Sessions v. Morales-Santana

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

注：在可行的情况下，案件摘要（页首提要）将随判决书发布，本案即如此处理。案件摘要不构成法院判决的任何部分，而是由判决汇编者为方便读者而编写。参见 United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337。 美国最高法院

SESSIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL v. MORALES­ SANTANA

塞申斯，司法部长 诉 莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­ ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

注意：本意见在《美国判例汇编》初步印刷出版前需经正式修订。请读者将任何印刷或其他正式错误通知位于华盛顿特区20543号的美国最高法院判决报告员，以便在初步印刷付印前进行更正。 美国最高法院

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL, PETITIONER v. LUIS RAMON MORALES-SANTANA

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III，司法部长，申请人诉LUIS RAMON MORALES-SANTANA

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

GINSBURG大法官发表了法院意见。

This case concerns a gender-based differential in the law governing acquisition of U. S. citizenship by a child born abroad, when one parent is a U. S. citizen, the other, a citizen of another nation. The main rule appears in 8 U. S. C. §1401(a)(7) (1958 ed.), now §1401(g) (2012 ed.). Applicable to married couples, §1401(a)(7) requires a period of physical presence in the United States for the U. S.-citizen parent. The requirement, as initially pre­ scribed, was ten years’ physical presence prior to the child’s birth, §601(g) (1940 ed.); currently, the requirement is five years prebirth, §1401(g) (2012 ed.). That main rule is rendered applicable to unwed U. S.-citizen fathers by §1409(a). Congress ordered an exception, however, for unwed U. S.-citizen mothers. Contained in §1409(c), the exception allows an unwed mother to transmit her citizen­ ship to a child born abroad if she has lived in the United States for just one year prior to the child’s birth.

本案涉及在父母一方为美国公民、另一方为他国公民时，海外出生子女获得美国公民身份的法律中的性别差异。 主要规则见于8 U. S. C. §1401(a)(7)（1958年版），现为§1401(g)（2012年版）。适用于已婚夫妇的§1401(a)(7)要求美国公民父母在美国实际存在一段时间。该要求最初规定为子女出生前十年实际存在，§601(g)（1940年版）；目前，要求为出生前五年，§1401(g)（2012年版）。该主要规则通过§1409(a)适用于未婚美国公民父亲。然而，国会为未婚美国公民母亲规定了一项例外。该例外载于§1409(c)，允许未婚母亲将公民身份传给海外出生的子女，如果她在子女出生前仅在美国居住一年。

The respondent in this case, Luis Ramón Morales- Santana, was born in the Dominican Republic when his father was just 20 days short of meeting §1401(a)(7)’s

本案被申请人Luis Ramón Morales-Santana出生在多米尼加共和国，当时他的父亲仅差20天满足§1401(a)(7)的

physical-presence requirement. Opposing removal to the Dominican Republic, Morales-Santana asserts that the equal protection principle implicit in the Fifth Amend­ ment 1 entitles him to citizenship stature. We hold that the gender line Congress drew is incompatible with the requirement that the Government accord to all persons “the equal protection of the laws.” Nevertheless, we can­ not convert §1409(c)’s exception for unwed mothers into the main rule displacing §1401(a)(7) (covering married couples) and §1409(a) (covering unwed fathers). We must therefore leave it to Congress to select, going forward, a physical-presence requirement (ten years, one year, or some other period) uniformly applicable to all children born abroad with one U. S.-citizen and one alien parent, wed or unwed. In the interim, the Government must ensure that the laws in question are administered in a manner free from gender-based discrimination.

实际存在要求。Morales-Santana反对被驱逐至多米尼加共和国，主张第五修正案1所隐含的平等保护原则赋予他公民身份地位。我们认定，国会划定的性别界限与政府给予所有人“法律的平等保护”的要求不相容。然而，我们不能将§1409(c)对未婚母亲的例外转换为取代§1401(a)(7)（涵盖已婚夫妇）和§1409(a)（涵盖未婚父亲）的主要规则。因此，我们必须留待国会今后选择一项统一适用于所有海外出生、父母一方为美国公民另一方为外籍人士（无论婚生与否）的子女的实际存在要求（十年、一年或其他期限）。在此期间，政府必须确保相关法律的管理不带有性别歧视。

I A We first describe in greater detail the regime Congress constructed. The general rules for acquiring U. S. citizen­ ship are found in 8 U. S. C. §1401, the first section in Chapter 1 of Title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act (1952 Act or INA), §301, 66 Stat. 235–236. Section 1401 sets forth the INA’s rules for determining who “shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth” by

I A 我们首先更详细地描述国会构建的制度。取得美国公民身份的一般规则见于8 U. S. C. §1401，即《移民与国籍法》（1952年法或INA）第三编第1章的第1节，§301，66 Stat. 235–236。第1401节规定了INA用于确定谁“shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth”的规则，通过

establishing a range of residency and physical-presence requirements calibrated primarily to the parents’ nation­ ality and the child’s place of birth. §1401(a) (1958 ed.); §1401 (2012 ed.). The primacy of §1401 in the statutory scheme is evident. Comprehensive in coverage, §1401 provides the general framework for the acquisition of citizenship at birth. In particular, at the time relevant here, 2 §1401(a)(7) provided for the U. S. citizenship of

确立一系列主要根据父母国籍和子女出生地校准的居住和实际存在要求。§1401(a)（1958年版）；§1401（2012年版）。§1401在法定方案中的首要地位显而易见。§1401覆盖全面，提供了出生时获得公民身份的一般框架。特别是，在相关时间，2 §1401(a)(7)规定了以下人士的美国公民身份：

“a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its out­ lying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States by such citizen parent may be in­ cluded in computing the physical presence require­ ments of this paragraph.”

“在美国及其外围领地地理界限之外出生的人，其父母一方为外籍人士，另一方为美国公民，且该美国公民在此人出生前，在美国或其外围领地实际存在总计不少于十年的一个或多个时期，其中至少五年是在年满十四岁之后：但规定，该公民父母在美国武装部队的任何光荣服役期间可计入本段的实际存在要求计算。”

Congress has since reduced the duration requirement to five years, two after age 14. §1401(g) (2012 ed.). 3

国会此后将期限要求减少至五年，其中两年在14岁之后。§1401(g)（2012年版）。3

Section 1409 pertains specifically to children with un­ married parents. Its first subsection, §1409(a), incorpo­ rates by reference the physical-presence requirements of §1401, thereby allowing an acknowledged unwed citizen parent to transmit U. S. citizenship to a foreign-born child

§1409专门涉及父母未婚的子女。其第一小节§1409(a)通过引用纳入§1401的实际存在要求，从而允许经承认的未婚公民父母将美国公民身份传给海外出生的子女

under the same terms as a married citizen parent. Section 1409(c)—a provision applicable only to unwed U. S.-citizen mothers—states an exception to the physical-presence requirements of §§1401 and 1409(a). Under §1409(c)’s exception, only one year of continuous physical presence is required before unwed mothers may pass citizenship to their children born abroad.

，条件与已婚公民父母相同。§1409(c)——仅适用于未婚美国公民母亲的规定——规定了§§1401和1409(a)实际存在要求的例外。根据§1409(c)的例外，未婚母亲在将公民身份传给海外出生子女之前，仅需一年连续实际存在。

B Respondent Luis Ramón Morales-Santana moved to the United States at age 13, and has resided in this country most of his life. Now facing deportation, he asserts U. S. citizenship at birth based on the citizenship of his biologi­ cal father, José Morales, who accepted parental responsi­ bility and included Morales-Santana in his household. José Morales was born in Guánica, Puerto Rico, on March 19, 1900. Record 55–56. Puerto Rico was then, as it is now, part of the United States, see Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2016) (slip op., at 2– 4); 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(38) (1958 ed.) (“The term United States . . . means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the [U. S.] Virgin Is­ lands.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); §1101(a)(38) (2012 ed.) (similar), and José became a U. S. citizen under the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, ch. 145, §5, 39 Stat. 953 (a predecessor to 8 U. S. C. §1402). After living in Puerto Rico for nearly two decades, José left his childhood home on February 27, 1919, 20 days short of his 19th birthday, therefore failing to satisfy §1401(a)(7)’s requirement of five years’ physical presence after age 14. Record 57, 66. He did so to take up employment as a builder-mechanic for a U. S. company in the then-U. S.-occupied Dominican Republic. Ibid. 4

