Matter of L-O-G-

Interim Decision #3281

临时决定第3281号

File A28 862 064 et al.- Miami

案卷A28 862 064等——迈阿密

Decided June 14, 1996

1996年6月14日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

This case was last before us on May 10, 1995, when we dismissed an appeal from an Immigration Judge’s denial of the respondents’ applications for asylum and withholding of deportation. The respondents, a mother and her 15-year-old daughter, have now filed a motion to reopen their deportation proceedings to apply for suspension of deportation. The respondents claim extreme hardship to themselves. The adult respondent also claims extreme hardship to her 6-year-old United States citizen child.

本案上一次由我们审理是在1995年5月10日，当时我们驳回了对移民法官拒绝被申请人庇护和暂缓驱逐申请的上诉。被申请人，一位母亲和她15岁的女儿，现已提交动议要求重新开启其驱逐程序以申请暂停驱逐。被申请人主张其自身遭受极端困难。成年被申请人还主张其6岁的美国公民子女遭受极端困难。

The Immigration and Naturalization Service opposes the motion to reopen for two reasons. First, the Service asserts that the respondents do not merit suspension of deportation, or reopening, as a matter of discretion because of their “obvious disregard for the immigration laws of the United States.” Sec- ond, the Service argues that the respondents “have not shown that they or their United States citizen child/brother would suffer extreme hardship if returned to Nicaragua,” because they have not shown “unique and extenuat- ing circumstances.” The motion to reopen will be granted.

移民和归化局基于两个理由反对重新开启的动议。第一，该局主张，被申请人因其“明显无视美国移民法”而不应作为自由裁量事项获得暂停驱逐或重新开启。第二，该局主张，被申请人“未能证明其本人或其美国公民子女/兄弟若返回尼加拉瓜将遭受极端困难”，因为他们未能证明“独特和可减轻的情节”。 重新开启的动议将获准许。

I. REQUIREMENTS FOR REOPENING

I. 重新开启的要求

An alien may file a motion to reopen to this Board in order to apply for dis- cretionary relief from deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1995). The Board has “broad discretion to grant or deny such motions.” INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992); INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985); INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981); Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 1992). There are at least three grounds on which the Board may deny motions to reopen. Failure to comply with the regulatory requirements which govern such motions can result in denial of the motion. In addition, a motion to reopen may be denied because the applicant has not established prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief being sought. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988). Finally, where the relief being sought is discretionary, the Board may deny reopening on discretionary grounds alone. INS v. Doherty, supra; INS v. Abudu, supra; INS v. Rios-Pineda, supra; Matter of Barrera, 19 I&N Dec. 837 (BIA 1989). The Service does not argue, and we do not find, that the respondents have failed to satisfy the regulatory requirements for reopening. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.8 (1995). The questions raised by the Service, which we must address, are (1) whether the respondents have made a prima facie showing of eligibility for suspension of deportation, and (2) whether their motion should be denied on discretionary grounds. We find no basis for denying the respondents’ motion to reopen in the exercise of discretion. The Service argues that the motion should be so denied because the respondents filed a “frivolous” appeal and failed to depart voluntarily when required to do so. We do not agree that the respondents’ appeal was frivolous. The Immigration Judge issued a 9-page decision deny- ing the respondents’ applications for asylum and withholding of deportation. The respondents filed a thoughtful brief in support of their appeal from that decision. We affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision in a brief order that did not indicate that the respondents’ appeal was frivolous or otherwise wholly lacking in merit. The respondents technically should have departed from the United States voluntarily within 30 days of our May 10, 1995, decision in this case.

外国人可以向本委员会提交重新开启的动议，以申请驱逐方面的自由裁量救济。8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1995)。委员会拥有“准许或拒绝此类动议的广泛自由裁量权”。INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992)；INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985)；INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981)；Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 1992)。委员会至少可以基于三个理由拒绝重新开启的动议。未能遵守管辖此类动议的监管要求可导致动议被拒绝。此外，重新开启的动议可因申请人未能确立对所寻求的 underlying 救济的表面资格而被拒绝。INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988)。最后，在所寻求的救济属于自由裁量性质的情况下，委员会可以仅基于自由裁量理由拒绝重新开启。INS v. Doherty, supra；INS v. Abudu, supra；INS v. Rios-Pineda, supra；Matter of Barrera, 19 I&N Dec. 837 (BIA 1989)。 该局未主张，我们也不认为，被申请人未能满足重新开启的监管要求。见8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.8 (1995)。该局提出且我们必须处理的问题是：(1) 被申请人是否已就暂停驱逐的资格作出表面证明，以及 (2) 其动议是否应基于自由裁量理由被拒绝。 我们认为没有依据在行使自由裁量权时拒绝被申请人的重新开启动议。该局主张，动议应因此被拒绝，因为被申请人提交了“轻率”上诉，且未按要求自愿离境。我们不同意被申请人的上诉是轻率的。移民法官发布了一份9页的决定，拒绝了被申请人的庇护和暂缓驱逐申请。被申请人为支持对该决定的上诉提交了一份深思熟虑的辩护状。我们在一份简短命令中维持了移民法官的决定，该命令未表明被申请人的上诉是轻率的或在其他方面完全缺乏依据。 从技术上讲，被申请人本应在我们就本案作出1995年5月10日决定后的30天内自愿离开美国。

However, we note that the respondents, as Nicaraguan nationals, were eligi- ble to apply for work authorization even after our decision in their case was rendered, pursuant to the Nicaraguan Review Program. While that program terminated on June 13, 1995, those covered by the program were authorized to request permission to work pending resolution of their applications for suspension of deportation. Given the fact that the Service has taken no action to deport these respondents and, indeed, indicated its acquiescence in the fil- ing of suspension applications by similarly situated individuals, we find no reason to deny reopening as a matter of discretion. See discussion infra part III. See generally Matter of Pena-Diaz, 20 I&N Dec. 841 (BIA 1994). The determinative issue in this case, then, is whether the respondents have established prima facie eligibility for suspension of deportation. To establish eligibility for suspension of deportation, an alien must show that (1) she has been physically present in the United States for the 7 years immediately preceding the filing of the suspension application; (2) she has been a person of good moral character for the same period of time; and (3) her deportation would result in extreme hardship to herself or to her United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, child, or parent. Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994). The older respondent in this case, now 38 years of age, entered the United States in April of 1988. Her daughter, now 15, entered in 1986. Nei- ther has left the country since their respective arrivals. The continuous physi- cal presence requirements have been met. The record does not indicate that these respondents lack good moral character. The remaining and critical issue is whether the respondents have made a prima facie showing of extreme hardship so as to warrant reopening of their deportation proceedings.

