行政先例 · 绿卡与身份调整

Matter of Francisco Herrera del Orden

移民法官审查DHS驳回I-751联合申请豁免时可采纳新证据

25 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 2011)

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review7 页原件

本案 respondent 通过与美国公民结婚取得附条件永久居民身份,离婚后依《移民与国籍法》第216(c)(4)(B)条申请豁免联合提交I-751,DHS以其未回应补件要求为由按放弃驳回。移民法官在递解程序中仅审查DHS原有记录并维持驳回,BIA 认定移民法官应不受此前是否向DHS提交的限制,采纳并考虑相关证据,且8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f)的审查权限与移民法官在递解程序中的通常职权范围一致,故撤销原判并发回重审。

所引用的裁判规则

外国人在递解程序中寻求审查DHS依《移民与国籍法》第216(c)(4)条驳回联合申请豁免的决定时,可提交相关证据,移民法官应予考虑,不论该证据此前是否已向DHS提交或经其考量;8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f)规定的审查权限范围与移民法官在递解程序中的通常职权和职责一致。

适用范围

适用于递解程序中移民法官对DHS依《移民与国籍法》第216(c)(4)条驳回联合申请豁免(I-751)决定的审查;确立移民法官可采纳此前未向DHS提交的相关证据,审查权限与其在递解程序中的通常职权一致。该判决为BIA先例,约束移民法官及BIA,不约束联邦法院。

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Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 2011) Interim Decision #3726

引用为 25 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 2011) 临时决定 #3726

Matter of Francisco HERRERA DEL ORDEN, Respondent

Francisco HERRERA DEL ORDEN 案,被申请人

Decided September 13, 2011

2011年9月13日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

(1) When an alien in removal proceedings seeks “review” of the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) denial of a waiver under section 216(c)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (2006), of the requirement to file a joint petition to remove the conditional basis of lawful permanent resident status, he or she may introduce, and the Immigration Judge should consider, any relevant evidence without regard to whether it was previously submitted or considered in proceedings before the DHS.

(1) 当驱逐程序中的外国人寻求“审查”国土安全部(“DHS”)根据《移民与国籍法》第216(c)(4)条,8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (2006),对免除提交联合申请以取消合法永久居民身份条件的要求的豁免申请的拒绝时,他或她可以提交,且移民法官应考虑任何相关证据,无论该证据是否先前已提交或在DHS程序中考虑过。

(2) The scope of the review authority provided in 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f) (2011) is coterminous with the Immigration Judge’s ordinary powers and duties in removal proceedings.

(2) 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f) (2011) 中规定的审查权限范围与移民法官在驱逐程序中的一般权力和职责相同。

FOR RESPONDENT: Adalicia C. Santaella, Esquire, San Juan, Puerto Rico

被申请人代表:Adalicia C. Santaella 律师,波多黎各圣胡安

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Magdalena Ramos Romey, Assistant Chief Counsel

国土安全部代表:Magdalena Ramos Romey,助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: COLE, PAULEY, and WENDTLAND, Board Members.

审理:委员会小组:COLE、PAULEY 和 WENDTLAND,委员会成员。

WENDTLAND, Board Member:

WENDTLAND,委员会成员:

In a decision dated June 11, 2008, an Immigration Judge reviewed the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) denial of the respondent’s application under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (2006), for a discretionary waiver of the requirement to file a joint Petition to Remove the Conditions on Residence (Form I-751) pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f) (2011). The Immigration Judge confined her review to the evidence that the respondent had previously presented to the DHS in support of the waiver request, before removal proceedings had commenced. The Immigration Judge determined on the basis of this evidence that the DHS had properly denied the respondent’s petition and waiver request as abandoned. She issued an order granting the respondent voluntary departure, with an alternative order of removal. On appeal, the respondent argues that the Immigration Judge should have admitted the new evidence that he presented in support of his request for a section 216(c)(4) waiver. To the extent that this evidence was otherwise