B 被申请人Luis Ramón Morales-Santana 13岁时移居美国，此后大部分时间居住在该国。现面临驱逐出境，他主张基于其生父José Morales的公民身份而在出生时即为美国公民，José Morales承担了父母责任并将Morales-Santana纳入其家庭。José Morales于1900年3月19日出生在波多黎各Guánica。记录55–56。波多黎各当时与现在一样，是美国的一部分，见Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2016)（slip op., at 2–4）；8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(38)（1958年版）（“The term United States . . . means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the [U. S.] Virgin Islands.”（内部引号省略））；§1101(a)(38)（2012年版）（类似），且José根据《波多黎各组织法》成为美国公民，ch. 145, §5, 39 Stat. 953（8 U. S. C. §1402的前身）。在波多黎各生活近二十年后，José于1919年2月27日离开童年家园，距其19岁生日差20天，因此未能满足§1401(a)(7)关于14岁后五年实际存在的要求。记录57, 66。他离开是为了在当时的美国占领下的多米尼加共和国为一家美国公司担任建筑机械师。同上。4

By 1959, José attested in a June 21, 1971 affidavit presented to the U. S. Embassy in the Dominican Repub­ lic, he was living with Yrma Santana Montilla, a Domini­ can woman he would eventually marry. Id., at 57. In 1962, Yrma gave birth to their child, respondent Luis Morales-Santana. Id., at 166–167. While the record before us reveals little about Morales-Santana’s childhood, the Dominican archives disclose that Yrma and José mar­ ried in 1970, and that José was then added to Morales­ Santana’s birth certificate as his father. Id., at 163–164, 167. José also related in the same affidavit that he was then saving money “for the susten[ance] of [his] family” in anticipation of undergoing surgery in Puerto Rico, where members of his family still resided. Id., at 57. In 1975, when Morales-Santana was 13, he moved to Puerto Rico, id., at 368, and by 1976, the year his father died, he was attending public school in the Bronx, a New York City borough, id., at 140, 369. 5

1959年，何塞在1971年6月21日提交给美国驻多米尼加共和国大使馆的宣誓书中证实，他与伊尔玛·桑塔纳·蒙蒂利亚——一位他最终将与之结婚的多米尼加女性——同居。同上，第57页。1962年，伊尔玛生下了他们的孩子，即答辩人路易斯·莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳。同上，第166–167页。虽然我们面前的记录对莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳的童年揭示甚少，但多米尼加档案显示，伊尔玛与何塞于1970年结婚，随后何塞被添加为莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳出生证明上的父亲。同上，第163–164页、第167页。何塞还在同一份宣誓书中陈述，他当时正在存钱“以维持[他的]家庭”，为在波多黎各接受手术做准备，他的家人仍居住在那里。同上，第57页。1975年，莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳13岁时移居波多黎各，同上，第368页；到1976年——即他父亲去世的那一年——他已在布朗克斯区（纽约市的一个行政区）就读公立学校，同上，第140页、第369页。5

C In 2000, the Government placed Morales-Santana in removal proceedings based on several convictions for offenses under New York State Penal Law, all of them rendered on May 17, 1995. Id., at 426. Morales-Santana ranked as an alien despite the many years he lived in the United States, because, at the time of his birth, his father did not satisfy the requirement of five years’ physical presence after age 14. See supra, at 3–4, and n. 3. An immigration judge rejected Morales-Santana’s claim to citizenship derived from the U. S. citizenship of his father, and ordered Morales-Santana’s removal to the Dominican

C 2000年，政府依据纽约州刑法典下的多项定罪将莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳置于遣返程序中，所有定罪均于1995年5月17日作出。同上，第426页。尽管莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳在美国生活多年，他仍被归类为外国人，因为在他出生时，其父亲未满足14岁后实际居住五年的要求。见上文第3–4页及脚注3。一名移民法官驳回了莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳关于从其父亲的美国公民身份衍生公民身份的主张，并下令将莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳遣返至多米尼加

Republic. Record 253, 366; App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a–49a. In 2010, Morales-Santana moved to reopen the proceed­ ings, asserting that the Government’s refusal to recognize that he derived citizenship from his U. S.-citizen father violated the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee. See Record 27, 45. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the motion. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a, 42a– 44a.

共和国。记录第253页、第366页；调卷令申请附录第45a–49a页。2010年，莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳动议重新启动程序，主张政府拒绝承认他从美国公民父亲处衍生公民身份违反了宪法的平等保护保障。见记录第27页、第45页。移民上诉委员会（BIA）驳回了该动议。调卷令申请附录第8a页、第42a–44a页。

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the BIA’s decision. 804 F. 3d 520, 524 (2015). Relying on this Court’s post-1970 construction of the equal protection principle as it bears on gender-based classifications, the court held unconstitutional the differ­ ential treatment of unwed mothers and fathers. Id., at 527–535. To cure the constitutional flaw, the court further held that Morales-Santana derived citizenship through his father, just as he would were his mother the U. S. citizen. Id., at 535–538. In so ruling, the Second Circuit declined to follow the conflicting decision of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F. 3d 990 (2008), see 804 F. 3d, at 530, 535, n. 17. We granted certiorari in Flores-Villar, but ultimately affirmed by an equally divided Court. Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U. S. 210 (2011) ( per curiam). Taking up Morales-Santana’s request for review, 579 U. S. ___ (2016), we consider the matter anew.

美国第二巡回上诉法院推翻了BIA的决定。804 F. 3d 520, 524 (2015)。依据本法院1970年后对涉及性别分类的平等保护原则的阐释，该法院裁定未婚母亲与未婚父亲的差别待遇违宪。同上，第527–535页。为纠正宪法缺陷，该法院进一步裁定，莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳通过其父亲衍生公民身份，正如其母亲为美国公民时他本应如此。同上，第535–538页。在作出该裁定时，第二巡回法院拒绝遵循第九巡回法院在United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F. 3d 990 (2008)中的冲突判决，见804 F. 3d, at 530, 535, n. 17。我们在Flores-Villar案中批准了调卷令，但最终由意见均分的法院维持原判。Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U. S. 210 (2011) (per curiam)。受理莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳的复审请求，579 U. S. ___ (2016)，我们重新审议此事项。

II Because §1409 treats sons and daughters alike, Morales- Santana does not suffer discrimination on the basis of his gender. He complains, instead, of gender-based discrimi­ nation against his father, who was unwed at the time of Morales-Santana’s birth and was not accorded the right an unwed U. S.-citizen mother would have to transmit citi­ zenship to her child. Although the Government does not contend otherwise, we briefly explain why Morales­

II 由于第§1409条对儿子和女儿一视同仁，莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳并未因其性别而遭受歧视。相反，他申诉的是针对其父亲的性别歧视，其父亲在莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳出生时未婚，未被赋予未婚美国公民母亲向子女传递公民身份的权利。尽管政府未作相反主张，我们简要解释为何莫拉莱斯-

Santana may seek to vindicate his father’s right to the equal protection of the laws. 6

桑塔纳可以寻求维护其父亲获得法律平等保护的权利。6

Ordinarily, a party “must assert his own legal rights” and “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights . . . of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975). But we recognize an exception where, as here, “the party asserting the right has a close relationship with the person who possesses the right [and] there is a hindrance to the possessor’s ability to protect his own interests.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 125, 130 (2004) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 411 (1991)). José Morales’ ability to pass citizenship to his son, respondent Morales- Santana, easily satisfies the “close relationship” require­ ment. So, too, is the “hindrance” requirement well met. José Morales’ failure to assert a claim in his own right “stems from disability,” not “disinterest,” Miller v. Al­ bright, 523 U. S. 420, 450 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment), for José died in 1976, Record 140, many years before the current controversy arose. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704, 711–712, 723, n. 7 (1987) (children and their guardians may assert Fifth Amendment rights of deceased relatives). Morales-Santana is thus the “obvi­ ous claimant,” see Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976), the “best available proponent,” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 116 (1976), of his father’s right to equal protection.

