Matter of Michael Vernon Thomas; Matter of Joseph Lloyd Thompson

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3966

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3966

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General (1) The tests set forth in Matter of Cota-Vargas, Matter of Song, and Matter of Estrada will no longer govern the effect of state-court orders that modify, clarify, or otherwise alter a criminal alien’s sentence. (2) Such state-court orders will be given effect for immigration purposes only if based on a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceeding; these orders will have no effect for immigration purposes if based on reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceeding, such as rehabilitation or the avoidance of immigration consequences.

美国司法部 司法部长办公室 (1) Matter of Cota-Vargas、Matter of Song 和 Matter of Estrada 中规定的检验标准 将不再支配修改、澄清或以其他方式变更刑事外国人刑罚的州法院命令的效力。 (2) 此类州法院命令仅在基于基础刑事诉讼程序或实体瑕疵时，才为移民目的赋予效力；如果基于与基础刑事诉讼实体无关的理由，例如康复或避免移民后果，则此类命令对移民目的不具有效力。

BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL On May 28, 2019, I directed the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) to refer this case for my review and invited the parties and interested amici to submit briefs addressing relevant questions. Matter of Thomas & Matter of Thompson, 27 I&N Dec. 556 (A.G. 2019). For the reasons set forth in the accompanying opinion, I overrule the Board’s decisions in Matter of Cota-Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. 849 (BIA 2005); Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2001); and Matter of Estrada, 26 I&N Dec. 749 (BIA 2016). The tests described in those cases will no longer govern the effect of state-court orders that modify, clarify, or otherwise alter a criminal alien’s sentence. Instead, for reasons similar to those explained in Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006), such state-court orders will be given effect for immigration purposes only when the orders are based on a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceeding. These state-court orders will have no effect for immigration purposes when based on reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceeding, such as rehabilitation or immigration hardship. Accordingly, I vacate the decisions below and remand these cases to the Board to reassess whether the relevant state-court sentence alterations should be effective for purposes of federal immigration law.

在司法部长面前 2019年5月28日，我指示移民上诉委员会（“委员会”）将此案提交我审查，并邀请各方和感兴趣的法庭之友提交简报，讨论相关问题。Matter of Thomas & Matter of Thompson, 27 I&N Dec. 556 (A.G. 2019)。 基于随附意见中所述理由，我推翻委员会在 Matter of Cota-Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. 849 (BIA 2005)；Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2001)；和 Matter of Estrada, 26 I&N Dec. 749 (BIA 2016) 中的裁决。这些案件中描述的检验标准将不再支配修改、澄清或以其他方式变更刑事外国人刑罚的州法院命令的效力。相反，基于与 Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006) 中所解释的理由类似的理由，此类州法院命令仅在基于基础刑事诉讼程序或实体瑕疵时，才为移民目的赋予效力。当此类州法院命令基于与基础刑事诉讼实体无关的理由，例如康复或移民困难时，对移民目的不具有效力。 因此，我撤销下述裁决，并将这些案件发回委员会，重新评估相关州法院刑罚变更是否应为联邦移民法目的生效。

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3966

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3966

Aliens convicted of crimes in state court may face immigration consequences based on the nature of the conviction and the length of the resulting sentence. To avoid these consequences, some aliens seek state-court orders retroactively vacating the conviction or altering the sentence. At present, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) has adopted three different tests to determine the legal effect of such state-court orders, depending upon how the state court describes its decision. If the order “vacates” an alien’s conviction, then the order has legal effect if based on “a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying proceedings,” but not if based on reasons “unrelated to the merits” such as “rehabilitation or immigration hardships.” Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006). If the order “modifies” an alien’s sentence, then the modification is given “full . . . faith and credit” for immigration purposes regardless of the reason. Matter of Cota-Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. 849, 850–52 (BIA 2005); see also Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2001). Finally, if the order “clarifies” an alien’s sentence, then an immigration judge assessing the order’s effect considers several characteristics of the order, such as whether the original sentencing order contained an obvious discrepancy and whether the clarifying court had jurisdiction to enter the order. Matter of Estrada, 26 I&N Dec. 749, 755–56 (BIA 2016). Adding to the confusion, the classification of a state-court order as a modification or clarification may turn on how the state court itself labels the order, not on any objective distinctions between the two categories. The tests articulated in Matter of Cota-Vargas, Matter of Song, and Matter of Estrada have no basis in the text of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), promote inconsistency in the application of the country’s immigration laws, and fail to advance Congress’s intent to attach immigration consequences to certain convictions and sentences. Accordingly, those cases are overruled. Going forward, immigration courts should apply the test articulated in Matter of Pickering in determining the immigration consequence of any change in a state sentence, no matter how the state court describes its order. Such an alteration will have legal effect for immigration purposes when based on a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceeding, but not when the change was based on reasons unrelated to the merits, such as the alien’s rehabilitation or an interest in avoiding an immigration consequence.

在州法院被定罪的外国人可能因定罪性质和由此产生的刑罚长度而面临移民后果。为避免这些后果，一些外国人寻求州法院命令追溯撤销定罪或变更刑罚。目前，移民上诉委员会（“委员会”）已采用三种不同的检验标准来确定此类州法院命令的法律效力，取决于州法院如何描述其决定。 如果命令“撤销”外国人的定罪，则如果基于“基础程序中的程序或实体瑕疵”，该命令具有法律效力，但如果基于“与实体无关”的理由，例如“康复或移民困难”，则不具有法律效力。Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006)。如果命令“修改”外国人的刑罚，则无论理由如何，该修改为移民目的被赋予“完全的……诚信和信用”。Matter of Cota-Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. 849, 850–52 (BIA 2005)；另见 Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2001)。最后，如果命令“澄清”外国人的刑罚，则评估该命令效力的移民法官会考虑该命令的若干特征，例如原始量刑命令是否包含明显差异，以及澄清法院是否有管辖权作出该命令。Matter of Estrada, 26 I&N Dec. 749, 755–56 (BIA 2016)。更添混乱的是，将州法院命令归类为修改或澄清可能取决于州法院自身如何标记该命令，而非两类之间的任何客观区别。 Matter of Cota-Vargas、Matter of Song 和 Matter of Estrada 中阐明的检验标准在《移民与国籍法》（“INA”）文本中没有依据，导致国家移民法适用不一致，并且未能推进国会将移民后果附加于某些定罪和刑罚的意图。因此，这些案件被推翻。今后，移民法院在确定州刑罚任何变更的移民后果时，应适用 Matter of Pickering 中阐明的检验标准，无论州法院如何描述其命令。此类变更在基于基础刑事诉讼程序或实体瑕疵时，将为移民目的具有法律效力，但当变更基于与实体无关的理由，例如外国人的康复或避免移民后果的利益时，则不具有法律效力。

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A. Congress has provided that an alien’s conviction for certain serious crimes, which result in a sentence of imprisonment of sufficient length, shall have consequences for an alien’s immigration status. Notably, the INA defines an “aggravated felony” to include a “crime of violence” for which “the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), and an alien convicted of an aggravated felony is ineligible for most forms of relief or protection from removal, see, e.g., id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In many cases, after the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commences removal proceedings against a criminal alien, the alien petitions a state court to alter the conviction or resulting sentence. An alien facing removal as an aggravated felon, for example, may ask the state court to vacate the underlying conviction entirely, or to modify, clarify, or otherwise alter the associated sentence so that it falls below the one-year term of imprisonment necessary to qualify as an “aggravated felony.” The state court’s order may have no actual impact on the alien under state law— in most cases, the alien has already served the term of imprisonment he seeks to alter. The sole issue then is the impact that the conviction has under the immigration laws. Under existing Board precedent, the immigration consequences of such a state-court order depend on the precise form of relief granted by the court. First, if the state court vacates the alien’s conviction, then the Board applies the test set forth in Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621. In Pickering, the Board concluded that there is a “significant distinction” between vacaturs based on a “procedural or substantive defect in the underlying proceedings,” and those based on “post-conviction events, such as rehabilitation or immigration hardships.” Id. at 624. The former circumstance calls into question whether the original conviction was valid, but the latter does not. Hence, under Pickering, “if a court with jurisdiction vacates a conviction based on a defect in the underlying criminal proceedings, the respondent no longer has a ‘conviction’ as that term is defined in the INA. If, however, a court vacates a conviction for reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings, [then] the respondent remains ‘convicted’ for immigration purposes.” Id. By contrast, if the state court modifies the alien’s sentence, rather than vacating the alien’s conviction, then the Board follows the rule set forth in Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. at 173–74, and Matter of Cota-Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. at 851–52. Under those decisions, the immigration judge will