在2008年6月11日的决定中,一名移民法官审查了国土安全部(“DHS”)根据《移民与国籍法》第216(c)(4)(B)条,8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (2006),对免除根据8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f) (2011)提交联合申请以取消居住条件(表格I-751)的要求的酌情豁免申请的拒绝。移民法官将其审查限于被申请人在驱逐程序开始前先前向DHS提交以支持豁免请求的证据。移民法官基于此证据认定DHS已适当地将被申请人的申请和豁免请求视为放弃而拒绝。她发布了准予被申请人自愿离境的命令,并附有替代驱逐令。 在上诉中,被申请人主张移民法官应采纳其提交以支持第216(c)(4)条豁免请求的新证据。只要该证据在其他方面

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relevant and probative, we agree that the Immigration Judge should have admitted and considered it without regard to whether it was previously submitted or considered in the proceedings before the DHS. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be sustained, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings.

相关且具有证明力,我们同意移民法官应采纳并考虑该证据,无论其是否先前已提交或在DHS程序中考虑过。因此,被申请人的上诉将获支持,案件记录将发回移民法官进一步审理。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. 事实与程序历史

The respondent became a conditional lawful permanent resident through marriage to a United States citizen. He subsequently filed a petition to remove the conditional basis of his lawful permanent resident status with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, an agency within the DHS. However, because the marriage had already ended in divorce, the respondent was unable to meet the requirements for a joint petition under section 216 of the Act. Consequently, in conjunction with the petition, the respondent requested a waiver of the general joint filing requirement under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the Act, claiming that he had entered into the now-terminated marriage in good faith. The DHS sent the respondent a Notice of Action (Form I-797) requesting additional evidence documenting (1) the bona fides of the marriage and (2) the lawful dissolution of the marriage. To that point, the respondent had only submitted a photocopy of the front side of his conditional lawful permanent resident card. However, the respondent did not submit any additional evidence in response to the request, and as a result, the DHS denied the petition and waiver request as abandoned. These removal proceedings were subsequently initiated with the issuance of a Notice to Appear (Form I-862) charging that the respondent is removable under section 237(a)(1)(D)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i) (2006), based on the termination of his conditional permanent resident status. The respondent conceded that he is removable as charged and sought to renew the section 216(c)(4)(B) waiver request, contending that it should be adjudicated on a record to be created during the hearing. However, the Immigration Judge concluded that 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f), the regulation allowing an alien to seek “review” in removal proceedings of the DHS’s denial of a section 216(c)(4) waiver request, limited her inquiry to “whether or not the [DHS] acted correctly”—i.e., an appellate-style review for error. 1 The respondent was seeking to present certain evidence that he had not previously submitted during the proceedings before the DHS, including

被申请人通过与一名美国公民结婚成为有条件合法永久居民。他随后向美国公民及移民服务局(DHS内的一个机构)提交了取消其合法永久居民身份条件的申请。然而,由于婚姻已以离婚告终,被申请人无法满足《法》第216条规定的联合申请要求。因此,连同申请,被申请人根据《法》第216(c)(4)(B)条请求豁免一般联合提交要求,声称他以善意缔结了现已终止的婚姻。 DHS向被申请人发送了一份行动通知(表格I-797),要求提供额外证据,证明(1)婚姻的善意和(2)婚姻的合法解除。截至当时,被申请人仅提交了其有条件合法永久居民卡正面的复印件。然而,被申请人未响应请求提交任何额外证据,因此,DHS以放弃为由拒绝了申请和豁免请求。随后,随着出庭通知(表格I-862)的发出,本驱逐程序启动,指控被申请人根据《法》第237(a)(1)(D)(i)条,8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i) (2006),因其有条件永久居民身份终止而可被驱逐。 被申请人承认其如所指控可被驱逐,并寻求重新提出第216(c)(4)(B)条豁免请求,主张应在听证期间创建的记录上进行裁决。然而,移民法官认为,8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f)(允许外国人在驱逐程序中寻求“审查”DHS对第216(c)(4)条豁免请求的拒绝的法规)将她的调查限于“DHS是否行为正确”——即上诉式错误审查。1 被申请人寻求提交某些他先前在DHS程序中未提交的证据,包括

1 The regulation states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o appeal shall lie from the decision of the director [of the pertinent regional service center]; however, the alien may seek review of such decision in removal proceedings.” 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f).

