Matter of Marquez

In Visa Petition Revocation Proceedings

在签证申请撤销程序中

A-27590846

A-27590846

Decided by Board February 23, 1990

由委员会于1990年2月23日决定

In a decision dated May 31, 1988, the district director revoked his prior approval of the visa petition filed by the petitioner to accord the beneficiary immediate relative status as her adopted daughter under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982). The petitioner appeals from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed. The petitioner, a 49-year-old native of the Philippines and citizen of the United States, adopted the beneficiary, a 20-year-old native and citizen of the Philippines, on December 2, 1980, when she was 11 years old. The petitioner filed the visa petition on the beneficiary's behalf on December 28, 1984, when the beneficiary was 15 years old.

在1988年5月31日的决定中，地区主任撤销了其先前对申请人提交的签证申请的批准，该申请旨在根据《移民与国籍法》第201(b)条、8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982) 赋予受益人作为其养女的直系亲属身份。申请人对该决定提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。 申请人，49岁，菲律宾出生，美国公民，于1980年12月2日收养了受益人，受益人当时11岁，20岁，菲律宾出生并为其公民。申请人于1984年12月28日代表受益人提交了签证申请，当时受益人15岁。

The record shows that the beneficiary is the petitioner's niece. The petitioner asserts that she resided with the beneficiary from her birth in 1969 until the petitioner emigrated to the United States in 1975. In support of her visa petition, the petitioner submitted an affidavit of the beneficiary's natural mother, which confirms that the petitioner resided in the home of the beneficiary's natural mother with the beneficiary, whom the petitioner helped support financially. The petitioner also provided a letter dated March 5, 1985, from the manager of the Esteva & Co., Inc., a dollar-peso exchange, listing numerous remittances from the petitioner and her husband payable to the beneficiary's natural mother from 1982 through 1984. At the time the district director entered his decision in this case, section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1982), included within the definition of the term "child," "a child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adoptive parent or parents for at least 2 years." The visa petition was approved on April 8, 1985. Thereafter, the Service received a memorandum from the American Embassy in the Philippines dated July 7, 1986, which concludes that the petitioner failed to comply with the 2-year residence requirement of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act. The memorandum states that the beneficiary was adopted by her aunt, that the petitioner did live in the benefi- ciary's household prior to her emigration to the United States, but that the beneficiary's natural mother resided in the same household and maintained parental authority. Based upon that memorandum, the district director advised the petitioner in an undated letter of his intention to revoke approval of the visa petition for failure to meet the residence requirement of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act. In his letter, the district director set forth the facts outlined in the Embassy memorandum and granted the petitioner 18 days within which to submit evidence rebutting the stated ground for revocation. In response to the district director's notice of intention to revoke the visa petition, the beneficiary submitted a letter dated April 27, 1988, from the beneficiary to the district director asking for reconsid- eration and stating that from the time of her adoption, her natural mother acted only as a guidance counselor, while the petitioner met her physical and financial needs. In his decision of May 31, 1988, the district director revoked his Prior approval of the visa petition on the ground that the petitioner had failed to submit evidence sufficient to overcome the stated basis for revocation. On appeal, the petitioner through counsel contends that the district

记录显示受益人是申请人的侄女。申请人声称，自受益人1969年出生起，她与受益人同住，直至申请人于1975年移居美国。为支持其签证申请，申请人提交了受益人自然母亲的宣誓书，确认申请人曾与受益人一同居住在受益人自然母亲的家中，申请人帮助资助受益人。申请人还提供了1985年3月5日来自Esteva & Co., Inc.（一家美元-比索兑换店）经理的信函，列明了1982年至1984年期间申请人和其丈夫向受益人自然母亲支付的众多汇款。 在地区主任对此案作出决定时，《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1982) 在“子女”一词的定义中包括“在16岁以下被收养的子女，如果该子女此后至少2年处于养父母的法律监护下并与其同住。” 签证申请于1985年4月8日获批。此后，移民局收到美国驻菲律宾大使馆1986年7月7日的备忘录，其结论是申请人未能遵守《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条的2年居住要求。备忘录指出，受益人由其姑母收养，申请人确实在移居美国前居住在受益人的家庭中，但受益人的自然母亲也居住在同一家庭中并保持亲权。 基于该备忘录，地区主任在一封未注明日期的信中通知申请人，他打算因未能满足《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条的居住要求而撤销签证申请的批准。在信中，地区主任列出了大使馆备忘录中概述的事实，并给予申请人18天时间提交反驳所述撤销理由的证据。 针对地区主任的撤销意向通知，受益人提交了1988年4月27日受益人致地区主任的信函，请求重新考虑，并声明自收养以来，其自然母亲仅充当指导顾问，而申请人满足了其身体和经济需求。 在1988年5月31日的决定中，地区主任撤销了其先前对签证申请的批准，理由是申请人未能提交足以克服所述撤销理由的证据。 在上诉中，申请人通过律师主张，地区主任

