Matter of Harutunian

Decided by Regional Commissioner February a, 1974

由区域专员于1974年2月a日裁定

The District Director found the applicant ineligible for adjust- ment of status and certified this matter to the Regional Commis- sioner for review pursuant to 8 CFR 103A. The applicant, a female native of Turkey, is now stateless. She resided in Roumania from 1931 to 1970. For the reason conditional entry visa numbers were not available, she was paroled into the United States in September 1970. The applicant submitted the instant application on October 5, 19'72 seeking status as a permanent resident under the provisions of section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, as a nonpreference immigrant. During the interview conducted on May 24, 1W3 in conjunction with her application, it

地区主任认定申请人不符合调整身份的条件，并依据8 CFR 103A将该事项认证提交区域专员复核。 申请人系土耳其出生的女性，现为无国籍人。她自1931年至1970年居住在罗马尼亚。由于没有条件入境签证名额，她于1970年9月被假释进入美国。 申请人于19'72年10月5日提交本申请，寻求依据经修正的《移民与国籍法》第245条的规定作为非优先移民获得永久居民身份。在1W3年5月24日与其申请相关的面谈中，

was determined that she had been granted "old age assistance" by the California State Department of Social Welfare upon her arrival in the United States and that her monthly grant was increased from $204.00 in November 1972 to $209.00 in December 1972. The District Director stated in part that the applicant has been on welfare since her arrival in the United States in September 1970 and denied the application on June 1, 1973 reasoning that she was excludable under section 212(a) of the Act which provides in pertinent part as follows: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excludable from admission into the United States: ... (15) Aliens who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission, are likely at any time to become public charges...." Counsel submitted a brief in response to the Notice of Certifica- tion (Form I-290C) for the Regional Commissioner's consideration wherein he stated that the "welfare" the applicant receives was, and is "old age assistance, a form of categorical aid." Counsel added as follows: There is no provision in the laws of the State of California requiring repayment of old age assistance benefits of the type received by Haigouhi A. narntunian (California Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 12000, et seq., and County of Alameda v. Janssen, (1940), 16 Cal. 2d 276, 283, 106 P2d 11), nor is there any provision in the laws of the State of California which provides for a charge to be made against the recipient of such aid as was received by Haigouhi A. Harutunian, except where the recipient subsequently acquires property (California Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 17403). (Amended Finding of Fact No. 8, Emanuel Braude v. United States of America, Civil No. 68-1973-EC). The term 'public charge,' as used in the exclusion provisions of the Immigra- tion and Naturalization Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(15)), ... is to be defined in the same way as the phrase 'public charge' is used in the deportation sections of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(8)). (Amended Conclusion of Law No_ 1, Emanuel Braude v. United States of America, supra). Therefore, the definition of 'public charge' used in the Immigration decision Matter of B—, 3 L & N. Dec. 323, (B IA, 1948), controls this case. (This decision was approved by the then Attorney General of the United States, 3I. & N. Dec. 227.) Counsel's contention that "There is no provision in the laws of the State of California for repayment of old age assistance of the type received ..." by the applicant, is not free from dispute. While that statement appears to be true with regard to the individual who is the recipient of such assistance, in a decision dated December 12, 1973 by the Supreme Court of California (Steoap v. Superior Court of Sacramento County), the Court held that the state law requires the adult children of a recipient of public assistance under Califor- nia's Old Ave Security Law to reimburse the county to the extent of their