A. 国会规定，外国人因某些严重犯罪被定罪，且导致足够长度的监禁刑罚的，应对该外国人的移民身份产生后果。值得注意的是，INA 将“加重重罪”定义为包括“暴力犯罪”，其“监禁期限至少为一年”，见 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)，而被定加重重罪的外国人无资格获得大多数免于遣返的救济或保护，见例如 id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)。在许多案件中，在国土安全部（“DHS”）对刑事外国人启动遣返程序后，该外国人向州法院申请变更定罪或由此产生的刑罚。例如，面临作为加重重罪被遣返的外国人可能请求州法院完全撤销基础定罪，或修改、澄清或以其他方式变更相关刑罚，使其低于符合“加重重罪”所需的一年监禁期限。州法院命令根据州法律可能对外国人没有实际影响——在大多数案件中，外国人已经服完其寻求变更的监禁刑期。唯一问题则是该定罪在移民法下的影响。 根据现有委员会先例，此类州法院命令的移民后果取决于法院授予救济的确切形式。第一，如果州法院撤销外国人的定罪，则委员会适用 Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 中阐明的检验标准。在 Pickering 中，委员会得出结论，基于“基础程序中的程序或实体瑕疵”的撤销与基于“定罪后事件，例如康复或移民困难”的撤销之间存在“重大区别”。Id. at 624。前一种情况质疑原始定罪是否有效，但后一种情况则不然。因此，根据 Pickering，“如果具有管辖权的法院基于基础刑事诉讼中的瑕疵撤销定罪，则被申请人不再拥有 INA 中定义的‘定罪’。但是，如果法院基于与基础刑事诉讼实体无关的理由撤销定罪，[则]被申请人为移民目的仍属‘被定罪’。”Id. 相比之下，如果州法院修改外国人的刑罚，而非撤销外国人的定罪，则委员会遵循 Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. at 173–74 和 Matter of Cota-Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. at 851–52 中规定的规则。根据这些裁决，移民法官将

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3966

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019) 临时决定 #3966

automatically give full faith and credit to the state court order, regardless of the reason for the modification. In Matter of Song, the respondent was originally sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year, but subsequently petitioned a state court to resentence him to a term of imprisonment of 360 days. 23 I&N Dec. at 173–74. Finding the situation analogous to one where a state court had deemed the alien’s initial sentence “to have been illegal” and thus regarding it “as void and of no force and effect,” see Matter of Martin, 18 I&N Dec. 226, 227 (BIA 1982), the Board concluded that “the offense no longer [fell] within the definition of an ‘aggravated felony’ in [the INA], and the respondent [was] not removable.” Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. at 174. Elaborating upon that reasoning in Matter of Cota-Vargas, the Board, over a dissent, held that “a modified or reduced sentence is recognized as valid for purposes of the immigration law without regard to the trial court’s reasons for effecting the modification or reduction.” 23 I&N Dec. at 849. Finally, if the state court “clarifies” an alien’s sentence, then the Board considers the characteristics of the order discussed in Matter of Estrada, 26 I&N Dec. 749. There, the respondent initially had received a twelve-month sentence, but it was not clear whether the sentence was for “probation” or for a “probated term of imprisonment”—only the latter of which would have counted as a term of imprisonment under the INA. The respondent successfully petitioned the state court to “[c]larify[]” that the sentence was solely for probation. See id. at 755. In deciding whether to give effect to the order, the Board considered several characteristics previously identified as relevant by the Eleventh Circuit. See id. (citing Herrera v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 811 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Garza-Mendez, 735 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2013)). These characteristics include whether the original sentencing order contained an obvious discrepancy; whether the original judge was the same as the clarifying judge; whether a significant period of time had passed between the original sentencing and the clarification; and whether the clarifying court had jurisdiction to enter the clarification. Id. at 755–56. The Board then observed that, in the case before it, the alien’s original sentencing order was legitimately unclear and the clarifying order had been issued by the same judge who had initially sentenced the alien. Id. For these reasons, the Board gave effect to the order and concluded that the alien was not removable. Id. at 756. Taken together, these Board decisions establish three distinct tests governing the immigration consequences of state-court orders that retroactively alter a criminal conviction or sentence. These tests are inconsistent with each other, and they cause similarly situated aliens to

自动给予州法院命令完全的诚信与信用，无论修改的原因如何。在Matter of Song案中，被申请人最初被判处1年监禁，但随后向州法院申请将其改判为360天监禁。23 I&N Dec. at 173–74。委员会认为该情形类似于州法院认定外国人最初的刑罚“非法”从而将其“视为无效且不具有任何效力”的情形，参见Matter of Martin, 18 I&N Dec. 226, 227 (BIA 1982)，并得出结论认为“该罪行不再属于[《移民与国籍法》]中‘加重重罪’的定义范围，且被申请人不可被驱逐。”Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. at 174。在Matter of Cota-Vargas案中对该推理进一步阐述时，委员会以异议意见为代价，裁定“经修改或减轻的刑罚被承认为有效用于移民法目的，而不论初审法院实施修改或减轻的理由为何。”23 I&N Dec. at 849。 最后，如果州法院“澄清”外国人的刑罚，则委员会考虑Matter of Estrada, 26 I&N Dec. 749中讨论的命令特征。在该案中，被申请人最初获得12个月刑罚，但不清楚该刑罚是针对“缓刑”还是“缓刑监禁期”——只有后者才会在《移民与国籍法》下计为监禁期。被申请人成功向州法院申请“[澄]清”该刑罚仅为缓刑。参见id. at 755。在决定是否赋予该命令效力时，委员会考虑了第11巡回法院此前认定相关的若干特征。参见id.（引用Herrera v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 811 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Garza-Mendez, 735 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2013)）。这些特征包括：原始量刑命令是否包含明显差异；原始法官是否与澄清法官为同一人；原始量刑与澄清之间是否经过了相当长的时间；以及澄清法院是否具有作出澄清的管辖权。Id. at 755–56。委员会随后指出，在其审理的案件中，外国人的原始量刑命令确实不明确，且澄清命令由最初对外国人量刑的同一法官作出。Id. 基于这些理由，委员会赋予该命令效力并认定该外国人不可被驱逐。Id. at 756。 综合来看，这些委员会裁决确立了三种不同的检验标准，用以规范追溯性改变刑事定罪或刑罚的州法院命令的移民后果。这些检验标准彼此不一致，并导致处境相似的外国人

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1. In Matter of Michael Vernon Thomas, the respondent, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, had been living in the United States as a lawful permanent resident since 1977. In 2001, a Georgia state court convicted Thomas of family violence battery, see Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-23.1(f), and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of twelve months. In 2016, DHS charged Thomas as removable as an aggravated felon because he had been convicted of a “crime of violence” for which the “term of imprisonment [was] at least one year.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Thomas conceded before an immigration judge that his conviction constituted grounds for removal, and the immigration judge ordered Thomas removed. While Thomas’s appeal was pending, he petitioned a Georgia state court to alter his criminal sentence. Thomas did not allege any procedural or substantive defect in the original criminal proceeding, which occurred over fifteen years before, but upon the consent of the prosecution, the state court issued an order stating, “Defendant’s sentence in the above matter is hereby clarified to reflect that Defendant was sentenced to a cumulative term of 11 months and 28 days of probation.” The Board then remanded for the immigration judge to review the impact of the consent order. The immigration judge declined to credit the order, and the Board affirmed. Because the order “clarified” Thomas’s sentence, the Board considered the characteristics of the order identified as relevant in Matter of Estrada. The Board observed that—in contrast to the situation of the alien in that case—Thomas’s original sentencing order was clear; a significant period of time (approximately fifteen years) had passed between the original sentence and the clarification; and the state-court judge clarifying the sentence differed from the original sentencing judge. The Board thus declined to credit the “clarification” of Thomas’s sentence, and he was deemed removable.