director erred in concluding that she had failed to satisfy the residence requitement of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act. The petitioner argues that the parties' undisputed 6-year residence in the same dwelling place prior to her emigration to the United States fulfills that requirement inasmuch as the concept of residence is addressed in the Act only in section 101(a)(33), which defines "residence" as one's "principal dwelling place." The petitioner further argues on appeal that contrary to the district director's view, parental control or authority is an element of legal custody and should not be intertwined with the residence requirement of section 101(bX1)(E) of the Act. Counsel for the petitioner also points out that in Palmer v. Reddy, 622 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1980), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held it improper for the Service, in the context of steprelationships, to require a stepparent to demonstrate "parental interest" when the statute made no explicit reference to such showing. He argues the same should be true for adoptive relationships. In its brief on appeal, the Service, relying on Matter of Repuyan, 19 I&N Dcc. 119 (BIA 1984), argues that the petitioner's appeal should be dismissed because the petitioner did not live with the beneficiary in a home established by her and because she has failed to establish that she did not adopt the beneficiary solely to facilitate the beneficiary's entry into the United States. The petitioner responded to the Service's arguments, arguing that section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act does not explicitly state that the residence of the adopted child and adoptive parent must occur in a home established by the adoptive parent. Counsel for the petitioner avers that such requirement would impermissibly burden adoptive parents by adding criteria to the statutory definition of an adopted child. Counsel further suggests that the absence of clear statutory language in section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act requiring that the residence of the parties occur in a home established by the adoptive parent, coupled with the absence of a provision for a de facto familial relationship, indicates congressional intent to recognize all adoptions which comply with the age and legal custody requirements of that section where the adopted child and adoptive parent have shared the same "principal dwelling place" for at least 2 years. In responding to the Service's argument that the petitioner failed to prove the adoption was not entered into in order to circumvent the immigration laws, counsel relies on Matter of Cho, 16 I&N Dec. 188, 190 (BIA 1977), for the proposition that the explicit requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act were designed by Congress to prevent sham adoptions, and that their satisfaction should establish for immigration purposes that the adoption is not a sham. In sum, the petitioner argues for strict statutory interpretation of

错误地认定她未能满足《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条的居住要求。申请人主张，双方在她移居美国前在同一住所无争议地共同居住6年，满足了该要求，因为《移民与国籍法》中仅在 section 101(a)(33) 中涉及居住概念，该条将“居住”定义为一人的“主要住所”。申请人进一步在上诉中主张，与地区主任的观点相反，亲权控制或权威是法律监护的一个要素，不应与《移民与国籍法》第101(bX1)(E)条的居住要求混为一谈。申请人的律师还指出，在 Palmer v. Reddy, 622 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1980) 中，美国第9巡回上诉法院裁定，在继亲属关系的背景下，移民局要求继父母证明“父母利益”是不当的，因为法规未明确提及此类证明。他主张收养关系也应如此。 在其上诉简报中，移民局依据 Matter of Repuyan, 19 I&N Dcc. 119 (BIA 1984) 主张，申请人的上诉应被驳回，因为申请人未与受益人居住在她建立的家中，且她未能证明她收养受益人并非仅为便利受益人进入美国。 申请人对移民局的论点作出回应，主张《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条并未明确声明被收养子女和养父母的居住必须发生在养父母建立的家中。申请人的律师断言，此类要求将通过向被收养子女的法定定义添加标准而不当加重养父母的负担。律师进一步建议，《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条缺乏明确法定语言要求双方居住发生在养父母建立的家中，加上缺乏事实家庭关系的规定，表明国会意图承认所有符合该条年龄和法律监护要求且被收养子女和养父母至少2年共享同一“主要住所”的收养。 在回应移民局关于申请人未能证明收养并非为规避移民法律而进行的论点时，律师依据 Matter of Cho, 16 I&N Dec. 188, 190 (BIA 1977)，主张《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条的明确要求是国会为防止虚假收养而设计的，满足这些要求应就移民目的确立收养并非虚假。 总之，申请人主张对