经认定，她抵达美国时已获得加利福尼亚州社会福利局的“老年援助”，且其每月补助金从1972年11月的$204.00增加至1972年12月的$209.00。 地区主任部分指出，申请人自1970年9月抵达美国以来一直领取福利，并于1973年6月1日否决该申请，理由是她依据该法第212(a)条不可入境，该条相关部分规定如下：“除本法另有规定外，下列各类外国人不得获得签证且不得入境美国：……(15) 在签证申请时领事官员认为，或在申请入境时司法部长认为，可能在任何时候成为公共负担的外国人……” 律师针对认证通知（表格I-290C）提交了一份简报供区域专员审议，其中称申请人所领取的“福利”过去是且现在是“老年援助，一种分类援助。”律师补充如下： 加利福尼亚州法律中没有规定要求偿还Haigouhi A. narntunian所领取类型的老年援助福利（《加利福尼亚州福利与机构法典》第12000条及以下；County of Alameda v. Janssen, (1940), 16 Cal. 2d 276, 283, 106 P2d 11），加利福尼亚州法律中也没有任何规定对Haigouhi A. Harutunian所领取此类援助的接受者设定收费，除非接受者此后取得财产（《加利福尼亚州福利与机构法典》第17403条）。（修正的事实认定第8号，Emanuel Braude v. United States of America, Civil No. 68-1973-EC）。 《移民与国籍法》排除条款（8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(15)）中所使用的“公共负担”一词……应以《移民与国籍法》驱逐条款（8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(8)）中使用“公共负担”一语相同的方式界定。（修正的法律结论第1号，Emanuel Braude v. United States of America, supra）。 因此，移民决定Matter of B—, 3 L & N. Dec. 323, (B IA, 1948)中使用的“公共负担”定义支配本案。（该决定经时任美国司法部长批准，3I. & N. Dec. 227。） 律师关于“加利福尼亚州法律中没有规定偿还……所领取类型的老年援助”的论点并非没有争议。虽然该陈述对于此类援助的接受者个人而言似乎属实，但在加利福尼亚州最高法院1973年12月12日的一项判决（Steoap v. Superior Court of Sacramento County）中，法院认定州法律要求根据加利福尼亚州老年保障法领取公共援助者的成年子女在其

1. The state by law imposes a charge for the services rendered, thereby creating a debt, to be paid by the alien or other designated persons, 2. the authorities have made a demand for reimbursement, 3. there was a failure to repay. Braude expressed doubt concerning the soundness of Matter of B—. However, in the light of that administrative interpretation the court held that a bond provision guaranteeing that an alien immigrant would not become a public charge was not breached when the alien received old age assistance in California, since there was no obligation under California law to repay. Applying the deportability standard contained in Matter of B— to the case under consideration, the Counsel for the applicant finds, as the court did in Braude, that under California law there is no provision for a charge to be made against the recipient of old age assistance, and he concludes that an alien dependent for support on old age assistance is not thereby rendered ineligible for a visa. Matter of B— defines deportability for having become a public charge after entry. But its appraisal of the deportation statute is not necessarily controlling in relation to the provisions for exclu- sion. While the exclusion and deportation statutes both refer to aliens who become a public charge, it does not follow necessarily that Congress intended that the same criteria be applied in both situations. The exclusion statute deals with aliens seeking to enter and who must satisfy detailed qualitative requirements. The deportation statute dislodges an established residence. The purpose of all rules for the interpretation of statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent. There is no invariable rule for the discovery of that intention. United States v. American Tru,c1c- ing Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940); 82 C.J.S., Statutes,

1. 州依法对所提供服务设定收费，从而产生债务，由该外国人或指定的其他人支付， 2. 当局已提出偿还要求， 3. 未予偿还。 Braude对Matter of B—的妥当性表示怀疑。然而，鉴于该行政解释，法院认定，当外国人在加利福尼亚领取老年援助时，保证外国移民不会成为公共负担的保证金条款并未被违反，因为根据加利福尼亚州法律没有偿还义务。 将Matter of B—所载的驱逐出境标准适用于本案，申请人的律师如同法院在Braude案中一样认定，根据加利福尼亚州法律，没有规定对老年援助接受者设定收费，他据此得出结论：依赖老年援助为生的外国人并不因此不可获得签证。 Matter of B—界定了入境后已成为公共负担的驱逐出境。但其对驱逐出境法规的评价对于排除条款未必具有支配力。虽然排除和驱逐法规都提及成为公共负担的外国人，但并不能必然推定国会意图在两种情形中适用相同标准。排除法规涉及寻求入境且必须满足详细定性要求的外国人。驱逐法规则驱逐已确立的居所。 解释法规的一切规则的目的在于实现立法意图。发现该意图并无一成不变的规则。United States v. American Tru,c1c-ing Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940); 82 C.J.S., Statutes,