然而，我们注意到，被申请人作为尼加拉瓜国民，根据尼加拉瓜审查计划，即使在我们对其案件作出决定后，仍有资格申请工作许可。虽然该计划于1995年6月13日终止，但受该计划覆盖者在其暂停驱逐申请待决期间被授权请求工作许可。鉴于该局未采取任何行动驱逐这些被申请人，并且实际上表示默许处境类似的个人提交暂停申请，我们认为没有理由作为自由裁量事项拒绝重新开启。见下文第三部分讨论。一般见Matter of Pena-Diaz, 20 I&N Dec. 841 (BIA 1994)。 因此，本案的决定性问题是，被申请人是否已确立暂停驱逐的表面资格。 要确立暂停驱逐的资格，外国人必须证明：(1) 在提交暂停申请之前的7年内她一直实际居住在美国；(2) 在同一期间她一直是品行良好的人；以及 (3) 她的驱逐将导致其本人或其美国公民或合法永久居民配偶、子女或父母遭受极端困难。《移民和国籍法》第244(a)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994)。本案中较年长的被申请人现年38岁，于1988年4月进入美国。她的女儿现年15岁，于1986年进入美国。两人自各自抵达以来均未离开该国。连续实际居住要求已满足。记录未表明这些被申请人缺乏良好品行。 剩余的关键问题是，被申请人是否已就极端困难作出表面证明，从而值得重新开启其驱逐程序。

II. MEANING OF THE TERM “EXTREME HARDSHIP”

II. “极端困难”一词的含义

A. The Legislative History

A. 立法历史

In assessing the meaning of the term “extreme hardship,” it is important to recall that section 244(a)(1) of the Act previously included the requirement of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” In 1962, Congress amended the suspension statute to require only “extreme” hardship, and left the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” language intact solely for those aliens who were convicted of crimes, or who were otherwise deportable on other specified grounds. See Act of October 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247. We have previously acknowledged that in amending sec- tion 244(a)(1) in this manner, Congress intended to lessen the degree of hard- ship required to qualify for suspension of deportation. See Matter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1964). The legislative history is silent regarding the reasons for the 1962 change in the suspension of deportation statute. We do not suggest that the change

在评估“极端困难”一词的含义时，重要的是要记得，《移民和国籍法》第244(a)(1)条此前包含“特殊和极其不寻常困难”的要求。1962年，国会修订了暂停法规，仅要求“极端”困难，而将“特殊和极其不寻常困难”的措辞仅保留给那些被定罪的外国人，或因其他特定理由可被驱逐的外国人。见1962年10月24日法案，Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247。我们此前已承认，国会以这种方式修订第244(a)(1)条，意在降低获得暂停驱逐资格所需的困难程度。见Matter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1964)。 立法历史对1962年暂停驱逐法规变更的原因未作说明。我们并不暗示该变更

reflects a congressional desire to return to the pre-1952 pattern of allowing aliens to remain in this country simply because they had been here for a time, or had acquired United States citizen relatives. However, it is clear that Con- gress found the “exceptional and extremely unusual” language inappropriate, and that it intended to make the suspension remedy more widely available by amending the statute in 1962. That clearly was a remedial intent. Moreover, section 244(a)(2) of the Act, which provides for suspension of deportation for certain criminal or otherwise deportable aliens, still requires a showing of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” for eligibility for this relief. The term “extreme hardship” in section 244(a)(1) should not be defined or applied so restrictively that it effectively subsumes this heightened standard under section 244(a)(2).

反映了国会希望回到1952年之前的模式，即仅因外国人曾在此停留一段时间或已获得美国公民亲属而允许其留在美国。然而，很明显，国会认为“特殊和极其不寻常”的措辞不适当，并意图通过1962年修订法规使暂停救济更广泛可用。这显然是一种补救意图。 此外，《移民和国籍法》第244(a)(2)条规定对某些刑事或其他可驱逐外国人暂停驱逐，仍要求证明“特殊和极其不寻常困难”以获得该救济资格。第244(a)(1)条中的“极端困难”一词不应被定义或适用得如此严格，以致实际上包含了第244(a)(2)条下的这一更高标准。

B. The Case Law

B. 判例法

“Hardship” is itself a difficult term to define or quantify, and the case law on this subject has reflected this difficulty. As this Board recognized over 30 years ago, the term “extreme hardship” under our immigration laws “is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning. It necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” Matter of Hwang, supra, at 451. In assessing hardship, and perhaps especially in con- sidering a possible prima facie showing of such hardship, we must keep in mind the subjective nature of the term. Moreover, in analyzing any case involving suspension of deportation, we should also be mindful of the reme- dial nature of the suspension statute. See generally Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964). A comprehensive discussion of the concepts underlying the meaning of extreme hardship was most recently set forth by the Board in Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994). In that case we first referred to the general fac- tors often cited as relevant to the issue of extreme hardship, including the alien’s age; the length of her residence in the United States; her family ties in the United States and abroad; her health; the economic and political condi- tions in the country to which she may be returned; her financial status, busi- ness, or occupation; the possibility of other means of adjustment of status, her immigration history; and her position in the community. This summary of factors, initially noted by the Board in Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978), was derived from a discussion in a committee report in the 94th Congress on § 4 of H.R. 8713, a bill which provided for discretionary adjust- ment of status for certain aliens whose deportation would result in unusual hardship. Id. at 597. Our decision in Matter of Ige, supra, which cited to a variety of Board and court precedents which we shall not repeat here, also summarized certain principles or maxims that have evolved over the years when evaluating the question of extreme hardship. For example, the birth of a United States

“困难”本身就是一个难以定义或量化的术语，而关于这一主题的判例法也反映了这一困难。正如本委员会30多年前所认识到的，我们移民法下的“极端困难”一词“并非一个具有固定和僵化内容或含义的可定义术语。它必然取决于每个案件特有的事实和情况。”Matter of Hwang，supra，第451页。在评估困难时，或许尤其是在考虑此类困难可能的表面证据（prima facie）证明时，我们必须牢记该术语的主观性质。此外，在分析任何涉及驱逐出境暂缓的案件时，我们也应注意到暂缓法规的救济性质。参见一般性论述 Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964)。 关于极端困难含义背后概念的最全面讨论，最近由本委员会在 Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994) 中阐述。在该案中，我们首先提到了通常被引为与极端困难问题相关的通用因素，包括外国人的年龄；其在美国居住的时间长度；其在美国和国外的家庭关系；其健康状况；其可能被遣返国家的经济和政治状况；其财务状况、生意或职业；其他调整身份途径的可能性；其移民历史；以及其在社区中的地位。这一因素摘要最初由本委员会在 Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978) 中指出，源自第94届国会关于 H.R. 8713 第4节的委员会报告中的讨论，该法案规定对某些驱逐出境将导致异常困难的特定外国人给予自由裁量的身份调整。Id. 第597页。 我们在 Matter of Ige，supra 中的裁决引用了各种委员会和法院先例，我们在此不再重复，该裁决还总结了多年来在评估极端困难问题时演变出的某些原则或格言。例如，美国