section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act such that all adoptions which satisfy the age and legal custody requirements of the Act where the parties have shared the same principal dwelling place for 2 years would be recognized for immigration purposes. She claims that she has fully satisfied the plain language of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act and approval of her visa petition should, therefore, be reinstated. In assessing the petitioner's arguments, we first note that the legislative history of the bill which provided for section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act indicates that Congress did not by its definition intend to recognize ad hoc adoptions entered into to circumvent immigration laws. See 103 Cong. Rec. 14,659 (1957).' Second, we disagree with the petitioner that section 101(b)(1)(E), and section 101(b)(1)(D) of the Act which provides for the admission of stepchildren, are sufficiently analogous that Palmer v. Reddy, supra, should influence how we interpret the language of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act. Palmer involved steprelationships, which, unlike adoptive relationships, are derivative in nature, arising as a consequence of another relationship, that is, a marriage of a natural parent and a stepparent. Thus, the familial status of children from such a marriage and the concomitant immigration benefit granted by Congress as a result of that status could not in itself involve an attempt to circumvent immigration laws? In this regard, we find the adoptive relationship more akin to marital relationships than we do to steprelationships because a marriage, like an adoption, may be entered into simply to facilitate entry into the United States. The United States Supreme Court has upheld inquiry into the bona fides of legal marriages despite the absence of statutory language mandating such inquiry. See, e.g., Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (the Court upheld criminal convictions for conspiracy to defraud the United States by obtaining illegal entry into this country of three aliens who had entered into marriages with the defendants for the sole purpose of qualifying them for admission into the United States). We also find misplaced the petitioner's reliance on Matter of Cho, supra, for the proposition that the bona fides of an adoption is established when the parties satisfy the age and legal custody

《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条进行严格法定解释，使得所有符合该法年龄和法律监护要求且双方共享同一主要住所2年的收养均被承认用于移民目的。她声称她已完全满足《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条的明文规定，因此其签证申请的批准应予恢复。 在评估申请人的论点时，我们首先注意到，规定《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条的法案的立法历史表明，国会通过其定义并不意图承认旨在规避移民法律的临时性收养。见 103 Cong. Rec. 14,659 (1957)。' 其次，我们不同意申请人关于《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条和规定继子女入境的第101(b)(1)(D)条足够类似，以至于 Palmer v. Reddy, supra, 应影响我们如何解释《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)条的措辞。Palmer 涉及继亲属关系，与收养关系不同，继亲属关系本质上是衍生的，作为另一关系的后果产生，即自然父母与继父母的婚姻。因此，此类婚姻所生子女的家庭身份以及国会因此身份而授予的伴随移民利益本身不可能涉及规避移民法律的企图？ 在这方面，我们认为收养关系更类似于婚姻关系而非继亲属关系，因为婚姻如同收养，可能仅为便利进入美国而缔结。美国最高法院已支持对合法婚姻善意的调查，尽管缺乏法定语言强制此类调查。见，例如，Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953)（法院维持了共谋欺诈美国的刑事定罪，通过使三名与被告结婚的外国人非法进入该国，其唯一目的是使他们有资格进入美国）。 我们还认为申请人依据 Matter of Cho, supra, 主张当双方满足年龄和法律监护要求时收养的善意即已确立，是错误的