Sec. 311. While it may normally be assumed that identical words used in different parts of the same statute are intended to have an identical meaning, this assumption readily yields when the legisla- tive intent requires variant meanings in different contexts. It is not unusual for the same word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory construction which precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the legislature intended it should have in each instance. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, . 286 U.S. 427,433 (1932). Words generally have different shades of meaning, and are to be construed if reasonably possible to effectuate the intent of -the lawmakers; and this meaning in particular instances is to be arrived at not only by a consideration of the words themselves but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which the words were employed, Vermilga43rown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377,386 (1948). The exclusion and deportation statutes embodying the term "public charge" have been on the statute books for over 80 years in essentially the same form. Act of March 3, 1891, secs. 2, 11; 26 Stat. 1084, 1086; cf. Act of August 3, 1882; 22 Stat. 214. The accepting of a bond promising, in consideration of an alien's admission, that he will not become a public charge apparently had its origin in administrative practice earlier than 1903—Act of March 3, 1903, Sec. 26; 32 Stat. 1220. The present language of Section 213 has been in the law without essential variation since 1907. Act of February 20, 1907, Sec. 20; 34 Stet. 907. Regarding deportability, there are no significant comments in the legislative history. Matter of B — went unmentioned in the 1950 and 1952 congressional reports accompanying the Act. An effort to enlarge the class of deportable aliens confined in public institutions by adding a new class to the Act, Section 241(aX3), 8 U.S.C. 1151(aX3), appears to have been ineffective as the result of last minute floor amendments to the legislation. Matter of Kenya- ski, 10 I. & N. Dec. 159 (BIA 1963). The stages in decisional interpretations of the deportation stat- ute, culminating in Matter of B supra, are instructive;

第311条。虽然通常可以假定同一法律不同部分使用的相同词语意在具有相同含义，但当立法意图要求在不同语境下具有不同含义时，这一假定便 readily 让位。同一词语在同一法案中被赋予不同含义并非不寻常，且没有任何法律解释规则禁止法院赋予该词语立法机关在每一情形下意图其应具有的含义。Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427,433 (1932)。词语通常具有不同的含义层次，若合理可能，应作解释以实现立法者的意图；而在特定情形下，这一含义不仅应通过考虑词语本身，还应通过考虑语境、法律目的以及词语被使用的情形来得出，Vermilga43rown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377,386 (1948)。包含“public charge”一词的排除和驱逐出境法规已在法规汇编中存在超过80年，基本形式相同。1891年3月3日法案，第2、11条；26 Stat. 1084, 1086；参见1882年8月3日法案；22 Stat. 214。接受一份保证书，以外国人获准入境为对价承诺其不会成为public charge，显然起源于早于1903年的行政实践——1903年3月3日法案，第26条；32 Stat. 1220。第213条目前的措辞自1907年以来一直在法律中，无实质变化。1907年2月20日法案，第20条；34 Stet. 907。关于可驱逐性，立法历史中没有重要评论。Matter of B — 在伴随该法案的1950年和1952年国会报告中未被提及。通过向该法案增加一个新类别，第241(aX3)条，8 U.S.C. 1151(aX3)，以扩大被关押在公共机构中的可驱逐外国人范围的努力，似乎因立法最后时刻的院会修正案而无效。Matter of Kenya-nski, 10 I. & N. Dec. 159 (BIA 1963)。驱逐出境法规裁决解释的各个阶段， culminating in Matter of B supra，具有启发性；

3. The alien had not become a public charge where the alien's mother had offered to make reimbursement, but under state law payment could not be accepted for maintenance and treatment of the institutionalized alien. Matter of V—, 2 I. & N. Dec. 78 (B IA 1944). 4. The alien had not become a public charge where the circumstances were like those described in 3, above, except that no one had offered reimburse- ment. Matter of B—, supra, 3 I. & N. Dec. 323 (Acting Attorney General 1948). In these four steps we observe a complete reversal of emphasis on the importance of the factor of ability to make reimbursement:

3. 如果外国人的母亲已提出偿还，但根据州法律不能接受用于被收容外国人的维持和治疗的付款，该外国人尚未成为public charge。Matter of V—, 2 I. & N. Dec. 78 (B IA 1944)。4. 如果情况与上述第3项所述类似，但无人提出偿还，该外国人尚未成为public charge。Matter of B—, supra, 3 I. & N. Dec. 323 (代理司法部长1948)。在这四个步骤中，我们观察到对偿还能力因素重要性的强调发生了完全逆转：

