行政先例 · 亲属移民
Matter of Bardouille
亲属移民签证申请资格须在递交申请时具备
18 I&N Dec. 114 (BIA 1981)
申请人以永久居民身份为两名非婚生子女提交第203(a)(2)条未婚子女亲属移民申请，声称其事后依路易斯安那州法律办理了正式认领从而完成准正。移民上诉委员会认为，即使假定准正有效，该准正发生在申请递交之后，受益人递交时并非申请人的“子女”，故申请不能获准。
所引用的裁判规则
为符合第203(a)条亲属优先类别的资格，外籍受益人必须在签证申请递交时即完全符合资格；申请递交后才出现的资格事实（如事后准正）不能追溯使受益人符合资格。
适用范围
适用于亲属移民优先类别签证申请中受益人资格是否须在递交申请时具备的问题；本案为移民上诉委员会行政先例，仅涉及第203(a)条亲属优先类别及第101(b)(1)(C)条准正子女定义，不涉及其他类别或法院判决。
查看官方引用与核查记录
核查日期：2026-11-04 · 官方判决来源
- 第5章 - 亲属移民申请的审理
[^ 71] The evidence must establish eligibility at the time of filing the benefit request. See 8 CFR 103.2(b)(1) and (12) . See Matter of Bardouille (PDF) , 18 I&N Dec. 114 (BIA 1981); Matter of Drigo (PDF) , 18 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 1982). If the petitioner was not already eligible when the petition was filed, subsequent developments cannot retroactively establish eligibility as of the filing date. See Matter of Katigbak (PDF) , 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm’r 1971).
以上记录用于核对官方对具体规则的引用。部分推翻、法律修订或有管辖权法院的后续判决，可能影响其适用范围。
完整中文参考译文，按原文页码与段落对应，保留标题、引注及脚注。官方文本为英文原件。
原文第 1 页
Interim Decision #2880
临时决定第2880号
MATTER OF BARDOUILLE
BARDOUILLE案
In Visa Petition Proceedings
在签证申请程序中
A-24652753 A-24652754
A-24652753 A-24652754
Decided by Board September 22, 1981
由委员会于1981年9月22日决定
(1) In order to be eligible for relative preference classification under section 203(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a), the alien beneficiary must be fully qualified at the time the visa petition is filed. (2) Visa petitions to classify the beneficiaries as "unmarried sons" under section 203(a)(2) of the Act are denied where the beneficiaries' alleged legitimation by their petitioner father occurred only after he filed the petitions and, therefore, they were not fully qualified as the petitioner's legitimated children under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Ac' 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(C), at the time the visa petitions were filed.
(1) 为符合《移民与国籍法》第203(a)条、8 U.S.C. 1153(a)规定的亲属优先类别资格，外籍受益人必须在签证申请提交时完全符合资格。 (2) 根据该法第203(a)(2)条将受益人归类为“未婚儿子”的签证申请被拒绝，因为受益人据称由其申请人父亲进行的准正仅发生在其提交申请之后，因此，在签证申请提交时，他们并未根据该法第101(b)(1)(C)条、8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(C)完全符合作为申请人准正子女的资格。
Os BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Fannie E. Burch, Esquire P.O. BOX 307 Amite, Louisiana 70422
代表申请人：Fannie E. Burch，Esquire P.O. BOX 307 Amite, Louisiana 70422
BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Maguire, Morris, and Vacca, Board Members
由： Milhollan，主席；Maniatis、Maguire、Morris和Vacca，委员会成员
These matters are before the Board on appeal from the District Director's decision of February 11, 1981, denying the petitions to clas- sify the beneficiaries as the unmarried sons of a lawful permanent resi- dent of the United States under section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2). The District Director found that the beneficiaries had not been legitimated so as to qualify them as the petitioner's children under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(C). The appeals will be dismissed. The petitioner is a 41 -year-old native and citizen of Grenada and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. The beneficiaries were born out of wedlock in Trinidad on January 4, 1967, and April 5, 1969. The petitioner states he is the beneficiaries' natural father, although their birth certificates do not include a father's name. The petitioner and the beneficiaries' mother have never married. The instant petitions were filed November 20, 1979. The beneficiaries can qualify as the petitioner's "unmarried sons" for preference immigrant status only if they qualify (or once qualified) as