通常，一方“必须主张自己的法律权利”，且“不能将其救济请求建立在……第三方的法律权利之上”。Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975)。但我们承认一项例外，即如本案，“主张权利的一方与拥有权利的人有密切关系[且]拥有权利者保护自身利益的能力存在障碍。”Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 125, 130 (2004)（引用Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 411 (1991)）。何塞·莫拉莱斯向其子即答辩人莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳传递公民身份的能力，轻松满足“密切关系”要求。“障碍”要求也同样充分满足。何塞·莫拉莱斯未能以自己的名义提出主张，“源于无能力”而非“不关心”，Miller v. Albright, 523 U. S. 420, 450 (1998)（O’Connor大法官，同意判决意见），因为何塞于1976年去世，记录第140页，远早于当前争议产生。见Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704, 711–712, 723, n. 7 (1987)（子女及其监护人可主张已故亲属的第五修正案权利）。因此，莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳是其父亲获得平等保护权利的“明显主张者”，见Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976)，“最佳可用主张者”，Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 116 (1976)。

III Sections 1401 and 1409, we note, date from an era when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife with overbroad gen­ eralizations about the way men and women are. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 62 (1961) (women are the

III 我们注意到，第§1401条和第§1409条源自一个时代，当时我国的法律书籍充斥着关于男女行为方式的过于宽泛的概括。见，例如，Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 62 (1961)（女性是

“center of home and family life,” therefore they can be “relieved from the civic duty of jury service”); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464, 466 (1948) (States may draw “a sharp line between the sexes”). Today, laws of this kind are subject to review under the heightened scrutiny that now attends “all gender-based classifications.” J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 136 (1994); see, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 555–556 (1996) (state-maintained military academy may not deny admis­ sion to qualified women).

“家庭和家庭生活的中心”，因此她们可以“免于陪审服务的公民义务”）；Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464, 466 (1948)（各州可以“在性别之间划出鲜明界线”）。如今，此类法律须接受现在适用于“所有性别分类”的强化审查。J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 136 (1994)；见，例如，United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 555–556 (1996)（州立军事学院不得拒绝录取合格女性）。

Laws granting or denying benefits “on the basis of the sex of the qualifying parent,” our post-1970 decisions affirm, differentiate on the basis of gender, and therefore attract heightened review under the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 84 (1979); see id., at 88–89 (holding unconstitutional provision of unemployed-parent benefits exclusively to fathers). Accord Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 206– 207 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional a Social Security classification that denied widowers survi­ vors’ benefits available to widows); Weinberger v. Wiesen­ feld, 420 U. S. 636, 648–653 (1975) (holding unconstitu­ tional a Social Security classification that excluded fathers from receipt of child-in-care benefits available to mothers); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 688–691 (1973) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional exclusion of married female officers in the military from benefits au­ tomatically accorded married male officers); cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 74, 76–77 (1971) (holding unconstitu­ tional a probate-code preference for a father over a mother as administrator of a deceased child’s estate). 7

我们1970年后的判决确认，基于“合格父母的性别”授予或拒绝福利的法律，构成基于性别的区别对待，因此应受宪法平等保护保障下的强化审查。Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 84 (1979)；见同上，第88–89页（裁定仅向父亲提供失业父母福利的条款违宪）。一致意见见Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 206–207 (1977)（复数意见）（裁定拒绝鳏夫享有寡妇可得的遗属福利的社会保障分类违宪）；Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 648–653 (1975)（裁定将父亲排除在母亲可得的育儿福利之外的社会保障分类违宪）；Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 688–691 (1973)（复数意见）（裁定将已婚女性军官排除在已婚男性军官自动享有的福利之外违宪）；参见Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 74, 76–77 (1971)（裁定遗嘱法典中父亲优先于母亲担任已故子女遗产管理人的规定违宪）。7

Prescribing one rule for mothers, another for fathers, §1409 is of the same genre as the classifications we de­ clared unconstitutional in Reed, Frontiero, Wiesenfeld, Goldfarb, and Westcott. As in those cases, heightened scrutiny is in order. Successful defense of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender, we have reiterated, requires an “exceedingly persuasive justification.” Virginia, 518 U. S., at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 461 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).

为母亲规定一条规则，为父亲规定另一条规则，第§1409条与我们在Reed、Frontiero、Wiesenfeld、Goldfarb和Westcott案中宣告违宪的分类属于同一类型。如同那些案件，应进行强化审查。我们已重申，成功为基于性别区别对待的立法辩护，需要“极具说服力的正当理由”。Virginia, 518 U. S., at 531（省略内部引号）；Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 461 (1981)（省略内部引号）。

A The defender of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender must show “at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substan­ tially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 (1982); alteration in original); see Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 60, 70 (2001). Moreover, the classification must substantially serve an important governmental interest today, for “in interpreting the [e]qual [p]rotection [guarantee], [we have] recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality . . . that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 20). Here, the Govern­ ment has supplied no “exceedingly persuasive justifica­ tion,” Virginia, 518 U. S., at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted), for §1409(a) and (c)’s “gender-based” and “gender­ biased” disparity, Westcott, 443 U. S., at 84 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A 为基于性别区别对待的立法辩护者必须表明“至少[受质疑的]分类服务于重要的政府目标，且所采用的歧视性手段与实现这些目标有实质性关联。”Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533（引用Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 (1982)；原文有改动）；见Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 60, 70 (2001)。此外，该分类必须在今天实质上服务于重要的政府利益，因为“在解释[平]等[保]护[保障]时，[我们]认识到新的见解和社会理解可以揭示……曾经未被注意和未被质疑的……不正当不平等。”Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015)（slip op., at 20）。在此，政府未对第§1409(a)和(c)条的“基于性别”和“性别偏向”差异提供“极具说服力的正当理由”，Virginia, 518 U. S., at 531（省略内部引号），Westcott, 443 U. S., at 84（省略内部引号）。

1 History reveals what lurks behind §1409. Enacted in ——————

1 历史揭示了第§1409条背后隐藏的东西。该条颁布于

the Nationality Act of 1940 (1940 Act), see 54 Stat. 1139– 1140, §1409 ended a century and a half of congressional silence on the citizenship of children born abroad to unwed parents. 8 During this era, two once habitual, but now untenable, assumptions pervaded our Nation’s citizenship laws and underpinned judicial and administrative rulings: In marriage, husband is dominant, wife subordinate; unwed mother is the natural and sole guardian of a non- marital child.

1940年《国籍法》（1940年法），见54 Stat. 1139–1140，第§1409条结束了国会一个半世纪对未婚父母海外出生子女公民身份的沉默。8在这一时代，两个曾经惯常但现已站不住脚的假设弥漫于我国的公民身份法律，并成为司法和行政裁决的基础：在婚姻中，丈夫主导，妻子服从；未婚母亲是非婚生子女的自然且唯一监护人。

Under the once entrenched principle of male dominance in marriage, the husband controlled both wife and child. “[D]ominance [of] the husband,” this Court observed in 1915, “is an ancient principle of our jurisprudence.” Mac­ kenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 311 (1915). 9 See generally Brief for Professors of History et al. as Amici Curiae 4–15. Through the early 20th century, a male citizen automati­ cally conferred U. S. citizenship on his alien wife. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, §2, 10 Stat. 604; see Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498 (1869) (the 1855 Act “confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to citizens of the United States”); C. Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship 15–16, 20–21 (1998). A female citizen, however, was incapable of con­ ferring citizenship on her husband; indeed, she was sub­ ject to expatriation if she married an alien. 10 The family of

在曾经根深蒂固的婚姻中男性主导原则下，丈夫控制妻子和孩子。本法院在1915年指出，“丈夫的主导地位”“是我们法理学的一项古老原则。”Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 311 (1915)。9 参见 generally 历史学教授等作为法庭之友的简报第4–15页。直至20世纪初，男性公民自动将美国公民身份授予其外籍妻子。1855年2月10日法案，第71章，第2条，10 Stat. 604；参见 Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498 (1869)（1855年法案“将公民身份的特权授予与美国公民结婚的妇女”）；C. Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship 15–16, 20–21 (1998)。然而，女性公民无法将公民身份授予其丈夫；事实上，如果她与外国人结婚，她将被剥夺国籍。10 该家庭

a citizen or a lawfully admitted permanent resident en­ joyed statutory exemptions from entry requirements, but only if the citizen or resident was male. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, §37, 32 Stat. 1221 (wives and children entering the country to join permanent-resident aliens and found to have contracted contagious diseases during transit shall not be deported if the diseases were easily curable or did not present a danger to others); S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 415–417 (1950) (wives exempt from literacy and quota requirements). And from 1790 until 1934, the foreign-born child of a married couple gained U. S. citizenship only through the father. 11