citizen child does not in itself establish extreme hardship. Further, a showing of a significant reduction in one’s standard of living does not alone compel a finding of extreme hardship, but the political and economic conditions in one’s homeland are relevant. A showing of some degree of financial hardship is not in itself sufficient to demonstrate extreme hardship. A claim that an adult or child will have difficulty in readjusting to life in one’s native country is also not sufficient without more. The fact that economic, educational, and medical facilities and opportunities may be better in the United States does not in itself establish extreme hardship. Also, the possibility of other means to adjust one’s status weighs against a finding of extreme hardship. Other general maxims, not referenced in Matter of Ige, supra, may be gleaned from a review of the case law. The most obvious of these is perhaps the long-recognized rule that a mere showing of 7 years’ presence in the United States does not constitute extreme hardship. Matter of Sipus, 14 I&N Dec. 229 (BIA 1972). Also, while conditions in the alien’s native country may be considered in evaluating an allegation of extreme hardship, a claim of per- secution may not generally be presented as a means of demonstrating extreme hardship for purposes of suspension of deportation. See Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1993); Farzad v. INS, 802 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1986); Kashefi-Zihagh v. INS, 791 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1986); Sanchez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Hee Yung Ahn v. INS, 651 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981); Matter of Kojoory, 12 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1967); Matter of Liao, 11 I&N Dec. 113 (BIA 1965). But see Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642 (2d Cir. 1995). Fur- ther, equities which are acquired after a final order of deportation has been entered are generally entitled to less weight than those acquired before entry of such an order. Matter of Correa, 19 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1984). General rules also revealed by study of the case law are that, with all else being equal, the younger the children, or the wealthier, better-educated, or more employable the alien, the less likely a finding of extreme hardship. See, e.g., Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88 (BIA 1974). See generally INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra. Additionally, applicants returning to a developed country are less likely to be able to demonstrate extreme hardship than those return- ing to a less developed or particularly impoverished country. See Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979). This litany of factors which do not, by themselves, generally constitute extreme hardship, must be considered in proper context. Each case must be carefully evaluated, and all possible hardship factors must be weighed together. See, e.g., Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1993); Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1987); Prapavat v. INS, 662 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1981). A factor which may not in itself be deter- minative should be considered, and may become a significant or even critical factor when weighed with all the other circumstances presented. In all cases, the particular degree of personal hardship resulting from each of the factors must be taken into account.

公民子女的出生本身并不确立极端困难。此外，仅显示生活水平显著下降并不单独强制认定极端困难，但一个人祖国的政治和经济状况是相关的。显示某种程度的经济困难本身不足以证明极端困难。声称成年人或儿童在重新适应祖国生活方面会有困难，若无更多内容，也不充分。美国的经济、教育和医疗设施及机会可能更好这一事实本身并不确立极端困难。此外，其他调整身份途径的可能性不利于认定极端困难。 其他未在 Matter of Ige，supra 中提及的通用格言，可以从判例法的回顾中得出。其中最明显的或许是长期认可的规则，即仅显示在美国居留7年并不构成极端困难。Matter of Sipus, 14 I&N Dec. 229 (BIA 1972)。此外，虽然外国人的祖国状况可在评估极端困难主张时予以考虑，但迫害主张一般不能作为证明驱逐出境暂缓目的下极端困难的手段提出。参见 Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1993); Farzad v. INS, 802 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1986); Kashefi-Zihagh v. INS, 791 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1986); Sanchez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Hee Yung Ahn v. INS, 651 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981); Matter of Kojoory, 12 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1967); Matter of Liao, 11 I&N Dec. 113 (BIA 1965)。但参见 Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642 (2d Cir. 1995)。此外，在最终驱逐出境令下达后获得的衡平因素，一般比在该命令下达前获得的衡平因素权重更轻。Matter of Correa, 19 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1984)。 通过研究判例法还揭示的一般规则是，在所有其他条件相同的情况下，子女越年幼，或外国人越富有、受教育程度越高或越有就业能力，认定极端困难的可能性就越小。参见，例如，Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88 (BIA 1974)。参见一般性论述 INS v. Jong Ha Wang，supra。此外，返回发达国家的外国人比返回欠发达国家或特别贫困国家的外国人更不可能证明极端困难。参见 Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979)。 这一系列本身通常不构成极端困难的因素，必须在适当的背景下考虑。每个案件都必须仔细评估，所有可能的困难因素必须综合权衡。参见，例如，Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1993); Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1987); Prapavat v. INS, 662 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1981)。一个本身可能不具决定性的因素应予以考虑，并且在与所有其他呈现的情况综合权衡时，可能成为重要甚至关键因素。在所有案件中，必须考虑每个因素所导致的个人困难的具体程度。

The Supreme Court has held that the Attorney General and her delegates “have the authority to construe ‘extreme hardship’ narrowly should they deem it wise to do so,” and has stated that a narrow interpretation of the term is consistent with the exceptional nature of the suspension remedy. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra, at 145. The Court used the “narrowly construe” lan- guage in ratifying this Board’s authority to interpret “extreme hardship” in the particular case before it. Wang involved affluent, educated respondents. We do not suggest that the denial of reopening in Wang was incorrect. A “narrow” interpretation that denies reopening to aliens such as the Wangs need not be as restrictive as the Service argues. Wang does not require that extreme hardship be construed in the narrowest sense. We have never in our published precedents interpreted the term so nar- rowly that it is reserved only for those cases involving the most compelling or manifestly unique hardships. Indeed, we do not accept the Service contention in this case that the motion should fail because no “unique or extenuating cir- cumstances” have been shown. The word “extreme” should not be equated with “unique,” and hardship for suspension purposes need not be unique to be extreme. A restrictive view of extreme hardship is not mandated either by the Supreme Court or by our published case law. Our granting of this motion is fully consonant with our seminal decision in Matter of Anderson, supra. Moreover, a flexible approach to extreme hardship harmonizes Board law with prevailing case law from the judicial circuits. See, e.g., Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995); Blanco v. INS, supra; Tukhowinich v. INS, 64 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1995); Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1995); Turri v. INS, supra; Babai v. INS, 985 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1993).

最高法院已裁定，司法部长及其代表“有权在认为明智时对‘极端困难’作狭义解释”，并指出对该术语的狭义解释符合暂缓救济的例外性质。INS v. Jong Ha Wang，supra，第145页。法院在批准本委员会在其面前特定案件中解释“极端困难”的权力时使用了“狭义解释”的措辞。Wang 涉及富裕、受过教育的 respondent。我们并不暗示 Wang 中拒绝重新开案是错误的。拒绝向像 Wang 夫妇这样的外国人重新开案的“狭义”解释不必像移民局所主张的那样严格。 Wang 并不要求将极端困难解释为最狭义。我们在已公布的先例中从未将该术语解释得如此狭窄，以至于仅保留给那些涉及最令人信服或明显独特困难的案件。事实上，我们不接受本案中移民局的主张，即因为未显示“独特或减轻情节”而应驳回动议。“极端”一词不应等同于“独特”，暂缓目的下的困难不必独特才构成极端。 对极端困难的限制性观点既未被最高法院强制，也未被我们已公布的判例法强制。我们批准本动议完全符合我们在 Matter of Anderson，supra 中的开创性裁决。此外，对极端困难采取灵活方法使委员会法律与各司法巡回区的现行判例法相协调。参见，例如，Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995); Blanco v. INS，supra; Tukhowinich v. INS, 64 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1995); Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1995); Turri v. INS，supra; Babai v. INS, 985 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1993)。

III. PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF EXTREME HARDSHIP

III. 极端困难的表面证据证明

Bearing in mind all these considerations regarding the meaning of extreme hardship, we turn now to the question of what constitutes a prima facie case of extreme hardship. Just as there are no bright line tests for determining what constitutes extreme hardship and what does not, so there are no easy rules for deciding what makes a prima facie case of such hardship and what does not. Certain clear requirements must be met, of course, to make such a show- ing. It is not enough, for example, simply to allege extreme hardship for rea- sons that will be explained at the reopened hearing. See Matter of Sipus, supra; see also INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra. In addition, the allegations of hardship that are made in a motion to reopen should be specific, not conclusory, and should be supported by evidence in the form of affidavits or other documentation. However, where, as in suspension cases, ruling on a motion to reopen requires the exercise of judgment regarding eligibility for the relief sought, the Board historically has not required a conclusive showing that, assuming