这些事项因不服地区主任1981年2月11日的决定而提交委员会审理，该决定拒绝了根据《移民与国籍法》第203(a)(2)条、8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2)将受益人归类为美国合法永久居民未婚儿子的申请。地区主任认定，受益人未被准正，因此不符合该法第101(b)(1)(C)条、8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(C)规定的申请人子女资格。上诉将被驳回。 申请人是一名41岁的格林纳达本地人和公民，也是美国合法永久居民。受益人于1967年1月4日和1969年4月5日在特立尼达非婚出生。申请人称他是受益人的生父，尽管他们的出生证明未包含父亲姓名。申请人和受益人的母亲从未结婚。本案申请于1979年11月20日提交。 受益人只有在符合（或曾经符合）该法第101(b)(1)条规定的其“子女”资格时，才能作为申请人的“未婚儿子”符合优先移民身份资格，
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原文第 2 页
Interim Decision #2880
临时决定第2880号
his "children" under section 101(b)(1) of the Act,. which includes among its definitions of "child":
该法第101(b)(1)条对“子女”的定义包括：
a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation. Section 101(h)(1)(0). The petitioner does not challenge the basis of the District Director's decision, which held that the beneficiaries had not been legitimated. However, subsequent to that decision, the petitioner executed a document entitled "Formal Acknowledgment of Illegitimate Children," which purportedly was executed in accordance with Louisi- ana Revised Statutes section 9:391 and Louisiana. Civil Code articles 202 and 203. Therefore, the petitioner contends that the beneficiaries are now his properly legitimated children, and he requests that the peti- tions be approved. On this record, we are unable to determine if the petitioner's "Formal Acknowledgment of Illegitimate Children" constitutes a valid legitima- tion of the beneficiaries under Louisiana law. See Matter of Ramirez, 13 I&N Dec. 6 (BIA 1971). Even assuming arguendo that the legitimation is valid, the petitions may not be approved. It is clear that the claimed legitimation of the beneficiaries occurred only after the instant petitions were filed. The filing date is vital, since under long-standing federal regulations of both the Department of State and the Department of Justice the priority date for issuance of a prefer- ence immigrant visa is established by the filing date of an approved preference visa petition. 22 C.F.R. 42.62(a); 8 C.F. R. 245.1(g)(2). Thus, were these petitions to be approved, the beneficiaries would be accorded priority dates as the petitioner's legitimated sons prior to the time they actually would have been legitimated. Such an anomaly cannot be countenanced. There are apparently no administrative or judicial precedents regard- ing filing dates as they relate to an alien's time of qualification in the context of relative preference visa petitions. However, it has been held in the case of preference visa petitions for alien professionals and labor- ers that the alien must be Qualified at the time the petition is filed. Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45 (Reg. Coro. 1971); Matter of Wing's Tea Haase, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Reg. Corn. 1977). See also Matter of Great Wall, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Reg. Corn. 1977). The reasoning was stated thusly:
根据子女居住地或住所地法律，或根据父亲居住地或住所地法律，在美国境内或境外准正的子女，如果该准正发生在子女年满十八岁之前，且子女在准正时处于准正父母的法律监护之下。 第101(h)(1)(0)条。申请人不质疑地区主任决定的依据，该决定认定受益人未被准正。然而，在该决定之后，申请人签署了一份题为“非婚生子女正式承认”的文件，据称该文件是根据《路易斯安那州修订法规》第9:391条以及《路易斯安那州民法典》第202条和第203条签署的。因此，申请人主张受益人现在是他适当准正的子女，并请求批准申请。 根据本记录，我们无法确定申请人的“非婚生子女正式承认”是否构成路易斯安那州法律下受益人的有效准正。参见Matter of Ramirez, 13 I&N Dec. 6 (BIA 1971)。即使假定准正有效，申请也不能被批准。 显然，受益人主张的准正仅发生在本案申请提交之后。提交日期至关重要，因为根据国务院和司法部长期存在的联邦法规，签发优先移民签证的优先日期由已批准优先签证申请的提交日期确定。22 C.F.R. 42.62(a)；8 C.F.R. 245.1(g)(2)。因此，如果这些申请被批准，受益人将作为申请人的准正儿子获得优先日期，而该日期早于他们实际被准正的时间。这种异常情况不能予以容忍。 在亲属优先签证申请背景下，关于提交日期与外籍人士符合资格时间的关系，似乎没有行政或司法先例。然而，在外籍专业人士和劳工的优先签证申请案件中，已裁定外籍人士必须在申请提交时符合资格。Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45 (Reg. Coro. 1971)；Matter of Wing's Tea Haase, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Reg. Corn. 1977)。另见Matter of Great Wall, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Reg. Corn. 1977)。理由如下：
Section 204 of the Act requires the filing of a visa petition for classification under seetion 203(a)(3). The latter section states, in pertinent part: "Visas shall next be made avail- able to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions." (Emphasis added.) It Is clear that it was the Intent of Congress that an alien be a recognized and fully qualified member of the professions at the time the petition is filed. Congress did not
该法第204条要求提交根据第203(a)(3)条进行分类的签证申请。后一条款在相关部分规定：“签证应接下来提供给符合条件的移民，即专业人士成员。”（强调 added。） 国会明确意图是，外籍人士在申请提交时必须是公认且完全符合资格的专业人士成员。国会并不
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原文第 3 页
Interim Decision #2880
临时决定第2880号
intend that a petition that was properly deni[able] because the beneficiary was not at that time qualified be subsequently approved at a future date when the beneficiary may become qualified under a new set of facts. To do otherwise would make a farce of the preference system and priorities set up by statute and regulation. Matter of Katigbak, supra, at 49. Like sections 203(a)(3) and (6), sec- tions 203(a)(1), (2), (4), and (5) recite that visas shall next be made available to qualified immigrants who are (present tense) the type of relative thereafter specified. The provisions of 8 C.F.R. 245.1(g)(2) and 22 C.F.R. 42.62(a) appertain to all six visa preference categories as well. Thus, the rationale expressed in Katigbak and Wing's Tea House also applies with equal force here; qualifying facts which come into being only subsequent to the filing of a preference visa petition may not be considered in support thereof, since to do so would result in granting the beneficiary a. visa priority date at a time when he was not qualified for the preference classification sought. Accordingly, we hold that in order to be eligible for relative preference classification under section 203(a) of the Act, the alien beneficiary must be fully qualified at the time the visa petition is filed Here, the claimed legitimation of the beneficiaries occurred only after the petitions were filed. Therefore, the beneficiaries were not then qualified as the petitioner's children under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act, and the petitions to classify them as tunuarried sons under section 203(a)(2) of the Act may riot be approved. ORDER: The appeals are dismissed.
意图是，一项因受益人当时不符合资格而本应被适当拒绝的申请，在受益人可能根据新的事实情况变得符合资格的未来日期被随后批准。否则将使优先制度和法规设定的优先顺序成为笑柄。 Matter of Katigbak, supra, at 49。与第203(a)(3)和(6)条一样，第203(a)(1)、(2)、(4)和(5)条规定，签证应接下来提供给符合条件的移民，即（现在时）此后指定的那类亲属。8 C.F.R. 245.1(g)(2)和22 C.F.R. 42.62(a)的规定也适用于所有六个签证优先类别。因此，Katigbak和Wing's Tea House中阐述的理由在此同样适用；仅在优先签证申请提交之后才产生的符合资格事实不得用于支持该申请，因为这样做将导致受益人在其不符合所寻求优先类别资格的时间获得签证优先日期。因此，我们裁定，为符合该法第203(a)条规定的亲属优先类别资格，外籍受益人必须在签证申请提交时完全符合资格。 在此，受益人主张的准正仅发生在申请提交之后。因此，受益人当时不符合该法第101(b)(1)(C)条规定的申请人子女资格，根据该法第203(a)(2)条将其归类为未婚儿子的申请不得被批准。 命令：上诉被驳回。
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