular court-martial conviction should not be recognized as a basis for removal because the Armed Forces did not inform him of his right to consular notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, available at 1969 WL 97928 (“Vienna Convention”).

在上诉中，被申请人没有质疑移民法官对其救济申请的拒绝。他也不争辩UCMJ第120(b)条所定义罪行的要素足以支持驱逐出境指控。相反，他主张驱逐程序必须终止，因为普通军事法庭作出的有罪判决不符合移民目的下的“定罪”。或者，被申请人主张，他的特定军事法庭定罪不应被承认为驱逐的依据，因为武装部队没有告知他根据《维也纳领事关系公约关于强制解决争端的任择议定书》第36条享有的领事通知权利，该公约于1963年4月24日开放签署，21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261，可查阅 1969 WL 97928（“维也纳公约”）。

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II. ISSUE

二、问题

The principal issue on appeal is whether a judgment of guilt of an alien, entered by a general court-martial of the United States Armed Forces, qualifies as a “conviction” within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

上诉中的主要问题是，由美国武装部队普通军事法庭作出的对外国人的有罪判决，是否符合《移民与国籍法》所指的“定罪”。

III. ANALYSIS

三、分析

A. Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act

A. 该法第101(a)(48)(A)条

As noted previously, the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent is removable under three separate grounds of deportability, each of which required proof by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent had been “convicted” of a crime. The term “conviction” is defined by section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, which states as follows:

如前所述，移民法官认定被申请人根据三个独立的驱逐出境理由可被驱逐，每个理由都要求以明确且令人信服的证据证明被申请人已被“定罪”犯罪。“定罪”一词由该法第101(a)(48)(A)条定义，其规定如下：

The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where—

“定罪”一词，就外国人而言，是指法院对该外国人作出的正式有罪判决，或者，如果判决有罪被暂缓，则指——

(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and

(i) 法官或陪审团已认定该外国人有罪，或该外国人已作出认罪答辩或不抗辩答辩，或已承认足以支持有罪认定的事实，且

(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.

(ii) 法官已命令对该外国人的自由施加某种形式的惩罚、刑罚或限制。

Section 101(a)(48)(A) was enacted pursuant to section 322(a)(1) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 (effective Apr. 1, 1997) (“IIRIRA”), and applies to “convictions . . . entered before, on, or after” IIRIRA’s enactment date. IIRIRA § 322(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-629; see also Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004).

第101(a)(48)(A)条是根据《1996年非法移民改革和移民责任法》第322(a)(1)条颁布的，该法为 Pub. L. No. 104-208 的C部分，110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628（1997年4月1日生效）（“IIRIRA”），并适用于“在IIRIRA颁布日期之前、当日或之后作出的定罪”。IIRIRA § 322(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-629；另见 Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004)。

B. Judgment of General Court-Martial as a “Conviction”

B. 普通军事法庭判决作为“定罪”

Whether a judgment of guilt entered by a general court-martial is encompassed by the language of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2007). In conducting such review, the touchstone of our analysis is the plain language of the statute. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984). The plain language of section 101(a)(48)(A) defines a “conviction” in part as “a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court.” Furthermore, a court’s formal judgment of “guilt” falls within the language of section 101(a)(48)(A) so long as it was entered in a “genuine criminal proceeding,” that is, a proceeding that is

普通军事法庭作出的有罪判决是否被该法第101(a)(48)(A)条的措辞所涵盖，是一个我们重新审查的法律解释问题。8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2007)。在进行此类审查时，我们分析的试金石是法规的平实语言。INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)；INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)。第101(a)(48)(A)条的平实语言将“定罪”部分定义为“法院对该外国人作出的正式有罪判决”。此外，法院的正式“有罪”判决属于第101(a)(48)(A)条的措辞范围，只要它是在“真正的刑事程序”中作出的，即该程序是

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“criminal in nature under the governing laws of the prosecuting jurisdiction.” Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I&N Dec. 684, 688 (BIA 2004).

