INS v. Rios-Pineda

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v.

移民和归化局诉

Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assist- ant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, and James A. Hunolt.

艾伦·I·霍罗维茨为申请人进行辩论。与其共同提交书状的有：总检察长李、代理助理总检察长威拉德、副总检察长盖勒以及詹姆斯·A·胡诺尔特。

Lawrence H. Rudnick argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Roman de la Campa.

劳伦斯·H·鲁德尼克为被申请人进行辩论。与其共同提交书状的有罗曼·德拉坎帕。

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

怀特大法官发表法院意见。

Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 66 Stat. 214, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(a)(1), allows the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of an alien. To warrant such action, the alien must have been physically present in the United States for a continuous pe- riod of at least seven years, be of good moral character, and demonstrate that deportation would result in extreme hardship to the alien, or the alien's "spouse, parent, or child,

《移民和国籍法》（该法）第244(a)(1)条，66 Stat. 214，经修正，8 U. S. C. § 1254(a)(1)，允许司法部长中止外国人的驱逐出境。要获得此种处理，外国人必须已在美国连续实际居留至少七年，品行良好，并证明驱逐出境将对外国人或外国人的“配偶、父母或子女，

who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." Ibid. Even if these prerequisites are satisfied, it remains in the discretion of the Attorney General to suspend, or refuse to suspend, deporta- tion. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S. 139, 144, n. 5 (1981); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 353 (1956). Although Congress did not provide a statutory mechanism for reopening sus- pension proceedings once suspension has been denied, the Attorney General has promulgated regulations under the Act

该配偶、父母或子女为美国公民或合法获准永久居留的外国人，造成极端困难。”同上。即使这些先决条件得到满足，中止或拒绝中止驱逐出境仍属于司法部长的裁量权。INS诉Jong Ha Wang，450 U. S. 139, 144, n. 5 (1981)；Jay诉Boyd，351 U. S. 345, 353 (1956)。尽管国会未规定在中止驱逐出境被拒后重新开启中止程序的法定机制，司法部长已根据该法颁布条例

allowing for such a procedure. 8 CFR § 3.2 (1985). Under the regulations, a motion to reopen will be denied unless reopening is sought on the basis of circumstances which have

允许此种程序。8 CFR § 3.2 (1985)。根据该条例，除非基于在原听证之后出现的情形寻求重新开启，否则重新开启的动议将被驳回

arisen subsequent to the original hearing. Ibid. The Attor- ney General, authorized by Congress to do so, 8 U. S. C. § 1103, has delegated his authority and discretion to suspend deportation to special inquiry officers of the Immigration and

。同上。司法部长经国会授权（8 U. S. C. § 1103），已将其中止驱逐出境的权力和裁量权授予移民

Naturalization Service (INS), whose decisions are subject to review by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 8 CFR §§242.8, 242.21 (1985).

和归化局（INS）的特别调查官，其决定须经移民上诉委员会（BIA）复审。8 CFR §§ 242.8, 242.21 (1985)。

Respondents, a married couple, are natives and citizens of Mexico. Respondent husband illegally entered the United States in 1972. Apprehended, he returned to Mexico in early 1974 under threat of deportation. Two months later, he and respondent wife paid a professional smuggler $450 to transport them into this country, entering the United

被申请人是一对已婚夫妇，为墨西哥国民和公民。被申请人丈夫于1972年非法进入美国。被抓获后，他于1974年初在驱逐出境威胁下返回墨西哥。两个月后，他和被申请人妻子支付450美元给一名职业偷运者，将其运入我国，通过偷运者的努力未经检查进入

States without inspection through the smuggler's efforts. Respondent husband was again apprehended by INS agents in 1978. At his request, he was granted permission to re- turn voluntarily to Mexico in lieu of deportation. He was also granted two subsequent extensions of time to depart, but he ultimately declined to leave as promised. INS then instituted deportation proceedings against both respondents. By that time, respondent wife had given birth to a child, who, born in the United States, was a citizen of this country. A deportation hearing was held in December 1978. Respond- ents conceded illegal entry, conceded deportability, but re-

美国。被申请人丈夫于1978年再次被INS探员抓获。应其请求，他获准自愿返回墨西哥以代替驱逐出境。他还获得两次后续离境延期，但最终拒绝如承诺般离境。INS随后对两被申请人启动驱逐出境程序。届时，被申请人妻子已生育一名子女，该子女因在美国出生而为本国公民。1978年12月举行了驱逐出境听证。被申请人承认非法入境，承认可被驱逐出境，但请

quested suspension of deportation. The Immigration Judge, ruling that respondents were ineligible for suspension be- cause they had not satisfied the requirement of seven years' continuous physical presence, ordered their deportation.

