Matter of Guzman-Gomez

Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 824 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3642

引用为 24 I&N Dec. 824 (BIA 2009) 临时决定第3642号

File A076 692 898 - San Diego, California

案卷 A076 692 898 - 加利福尼亚州圣迭戈

Decided May 8, 2009

2009年5月8日裁定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

(1) The terms “child” and “parent” defined at section 101(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (2006), do not encompass stepchildren and stepparents. (2) A person born outside the United States cannot derive United States citizenship under section 320(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (2006), by virtue of his or her relationship to a nonadoptive stepparent.

(1) 《移民与国籍法》第101(c)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (2006)，所定义的“子女”和“父母”术语，不涵盖继子女和继父母。 (2) 在美国境外出生的人，不能凭借其与非收养继父母的关系，依据该法第320(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (2006)，取得美国公民身份。

FOR RESPONDENT: Thomas A. Lappin, Esquire, San Diego, California

被申请人代理人：Thomas A. Lappin 律师，加利福尼亚州圣迭戈

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Kerri Harlin, Assistant Chief Counsel

国土安全部代理人：Kerri Harlin，助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: FILPPU, COLE, and PAULEY, Board Members.

审理：委员会合议庭：FILPPU、COLE 和 PAULEY，委员会成员。

FILPPU, Board Member:

FILPPU，委员会成员：

In a decision dated November 24, 2008, an Immigration Judge ordered the respondent removed from the United States pursuant to sections 237(a)(2)(A)(i) and (iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and (iii) (2006). The respondent has appealed from that decision, arguing that the proceedings should be terminated because he is a United States citizen. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposes the appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The respondent was born in Mexico in July 1986. In February 2000, when he was 13 years old, the respondent was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident, apparently on the basis of an immediate relative petition filed by his mother’s husband, a United States citizen by birth who married the respondent’s mother in 1994. After his admission to the United States, the respondent evidently resided with his mother and stepfather in California, although no explicit evidence was presented on that point. The sole issue on appeal is whether the respondent automatically derived United States

在2008年11月24日的决定中，一名移民法官依据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(2)(A)(i)和(iii)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)和(iii) (2006)，命令将被申请人驱逐出美国。被申请人对该决定提出上诉，主张程序应予终止，因为他是美国公民。国土安全部（“DHS”）反对该上诉。上诉将被驳回。 被申请人于1986年7月在墨西哥出生。2000年2月，被申请人13岁时，作为合法永久居民获准进入美国，显然是基于其母亲的丈夫提交的近亲属申请，该丈夫是出生即为美国公民者，于1994年与被申请人的母亲结婚。获准进入美国后，被申请人显然与其母亲和继父居住在加利福尼亚州，尽管未就此点提交明确证据。上诉的唯一问题是，被申请人是否依据该法第320(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (2006)，通过其继父自动取得美国

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引用为 24 I&N Dec. 824 (BIA 2009) 临时决定第3642号

citizenship through his stepfather pursuant to section 320(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (2006). 1 We agree with the Immigration Judge that he did not.

根据该法第320(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (2006)，通过其继父获得公民身份。1 我们同意移民法官的意见，即他并未获得。

Section 320 of the Act provides as follows, in its entirety:

该法第320条全文规定如下：

Children Born Outside the United States and Residing Permanently in the United States; Conditions Under Which Citizenship Automatically Acquired

在美国境外出生并永久居住在美国的子女；自动取得公民身份的条件

(a) A child born outside of the United States automatically becomes a citizen of the United States when all of the following conditions have been fulfilled: (1) At least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization. (2) The child is under the age of eighteen years. (3) The child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical custody of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence. (b) Subsection (a) of this section shall apply to a child adopted by a United States citizen parent if the child satisfies the requirements applicable to adopted children under section 101(b)(1). 2

(a) 在美国境外出生的子女，在下列所有条件均满足时，自动成为美国公民： (1) 该子女至少有一名父母是美国公民，无论是通过出生还是归化。 (2) 该子女未满18岁。 (3) 该子女依据合法永久居民入境，在美国境内居住于该公民父母的法定和实际监护之下。 (b) 本条(a)款适用于由美国公民父母收养的子女，如果该子女满足第101(b)(1)条适用于被收养子女的要求。2

