Matter of Fakalata

The lawful permanent resident petitioner applied for preference sta- tus on behalf of the beneficiary as his adopted son under section 202(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2). In a deci- sion dated October 1, 1979, the District Director denied the petition. The petitioner has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed. - The petitioner is a 72-year-old native and citizen of Tonga. The benefi- ciary is also a native and citizen of Tonga who was born the legitimate son of the petitioner's cousin on June 80, 1061. At the age of 9 months, the beneficiary was taken into the petitioner's home and was raised as a

合法永久居民申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第202(a)(2)条、8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2)，作为受益人的养父为其申请优先身份。在1979年10月1日的一项决定中，地区主任拒绝了该申请。申请人已对该决定提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。 - 申请人是72岁的汤加本土出生公民。受益人也是汤加本土出生公民，于1061年6月80日出生，是申请人表亲的婚生子。在9个月大时，受益人被带入申请人家中，并作为

member of his family. The petitioner argues that under these circum- stances the beneficiary qualifies as his adopted son under the customary law of Tonga_ The District Director denied the petition on the ground that the "adoption" did not create a legal status or relationship under Tongan law and therefore was not legally valid. In reaching this conclusion, he relied on our decision in Matter of Palelei, 16 I&N Dec. 716 (BIA 1979), where we found that a customary adoption in Tonga would not be consid- ered valid for immigration purposes: In that decision we noted the opinion of the Crown Solicitor of Tonga which stated that a customary adoption was not recognized as legally valid under the law of that country. On appeal, the petitioner has submitted another opinion from the Crown Solicitor of Tonga dated July 18, 1980,-which states, in pertinent part:

其家庭成员抚养。申请人主张，在此情况下，受益人根据汤加习惯法符合其养子的资格。 地区主任以该“收养”未根据汤加法律创设法律地位或关系、因而在法律上无效为由拒绝了该申请。在得出这一结论时，他依据了我们在Matter of Palelei, 16 I&N Dec. 716 (BIA 1979)案中的决定，在该案中我们认定汤加的习惯法收养在移民目的上不被视为有效。在该决定中，我们注意到了汤加王国法律顾问的意见，该意见指出习惯法收养根据该国法律不被承认为法律上有效。 在上诉中，申请人提交了汤加王国法律顾问于1980年7月18日出具的另意见，其相关部分指出：

and the legal rights and duties of the parents and children involved in them. See Matter of. Poon, sizpra; Matter of Ng, supra; Matter of Chin, 12 I&N Dec. 240 (BIA 1967). Thus;_ where we have found that the claimed adoptions did not comply with the provisions of that customary law, we have considered them invalid for immigration purposes. See Matter of Lee, 15 I&N Dec. 221(BIA 1975). On the other hand, in countries where adoption is practiced according to local custom, but does not create substantial legal rights and obliga- tions which are sanctioned by the government as having legal force, the Board has declined to give such customary adoptions recognition. See ' Matter of Benjamin, 15 I&N Dec. 709 (BIA 1976); Matter of Rehman, 15 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1975); Matter of Mozeb, 15 I&N Dec. 430 (BIA 1975); Matter ofBh,egani, 15 I&N Dec. 299 (BIA 1975); Matter of Kong, 14 I&N Dec. 649 (BIA 1974), motion to reconsider denied, Matter of Kong, 15 I&N Dec. 224 (BIA 1975); Matter of Ashree, Ahmed and Ahmed, 14 _UN Dec. 305 (BIA 1973); Mattel' of Boghdadi, 12 I&N Dec. 6 (BIA 1968); Matter of B-, 9 I&NDec. 521 (BIA 1961). We must therefore determine whether customary adoption in Tonga creates a legal status which is recognized by the government in that country as carrying with it substantial legal rights and obligation& The evidence which best indicates the Tongan government's position regard- ing customary adoption consists of the two opinions offered by the Crown Solicitor. In the first of those opinions, which we cited in Matter of Palelei, supra, the Crown Solicitor unequivocally pronounced that "there is no provision in our law for the adoption of children born legitimately" and that a customary adoption "is not recognized as legally valid under Tongan law." He further notes in his second opinion that there is no reported law concerning the rights and duties of parents or children "involved in customary adoptions. This lack of judicial law is attributed to the fact that "everyone understands that customarily adopted chil- dren are treated in all respects as if they were legally adopted except that they cannot inherit." In conclusion, the Crown Solicitor states that customary adoptions have the effect in Tonga of creating a parent and child relationship. Other evidence relating to the legal effect of customary adoptions in Tonga includes a statement from Mr. William Clive Edwards, who states that he is a licensed lawyer• of the Supreme Court of Tonga, and a monograph entitled "Tongan Adoption." Morton, Tongan Adoption, in Transactions in Kinship—Adoption and Fosterage in Oceania 64 (L Brady ed. 1976). Mr. Edwards asserts that the law "in Tonga only enables illegitimate children to be adopted and it does not allow for adoption of , legitimate issues." Mr. Morton offers the following statement in regard to adoption transactions in -Tonga:

。见Matter of. Poon, sizpra；Matter of Ng, supra；Matter of Chin, 12 I&N Dec. 240 (BIA 1967)。因此，在我们认定所主张的收养不符合该习惯法规定的情况下，我们已认定其在移民目的上无效。见Matter of Lee, 15 I&N Dec. 221(BIA 1975)。 另一方面，在收养依当地习惯实行、但并未创设经政府认可具有法律效力的实质性法律权利和义务的国家，委员会拒绝给予此类习惯法收养承认。见'Matter of Benjamin, 15 I&N Dec. 709 (BIA 1976)；Matter of Rehman, 15 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1975)；Matter of Mozeb, 15 I&N Dec. 430 (BIA 1975)；Matter ofBh,egani, 15 I&N Dec. 299 (BIA 1975)；Matter of Kong, 14 I&N Dec. 649 (BIA 1974)，重新审议动议被驳回，Matter of Kong, 15 I&N Dec. 224 (BIA 1975)；Matter of Ashree, Ahmed and Ahmed, 14 _UN Dec. 305 (BIA 1973)；Mattel' of Boghdadi, 12 I&N Dec. 6 (BIA 1968)；Matter of B-, 9 I&NDec. 521 (BIA 1961)。 因此，我们必须确定汤加的习惯法收养是否创设了一种被该国政府承认为附带实质性法律权利和义务的法律地位。最能表明汤加政府关于习惯法收养立场的证据由法律顾问提供的两份意见组成。在其中第一份意见中（我们在Matter of Palelei, supra案中曾引用），法律顾问明确宣称“我国法律没有关于收养婚生子女的规定”，且习惯法收养“根据汤加法律不被承认为法律上有效”。他在第二份意见中进一步指出，没有关于“涉及习惯法收养的”父母或子女权利和义务的已报告法律。这种司法法律的缺失被归因于以下事实：“所有人都理解，习惯法收养的子女在所有方面均被视为如同合法收养一样对待，只是他们不能继承。”最后，法律顾问指出，习惯法收养在汤加具有创设父母子女关系的效力。 与汤加习惯法收养法律效力有关的其他证据包括William Clive Edwards先生的陈述，他称自己是汤加最高法院的执业律师，以及一篇题为“汤加收养”的专著。Morton, Tongan Adoption, in Transactions in Kinship—Adoption and Fosterage in Oceania 64 (L Brady ed. 1976)。Edwards先生断言，法律“在汤加仅允许收养非婚生子女，不允许收养婚生子女。”Morton先生就汤加的收养交易提供了以下陈述：