requirements of the statute and show they have shared a principal dwelling place for 2 years. In Matter of Cho, we asserted that district directors should not impose stricter standards on adoptive relation- ships than Congress and we recognized that Congress inserted specific safeguards against ad hoc adoptions. However, an examination of the nature of the parties' residence with one another is not precluded by Matter of Cho, supra. Taking the petitioner's arguments to their logical extreme, district directors would have to recognize all adoptions meeting the age and legal custody requirements of the Act where the parties have shared a principal dwelling place for 2 years even if they concede that the sole purpose of the adoption was to facilitate entry of the adopted child into the United States. While it may be a rare occasion that an adoptive parent admits such purpose for an adoption, we note that most of the cases which raise the specter of a sham adoption arise in a limited factual context. Generally, the adoption is by a close relative, the natural parent or parents are still alive, the cohabitation of the adoptive parent and child occurs with the natural parent or parents, often in the home of the natural parents, and no meaningful objective evidence is provided that the relationship between the natural parents and adopted child changed subsequent to the adoption. Further, the adoptive parent often leaves the residence at some point after the adoption, sometimes for years, while the natural parents and adopted child continue to live together. In both Matter of Repuyan, supra, and Matter of Cuello, 20 I&N Dec. 94 (BIA 1989), we concluded that such adoptions must be evaluated in light of the congressional intent to recognize only bona fide adoptive relationships. To facilitate congressional intent, we determined in Matter of Cuello, supra, that the residence requirement of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act means more than simply that the adopted child and adoptive parent live together in the same residence for 2 years) We determined that, under the circumstances described above, the adoptive parent has the burden of establishing primary parental control during his or her residence with the adopted child. Id. In order to establish parental control, the petitioner may submit competent objective evidence that the adoptive parent owns or maintains the property where the child resides, provides financial support and daily care, and assumes responsibility for important decisions in the child's life. Id. A description of the relationship

法规的要求，并证明他们已共同拥有主要居住地2年。在 Matter of Cho 中，我们主张地区主任不应在收养关系上施加比国会更严格的标准，并且我们认识到国会针对临时收养（ad hoc adoptions）插入了具体保障措施。然而，Matter of Cho, supra 并不排除对当事人彼此居住性质进行审查。 将申请人的论点推向其逻辑极端，地区主任将不得不承认所有符合该法案年龄和合法监护要求且当事人已共同拥有主要居住地2年的收养，即使他们承认收养的唯一目的是便利被收养子女进入美国。虽然收养父母承认此类收养目的的情况可能罕见，但我们注意到，大多数引发虚假收养（sham adoption）疑虑的案件都出现在有限的事实背景下。通常，收养由近亲属进行，亲生父母一方或双方仍在世，收养父母与子女的同住是与亲生父母一方或双方一起发生，往往在亲生父母的家中，并且没有提供有意义的客观证据表明收养后亲生父母与被收养子女之间的关系发生了变化。此外，收养父母往往在收养后某个时候离开住所，有时长达数年，而亲生父母与被收养子女继续共同生活。 在 Matter of Repuyan, supra 和 Matter of Cuello, 20 I&N Dec. 94 (BIA 1989) 两案中，我们得出结论，此类收养必须根据国会仅承认真实（bona fide）收养关系的意图进行评估。为促进国会意图，我们在 Matter of Cuello, supra 中认定，该法案第101(b)(1)(E)条的居住要求不仅仅意味着被收养子女与收养父母在同一住所共同居住2年。我们认定，在上述情况下，收养父母有责任证明其与被收养子女居住期间的主要父母控制权。Id. 为确立父母控制权，申请人可以提交有说服力的客观证据，证明收养父母拥有或维护子女居住的财产，提供经济支持和日常照料，并承担子女生活中重要决策的责任。Id. 对关系的描述

between the adopted child and her natural parents subsequent to the adoption must also be provided. Id. In the instant case, the petitioner concedes that she resided with the beneficiary and her natural mother in the home of the beneficiary's natural mother. No competent objective evidence was proffered to establish that the petitioner exercised primary parental control during the parties' residence with one another. See Matter of Cuello, supra; Matter. of Repuyan, supra. We accordingly find that the district director had good and sufficient cause to issue the notice of intention to revoke and we agree with the district director that the evidence the petitioner submitted in response to that notice is insufficient to establish compliance with the 2-year residence requirement of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act. Inasmuch as the basis for revocation alleged in the notice has not been overcome by the petitioner, the appeal will be dismissed. See generally Matter of Estime, 19 I&N Dec. 450 (BIA 1987). ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

