Matter of Viado

This is an appeal from a decision by the district director, San Francisco, declaring that a public charge bond was breached. The appeal will be dismissed. The obligor posted a $5,000 public charge bond on February 28, 1979. Evidence contained in the record reveals that Adela Viado, for whom the bond was posted, has received public support in the form of Supplemental Security Income ("SST") since June 1981. On appeal, the obligor states that Mrs. Viado was incorrectly ad- vised by a staff member of the Manila Town Senior Center in San Francisco that the receipt of SSI benefits would not constitute a breach of a public charge bond. Mrs. Viado consequently applied for and received those benefits. Although the State of California did not make a demand for repayment of the SSI, the district direc- tor considered the bond breached due to a substantial violation of the terms of the bond. Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, § 103.6 (1985) provides for the posting of public charge bonds. Conditions for such a bond are clearly stated on the bond agreement so that the obligor will know and understand exactly what is required. Title 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(c)(3) (1985) states that substantial perform- ance of all conditions imposed by the terms of the bond shall re- lease the obligor from liability. Title 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e) (1985) states that a bond is breached when there has been a substantial viola-

本上诉针对旧金山地区主任作出的裁定，该裁定宣布公共负担保证金已违约。上诉将被驳回。 义务人于1979年2月28日提交了5,000美元的公共负担保证金。记录中的证据显示，为其提交保证金的Adela Viado自1981年6月起以补充保障收入（"SST"）的形式领取公共资助。 在上诉中，义务人称，Viado女士被旧金山Manila Town Senior Center的一名工作人员错误告知，领取SSI福利不会构成公共负担保证金违约。Viado女士因此申请并领取了这些福利。尽管加利福尼亚州未要求偿还SSI，地区主任因实质性违反保证金条款而认定保证金已违约。 《联邦法规汇编》第8编第103.6条（1985年）规定了公共负担保证金的提交。此类保证金的条件在保证金协议中明确载明，以便义务人知晓并确切理解所要求的内容。 《联邦法规汇编》第8编第103.6(c)(3)条（1985年）规定，实质性履行保证金条款所施加的所有条件应解除义务人的责任。《联邦法规汇编》第8编第103.6(e)条（1985年）规定，当存在对约定条件的实质性违反时，保证金即告违约。

tion of the stipulated conditions. The main thrust of the obligor's appeal concerns substantial performance and substantial violation. The obligor cites several precedent decisions which relate to depar- ture bonds and delivery bonds. The obligor adds that the bonded alien acted with the good faith belief that she had complied with the required terms; therefore, the accidental violation should not be found to be substantial and cause the bond to be breached. We are not persuaded by these arguments. None of the cases cited by the obligor pertains to the public charge bond. Each of the four types of surety bonds provided for in the regulation has its own specific conditions. The conditions are clear. In signing the public charge bond, the obligor provides assurance that Mrs. Viado will not become a public charge, whatever the cause may be. This bond remains in full force and effect unless it is cancelled by the district director, or the alien dies, or departs permanently from the United States, or is naturalized. The fact that Mrs. Viado did not know that receipt of SSI was receipt of public assistance does not lead to the conclusion that the breach was insubstantial. In Matter of B-, 3 I&N Dec. 323 (BIA, Acting A.G. 1948), the At- torney General affirmed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals which reversed a finding of deportability on the basis that the alien became a "public charge" within 5 years after entry, under section 19 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917. Matter of B- held that before an alien can be considered deportable on this ground, state authorities must demand repayment of charges for services rendered and the charges must thereafter remain unpaid. In contrast, a demand for repayment of charges is not necessary for an alien to be considered excludable under section 212(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15) (1982), as a person likely to become a public charge. Matter of Harutunian, 14 I&N Dec. 583, 590 (R.C. 1974). The distinction is based on the fact that the determination of excludability involves a prediction of the likelihood of an alien becoming a public charge in the future, rather than an assessment of whether the alien has already become a public charge. Although there are no published administrative decisions on the applicability of the Matter of B- requirement to the breach of a public charge bond, we conclude that such a requirement does not apply. Public charge bonds are issued as a condition of the alien's admission and require the same determination of the likelihood of future events discussed in Matter of Harutunian, supra. Simply put, the purpose of issuing a public charge bond is to assure that the alien will not in the future become a public charge. Moreover,

义务人上诉的主旨涉及实质性履行和实质性违反。义务人援引了若干与离境保证金和交付保证金相关的先例裁定。义务人补充称，被担保的外国人善意相信其已遵守所要求的条款；因此，意外违反不应被认定为实质性并导致保证金违约。 我们未被这些论点说服。义务人所援引的案件均不涉及公共负担保证金。该条例规定的四种保证保证金各有其特定条件。这些条件是明确的。在签署公共负担保证金时，义务人保证Viado女士不会成为公共负担，无论原因为何。该保证金保持完全有效，除非被地区主任取消，或该外国人死亡，或永久离开美国，或入籍。Viado女士不知道领取SSI即为领取公共援助这一事实，并不能得出违约非实质性的结论。 在B-案，3 I&N Dec. 323（BIA，代理总检察长1948年）中，总检察长维持了移民上诉委员会的决定，该决定推翻了基于该外国人在入境后5年内成为1917年《移民和国籍法》第19条所指"公共负担"的驱逐出境认定。B-案裁定，在外国人可依此理由被视为可驱逐出境之前，州当局必须要求偿还所提供服务的费用，且该费用此后必须仍未支付。 相比之下，根据《移民和国籍法》第212(a)(15)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15)（1982年），外国人作为可能成为公共负担的人被视为不可入境，并不需要要求偿还费用。Harutunian案，14 I&N Dec. 583, 590（R.C. 1974）。这一区别基于以下事实：不可入境性的认定涉及对该外国人未来成为公共负担可能性的预测，而非评估该外国人是否已经成为公共负担。 尽管没有关于B-案要求是否适用于公共负担保证金违约的已公布行政裁定，我们得出结论认为该要求不适用。公共负担保证金是作为外国人入境的条件而签发的，并要求作出与上述Harutunian案中讨论的相同的对未来事件可能性的判断。简言之，签发公共负担保证金的目的是确保该外国人将来不会成为公共负担。此外，

in a state where no provision for making a demand exists, applica- tion of the Matter of B- requirement would allow an alien to re- ceive unlimited public benefits without a breach, and the issuance of the bond would become meaningless. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

在没有规定可提出要求的州，适用B-案要求将允许外国人无限领取公共福利而不构成违约，保证金的签发将变得毫无意义。 命令：上诉被驳回。