1 该法规相关部分规定,“对[相关区域服务中心]主任的决定不得上诉;但是,外国人可以在驱逐程序中寻求对此类决定的审查。” 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f)。

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引用为 25 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 2011) 临时决定 #3726

a divorce certificate and testimony by the respondent’s former spouse. But the Immigration Judge reasoned that if she received evidence that had not been previously presented to the DHS, she would be “trespassing on the agency’s original jurisdiction.” Thus, the Immigration Judge determined that the DHS had appropriately denied the respondent’s section 216 petition and accompanying waiver request on the basis of his failure to respond to the request for additional evidence.

离婚证书和被申请人前配偶的证词。但移民法官认为,如果她接收先前未向DHS提交的证据,她将“侵犯该机构的原始管辖权”。因此,移民法官认定DHS基于被申请人未响应额外证据请求而适当拒绝了其第216条申请及随附豁免请求。

II. ISSUE

II. 问题

The issue in this case is whether 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f), which provides for “review” in removal proceedings of an application under section 216(c)(4) of the Act seeking a waiver of the general joint filing requirement for a petition to remove the conditional basis of lawful permanent resident status, restricts the Immigration Judge’s ability to consider evidence that was not previously submitted or considered during the initial proceedings before the DHS.

本案的问题是,8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f) 规定在驱逐程序中对根据《法》第216(c)(4)条寻求豁免取消合法永久居民身份条件的申请的一般联合提交要求的申请进行“审查”,该规定是否限制移民法官考虑先前未在DHS初始程序中提交或考虑的证据的能力。

III. ANALYSIS

III. 分析

Inasmuch as the governing regulation does not elaborate on the scope of the “review” for which it provides, we begin by considering the general form and structure of the procedures for adjudicating applications for relief in the context of removal proceedings. In exercising the powers and duties delegated by the Attorney General of the United States, Immigration Judges have broad authority over the manner in which they conduct proceedings, not only in cases where removability is at issue, but also in those where the alien seeks only relief from removal. See generally Matter of K-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 661, 664 (BIA 2004). In either case, an Immigration Judge must exercise his or her independent judgment and discretion and may take any action consistent with the Act and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1240.1(a)(1)(iv) (2011). In particular, an Immigration Judge conducting removal proceedings has the authority to create and control the record of proceedings, receive and consider material and relevant evidence, question the alien and any other witnesses, issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the presentation of evidence, and generally take any action consistent with applicable law and regulations as may be appropriate. See section 240(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1003.36, 1240.1(a)(1)(iv), (c) (2011); cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1246.4 (2011) (stating the authority of Immigration Judges in proceedings to rescind adjustment of status). The substantive forms of relief that may be sought are provided by statute, but the Immigration Judge’s specific authority to adjudicate the various kinds of applications for relief is provided through implementing regulations.

鉴于管辖法规未详细说明其规定的“审查”范围,我们首先考虑在驱逐程序背景下裁决救济申请程序的一般形式和结构。在行使美国总统授权的权力和职责时,移民法官对其进行程序的方式拥有广泛权力,不仅在涉及可驱逐性的案件中,而且在外国人仅寻求免于驱逐的救济的案件中也是如此。参见 Matter of K-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 661, 664 (BIA 2004)。在任一情况下,移民法官必须行使独立判断和自由裁量权,并可采取与《法》和法规一致且对此类案件处置适当和必要的任何行动。8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1240.1(a)(1)(iv) (2011)。特别是,进行驱逐程序的移民法官有权创建和控制程序记录,接收和考虑重要且相关的证据,询问外国人和任何其他证人,签发传票要求证人出席和出示证据,并一般采取与适用法律和法规一致且可能适当的任何行动。参见《法》第240(b)(1)条,8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2006);8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1003.36, 1240.1(a)(1)(iv), (c) (2011);比较 8 C.F.R. § 1246.4 (2011)(规定移民法官在撤销调整身份程序中的权力)。 可寻求的实质性救济形式由法规规定,但移民法官裁决各种救济申请的具体权力通过实施法规提供。