求中止驱逐出境。移民法官裁定被申请人不符合中止资格，因其未满足七年连续实际居留的要求，下令将其驱逐出境。

Respondents appealed the order to the BIA, asserting a vari- ety of arguments to establish that the deportation violated their rights or the rights of their child. The BIA rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal.

被申请人就该命令向BIA提出上诉，提出各种论据以证明驱逐出境侵犯了其本人或其子女的权利。BIA驳回这些论据并驳回上诉。

In July 1980, respondents filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals, which automatically stayed their depor- tation pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a)(3). Asking that the court order their deportation suspended, respondents

1980年7月，被申请人向上诉法院提交复审申请，该申请依据8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a)(3)自动中止其驱逐出境。被申请人请求法院下令中止其驱逐出境，并

asserted substantially the same claims rejected by the BIA: that the Immigration Judge should have given them Miranda warnings, that their deportation was an unlawful de facto deportation of their citizen child, and that respondent hus- band should have been considered present in the United

提出与BIA所驳回的实质相同的请求：移民法官本应给予其米兰达警告，其驱逐出境构成对其公民子女的非法事实上的驱逐出境，且被申请人丈夫本应被视为在美国

States for seven years. In March 1982, 15 months after the briefs were filed, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision

居留七年。1982年3月，在书状提交15个月后，上诉法院撤销BIA的决定

of the BIA and remanded the case for further proceedings. Rios-Pineda v. United States Department of Justice, 673

并将案件发回进一步审理。Rios-Pineda诉美国司法部，673

F. 2d 225 (CA8). The Court of Appeals was of the view that during the pendency of the appeals, respondents had accrued the requisite seven years' continuous physical presence in the

F. 2d 225 (CA8)。上诉法院认为，在上诉待决期间，被申请人已累积所需的七年连续实际居留于

United States. Id., at 227. Because of this development, the court directed the BIA to allow respondents 60 days to file a motion to reopen their deportation proceeding and

美国。同上，第227页。鉴于这一进展，法院指示BIA允许被申请人在60天内提交重新开启其驱逐出境程序的动议，并

cautioned the BIA "to give careful and thorough consider- ation to the . . . motion to reopen if, indeed, one is filed." Id., at 228, n. 5. During the pendency of the appeals, respondent wife gave birth to a second citizen child.

告诫BIA“如确有人提交重新开启动议，应对该动议给予认真彻底的考虑。”同上，第228页，n. 5。在上诉待决期间，被申请人妻子生育了第二名公民子女。

Respondents then moved the BIA to reopen and requested suspension of deportation. They alleged that deportation would result in extreme hardship in that their two citizen children would be deprived of their right to an education in United States schools and to social assistance. Respondents

被申请人随后向BIA提出重新开启动议并请求中止驱逐出境。他们声称驱逐出境将造成极端困难，因为其两名公民子女将被剥夺在美国学校接受教育和获得社会援助的权利。被申请人

also alleged general harm to themselves from their "low skills and educations" and the lower standard of living in Mexico.

还声称因其“低技能和低教育水平”以及墨西哥较低的生活水平而受到一般性损害。

The BIA denied the motion to reopen. First, the motion was not timely filed, as respondents had not served it on the proper official within the specified 60 days. Second, discretionary relief was unwarranted, since the additional facts-seven years' continuous physical presence and an ad- ditional child-were available only because respondents had delayed departure by frivolous appeals. Third, respondent husband's conduct in returning to the country only two months after his 1974 departure, respondents' payment to a professional smuggler to enter this country illegally, and respondent husband's refusal to depart voluntarily after promising to do so, all evinced a blatant disregard for the immigration laws, disentitling respondents to the favorable exercise of discretion.