牢记所有这些关于极端困难含义的考虑，我们现在转向什么构成极端困难表面证据案件的问题。正如没有明确界限测试来确定什么构成极端困难、什么不构成一样，也没有简单规则来决定什么构成此类困难的表面证据案件、什么不构成。 当然，要作出这样的证明，必须满足某些明确要求。例如，仅仅以将在重新开案的听证会上解释的理由来主张极端困难是不够的。参见 Matter of Sipus，supra；另参见 INS v. Jong Ha Wang，supra。此外，在重新开案动议中提出的困难主张应具体而非结论性，并应以宣誓书或其他文件形式的证据支持。 然而，在如暂缓案件那样，对重新开案动议的裁决需要对所寻求救济的资格行使判断力时，委员会历史上并未要求确凿证明，即假设

the facts alleged to be true, eligibility for relief has been established. Rather, we have been willing to reopen “where the new facts alleged, when coupled with the facts already of record, satisfy us that it would be worthwhile to develop the issues further at a plenary hearing on reopening.” Matter of Sipus, supra, at 231. As the Supreme Court stated in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra, reopening for a hearing on suspension of deportation is appropriate where the Board is presented with a motion “reliably indicating the specific recent events that would render deportation a matter of extreme hardship.” Id. at 143. In considering a motion to reopen, the Board should not prejudge the mer- its of a case before the alien has had an opportunity to prove the case. See gen- erally Motamedi v. INS, 713 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1983). By finding that an alien has made out a prima facie case of extreme hardship, we are not decid- ing that the respondents should be granted suspension of deportation as a matter of law or discretion if the facts alleged are shown to be true. We are deciding only that there is a reasonable likelihood that the statutory require- ments for the relief sought have been satisfied, and that there is a reasonable likelihood that relief will be granted in the exercise of discretion. See M.A. v. United States INS, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990); Marcello v. INS, 694 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). The ultimate determination on a suspension application rests with the Immigration Judge after the respondents have had an opportunity to present all the evidence and arguments in their favor at the hearing. See Matter of Pena-Diaz, supra. Given the subjective nature of the extreme hardship requirement, it is appropriate for the Immigration Judge to hear in person the evidence in support of the claim. We note that the testimony of suspension applicants, and sometimes of their family members, can often be crucial in these cases. Frequently, it will be difficult to assess from motion papers alone what actual hardship will occur upon deportation in a given case. Therefore, so long as the motion papers do provide objective facts to support a reason- able likelihood of extreme hardship, we do not require a showing that the facts, if true, definitively establish extreme hardship. We acknowledge our prior decisions holding that the moving party gener- ally bears a heavy burden in seeking reopening of proceedings. Matter of Ige, supra; Matter of Coelho, supra. The Supreme Court has also recognized this heavy burden. See INS v. Doherty, supra; INS v. Abudu, supra. However, this principle does not require a conclusive showing on elements of eligibility which involve the exercise of judgment, such as the extreme hardship requirement for suspension of deportation. We further note that in those cases where we have emphasized the heavy burden of proof faced by an alien seeking reopening, the facts warranted the strict imposition of such a burden. In Matter of Coelho, supra, for example, the alien had already had an opportunity to fully present and litigate his request for discretionary relief from deportation under section 212(c) of the

所主张的事实为真，救济资格已确立。相反，我们愿意在“所主张的新事实与记录中已有事实相结合，使我们确信值得在重新开庭的全面听证中进一步展开问题时”重新开庭。Matter of Sipus, supra, 第231页。正如最高法院在INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra案中所指出的，当委员会收到“可靠地表明将使驱逐成为极度困难事项的具体近期事件”的动议时，就暂停驱逐举行听证而重新开庭是适当的。Id. 第143页。 在审议重新开庭动议时，委员会不应在外籍人有机会证明其案件之前预断案件的实体问题。参见一般性Motamedi v. INS, 713 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1983)。通过认定外籍人已提出极度困难的初步证据案件，我们并非裁定如果所主张的事实被证明为真，被申请人就应作为法律问题或裁量问题获得暂停驱逐。我们仅裁定，所寻求救济的法定要求有合理可能性已得到满足，并且有合理可能性在行使裁量权时给予救济。参见M.A. v. United States INS, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990); Marcello v. INS, 694 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983)。 暂停申请的最终裁定权属于移民法官，须在被申请人有机会在听证中提交所有有利于其的证据和论点之后作出。参见Matter of Pena-Diaz, supra。鉴于极度困难要求的主观性质，移民法官亲自听取支持该主张的证据是适当的。我们注意到，暂停申请人的证言，有时还有其家庭成员的证言，在此类案件中往往至关重要。通常，仅从动议文件很难评估在特定案件中驱逐后将实际发生何种困难。因此，只要动议文件确实提供了客观事实以支持极度困难的合理可能性，我们就不要求证明这些事实若为真即确定性地确立极度困难。 我们承认此前的裁决认定，提出动议的一方在寻求重新开庭程序时通常承担沉重负担。Matter of Ige, supra; Matter of Coelho, supra。最高法院也认可了这一沉重负担。参见INS v. Doherty, supra; INS v. Abudu, supra。然而，这一原则并不要求在涉及判断行使的资格要素上作出结论性证明，例如暂停驱逐的极度困难要求。 我们进一步注意到，在我们强调寻求重新开庭的外籍人面临沉重举证责任的案件中，事实都支持严格施加此种负担。例如，在Matter of Coelho, supra案中，该外籍人已有机会充分提交并诉讼其根据第212(c)条

Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988). He sought a remand for further consideration of the section 212(c) application. We held that “in cases such as this,” reopen- ing should not be granted unless the alien had met the “heavy burden” of showing that the new evidence presented “would likely change the result in the case.” Id. at 473. In another case, Matter of Reyes, 18 I&N Dec. 249 (BIA 1982), the alien had entered the United States in October of 1968, had been ordered deported in May of 1970, and had been granted 30 days’ voluntary departure. She did not depart, but went into hiding and filed a motion to reopen to apply for sus- pension 9 years later, in July of 1979. We held that “under the factual back- ground of cases such as this, we consider it warranted and reasonable to require a clear, unambiguous showing of evidentiary support to justify reopening.” Id. at 251. Many motions to reopen, however, do not present these special, adverse considerations. Where an alien is seeking previously unavailable relief and has not had an opportunity to present her application before the Immigration Judge, the Board will look to whether there is sufficient evidence proffered to indicate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, so as to make it worthwhile to develop the issues further at a full evidentiary hearing. See Matter of Sipus, supra. The case before us presents none of the more egregious factors present in such cases as Matter of Coelho, supra, and Matter of Reyes, supra. The absence of any dilatory tactics in this case is a proper matter for our consider- ation. See generally Blanco v. INS, supra; Matter of Pena-Diaz, supra.