1. 在Matter of Michael Vernon Thomas案中，被申请人系特立尼达和多巴哥公民，自1977年起作为合法永久居民居住在美国。2001年，佐治亚州法院判定Thomas犯有家庭暴力殴打罪，参见Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-23.1(f)，并判处其12个月监禁。2016年，国土安全部指控Thomas作为加重重罪犯可被驱逐，因其被判犯有“暴力犯罪”且“监禁期至少为1年”。参见8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)。Thomas在移民法官面前承认其定罪构成驱逐理由，移民法官下令将Thomas驱逐。 在Thomas的上诉待决期间，他向佐治亚州法院申请改变其刑事刑罚。Thomas未主张发生于15年前的原始刑事诉讼程序存在任何程序或实质缺陷，但经检方同意，州法院发布命令称：“特此澄清被告在上述事项中的刑罚，以反映被告被判处累计11个月零28天缓刑。”委员会随后发回重审，由移民法官审查该同意令的影响。 移民法官拒绝采信该命令，委员会予以维持。由于该命令“澄清”了Thomas的刑罚，委员会考虑了Matter of Estrada中认定相关的命令特征。委员会指出——与该案中外国人的情形相反——Thomas的原始量刑命令是明确的；原始刑罚与澄清之间经过了相当长的时间（约15年）；且澄清刑罚的州法院法官与原始量刑法官不同。委员会因此拒绝采信对Thomas刑罚的“澄清”，他遂被认定可被驱逐。

2. In Matter of Joseph Lloyd Thompson, the respondent, a citizen of Jamaica, was lawfully admitted to the United States in 1987. In 2012, a Georgia state court convicted Thompson of family violence battery, see Ga.

2. 在Matter of Joseph Lloyd Thompson案中，被申请人系牙买加公民，于1987年合法入境美国。2012年，佐治亚州法院判定Thompson犯有家庭暴力殴打罪，参见Ga.

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Code Ann. § 16-5-23.1(f), and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of twelve months. As with Thomas, in 2017, DHS charged Thompson as removable as an aggravated felon, because had had been convicted of a “crime of violence” for which the “term of imprisonment [was] at least one year.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). In March 2018, while the removal charges were pending, Thompson filed a “Motion to Modify Sentence” in Georgia state court seeking to reduce his sentence to eleven months and twenty-seven days. Thompson did not identify any defect in the original criminal proceeding, but the court granted the motion the same day. Before the immigration judge, Thompson admitted that he had been convicted of a crime of violence, yet argued that his modified sentence did not amount to a term of imprisonment of at least one year. After the immigration judge rejected Thompson’s argument, the Board reversed on appeal. The Board acknowledged that there were questions concerning whether the Georgia state court had jurisdiction to issue the order and that the timing of the order suggested that it may have been issued to affect the immigration court proceeding. But under Matter of Cota-Vargas, the Board concluded that it must “give full effect” to the modified sentence. Thus, in contrast with Matter of Thomas, the Board gave effect to the post- sentencing state-court order and concluded that Thompson was no longer removable.

Code Ann. § 16-5-23.1(f)，并判处其12个月监禁。与Thomas一样，2017年，国土安全部指控Thompson作为加重重罪犯可被驱逐，因其被判犯有“暴力犯罪”且“监禁期至少为1年”。参见8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)。 2018年3月，在驱逐指控待决期间，Thompson在佐治亚州法院提交“刑罚修改动议”，寻求将其刑罚减至11个月零27天。Thompson未指出原始刑事诉讼程序存在任何缺陷，但法院于同日批准了该动议。在移民法官面前，Thompson承认其被判犯有暴力犯罪，但主张其经修改的刑罚不构成至少1年的监禁期。 在移民法官驳回Thompson的主张后，委员会在上诉中予以推翻。委员会承认，关于佐治亚州法院是否具有发布该命令的管辖权存在疑问，且该命令的时机表明其可能是为影响移民法院程序而发布的。但根据Matter of Cota-Vargas，委员会得出结论认为其必须“给予经修改的刑罚完全效力”。因此，与Matter of Thomas相反，委员会赋予量刑后州法院命令效力，并认定Thompson不再可被驱逐。

3. Both Thomas and Thompson were convicted of the same state law offense, were charged with removability on the same ground, and petitioned the state courts to alter their sentences without alleging any procedural or substantive defects in the original proceeding. Yet these similarly situated aliens faced markedly divergent consequences. Relying on a semantic distinction between a “clarification” and a “modification,” the Board found that Thomas was removable but Thompson was not. I certified these cases to address these inconsistencies and to clarify the appropriate treatment under the INA. See 27 I&N Dec. 556 (A.G. 2019). 1

3. Thomas和Thompson均被判犯有同一州法律罪行，均基于同一理由被指控可被驱逐，且均向州法院申请改变其刑罚而未主张原始程序存在任何程序或实质缺陷。然而这些处境相似的外国人面临了明显不同的后果。委员会依据“澄清”与“修改”之间的语义区分，认定Thomas可被驱逐而Thompson不可。我调取这些案件以处理这些不一致之处并澄清《移民与国籍法》下的适当处理方式。参见27 I&N Dec. 556 (A.G. 2019)。1

1 After I certified these cases for my review, Thomas filed a “Motion for Production” asserting that the Due Process Clause entitles him to a chance to respond to any “briefing, memoranda, or other documents” that might influence the decision in his case. The motion is denied. Thomas has received DHS’s briefs in these matters, and he had a full and fair opportunity to raise his own arguments and respond to any other party’s arguments through his own initial and reply brief.

1 在我调取这些案件进行审查后，Thomas提交了“制作动议”，主张正当程序条款赋予其机会回应任何可能影响其案件裁决的“简报、备忘录或其他文件”。该动议被驳回。Thomas已收到国土安全部在这些事项中的简报，且其通过自己的初始简报和答辩简报充分且公平地有机会提出自己的主张并回应任何其他当事人的主张。

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II. The INA assigns clear immigration consequences to an alien who has been convicted and sentenced for a state crime, yet the Board has adopted multiple tests that permit state courts to change those results well after the fact. Although a state court may alter a state conviction for appropriate reasons under state law, the state court does not have the authority to make immigration-law determinations. In view of these considerations, I conclude that the Pickering test should apply to state-court orders that modify, clarify, or otherwise alter the term of imprisonment or sentence associated with a state-court conviction. As a result, such alterations will have legal effect for immigration purposes if they are based on a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceeding, but not if they are based on reasons unrelated to the merits, such as rehabilitation or immigration hardship. Matter of Cota-Vargas, Matter of Song, and Matter of Estrada must therefore be overruled.

II. 《移民与国籍法》对已因州罪行被定罪并判刑的外国人规定了明确的移民后果，然而委员会却采纳了多种检验标准，允许州法院在事后改变这些结果。尽管州法院可以基于州法律下的适当理由改变州定罪，但州法院无权作出移民法上的认定。鉴于这些考量，我得出结论认为Pickering检验标准应适用于修改、澄清或以其他方式改变与州法院定罪相关的监禁期或刑罚的州法院命令。因此，此类改变若基于基础刑事诉讼程序中的程序或实质缺陷，则在移民目的上具有法律效力；但若基于与实体无关的理由，如康复或移民困难，则不具有法律效力。Matter of Cota-Vargas、Matter of Song和Matter of Estrada因此必须被推翻。

1. In considering whether a state-court order that modifies, clarifies, or otherwise alters a “term of imprisonment or a sentence” should change the immigration consequences of the original sentence, we begin with the text of the statute. E.g., Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016). The INA defines “conviction” and a “term of imprisonment or a sentence” as follows:

1. 在考虑修改、澄清或以其他方式改变“监禁期或刑罚”的州法院命令是否应改变原始刑罚的移民后果时，我们从法条文本开始。例如，Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016)。《移民与国籍法》对“定罪”和“监禁期或刑罚”定义如下：

(A) The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where—

(A) “定罪”一词就外国人而言，系指法院对该外国人作出的正式有罪判决，或者，在暂缓有罪裁断的情况下，当——

(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and

(i) 法官或陪审团已认定该外国人有罪，或该外国人已作出认罪答辩或不抗辩答辩，或已承认足以支持有罪认定的事实，且

(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed. (B) Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of