BIA驳回重新开启动议。第一，动议未及时提交，因为被申请人未在规定的60天内将其送达适当官员。第二，裁量性救济不成立，因为额外事实——七年连续实际居留和新增子女——之所以可得，仅因被申请人以无谓上诉拖延离境。第三，被申请人丈夫在1974年离境仅两个月后即返回本国的行为、被申请人支付职业偷运者以非法进入本国的行为，以及被申请人丈夫在承诺自愿离境后拒绝离境的行为，均表现出对移民法的公然漠视，使被申请人无权获得有利的裁量。

The Court of Appeals reversed and directed the BIA to reopen the proceeding. Rios-Pineda v. United States De- partment of Justice, 720 F. 2d 529 (CA8 1983). The motion to reopen, the panel concluded, was timely filed,' respond- ents had made out a prima facie case of hardship, and the factors relied on by the BIA did not justify its refusal to reopen. Although the court did not find merit in any of the legal arguments respondents had pressed during their prior appeals, their appeals were not frivolous. Neither could the BIA deny a motion to reopen because of respondents' disre- gard of the immigration laws, since such disregard is present in some measure in all deportation cases. Id., at 534. We granted certiorari, 469 U. S. 1071 (1984), because this case involves important issues bearing on the scope of the Attorney General's discretion in acting on motions to reopen civil requests for suspension of deportation.

上诉法院撤销原判并指示BIA重新开启程序。 Rios-Pineda v. United States De- partment of Justice, 720 F. 2d 529 (CA8 1983)。 合议庭认定，重新开启的动议系及时提出，' 被申请人已初步证明存在困难，且BIA所依据的因素不足以证明其拒绝重新开启具有正当理由。 尽管法院未认定被申请人在此前各次上诉中所主张的任何法律论点具有实质价值，但其上诉并非无意义。BIA也不能因被申请人无视移民法而驳回重新开启的动议，因为此种无视在某种程度上存在于所有驱逐出境案件中。 Id., at 534。 我们批准了调卷令，469 U. S. 1071 (1984)，因为本案涉及与司法部长在处理重新开启中止驱逐出境民事请求的动议时所享有的裁量权范围有关的重要问题。

IThe issue of whether the motion to reopen was timely filed is not before this Court, and we assume, without deciding, that timely filing was estab-

I重新开启的动议是否系及时提出这一问题不在本法院审理范围之内，我们假定（但不作裁定）及时提出已由

We have recently indicated that granting a motion to reopen is a discretionary matter with BIA. INS v. Phin- pathya, 464 U. S. 183, 188, n. 6 (1984). Thus, even assum- ing that respondents' motion to reopen made out a prima facie case of eligibility for suspension of deportation, the At-

我们最近已指出，批准重新开启的动议属于BIA的裁量事项。 INS v. Phin- pathya, 464 U. S. 183, 188, n. 6 (1984)。 因此，即使假定被申请人的重新开启动议已初步证明其符合中止驱逐出境的资格，司法

torney General had discretion to deny the motion to reopen. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S. 139, 144, n. 5 (1981). We have also held that if the Attorney General decides that relief should be denied as a matter of discretion, he need not con- sider whether the threshold statutory eligibility requirements are met. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U. S. 24 (1976); see also Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S., at 143-144, n. 5.

部长仍享有裁量权以驳回该重新开启的动议。 INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S. 139, 144, n. 5 (1981)。 我们还曾认定，如果司法部长决定作为裁量事项应拒绝给予救济，则其无需考虑是否满足门槛性的法定资格要求。INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U. S. 24 (1976)；另见 Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S., at 143-144, n. 5。

Given the Attorney General's broad discretion in this con- text, we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals' holding that denial of the motion to reopen was an impermissible exercise of that discretion. If, as was required by the regulations, respondents' motion to reopen was based on intervening circumstances demonstrating 7-year residence and extreme hardship, the Attorney General, acting through the BIA, nevertheless had the authority to deny the motion for two separate and quite adequate reasons.

鉴于司法部长在此情形下享有广泛的裁量权，我们不能同意上诉法院的认定，即驳回重新开启的动议是对该裁量权的不允许行使。 如果按照法规的要求，被申请人的重新开启动议系基于证明7年居留和极端困难的介入情形，则司法部长通过BIA行事，仍有权基于两个各自独立且相当充分的理由驳回该动议。

First, although by the time the BIA denied the motion, respondents had been in this country for seven years, that was not the case when suspension of deportation was first denied; 2 the seven years accrued during the pendency of

第一，尽管在BIA驳回该动议时，被申请人已在本国居留七年，但在最初驳回中止驱逐出境时并非如此；2 该七年期间是在

I Even prior to our decision in INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U. S. 183 (1984), while the administrative practice treated some minor absences as not breaking the continuous presence period, neither the courts nor the Attor- ney General had ever considered a departure under threat of deportation, coupled with a subsequent illegal entry after two months' absence, any- thing less than a meaningful interruption of the period. Not only had the Immigration Judge explained, both at the deportation hearing and in his written decision, App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a, that such an absence was an interruption of the period of continuous presence, the law itself was clear.