（《法案》，8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988)）申请驱逐出境裁量救济。他寻求发回重审以进一步审议第212(c)条申请。我们裁定，“在此类案件中”，除非外籍人已满足“沉重负担”，表明新提交的证据“可能改变案件结果”，否则不应准予重新开庭。Id. 第473页。 在另一案件Matter of Reyes, 18 I&N Dec. 249 (BIA 1982)中，该外籍人于1968年10月进入美国，于1970年5月被命令驱逐出境，并获得30天自愿离境。她未离境，而是藏匿起来，并于9年后的1979年7月提交重新开庭动议以申请暂停驱逐。我们裁定，“在此类案件的事实背景下，我们认为要求明确、无歧义的证据支持证明以证明重新开庭的正当性是适当且合理的。”Id. 第251页。 然而，许多重新开庭动议并不呈现这些特殊的、不利的考量因素。当外籍人寻求此前无法获得的救济，且尚未有机会在移民法官面前提交其申请时，委员会将审查所提交的证据是否足以表明实体上有合理成功可能性，从而值得在全面证据听证中进一步展开问题。参见Matter of Sipus, supra。 本案不呈现Matter of Coelho, supra和Matter of Reyes, supra等案件中的任何更为恶劣的因素。本案不存在任何拖延策略，这是供我们考量的适当事项。参见一般性Blanco v. INS, supra; Matter of Pena-Diaz, supra。

IV. THE RESPONDENT’S MOTION

IV. 被申请人的动议

With these considerations in mind, we turn now to the question of whether the respondents in this case have made a prima facie showing of extreme hardship sufficient to warrant reopening of their deportation proceedings. We find that such a showing has been made, and we therefore reopen the proceedings. As mentioned above, the respondents have remained in the United States continuously since their entries in 1988 and 1986. The adult respondent now also has a 6-year-old United States citizen child. The minor respondent has now lived here for most of her life. In support of the motion to reopen, the respondents filed individual applications for suspension of deportation. The applications are supported by affidavits, letters, and other documentation. An affidavit submitted by the adult respondent states that she would be unable to get a job comparable to the one she has in this country, because the economic situation in Nicaragua is “unbearable.” The affidavit also states that her daughter would suffer extreme hardship upon deportation because she has lived in this country since the age of 6, speaks English better than Spanish, and “feels as American.” The respondent further states that her 6-year-old

基于上述考量，我们现在转向本案被申请人是否已提出足以证明值得重新开庭其驱逐程序的极度困难初步证据的问题。我们认定已作出此种证明，因此重新开庭程序。 如上所述，被申请人自1988年和1986年入境以来一直连续留在美国。成年被申请人现在还有一名6岁的美国公民子女。未成年被申请人现在大部分人生都在此度过。为支持重新开庭动议，被申请人提交了各自的暂停驱逐申请。申请附有宣誓书、信件和其他文件。成年被申请人提交的宣誓书称，她将无法获得与她在本国所从事工作相当的工作，因为尼加拉瓜的经济状况“难以忍受”。宣誓书还称，其女儿若被驱逐将遭受极度困难，因为她自6岁起就在此国生活，英语比西班牙语说得好，并且“感觉像美国人”。被申请人进一步称，她6岁的

citizen son would suffer hardship if he accompanied his mother to Nicaragua because he also feels American, only speaks English, and now attends school. Moreover, it is alleged that the medical assistance and economic situ- ation in Nicaragua are “chaotic.” The adult respondent’s affidavit is not artfully drawn and we note the dis- sent’s concern over the claim that her 6-year-old son speaks only English. However, even discounting the alleged language abilities of the citizen child, we find the affidavit, together with the underlying facts of the case and the other documentation offered in support of the motion, sufficient to establish a prima facie case of extreme hardship. Our conclusion is primarily based on several critical factors. First, the minor respondent has now lived in this country since the age of 6. She has essentially grown up in the United States. All her education has been here. Life in Nicaragua would likely be completely foreign to her now in every respect. The degree of her integration into the society of the United States is a proper matter for consideration on remand. See Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996). Her claim that she does not speak Spanish well may also be explored at the reopened hearing. Second, the adult respondent’s citizen child, while still of tender years, has now begun school. There is nothing in the record to suggest that he could remain in the United States with another relative or friend, even if his mother would consider such a course of action. Third, Nicaragua is an extremely poor country, still in political turmoil, with a shattered economy, very high unemployment, and minimal govern- ment services. The employment prospects for the adult respondent and the opportunities for further education for the minor respondent and her United States citizen brother will not simply be less in Nicaragua than in this coun- try: their opportunities will be vastly diminished if they are returned to one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere. Fourth, as discussed above, it appears that the respondents have been cov- ered since 1987 by the Nicaraguan Review Program. Under that program, essentially no Nicaraguan nationals were deported, and virtually all were granted employment authorization. Even now, work authorization is autho- rized for those Nicaraguans who have applied for suspension of deportation and who meet the 7 years’ physical presence requirement for that relief. As we recognized in Matter of Pena-Diaz, supra, where the Service affirma- tively indicates that it does not intend to deport an alien, the alien’s reliance on that fact can “contribute to the respondent’s other allegations of hardship.” Id. at 847. This consideration may not necessarily be of particular signifi- cance in any given case. However, it is one factor which may be considered in assessing hardship as a whole. We further note in this regard that the Service itself has recognized that the Nicaraguans who have lived here for many years under color of law may face hardship upon their return. See Immigra- tion and Naturalization Service Fact Sheet 5 (June 2, 1995).

公民儿子若随母亲前往尼加拉瓜将遭受困难，因为他同样感觉像美国人，只说英语，且现已上学。此外，据称尼加拉瓜的医疗援助和经济状况“混乱”。 成年被申请人的宣誓书起草并不精巧，我们注意到异议意见对其6岁儿子只说英语这一主张的关切。然而，即使不考虑该公民子女所称的语言能力，我们认定该宣誓书连同案件基本事实及为支持动议提交的其他文件，足以确立极度困难的初步证据案件。我们的结论主要基于若干关键因素。 第一，未成年被申请人自6岁起就在此国生活。她基本上在美国长大。她的全部教育都在此完成。如今尼加拉瓜的生活在各方面对她而言很可能完全陌生。她融入美国社会的程度是发回重审时考量的适当事项。参见Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996)。她关于自己西班牙语说得不好的主张也可在重新开庭的听证中探究。 第二，成年被申请人的公民子女虽仍年幼，但现已开始上学。记录中没有任何内容表明他可以与另一亲属或朋友留在美国，即使其母亲会考虑此种做法。 第三，尼加拉瓜是极度贫困的国家，仍处于政治动荡之中，经济崩溃，失业率极高，政府服务极少。成年被申请人的就业前景以及未成年被申请人及其美国公民兄弟继续受教育的机会，在尼加拉瓜将不仅仅是少于本国：如果他们被送回西半球最贫困的国家之一，他们的机会将大幅减少。 第四，如上所述，被申请人似乎自1987年起即受尼加拉瓜审查计划覆盖。根据该计划，基本上没有尼加拉瓜国民被驱逐出境，几乎所有人都获得了工作许可。即使在现在，对于那些已申请暂停驱逐并满足该救济7年实际居留要求的尼加拉瓜人，工作许可仍获批准。正如我们在Matter of Pena-Diaz, supra案中所认可的，当服务局肯定地表示其不打算驱逐某外籍人时，该外籍人对此事实的信赖可以“助成被申请人的其他困难主张”。Id. 第847页。这一考量在任何特定案件中未必特别重要。然而，它是在整体评估困难时可以考虑的一个因素。我们在此进一步注意到，服务局本身已认识到，根据法律名义在此生活多年的尼加拉瓜人返回后可能面临困难。参见移民和归化局情况说明第5页（1995年6月2日）。

In and of themselves, each of these factors may not have been sufficient to warrant reopening. Nor will we speculate in this case as to whether the absence of any one of these factors would or would not have been be fatal to the motion. However, the facts just mentioned, considered as a whole, con- vince us that it is worthwhile to develop the extreme hardship issue further at a full evidentiary hearing before the Immigration Judge. We caution that this decision is not a determination that the respondents should be granted suspension of deportation as a matter of law or discretion. That decision rests with the Immigration Judge after the respondents have had the opportunity to present all evidence and arguments in favor of their applications for suspension of deportation. Accordingly, the motion to reopen will be granted. ORDER: The motion to reopen is granted, the proceedings are reopened, and the record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion, and for the entry of a new decision.