“根据起诉管辖区的法律具有刑事性质。”Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I&N Dec. 684, 688 (BIA 2004)。

There is no dispute that a general court-martial is a “criminal” proceeding under the governing laws of the United States Armed Forces, and the respondent’s general court-martial unquestionably resulted in the entry of a formal judgment of his “guilt” beyond a reasonable doubt. UCMJ Art. 51(c), 10 U.S.C. § 851(c) (2000); United States v. Verdi, 5 M.J. 330, 335 (C.M.A.1978) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). Furthermore, because the respondent was a Specialist in the United States Army at the time of his court-martial, he was subject to the constitutional jurisdiction of the military justice system. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1987). As the Supreme Court has recognized, courts-martial are lawful tribunals with authority to finally determine any case over which they have jurisdiction. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 345 (1907) (holding that a judgment of acquittal entered by a general court-martial has preclusive effect in civilian courts for double jeopardy purposes). Thus, a trial by court-martial does not infringe on the constitutional rights of an accused who is properly subject to military jurisdiction, despite the absence of some protections afforded civilian defendants, such as the right to a trial by jury. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1994); Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950) (citing Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 8 (1921)). 2 Because the respondent’s crime was adjudicated in a proceeding that was “criminal in nature” under the laws of the prosecuting jurisdiction—i.e., the United States Armed Forces—we are satisfied that his “guilt” was determined in a “genuine criminal proceeding.” Matter of Eslamizar, supra. Thus, the only remaining question is whether that adjudication of guilt was entered by a “court.”

没有争议的是，普通军事法庭根据美国武装部队的法律是“刑事”程序，且被申请人的普通军事法庭无疑导致作出了其“有罪”的正式判决，且证明标准为排除合理怀疑。UCMJ Art. 51(c), 10 U.S.C. § 851(c) (2000)；United States v. Verdi, 5 M.J. 330, 335 (C.M.A.1978)（引用 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)）。此外，由于被申请人在其军事法庭审判时是美国陆军的一名专家，他受军事司法系统的宪法管辖权约束。Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1987)。正如最高法院所承认的，军事法庭是合法法庭，有权最终裁定其拥有管辖权的任何案件。Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 345 (1907)（裁定普通军事法庭作出的无罪判决在民事法院中具有双重危险目的的排除效力）。因此，军事法庭审判不侵犯适当受军事管辖权约束的被告的宪法权利，尽管缺乏向民事被告提供的一些保护，例如陪审团审判权。Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1994)；Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950)（引用 Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 8 (1921)）。2 由于被申请人的犯罪是在根据起诉管辖区——即美国武装部队——的法律“具有刑事性质”的程序中裁定的，我们确信其“有罪”是在“真正的刑事程序”中确定的。Matter of Eslamizar, supra。因此，唯一剩下的问题是，该有罪判决是否由“法院”作出。

The Immigration and Nationality Act does not define the term “court.” Therefore we give the word its ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning: “[a] governmental body consisting of one or more judges who sit to adjudicate disputes and administer justice.” Black’s Law Dictionary 378 (8th ed. 2004). A military judge presides over each general court-martial, and an accused may

《移民与国籍法》没有定义“法院”一词。因此，我们赋予该词其通常、当代和普通含义：“[a] 由政府机构组成，由一名或多名法官组成，他们开庭裁决争议并主持正义。”Black’s Law Dictionary 378 (8th ed. 2004)。每普通军事法庭由一名军事法官主持，被告可以

2 We emphasize, however, that “the protections in the Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to members of our armed forces.” United States v. Jacoby, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (C.M.A. 1960). Thus, a person prosecuted by general court-martial possesses many of the procedural protections afforded to civilian defendants, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, UCMJ Art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2000); the right to representation by counsel at public expense, UCMJ Art. 38(b), 10 U.S.C. § 838(b) (2000); and the right to call witnesses and present evidence, UCMJ Art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (2000); see also Weiss v. United States, supra, at 194 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that “men and women in the Armed Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards and judicial protection behind when they enter military service”).