(ii) 法官已命令对该外国人施加某种形式的惩罚、刑罚或人身自由限制。 (B) 就某一罪行而言，对监禁期或刑罚的任何提及均视为包括法院命令的监禁或关押期间，无论是否中止

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the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (emphasis added). An alien plainly has been convicted under the INA when a court has entered “a formal judgment of guilt,” and he has received a sentence when the court orders a “period of incarceration or confinement,” no matter whether that sentence is executed. The question then is whether the state court’s subsequent alteration of a “conviction” or a “sentence” changes those facts under the INA. Neither the INA nor the associated regulations provide further guidance on this point, but the statute’s history helps illuminate the meaning of the phrase. Congress amended the INA to define “conviction” following the Board’s decision in Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988). There, the Board established a rule that “a conviction will be found for immigration purposes” where:

对该监禁或刑罚的全部或部分执行或施加。 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)（着重号为后加）。当法院已作出“有罪正式判决”时，外国人显然已根据《移民与国籍法》被定罪；而当法院命令“监禁或拘禁期间”时，其即已获得刑罚，无论该刑罚是否被执行。 那么问题在于，州法院随后对“定罪”或“刑罚”的变更是否改变了《移民与国籍法》下的这些事实。《移民与国籍法》及相关法规均未就此点提供进一步指引，但该法规的立法史有助于阐明该短语的含义。在委员会作出Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988)裁决后，国会修订了《移民与国籍法》以界定“定罪”。在该案中，委员会确立了一项规则，即在以下情况下“将为移民目的认定存在定罪”：

(1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or he has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty;

(1) 法官或陪审团已认定该外国人罪名成立，或其已作出认罪答辩或不抗辩答辩，或已承认足以支持有罪认定的充分事实；

(2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the person’s liberty to be imposed (including but not limited to incarceration, probation, a fine or restitution, or community-based sanctions such as a rehabilitation program, a work-release or study- release program, revocation or suspension of a driver’s license, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, or community service); and

(2) 法官已命令对该人的人身自由施加某种形式的惩罚、刑罚或限制（包括但不限于监禁、缓刑、罚金或赔偿，或基于社区的制裁，如康复计划、工作释放或学习释放计划、吊销或中止驾驶执照、剥夺非必要活动或特权，或社区服务）；以及

(3) a judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person violates the terms of his probation or fails to comply with the requirements of the court’s order, without availability of further proceedings regarding the person’s guilt or innocence of the original charge. Id. at 551–52. Under Ozkok’s definition of “conviction,” “it was possible for a defendant to plead nolo contendere, obtain a suspended sentence, or enter a rehabilitation program on probation—so long as the court stopped short of a formal adjudication of guilt—without having the offense be considered a conviction for purposes of immigration laws.” Francis v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2006). Applying this definition “required an individualized analysis of the particular procedures of different state penal systems to determine whether a person had been ‘convicted.’” Id.

(3) 如果该人违反其缓刑条件或未能遵守法院命令的要求，可以作出有罪判决或裁定，而无需就该人对原指控是否有罪或无罪进行进一步程序。 同上，第551–52页。根据Ozkok对“定罪”的定义，“被告可以作出不抗辩答辩、获得缓刑判决，或在缓刑期间参加康复计划——只要法院未作出有罪正式裁定——而不会使该罪行在移民法意义上被视为定罪。”Francis v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2006)。适用这一定义“需要对不同州刑罚体系的特定程序进行个案分析，以确定某人是否已被‘定罪’。”同上。

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Congress rejected the third element of Ozkok in enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). The statute incorporated the first two elements of Ozkok’s definition of “conviction,” but eliminated the third, which had excluded certain suspended sentences. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 322, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546, 3009-628 (1996); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 224 (Conf. Rep. 1996) (confirming this textual interpretation by observing that the IIRIRA “broaden[ed] the scope of the definition of ‘conviction’ beyond that adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Ozkok,” which had not gone “far enough to address situations where a judgment of guilt or imposition of sentence [was] suspended.”); Francis, 442 F.3d at 141 (collecting cases acknowledging “that in enacting IIRIRA, Congress specifically and deliberately abrogated the Ozkok test”). In enacting section 1101(a)(48), Congress made clear that immigration consequences should flow from the original determination of guilt. In addition, Congress ensured uniformity in the immigration laws by avoiding the need for immigration judges to examine the post-conviction procedures of each State. See Saleh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Interpreting the new definition, the BIA identified two primary aims that it believed Congress sought to accomplish: to focus the conviction inquiry on the ‘original determination of guilt’ and to ‘implement a uniform federal approach.’” (quoting Matter of Roldan–Santoyo, 22 I&N Dec. 512, 521–22 (BIA 1999)); Herrera-Inirio v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 299, 306 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining the “emphasis that Congress placed on the original admission of guilt” when enacting the new definition of “conviction” (emphasis in original)); id. at 305 (explaining that Matter of Ozkok “failed to produce . . . uniformity and Congress stepped in to fill the void”); see also, e.g., Resendiz-Alcaraz v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 383 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004). This statutory history confirms that, under paragraph (A), an alien’s original adjudication or admission of guilt establishes the fact of his “conviction.” The remainder of the definition, paragraph (B), similarly contains language making clear that the length of a “term of imprisonment or a sentence” is calculated “regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (emphasis added). The length of a sentence for immigration purposes thus ignores “suspensions” (whether occurring at the time of sentencing or thereafter), suggesting that other post-sentencing events—such as modifications or clarifications—should not be relevant under the immigration laws. Accordingly, the phrase “term of imprisonment or a sentence” in paragraph (B) is best read to concern an alien’s original

国会在制定8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)作为1996年《非法移民改革和移民责任法》（“IIRIRA”）的一部分时，否决了Ozkok的第三项要素。该法规纳入了Ozkok“定罪”定义的前两项要素，但删除了第三项要素，该要素曾排除某些缓刑判决。见Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 322, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546, 3009-628 (1996)；另见H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 224 (Conf. Rep. 1996)（通过指出IIRIRA“将‘定罪’定义的范围扩大至超出移民上诉委员会在Matter of Ozkok中采用的定义”，而该定义未“足够远地处理有罪判决或刑罚施加被缓期执行的情形”，从而确认了这一文本解释）；Francis, 442 F.3d at 141（汇集承认“在制定IIRIRA时，国会具体且有意废除了Ozkok检验标准”的判例）。 在制定第1101(a)(48)条时，国会明确表示移民后果应源自最初的有罪认定。此外，国会通过避免移民法官需要审查各州定罪后程序，确保了移民法的统一性。见Saleh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 2007)（“在解释新定义时，移民上诉委员会确定了其认为国会试图实现的两个主要目标：将定罪调查集中于‘最初的有罪认定’，并‘实施统一的联邦方法’。”（引用Matter of Roldan–Santoyo, 22 I&N Dec. 512, 521–22 (BIA 1999)）；Herrera-Inirio v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 299, 306 (1st Cir. 2000)（解释国会在制定“定罪”新定义时“对最初认罪的强调”（原文着重号））；同上第305页（解释Matter of Ozkok“未能产生……统一性，国会介入以填补空白”）；另见，例如，Resendiz-Alcaraz v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 383 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004)。 这一立法史确认，根据(A)款，外国人的最初裁定或认罪确立了其“定罪”的事实。定义的其余部分，即(B)款，同样包含明确表明“监禁期或刑罚”的长度是“无论该监禁或刑罚的全部或部分施加或执行是否被缓期”而计算的措辞。8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B)（着重号为后加）。因此，为移民目的计算的刑罚长度忽略“缓期执行”（无论是在量刑时还是之后发生），这表明其他量刑后事件——如修改或澄清——在移民法下不应相关。因此，(B)款中的“监禁期或刑罚”短语最好理解为涉及外国人的最初