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See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(1)(ii). It is not uncommon, on the one hand, for an alien to apply for relief from removal for the first time following the commencement of proceedings. For example, an application for cancellation of removal under section 240A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006 & Supp. III 2009), can only be made to an Immigration Judge after the initiation of proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.20(b) (2011). But many other aliens in removal proceedings seek relief by renewing applications for immigration benefits that they had initially submitted outside the context of such proceedings. With respect to some of these immigration benefits initially sought prior to the commencement of removal proceedings, the regulations provide for the initiation of proceedings upon the application’s denial, as is the case here. 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(f), 1216.5(f) (2011); Marriage Fraud Amendments Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,011, 30,014 (Aug. 10, 1988) (Supplementary Information) (“The only forum in which an alien may seek review of the Service’s decision to terminate his or her status is during a hearing before an immigration judge. For this reason, the regulations provide that the district director shall issue an Order to Show Cause (which initiates the deportation proceeding) whenever an alien’s status is terminated.”); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.4(d)(2), 1216.4(d)(2) (2011) (similarly addressing the denial of a joint petition to remove the conditional basis of lawful permanent resident status for an alien spouse); cf. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14(c)(1), 1208.14(c)(1) (providing that the DHS shall “refer the application to an immigration judge” and initiate removal proceedings when the asylum officer declines to grant an affirmatively filed application for asylum and related relief); 240.70(d), 1240.70(d) (providing for referral of certain applications for suspension of deportation and special rule cancellation of removal by an asylum officer to the Immigration Court); 245.13(m)(1)(i), 1245.13(m)(1)(i) (providing for the initiation of removal proceedings following the denial of adjustment of status of certain nationals of Nicaragua and Cuba); 245.15(r)(2)(i), 1245.15(r)(2)(i) (2011) (providing for the initiation of removal proceedings following the denial of adjustment of status of certain Haitian nationals). In these cases, the regulations generally indicate that there is no direct appeal from the denial (or simply omit any mention of authorization of a direct appeal) but expressly preserve the alien’s prerogative to “renew,” “seek review of,” or obtain an “adjudication” of the application in removal proceedings. Further, there are some discrete procedures for adjustment of status where the regulations, although not expressly providing for the initiation of removal proceedings, state that there is no direct appeal from the application’s denial except that the alien may “renew” the adjustment application in removal proceedings (subject to the restriction on arriving aliens adjusting status in proceedings). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a)(5)(ii), (c), 1245.2(a)(5)(ii), (c), 245.20(k), 1245.20(k) (2011). In addition, an applicant for Temporary