2 然而，我们强调，“《权利法案》中的保护，除那些明示或经必要暗示不适用者外，均可为我们的武装部队成员所享有。”United States v. Jacoby, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (C.M.A. 1960)。因此，被普通军事法庭起诉的人拥有许多向民事被告提供的程序保护，例如反对强制自证其罪的特权，UCMJ Art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2000)；由公费律师代理的权利，UCMJ Art. 38(b), 10 U.S.C. § 838(b) (2000)；以及传唤证人和出示证据的权利，UCMJ Art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (2000)；另见 Weiss v. United States, supra, at 194 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)（指出“武装部队中的男女在进入兵役时并未将宪法保障和司法保护抛在身后”）。

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elect to be tried by a military judge alone or by a panel comprised of not less than five members. UCMJ Arts. 16(1), 26(a), 10 U.S.C. §§ 816(1), 826(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 3 Furthermore, the function of a general court-martial is, among other things, “to try persons subject to [the UCMJ] for any offense made punishable [thereunder]” and to “adjudge any punishment not forbidden.” UCMJ Art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000). Such a tribunal satisfies the conventional definition of a “court.”

选择由军事法官单独审判，或由不少于五名成员组成的审判组审判。UCMJ Arts. 16(1), 26(a), 10 U.S.C. §§ 816(1), 826(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)。3 此外，普通军事法庭的职能包括“审判受[《统一军事司法法典》]管辖的人员所犯的、[依该法]可予处罚的任何罪行”，并“判处任何未被禁止的刑罚”。UCMJ Art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000)。此种法庭符合“法院”的通常定义。

We recognize that some differences exist between civilian courts and general courts-martial. General courts-martial are not “Federal courts” in the strict sense; that is, they are not among the “inferior Courts” that Congress “may from time to time ordain and establish” pursuant to Article III, section 1 of the Constitution of the United States. Instead, courts-martial operate on an ad hoc basis and derive their constitutional jurisdiction from Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 & n.6 (1955) (citing Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 79 (1857) (“Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses . . . and . . . the power to do so is given without any connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States . . . .”)). Yet despite these differences between civilian and military courts, this Board has from its earliest days considered judgments entered by courts-martial, both domestic and foreign, to be valid “convictions” for immigration purposes. Matter of V-D-B-, 8 I&N Dec. 608 (BIA1960); Matter of F-, 8 I&N Dec. 469 (BIA 1959); Matter of F-, 5 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 1953), rev’d on other grounds, Matter of P-, 6 I&N Dec. 481 (BIA 1954); Matter of W-, 1 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 1943). We see nothing in the language of section 101(a)(48)(A) that would lead us to conclude that Congress intended to modify this historical understanding by limiting the term “court” to those organized under Article III of the Constitution or its counterparts under State law.

我们认识到，民事法院与普通军事法庭之间存在一些差异。普通军事法庭并非严格意义上的“联邦法院”；也就是说，它们不属于国会依据《美国宪法》第3条第1款“可不时设立”的“下级法院”。相反，军事法庭以临时方式运作，其宪法管辖权源自《宪法》第1条第8款，该款授予国会“制定治理和规范陆海军部队的规则”的权力。见 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 & n.6 (1955)（引用 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 79 (1857)（“国会有权规定对军事和海军犯罪进行审判和处罚……并且……授予这一权力与《宪法》第3条界定美国司法权毫无关联……”））。然而，尽管民事法院与军事法院之间存在这些差异，本委员会自成立之初起，就一直将国内外军事法庭作出的判决视为移民目的下的有效“定罪”。Matter of V-D-B-, 8 I&N Dec. 608 (BIA1960)；Matter of F-, 8 I&N Dec. 469 (BIA 1959)；Matter of F-, 5 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 1953), rev’d on other grounds, Matter of P-, 6 I&N Dec. 481 (BIA 1954)；Matter of W-, 1 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 1943)。我们在第101(a)(48)(A)条的语言中，没有发现任何内容会使我们得出结论认为，国会意图通过将“法院”一词限于依据《宪法》第3条组织的法院或州法律下的对应法院，来修改这一历史理解。

As we noted previously, the Supreme Court has long held that the judgments of courts-martial are to “be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance.” Grafton v. United States, supra, at 345. Consequently, it has been determined in the Federal sentencing context that for purposes of computing an individual’s criminal history as a basis for

正如我们先前所指出的，最高法院长期以来一直认为，军事法庭的判决“在其可合法审理的案件所涉问题上，应被赋予与民事法院判决同等的终局性和结论性”。Grafton v. United States, supra, at 345。因此，在联邦量刑语境中已确定，为计算个人犯罪历史作为

A military judge must be a member of a Federal or State bar whose qualifications for judicial duty have been certified by the Judge Advocate General for his or her particular branch of the service. UCMJ Art. 26(b), 10 U.S.C. § 826(b) (2000); see also Weiss v. United States, supra, at 167-68.