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criminal sentence, without regard to post-sentencing alterations that, like a suspension, merely alleviate the impact of that sentence. This reasoning, which supports the Pickering test, should likewise extend to all state-court modifications, clarifications, and other alterations of a criminal sentence. If the original sentence was altered because of a legal defect, then the sentence was not legally effective, and there is no valid sentence to which immigration consequences can attach. The original sentence—because of the defect—should not have been entered in the first place. If, in contrast, a state court later alters an earlier sentence for rehabilitative or immigration reasons, then the immigration consequences of that sentence under section 1101(a)(48) remain unchanged because section 1101(a)(48) addresses the alien’s original term of imprisonment or sentence. See Saleh, 495 F.3d at 24 (explaining that “Congress did not intend to allow an alien to escape [immigration] consequences by means of a state vacatur that was not on the merits”). Said differently, Congress has determined that an alien who is convicted of a crime that is sufficiently serious to warrant a significant sentence should be subject to removal. Later alterations to that sentence that do not correct legal defects, do not change the underlying gravity of the alien’s action. They accordingly do not affect Congress’s judgment as to whether that alien should be removed. Such an alteration therefore should have no effect for purposes of the immigration laws. Cf. id. at 25 (“When a conviction is amended nunc pro tunc solely to enable a defendant to avoid immigration consequences, in contrast to an amendment or vacatur on the merits, there is no reason to conclude that the alien is any less suitable for removal.”). Applying the Pickering test to all sentence alterations thus ensures that aliens who have committed significant crimes, as identified by Congress, do not later avoid the immigration consequences of those actions. Furthermore, the application of a single test to state-court sentence alterations promotes uniformity in the law. In the cases currently under review, for example, applying the Pickering test should avoid the inconsistent results that apply to the two similarly situated respondents. If neither state court altered the respondent’s sentence on the basis of “a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying proceedings,” see Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. at 624, then the Pickering test would dictate the same immigration consequence for both respondents. In addition, applying the Pickering test to all forms of state-court sentence alterations resolves inconsistencies among the states’ “crazy quilt of . . . widely disparate state rehabilitative and diversionary arrangements.” Herrera-Inirio, 208 F.3d at 305; see also, e.g., Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 205 (3d Cir. 2005) (observing that the Board in the past has been

刑事刑罚，而不考虑量刑后的变更，这些变更如同缓期执行一样，仅减轻该刑罚的影响。 这一支持Pickering检验标准的推理，同样应扩展至所有州法院对刑事刑罚的修改、澄清及其他变更。如果原刑罚因法律缺陷而被变更，则该刑罚在法律上无效，且不存在可附加移民后果的有效刑罚。原刑罚——由于该缺陷——本就不应被作出。相反，如果州法院后来因康复或移民原因变更先前的刑罚，则该刑罚在section 1101(a)(48)下的移民后果保持不变，因为section 1101(a)(48)涉及外国人的最初监禁期或刑罚。见Saleh, 495 F.3d at 24（解释“国会不打算允许外国人通过非基于实体的州撤销来逃避[移民]后果”）。 换言之，国会已确定，被定罪犯有足够严重罪行以致应判处重大刑罚的外国人应被驱逐。对该刑罚的事后变更若不纠正法律缺陷，则不改变该外国人行为的根本严重性。因此，它们不影响国会关于该外国人是否应被驱逐的判断。此种变更因此在移民法目的下不应具有任何效力。参同上第25页（“当定罪仅为使被告避免移民后果而被追溯修改，而非基于实体的修改或撤销时，没有理由得出结论认为该外国人较不适合被驱逐。”）。因此，将Pickering检验标准适用于所有刑罚变更，确保犯有国会所认定的重大罪行的外国人不会后来逃避这些行为的移民后果。 此外，对州法院刑罚变更适用单一检验标准促进了法律的统一性。例如，在当前审查的案件中，适用Pickering检验标准应避免适用于两名情况相似的受访人的不一致结果。如果两个州法院均未基于“ underlying proceedings中的程序或实体缺陷”变更受访人的刑罚，见Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. at 624，那么Pickering检验标准将为两名受访人规定相同的移民后果。 此外，将Pickering检验标准适用于所有形式的州法院刑罚变更，解决了各州“拼凑而成的…… widely disparate state rehabilitative and diversionary arrangements”之间的不一致。Herrera-Inirio, 208 F.3d at 305；另见，例如，Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 205 (3d Cir. 2005)（指出委员会过去一直

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“bedeviled by the diversity of state rehabilitative programs and the resulting difficulty in fashioning a uniform national immigration policy”); Resendiz-Alcaraz, 383 F.3d at 1269 (noting “the vagaries of state law” related to the alteration of a conviction). The Pickering test eliminates the need to assess this broad array of state procedures. If the state court alters the alien’s sentence because of a procedural or substantive defect in the original proceeding, then the alteration has legal effect—regardless of the label the state court placed on the order. If the state court alters an alien’s sentence on the basis of something other than a procedural or substantive defect, then the alteration has no effect and the immigration judge need inquire no further. Moreover, similarly situated aliens in different states will face similar consequences. Whether one state affords more or less generous mechanisms for altering a sentence for rehabilitative purposes will be irrelevant. Only those alterations based on legal defects will receive effect. The country’s immigration system will thereby achieve more uniform results.

“被州康复项目的多样性以及由此产生的制定统一国家移民政策的困难所困扰”）；Resendiz-Alcaraz, 383 F.3d at 1269（指出与定罪变更相关的“州法律的变幻莫测”）。Pickering检验标准消除了评估这一广泛州程序的需要。如果州法院因原程序中的程序或实体缺陷而变更外国人的刑罚，则该变更具有法律效力——无论州法院对命令贴上何种标签。如果州法院基于程序或实体缺陷以外的其他原因变更外国人的刑罚，则该变更无效，移民法官无需进一步调查。此外，不同州的情况相似的外国人将面临相似的后果。一个州是否为康复目的提供更宽松或更严格的刑罚变更机制将无关紧要。只有基于法律缺陷的变更才会获得效力。国家的移民体系将由此实现更统一的结果。

2. In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the Board’s reasons for adopting the Cota-Vargas and Estrada tests, but I find them unpersuasive. In Matter of Song, the Board offered little analysis before giving full effect to state-court modifications, and it did not ground that rule in any facet of the text of the INA. See 23 I&N Dec. 173. In Matter of Cota-Vargas, the Board acknowledged that the “language and purpose of section 101(a)(48)(A)” support applying the Pickering rule to sentence alterations, see 23 I&N Dec. at 852, but found it relevant that paragraph (B) addresses “suspensions” and not “modifications.” Based upon this statutory silence, the Board inferred a congressional intent to credit state-court modifications that were unrelated to the merits of a criminal proceeding. See id. Yet paragraph (A)’s definition of “conviction” is equally silent about “vacaturs,” and the Board nonetheless determined in Matter of Pickering that vacaturs unrelated to the merits will not have immigration consequences. See 23 I&N Dec. at 624. Paragraph (A) and paragraph (B) simply do not address vacaturs, modifications, or clarifications. This silence, however, provides no reason to depart from Congress’s focus on the alien’s original conviction and sentence in either of those provisions. I likewise do not believe that the Estrada test finds any more support in the INA. There, the Board considered a number of characteristics in assessing the effect of a clarification, yet none of them flows directly from the text of the INA itself, see 26 I&N Dec. 755–56, and reliance on such

2. 在得出这一结论时，我考虑了委员会采纳Cota-Vargas和Estrada检验标准的理由，但我认为这些理由缺乏说服力。在Matter of Song案中，委员会在赋予州法院修改完全效力之前几乎没有进行分析，也没有将该规则建立在INA文本的任何方面之上。参见23 I&N Dec. 173。在Matter of Cota-Vargas案中，委员会承认“第101(a)(48)(A)条的语言和目的”支持将Pickering规则适用于刑罚变更，参见23 I&N Dec. at 852，但认为(B)款涉及的是“中止”而非“修改”这一点具有相关性。基于这一法律沉默，委员会推断出国会意图认可与刑事程序实体无关的州法院修改。参见同上。然而，(A)款对“定罪”的定义同样对“撤销”保持沉默，而委员会在Matter of Pickering案中仍然认定，与实体无关的撤销将不具有移民后果。参见23 I&N Dec. at 624。(A)款和(B)款根本没有涉及撤销、修改或澄清。然而，这一沉默并未提供任何理由来偏离国会在上述任一规定中对非公民原始定罪和刑罚的关注。 我同样认为Estrada检验标准在INA中找不到更多支持。在该案中，委员会在评估澄清的效力时考虑了一系列特征，但这些特征没有一个直接源自INA本身的文本，参见26 I&N Dec. 755–56，而依赖此类

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varied considerations does not promote uniformity, cf. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 91–92 (2010) (observing that “highly general multifactor tests . . . [had] failed to achieve a nationally uniform interpretation of federal law”). Moreover, the Estrada test may give effect to state-court clarifications that do not call into question the validity of a criminal alien’s original sentence. For example, the opinion in Estrada suggests that a “clarification” entered shortly after the original sentence by the same judge who issued the sentence could be given effect for immigration purposes, see 26 I&N Dec. 755–56, even if the alien who sought the clarification did so just to avoid immigration consequences. The Estrada test thus undermines Congress’s decision to attach immigration consequences to sentences of a certain length.