收养后被收养子女与其亲生父母之间的关系也必须提供。Id. 在本案中，申请人承认她与被受益人及其亲生母亲居住在受益人的亲生母亲家中。没有提供有说服力的客观证据来证明申请人在当事人彼此居住期间行使了主要父母控制权。见 Matter of Cuello, supra; Matter of Repuyan, supra。 因此，我们认定地区主任有正当和充分的理由发出撤销意向通知，并且我们同意地区主任的观点，即申请人针对该通知提交的证据不足以证明符合该法案第101(b)(1)(E)条的2年居住要求。鉴于申请人未能推翻通知中指控的撤销依据，上诉将被驳回。一般见 Matter of Estime, 19 I&N Dec. 450 (BIA 1987)。 命令： 上诉被驳回。

(2) A decision to revoke approval of a visa petition because the beneficiary entered into pliut mat-Liege for the primary purpose of obtaining immigration benefits can only be sustained if there is substantial and probative evidence in the alien's file to the effect that the prior marriage was entered into for such purpose, and, where the district director concluded that there was evidence in the record from which it could "reasonably be inferred" that a marriage had been entered into for the primary purpose of obtaining immigration benefits, the substantial and probative evidence, requisite to the revocation of a subsequently approved visa petition, was not presented. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE; Milton A. DeJesus, Esquire Harris L. Leatherwood P.O. Box 22634 General Attorney Little Rock, Arkansas 72221

(2) 因受益人主要为获得移民福利而缔结婚姻（pliut mat-Liege）而撤销签证申请批准的决定，只有在外国人档案中存在实质性和证明性证据表明先前婚姻是为该目的而缔结的情况下才能维持；并且，如果地区主任认为记录中存在可以“合理推断”婚姻主要为获得移民福利而缔结的证据，则撤销随后批准的签证申请所需的实质性和证明性证据并未呈现。 申请人代表： 移民局代表： Milton A. DeJesus, Esquire Harris L. Leatherwood P.O. Box 22634 General Attorney Little Rock, Arkansas 72221

The United States citizen petitioner applied for immediate relative status for the beneficiary as her spouse under section 201(b) of the Immigration. and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982). The petition was approved on September 14, 1987. In a decision dated July 25, 1989, the district director revoked approval of the petition on the ground that the beneficiary had previously attempted to be accorded immediate relative status as the spouse of a United States citizen by reason of a marriage determined by the Attorney General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. The

美国公民申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第201(b)条、8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982) 为受益人作为其配偶申请直系亲属身份。该申请于1987年9月14日获批。在1989年7月25日的决定中，地区主任撤销了该申请的批准，理由是受益人此前曾因一段被司法部长认定为为逃避移民法而缔结的婚姻，试图作为美国公民的配偶获得直系亲属身份。该

petitioner has appealedr The appeal will be sustained and approval of the visa petition will 1Se reinstated. The petitioner's request for oral argument is denied. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e) (1989). The beneficiary, a 4,1-year-old native and citizen of Egypt, married the petitioner in 1987. The record reflects that this was his third marriage, and his second marriage to a United States citizen. In the instant proceedings, the district director revoked the beneficiary's approved visa petition, filed on his behalf by the petitioner. Under section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1982), the Attorney General may revoke the approval of any visa petition approved by him for what he deems to be "good and sufficient cause." A notice of intention to revoke a visa petition is properly issued for "good and sufficient cause" when the evidence of record at the time of issuance, if unexplained and unrebutted, would warrant a denial of the visa petition based upon the petitioner's failure to meet his burden of proof. However, where a notice of intention to revoke is based upon an unsupported statement, revocation of the visa petition cannot be sustained. Matter of Arias, 19 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 1988); Matter of Estime, 19 I&N Dec. 450 (BIA 1987). The notice of intention to revoke the visa petition at issue here, dated September 8, 1988, was issued based on the premise that the beneficiary had previously "engaged in and sought status through a marriage that was determined to have been entered into for the purpose of evading immigration laws." Section 204(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (1988), prohibits the approval of a visa petition filed on behalf of an alien who has attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. Accordingly, the district director must deny any subsequent visa petition for immigrant classification filed on behalf of such alien, regardless of whether the alien received a benefit through the attempt or conspiracy. As a basis for the denial it is not necessary that the alien have been convicted of, or even prosecuted for, the attempt or conspiracy. However, the evidence of such attempt or conspiracy must be documented in the alien's file and must be substantial and probative. Matter of Kahy, 19 I&N Dec. 803 (BIA 1988); Matter of Agdinaoay, 16 I&N Dec. 545 (BIA 1978); Matter of La Grotta, 14 I&N Dec- 110 (BIA 1972); 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(2)(iv) (1989).