军事法官必须是联邦或州律师协会的成员，其司法职务资格已由其所属军种的军法署署长认证。UCMJ Art. 26(b), 10 U.S.C. § 826(b) (2000)；see also Weiss v. United States, supra, at 167-68。

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sentence enhancement, “[s]entences resulting from military offenses are counted if imposed by a general or special court martial.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(g) (2000), reprinted in USSG, § 4A1.2(g), 18 U.S.C.A. (2007). Similarly, in cases arising under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000), which makes it a crime for a person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to ship, transport, possess or receive a firearm in interstate commerce, the Federal courts—including the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this proceeding arises—have concluded that the term “any court” encompasses a general court-martial. United States v. Martinez, 122 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. MacDonald, 992 F.2d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Lee, 428 F.2d 917, 918 n.1, 920 (6th Cir. 1970) (arising under former 15 U.S.C. § 902(e), repealed by Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. IV, § 906, 82 Stat. 234 (1968)); United States v. Noble, 613 F. Supp. 1224, 1225-26 (D. Mont. 1985) (arising under former 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202, repealed by Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 449, 459 (1986)). These authorities lend further support to our determination that the statutory term “court” includes a general court-martial.

量刑加重的基础，“[由]军事罪行产生的刑罚，如果由普通或特别军事法庭判处，则予以计入”。《美国量刑指南手册》§ 4A1.2(g) (2000)，重印于 USSG, § 4A1.2(g), 18 U.S.C.A. (2007)。同样，在依据18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000)产生的案件中，该条规定“在任何法院被定罪、所犯罪行可判处超过一年监禁”的人在州际商业中运输、运送、持有或接收枪支构成犯罪，联邦法院——包括本案程序所在辖区的美国第七巡回上诉法院——已得出结论认为，“任何法院”一词涵盖普通军事法庭。United States v. Martinez, 122 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1997)；United States v. MacDonald, 992 F.2d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 1993)；see also United States v. Lee, 428 F.2d 917, 918 n.1, 920 (6th Cir. 1970)（依据原15 U.S.C. § 902(e)产生，该条由Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. IV, § 906, 82 Stat. 234 (1968)废止）；United States v. Noble, 613 F. Supp. 1224, 1225-26 (D. Mont. 1985)（依据原18 U.S.C. app. § 1202产生，该条由《枪支所有者保护法》Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 449, 459 (1986)废止）。这些权威依据进一步支持我们的认定，即法定用语“法院”包括普通军事法庭。

C. Effect of Ninth Circuit Precedent in Gubbels v. Hoy

C. 第9巡回法院在Gubbels v. Hoy案中先例的效力

In his appellate brief, the respondent relies heavily on a 1958 decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that a judgment of guilt entered by a general court-martial was not a “conviction” for immigration purposes, primarily because the “ad hoc” nature of such tribunals raised serious doubts as to whether it would be practicable for the alien to request or receive a judicial recommendation against deportation (“JRAD”), 4 which the court deemed an “important right or privilege” of the alien under the law as it then existed.

在其上诉状中，答辩人大量依赖第9巡回法院1958年的一项裁决，该裁决认定普通军事法庭作出的有罪判决不构成移民目的的“定罪”，主要理由是此类法庭的“临时”性质使人严重怀疑，外国人请求或获得反对驱逐的司法建议（“JRAD”）是否切实可行，4 而法院认为，根据当时有效的法律，该建议是外国人的一项“重要权利或特权”。

4 Before 1990, former section 241(b)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1988), provided as follows, in pertinent part:

4 在1990年之前，该法原第241(b)(2)条，8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1988)，相关规定如下：

The provisions of subsection (a)(4) respecting the deportation of an alien convicted of a crime or crimes shall not apply . . . (2) if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall make, at the time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported, due notice having been given prior to making such recommendation to representatives of the interested State, the Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall be granted an opportunity to make representations in the matter. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply in the case of any alien who is charged with being deportable from the United States under subsection (a)(11) of this section.