这些因素本身各自可能不足以证明重新开庭的正当性。我们也不在本案中推测缺少其中任何一个因素是否会对动议构成致命影响。然而，刚刚提及的事实作为整体使我们确信，值得在移民法官面前进行全面证据听证以进一步展开极度困难问题。 我们告诫，本裁决并非裁定被申请人应作为法律问题或裁量问题获得暂停驱逐。该裁定权属于移民法官，须在被申请人有机会提交所有有利于其暂停驱逐申请的证据和论点之后作出。 因此，重新开庭动议将获准。 命令： 重新开庭动议获准，程序重新开庭，记录发回移民法官，以便按照上述意见进行进一步程序，并作出新裁决。

DISSENTING OPINION: Lauri S. Filppu, Board Member, in which Fred W. Vacca and Michael J. Heilman, Board Members, joined

异议意见：委员会成员Lauri S. Filppu，委员会成员Fred W. Vacca和Michael J. Heilman加入

I respectfully dissent. This case involves an adult female respondent, who came here at age 30 and has 8 years’ residence in Florida, and her 15-year-old daughter, who trav- eled with an aunt and arrived here, ahead of the mother, about 10 years ago at age 6. This family now includes a 6-year-old United States citizen child. The respondents would be returning to a poor country, Nicaragua. The family would experience a reduced standard of living and would encounter the other difficulties associated with adjustment and readjustment to life in another society. The majority finds that the respondents have made a prima facie showing of statutory eligibility for suspension of deportation on the basis of these circumstances and the existence of the Nicaraguan Review Program. This Board recognized over 30 years ago that the term “extreme hardship” is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning. It neces- sarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” Mat- ter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). Indeed, deportation will involve some hardship to almost every alien, but a wide spectrum of hard- ships will be encountered depending on the facts of the various cases. The majority recognizes these principles, but they generously accord weight to hardship factors which do not rise to the level of extreme. Further, the majority fails to identify which, if any, of the qualifying per- sons have made a prima facie showing of extreme hardship. It is not clear whether the majority finds that the alien respondents and the citizen child each independently has a reasonable likelihood of suffering extreme hard- ship in Nicaragua, or whether it finds the hardships to all of the qualifying

我谨此提出异议。 本案涉及一名成年女性 respondent（被申请人），她于30岁时来到美国，在佛罗里达州已居住8年，以及她15岁的女儿，该女儿随一位阿姨旅行，约10年前在母亲之前抵达美国，当时6岁。这个家庭现在包括一名6岁的美国公民子女。respondents 将返回一个贫穷的国家尼加拉瓜。该家庭将经历生活水平下降，并会遇到与调整和重新适应另一个社会生活相关的其他困难。多数意见认定，基于这些情况以及尼加拉瓜审查计划的存在，respondents 已就暂停驱逐出境的法定资格作出 prima facie（初步）表面证据。 本委员会30多年前就认识到，“extreme hardship（极端困难）”一词“并非一个内容或含义固定且僵化的可定义术语。它必然取决于每个案件特有的事实和情况。”Matter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964)。的确，驱逐出境几乎会给每一个外国人带来某种困难，但根据各个案件的事实，会遇到范围广泛的困难。多数意见承认这些原则，但他们慷慨地赋予那些未达到极端程度的困难因素以权重。 此外，多数意见未能指明哪些（如果有的话）符合条件的人已就极端困难作出 prima facie 表面证据。尚不清楚多数意见是认定外国人 respondents 和公民子女各自独立地在尼加拉瓜有遭受极端困难的合理可能性，还是认定所有符合条件的

individuals in the aggregate make out a case for reopening. This question, moreover, is not unimportant in a case that is being issued as guidance for Immigration Judges and the public. For example, if the adult respondent has made a showing of hardship to herself that is sufficient for reopening, it is likely to affect other cases involving aliens who arrived here as adults, have 8 years’ residence here, and would be returning to poor countries. On the other hand, aggregating the hardships would appear to run contrary to the mandate of the statute. The extreme hardship requirement is not satis- fied by adding together the individual, but not “extreme,” hardships of all members of a family. There must be at least one person whose individual hardship can be said to be “extreme,” and who satisfies the affinity require- ments of the statute. The majority may mean that the adult respondent’s motion prevails because of possible hardship to the citizen child, and that the minor respondent has her own qualifying claim. But if so, the majority ought to make this clear. In this respect, section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994), requires that the suspension applicant prove that her deportation would, “in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to [her] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citi- zen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi- dence.” The adult respondent must show extreme hardship to herself or her citizen child. The minor respondent must show extreme hardship to herself. Collective family hardship, while relevant as to the exercise of discretion, does not make out a case for statutory eligibility. As this case involves a motion to reopen, the precise question before the Board is whether a prima facie showing of extreme hardship has been made. The majority does not find that extreme hardship has actually been estab- lished here. It only concludes that there is a reasonable likelihood of success, such that it would be worthwhile to develop the issues at a full evidentiary hearing. The prima facie case concept evidently has at least two meanings: 1) that the evidence is “sufficient to render reasonable a conclusion in favor” of the asserted contention, and thereby allow the claim to go to the trier of fact; and 2) that the “evidence compels” a particular conclusion if the oppos- ing party fails to produce evidence in rebuttal. Black’s Law Dictionary 1189-90 (6th ed. 1990). I understand the majority to be using the first of these meanings, such that a grant of reopening does not “compel” a finding of extreme hardship in the absence of contradictory evidence from the Immigra- tion and Naturalization Service. Nevertheless, the assessment of a “prima facie case of extreme hardship” is inextricably linked to the meaning of “extreme hardship” itself, even if we mean that a finding of the requisite hardship is merely reasonable, as opposed to being compelled, on the strength of the presentation made in the motion. The concept of a prima facie case must be measured against the ultimate stat- utory requirement in order to have practical meaning.