参见,例如,8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(1)(ii)。一方面,外国人在程序启动后首次申请免于遣返的救济并不罕见。例如,根据该法第240A条,8 U.S.C. § 1229b(2006及Supp. III 2009),取消遣返的申请只能在程序启动后向移民法官提出。参见8 C.F.R. § 1240.20(b)(2011)。但许多其他处于遣返程序中的外国人通过重新提交其最初在此类程序之外提交的移民福利申请来寻求救济。 对于其中一些在遣返程序启动之前最初寻求的移民福利,法规规定在申请被拒后启动程序,本案即属此类。8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(f), 1216.5(f)(2011);《婚姻欺诈修正案条例》,53 Fed. Reg. 30,011, 30,014(1988年8月10日)(补充信息)(“外国人可以就服务局终止其身份的决定寻求复审的唯一场所是在移民法官面前的听证会。为此原因,法规规定,每当外国人的身份被终止时,地区主任应发出说明理由令(该令启动遣返程序)。”);另参见8 C.F.R. §§ 216.4(d)(2), 1216.4(d)(2)(2011)(类似地处理外国配偶为移除合法永久居民身份条件而提出的联合申请被拒的情况);比较8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14(c)(1), 1208.14(c)(1)(规定当庇护官员拒绝批准主动提交的庇护及相关救济申请时,DHS应“将申请转交移民法官”并启动遣返程序);240.70(d), 1240.70(d)(规定庇护官员将某些暂停遣返申请和特殊规则取消遣返申请转交移民法院);245.13(m)(1)(i), 1245.13(m)(1)(i)(规定某些尼加拉瓜和古巴国民的调整身份申请被拒后启动遣返程序);245.15(r)(2)(i), 1245.15(r)(2)(i)(2011)(规定某些海地国民的调整身份申请被拒后启动遣返程序)。在这些案件中,法规通常表明对拒绝没有直接上诉(或仅省略任何关于授权直接上诉的提及),但明确保留外国人“重新提交”、“寻求复审”或在遣返程序中获得申请“裁决”的特权。 此外,还有一些调整身份的个别程序,法规虽未明确规定启动遣返程序,但规定对申请被拒没有直接上诉,除非外国人可以在遣返程序中“重新提交”调整身份申请(受制于在程序中调整身份的到达外国人限制)。参见8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a)(5)(ii), (c), 1245.2(a)(5)(ii), (c), 245.20(k), 1245.20(k)(2011)。此外,临时

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引用为25 I&N Dec. 589(BIA 2011) 临时决定#3726

Protected Status may have an opportunity to both appeal to the Administrative Appeals Unit and renew the application in removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 244.10, 1244.10 (2011). In contrast, the regulations describe comparatively few discrete immigration benefits for which the renewal or adjudication of the application in removal proceedings is expressly forbidden. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.11(h)(i), 1245.11(h)(i) (adjustment of aliens in S nonimmigrant classification); 245.21(c), 1245.21(c) (2011) (adjustment of status of certain nationals of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). The general rule, therefore, is that an alien may renew an application for an immigration benefit before an Immigration Judge in removal proceedings. Further, nothing in these regulations indicates that the Immigration Judge’s ordinary power and duty to receive evidence into the record of proceeding and adjudicate an application for relief, as described above, is diminished or restricted when the application is renewed. Here, the operative regulation does not literally provide for the “renewal” of the section 216(c)(4) waiver application in removal proceedings. Rather, 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f) states that in such proceedings the alien “may seek review” of the initial decision issued by the DHS. Nevertheless, the regulation sets forth no definition of “review,” no explicit restriction on the evidence that the Immigration Judge may consider in reviewing a section 216(c)(4) waiver denial, and no other indicator of any intention to depart from the general procedures for receiving evidence pertinent to the adjudication of both removability and eligibility for relief, as described above. We are mindful that, as a legal term, “review,” even de novo review, customarily denotes an appellate-style review for error of the proceedings conducted by an underlying adjudicative body, and such review is typically confined to the evidentiary record presented for review on appeal. See, e.g., Matter of Fedorenko, 19 I&N Dec. 57, 74 (BIA 1984) (“[A]ll evidence which is pertinent to determinations made during deportation proceedings . . . must be adduced in the hearing before the immigration judge. The Board is an appellate body whose function is to review, not to create, a record.” (footnote omitted)). But nothing in the statutory and regulatory provisions defining the Immigration Judge’s powers and duties endows the Immigration Judge with an appellate function. See section 240(b) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1240.1. To the contrary, the regulations only provide that the Immigration Judge’s decisions are subject to appellate review. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(c). It is the Immigration Judge’s function to create, not review, a record. Given the Immigration Judge’s broad overall authority to conduct removal proceedings, we conclude that he or she is presumed to have jurisdiction to gather and receive evidence pertinent to an application for relief from removal unless the Attorney General expressly withholds

