Matter of Revelo

Interim Decision #2691

临时决定第2691号

In Visa Petition Proceedings

在签证申请程序中

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER.: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Joseph N. Tauber, Esquire George Indelicate 29 Hoyt Street Appellate Trial Attorney Stamford, Connecticut 069115

代表申请人： 代表移民局： Joseph N. Tauber，律师 George Indelicate 29 Hoyt Street 上诉审判律师 Stamford, Connecticut 069115

This case presents an appeal from the decision of the Acting District Director dated June 12, 1978, denying a visa petition filed on behalf of the beneficiary as the spouse of the petitioner pursuant to section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2). The appeal will be dismissed. The petitioner is a native and citizen of Ecuador who was admitted as a lawful permanent resident of the United States at New York on April 9, 1974. The beneficiary is a native and citizen of Colombia. On De- cember 18, 1976, the parties married in Stamford, Connecticut, after each had obtained Dominican divorces from their previous spouses in 19'75. The Acting District nirerter denied the visa petition concluding that the parties' marriage subsequent to the Dominican divorces was invalid under Connecticut law, and, thus, the beneficiary was not entitled to

本案是对代理地区主任1978年6月12日决定的上诉，该决定拒绝了依据《移民与国籍法》第203(a)(2)条、8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2)，为受益人作为申请人配偶提交的签证申请。上诉将被驳回。 申请人是厄瓜多尔本土出生公民，于1974年4月9日在纽约被接纳为美国合法永久居民。受益人是哥伦比亚本土出生公民。1976年12月18日，双方在康涅狄格州斯坦福德结婚，此前双方各自于19'75年从各自的前配偶处取得了多米尼加离婚判决。 代理地区主任拒绝了该签证申请，认定双方在多米尼加离婚后的婚姻依据康涅狄格州法律无效，因此受益人无权

preference immigration status through the petitioner. His conclusion was based on the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540, 295 A.2d 519 (1972), where the court ruled that in order for a foreign divorce to be recognized in Connecticut, at least one of the parties must be a good faith domiciliary of the foreign country where the divorce was obtained. Since the petitioner was a lawful permanent resident of the United States when the divorce took place and there was no record of the beneficiary having been in the Dominican Republic, the Acting District Director concluded that neither party was a Dominican domiciliary and the divorce would not be recognized under Connecticut law. The legal validity of a marriage is generally determined by the place of celebration. Matter of Levine, 13 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1969); Matter of Freeman, 11 I. & N. Dec. 482 (BIA. 1966). In the present case, Connecticut is the place of the marriage celebration, thus, we must evaluate the marriage's validity under Connecticut law. In Matter of Biebl, Interim Decision 2672 (BIA 1978), we examined the law of Connecticut and concluded that a bona fide domicile by at least one of the parties to the divorce in the country where the divorce took place was required in order to recognize it. 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(2) specifically requires a petitioner to establish the validity of a claimed divorce_ Since the petitioner has not submitted any evidence to prove that any of the parties to the two divorces was a Dominican domiciliary, the petitioner has not met his burden of proving that he is entitled to the immigration benefits sought. Matter of Brantigan, 11 I. & N. Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). However, the petitioner at oral argument has attempted to distin- guish the facts in the present case from those considered by the Connec- ticut court in Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, supra. He points out that Litvaitis dealt with an ex parte divorce unlike the mutual consent divorce which the petitioner and beneficiary in the present case obtained. Although we agree with the petitioner's contention that Litvaitis wsis not a mutual consent divorce, that difference does not require a differ- ent result from the Acting District Director's conclusion. In Litvaitis the Connecticut Supreme Court was not stating a rule limited to ex parte divorces. Bather, the court in Litvaitis was restating its previous holdings in other cases involving bilateral divorces, that a bona fide domicile by at least one of the parties was a requirement for recogni- tion under Connecticut law. See Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conu. 689, 92 A. 684 (1914); Rice v. Rice, 134 Conn. 440, 58 A.2d 523 (1948); State v. Cooke, 110 Conn. 348, 148 A. 385 (1930). The rationale for the Connecticut rule is that the divorcing court mist have personal jurisdic- tion and also res jurisdiction over the marriage which is the res in a divorce proceeding: See Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 92 A. at 685.