1. No one could pay—deportable. 2. No one had paid, but a relative could—not deportable. 3. No one had paid; a relative, though not obliged to, was willing—not deportable. 4. No one could pay and no one was obliged to—not deportable. Even though the burden in cases 3 and 4 above falls on the taxpayers, there are cogent reasons for inferring a legislative intent (bearing in mind a resident alien's stake in this country) to construe the deportability provision favorably toward the alien. Cf. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); .Cwong Hai Chew v. Golding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966). These and other cases have permeated the deportation statutes, both substantive and procedural, with a rule of strict construction. Cf. Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure, Sec. 4.1c. The legislative history of the exclusion statute, Section 212(aX15), is somewhat more revealing of congressional intent. Mention has been made of the early adoption of the term "public charge". In 1915 the Supreme Court ruled in Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, that immigrants destined to a particular city were not excludable as persons likely to become a public charge on the basis of lack of job opportunities there. The court ruled that the exclusion ground rests on "permanent personal objections" irre- spective of economic conditions. In order to nullify this restrictive interpretation of the statute Congress amended the exclusion section when it reenacted it in the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 by relocating the phrase in question, moving it away from "paupers", etc. S.Rep. 352, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., April 17, 1916. Several courts promptly questioned the efficacy of the amendment and affirmed the interpretation that a "person likely to become a public charge" is one who for some cause is about to be supported at public expense "by reason of poverty, insanity and poverty,

1. 无人能够支付——可驱逐。2. 无人已支付，但亲属能够——不可驱逐。3. 无人已支付；亲属虽无义务但愿意——不可驱逐。4. 无人能够支付且无人有义务——不可驱逐。即使上述第3和第4类案件中的负担落在纳税人身上，也有令人信服的理由推断立法意图（考虑到居民外国人在本国的利害关系）以有利于外国人的方式解释可驱逐性条款。参见Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903)；Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948)；Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950)；.Cwong Hai Chew v. Golding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953)；Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957)；Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963)；INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966)；Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966)。这些及其他案件已使严格解释规则渗透到驱逐出境法规，无论是实体还是程序方面。参见Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure, Sec. 4.1c。排除法规第212(aX15)条的立法历史更能揭示国会意图。已提及“public charge”一词的早期采用。1915年，最高法院在Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3中裁定，目的地为特定城市的移民不能以那里缺乏就业机会为由被排除为可能成为public charge的人。法院裁定，排除理由基于“永久的个人反对”，而不论经济状况。为了抵消对法规的这一限制性解释，国会在1917年2月5日《移民法》中重新颁布排除条款时，通过重新定位有关短语，将其从“paupers”等移开，从而修正了排除条款。S.Rep. 352, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., April 17, 1916。几个法院迅速质疑修正案的效力，并确认了以下解释：“可能成为public charge的人”是指因某种原因即将“因贫困、精神失常和贫困、

disease and poverty, idiocy and poverty ...". Ex parte Mitchell, 256 F. 299, N.D.N.Y. 1919; Ex parte Sakaguchi, 277 F. 913, CA. 9, 1922. The 1950 Omnibus Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, preceding adoption of the Immigration and Nationality Act, had an extensive discussion of persons excludable as likely to become a public charge. S.Rep. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., April 20, 1950, pp. 346-350. Noting that courts had given varied definitions to the phrase, the subcommittee recapitulated the holdings. A relevant portion, with citations deleted, reads: The financial status of an alien, although not the only criterion, has been considered along with other elements. Thus, an alien who owned a business in this country was held not to be deportable under the "public charge" provision, even though he was unable to read English or any other language. An illiterate widow of 70 with only $100 in hand and $1,000 in postal savings in Italy, and with no one obligated to support her, was excluded as likely to become a public charge. An alien's physical condition as it related to his ability and capacity for employment was considered, and the fact that an alien's passage to this country had been paid by another has been considered evidence, although not necessarily conclusive evidence, of the alien's ability to care for himself. P. 348. The mentioned case of the '70-year-old widow is Minuto v. Reimer, 83 F2d 166, (C.A. 2, 1936). The subcommittee's conclusion, in pertinent part was: The subcommittee recommends that the clause excluding persnns likely to become public charges should be retained in the law. Since the elements constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied, there should be no attempt to define the term in the law, but rather to establish the specific qualification that the determination of whether an alien falls into that category rests within the discretion of the consular officers or the Commissioner. P. 349.