公民或合法获准永久居民享有入境要求的法定豁免，但仅限于该公民或居民为男性。参见，例如，1903年3月3日法案，第1012章，第37条，32 Stat. 1221（入境与永久居民外国人团聚的妻儿，若在过境期间被认定感染传染病，如该疾病易于治愈或不对他人构成危险，则不得被驱逐出境）；S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 415–417 (1950)（妻子豁免于识字和配额要求）。而从1790年至1934年，已婚夫妇的外国出生子女仅通过父亲获得美国公民身份。11

For unwed parents, the father-controls tradition never held sway. Instead, the mother was regarded as the child’s natural and sole guardian. At common law, the mother, and only the mother, was “bound to maintain [a nonmarital child] as its natural guardian.” 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *215–*216 (8th ed. 1854); see Nguyen, 533 U. S., at 91–92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In line with that understanding, in the early 20th century, the State Department sometimes permitted ——————

对于未婚父母，父亲控制传统从未占据主导。相反，母亲被视为孩子的自然和唯一监护人。在普通法中，母亲，且只有母亲，“有义务作为其自然监护人抚养[非婚生子女]。”2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *215–*216 (8th ed. 1854)；参见 Nguyen, 533 U. S., at 91–92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)。根据这一理解，在20世纪初，国务院有时允许

unwed mothers to pass citizenship to their children, de­ spite the absence of any statutory authority for the prac­ tice. See Hearings on H. R. 6127 before the House Com­ mittee on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 43, 431 (1940) (hereinafter 1940 Hearings); 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 397, 397–398 (1939); 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 290, 291 (1939). See also Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus San­ guinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 Yale L. J. 2134, 2199–2205 (2014) (hereinafter Collins).

未婚母亲将公民身份传给其子女，尽管该做法缺乏任何法定授权。参见 Hearings on H. R. 6127 before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 43, 431 (1940)（以下简称1940 Hearings）；39 Op. Atty. Gen. 397, 397–398 (1939)；39 Op. Atty. Gen. 290, 291 (1939)。另参见 Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 Yale L. J. 2134, 2199–2205 (2014)（以下简称Collins）。

In the 1940 Act, Congress discarded the father-controls assumption concerning married parents, but codified the mother-as-sole-guardian perception regarding unmarried parents. The Roosevelt administration, which proposed §1409, explained: “[T]he mother [of a nonmarital child] stands in the place of the father . . . [,] has a right to the custody and control of such a child as against the putative father, and is bound to maintain it as its natu- ral guardian.” 1940 Hearings 431 (internal quotation marks omitted).

在1940年法案中，国会抛弃了关于已婚父母的父亲控制假设，但编纂了关于未婚父母的母亲作为唯一监护人的观念。提出§1409的罗斯福政府解释说：“[非婚生子女的]母亲[ ]代替父亲……[，]有权对抗推定父亲获得该子女的监护和控制权，并有义务作为其自然监护人抚养该子女。”1940 Hearings 431（内部引号省略）。

This unwed-mother-as-natural-guardian notion renders §1409’s gender-based residency rules understandable. Fearing that a foreign-born child could turn out “more alien than American in character,” the administration believed that a citizen parent with lengthy ties to the United States would counteract the influence of the alien parent. Id., at 426–427. Concern about the attachment of foreign-born children to the United States explains the treatment of unwed citizen fathers, who, according to the familiar stereotype, would care little about, and have scant contact with, their nonmarital children. For unwed citizen mothers, however, there was no need for a pro­ longed residency prophylactic: The alien father, who might transmit foreign ways, was presumptively out of the pic­ ture. See id., at 431; Collins 2203 (in “nearly uniform view” of U. S. officials, “almost invariably,” the mother

这种未婚母亲作为自然监护人的观念使§1409基于性别的居住规则变得可以理解。由于担心外国出生的子女可能变得“在性格上更像外国人而非美国人”，政府认为与美国有长期联系的公民父母将抵消外国父母的影响。同上，第426–427页。对外国出生子女与美国联系的担忧解释了未婚公民父亲的处理方式，根据熟悉的刻板印象，他们很少关心非婚生子女，与其接触甚少。然而，对于未婚公民母亲，则无需长期居住的预防措施：可能传递外国方式的外国父亲，推定不在考虑之列。参见同上，第431页；Collins 2203（在美国官员“几乎一致的观点”中，“几乎无一例外”，母亲

alone “concern[ed] herself with [a nonmarital] child” (in­ ternal quotation marks omitted)).

独自“关心[非婚]子女”（内部引号省略））。

2 For close to a half century, as earlier observed, see supra, at 7–8, this Court has viewed with suspicion laws that rely on “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.” Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533; see Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 643, 648. In particular, we have recognized that if a “stat­ utory objective is to exclude or ‘protect’ members of one gender” in reliance on “fixed notions concerning [that gender’s] roles and abilities,” the “objective itself is illegit­ imate.” Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U. S., at 725. In accord with this eventual understanding, the Court has held that no “important [governmental] interest” is served by laws grounded, as §1409(a) and (c) are, in the obsolescing view that “unwed fathers [are] invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers” to take responsibility for nonmarital children. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 382, 394 (1979). 12 Overbroad generalizations of that order, the Court has come to comprehend, have a con­ straining impact, descriptive though they may be of the

2 近半个世纪以来，如先前所述，参见 supra, at 7–8，本法院一直以怀疑的眼光看待依赖“关于男性和女性不同才能、能力或偏好的过度宽泛概括”的法律。Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533；参见 Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 643, 648。特别是，我们已认识到，如果“法定目标是排除或‘保护’某一性别的成员”，依赖“关于[该性别]角色和能力的固定观念”，则“目标本身即为非法”。Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U. S., at 725。根据这一最终理解，本法院裁定，§1409(a)和(c)所依据的、正在过时的观点——即“未婚父亲[ ]总是比母亲更不合格、更无权”对非婚生子女承担责任——不服务于任何“重要的[政府]利益”。Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 382, 394 (1979)。12 本法院已认识到，此类过度宽泛的概括具有限制性影响，尽管它们可能描述

way many people still order their lives. 13 Laws according or denying benefits in reliance on “[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles,” the Court has observed, may “creat[e] a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that force[s] women to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver.” Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 736 (2003). Correspondingly, such laws may disserve men who exercise responsibility for raising their children. See ibid. In light of the equal protection jurisprudence this Court has developed since 1971, see Virginia, 518 U. S., at 531–534, §1409(a) and (c)’s discrete duration-of-residence requirements for unwed mothers and fathers who have accepted parental responsi­ bility is stunningly anachronistic.

许多人仍然如此安排他们的生活。13 本法院指出，依据“[关于女性家庭角色的]刻板印象”授予或拒绝福利的法律，可能“制造一个自我实现的歧视循环，迫使女性继续承担主要家庭照顾者的角色”。Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 736 (2003)。相应地，此类法律可能不利于承担抚养子女责任的男性。参见同上。鉴于本法院自1971年以来发展的平等保护法理学，参见 Virginia, 518 U. S., at 531–534，§1409(a)和(c)对已接受父母责任的未婚母亲和父亲的不同居住期限要求，是极其过时的。

B In urging this Court nevertheless to reject Morales­ Santana’s equal protection plea, the Government cites three decisions of this Court: Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787 (1977); Miller v. Albright, 523 U. S. 420; and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53. None controls this case. The 1952 Act provision at issue in Fiallo gave special immigration preferences to alien children of citizen (or

B 在敦促本法院尽管如此仍拒绝Morales-Santana的平等保护请求时，政府引用了本法院的三项判决：Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787 (1977)；Miller v. Albright, 523 U. S. 420；以及 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53。无一控制本案。Fiallo中涉及的1952年法案条款给予公民（或

lawful-permanent-resident) mothers, and to alien unwed mothers of citizen (or lawful-permanent-resident) children. 430 U. S., at 788–789, and n. 1. Unwed fathers and their children, asserting their right to equal protection, sought the same preferences. Id., at 791. Applying minimal scrutiny (rational-basis review), the Court upheld the provision, relying on Congress’ “exceptionally broad power” to admit or exclude aliens. Id., at 792, 794. 14 This case, however, involves no entry preference for aliens. Morales- Santana claims he is, and since birth has been, a U. S. citizen. Examining a claim of that order, the Court has not disclaimed, as it did in Fiallo, the application of an exacting standard of review. See Nguyen, 533 U. S., at 60–61, 70; Miller, 523 U. S., at 434–435, n. 11 (opinion of Stevens, J.).