第(a)(4)款关于驱逐被判一项或多项罪行的外国人的规定不适用……(2) 如果对此外国人判处该罪行的法院在首次作出判决或宣判时，或在其后三十天内，向司法部长提出建议，建议不驱逐此外国人，且在此建议作出之前已向有关州、移民局和检察机关的代表发出适当通知，并给予其就此事项作出陈述的机会。本款规定不适用于依据本条(a)(11)款被指控应从美国驱逐的任何外国人。

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Gubbels v. Hoy, 261 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1958); cf. also Matter of Gian, 11 I&N Dec. 242 (BIA 1965) (holding that alien’s conviction by a French criminal court while serving overseas as a member of the United States Army could not serve as a basis for his deportation because the French court lacked authority to make a binding JRAD). But see Matter of W-, supra, at 486 (rejecting an opinion of the Solicitor of Labor, which had cited the unavailability of JRADs as a justification for refusing to treat courts-martial as “convictions” for immigration purposes). Because the present case arises within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gubbels v. Hoy, supra, lacks controlling precedential force. Nevertheless, we deem it appropriate to explain why we consider the rationale of that case to be inapposite here.

Gubbels v. Hoy, 261 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1958)；cf. also Matter of Gian, 11 I&N Dec. 242 (BIA 1965)（认定外国人作为美国陆军成员在海外服役期间被法国刑事法院定罪，不能作为其驱逐的依据，因为法国法院无权作出有约束力的JRAD）。But see Matter of W-, supra, at 486（驳回劳工部长的意见，该意见援引JRAD的不可获得性作为拒绝将军事法庭视为移民目的“定罪”的理由）。由于本案产生于第7巡回法院辖区，第9巡回法院在Gubbels v. Hoy, supra案中的裁决不具有约束性先例效力。尽管如此，我们认为有必要解释为何我们认为该案的推理在此不适用。

First, any present determination as to whether the respondent’s adjudication of guilt by a general court-martial constitutes a “conviction” must be determined by reference to section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, a provision of law not yet in existence when Gubbels v. Hoy, supra, was decided. And as we have explained, a judgment of guilt entered by a general court-martial is encompassed by the language of section 101(a)(48)(A). Second, assuming that Gubbels v. Hoy accurately characterized the capacity of an alien to receive a JRAD from a court-martial, 5 the decision lacks modern relevance because Congress abolished the JRAD pursuant to section 505 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (“IMMACT”). 6 Indeed, as early as 1959 we had explained the limited scope of Gubbels v. Hoy, concluding that it precluded the judgment of a court-martial from qualifying as a “conviction” only if the judgment was charged as a basis for deportability under former section 241(b)(4) of the Act, the only ground of deportability for

第一，目前关于答辩人被普通军事法庭判定有罪是否构成“定罪”的任何认定，都必须参照该法第101(a)(48)(A)条来确定，而该法律条款在Gubbels v. Hoy, supra案裁决时尚未存在。而且正如我们已解释的，普通军事法庭作出的有罪判决被第101(a)(48)(A)条的语言所涵盖。第二，假设Gubbels v. Hoy准确描述了外国人从军事法庭获得JRAD的能力，5 该裁决缺乏现代相关性，因为国会依据《1990年移民法》第505条，Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050（“IMMACT”）废除了JRAD。6 事实上，早在1959年我们就已解释了Gubbels v. Hoy的有限范围，认定它仅在判决被指控为原第241(b)(4)条——国会规定可获得JRAD的唯一驱逐理由——项下驱逐依据时，才排除军事法庭判决构成“定罪”的资格。Matter of F-, supra, at 471-72