I甚至在我们于INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U. S. 183 (1984)中作出判决之前，尽管行政实践将某些轻微离境视为不中断连续居留期间，但法院和司法部长从未将因受驱逐出境威胁而离境、随后在离境两个月后非法入境的情形，视为任何低于对该期间的有意义中断。 移民法官不仅在驱逐出境听证会上、而且在其书面决定中均解释过，App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a，此种离境构成对连续居留期间的中断，法律本身亦是明确的。

See Heitland v. INS, 551 F. 2d 495, 503-504 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 819 (1977); Segura-Viachi v. INS, 538 F. 2d 91, 92 (CA5 1976); Barragan- Sanchez v. Rosenberg, 471 F. 2d 758, 760 (CA9 1972); see generally Phinpathya, supra, at 193-194.

See Heitland v. INS, 551 F. 2d 495, 503-504 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 819 (1977); Segura-Viachi v. INS, 538 F. 2d 91, 92 (CA5 1976); Barragan- Sanchez v. Rosenberg, 471 F. 2d 758, 760 (CA9 1972); see generally Phinpathya, supra, at 193-194。

respondents' appeals. The BIA noted that respondents' issues on appeals were without merit and held that the 7- year requirement satisfied in this manner should not be recognized. In our view, it did not exceed its discretion in doing so.

被申请人上诉期间累积的。 BIA指出，被申请人在上诉中提出的问题没有实质价值，并认定以这种方式满足的7年要求不应予以承认。 我们认为，BIA这样做并未超越其裁量权。

The Court of Appeals thought the appeal had not been frivolous because it had resulted in further proceedings. But this was true only because seven years of residence had accrued during the pendency of the appeal. No substance was found in any of the points raised on appeal, in and of themselves, and we agree with the BIA that they were with- out merit. The purpose of an appeal is to correct legal errors which occurred at the initial determination of deportability; it is not to permit an indefinite stalling of physical departure in the hope of eventually satisfying legal prerequisites. One illegally present in the United States who wishes to remain already has a substantial incentive to prolong litigation in order to delay physical deportation for as long as possible. See, e. g., Sung Ja Oum v. INS, 613 F. 2d 51, 52-54 (CA4

上诉法院认为该上诉并非无意义，因为它导致了进一步程序。 但这仅仅是因为在上诉待决期间累积了七年居留期间。 上诉中所提出的任何论点本身均未发现具有实质内容，我们同意BIA的意见，即这些论点没有实质价值。上诉的目的是纠正最初驱逐出境裁定中发生的法律错误；而不是允许无限期拖延实际离境，以期最终满足法律前提条件。 非法居留于美国而希望留下的人，本已有重大动机延长诉讼，以尽可能拖延实际驱逐出境。 See, e. g., Sung Ja Oum v. INS, 613 F. 2d 51, 52-54 (CA4

1980); Hibbert v. INS, 554 F. 2d 17, 19-21 (CA2 1977). The Attorney General can, in exercising his discretion, legiti- mately avoid creating a further incentive for stalling by re- fusing to reopen suspension proceedings for those who be- came eligible for such suspension only because of the passage of time while their meritless appeals dragged on. See Leblanc v. INS, 715 F. 2d 685, 693 (CA1 1983); Agustin v. INS, 700 F. 2d 564, 566 (CA9 1983); Balani v. INS, 669 F. 2d 1157, 1160-1162 (CA6 1982); Der-Rong Chour v. INS, 578

1980); Hibbert v. INS, 554 F. 2d 17, 19-21 (CA2 1977)。 司法部长在行使其裁量权时，可以正当地避免通过拒绝为那些仅因无实质价值的上诉拖延期间时间流逝而变得符合中止资格的人重新开启中止程序，从而制造进一步的拖延动机。 See Leblanc v. INS, 715 F. 2d 685, 693 (CA1 1983); Agustin v. INS, 700 F. 2d 564, 566 (CA9 1983); Balani v. INS, 669 F. 2d 1157, 1160-1162 (CA6 1982); Der-Rong Chour v. INS, 578