合法永久居民）母亲，以及公民（或合法永久居民）子女的外籍未婚母亲。430 U. S., at 788–789, and n. 1。未婚父亲及其子女主张平等保护权利，寻求相同的优惠。Id., at 791。适用最低审查（理性基础审查），法院维持了该条款，依据国会“异常广泛权力”接纳或排除外籍人。Id., at 792, 794。14 然而，本案不涉及外籍人的入境优惠。Morales-Santana声称他是，并且自出生以来一直是，美国公民。审查此类主张时，法院没有像在Fiallo案中那样放弃适用严格审查标准。参见Nguyen, 533 U. S., at 60–61, 70；Miller, 523 U. S., at 434–435, n. 11（Stevens大法官意见）。

The provision challenged in Miller and Nguyen as viola­ tive of equal protection requires unwed U. S.-citizen fa­ thers, but not mothers, to formally acknowledge parenthood of their foreign-born children in order to transmit their U. S. citizenship to those children. See §1409(a)(4) (2012 ed.). 15 After Miller produced no opinion

在Miller和Nguyen案中被挑战为违反平等保护的条款要求未婚美国公民父亲，而非母亲，正式承认其外国出生子女的亲子关系，以便将美国公民身份传给这些子女。参见§1409(a)(4)（2012年版）。15 在Miller案未产生意见

for the Court, see 523 U. S., at 423, we took up the issue anew in Nguyen. There, the Court held that imposing a paternal-acknowledgment requirement on fathers was a justifiable, easily met means of ensuring the existence of a biological parent-child relationship, which the mother establishes by giving birth. See 533 U. S., at 62–63. Morales-Santana’s challenge does not renew the contest over §1409’s paternal-acknowledgment requirement (whether the current version or that in effect in 1970), and the Government does not dispute that Morales-Santana’s father, by marrying Morales-Santana’s mother, satisfied that requirement.

法院意见，参见523 U. S., at 423，我们在Nguyen案中重新讨论了该问题。在那里，法院认为，对父亲施加承认父权的要求是确保生物亲子关系存在的可正当化且容易满足的手段，而母亲通过分娩确立该关系。参见533 U. S., at 62–63。Morales-Santana的挑战没有重新对§1409的承认父权要求（无论是当前版本还是1970年生效的版本）提出争议，并且政府不争议Morales-Santana的父亲通过娶Morales-Santana的母亲满足了该要求。

Unlike the paternal-acknowledgment requirement at issue in Nguyen and Miller, the physical-presence re­ quirements now before us relate solely to the duration of the parent’s prebirth residency in the United States, not to the parent’s filial tie to the child. As the Court of Ap­ peals observed in this case, a man needs no more time in the United States than a woman “in order to have assimi­ lated citizenship-related values to transmit to [his] child.” 804 F. 3d, at 531. And unlike Nguyen’s parental- acknowledgment requirement, §1409(a)’s age-calibrated physical-presence requirements cannot fairly be described as “minimal.” 533 U. S., at 70.

与Nguyen和Miller案中争议的承认父权要求不同，现在面前的亲身存在要求仅涉及父母在子女出生前在美国居住的持续时间，而非父母与子女的亲子关系。正如上诉法院在本案中观察到的，男性不需要比女性更多的时间在美国“以吸收与公民身份相关的价值观传递给[他的]子女”。804 F. 3d, at 531。并且与Nguyen案的父母承认要求不同，§1409(a)的按年龄校准的亲身存在要求不能公平地描述为“最低限度”。533 U. S., at 70。

C Notwithstanding §1409(a) and (c)’s provenance in tradi­

C 尽管§1409(a)和(c)源于传统

tional notions of the way women and men are, the Gov­ ernment maintains that the statute serves two important objectives: (1) ensuring a connection between the child to become a citizen and the United States and (2) preventing “statelessness,” i.e., a child’s possession of no citizenship at all. Even indulging the assumption that Congress intended §1409 to serve these interests, but see supra, at 9–13, neither rationale survives heightened scrutiny.

关于男女行为方式的传统观念，政府主张该法规服务于两个重要目标：(1) 确保将成为公民的子女与美国之间的联系，以及(2) 防止“无国籍”，即子女完全不拥有任何公民身份。即使假设国会意图§1409服务于这些利益，但参见上文第9–13页，两种理由都无法通过严格审查。

1 We take up first the Government’s assertion that §1409(a) and (c)’s gender-based differential ensures that a child born abroad has a connection to the United States of sufficient strength to warrant conferral of citizenship at birth. The Government does not contend, nor could it, that unmarried men take more time to absorb U. S. values than unmarried women do. See supra, at 16. Instead, it presents a novel argument, one it did not advance in

1 我们首先讨论政府的断言，即§1409(a)和(c)的基于性别的差异确保外国出生子女与美国有足够强度的联系，以证明出生时授予公民身份是正当的。政府不主张，也不能主张，未婚男性比未婚女性需要更多时间吸收美国价值观。参见上文第16页。相反，它提出了一个新论点，这是它在

16 Flores-Villar.

16 Flores-Villar案中没有提出的。

An unwed mother, the Government urges, is the child’s only “legally recognized” parent at the time of childbirth. Brief for Petitioner 9–10, 28–32. 17 An unwed citizen fa­ ther enters the scene later, as a second parent. A longer physical connection to the United States is warranted for the unwed father, the Government maintains, because of the “competing national influence” of the alien mother. Id., at 9–10. Congress, the Government suggests, de­ signed the statute to bracket an unwed U. S.-citizen mother with a married couple in which both parents are U. S.

政府敦促，未婚母亲是子女出生时唯一“法律承认”的父母。Brief for Petitioner 9–10, 28–32。17 未婚公民父亲后来作为第二父母进入场景。政府主张，对于未婚父亲，需要更长的与美国实际联系，因为外籍母亲的“竞争性国家影响”。Id., at 9–10。政府建议，国会设计该法规是为了将未婚美国公民母亲与双方父母均为美国

citizens, 18 and to align an unwed U. S.-citizen father with a married couple, one spouse a citizen, the other, an alien.

公民的已婚夫妇并列，18 并将未婚美国公民父亲与已婚夫妇并列，一方为公民，另一方为外籍人。

Underlying this apparent design is the assumption that the alien father of a nonmarital child born abroad to a U. S.-citizen mother will not accept parental responsibil­ ity. For an actual affiliation between alien father and nonmarital child would create the “competing national influence” that, according to the Government, justifies imposing on unwed U. S.-citizen fathers, but not unwed U. S.-citizen mothers, lengthy physical-presence require­ ments. Hardly gender neutral, see id., at 9, that assump­ tion conforms to the long-held view that unwed fathers care little about, indeed are strangers to, their children. See supra, at 9–13. Lump characterization of that kind, however, no longer passes equal protection inspection. See supra, at 13–14, and n. 13. Accepting, arguendo, that Congress intended the diverse physical-presence prescriptions to serve an interest in ensuring a connection between the foreign-born nonmari­ tal child and the United States, the gender-based means scarcely serve the posited end. The scheme permits the transmission of citizenship to children who have no tie to the United States so long as their mother was a U. S. citizen continuously present in the United States for one year at any point in her life prior to the child’s birth. The transmission holds even if the mother marries the child’s alien father immediately after the child’s birth and never returns with the child to the United States. At the same time, the legislation precludes citizenship transmission by a U. S.-citizen father who falls a few days short of meeting §1401(a)(7)’s longer physical-presence requirements, even ——————

这一明显设计的基础是假设：美国公民母亲在国外非婚生子女的外籍父亲不会承担父母责任。因为外籍父亲与非婚生子女之间的实际联系会创造“竞争性国家影响”，据政府称，这证明对未婚美国公民父亲而非未婚美国公民母亲施加长期亲身存在要求是正当的。 hardly gender neutral, see id., at 9，该假设符合长期观点，即未婚父亲很少关心，实际上对其子女是陌生人。参见上文第9–13页。然而，这种笼统定性不再通过平等保护审查。参见上文第13–14页及n. 13。 假设（arguendo）国会意图各种亲身存在规定服务于确保外国出生非婚生子女与美国之间联系的利益，基于性别的手段几乎不服务于所设目标。该方案允许将公民身份传给与美国无联系的子女，只要其母亲在子女出生前任何时间作为美国公民连续在美国实际存在一年。即使母亲在子女出生后立即嫁给子女的外籍父亲并且从未带子女返回美国，传递仍然成立。同时，立法排除美国公民父亲传递公民身份，如果他差几天未满足§1401(a)(7)的更长亲身存在要求，即使

if the father acknowledges paternity on the day of the child’s birth and raises the child in the United States. 19 One cannot see in this driven-by-gender scheme the close means-end fit required to survive heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U. S. 142, 151–152 (1980) (holding unconstitutional state workers’ compensation death-benefits statute presuming widows’ but not widowers’ dependence on their spouse’s earnings); Westcott, 443 U. S., at 88–89.

