Matter of Tee

In Deportation Proceedings

驱逐程序中

Decided by Board January 10, 1995

由委员会于1995年1月10日决定

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Keith W. Bell, Esquire Robert Solmonson 3351 Arctic Boulevard District Counsel Anchorage, Alaska 99503

代表被申请人： 代表移民局： Keith W. Bell, Esquire Robert Solmonson 3351 Arctic Boulevard 地区法律顾问 Anchorage, Alaska 99503

The respondent has appealed from the March 14, 1991, decision of an immigration judge finding her deportable as charged and denying her joint petition to remove the conditional basis of her lawful permanent resident status under section 216 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 11 86a (1988), as well as her request for the privilege of voluntary departure. During the pendency of this appeal, the respondent filed a motion to remand the record to the immigration judge in order to present an application for a waiver under section 216(c)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.0 § 1186a(cX4) (Supp. V 1993). The record will be remanded to the immigration judge for further proceedings. The respondent is a 33-year-old native and citizen of Malaysia. She entered the United States on January 30, 1981, as a nonimmigrant student. On April 22, 1986, the respondent married Arthell Hubbard, a United States citizen. On the basis of a petition filed by her husband, the respondent was granted lawful permanent resident status on a

被申请人就移民法官1991年3月14日的决定提出上诉，该决定认定其可如所指控般被驱逐，并驳回其根据《移民与国籍法》第216条、8 U.S.C. § 11 86a (1988)提出的取消其合法永久居民身份条件性基础的联合申请，以及其自愿离境特权的请求。在本上诉审理期间，被申请人提出将记录发回移民法官的动议，以便根据该法第216(c)(4)条、8 U.S.0 § 1186a(cX4) (Supp. V 1993)提出豁免申请。记录将发回移民法官进一步审理。 被申请人是33岁的马来西亚本地人和公民。她于1981年1月30日作为非移民学生进入美国。1986年4月22日，被申请人与美国公民Arthell Hubbard结婚。基于其丈夫提交的申请，被申请人于

conditional basis under section 216(a) of the Act on January 9, 1987. In order to remove the conditional basis of the lawful permanent residence, section 216(c)(1) of the Act requires the alien and his or her petitioning spouse to file a joint petition during the 90-day period before the second anniversary of the date the alien obtained that status. The respondent and her husband did so on December 12, 1988. However, on April 21, 1989, during the pendency of the interview and investigation process by officers of the Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service, the respondent was divorced from her United States citizen husband. The record is not clear as to whether the district director was notified of the divorce or not. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the district director denied the joint petition on February 7, 1990. The respondent was accordingly placed in deporta- tion proceedings by issuance of an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) on May 8, 1990. The respondent appeared before the immigration judge and submit- ted the joint petition for review pursuant to section 216(c)(3)(D) of the Act. At the time of the hearing in this matter, the respondent was remarried to another United States citizen, by whom she was expecting a child. Upon conclusion of the evidence and testimony of the parties, the immigration judge issued a decision finding that the respondent had entered into her first marriage in order to secure an immigration benefit. The joint petition was accordingly denied. Voluntary departure was also denied, both on grounds of statutory ineligibility and in the exercise of discretion. The respondent appealed, asserting that the evidence does not support a finding that the marriage was not bona fide and arguing that her applications for relief were improperly denied_ Upon consideration of the record of proceedings, we find that the immigration judge should not have considered the merits of the joint petition under section 216(c)(1) of the Act as the respondent was statutorily ineligible for such relief. In a deportation proceeding where the immigration judge is reviewing a joint petition denied by the Service on its merits,