The respondent was not adopted by his mother’s husband, so section 320(b) of the Act is inapplicable. Furthermore, the respondent’s mother did not become a United States citizen before his 18th birthday. Thus, if the respondent derived United States citizenship at all under section 320(a) of the Act, he did so through his stepfather. Because the respondent was born abroad, he is presumed to be an alien and must come forward with the evidence to prove his citizenship claim. Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. 544, 546 (BIA 2008). To establish derivative United States citizenship under section 320(a) of the Act, the respondent must prove that he qualifies as the “child” of his United States citizen stepfather and that his stepfather qualifies as his “parent.” Furthermore, if the respondent satisfies that threshold requirement, he must also prove that he resided in his stepfather’s “legal and physical custody” after being admitted as a lawful permanent resident in February 2000. Section 320(a)(3) of the Act.

被申请人未被其母亲的丈夫收养，因此该法第320(b)条不适用。此外，被申请人的母亲在其18岁生日之前未成为美国公民。因此，如果被申请人依据该法第320(a)条取得美国公民身份，他是通过其继父取得的。 由于被申请人在境外出生，他被推定为外国人，必须提交证据以证明其公民身份主张。Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. 544, 546 (BIA 2008)。为确立该法第320(a)条下的派生美国公民身份，被申请人必须证明他符合其美国公民继父的“子女”资格，且其继父符合其“父母”资格。此外，如果被申请人满足该门槛要求，他还必须证明他在2000年2月作为合法永久居民获准入境后，居住在其继父的“法定和实际监护”之下。该法第320(a)(3)条。

1 On December 22, 2004, the respondent was convicted of second-degree robbery in violation of section 212.5(c) of the California Penal Code and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years. There is no dispute that this conviction renders the respondent removable if he is an alien. 2 Section 320 was enacted in its current form pursuant to section 101(a) of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631, 1631, and applies to individuals who satisfied all of its requirements on or after February 27, 2001. Id. § 104, 114 Stat. at 1633; see also Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. 153 (BIA 2001).

1 2004年12月22日，被申请人因违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第212.5(c)条犯二级抢劫罪被定罪，并被判处2年监禁。如果被申请人是外国人，该定罪使其可被驱逐，此点并无争议。 2 第320条依据《2000年儿童公民身份法》第101(a)条，Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631, 1631，以现行形式颁布，适用于在2001年2月27日或之后满足其所有要求的个人。Id. § 104, 114 Stat. at 1633；另见 Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. 153 (BIA 2001)。

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引用为 24 I&N Dec. 824 (BIA 2009) 临时决定第3642号

For purposes of section 320(a), the terms “child” and “parent” are defined by section 101(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (2006), which provides as follows:

就第320(a)条而言，“子女”和“父母”术语由该法第101(c)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (2006) 定义，其规定如下：

As used in title III– (1) The term “child” means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age and includes a child legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or domicile, or under the law of the father’s residence or domicile, whether in the United States or elsewhere, and, except as otherwise provided in sections 320 and 321 of title III, a child adopted in the United States, if such legitimation or adoption takes place before the child reaches the age of 16 years (except to the extent that the child is described in subparagraph (E)(ii) or (F)(ii) of subsection (b)(1), and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating or adopting parent or parents at the time of such legitimation or adoption. (2) The terms “parent”, “father”, and “mother” include in the case of a posthumous child a deceased parent, father, and mother.

如用于第三编—— (1) “子女”术语指未满21岁的未婚人士，并包括根据子女居住地或住所地法律，或根据父亲居住地或住所地法律，无论在美国境内还是其他地方，已获合法化的子女，以及，除第三编第320条和第321条另有规定外，在美国境内被收养的子女，如果该合法化或收养发生在子女年满16岁之前（但以该子女属于第(b)(1)款(E)(ii)项或(F)(ii)项所述范围为限），且该子女在合法化或收养时处于合法化父母或收养父母的法定监护之下。 (2) “父母”、“父亲”和“母亲”术语，在遗腹子女的情况下，包括已故的父母、父亲和母亲。