如果父亲在子女出生当天承认父权并在美国抚养子女。19 人们无法在这种由性别驱动的方案中看到通过严格审查所需的密切手段-目的契合。参见，例如，Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U. S. 142, 151–152 (1980)（裁定州工人补偿死亡福利法规推定寡妇而非鳏夫依赖配偶收入违宪）；Westcott, 443 U. S., at 88–89。

2 The Government maintains that Congress established the gender-based residency differential in §1409(a) and (c) to reduce the risk that a foreign-born child of a U. S. citi­ zen would be born stateless. Brief for Petitioner 33. This risk, according to the Government, was substantially greater for the foreign-born child of an unwed U. S.-citizen mother than it was for the foreign-born child of an unwed U. S.-citizen father. Ibid. But there is little reason to believe that a statelessness concern prompted the diverse physical-presence requirements. Nor has the Government shown that the risk of statelessness disproportionately endangered the children of unwed mothers.

2 政府主张，国会制定§1409(a)和(c)中基于性别居住差异是为了降低美国公民的外国出生子女出生时无国籍的风险。Brief for Petitioner 33。据政府称，这种风险对于未婚美国公民母亲的外国出生子女远大于未婚美国公民父亲的外国出生子女。Ibid。但几乎没有理由相信无国籍担忧促成了各种亲身存在要求。政府也没有表明无国籍风险不成比例地危及未婚母亲的子女。

As the Court of Appeals pointed out, with one excep­ ——————

正如上诉法院所指出的，除了一项例外—— ——————

tion, 20 nothing in the congressional hearings and reports on the 1940 and 1952 Acts “refer[s] to the problem of statelessness for children born abroad.” 804 F. 3d, at 532– 533. See Collins 2205, n. 283 (author examined “many hundreds of pre-1940 administrative memos . . . de­ fend[ing] or explain[ing] recognition of the nonmarital foreign-born children of American mothers as citizens”; of the hundreds, “exactly one memo by a U. S. official . . . mentions the risk of statelessness for the foreign-born nonmarital children of American mothers as a concern”). Reducing the incidence of statelessness was the express goal of other sections of the 1940 Act. See 1940 Hearings 430 (“stateless[ness]” is “object” of section on foundlings). The justification for §1409’s gender-based dichotomy, however, was not the child’s plight, it was the mother’s role as the “natural guardian” of a nonmarital child. See supra, at 9–13; Collins 2205 (“[T]he pronounced gender asymmetry of the Nationality Act’s treatment of nonmari­ tal foreign-born children of American mothers and fathers was shaped by contemporary maternalist norms regarding the mother’s relationship with her nonmarital child—and

……20在国会关于1940年和1952年法案的听证会和报告中，没有任何内容“提及在国外出生的儿童的无国籍问题”。804 F. 3d，第532–533页。见Collins第2205页，脚注283（作者审查了“数百份1940年前的行政备忘录……为承认美国母亲的非婚外国出生子女为公民进行辩护或解释”；在数百份备忘录中，“只有一份美国官员的备忘录……提到美国母亲的非婚外国出生子女的无国籍风险是一个关切”）。减少无国籍现象的发生是1940年法案其他条款的明确目标。见1940年听证会第430页（“无国籍”是弃儿条款的“目标”）。然而，§1409基于性别的二分法的理由并非儿童的困境，而是母亲作为非婚子女“自然监护人”的角色。见上文第9–13页；Collins第2205页（“《国籍法》对美国母亲和美国父亲的非婚外国出生子女待遇的显著性别不对称，是由当时关于母亲与非婚子女关系的母性主义规范所塑造的——并且

the father’s lack of such a relationship.”). It will not do to “hypothesiz[e] or inven[t]” governmental purposes for gender classifications “post hoc in response to litigation.” Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533, 535–536.

……父亲缺乏这种关系。”）。在性别分类问题上，“事后为应对诉讼而”“假设或发明”政府目的，是不行的。弗吉尼亚案，518 U. S.，第533、535–536页。

Infecting the Government’s risk-of-statelessness argu­ ment is an assumption without foundation. “[F]oreign laws that would put the child of the U. S.-citizen mother at risk of statelessness (by not providing for the child to acquire the father’s citizenship at birth),” the Government asserts, “would protect the child of the U. S.-citizen father against statelessness by providing that the child would take his mother’s citizenship.” Brief for Petitioner 35. The Government, however, neglected to expose this sup­ posed “protection” to a reality check. Had it done so, it would have recognized the formidable impediments placed by foreign laws on an unwed mother’s transmission of citizenship to her child. See Brief for Scholars on State­ lessness as Amici Curiae 13–22, A1–A15.

政府关于无国籍风险的论点中渗透着一个没有根据的假设。政府声称，“那些会使美国公民母亲的子女面临无国籍风险的外国法律（因为不规定子女在出生时获得父亲的公民身份）”，“会通过规定子女取得母亲的公民身份来保护美国公民父亲的子女免于无国籍。”申请人陈述第35页。然而，政府未能对这一所谓的“保护”进行现实检验。如果进行了检验，它就会认识到外国法律对未婚母亲向其子女传递公民身份所设置的巨大障碍。见无国籍问题学者作为法庭之友的陈述第13–22页，A1–A15。

Experts who have studied the issue report that, at the time relevant here, in “at least thirty countries,” citizen mothers generally could not transmit their citizenship to nonmarital children born within the mother’s country. Id., at 14; see id., at 14–17. “[A]s many as forty-five coun­ tries,” they further report, “did not permit their female citizens to assign nationality to a nonmarital child born outside the subject country with a foreign father.” Id., at 18; see id., at 18–21. In still other countries, they also observed, there was no legislation in point, leaving the nationality of nonmarital children uncertain. Id., at 21–22; see Sandifer, A Comparative Study of Laws Relating to Nationality at Birth and to Loss of Nationality, 29 Am. J. Int’l L. 248, 256, 258 (1935) (of 79 nations studied, about half made no specific provision for the nationality of non- marital children). Taking account of the foreign laws actually in force, these experts concluded, “the risk of parenting stateless children abroad was, as of [1940 and

研究该问题的专家报告称，在相关时期，“至少在三十个国家”，公民母亲通常无法将公民身份传递给在母亲本国境内出生的非婚子女。同上，第14页；见同上，第14–17页。“多达四十五个国家”，他们进一步报告，“不允许其女性公民将国籍赋予与外国父亲在 subject country 境外所生的非婚子女。”同上，第18页；见同上，第18–21页。他们还观察到，在另外一些国家，没有相关立法，使非婚子女的国籍处于不确定状态。同上，第21–22页；见Sandifer，《关于出生国籍和丧失国籍法律的比较研究》，29 Am. J. Int’l L. 248, 256, 258（1935年）（在所研究的79个国家中，约一半没有对非婚子女的国籍作出具体规定）。考虑到实际生效的外国法律，这些专家得出结论，“在国外抚养无国籍子女的风险，截至[1940年和

1952], and remains today, substantial for unmarried U. S. fathers, a risk perhaps greater than that for unmarried U. S. mothers.” Brief for Scholars on Statelessness as Amici Curiae 9–10; see id., at 38–39. One can hardly characterize as gender neutral a scheme allegedly attend­ ing to the risk of statelessness for children of unwed U. S.­ citizen mothers while ignoring the same risk for children of unwed U. S.-citizen fathers.