各不相同的考量并不促进统一性，参见Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 91–92 (2010)（指出“高度概括的多因素检验标准……[已]未能实现对联邦法律的全国统一解释”）。此外，Estrada检验标准可能赋予州法院澄清以效力，而这些澄清并未对刑事非公民原始刑罚的有效性提出质疑。例如，Estrada案的判决意见表明，由作出原始刑罚的同一法官在原始刑罚后不久作出的“澄清”可以为移民目的赋予效力，参见26 I&N Dec. 755–56，即使寻求澄清的非公民仅仅是为了避免移民后果而这样做。因此，Estrada检验标准削弱了国会将移民后果附加于特定长度刑罚的决定。

1. The respondents first argue that requiring immigration judges to assess the reasons that a state court altered a criminal alien’s sentence would require them to act as fact-finders in matters of state criminal law with which they have little familiarity. The Pickering test, however, already requires immigration judges to assess the administrative record and make determinations about the reasons that certain state-court orders were entered. See 23 I&N Dec. at 625 (examining “the law under which the [post-conviction] court issued its order,” “the terms of the order itself,” and “the reasons presented by the respondent in requesting that the court vacate the conviction”). The extension of the Pickering test to state-court sentence alterations raises no new concerns about the role of immigration judges in assessing the record. Moreover, the evidence on which immigration judges will rely when assessing state-court sentence alterations will typically be readily available in the record and should require little interpretation of state law. The application of the Pickering test demonstrates as much, as adjudicators applying it frequently determine whether a vacatur is valid for immigration purposes by assessing the text of the order of vacatur itself or the alien’s motion requesting the vacatur. See, e.g., Al-Najar v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir. 2008) (declining to give effect to a vacatur because of “the absence of any substantive legal basis cited in [the alien’s] motion”); Sanusi

1. 被申请人首先主张，要求移民法官评估州法院变更刑事非公民刑罚的理由，将要求他们在其不甚熟悉的州刑法事项中充当事实认定者。然而，Pickering检验标准已经要求移民法官评估行政记录并就某些州法院命令作出的理由作出认定。参见23 I&N Dec. at 625（审查“[定罪后]法院据以发布命令的法律”、“命令本身的条款”以及“被申请人在请求法院撤销定罪时提出的理由”）。将Pickering检验标准扩展至州法院刑罚变更，并未就移民法官在评估记录方面的角色引发新的关切。 此外，移民法官在评估州法院刑罚变更时所依赖的证据通常将在记录中随时可得，且应几乎不需要对州法律进行解释。Pickering检验标准的适用本身就证明了这一点，因为适用该标准的裁判者经常通过评估撤销令本身的文本或非公民请求撤销的动议来确定撤销是否为移民目的有效。参见，例如，Al-Najar v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir. 2008)（因“[非公民]动议中未援引任何实体法律依据”而拒绝赋予撤销效力）；Sanusi

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v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining to give effect to a vacatur because “[a] colorable legal ground for the granting of a writ of coram nobis was not raised in [the alien’s] state court petition”); Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006) (giving effect to a vacatur after examining the “state court order” and the alien’s “coram nobis petition” to determine “the reason underlying the state court’s decision to vacate” the conviction). The availability of such evidence thus indicates that immigration judges should not need to wade into the intricacies of state criminal law in applying this opinion’s rule.

v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2007)（因“[非公民]州法院申请中未提出授予人身保护令状的表面法律依据”而拒绝赋予撤销效力）；Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006)（在审查“州法院命令”和非公民的“人身保护令状申请”以确定“州法院撤销定罪决定背后的理由”后赋予撤销效力）。因此，此类证据的可得性表明，移民法官在适用本意见的规则时不应需要深入州刑法的复杂细节。

2. The respondents next contend that the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (the “Act”), requires that immigration judges and the Board give effect to state-court alterations of a criminal sentence, regardless of the reasons for that alteration. The respondents contend that Matter of Cota-Vargas supports this argument because, although that decision did not cite the Act, it concluded that a state court’s “decision to modify or reduce an alien’s criminal sentence nunc pro tunc is entitled to full faith and credit by the Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 23 I&N Dec. at 849 (emphasis added). This argument fails for two independent reasons. First, Congress may define terms such as “conviction” for the purposes of federal law in a way that differs from the definition attached to such terms by state courts. Thus, in deciding whether a vacated conviction remains effective for immigration purposes, an immigration judge or the Board merely applies and upholds the definition of conviction in the INA. The adjudicator is not reevaluating or otherwise questioning the validity of the state-court judgment. The adjudicator accordingly does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Act. See Saleh, 495 F.3d at 26 (“[T]he BIA is simply interpreting how to apply Saleh’s vacated State conviction for receiving stolen property to the INA and is not refusing to recognize or relitigating the validity of Saleh’s California state conviction. The full faith and credit statute is not thereby violated.”); Herrera-Inirio, 208 F.3d at 307 (“Neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor the statutory overlay ‘purports to prevent federal legislative authorities from writing federal statutes that differ from state statutes or from attaching, to words in a federal statute, a meaning that differs from the meaning attached to the same word when used in a statute enacted by a state.’” (quoting Molina v. INS, 981 F.2d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer, J.))).

2. 被申请人接下来主张，《充分信任与信用法》，28 U.S.C. § 1738（“该法”），要求移民法官和委员会赋予州法院对刑事刑罚的变更以效力，无论该变更的理由为何。被申请人主张Matter of Cota-Vargas支持这一论点，因为尽管该决定未引用该法，但其结论认为州法院“以nunc pro tunc方式修改或减轻非公民刑事刑罚的决定有权获得移民法官和移民上诉委员会的充分信任与信用”。23 I&N Dec. at 849（着重号为原文所加）。这一论点因两个独立理由而不能成立。 第一，国会可以为联邦法律之目的界定“定罪”等术语，其方式不同于州法院对此类术语所附加的定义。因此，在裁定被撤销的定罪是否仍为移民目的有效时，移民法官或委员会仅仅是在适用和维护INA中的定罪定义。裁判者并非在重新评估或以其他方式质疑州法院判决的有效性。裁判者因此并未违反《充分信任与信用法》。参见Saleh, 495 F.3d at 26（“[BIA]只是在解释如何将Saleh因接收被盗财产而被撤销的州定罪适用于INA，并非拒绝承认或重新诉讼Saleh加州州定罪的有效性。充分信任与信用法规并未因此被违反。”）；Herrera-Inirio, 208 F.3d at 307（“充分信任与信用条款和法定覆盖层均‘无意阻止联邦立法机关制定与州法规不同的联邦法规，或赋予联邦法规中的词语以不同于州立法机关颁布的法规中同一词语被赋予的含义。’”（引用Molina v. INS, 981 F.2d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1992)（Breyer法官）））。