疾病和贫困、白痴和贫困……”而由公共费用扶养的人。Ex parte Mitchell, 256 F. 299, N.D.N.Y. 1919；Ex parte Sakaguchi, 277 F. 913, CA. 9, 1922。在通过《移民和国籍法》之前，1950年参议院司法委员会综合报告对可能成为public charge而被排除的人进行了广泛讨论。S.Rep. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., April 20, 1950, pp. 346-350。注意到法院对该短语给出了不同定义，小组委员会重述了各项裁决。相关部分（删除引注）如下：外国人的财务状况虽然不是唯一标准，但已与其他因素一并考虑。因此，在本国拥有企业的外国人被裁定不能根据“public charge”条款驱逐出境，即使他不能阅读英文或任何其他语言。一位70岁的文盲寡妇，手头只有100美元，在意大利有1,000美元邮政储蓄，且无人有义务扶养她，被排除为可能成为public charge。外国人的身体状况与其就业能力和资格相关，已予考虑；外国人前往本国的路费由他人支付的事实已被视为该外国人自我扶养能力的证据，尽管不一定是决定性证据。第348页。上述70岁寡妇的案件是Minuto v. Reimer, 83 F2d 166, (C.A. 2, 1936)。小组委员会的结论相关部分为：小组委员会建议，排除可能成为public charge的人的条款应保留在法律中。由于构成成为public charge可能性的要素多种多样，不应试图在法律中定义该术语，而应确立具体限定，即确定外国人是否属于该类别属于领事官员或专员的自由裁量权。第349页。

In Section 212(a)(15) of the 1952 Act, Congress inserted the words "in the opinion of (the consul or the Attorney General) with the manifest intention of putting borderline adverse determina- tions beyond the reach of judicial review. Cf. Dolenz v. Shaugh- nessy, 206 F.2d 392, (C.A. 2, 1953). There is a paucity of interpretive precedent decisions in modern times. The administrative authorities have adopted the view that, while economic factors should be taken into account, the alien's physical and mental condition, as it affects ability to earn a living, is of major significance. Foreign Affairs Manual, Part HI, Vol. 9, Note 1 to 22 CFR 42.91(a)(15); Matter of Martinez-Lopez, 10 I. & N. Dec. 409, 421-423 (AG, 1964). We have remarked that the deportation statute must be strictly construed. The rule is otherwise as to exclusion. An unadmitted alien has no constitutional right of entry into this country. Turner

在1952年法案第212(a)(15)条中，国会插入了“（领事或司法部长）认为”等词语，明显意图使边缘性不利裁定超出司法审查的范围。参见Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, (C.A. 2, 1953)。现代解释性先例决定很少。行政当局采取的观点是，虽然应考虑经济因素，但外国人的身体和精神状况，因其影响谋生能力，具有重大意义。Foreign Affairs Manual, Part HI, Vol. 9, Note 1 to 22 CFR 42.91(a)(15)；Matter of Martinez-Lopez, 10 I. & N. Dec. 409, 421-423 (AG, 1964)。我们已指出，驱逐出境法规必须严格解释。排除则规则不同。未获准入境的外国人没有进入本国的宪法权利。Turner