1952年]，并且至今仍然，对未婚美国父亲来说是巨大的，这一风险或许大于未婚美国母亲的风险。”无国籍问题学者作为法庭之友的陈述第9–10页；见同上，第38–39页。一个据称关注未婚美国公民母亲子女的无国籍风险、却忽视未婚美国公民父亲子女的同样风险的方案，很难被描述为性别中立的。

In 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) undertook a ten-year project to elimi­ nate statelessness by 2024. See generally UNHCR, End­ ing Statelessness Within 10 Years, online at http:// www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/statelessness/546217229/ special-report-ending-statelessness-10-years.html (all Internet materials as last visited June 9, 2017). Cogni­ zant that discrimination against either mothers or fathers in citizenship and nationality laws is a major cause of statelessness, the Commissioner has made a key compo­ nent of its project the elimination of gender discrimination in such laws. UNHCR, The Campaign To End Stateless­ ness: April 2016 Update 1 (referring to speech of UNHCR “highlight[ing] the issue of gender discrimination in the nationality laws of 27 countries—a major cause of state­ lessness globally”), online at http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/ wp-content / uploads / Campaign-Update-April-2016.pdf; UNHCR, Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationali­ ty Laws and Statelessness 2016, p. 1 (“Ensuring gender equality in nationality laws can mitigate the risks of statelessness.”), online at http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 56de83ca4.html. In this light, we cannot countenance risk of statelessness as a reason to uphold, rather than strike out, differential treatment of unmarried women and men with regard to transmission of citizenship to their children.

2014年，联合国难民事务高级专员（UNHCR）开展了一个十年项目，旨在到2024年消除无国籍状态。参见 generally UNHCR, Ending Statelessness Within 10 Years, online at http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/statelessness/546217229/special-report-ending-statelessness-10-years.html（所有互联网材料最后访问于2017年6月9日）。认识到在公民身份和国籍法中对母亲或父亲的歧视是无国籍状态的一个主要原因，专员已将其项目的关键组成部分定为消除此类法律中的性别歧视。UNHCR, The Campaign To End Statelessness: April 2016 Update 1（提及UNHCR的讲话“强调27个国家国籍法中的性别歧视问题——全球无国籍状态的一个主要原因”），online at http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content / uploads / Campaign-Update-April-2016.pdf；UNHCR, Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality Laws and Statelessness 2016, p. 1（“确保国籍法中的性别平等可以减轻无国籍状态的风险。”），online at http://www.refworld.org/docid/56de83ca4.html。有鉴于此，我们不能将无国籍状态的风险作为维持而非废除未婚女性和男性在向其子女传递公民身份方面差别待遇的理由。

In sum, the Government has advanced no “exceedingly persuasive” justification for §1409(a) and (c)’s gender­

总之，政府未能为§1409(a)和(c)的性别

specific residency and age criteria. Those disparate crite­ ria, we hold, cannot withstand inspection under a Consti­ tution that requires the Government to respect the equal dignity and stature of its male and female citizens. 21

特定的居留和年龄标准提出任何“极具说服力”的理由。我们裁定，这些不同的标准无法通过一部要求政府尊重其男女公民平等尊严和地位的宪法的检验。21

IV While the equal protection infirmity in retaining a longer physical-presence requirement for unwed fathers than for unwed mothers is clear, this Court is not equipped to grant the relief Morales-Santana seeks, i.e., extending to his father (and, derivatively, to him) the benefit of the one-year physical-presence term §1409(c) reserves for unwed mothers. There are “two remedial alternatives,” our decisions instruct, Westcott, 443 U. S., at 89 (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result)), when a statute benefits one class (in this case, unwed mothers and their children), as §1409(c) does, and excludes another from the benefit (here, unwed fathers and their children). “[A] court may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion.” Westcott, 443 U. S., at 89 (quot­ ing Welsh, 398 U. S., at 361 (opinion of Harlan, J.)). 22

IV 虽然对未婚父亲保留比未婚母亲更长的实际居留要求存在平等保护缺陷是明确的，但本法院无法给予莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳所寻求的救济，即将其父亲（并由此及于他本人）纳入§1409(c)为未婚母亲保留的一年实际居留期限的利益。 当一项法规使一个群体（本案中为未婚母亲及其子女）受益，如§1409(c)所做的那样，并将另一个群体（此处为未婚父亲及其子女）排除在利益之外时，我们的判例指示，“有两种救济选择”，Westcott，443 U. S.，第89页（引用Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361（1970）（Harlan大法官，对结果 concurring））。“法院可以宣布[该法规]无效，并命令其利益不扩展到立法机关意图受益的群体，或者可以将法规的覆盖范围扩展到包括因被排除而受损害的人。”Westcott，443 U. S.，第89页（引用Welsh，398 U. S.，第361页（Harlan大法官意见））。22

“[W]hen the ‘right invoked is that to equal treatment,’ the appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well as by extension of benefits to the excluded class.” Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 740 (1984) (quoting Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Ben­ nett, 284 U. S. 239, 247 (1931); emphasis deleted). “How equality is accomplished . . . is a matter on which the Constitution is silent.” Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U. S. 413, 426–427 (2010). 23

“当‘所援引的权利是平等对待的权利’时，适当的救济是平等对待的命令，这一结果既可以通过从受优待群体撤回利益来实现，也可以通过将利益扩展到被排除群体来实现。”Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 740（1984）（引用Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239, 247（1931）；着重号删除）。“如何实现平等……是宪法未作规定的事项。”Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U. S. 413, 426–427（2010）。23

The choice between these outcomes is governed by the legislature’s intent, as revealed by the statute at hand. See id., at 427 (“On finding unlawful discrimination, . . . courts may attempt, within the bounds of their institu­ tional competence, to implement what the legislature would have willed had it been apprised of the constitu­ tional infirmity.”). See also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U. S. 320, 330 (2006) (“the touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative

这些结果之间的选择由立法机关的意图决定，而立法机关的意图通过手头的法规体现。参见同上，第427页（“在发现非法歧视时，……法院可以在其机构权限范围内，尝试实施如果立法机关被告知宪法缺陷本会意欲实施的内容。”）。另见Ayotte诉新英格兰北部计划生育组织案，546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006)（“关于救济的任何决定的试金石是立法机关的意图”）。

intent”). 24

意图”）。24

Ordinarily, we have reiterated, “extension, rather than nullification, is the proper course.” Westcott, 443 U. S., at 89. Illustratively, in a series of cases involving federal financial assistance benefits, the Court struck discrimina­ tory exceptions denying benefits to discrete groups, which meant benefits previously denied were extended. See, e.g., Goldfarb, 430 U. S., at 202–204, 213–217 (plurality opin­ ion) (survivors’ benefits), aff ’g 396 F. Supp. 308, 309 (EDNY 1975) (per curiam); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 630–631, and n. 2, 637–638 (1974) (disability benefits); Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 529–530, 538 (1973) (food stamps); Frontiero, 411 U. S., at 678–679, and n. 2, 691, and n. 25 (plurality opin­ ion) (military spousal benefits). Here, however, the dis­ criminatory exception consists of favorable treatment for a discrete group (a shorter physical-presence requirement for unwed U. S.-citizen mothers giving birth abroad). Following the same approach as in those benefits cases—

我们通常重申，“扩展而非无效是适当的做法。”Westcott案，443 U.S.，第89页。举例来说，在一系列涉及联邦财政援助福利的案件中，法院推翻了拒绝向离散群体提供福利的歧视性例外，这意味着以前被拒绝的福利被扩展。参见，例如，Goldfarb案，430 U.S.，第202–204、213–217页（ plurality意见）（遗属福利），维持396 F. Supp. 308, 309 (EDNY 1975)（ per curiam）；Jimenez诉Weinberger案，417 U.S. 628, 630–631, 及n. 2, 637–638 (1974)（残疾福利）；农业部诉Moreno案，413 U.S. 528, 529–530, 538 (1973)（食品券）；Frontiero案，411 U.S.，第678–679页，及n. 2, 691，及n. 25（ plurality意见）（军人配偶福利）。然而，在这里，歧视性例外包括对离散群体的优惠待遇（对在国外生育的非婚美国公民母亲较短的物理存在要求）。遵循那些福利案件中的相同方法——

striking the discriminatory exception—leads here to ex­ tending the general rule of longer physical-presence re­ quirements to cover the previously favored group.