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The same reasoning applies to sentence alterations. In applying the Pickering test to these state-court orders, the immigration judge is simply determining the meaning of the phrase “term of imprisonment or a sentence” in the INA for the purpose of enforcing federal immigration law. Hence, for the same reason that interpreting the term “conviction” in accordance with the Pickering test “does not infract applicable principles of full faith and credit,” see Herrera-Inirio, 208 at 307, applying the Pickering test to the phrase “term of imprisonment or a sentence” likewise does not implicate, much less violate, the Full Faith and Credit Act. The respondents attempt to avoid this result on the ground that Matter of Pickering’s interpretation of “conviction” is required by paragraph (A) of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48), whereas paragraph (B) does not mandate a similar result for the phrase “term of imprisonment or a sentence.” As discussed above, however, I believe that the text and history of this provision suggest that the two paragraphs are properly construed together, such that paragraph (A)’s focus on the original criminal proceeding requires paragraph (B) to be similarly interpreted. Moreover, just as paragraph (B) does not specifically address the effect of state-court “modifications,” “clarifications,” or other alterations of a sentence, paragraph (A) does not specifically address the effect of state-court “vacaturs” of a conviction. Both paragraphs, in other words, are silent on the effect of state-court orders, so there is no express textual basis for differentiating between the paragraphs in deciding whether to apply the Full Faith and Credit Act. The respondents’ argument also fails for the second reason that the Full Faith and Credit Act does not apply to federal agencies. By its own terms, that statute provides that “[a]cts, records and judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (emphasis added). The text of the Act is thus clear: it applies to “courts”—but not to “agencies”—and does not require agency officials such as immigration judges or the Board to give effect to state-court orders. See Perez v. Cissna, 914 F.3d 846, 857 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Act does not apply to agencies. The text of the Act is clear. . . . The [United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)] is not a court. Thus, the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 establishes that it does not apply to [USCIS].”); see also Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 799 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the “plain language of [the Act] establishes that it does not apply” to an agency); N.L.R.B. v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 930 F.2d 316,

同样的推理适用于刑罚变更。在将Pickering检验标准适用于这些州法院命令时，移民法官只是在为执行联邦移民法律之目的确定INA中“监禁期限或刑罚”一语的含义。因此，正如依据Pickering检验标准解释“定罪”一词“不侵犯充分信任与信用的适用原则”一样，参见Herrera-Inirio, 208 at 307，将Pickering检验标准适用于“监禁期限或刑罚”一语同样不涉及、更不用说违反《充分信任与信用法》。 被申请人试图以如下理由避免这一结果：Matter of Pickering对“定罪”的解释是8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)的(A)款所要求的，而(B)款并未对“监禁期限或刑罚”一语强制要求类似结果。然而，如上所述，我认为该规定的文本和历史表明，两款应被适当地一并解释，因此(A)款对原始刑事程序的关注要求(B)款也应作类似解释。此外，正如(B)款未具体涉及州法院“修改”、“澄清”或其他刑罚变更的效力一样，(A)款也未具体涉及州法院“撤销”定罪的效力。换言之，两款均未就州法院命令的效力作出规定，因此在决定是否适用《充分信任与信用法》时，不存在区分两款的明示文本依据。 被申请人的论点还因第二个理由而不能成立，即《充分信任与信用法》不适用于联邦机构。该法规本身规定，“法案、记录和司法程序……在美国及其领土和属地内的每个法院中应具有与在其来源州、领土或属地的法院中依法或依惯例所具有的同等充分信任与信用。”28 U.S.C. § 1738（着重号为原文所加）。因此，该法的文本是明确的：它适用于“法院”——但不适用于“机构”——且不要求移民法官或委员会等机构官员赋予州法院命令以效力。参见Perez v. Cissna, 914 F.3d 846, 857 (4th Cir. 2019)（“该法不适用于机构。该法的文本是明确的。……[美国公民及移民服务局（‘USCIS’）]不是法院。因此，28 U.S.C. § 1738的平实语言确立其不适用于[USCIS]。”）；另参见Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 799 (5th Cir. 2000)（解释“[该法]的平实语言确立其不适用”于机构）；N.L.R.B. v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 930 F.2d 316,

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320 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that “federal administrative agencies are not bound by section 1738 because they are not ‘courts’”). 2 The foregoing observations also dispose of the respondents’ broader argument that—even apart from the Act—an immigration judge’s assessment of state-court sentence alterations would contravene principles of federalism and comity. Contrary to respondent Thompson’s argument, an immigration judge’s evaluation of the reasoning behind a state-court alteration of an alien’s sentence does not “arrogate” to the federal government “the power to determine the effectiveness of state court orders.” Instead, as explained above, the immigration judge in such a case simply determines the effect of that order for the purposes of federal immigration law. See Matter of Velasquez-Rios, 27 I&N Dec. 470, 474 (BIA 2018) (“We must use Federal law, rather than State law, to determine the immigration consequences of [a] respondent’s . . . conviction.” (emphases in original)). The state-court order itself remains effective and unchallenged for all other purposes, and there accordingly exists no intrusion on state law of the sort that principles of federalism and comity are designed to prevent.

320 (3d Cir. 1991)（裁定“联邦行政机构不受第1738条约束，因为它们不是‘法院’”）。2 上述观察也解决了被上诉人更宽泛的论点——即使撇开该法不谈——移民法官对州法院变更刑罚的评估也会违反联邦主义与礼让原则。与被上诉人Thompson的论点相反，移民法官对外国人刑罚的州法院变更背后理由的评估，并不“僭取”联邦政府“决定州法院命令效力的权力”。相反，如上所述，此类案件中的移民法官仅为联邦移民法的目的确定该命令的效力。见Matter of Velasquez-Rios, 27 I&N Dec. 470, 474 (BIA 2018)（“我们必须使用联邦法而非州法来确定[被上诉人]……定罪的移民后果。”（原文强调））。州法院命令本身在所有其他目的上仍然有效且不受质疑，因此不存在联邦主义与礼让原则旨在防止的那种对州法的侵入。

3. The respondents finally argue that, in determining the impact that a state-court alteration of a sentence should have on the immigration laws, the Attorney General should proceed through rulemaking rather than adjudication. But given that the Board itself adopted its prior tests precisely in the context of administrative adjudications, I do not believe that there is a need for a regulation here. Indeed, Supreme Court precedent confirms my authority as agency head to proceed by adjudication, and my authority here derives from the text of the relevant provisions in the INA. The Supreme Court has long recognized that agencies may decide whether to announce reinterpretations of a statute through rulemaking or through adjudication. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (“[T]he choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first

3. 被上诉人最后主张，在确定州法院变更刑罚应对移民法产生何种影响时，司法部长应通过规则制定而非裁决进行。但鉴于委员会本身正是在行政裁决的背景下采纳了其先前的检验标准，我认为此处无需制定规章。事实上，最高法院的先例确认了我作为机构首长通过裁决行事的权力，而我在此的权力源自INA相关条款的文本。 最高法院早已确认，机构可以决定是通过规则制定还是通过裁决来宣布对法规的重新解释。见NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)（“[T]在规则制定与裁决之间的选择首先属于

2 Two Board opinions suggest that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 nonetheless applies to federal agencies. See Matter of Adamiak, 23 I&N Dec. 878, 880 (BIA 2006) (“In the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary, we are required by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) to give full faith and credit to this State court judgment.”); Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I&N Dec. 1378, 1380 (BIA 2000) (“We will instead accord full faith and credit to this state court judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738.”). The plain text of the statute and the federal court precedent cited above indicate that these cases were wrongly decided. These cases accordingly are overruled to the extent that they suggest that the Full Faith and Credit Act applies to proceedings before immigration judges and the Board.

2 委员会的两份意见表明28 U.S.C. § 1738仍适用于联邦机构。见Matter of Adamiak, 23 I&N Dec. 878, 880 (BIA 2006)（“在无相反法定指令的情况下，我们依28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000)须对该州法院判决给予充分信任与尊重。”）；Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I&N Dec. 1378, 1380 (BIA 2000)（“我们将改为对该州法院判决给予充分信任与尊重。见28 U.S.C. § 1738。”）。该法规的明文及上述引用的联邦法院先例表明，这些案件裁判错误。因此，这些案件在暗示《充分信任与尊重法》适用于移民法官和委员会面前程序的范围內被推翻。

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instance within the [agency’s] discretion.”); see also Velasco-Giron v. Holder, 773 F.3d 774, 779 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that agencies “can choose freely between rules and standards, between rulemaking and adjudication”); Gao v. Holder, 595 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is a basic principle of administrative law that ‘the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.’” (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)). Indeed, in the decades since Bell Aerospace, the Supreme Court “has not even suggested that a court can constrain an agency’s choice between rulemaking and adjudication.’” Velasco-Giron, 773 F.3d at 779 (emphasis added) (quoting Richard J. Pierce, Jr., I Administrative Law Treatise § 6.9 at 510 (5th ed. 2010)). And agencies retain their discretion even when announcing interpretations that may conflict with prior decisions. See Chisholm v. F.C.C., 538 F.2d 349, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[A]n administrative agency is permitted to change its interpretation of a statute, especially where the prior interpretation is based on error, no matter how longstanding.”); see also id. at 365 (“The original interpretation of the [statute] was . . . established by adjudication; thus reversal by adjudication seems particularly appropriate here.”). I accordingly conclude that it is appropriate to address these Board precedents in the context of an administrative adjudication, and there is no legal requirement to do so by regulation.