申请人已提出上诉。上诉将获支持，签证申请的批准将1Se恢复。申请人的口头辩论请求被驳回。见8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e) (1989)。 受益人是一名4,1岁的埃及本土出生公民，于1987年与申请人结婚。记录显示这是他的第3次婚姻，也是他第2次与美国公民结婚。 在本程序中，地区主任撤销了受益人已获批准的签证申请，该申请由申请人为其提交。根据该法第205条，8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1982)，司法部长可以以其认为的“良好和充分理由”撤销其批准的任何签证申请的批准。当签发时的记录证据，如果未经解释和反驳，将因申请人未能履行其举证责任而足以导致签证申请被拒时，即属为“良好和充分理由”妥善发出撤销签证申请意向通知。然而，如果撤销意向通知基于未经支持的陈述，则签证申请的撤销不能维持。Matter of Arias, 19 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 1988)；Matter of Estime, 19 I&N Dec. 450 (BIA 1987)。 此处所涉撤销签证申请的意向通知日期为1988年9月8日，其签发前提是受益人此前“从事并通过一项被认定是为规避移民法目的而缔结的婚姻寻求身份”。 该法第204(c)条，8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (1988)，禁止批准为曾试图或共谋为规避移民法目的缔结婚姻的外国人提交的签证申请。因此，地区主任必须拒绝此后为该外国人提交的任何移民分类签证申请，无论该外国人是否通过该试图或共谋获得了利益。作为拒绝的依据，不要求该外国人已因该试图或共谋被定罪，甚至不要求其已被起诉。然而，此类试图或共谋的证据必须记录在该外国人的档案中，并且必须是实质性和有证明力的。Matter of Kahy, 19 I&N Dec. 803 (BIA 1988)；Matter of Agdinaoay, 16 I&N Dec. 545 (BIA 1978)；Matter of La Grotta, 14 I&N Dec- 110 (BIA 1972)；8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(2)(iv) (1989)。

Interim Decision #3130

临时决定 #3130

Neither section 204(c) of the Act nor the regulations specify who may make the Attorney General's decision in such matters and at what point it is to be made. However, we have held that the determination is to be made on behalf of the Attorney General by the district director in the course of his adjudication of the subsequent visa petition. Matter of Samsen, 15 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 1974). In making that adjudication, the district director may rely on any relevant evidence, including evidence having its origin in prior Service proceedings involving the beneficiary, or in court proceedings involv- ing the prior marriage. Ordinarily, the district director should not give conclusive effect to determinations made in a prior proceeding, but, rather, should reach his own independent conclusion based on the evidence before him. See Matter of F-, 9 I&N Dec. 684 (BIA 1962). However, for example, in a case where the beneficiary has previously been found deportable based on a determination, supported by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence, that that beneficiary became a party to a fraudulent marriage for the purpose of entering the United States as an immigrant, it would he appropriate for the district director to rely on that finding of deportability in a determination that the beneficiary would be precluded by section 204(c) of the Act from obtaining an immigration benefit by virtue of a subsequent marriage. Matter of Agdinaoay, supra. In this case, the district director noted that the evidence showing that the beneficiary had entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws had been "sufficient to warrant the denial of the petition" filed by the beneficiary's former United States citizen spouse, and, on that basis, the previously approved visa petition, filed by the beneficiary's current United States citizen spouse, was revoked on July 25, 1989. It is to be noted, however, that in the determination of the first visa petition submitted on behalf of the beneficiary, it was not found that the beneficiary had attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. Rather, the district director involved in the determination of that petition noted that the record contained evidence, which had not been rebutted, "from which it [could] reasonably be inferred" that the beneficiary entered into a marriage for the primary purpose of obtaining immigration benefits. Such a reasonable inference does not rise to the level of substantial and probative evidence requisite to the preclusion of approval of a visa petition in accordance with section 204(c) of the Act. Since, with respect to the first visa petition submitted on behalf of the respondent, there was no affirmative finding that the marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, resolution of whether the visa petition revocation can be sustained will