1987年1月9日根据该法第216(a)条获得有条件基础。 为解除合法永久居留的有条件基础，该法第216(c)(1)条要求外籍人士及其申请配偶在該外籍人士获得该身份之日第2周年之前的90天期间内提交联合申请。被申请人和她的丈夫于1988年12月12日这样做了。 然而，1989年4月21日，在移民和归化局官员进行面谈和调查程序期间，被申请人与她的美国公民丈夫离婚。记录不清楚地区局长是否被告知离婚。调查结束后，地区局长于1990年2月7日拒绝了联合申请。被申请人因此于1990年5月8日通过签发说明理由令和听证通知（Form I-221）被置于驱逐程序中。 被申请人出现在移民法官面前，并根据该法第216(c)(3)(D)条提交联合申请以供审查。在本次听证时，被申请人已与另一名美国公民再婚，并怀有他的孩子。在证据和当事人证词结束后，移民法官作出决定，认定被申请人缔结第一次婚姻是为了获得移民利益。联合申请因此被拒绝。自愿离境也被拒绝，理由既是法定不合格，也是行使自由裁量权。被申请人提出上诉，主张证据不支持婚姻非善意的认定，并辩称她的救济申请被不当拒绝_ 在审议诉讼记录后，我们认为移民法官不应根据该法第216(c)(1)条审议联合申请的实质，因为被申请人在法律上不符合此类救济的资格。 在驱逐程序中，移民法官审查服务局基于实质理由拒绝的联合申请时，

Section 216(c)(3)(D) of the Act (emphasis added); see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(d)(2) (1994). Among the "facts and information" which the Service roust prove untrue is the allegation by joint petitioners that "the qualifying marriage ... has not been judicially annulled or terminated, other than through the death of a spouse." Section

该法第216(c)(3)(D)条（着重号为添加）；另见8 C.F.R. § 216.4(d)(2)（1994年）。在移民局必须证明不真实的“事实和信息”中，包括联合申请人关于“合格婚姻……未被司法宣告无效或终止，除配偶死亡外”的主张。该法第

216(d)(1)(A)(11) of the Act (emphasis added); see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a) (1994). Thus, the Act requires the Service to demonstrate in deportation proceedings that the facts and information in the petition "are not true" with respect to the marriage, and the joint petition must include information to the effect that the marriage "has not been" annulled or terminated. Considering that the Act requires a present demonstration that the marriage has not been annulled or terminated, it is clear that the qualifying marriage must be ongoing in order for a joint petition to be approved. We accordingly find by the plain meaning of the Act that an alien becomes statutorily ineligible for approval of a section 216(c)(1) joint petition upon termination of the marriage, other than through the death of the spouse, before its adjudication by an immigration judge. This holding is consistent with the statutory scheme enacted as section 216 of the Act by the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend- ments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537. Under that scheme, the joint petition procedure is an extension of the initial visa petition procedure of section 204 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Matter of Mende:, 20 I&N Dec. 833 (BIA 1994). As such, the petitioning spouse is clearly considered an integral part of the process of removal of the conditional basis of the alien's lawful permanent resident status under the joint petition procedure. Id In this connection, we note that the regulations have long provided that the legal termination of the marriage between a petitioner and the beneficiary of a relative visa petition, prior to the alien's adjustment of status or entry on the basis of that petition, constitutes automatic revocation of the petition, even though it was already approved. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(4) (1994). 1 Thus, it is consistent with the existing statutory and regulatory scheme to hold that divorce automatically withdraws the joint petition from consideration. Moreover, where the marriage has been terminated, the respondent is still entitled under the statutory scheme to apply for a waiver of the requirement to file a joint petition under section 216(c)(4) of the Act. This, gives the alien an opportunity to demonstrate that the conditional basis of the permanent residence should be removed despite the termination of the marriage- See generally Matter of Mendes, supra; Matter of Balsillie, 20 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1992). Accordingly, since the respondent was not married to the petition-

《移民与国籍法》第216(d)(1)(A)(11)条（着重号为后加）；另见8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)（1994年）。 因此，该法要求移民局在驱逐出境程序中证明，请愿书中关于婚姻的事实和信息“不真实”，且联合请愿书必须包含婚姻“未被”宣告无效或终止的信息。考虑到该法要求作出婚姻未被宣告无效或终止的当前证明，显然，为使联合请愿书获得批准，符合条件的婚姻必须持续存在。因此，我们依据该法的平实含义认定，外国人若在移民法官对其第216(c)(1)条联合请愿书作出裁定之前婚姻终止（配偶死亡除外），即依法丧失批准资格。 这一裁定与1986年《移民婚姻欺诈修正案》（Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537）作为该法第216条所制定的法定方案相一致。根据该方案，联合请愿程序是该法第204条（8 U.S.C. § 1154（1988年及1993年增补第V卷））初始签证请愿程序的延伸。Matter of Mende:, 20 I&N Dec. 833 (BIA 1994)。因此，在联合请愿程序下，请愿配偶显然被视为解除外国人合法永久居民身份条件过程中不可或缺的一部分。Id。就此而言，我们注意到，法规长期以来规定，请愿人与亲属签证请愿受益人之间的婚姻在该外国人基于该请愿调整身份或入境之前合法终止的，构成请愿的自动撤销，即使该请愿已获批准。8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(4)（1994年）。1 因此，认定离婚自动使联合请愿退出审理，与现行法定和法规方案相一致。 此外，在婚姻已终止的情况下，被申请人仍有权依据法定方案申请豁免该法第216(c)(4)条规定的提交联合请愿的要求。这使该外国人有 机会证明，尽管婚姻已终止，永久居留的条件仍应被解除——一般参见Matter of Mendes, supra；Matter of Balsillie, 20 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1992)。 因此，由于被申请人未与请愿