v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Klein- dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). Congress has been concerned almost continuously since 1875 with the quality of prospective entrants, and the pattern generally has been one of increasing control. Kleindienst v. Mandel, supra, at p. 761. Contrary to their attitude in deportation cases, the courts without exception have sustained Congress' plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess characteristics which Congress has forbidden. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1389); Eleindienst v. Mandel, supra, at p. 766. With this in mind we consider that it would be incorrect to interpret "public charge" in Section 212(a)(15) as narrowly as in the deportation section. Everything in the statutes, the legislative comments and the decisions points to one conclusion, that Congress intends that an applicant for a visa be excluded who is without sufficient funds to support himself, who has no one under any obligation to support him and who, being older, has an increasing chance of becoming dependent, disabled and sick. Cf. Minuto v. Reimer, supra. Nor can there be any doubt that old age assistance is individual- ized public support to the needy, as distinguished from essentially supplementary benefits, directed to the general welfare of the public as a whole. 42 U.S.C. 306. It is a well established fact that an applicant for adjustment of status under Section 245 of the Act is in the same posture as to though he were an applicant before an American consular officer abroad seeking issuance of an immigrant visa for the purpose of gaining admission to the United States as a lawfully permanent resident. In considering the factors discussed above, it becomes clear that under the provisions of Section 241(a)(8) the determination of deportability is made upon the basis of the alien having already become a public charge; that such determination is predicated on an event that has actually transpired, thus making demand for reimbursement, and reimbursement, feasible elements. However in Section 212(aX15) the determination of excludability is based upon an opinion of whether the alien is likely to become a public charge at some future time, a predication which necessarily precludes the element of reimbursement. Therefore, in our opinion any alien who is incapable of earning a livelihood, who does not have sufficient funds in the United States for his support, and has no person in the United States willing and able to assure that he will not need public support is excludable as likely to become a

v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)。自1875年以来，国会几乎持续不断地关注潜在入境者的素质，且总体模式一直是加强控制。Kleindienst v. Mandel, supra, at p. 761。与他们在驱逐出境案件中的态度相反，法院无一例外地维持了国会的完全权力，即为外国人的入境制定规则并排除那些具有国会所禁止特征的人。Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1389); Eleindienst v. Mandel, supra, at p. 766。考虑到这一点，我们认为将第212(a)(15)条中的“公共负担”解释得如同驱逐出境条款中那样狭窄是不正确的。法规、立法评论和判决中的一切均指向一个结论，即国会意图排除这样的签证申请人：他没有足够资金供养自己，没有任何人有义务供养他，并且由于年事已高，他成为受抚养者、残疾者和病患的可能性日益增加。Cf. Minuto v. Reimer, supra。 毫无疑问，老年援助是对贫困者的个性化公共支持，有别于本质上属于补充性福利、旨在促进公众整体一般福利的给付。42 U.S.C. 306。 一个已确立的事实是，根据该法第245条申请调整身份的人，其处境与在美国境外向美国领事官员申请移民签证以作为合法永久居民入境美国的人相同。 在考虑上述因素后，可以明确的是，根据第241(a)(8)条的规定，驱逐出境的决定是基于外国人已经成为公共负担这一事实作出的；该决定以实际发生的事件为依据，从而使要求偿还和偿还款项成为可行的要素。然而，在第212(aX15)条中，排除入境的决定是基于对外国人是否有可能在未来某个时候成为公共负担的意见，这种预测必然排除了偿还这一要素。因此，我们认为，任何无法谋生、在美国没有足够资金供养自己、且在美国没有任何人愿意并能够保证其不会需要公共支持的外国人，均可作为有可能成为

public charge whether or not the public support which will be available to him is reimbursable to the state. It is our conclusion that an older alien, who lacks means of supporting herself; who has no one responsible for her support and who expects to be dependent for support on old age assistance is ineligible for a visa under Section 212(a)(15) of the Act, as likely to become a public charge, even though the state from which she will receive old age assistance may not permit reimbursement. In view of the above, it is determined that the record establishes that the applicant is excludable under the provisions of Section 212(aX15). Accordingly, the District Director's decision denying the application will be affirmed. ORDER: It is ordered that the denial decision of the District Director be affirmed.

公共负担而被排除，无论其将获得的公共支持是否可向州偿还。 我们的结论是，一名年长的外国人，如果缺乏供养自己的手段；没有任何人负责供养她，并且预期依赖老年援助供养，则根据该法第212(a)(15)条，她作为有可能成为公共负担者，没有资格获得签证，即使她将从中获得老年援助的州可能不允许偿还。 鉴于上述情况，认定记录表明申请人根据第212(aX15)条的规定应被排除。因此，地区主任拒绝申请的决定将予维持。 命令：兹命令维持地区主任的拒绝决定。