通过申请人获得优先移民身份。其结论基于康涅狄格州最高法院在Litvaitis v. Litvaitis，162 Conn. 540，295 A.2d 519（1972）中的判决，该法院裁定，外国离婚要在康涅狄格州获得承认，至少一方当事人必须是获得离婚所在外国的善意住所地居民。由于申请人在离婚发生时是美国合法永久居民，且没有记录显示受益人曾到过多米尼加共和国，代理地区主任认定双方均非多米尼加住所地居民，该离婚根据康涅狄格州法律将不予承认。 婚姻的法律有效性通常由举行地决定。Matter of Levine，13 I. & N. Dec. 244（BIA 1969）；Matter of Freeman，11 I. & N. Dec. 482（BIA 1966）。在本案中，康涅狄格州是婚姻举行地，因此，我们必须根据康涅狄格州法律评估该婚姻的有效性。 在Matter of Biebl，临时决定2672（BIA 1978）中，我们审查了康涅狄格州法律并认定，离婚要在该国获得承认，至少一方当事人须在离婚发生国拥有善意住所。8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(2)明确要求申请人证明所主张离婚的有效性。由于申请人未提交任何证据证明两次离婚的任何一方当事人是多米尼加住所地居民，申请人未履行其证明有权获得所寻求移民利益的举证责任。Matter of Brantigan，11 I. & N. Dec. 493（BIA 1966）。 然而，申请人在口头辩论中试图将本案事实与康涅狄格州法院在Litvaitis v. Litvaitis，supra中所考虑的事实区分开来。他指出，Litvaitis涉及的是单方离婚，不同于本案申请人和受益人获得的双方同意离婚。 尽管我们同意申请人关于Litvaitis并非双方同意离婚的主张，但该差异并不要求得出不同于代理地区主任结论的结果。在Litvaitis中，康涅狄格州最高法院并未陈述一项仅限于单方离婚的规则。相反，Litvaitis法院是在重述其在其他涉及双边离婚案件中的先前判决，即至少一方当事人的善意住所是康涅狄格州法律承认的要求。参见Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve，88 Conn. 689，92 A. 684（1914）；Rice v. Rice，134 Conn. 440，58 A.2d 523（1948）；State v. Cooke，110 Conn. 348，148 A. 385（1930）。康涅狄格州规则的理由是，作出离婚判决的法院必须对婚姻拥有属人管辖权和对物管辖权，而婚姻是离婚程序中的物。参见Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve，92 A. at 685。

Interim Decision #2691

临时决定第2691号

We also reject the petitioner's contention that the Acting District Director lacks standing under Connecticut law to challenge the validity of the Dominican divorces. The word "standing" is a legal term inti- mately related to a court's jurisdiction. The courts must ascertain that a party has a legally protected interest in order to allow him to participate in a judicial proceeding so that the legal questions will be framed with the necessary specificity and the issues contested with the necessary adverseness and vigor. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). In a visa petition proceeding the Acting District Director is not an adversary who needs standing to participate. 8 C.F. R. 103.1(n) grants the District Director the power to adjudicate the visa petition. Thus, the District Director's role is that of an adjudicator and not an adversary in visa petition proceedings. The term "standing" has therefore no rele- vance with regards to the Acting District Director's role in adjudicating a visa petition. We impliedly held that the Service has the power to contest the validity of a foreign divorce in visa petition proceedings. See, e.g., Matter of Guzman, Interim Decision 2484 (BIA 1976); Matter of Darwish, 14 I. & N. Dec. 307 (BIA 1973); Matter of Atwater, 14 I. & N. Dec. 410 (BIA 1973). Thus, the petitioner's contention Is without merit and the appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

我们还驳回申请人关于代理地区主任根据康涅狄格州法律缺乏诉讼资格质疑多米尼加离婚有效性的主张。“诉讼资格”一词是与法院管辖权密切相关的法律术语。法院必须确定当事人拥有受法律保护的利益，才能允许其参与司法程序，以便法律问题以必要的具体性被界定，争议问题以必要的对抗性和力度被争辩。参见Flast v. Cohen，392 U.S. 83，106（1968）。在签证申请程序中，代理地区主任并非需要诉讼资格才能参与的对抗方。8 C.F.R. 103.1(n)授予地区主任裁决签证申请的权力。因此，地区主任在签证申请程序中的角色是裁决者而非对抗方。“诉讼资格”一词因此与代理地区主任在裁决签证申请中的角色无关。我们已默示认定移民局有权在签证申请程序中质疑外国离婚的有效性。参见，例如，Matter of Guzman，临时决定2484（BIA 1976）；Matter of Darwish，14 I. & N. Dec. 307（BIA 1973）；Matter of Atwater，14 I. & N. Dec. 410（BIA 1973）。因此，申请人的主张没有依据，上诉将被驳回。 命令：上诉驳回。