Obviously, the respondent is not his stepfather’s biological child. Moreover, as previously noted, he was never adopted by his stepfather. Nor has any evidence been submitted to suggest that the respondent was born out of wedlock in Mexico, such that he could have been “legitimated” by his stepfather under the law of Mexico or California. 3 Thus, the question we must decide is whether the terms “child” and “parent,” as defined in section 101(c) of the Act, encompass stepchildren and stepparents. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that they do not. At the outset, the plain language of section 101(c), viewed in isolation, is silent and therefore ambiguous as to whether it embraces the “stepchild-stepparent” relationship. In such cases, where Congress’s intent is not plainly expressed, it is our obligation to fill the statutory gap by adopting

显然，被申请人不是其继父的亲生子女。此外，如前所述，他从未被其继父收养。也未提交任何证据表明被申请人在墨西哥是非婚生子女，从而可能根据墨西哥或加利福尼亚州法律被其继父“合法化”。3 因此，我们必须决定的问题是，该法第101(c)条所定义的“子女”和“父母”术语是否涵盖继子女和继父母。基于以下理由，我们认定它们不涵盖。 首先，单独审视第101(c)条的平实语言，其对于是否包含“继子女-继父母”关系保持沉默，因而存在歧义。在此类国会意图未明确表达的案件中，我们有义务通过采用

3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that a child can acquire citizenship at birth through a person who is neither a biological nor an adoptive parent if that person was legally married to one of the child’s biological parents at the time of the birth. Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005); Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2000). We have no occasion to opine as to the merits of these precedents, which arose in the context of “acquired citizenship,” rather than “derivative citizenship,” at issue here. We note, however, that the statutes being construed in those cases, sections 301 and 309(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409(a) (2000), do not employ the statutory term “child.” In any event, it is sufficient for present purposes to observe that the respondent’s stepfather was not married to the respondent’s mother at the time of the respondent’s birth. Martinez-Madera v. Holder, 559 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Solis-Espinoza and Scales where the citizen stepparent was not married to one of the child’s biological parents at the time of his birth).

3 美国第9巡回上诉法院裁定，子女可以在出生时通过既非亲生父母也非收养父母的人取得公民身份，如果该人在子女出生时与子女的亲生父母之一合法结婚。Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005)；Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2000)。我们无需就这些先例的实体问题发表意见，这些先例产生于“取得公民身份”而非本案所涉“派生公民身份”的背景。但我们注意到，那些案件中解释的法规，即该法第301条和第309(a)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 和 1409(a) (2000)，并未使用“子女”这一法定术语。无论如何，就当前目的而言，只需指出被申请人的继父在被申请人出生时并未与被申请人的母亲结婚即可。Martinez-Madera v. Holder, 559 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2009)（区分 Solis-Espinoza 和 Scales，因公民继父母在子女出生时未与子女的亲生父母之一结婚）。

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a reasonable interpretation of the language in question. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1163-64, 1167-68 (2009); Matter of Nwozuzu, 24 I&N Dec. 609, 612 (BIA 2008). To be reasonable, our interpretation must take into account the language and design of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a whole, because the meaning of an ambiguous term may only become evident when placed in its broader statutory context. National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)). With the foregoing principles in mind, we begin by observing that the terms “child” and “parent” bear different meanings in citizenship cases than they do in other cases arising under the Act. Specifically, section 101(c) defines those terms in citizenship cases, while section 101(b) defines them for all other purposes, such as those involving the allocation of visas or the establishment of eligibility for certain forms of relief from removal that require a showing of hardship to a “child.” Notably, section 101(b)(1)(B) specifically defines the term “child” to include “a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred.” (Emphasis added.) Further, section 101(b)(2) defines a “parent” to include a stepparent, since the status of stepparent “exists by reason of any of the circumstances” that make one a “child” under section 101(b)(1). Yet such an explicit reference to stepchildren and stepparents is notably absent from section 101(c) of the Act. The foregoing comparison of sections 101(b) and (c) shows that when Congress wants the term “child” to encompass stepchildren for some purpose under the Act, it knows how to make its intention clear in that regard. Cf. Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355, 368 (BIA 2007). Furthermore, it is well established that a negative inference may reasonably be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is included in other provisions of the same statute. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006). As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “‘[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). We see no reason why this presumption should not apply here. Indeed, the legislative history of sections 101(b) and (c) contain substantial evidence that Congress deliberately defined the term “child” to encompass stepchildren for visa allocation purposes, but not for purposes of derivative citizenship. As to stepchildren, the definitions in sections 101(b) and (c) of the Act find their origin in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163. Prior to the 1952 Act, a stepchild was not considered a