ing spouse at the time of the hearing, she was no longer eligible for relief from deportation by means of a joint petition to remove the conditional basis of her lawful permanent resident status. Thus, the petition should have been denied for statutory ineligibility, thereby obviating consideration of the merits of the petition. On July 24, 1991, soon after the immigration judge's decision in this case, the respondent filed an application with the district director for a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Act. The district director subsequently denied the petition, and the respondent then filed a motion with this Board to remand this matter to the immigration judge so that the denial of the petition could be reviewed pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(1) (1994). We have held that where a respondent becomes statutorily eligible for a waiver under section 216(c)(4) by virtue of changed circumstances, she may request a continuance of deportation proceedings in order to submit the waiver request to the Service for adjudication. Matter of nderson, 20 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 1994); Matter of endes, supra. Here, the changed circumstance of the respondent's divorce actually occurred before the initiation of deporta- tion proceedings. However, in view of the erroneous assumption by all of the parties, to> this proceeding, including the immigration judge, that presentation of the merits of the joint petition in deportation proceedings was nevertheless appropriate, we shall remand the record for consideration of the waiver request, and for such other matters as are consistent with this opinion. We note that one of the reasons the Service opposed the motion to remand was that the respondent had not paid a filing fee for a motion to reopen. Where a motion to remand is in, the nature of a motion to reopen, it must comply with the substantive requirements for a motion to reopen. Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 1992). However, a filing fee is not required for a motion to remand. With regard to the joint petition, we have not here addressed the bona fides of the respondent's marriage to Arthell Hubbard for the same reason that the petition should not have been considered by the immigration judge. If another application is presented, the relevance of the testimony and evidence already submitted to the immigration judge can be considered at that time. ORDER: The record is, remanded to the immigration judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the entry of a new decision.

在听证时，她已不再有资格通过联合申请取消其合法永久居民身份的条件性基础来获得免于驱逐出境的救济。因此，该申请本应因法定不合格而被驳回，从而无需考虑申请的实体问题。 1991年7月24日，在本案移民法官作出裁决后不久，被申请人向地区主任提交了一份依据该法第216(c)(4)(A)条申请豁免的申请。地区主任随后驳回了该申请，被申请人于是向本委员会提出动议，要求将本事项发回移民法官，以便依据8 C.F.R. § 216.5(1) (1994)对该申请的驳回进行审查。我们曾裁定，如果被申请人因情况变化而在法律上符合第216(c)(4)条规定的豁免资格，她可以请求延期驱逐出境程序，以便将豁免请求提交移民局裁决。Matter of nderson, 20 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 1994)；Matter of endes, supra。在此，被申请人离婚这一情况变化实际上发生在驱逐出境程序启动之前。然而，鉴于本案所有各方，包括移民法官，均错误地假定在驱逐出境程序中陈述联合申请的实体问题仍然是适当的，我们将发回记录，以考虑该豁免请求以及与本意见一致的其他事项。 我们注意到，移民局反对发回动议的理由之一是被申请人未支付重新开案动议的申请费。当发回动议具有重新开案动议的性质时，它必须符合重新开案动议的实质性要求。Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 1992)。但是，发回动议不需要支付申请费。 关于联合申请，我们在此未讨论被申请人与Arthell Hubbard婚姻的善意问题，原因与移民法官本不应考虑该申请相同。如果提交另一份申请，届时可以考虑已经向移民法官提交的证言和证据的相关性。 命令： 记录发回移民法官，以便按照本意见进行进一步程序并作出新裁决。