个人的困难总体上构成重新开案的理由。此外，在一个作为移民法官和公众指导而发布的案件中，这个问题并非不重要。例如，如果成年 respondent 已就自身遭受的困难作出足以重新开案的证明，这很可能影响其他涉及以下外国人的案件：他们作为成年人来到美国，在此居住8年，并将返回贫穷国家。 另一方面，将各项困难汇总似乎与法规的强制要求相悖。极端困难的要求不能通过将家庭所有成员各自的、但并非“极端”的困难相加来满足。必须至少有一个人，其个人困难可被称为“极端”，并且满足法规的亲属关系要求。多数意见可能意指，由于公民子女可能遭受困难，成年 respondent 的动议胜诉，而未成年 respondent 有其自己的符合条件的主张。但如果是这样，多数意见应当明确说明这一点。 在这方面，《移民和国籍法》第244(a)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994)，要求暂停申请人证明其驱逐出境将“在司法部长的意见中，导致该外国人或其[她的]配偶、父母或子女遭受极端困难，而该配偶、父母或子女是美国公民或合法获准永久居留的外国人。”成年 respondent 必须证明其本人或其公民子女遭受极端困难。未成年 respondent 必须证明其本人遭受极端困难。家庭集体困难，虽然与行使自由裁量权相关，但不构成法定资格的理由。 由于本案涉及重新开案的动议，本委员会面前的确切问题是是否已作出极端困难的 prima facie 表面证据。多数意见并未认定此处实际已确立极端困难。它仅得出结论认为存在合理的胜诉可能性，因此在全面证据听证会上展开这些问题将是值得的。prima facie 案件概念显然至少有两种含义：1）证据“足以使有利于所主张论点的结论成为合理”，从而允许该主张提交事实认定者；以及2）如果对方未能提出反驳证据，“证据强制”得出特定结论。Black's Law Dictionary 1189-90 (6th ed. 1990)。我理解多数意见使用的是第一种含义，即批准重新开案并不在移民和归化局未提供相反证据的情况下“强制”认定极端困难。 然而，对“极端困难的 prima facie 案件”的评估与“极端困难”本身的含义密不可分，即使我们意指根据动议中提出的陈述，对所需困难的认定仅仅是合理的，而非被强制的。prima facie 案件的概念必须对照最终的法定要求来衡量，才能具有实际意义。

In analyzing the concept of “extreme hardship,” we are instructed by the actual language of the statute. One of the definitions of the term “extreme” is “being in a very high degree,” “extending far beyond the norm,” or “of the greatest severity.” See Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 457-58 (1984); cf. Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996) (Filppu, dissenting) (offering yet another, similar dictionary definition). The choice of the word “extreme,” in contrast with other possible adjectives, is consis- tent with Congress’ goal of limiting the availability of suspension of deporta- tion for aliens who manage to remain here for a number of years or who acquire ordinary ties to United States citizens, while providing relief for those who exhibit hardships “far beyond the norm.” The legislative history of section 244 of the Act, the Board’s practice over the last two or more decades, and the Supreme Court’s and Congress’ implicit endorsement of a narrow view of the term “extreme hardship” sup- port an interpretation that is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word “extreme.” See S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1718; INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 44 (1985); INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981); Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994); Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88 (BIA 1974); Matter of Sipus, 14 I&N Dec. 229 (BIA 1972); see also Matter of O-J-O-, supra (Filppu, dissenting), for a detailed discussion of the above. Although the Board’s longstanding interpretation of extreme hardship has not been a generous one, it is consistent with the literal language of the statute. It is with this benchmark for “extreme hardship” that I examine whether the respondents have made their case for reopening. Contrary to the majority, I find that the respondents have not met their bur- den of showing a reasonable likelihood of extreme hardship either to them- selves, or, in the case of the adult respondent, to her United States citizen son. The respondents have presented unpersuasive, and in one instance, ques- tionable evidence of hardship in support of the motion. The adult respondent asserts that she would suffer extreme emotional, economic, and political hardship if she is returned to Nicaragua. She claims that she would be unable to get a “good job” in Nicaragua like the one she has in this country on account of her seniority and the adverse economic conditions in her native country. The adult respondent also alleges that both she and her daughter would endure such hardship because her daughter, the minor respondent, came to the United States when she was 6 years old. The mother asserts that her daughter would suffer extreme emotional hardship because “she is adapted to the American system and she speak[s] English better than Spanish and she feels as American.” Further, the mother claims that her son, a United States citizen, would suffer emotional and economic hardship if he leaves this country and goes to Nicaragua where the medical assistance and the eco- nomic situation are chaotic. Finally, she claims that her son is attending school and “only speaks English and he feels as American.”

在分析“extreme hardship（极端困难）”的概念时，我们受法规实际措辞的指引。“extreme”一词的定义之一是“处于非常高的程度”、“远远超出常规”或“最严重的程度”。见 Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 457-58 (1984)；cf. Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996) (Filppu, dissenting)（提供了另一个类似的词典定义）。选择“extreme”一词而非其他可能的形容词，与国会的目标一致，即限制对那些设法在此居留若干年或与美国公民建立普通联系的外国人提供暂停驱逐出境，同时为那些表现出“远远超出常规”的困难的人提供救济。 该法第244条的立法历史、本委员会过去二十多年或更长时间的实践，以及最高法院和国会对“extreme hardship”一词狭义观点的默示认可，支持与“extreme”一词通常含义一致的解释。见 S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1952)；H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1718；INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 44 (1985)；INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981)；Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994)；Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88 (BIA 1974)；Matter of Sipus, 14 I&N Dec. 229 (BIA 1972)；另见 Matter of O-J-O-, supra (Filppu, dissenting)，对上述内容有详细讨论。尽管本委员会对极端困难的长期解释并非宽松，但它与法规的字面语言一致。正是以这一“极端困难”基准，我审查 respondents 是否已为其重新开案的主张作出证明。 与多数意见相反，我认定 respondents 未履行其举证责任，未能证明其本人，或就成年 respondent 而言，其美国公民儿子，有遭受极端困难的合理可能性。respondents 为支持动议提出了缺乏说服力的、且在一处值得质疑的困难证据。成年 respondent 声称，如果她被遣返回尼加拉瓜，她将遭受极端的情感、经济和政治困难。她声称，由于她的资历和母国不利的经济状况，她无法在尼加拉瓜获得像她在美国这样的“好工作”。成年 respondent 还声称，她和她的女儿都将承受这样的困难，因为她的女儿，即未成年 respondent，在6岁时来到美国。母亲声称，她的女儿将遭受极端的情感困难，因为“她适应了美国制度，她英语说得比西班牙语好，她感觉自己像美国人。”此外，母亲声称，她的儿子，一名美国公民，如果离开美国前往医疗援助和经济状况混乱的尼加拉瓜，将遭受情感和经济困难。最后，她声称她的儿子正在上学，“只会说英语，他感觉自己像美国人。”