对所涉语言的合理解释。Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1163-64, 1167-68 (2009)；Matter of Nwozuzu, 24 I&N Dec. 609, 612 (BIA 2008)。要成为合理的解释，我们的解释必须考虑《移民与国籍法》整体的语言和设计，因为一个模糊术语的含义只有置于其更广泛的法定语境中才可能变得明确。National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007)（引用FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)）。 基于上述原则，我们首先注意到，“子女”和“父母”这两个术语在公民身份案件中与该法下产生的其他案件中的含义不同。具体而言，第101(c)条在公民身份案件中界定这些术语，而第101(b)条为所有其他目的界定它们，例如涉及签证分配或确立某些免于驱逐的救济形式的资格，这些救济要求证明对“子女”造成困难。值得注意的是，第101(b)(1)(B)条特别将“子女”一词界定为包括“继子女，无论是否非婚生，只要该子女在创设继子女身份的婚姻发生时尚未年满十八岁。”（着重号为原文所加。）此外，第101(b)(2)条将“父母”界定为包括继父母，因为继父母身份“因任何使一人成为第101(b)(1)条下‘子女’的情形而存在”。然而，该法第101(c)条明显缺少对继子女和继父母的此类明确提及。 上述对第101(b)条和第(c)条的比较表明，当国会希望“子女”一词为该法下某一目的而涵盖继子女时，它知道如何在这方面明确表达其意图。参见Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355, 368 (BIA 2007)。此外，公认的是，可以从同一法规其他条款包含而某一法定条款排除的语言中合理得出否定性推论。Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006)。正如美国最高法院所述，“‘[当]国会在一项法规的某一条款中包含特定语言但在同一法的另一条款中省略它时，一般推定国会在此种不同包含或排除中是有意和故意为之。’”INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987)（引用Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)）。我们认为没有理由该推定不适用于此。事实上，第101(b)条和第(c)条的立法历史包含大量证据表明，国会故意将“子女”一词界定为在签证分配目的上涵盖继子女，但在派生公民身份目的上不涵盖。 关于继子女，该法第101(b)条和第(c)条中的定义源于1952年《移民与国籍法》，Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163。在1952年法之前，继子女不被视为

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“child” under the immigration law for either derivative citizenship or visa allocation purposes. S. Rep. No. 81-1515, at 707 (1950) (“Stepchildren do not derive citizenship through the naturalization of a stepparent.”); Int’l Mercantile Marine Co. v. Elting, 67 F.2d 886, 888 (2d Cir. 1933) (holding that a stepchild could not be admitted as an immigrant by virtue of his relationship to his stepfather); Weedin v. Mon Hin, 4 F.2d 533, 534 (9th Cir. 1925) (same); see also Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Federal Law, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 491, 514-34 (Winter 1987) (discussing the evolution of the treatment of stepchildren under the immigration laws). 4 In April 1950, a Senate subcommittee that was charged with the task of examining the immigration system and making recommendations for its improvement issued a comprehensive report discussing, among other things, how children (including stepchildren) had historically been treated under the immigration law. S. Rep. No. 81-1515, at 467-68, 706-09. The subcommittee report noted at the outset that stepchildren had traditionally been ineligible under our laws to obtain visas or derivative citizenship through their stepparents. Id. at 468, 707. In the visa context, the subcommittee recommended that the law be liberalized to grant “nonquota status” (roughly the equivalent of “immediate relative” status under current law) to some stepchildren of United States citizens. Id. at 468. When it came to derivative citizenship, however, the subcommittee affirmatively disclaimed any intention to change the existing law, which then provided that “[s]tepchildren do not derive citizenship through the naturalization of a stepparent.” Id. at 707; see also id. at 712-13.