删除歧视性例外——导致在这里将较长物理存在要求的一般规则扩展到涵盖先前受优惠的群体。

The Court has looked to Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S., at 361–367, in considering whether the legislature would have struck an exception and applied the general rule equally to all, or instead, would have broadened the exception to cure the equal protection violation. In making this assessment, a court should “‘measure the intensity of commitment to the residual policy’”—the main rule, not the exception—“‘and consider the degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to abro­ gation.’” Heckler, 465 U. S., at 739, n. 5 (quoting Welsh, 398 U. S., at 365 (opinion of Harlan, J.)).

法院在考虑立法机关是否会删除例外并对所有人平等适用一般规则，还是会扩大例外以纠正平等保护侵犯时，参考了哈兰大法官在Welsh诉美国案，398 U.S.，第361–367页中的同意意见。在进行这一评估时，法院应“‘衡量对剩余政策’——主要规则，而非例外——‘的承诺强度，并考虑通过扩展而非废除对法规体系可能造成的破坏程度。’”Heckler案，465 U.S.，第739页，n. 5（引用Welsh案，398 U.S.，第365页（哈兰大法官意见））。

The residual policy here, the longer physical-presence requirement stated in §§1401(a)(7) and 1409, evidences Congress’ recognition of “the importance of residence in this country as the talisman of dedicated attachment.” Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U. S. 815, 834 (1971); see Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U. S. 657, 665–666 (1927) (Congress “at­ tached more importance to actual residence in the United States as indicating a basis for citizenship than it did to descent. . . . [T]he heritable blood of citizenship was thus associated unmistakeably with residence within the coun­ try which was thus recognized as essential to full citizen­ ship.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And the poten­ tial for “disruption of the statutory scheme” is large. For if §1409(c)’s one-year dispensation were extended to unwed citizen fathers, would it not be irrational to retain the longer term when the U. S.-citizen parent is married? Disadvantageous treatment of marital children in compar­ ison to nonmarital children is scarcely a purpose one can sensibly attribute to Congress. 25

这里的剩余政策，即§§1401(a)(7)和1409中规定的较长物理存在要求，证明国会认识到“在本国居住作为忠诚归属的护身符的重要性。”Rogers诉Bellei案，401 U.S. 815, 834 (1971)；参见Weedin诉Chin Bow案，274 U.S. 657, 665–666 (1927)（国会“更重视在美国的实际居住作为公民身份的基础，而非血统。……[公民身份的遗传血液因此与国内居住明确关联，从而被认识到对完全公民身份至关重要。”）（内部引号省略）。而“对法规体系的破坏”潜力很大。因为如果§1409(c)的一年豁免扩展到非婚公民父亲，那么当美国公民父母已婚时保留较长期限难道不是不合理的吗？将婚生子女与非婚生子女相比的不利待遇几乎不能合理地归因于国会。25

Although extension of benefits is customary in federal benefit cases, see supra, at 23–24, n. 22, 25, all indicators in this case point in the opposite direction. 26 Put to the choice, Congress, we believe, would have abrogated §1409(c)’s exception, preferring preservation of the general rule. 27

尽管在联邦福利案件中扩展福利是惯例，参见上文，第23–24页，n. 22, 25，但本案中的所有指标都指向相反方向。26 我们认为，如果面临选择，国会会废除§1409(c)的例外，倾向于保留一般规则。27

V The gender-based distinction infecting §§1401(a)(7) and 1409(a) and (c), we hold, violates the equal protection principle, as the Court of Appeals correctly ruled. For the reasons stated, however, we must adopt the remedial course Congress likely would have chosen “had it been apprised of the constitutional infirmity.” Levin, 560 U. S., at 427. Although the preferred rule in the typical case is ——————

V 我们裁定，影响§§1401(a)(7)和1409(a)及(c)的性别区分违反了平等保护原则，正如上诉法院正确裁定的那样。然而，基于上述理由，我们必须采取国会“如果被告知宪法缺陷”可能选择的救济途径。Levin案，560 U.S.，第427页。尽管典型案件中的首选规则是——————

to extend favorable treatment, see Westcott, 443 U. S., at 89–90, this is hardly the typical case. 28 Extension here would render the special treatment Congress prescribed in §1409(c), the one-year physical-presence requirement for U. S.-citizen mothers, the general rule, no longer an excep­ tion. Section 1401(a)(7)’s longer physical-presence re­ quirement, applicable to a substantial majority of children born abroad to one U. S.-citizen parent and one foreign- citizen parent, therefore, must hold sway. 29 Going for­ ward, Congress may address the issue and settle on a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender. In the interim, as the Government suggests, §1401(a)(7)’s now-five- year requirement should apply, prospectively, to children born to unwed U. S.-citizen mothers. See Brief for Peti­ tioner 12, 51; Reply Brief 19, n. 3.

给予优惠待遇，见Westcott, 443 U. S., at 89–90，这绝非典型案件。28 在此处进行扩展将使国会于§1409(c)中规定的特殊待遇——对美国公民母亲的1年实际居留要求——成为一般规则，而不再是一项例外。因此，§1401(a)(7)中较长的实际居留要求——适用于由一名美国公民父母和一名外国公民父母在境外所生的绝大多数子女——必须占据主导地位。29 今后，国会可以处理该问题并确定一项统一的规则，既不基于性别偏袒也不不利于任何人。在此期间，如政府所建议，§1401(a)(7)中现为5年的要求应具有前瞻性地适用于未婚美国公民母亲所生子女。见Brief for Petitioner 12, 51; Reply Brief 19, n. 3。

* * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

* * * 第二巡回上诉法院的判决部分维持部分撤销，案件发回重审以进行与本意见一致的进一步程序。

It is so ordered.

特此命令。

JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

戈萨奇大法官未参与本案的审议或决定。

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL, PETITIONER v. LUIS RAMON MORALES-SANTANA

杰斐逊·B·塞申斯三世，司法部长， 申请人诉路易斯·拉蒙·莫拉莱斯-桑塔纳

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, concurring in the judgment in part.

托马斯大法官，与阿利托大法官加入， 部分同意判决。

The Court today holds that we are “not equipped to” remedy the equal protection injury that respondent claims his father suffered under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952. Ante, at 23. I agree with that holding. As the majority concludes, extending 8 U. S. C. §1409(c)’s 1-year physical presence requirement to unwed citizen fathers (as respondent requests) is not, under this Court’s precedent, an appropriate remedy for any equal protection violation. See ante, at 23. Indeed, I am skeptical that we even have the “power to provide relief of the sort requested in this suit—namely, conferral of citizenship on a basis other than that prescribed by Congress.” Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 73 (2001) (Scalia, J., joined by THOMAS, J., concurring) (citing Miller v. Albright, 523 U. S. 420, 452 (1998) (Scalia, J., joined by THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment)).

本院今天裁定，我们“不具备条件”救济被申请人声称其父亲根据1952年《移民与国籍法》（INA）遭受的平等保护损害。见前文，第23页。我同意该裁定。正如多数意见所结论，根据本院先例，将8 U. S. C. §1409(c)的1年实际居住要求扩展适用于未婚公民父亲（如被申请人所请求），并非对任何平等保护 violation 的适当救济。见前文，第23页。事实上，我怀疑我们甚至拥有“权力提供本诉讼中所请求的那种救济——即以国会规定之外的基础授予公民身份”。Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 73 (2001)（斯卡利亚大法官，托马斯大法官加入，同意意见）（引Miller v. Albright, 523 U. S. 420, 452 (1998)（斯卡利亚大法官，托马斯大法官加入，同意判决））。

The Court’s remedial holding resolves this case. Be­ cause respondent cannot obtain relief in any event, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the 1952 version of the INA was constitutional, whether respondent has third- party standing to raise an equal protection claim on behalf of his father, or whether other immigration laws (such as the current versions of §§1401(g) and 1409) are constitu-

本院的救济裁定解决了本案。由于被申请人无论如何都无法获得救济，我们无需裁定1952年版INA是否合宪、被申请人是否有第三方资格代表其父亲提出平等保护主张，或其他移民法律（例如§§1401(g)和1409的现行版本）是否合宪。

tional. I therefore concur only in the judgment reversing the Second Circuit.

因此，我仅同意撤销第二巡回法院判决的裁定。