该法第204(c)条和条例均未规定在此类事项中谁可以作出司法部长的决定以及在何时作出。然而，我们已裁定，该认定应由地区主任在裁决后续签证申请的过程中代表司法部长作出。Matter of Samsen, 15 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 1974)。 在作出该裁决时，地区主任可以依据任何相关证据，包括来源于涉及受益人的先前移民局程序或涉及先前婚姻的法院程序的证据。通常，地区主任不应对先前程序中作出的认定赋予终局效力，而应基于其面前的证据得出自己的独立结论。见 Matter of F-, 9 I&N Dec. 684 (BIA 1962)。 然而，例如，在受益人此前已基于有明确、毫不含糊且令人信服的证据支持的认定——即该受益人为了作为移民进入美国而成为欺诈婚姻的一方——被认定可驱逐出境的情况下，地区主任在认定受益人将因该法第204(c)条而因后续婚姻被禁止获得移民福利时，依据该可驱逐出境的认定是适当的。Matter of Agdinaoay, supra。 在本案中，地区主任指出，显示受益人为了规避移民法而缔结婚姻的证据"足以构成拒绝"受益人前美国公民配偶提交的申请的理由，并据此于1989年7月25日撤销了此前已批准的、由受益人现任美国公民配偶提交的签证申请。然而，应当指出，在就代表受益人提交的第一份签证申请所作的认定中，并未认定受益人曾试图或共谋为规避移民法而缔结婚姻。相反，参与该申请认定的地区主任指出，记录中包含未被反驳的证据，"从中[可以]合理推断"受益人缔结婚姻的主要目的是获得移民福利。此种合理推断未达到依据该法第204(c)条禁止批准签证申请所需的实质性和证明性证据的水平。 由于就代表被申请人提交的第一份签证申请而言，不存在关于该婚姻是为规避移民法而缔结的肯定性认定，关于签证申请撤销能否维持的解决将

depend on a determination of whether there is, at present, sufficient evidence, inclusive of evidence relied upon in the determination of the first visa petition, to support the contention that the beneficiary's previous marriage to a United States citizen was entered into for purposes of evading the immigration laws. The beneficiary's first marriage to a United States citizen took place in 1985. The Petition to Classify Status of Alien Relative for Issuance of Immigrant Visa (Form 1-130) filed on behalf of the beneficiary by his first United States citizen wife was denied by the district director on January 30, 1987, based on the finding that the marriage was entered into for the primary purpose of obtaining immigration benefits for the beneficiary. The basis for the finding was the fact that the petitioner and beneficiary lived in different cities at the time of the denial, and on the conclusion that, at the same time, the beneficiary was living with his first wife, a citizen of Egypt. No evidence beyond these conclusions is contained in the record. We note that while the petition filed by the beneficiary's first United States citizen wife was still pending before the district director, the beneficiary divorced that wife, without knowledge as to what the outcome of the petition might be. The divorce decree, entered on December 17, 1986, 1 1/2 months prior to the denial of the petition, provides that the beneficiary and his wife "were a married couple and lived together as husband and wife until August 1986 and since then have lived separate and apart." The mere fact that, at the time of the visa petition denial, the petitioner was living separate from the beneficiary is not evidence of an attempt or conspiracy on the beneficiary's part to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. Quite to the contrary, his divorce, prior to a decision on the petition which may have been to his favor, tends to reflect the bona fide nature of the marriage that he chose to terminate. Further, the district director offered no evidence to support his conclusion that the petitioner never lived with the beneficiary. With respect to the concern that, during the course of the marriage of the beneficiary and his first United States citizen wife, the beneficiary was living with his former wife, we note that, according to the information contained in the divorce decree of the beneficiary and his first United States citizen wife, their separation occurred 4 months prior to their divorce and 5 months prior to the denial of the petition submitted on the beneficiary's behalf. Therefore, the conclusion of the district director that the beneficiary was living with his former wife at the time of the denial, a conclusion also unsupported by documentary evidence, is, of itself, of no relevance to the issue of whether the beneficiary