5 In 1987 the Army Court of Military Review determined that Gubbels v. Hoy, supra, was “dated and no longer of precedential value” because it did not accurately reflect the ability of an alien serviceman to receive a JRAD from a military judge. United States v. Berumen, 24 M.J. 737, 741 n.2 (A.C.M.R. 1987) (indicating that JRADs or their functional equivalents were available in courts-martial), petition denied, 26 M.J. 67 (C.M.A. 1988). 6 In a 1998 Legal Opinion, the General Counsel of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service expressed the view that Congress’s elimination of the JRAD had “almost certainly deprived Gubbels of precedential value.” INS Legal Opinion No. 98-16, Bo Cooper for Paul W. Virtue, General Counsel, to Eloise Rosas, District Counsel, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 24, 1998), available at 1998 WL 1806687. In the wake of IMMACT, numerous legal commentators expressed much the same view. See Gregory E. Fehlings, Deportation as a Consequence of a Court-Martial Conviction, 7 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 295, 298-99 & n.27, 311-13 (June 1993); Samuel Bettwy, Assisting Soldiers in Immigration Matters, 1992-APR Army Law. 3, 13 (Apr. 1992); Ira L. Frank, Deportation of Alien Military Service Personnel, 13 U. Haw. L. Rev. 111, 122, 135 (Summer 1991).

5 1987年，陆军军事审查法院认定Gubbels v. Hoy, supra已“过时且不再具有先例价值”，因为它没有准确反映外国军人从军事法官处获得JRAD的能力。United States v. Berumen, 24 M.J. 737, 741 n.2 (A.C.M.R. 1987)（指出军事法庭可获得JRAD或其功能等同物），petition denied, 26 M.J. 67 (C.M.A. 1988)。 6 在1998年的一份法律意见中，原移民和归化局总法律顾问表示，国会取消JRAD“几乎肯定已使Gubbels丧失先例价值”。INS Legal Opinion No. 98-16, Bo Cooper for Paul W. Virtue, General Counsel, to Eloise Rosas, District Counsel, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 24, 1998), available at 1998 WL 1806687。在IMMACT之后，众多法律评论者表达了大致相同的观点。See Gregory E. Fehlings, Deportation as a Consequence of a Court-Martial Conviction, 7 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 295, 298-99 & n.27, 311-13 (June 1993)；Samuel Bettwy, Assisting Soldiers in Immigration Matters, 1992-APR Army Law. 3, 13 (Apr. 1992)；Ira L. Frank, Deportation of Alien Military Service Personnel, 13 U. Haw. L. Rev. 111, 122, 135 (Summer 1991)。

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which Congress had made JRADs available. Matter of F-, supra, at 471-72 (distinguishing Gubbels and holding that the respondent’s conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude by a foreign court-martial supported a charge of deportability under former section 241(a)(1) of the Act because no JRAD was available with respect to such a charge). Because Congress has now abolished the JRAD and enacted a statutory definition of a “conviction” that encompasses judgments of guilt entered by general courts-martial, we conclude that the rationale underlying Gubbels v. Hoy has been superseded by statute. Accordingly, we now hold that the judgments of general courts-martial retain their historical status as “convictions” for immigration purposes.

国会曾提供JRAD。Matter of F-, supra, at 471-72（区分Gubbels案，并认定： respondent因涉及道德败坏之罪行被外国军事法庭定罪，支持依《移民与国籍法》原第241(a)(1)条提出驱逐指控，因为就该指控而言不存在可用的JRAD）。由于国会现已废除JRAD，并制定了涵盖普通军事法庭作出的有罪判决的“conviction”法定定义，我们认定Gubbels v. Hoy案所依据的理由已被成文法取代。因此，我们现在裁定：普通军事法庭的判决为移民目的保留其作为“convictions”的历史地位。

D. Vienna Convention

D. 维也纳公约

The respondent’s final argument is that his conviction by general court-martial should not be treated as a “conviction” for immigration purposes because neither the military court nor his criminal defense attorney made him aware of his right to consular notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. 7 The argument lacks merit. Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act provides that a “conviction” exists for immigration purposes upon proof that a “court” has entered a formal judgment of the alien’s “guilt” in a genuine criminal proceeding. Whether an alien’s procedural right to consular notification under the Vienna Convention was violated prior to the entry of such a judgment simply has no bearing on the statutory analysis. Furthermore, once the statutory elements of a valid “conviction” are proven, immigration adjudicators are bound to give effect to the judgment in removal proceedings and cannot entertain collateral challenges to it, absent an affirmative showing that the judgment is void on its face. Doe v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Mansoori v. INS, 32 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 1994)); Matter of Madrigal, 21 I&N Dec. 323, 327 (BIA 1996); Matter of Fortis, 14 I&N Dec. 576, 577 (BIA 1974).