The impact of any other rule is pointed out by this case. Respondents were apprehended in 1978, and they conceded deportability. Nonetheless, over six years later they remain in the United States by virtue of their baseless appeals. In administering this country's immigration laws, the Attorney General and the INS confront an onerous task even without

本案指出了任何其他规则的影响。 被申请人于1978年被抓获，他们承认可被驱逐出境。尽管如此，六年多之后，他们仍凭借其毫无根据的上诉留在美国。 在执行本国的移民法时，司法部长和INS面临着一项艰巨的任务，即使没有

the addition of judicially augmented incentives to take merit- less appeals, engage in repeated violations, and undertake other conduct solely to drag out the deportation process. Administering the 7-year requirement in this manner is within the authority of the Attorney General. The Act com- mits the definition of the standards in the Act to the Attorney General and his delegate in the first instance, "and their con- struction and application of th[ese] standard[s] should not be overturned by a reviewing court simply because it may pre- fer another interpretation of the statute." INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra, at 144.

司法上增加的动机，即提起无实质价值的上诉、反复违法以及仅为拖延驱逐出境程序而实施其他行为。 以这种方式执行7年要求属于司法部长的权限范围。该法将其中标准的定义首先交由司法部长及其代表负责，“且其对这些标准的解释和适用不应仅因审查法院可能倾向于对法规作出另一种解释而被推翻。”INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra, at 144。

Second, we are sure that the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening based on respond- ents' flagrant violation of the federal law in entering the United States, as well as respondent husband's willful failure to depart voluntarily after his request to do so was honored by the INS. The Court of Appeals' rejection of these con- siderations as "irrelevant" is unpersuasive. While all aliens illegally present in the United States have, in some way, vio- lated the immigration laws, it is untenable to suggest that the Attorney General has no discretion to consider their indi- vidual conduct and distinguish among them on the basis of the flagrancy and nature of their violations. There is a difference in degree between one who enters the country legally, staying beyond the terms of a visa, and one who

第二，我们确信，司法部长基于被申请人进入美国时公然违反联邦法律，以及被申请人丈夫在INS批准其自愿离境请求后故意未能离境，而驳回重新开启，并未滥用其裁量权。上诉法院将这些考虑因素斥为“无关”的认定缺乏说服力。 虽然所有非法居留于美国的外国人在某种程度上都违反了移民法，但认为司法部长没有裁量权考虑其个人行为并根据其违法行为的公然性和性质加以区分，是站不住脚的。 合法进入本国但超过签证期限居留的人，与未经检查

enters the country without inspection. Nor does everyone who illegally enters the country do so repeatedly and with the assistance of a professional smuggler. Furthermore, the Attorney General can certainly distinguish between those who, once apprehended, comply with the laws, and those who refuse to honor previous agreements to report for voluntary departure. Accordingly, we are convinced that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening because of respondents' prior conduct.

进入本国的人之间，在程度上有区别。 也并非每个非法进入本国的人都反复这样做并有专业走私者的协助。此外，司法部长当然可以区分那些一旦被抓获即遵守法律的人，与那些拒绝履行先前报到自愿离境协议的人。 因此，我们确信，BIA基于被申请人先前的行为而驳回重新开启，并未滥用其裁量权。

This case, therefore, does not involve the unreasoned or arbitrary exercise of discretion. Here the BIA's explanation of its decision was grounded in legitimate concerns about the

因此，本案不涉及无理由或任意的裁量权行使。在此，BIA对其决定的解释基于对

administration of the immigration laws and was determined on the basis of the particular conduct of respondents. In this government of separated powers, it is not for the judiciary to usurp Congress' grant of authority to the Attorney General by applying what approximates de novo appellate review. See Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S., at 144-145; Phinpathya, 464 U. S., at 195-196. Because we conclude that here the re- fusal to reopen the suspension proceeding was within the dis- cretion of the Attorney General, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

移民法执行的正当关切，并且是基于被申请人的特定行为而作出的。在这个分权政府中，司法部门不应通过适用近似于重新审查的上诉审查来篡夺国会授予司法部长的权力。 See Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S., at 144-145; Phinpathya, 464 U. S., at 195-196。 因为我们认定，在此拒绝重新开启中止程序属于司法部长的裁量权范围，我们撤销上诉法院的判决。

So ordered.

特此命令。

JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

POWELL大法官未参与本案的审理或裁决。