受保护身份者可能有机会既向行政上诉办公室上诉,又在遣返程序中重新提交申请。参见8 C.F.R. §§ 244.10, 1244.10(2011)。相比之下,法规描述的明确禁止在遣返程序中重新提交或裁决申请的个别移民福利相对较少。参见8 C.F.R. §§ 245.11(h)(i), 1245.11(h)(i)(S非移民类别外国人的调整身份);245.21(c), 1245.21(c)(2011)(某些越南、柬埔寨和老挝国民的调整身份)。 因此,一般规则是,外国人可以在遣返程序中向移民法官重新提交移民福利申请。此外,这些法规中没有任何内容表明,如上所述,移民法官接收证据进入程序记录并裁决救济申请的普通权力和职责在申请被重新提交时被削弱或限制。 在此,操作性法规并未字面规定第216(c)(4)条豁免申请在遣返程序中的“重新提交”。相反,8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f)规定在此类程序中外国人“可以寻求复审”DHS作出的初始决定。然而,该法规未对“复审”作出任何定义,未明确限制移民法官在复审第216(c)(4)条豁免拒绝时可以考虑的证据,也没有其他任何迹象表明有意偏离上述关于接收与裁决可遣返性和救济资格相关证据的一般程序。 我们注意到,作为一个法律术语,“复审”,即使是重新审查,通常指对 underlying 裁决机构所进行程序的错误进行上诉式复审,且此类复审通常限于上诉复审时提交的证据记录。参见,例如,Matter of Fedorenko, 19 I&N Dec. 57, 74(BIA 1984)(“[A]ll evidence which is pertinent to determinations made during deportation proceedings . . . must be adduced in the hearing before the immigration judge. The Board is an appellate body whose function is to review, not to create, a record.”(脚注省略))。但界定移民法官权力和职责的法定和法规条款中没有任何内容赋予移民法官上诉职能。参见该法第240(b)条;8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1240.1。相反,法规仅规定移民法官的决定受上诉复审。参见8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(c)。移民法官的职能是创建而非复审记录。鉴于移民法官进行遣返程序的广泛总体权力,我们得出结论,推定其拥有收集和接收与免于遣返救济申请相关证据的管辖权,除非司法部长明确保留

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引用为25 I&N Dec. 589(BIA 2011) 临时决定#3726

such jurisdiction or takes it away. See, e.g., Matter of Martinez-Montalvo, 24 I&N Dec. 778 (BIA 2009) (finding that Matter of Artigas, 23 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 2001), was superseded by regulations restricting the jurisdiction of Immigration Judges in the case of Cuban refugees seeking adjustment of status). In addition to the powers and duties of the Immigration Judge, we must consider the rights and burdens of the respondent. A respondent in removal proceedings has the statutory right to a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his or her own behalf. Section 240(b)(4)(B) of the Act; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (2011). It is also an alien’s burden to prove eligibility for any requested relief from removal. Section 240(c)(4)(A) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2011). Absent some specific provision that prohibits the introduction of new evidence before the Immigration Judge, we decline to potentially impair a respondent’s ability to satisfy this burden of proof by limiting the right to present evidence on his or her behalf in support of an application for a waiver under section 216(c)(4) of the Act. 2 Further, it is generally not practicable or prudent for an Immigration Judge to limit his or her review to the decisions made by the DHS prior to the initiation of removal proceedings. As the Attorney General noted in providing the Board with full de novo review over similar kinds of decisions made by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, “[T]hese decisions are made on applications and interviews, and other information available to the Service.” See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,891 (Aug. 26, 2002) (Supplementary Information). The DHS’s decisions are not transcribed, except perhaps in rare instances. In contrast, the removal proceedings conducted by the Immigration Judge are recorded and, if necessitated by an appeal, transcribed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.28 (2011). Therefore the administrative record generated by the DHS’s denial of an application for an immigration benefit does not provide the same reliability and reviewability as the record created and maintained by the Immigration Judge in a removal proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.36. In view of the foregoing, the use in the governing regulation of the word “review” does not suffice to persuade us that the promulgators of the regulation intended to exempt section 216(c)(4) waiver applications from the broadly applicable procedures for gathering and receiving evidence in removal proceedings generally.