取决于对以下问题的认定：目前是否有充分证据（包括在第一次签证申请裁定中所依据的证据）支持以下主张，即受益人与一名美国公民的先前婚姻是为了规避移民法而缔结的。 受益人与一名美国公民的第一次婚姻发生于1985年。由受益人的第一任美国公民妻子代表其提交的《外籍亲属身份分类以签发移民签证的申请》（Form 1-130）于1987年1月30日被地区主任驳回，依据是认定该婚姻缔结的主要目的是为受益人获取移民利益。该认定的依据是：在驳回时申请人与受益人居住在不同城市，以及认定在同一时期受益人与其第一任妻子（一名埃及公民）同居。记录中除这些结论外并无其他证据。 我们注意到，在受益人的第一任美国公民妻子提交的申请仍在地区主任处待决期间，受益人与该妻子离婚，且并不知晓该申请的结果可能如何。离婚判决于1986年12月17日作出，早于申请被驳回1 1/2个月，其中载明受益人与妻子“曾为夫妻并作为夫妻共同生活直至1986年8月，此后分居生活。”仅仅在签证申请被驳回时申请人已与受益人分居这一事实，并不构成受益人为规避移民法而缔结婚姻的企图或共谋的证据。恰恰相反，他在申请作出可能对其有利的裁定之前离婚，反而倾向于反映其所选择终止的婚姻具有真实性质。此外，地区主任未提供任何证据支持其关于申请人从未与受益人同居的结论。关于在受益人与第一任美国公民妻子婚姻期间受益人与其前妻同居的疑虑，我们注意到，根据受益人与第一任美国公民妻子离婚判决中所载信息，他们分居发生于离婚前4个月、代表受益人提交的申请被驳回前5个月。因此，地区主任关于受益人在驳回时与其前妻同居的结论——该结论同样无书面证据支持——本身与受益人是否

entered into the marriage with his first United States citizen wife in an attempt to evade the immigration laws. 2 In order to sustain the district director's revocation of the visa petition at issue here, it would be necessary to show that approval of that visa petition was precluded by section 204(c) of the Act, which bars approval of a visa petition for the benefit of an alien who has attempted to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. If that were the case, the previously approved visa petition would have been revoked for "good and sufficient cause." Matter of Arias, Supra; Matter of sthne, supra. However, the language of the Code of Federal Regulations is clear that in order to find that an alien has attempted to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, the evidence of such an attempt must be documented in the alien's file. 8 C.F.R. § 204_1(a)(2)(iv) (1989); Matter of Kahy, supra. No such documentation is contained in the record before us, and, therefore, there is no basis to support the district director's conclusion that the beneficiary's prior marriage to a United States citizen was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. Since the beneficiary's prior marriage provided the sole basis for the revocation of his approved visa petition and there is no substantial and probative evidentiary basis for a finding that that marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, the revocation of the previously approved visa petition cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the petitioner's appeal will be sustained, and the district director's decision will be reversed. ORDER: The appeal is sustained, and the approval of the visa petition is reinstated.

试图规避移民法而与第一任美国公民妻子缔结婚姻这一问题无关。2 为维持地区主任对本案所涉签证申请的撤销，必须证明该签证申请的批准被该法第204(c)条所禁止，该条禁止为曾试图为规避移民法而缔结婚姻的外国人批准签证申请。若属此种情形，此前已批准的签证申请将因"正当且充分的理由"被撤销。Matter of Arias, Supra; Matter of sthne, supra。 然而，《联邦法规汇编》的措辞明确表明，要认定外国人曾试图为规避移民法而缔结婚姻，此种企图的证据必须记录在该外国人的档案中。8 C.F.R. § 204_1(a)(2)(iv) (1989); Matter of Kahy, supra。我们面前的记录中不包含任何此类记录，因此，没有依据支持地区主任关于受益人与美国公民的先前婚姻是为规避移民法而缔结的结论。由于受益人的先前婚姻是撤销其已批准签证申请的唯一依据，且没有实质性和证明性的证据基础可认定该婚姻是为规避移民法而缔结，此前已批准签证申请的撤销不能维持。据此，申请人的上诉将获支持，地区主任的决定将被撤销。 命令： 上诉获支持，签证申请的批准予以恢复。