The record reflects that the adult respondent has been in the United States since her April 1988 entry. She thus exceeds the statutory 7 years’ continuous physical presence requirement by only 1 year. She has worked steadily and has remained with her present employer for 4 years. She attends a church and has made acquaintances during that time. Further, she gave birth to her son in this country. She claims that economic conditions in Nicaragua are worse than in the United States. I find nothing in her motion or in the record which demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that her deportation would result in per- sonal extreme hardship. She resided in Nicaragua until the age of 30. She was steadily employed in Nicaragua despite the political turmoil of the time; she even completed her high school education and had a semester of college. Her father still resides in her native country. Although her mother and siblings are in the United States, they do not have lawful status, and she places no reliance on them in her motion papers. There has been a beneficial change in the polit- ical climate in Nicaragua. Although there will undoubtedly be some financial hardship to the adult respondent as a result of deportation, she offers no evi- dence to show that it would be severe. Further, I do not find that these factors either individually or cumulatively demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that she would personally endure extreme hardship. In addition, it has not been demonstrated that the adult respondent’s United States citizen son has a reasonable likelihood of suffering extreme hardship upon his mother’s deportation. He is 6 years old. I find somewhat disingenuous the mother’s claim that he “only speaks English” given the mother’s own lack of English language skills. At the time of her asylum hear- ing in April 1992, she testified that she did not speak English, and in fact required a Spanish language interpreter. Her son was then almost 3 years old, and he must have communicated with his mother, both at that time and for at least sometime thereafter, in her native tongue, Spanish. I therefore will not credit this “English language” claim of hardship to the son without further clarification or an explanation. In any event, he is still young and should be able to adapt to a new culture and even a “new” language in Nicaragua. His half-sister, the minor respondent, apparently adapted to the language and cul- ture in this country, when she left her native land at the age of 6, the same age as is the son today. I recognize there will be some economic disadvantages, and the medical care and educational opportunities are not likely the same in Nicaragua. Nonetheless, on this record there is nothing to distinguish this adult respondent and young citizen child from any other similar parent and young child who are facing a return to a country experiencing the economic circumstances of Nicaragua in 1996. With respect to the minor respondent, I first note that she has been in this country approximately 10 years. She entered the United States at the age of 6, has continued to grow up in this country, allegedly speaks English better than Spanish, and has attended school here. She, more than her mother or brother, may suffer the greatest immediate hardship upon her return to her native

记录显示，成年被申请人在1988年4月入境后一直留在美国。因此，她仅超出法定的7年连续实际居住要求1年。她一直稳定工作，并在现雇主处工作了4年。她参加教会活动，并在此期间结识了一些人。此外，她在这个国家生下了她的儿子。她声称尼加拉瓜的经济状况比美国更差。我在她的动议或记录中未发现任何内容表明，她的驱逐出境有合理可能性导致个人极端困境。她在尼加拉瓜居住至30岁。尽管当时政治动荡，她在尼加拉瓜仍有稳定工作；她甚至完成了高中学业，并上过一个学期的大学。她的父亲仍居住在她的祖国。虽然她的母亲和兄弟姐妹在美国，但他们没有合法身份，且她在动议文件中并未依赖他们。尼加拉瓜的政治气候已发生有利变化。尽管成年被申请人因驱逐出境无疑会面临一些经济困难，但她未提供任何证据表明这种困难会是严重的。此外，我认为这些因素无论单独还是累积，均不能表明她有合理可能性会亲身遭受极端困境。 此外，尚未证明成年被申请人的美国公民儿子在其母亲被驱逐出境后有合理可能性遭受极端困境。他6岁。我认为母亲关于他“只说英语”的说法有些不够坦诚，因为母亲本人缺乏英语语言能力。在1992年4月她的庇护听证时，她作证称她不会说英语，事实上需要西班牙语口译员。她的儿子当时快3岁，他当时以及至少此后一段时间必定用她的母语西班牙语与她交流。因此，在没有进一步澄清或解释的情况下，我不会采信这一关于儿子困境的“英语语言”主张。无论如何，他仍然年幼，应该能够适应尼加拉瓜的新文化甚至“新”语言。她的同母异父姐姐，即未成年被申请人，显然在6岁离开祖国时适应了这个国家的语言和文化，与儿子今天的年龄相同。我认识到会有一些经济上的不利，尼加拉瓜的医疗保健和教育机会可能不同。然而，根据本记录，没有任何内容能将这名成年被申请人和年幼公民子女与任何其他面临返回经历1996年尼加拉瓜经济状况的国家的类似父母和年幼子女区分开来。 关于未成年被申请人，我首先注意到她在这个国家已约10年。她6岁进入美国，继续在这个国家成长，据称英语说得比西班牙语好，并在这里上学。由于在美国10个成长 formative 年后生活方式和文化的明显变化，她可能比她的母亲或兄弟在返回祖国时遭受最大的直接困境。

country because of the obvious change in lifestyle and culture after 10 forma- tive years in the United States. However, she speaks Spanish, spent her first 6 years in Nicaragua, and is young enough to acculturate herself. The record noticeably does not contain an affidavit by the minor respondent, who, at age 15 1/2 and having the assistance of counsel, should be able to help explain her own circumstances. The only evidence presented on the daughter’s behalf is her suspension application and record of school enrollment. On this record there is no showing that she will endure severe financial or educational hard- ships if required to return to her native country. Although the hardships that would be encountered by the minor respondent are significant, there is insuf- ficient evidence on this record to make a showing of a reasonable likelihood of extreme hardship. The respondents do not rely on either the Nicaraguan Review Program or our decision in Matter of Pena-Diaz, 20 I&N Dec. 841 (BIA 1994), in their motion papers. They claim no special hardship that arises from any possible past governmental forbearance in relation to their circumstances. The major- ity references Pena-Diaz and the Nicaraguan Review Program, and uses them as favorable discretionary factors. The majority also notes them in rela- tion to hardship, yet it fails to explain how either the Nicaraguan Review Progam or Pena-Diaz may enhance the respondents’ hardship in this particu- lar case. I would require an affirmative explanation, preferably coupled with some showing of actual reliance on the Nicaraguan Review Program, before even speculating on the direct application of Pena-Diaz to the hardship issues in this case. In sum, the respondents have shown nothing outside the normal hardship that is routinely experienced by members of a family that have been here a lit- tle over the statutory minimum of 7 years and are returning to one of the world’s less affluent nations. In my view the respondents have not made a prima facie case of extreme hardship. Accordingly, I would deny the motion to reopen.

祖国，因为在美国10个成长 formative 年后生活方式和文化的明显变化。然而，她会说西班牙语，在尼加拉瓜度过了最初的6年，并且足够年轻，能够使自己适应文化。记录明显没有包含未成年被申请人的宣誓书，她现年15 1/2岁并有律师协助，应该能够帮助解释她自己的情况。为女儿提交的唯一证据是她的暂停申请和入学记录。根据本记录，没有表明如果她被要求返回祖国，将遭受严重的经济或教育困难。尽管未成年被申请人将遇到的困难是重大的，但本记录中的证据不足以表明有合理可能性的极端困境。 被申请人在其动议文件中既不依赖尼加拉瓜审查计划，也不依赖我们在Matter of Pena-Diaz, 20 I&N Dec. 841 (BIA 1994)中的裁决。他们未主张因任何可能的过去政府对其情况的宽恕而产生任何特殊困难。多数意见提及Pena-Diaz和尼加拉瓜审查计划，并将其作为有利的酌情因素。多数意见还就困难提及它们，但未能解释尼加拉瓜审查计划或Pena-Diaz如何可能在本特定案件中加重被申请人的困难。在甚至推测Pena-Diaz直接适用于本案困难问题之前，我会要求作出肯定性解释，最好结合对尼加拉瓜审查计划实际依赖的某种证明。 总之，被申请人未表明超出正常困难之外的任何内容，这种正常困难是已在此地略超过法定最低7年并返回世界较不富裕国家之一的家庭成员通常经历的。我认为被申请人未提出极端困境的初步证据。因此，我会否决重新开案的动议。