移民法下为派生公民身份或签证分配目的的“子女”。S. Rep. No. 81-1515, at 707 (1950)（“继子女不通过继父母的归化而派生公民身份。”）；Int'l Mercantile Marine Co. v. Elting, 67 F.2d 886, 888 (2d Cir. 1933)（裁定继子女不能凭借其与继父的关系作为移民入境）；Weedin v. Mon Hin, 4 F.2d 533, 534 (9th Cir. 1925)（同）；另见Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Federal Law, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 491, 514-34 (Winter 1987)（讨论移民法下继子女待遇的演变）。4 1950年4月，一个受命审查移民制度并提出改进建议的参议院小组委员会发布了一份综合报告，其中除其他事项外讨论了子女（包括继子女）在移民法下历史上的待遇。S. Rep. No. 81-1515, at 467-68, 706-09。该小组委员会报告一开始就指出，继子女传统上根据我们的法律没有资格通过其继父母获得签证或派生公民身份。Id. at 468, 707。在签证方面，小组委员会建议放宽法律，给予某些美国公民的继子女“非配额身份”（大致相当于现行法下的“直系亲属”身份）。Id. at 468。然而，在派生公民身份方面，小组委员会明确否认有任何改变现有法律的意图，当时法律规定“[继]子女不通过继父母的归化而派生公民身份。”Id. at 707；另见id. at 712-13。

4 See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 102(h), 54 Stat. 1137, 1138; Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 28(m), 43 Stat. 153, 169. Between 1855 and 1922, the general rule was that an alien woman who was herself eligible for naturalization acquired United States citizenship automatically upon her marriage to a United States citizen. See Act of February 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604; see also Kelly v. Owen, 74 U.S. 496, 498 & n.2 (1868). In turn, the minor children of such a woman would derive United States citizenship automatically through their mother—whether they were related to her new husband or not—pursuant to the Act of April 14, 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 155, which stated in relevant part that the children of naturalized citizens were to be treated as citizens themselves. In re Roberston, 179 F. 131, 132 (D.C. Pa. 1910); United States ex rel. Fisher v. Rodgers, 144 F. 711, 712 (D.C. Pa. 1906); United States v. Kellar, 13 F. 82, 84-85 (C.C. Ill. 1882). Thus, in some sense these children could be viewed as having derived citizenship through their United States citizen stepfathers, albeit at several removes. However, the law that conferred automatic citizenship on the alien wives of United States citizens was repealed in 1922. See Act of September 22, 1922, ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021. Consequently, after that date the children of such women ceased to derive citizenship, by extension, through their stepfathers. See S. Rep. No. 81-1515, at 707.

4 见1940年《国籍法》，ch. 876, § 102(h), 54 Stat. 1137, 1138；1924年《移民法》，ch. 190, § 28(m), 43 Stat. 153, 169。1855年至1922年间，一般规则是本身有资格归化的外国女性在与美国公民结婚后自动获得美国公民身份。见1855年2月10日法，ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604；另见Kelly v. Owen, 74 U.S. 496, 498 & n.2 (1868)。反过来，此类女性的未成年子女将自动通过其母亲派生美国公民身份——无论他们是否与她新丈夫有关系——依据1802年4月14日法，ch. 28, 2 Stat. 155，该法相关部分规定归化公民的子女应被视为公民本人。In re Roberston, 179 F. 131, 132 (D.C. Pa. 1910)；United States ex rel. Fisher v. Rodgers, 144 F. 711, 712 (D.C. Pa. 1906)；United States v. Kellar, 13 F. 82, 84-85 (C.C. Ill. 1882)。因此，在某种意义上这些子女可被视为通过其美国公民继父派生了公民身份，尽管隔了几层。然而，授予美国公民的外国妻子自动公民身份的法律于1922年被废除。见1922年9月22日法，ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021。因此，该日期之后此类女性的子女不再通过其继父延伸派生公民身份。见S. Rep. No. 81-1515, at 707。

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Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 824 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3642