legal adoption are made to the courts because the circumstances of Tongan adoption are often incongruent with the European model of adoption applied in the courts. Morton, supra, at 65. According to these sources, the statutory law of Tonga only provides for the adoption of illegitimate children and does not officially recognize the adoption of legitimate children as establishing any rights or duties of the parties. involved.' From this we must conclude that customary adoptions, which are apparently accomplished without the benefit of any ceremony or formal proceedings, do not create a legal status or relationship under Tongan law. The petitioner argues that the Crown Solicitor has indicated that customary adoptions are legally recognized in Tonga by his statement that these adoptions create a parent and child relationship. However, our examination of Mr. Morton's treatise on adoptions in Tonga per- suades us that the parent and child relationship resulting from a custom- ary adoption does not carry with it such rights and obligations as we would characterize as legally sanctioned. For example, he states that lijn contrast to Western practices of child rearing, the rights and duties of jural parenthood extend to a large number of kinsmen, neighbors, and friends." Morton, supra, at 65. He further explains that children are considered to be valuable resources which are essentially shared among kinsmen and that adoption transactions are a means of strength- ening the bonds of kinship. (pp. 73, 76, 77). According to Mr. Morton, the adoption of a child does not significantly alter his kinship status as acquired at birth through his natural parents, but rather provides him with two overlapping kindreds because most adoptions take place between blood relatives (p. 77). Since an adopted child's relationship to his natural parents is generally a continuing one, he benefits from the adoption in that it gives him the advantage of manipulating his kinship status by stressing his relationship to either. his natural parents or his adoptive parents (pp. 77-78, 80). Although a new parent and child relationship may be created through customary adoption in Tonga, it appears that it is not exclusive since the relationship of an adopted child to his natural parents is diminished only by his own choice. A system which gives an adopted child the option to maintain a legal relationship with his natural parents is inconsistent with our concept of adoption and with section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Immi- gration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E). Consequently, we are not convinced that the parent and child relationship resulting from Tongan customary adoption creates rights and duties which we would

向法院提出的合法收养，是因为汤加收养的情形往往与法院所适用的欧洲收养模式不一致。Morton，前引，第65页。 根据这些来源，汤加的成文法仅规定非婚生子女的收养，并且不正式承认婚生子女的收养可确立当事人的任何权利或义务。由此我们必须得出结论：习惯法上的收养显然无需任何仪式或正式程序即可完成，并不在汤加法律下创设法律地位或关系。 申请人主张，王室法律顾问（Crown Solicitor）已表示习惯法上的收养在汤加获得法律承认，其陈述称这些收养创设父母子女关系。然而，我们对Morton先生关于汤加收养的专著的考察使我们确信，习惯法收养所产生的父母子女关系并不附带我们所认为的经法律认可的权利和义务。例如，他指出，“与西方的育儿实践相比，法律上父母身份的权利和义务延伸至大量亲属、邻居和朋友。”Morton，前引，第65页。他进一步解释，子女被视为宝贵的资源，本质上在亲属之间共享，而收养交易是加强亲属纽带的一种手段。（第73、76、77页）。 根据Morton先生的说法，收养子女并不会显著改变其出生时通过自然父母获得的亲属地位，而是为其提供两个重叠的亲属群体，因为大多数收养发生在血亲之间（第77页）。由于被收养子女与自然父母的关系通常是持续性的，他从收养中受益，因为这使他能够通过强调与自然父母或养父母的关系来操纵其亲属地位（第77-78、80页）。 尽管在汤加通过习惯法收养可能创设新的父母子女关系，但该关系似乎并非排他性的，因为被收养子女与自然父母的关系仅因其自身选择而减弱。一种赋予被收养子女选择权以维持与自然父母法律关系的制度，与我们的收养概念以及《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条、8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E)不一致。因此，我们并不确信汤加习惯法收养所产生的父母子女关系创设了我们