[机构]裁量范围内的事项。”）；另见Velasco-Giron v. Holder, 773 F.3d 774, 779 (7th Cir. 2014)（解释机构“可以在规则与标准之间、在规则制定与裁决之间自由选择”）；Gao v. Holder, 595 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2010)（“[I]行政法的一项基本原则是，‘在通过一般规则还是通过个别、临时的诉讼程序之间作出的选择，主要属于行政机构的知情裁量范围。’”（引用SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)））。事实上，在Bell Aerospace之后的数十年里，最高法院“甚至从未暗示法院可以限制机构在规则制定与裁决之间的选择。”Velasco-Giron, 773 F.3d at 779（强调为原文所加）（引用Richard J. Pierce, Jr., I Administrative Law Treatise § 6.9 at 510 (5th ed. 2010)）。而且，即使宣布可能与先前决定冲突的解释，机构仍保留其裁量权。见Chisholm v. F.C.C., 538 F.2d 349, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1976)（“[A]允许行政机构改变其对法规的解释，尤其是在先前解释基于错误的情况下，无论其存在多久。”）；另见id. at 365（“对[该法规]的原始解释是……通过裁决确立的；因此在此通过裁决予以推翻似乎尤为适当。”）。因此，我得出结论，在行政裁决的背景下处理这些委员会先例是适当的，且法律上并无通过规章为之的要求。

C. Finally, although I did not request briefing on the subject, the parties to this case have addressed which side should carry the burden of proof when it comes to establishing the state court’s reason for altering a sentence under the Pickering test. The Board and the courts of appeals have considered this issue in applying Matter of Pickering to vacaturs of convictions, and they have allocated the burden in different ways, depending on the procedural posture of the case at hand. See, e.g., Andrade-Zamora v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 2016) (the alien bears the burden to prove that a conviction was vacated because of a procedural or substantive defect when applying for cancellation of removal); Barakat v. Holder, 621 F.3d 398, 403–04 (6th Cir. 2010) (the government bears the burden to prove that a conviction was vacated for reasons other than a procedural or substantive defect when seeking to establish that an alien is removable); Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2006) (the alien bears the burden to prove that a conviction was vacated because of a procedural or substantive defect when seeking to reopen removal proceedings).

C. 最后，尽管我未就该主题要求提交书状，本案各方已论述了在根据Pickering检验标准确定州法院变更刑罚的理由时，哪一方应承担举证责任。委员会和各上诉法院在将Matter of Pickering适用于撤销定罪时已考虑过该问题，且它们根据手头案件的程序状态以不同方式分配了举证责任。见，例如，Andrade-Zamora v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 2016)（在申请取消递解时，外国人承担证明定罪因程序或实体瑕疵而被撤销的责任）；Barakat v. Holder, 621 F.3d 398, 403–04 (6th Cir. 2010)（在试图确立外国人可被递解时，政府承担证明定罪因程序或实体瑕疵以外的原因而被撤销的责任）；Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2006)（在寻求重新开启递解程序时，外国人承担证明定罪因程序或实体瑕疵而被撤销的责任）。

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The courts of appeals have sometimes invoked a burden-shifting framework to describe the burden of proof, e.g., Barakat, 621 F.3d at 403 (describing how “the burden of production may shift during removal proceedings”), but regardless of how the issue is described, the bottom line remains the same: When the government alleges that an alien is deportable, the government bears the burden of proving deportability by clear and convincing evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). And when an alien applies for relief from removal, the alien bears the burden to prove that he meets the eligibility requirements for the specific form of relief requested. Id. § 1229a(c)(4). After all of the evidence has been proffered by the parties, the immigration judge must weigh that evidence and determine whether the party bearing the burden of proof has carried its burden. The parties to this appeal dispute how these principles should apply in the context of sentence alterations, but I did not request briefing on this issue. See 27 I&N Dec. 556. In the absence of such a request, I decline to address the burden-shifting issue anew and thus leave undisturbed the existing body of law applying the Pickering test.

各上诉法院有时援引举证责任转移框架来描述举证责任，例如，Barakat, 621 F.3d at 403（描述“举证责任在递解程序中可能发生转移”），但无论该问题如何描述，底线仍然相同：当政府主张外国人可被递解时，政府承担以清晰且令人信服的证据证明可递解性的责任。8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A)。而当外国人申请免于递解的救济时，外国人承担证明其符合所请求特定救济形式的资格要求的责任。Id. § 1229a(c)(4)。在各方提出所有证据后，移民法官必须权衡该证据并确定承担举证责任的一方是否已履行其责任。 本上诉各方对这些问题应如何适用于刑罚变更存在争议，但我未就该问题要求提交书状。见27 I&N Dec. 556。在无此类请求的情况下，我拒绝重新处理举证责任转移问题，因此不改变适用Pickering检验标准的现有法律体系。

III. For the reasons explained, the Board’s decisions in Matter of Cota-Vargas, Matter of Song, and Matter of Estrada are overruled. The tests described in those cases will no longer govern the immigration-related effects of state-court orders that modify, clarify, or otherwise alter a criminal alien’s sentence. Instead, such state-court orders will be given effect for immigration purposes only if based on a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceeding. These orders will have no effect for immigration purposes if based on reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceeding, such as rehabilitation or the avoidance of immigration consequences. Because the Board’s decisions in Matter of Michael Vernon Thomas and Matter of Joseph Lloyd Thompson were based on these earlier precedents, I vacate the Board’s decisions below and remand these cases to the Board to assess the state-court alterations in light of the Pickering test. I do not doubt that it would be the rare case where a state court’s alteration of an old sentence by three or four days (as in respondents’ cases) would reflect a necessary remedy for a fundamental legal defect, rather than an exercise of the trial judge’s sentencing discretion. But insofar as the parties litigated these cases under the earlier precedents, I do not wish to foreclose any available arguments in that regard. On remand, the Board may review the evidence in the record, and consider any appropriate requests to reopen the

III. 基于所述理由，委员会在Matter of Cota-Vargas、Matter of Song和Matter of Estrada中的决定被推翻。这些案件所述的检验标准将不再支配州法院修改、澄清或以其他方式变更刑事外国人刑罚的命令在移民相关方面的效力。相反，此类州法院命令仅在基于 underlying 刑事程序中的程序或实体瑕疵时，才为移民目的赋予效力。如果基于与 underlying 刑事程序实体无关的理由，例如改造或避免移民后果，这些命令将不具有移民目的上的效力。 由于委员会在Matter of Michael Vernon Thomas和Matter of Joseph Lloyd Thompson中的决定基于这些较早的先例，我撤销委员会的下述决定，并将这些案件发回委员会，以根据Pickering检验标准评估州法院的变更。我不怀疑，州法院将旧刑罚变更三天或四天（如被上诉人的案件）会反映对根本法律瑕疵的必要救济，而非审判法官量刑裁量的行使，这将是罕见的情形。但鉴于各方是根据较早的先例诉讼这些案件，我不希望在此方面排除任何可用的论点。在发回后，委员会可以审查记录中的证据，并考虑任何适当的重新开启记录的请求

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record, to determine whether the state-court alterations in each of these cases arose as a result of a procedural or substantive defect, or for some other reason.

以确定这些案件中每一案件的州法院变更是否因程序或实体瑕疵而产生，还是因其他原因而产生。

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