此类管辖权或将其取走。参见,例如,Matter of Martinez-Montalvo, 24 I&N Dec. 778(BIA 2009)(认定Matter of Artigas, 23 I&N Dec. 99(BIA 2001)已被限制移民法官在古巴难民寻求调整身份案件中管辖权的法规所取代)。 除移民法官的权力和职责外,我们还必须考虑答辩人的权利和负担。遣返程序中的答辩人享有法定权利,有合理机会为其自身利益提交证据。该法第240(b)(4)(B)条;另参见8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4)(2011)。证明符合任何请求的免于遣返救济资格也是外国人的负担。该法第240(c)(4)(A)条;8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d)(2011)。在没有任何具体条款禁止向移民法官提交新证据的情况下,我们拒绝通过限制答辩人为其自身利益提交支持该法第216(c)(4)条豁免申请的证据的权利,来潜在地损害答辩人满足此证明负担的能力。2 此外,移民法官将其复审限于DHS在遣返程序启动前作出的决定,通常既不切实际也不审慎。正如司法部长在赋予委员会对前移民和归化局作出的类似决定进行全面重新审查时所指出的,“[T]hese decisions are made on applications and interviews, and other information available to the Service.”参见Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,891(2002年8月26日)(补充信息)。DHS的决定未被转录,除非在极少数情况下。相比之下,移民法官进行的遣返程序被记录,并且如果上诉需要,会被转录。参见8 C.F.R. § 1003.28(2011)。因此,DHS拒绝移民福利申请所产生的行政记录,与移民法官在遣返程序中创建和维护的记录相比,不能提供相同的可靠性和可复审性。参见8 C.F.R. § 1003.36。 鉴于上述情况,操作性法规中使用“复审”一词不足以说服我们,法规颁布者意图将第216(c)(4)条豁免申请豁免于遣返程序中普遍适用的收集和接收证据的程序。

2 We would reach the same conclusion were the DHS seeking to present evidence in removal proceedings that was not previously submitted to or considered by the DHS outside of such proceedings.

2 如果DHS寻求在遣返程序中提交此前未在此类程序之外向DHS提交或由DHS考虑的证据,我们也会得出相同结论。

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引用为25 I&N Dec. 589(BIA 2011) 临时决定#3726

IV. CONCLUSION

IV. 结论

We conclude that during the course of review in removal proceedings of an alien’s application under section 216(c)(4) of the Act for a waiver of the general joint filing requirement for a petition to remove the conditions on his or her lawful permanent resident status, the alien may introduce, and the Immigration Judge should consider, material and relevant evidence without regard to whether it was previously submitted or considered in proceedings before the DHS. The scope of the “review” authority provided to the Immigration Judge in 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f) is coterminous with his or her ordinary powers and duties in removal proceedings. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings. ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the decision of the Immigration Judge is vacated. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.

我们得出结论,在遣返程序中对根据该法第216(c)(4)条提出的豁免移除其合法永久居民身份条件申请的普通联合提交要求的申请进行复审的过程中,外国人可以提交,且移民法官应考虑,实质性和相关证据,无论该证据此前是否在DHS程序中提交或考虑。8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f)中赋予移民法官的“复审”权限范围与其在遣返程序中的普通权力和职责相同。因此,答辩人的上诉将获支持,记录将发回移民法官进一步审理。 命令:上诉获支持,移民法官的决定被撤销。 进一步命令:记录发回移民法官,按照上述意见进一步审理并作出新决定。

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