recognize as enforceable by law: Also of significance to our inquiry is the fact that the Constitution of Tonga prohibits the inheritance of land by children who are adopted according to customary practice. Although the petitioner notes that the Board has found Chinese customary adoptions which bestowed no suc- cession rights to be valid for immigration purposes in Matter of Ng, supra, and Matter of Yne, supra, we believe, that the situation pre- sented here is distinguishable. Under Chinese customary law, two kinds Of adoption exist: (1) adoption of a male child for the purpose of institut- ing him as an heir for perpetuation of the ancestral cult, which requires that the child come from the same kindred and have the same surname, and (2) adoption of a child, whether male or female, without intending to institute it as an heir. See Matter of Young, 14 I&N Dec. 158 (BIA 1972); Matter of Poon, supra; Matter of Ng, septa; Matter of Chin, supra. Thus, although male children who are without the required qualifi- cations and all females may not inherit from their adoptive parents under Chinese customary law, they are nonetheless recognized as hav- ing equal status with those natural children who also do not have the right to inherit. Seellatter of Ng, supra. On the other hand, children adopted in Tonga pursuant to custom are not permitted to inherit and therefore do not have rights comparable to those of natural legitimate children. The Board has refused to recognize as valid for immigration purposes customary adoptions which do not accord adopted children a status similar to' hat of natural children. See Matter of Mosel), supra, Matter of Kong, supra. Customary adoptions in Tonga do not give the adopted child a legal status or relationship which bestows rights and obligations comparable to those of natural legitimate children and they do not appear to have 'any legal effect under Tongan law. The Crown Solicitor's original conch- siori that customary adoptions are not recognized as legally valid has not been retracted or contradicted, nor has the petitioner offered any evi- dence which has persuaded us that they have any legal effect. We there- fore conclude that these adoptions shOuld not be recognized as valid for - immigration purposes. We note in this regard the suggestion by Mr. Morton that an adoption may be obtained through application to the courts which is recognized by Tongan law as according rights of succession to the adopted child. Morton, supra at 65, 71. The petitioner has offered no evidence that would either verify or refute the existence of such a procedure. However, if a means of acquiring legal sanction for an adoption is available, we believe that our immigration laws would require a person seeking immi- gration benefits on the basis of an adoption in Tonga to obtain the endorsement of law in that manner. We are aware of the decision in Milo. v. District Director of Denver,

认为可由法律强制执行： 对我们的调查同样具有重要意义的是，汤加《宪法》禁止依习惯做法被收养的子女继承土地。尽管申请人指出，委员会在Matter of Ng，前引，和Matter of Yne，前引中认定不赋予继承权的中国习惯法收养为移民目的有效，但我们认为，此处呈现的情况是可区分的。根据中国习惯法，存在两种收养：（1）为立男性子女为继承人以延续祖先崇拜而进行的收养，这要求该子女来自同一宗族并具有相同姓氏，以及（2）不以立其为继承人为目的而收养子女，无论男女。见Matter of Young，14 I&N Dec. 158（BIA 1972）；Matter of Poon，前引；Matter of Ng，前引；Matter of Chin，前引。因此，尽管不具备所需资格的男性子女和所有女性在中国习惯法下不得继承其养父母，但他们仍被承认与同样无权继承的自然子女具有同等地位。见Matter of Ng，前引。 另一方面，在汤加依习惯被收养的子女不被允许继承，因此不具有与自然婚生子女相当的权利。委员会拒绝承认未赋予被收养子女与自然子女类似地位的习惯法收养为移民目的有效。见Matter of Mosel)，前引，Matter of Kong，前引。 汤加的习惯法收养并未赋予被收养子女一种授予与自然婚生子女相当权利和义务的法律地位或关系，且它们似乎不在汤加法律下具有任何法律效力。王室法律顾问最初认为习惯法收养不被承认具有法律有效性的结论未被撤回或反驳，申请人也未提供任何证据使我们确信它们具有任何法律效力。因此我们得出结论，这些收养不应被承认为移民目的有效。 在这方面，我们注意到Morton先生的建议，即可以通过向法院申请获得汤加法律承认赋予被收养子女继承权的收养。Morton，前引，第65、71页。申请人未提供任何证据证实或反驳此种程序的存在。然而，如果存在获得收养法律认可的手段，我们认为我们的移民法将要求依据汤加收养寻求移民利益的人以该方式获得法律认可。 我们知悉Milo. v. District Director of Denver一案中的裁决，