引用为24 I&N Dec. 824 (BIA 2009) 临时决定#3642

Like the Supreme Court, we consider S. Rep. No. 81-1515 to be a valuable historical resource for understanding the meaning of the 1952 Act. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 835 n.10 (1987); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 78 (1974); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 531 (1955). The report is of particular value in this case, because the definitions of the term “child” ultimately embodied in sections 101(b) and (c) of the 1952 Act appear to have sprung quite directly from the subcommittee’s recommendations. Finally, we observe that the DHS’s United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has formally taken the position that stepchildren cannot derive United States citizenship through their stepparents under section 320(a) of the Act. See USCIS, DHS, Adjudicator’s Field Manual, ch. 71.1(b) & app. 71-7 (2007), available at http://www.westlaw.com (find by citation to “FIM-ADJFMAN 71.1” and “FIM-ADJFMAN APP 71-7”); see also Letter of Rosalina Lacot, Acting Director, Business Process and Re-engineering, INS Immigration Services Division, Dep’t of Justice, to Mr. Alan Lee (Aug. 8, 2001), reprinted in 78 Interpreter Releases, No. 32, Aug. 20, 2001, app. III, at 1350, 1370. DHS memoranda and internal guidance do not have the force and effect of law in removal proceedings, but the policies contained in such memoranda can be adopted by the Board when appropriate. Matter of M/V Saru Meru, 20 I&N Dec. 592, 595-96 (BIA 1992) (citing Matter of Cavazos, 17 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1980)). In light of the foregoing, we agree with the Immigration Judge that an alien cannot demonstrate derivative citizenship under section 320(a) of the Act through a nonadoptive stepparent. 5 Consequently, the respondent has failed to rebut the presumption of alienage that arises by virtue of his foreign birth, and the DHS has satisfied its burden of proving that the respondent is an “alien.” The respondent is therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Immigration Court and this Board. He has made no argument on appeal as to the validity of the charges of removability. Nor has he requested any form of relief from removal. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

与最高法院一样，我们认为S. Rep. No. 81-1515是理解1952年法含义的宝贵历史资源。见，例如，United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 835 n.10 (1987)；Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 78 (1974)；United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 531 (1955)。该报告在本案中特别有价值，因为最终体现在1952年法第101(b)条和第(c)条中的“子女”一词的定义似乎相当直接地源于小组委员会的建议。 最后，我们注意到DHS的美国公民及移民服务局（“USCIS”）已正式采取立场，认为继子女不能根据该法第320(a)条通过其继父母派生美国公民身份。见USCIS, DHS, Adjudicator's Field Manual, ch. 71.1(b) & app. 71-7 (2007)，可查阅http://www.westlaw.com（通过引用“FIM-ADJFMAN 71.1”和“FIM-ADJFMAN APP 71-7”查找）；另见Letter of Rosalina Lacot, Acting Director, Business Process and Re-engineering, INS Immigration Services Division, Dep't of Justice, to Mr. Alan Lee (Aug. 8, 2001)，重印于78 Interpreter Releases, No. 32, Aug. 20, 2001, app. III, at 1350, 1370。DHS备忘录和内部指导在驱逐程序中不具有法律效力，但此类备忘录中包含的政策可在适当时由委员会采纳。Matter of M/V Saru Meru, 20 I&N Dec. 592, 595-96 (BIA 1992)（引用Matter of Cavazos, 17 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1980)）。 鉴于上述，我们同意移民法官的意见，即外国人不能通过非收养继父母证明该法第320(a)条下的派生公民身份。5 因此，被申请人未能反驳因其外国出生而产生的外国人身份推定，且DHS已履行其证明被申请人是“外国人”的举证责任。因此，被申请人受移民法院和本委员会的管辖。他在上诉中未就驱逐指控的有效性提出任何论点。他也未请求任何形式的免于驱逐救济。据此，被申请人的上诉将被驳回。 命令：上诉驳回。

5 In view of this fact, we have no occasion to decide whether the respondent was in his stepfather’s “legal and physical custody” after being admitted as a lawful permanent resident, as required by section 320(a)(3) of the Act.

5 鉴于这一事实，我们无需裁定被申请人在获准作为合法永久居民入境后是否处于其继父的“合法和实际监护”之下，如该法第320(a)(3)条所要求。

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