被申请人的最后一项主张是，其经普通军事法庭作出的有罪判决不应在移民目的上被视为“定罪”，因为军事法院和其刑事辩护律师均未告知其根据《维也纳公约》第36条享有的领事通知权。7 该主张缺乏依据。该法第101(a)(48)(A)条规定，在证明“法院”已在真实的刑事诉讼程序中对此外国人的“罪行”作出正式判决后，即存在移民目的上的“定罪”。外国人在该判决作出之前根据《维也纳公约》享有的领事通知程序性权利是否受到侵犯，与法定分析毫无关联。此外，一旦有效“定罪”的法定要件得到证明，移民裁决者在遣返程序中必须赋予该判决效力，且不得受理对该判决的附带质疑，除非有肯定性证据表明该判决表面上无效。Doe v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 2007)（引用 Mansoori v. INS, 32 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 1994)）；Matter of Madrigal, 21 I&N Dec. 323, 327 (BIA 1996)；Matter of Fortis, 14 I&N Dec. 576, 577 (BIA 1974)。

The Seventh Circuit has determined that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives foreign nationals an individually enforceable private right to consular notification. Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 835 (7th Cir. 2007). Even assuming that the respondent’s 1997 court-martial was conducted in derogation of that right, however, it is evident that such a violation would not invalidate or otherwise vitiate his conviction for criminal law purposes, much

第7巡回法院已认定，《维也纳公约》第36条赋予外国人一项可个人强制执行的私人领事通知权。Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 835 (7th Cir. 2007)。然而，即使假定被申请人1997年的军事法庭审判是在减损该权利的情况下进行的，显然此种违反在刑法目的上不会使其定罪无效或以其他方式使之失效，更

7 Article 36, Paragraph 1(b) of the Vienna Convention requires that the authorities of any signatory State must, upon arresting or detaining a foreign national, inform the foreign national that he has a right to communicate with and have access to his country’s consular officers.

7 《维也纳公约》第36条第1款(b)项要求，任何签署国的当局在逮捕或拘留外国人时，必须告知该外国人其有权与其本国的领事官员联系并会见领事官员。

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less render it void on its face. On the contrary, the Federal courts of appeals, including the Seventh Circuit, have held that neither the suppression of evidence nor the dismissal of an indictment is a proper remedy for violation of the right to consular notification. See, e.g., United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 197-98 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 2000);United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Instead, where such a right exists, it must be vindicated by means of civil litigation. See Jogi v. Voges, supra, at 835-36. Because violation of the right to consular notification has no effect on the validity of a conviction for criminal law purposes, it also has no effect for immigration purposes.

不会使其表面上无效。相反，包括第7巡回法院在内的联邦上诉法院已认定，无论是排除证据还是驳回起诉，均不是侵犯领事通知权的适当救济。参见，例如，United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2001)；United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 197-98 (5th Cir. 2001)；United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 2000)；United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000)（全体法官审理）。相反，在存在此种权利的情况下，必须通过民事诉讼途径予以维护。参见 Jogi v. Voges, 同上，第835-36页。由于侵犯领事通知权在刑法目的上对定罪的有效性没有影响，其在移民目的上也没有影响。

IV. CONCLUSION

IV. 结论

In conclusion, we agree with the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent’s adjudication of guilt by a general court-martial qualified as a “conviction” under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act. We therefore find no reversible error in his decision sustaining the charges of deportability. Because the respondent raises no other issues on appeal, his appeal will be dismissed.

总之，我们同意移民法官的认定，即被申请人经普通军事法庭作出的有罪裁定符合该法第101(a)(48)(A)条规定的“定罪”。因此，我们认定其维持可遣返指控的决定不存在可撤销的错误。由于被申请人在上诉中未提出其他问题，其上诉将被驳回。

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