Matter of Perez Quintanilla

To: REGIONAL DIRECTORS SERVICE CENTER DIRECTORS FIELD OFFICE DIRECTORS NATIONAL BENEFIT CENTER DIRECTOR From: Jonathan Scharfen /s/ Deputy Director Date: July 30, 2007 Re: Matter of Perez Quintanilla (June 7, 2007) As Deputy Director I hereby designate the attached decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in Matter of Perez Quintanilla as a USCIS Adopted Decision. Accordingly, this decision is binding policy guidance on all USCIS personnel. This AAO decision provides guidance regarding the determination of constructive custody for applicants for special immigrant juvenile status pursuant to section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act,) 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I). In addition, the decision addresses Florida Statute § 39.013(2) whereby a juvenile court in the State of Florida extends its jurisdiction over an applicant for special immigrant juvenile status beyond his or her 18th birthday allowing the applicant to continue to meet the eligibility criteria for special immigrant juvenile status set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5), unless the juvenile court orders otherwise. USCIS personnel are directed to follow the reasoning in this decision in similar cases.

致： 区域主任 服务中心主任 外地办事处主任 国家福利中心主任 自：Jonathan Scharfen /s/ 副主任 日期：2007年7月30日 事由： Perez Quintanilla案（2007年6月7日） 作为副主任，我特此将行政上诉办公室（AAO）在Perez Quintanilla案中附上的裁决指定为USCIS采纳裁决。因此，该裁决对所有USCIS人员具有约束力的政策指导。该AAO裁决就根据《移民与国籍法》（该法）第101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)确定特殊移民 juvenile 身份申请人的推定监护提供了指导。此外，该裁决涉及佛罗里达州法规§ 39.013(2)，据此佛罗里达州 juvenile 法院将其对特殊移民 juvenile 身份申请人的管辖权延长至其18岁生日之后，允许申请人继续满足8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)中规定的特殊移民 juvenile 身份的资格标准，除非 juvenile 法院另有命令。 USCIS人员被指示在类似案件中遵循该裁决的推理。

June 7, 2007 (1) Pursuant to section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I), when an applicant for special immigrant juvenile status is in the actual or constructive custody of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, he or she must obtain the Secretary’s specific consent to a juvenile court’s jurisdiction to determine his or her custody status or placement. For the purpose of determining whether an applicant is in the constructive custody of the Secretary such that specific consent is required, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services will look to the current policy and practices of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2) Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5), an applicant must continue “to be dependent upon the juvenile court and eligible for long-term foster care” in order to be eligible for special immigrant juvenile status. Eligibility for long-term foster care is defined by regulation to mean “that a determination has been made by the juvenile court that family reunification is no longer a viable option.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a). When a juvenile court in the State of Florida extends its jurisdiction over an applicant beyond his or her 18th birthday pursuant to Florida Statute § 39.013(2), and the juvenile court has determined that the applicant is eligible for long-term foster care due to the non-viability of family reunification, the applicant continues to meet the eligibility criteria for special immigrant juvenile status set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5), unless the juvenile court orders otherwise. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: DEBORAH LEE FLORIDA IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CENTER, INC. 3000 BISCAYNE BLVD., SUITE 400 MIAMI, FL 33137

2007年6月7日 (1) 根据《移民与国籍法》（该法）第101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)，当特殊移民 juvenile 身份申请人处于国土安全部部长实际或推定监护下时，他或她必须获得部长对 juvenile 法院管辖权的具体同意，以确定其监护状况或安置。为确定申请人是否处于部长的推定监护下从而需要具体同意之目的，美国公民及移民服务局将参照美国移民和海关执法局的现行政策和实践。 (2) 根据8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)，申请人必须继续“依赖 juvenile 法院并有资格获得长期寄养”才有资格获得特殊移民 juvenile 身份。长期寄养的资格由法规定义为“juvenile 法院已作出家庭团聚不再是可行选择的裁定”。8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a)。当佛罗里达州的 juvenile 法院根据佛罗里达州法规§ 39.013(2)将其对申请人的管辖权延长至其18岁生日之后，且 juvenile 法院已裁定申请人因家庭团聚不可行而有资格获得长期寄养时，申请人继续满足8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)中规定的特殊移民 juvenile 身份的资格标准，除非 juvenile 法院另有命令。 代表申请人： DEBORAH LEE FLORIDA IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CENTER, INC. 3000 BISCAYNE BLVD., SUITE 400 MIAMI, FL 33137

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DISCUSSION: The District Director, Miami, denied the special immigrant visa petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained. The applicant is an 18-year-old native and citizen of the Nicaragua. He seeks classification as a special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) pursuant to section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4). The District Director found that the applicant failed to show that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) specifically consented to a juvenile court’s jurisdiction to determine his custody status, as provided in section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of the Act. The District Director further found that the applicant failed to show that he continues to be eligible for long-term foster care in the State of Florida, despite that fact that the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit In and For Miami-Dade County, Florida, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court”) extended its jurisdiction over the applicant, as permitted by Florida Statute section 39.013(2). The petition was denied accordingly. On appeal, counsel for the applicant contends that the applicant did not require the specific consent of DHS in order for the juvenile court to take jurisdiction over him. Statement from Counsel on Form I-290B, dated December 5, 2006. Counsel further asserts that the District Director misinterpreted federal and Florida law regarding whether the applicant is “eligible for long-term foster care,” as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5). Id. The record contains a statement from counsel on Form I-290B; a brief from counsel; a copy of the applicant’s birth certificate; copies of orders from the juvenile court issued on December 3, 2004, December 19, 2005, and September 1, 2006; a copy of a predisposition report from the Florida Department of Children and Families; a copy of the applicant’s passport; documents in connection with the applicant’s Immigration Court proceedings; statements from the applicant; a statement from the applicant’s grandmother; copies of correspondence from counsel to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) regarding whether the applicant required specific consent to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, and; copies of two letters from ICE in connection with separate matters regarding whether specific consent is required when an individual has been released from custody but has not received a final order of removal. The entire record was considered in rendering a decision on the current appeal. Section 203(b)(4) of the Act provides classification to qualified special immigrant juveniles as described in section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act, which pertains to an immigrant who is present in the United States—

讨论：迈阿密地区主任拒绝了特殊移民签证申请。此事现因上诉由行政上诉办公室（AAO）审理。上诉将获支持。 申请人是18岁的尼加拉瓜国民和公民。他寻求根据《移民与国籍法》（该法）第203(b)(4)条、8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4)被归类为特殊移民 juvenile（SIJ）。 地区主任认定，申请人未能证明美国国土安全部（“DHS”）具体同意 juvenile 法院管辖权以确定其监护状况，如该法第101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)条规定。地区主任进一步认定，申请人未能证明他继续有资格在佛罗里达州获得长期寄养，尽管佛罗里达州第十一司法巡回法院迈阿密-戴德县 juvenile 分庭（“juvenile 法院”）根据佛罗里达州法规第39.013(2)条允许，延长了对申请人的管辖权。申请 accordingly 被拒。 在上诉中，申请人的律师主张，申请人不需要DHS的具体同意即可让 juvenile 法院对其行使管辖权。律师于2006年12月5日在I-290B表格上的陈述。律师进一步主张，地区主任误解了联邦和佛罗里达州法律关于申请人是否有资格获得8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)法规所要求的“长期寄养”。同上。 记录包含律师在I-290B表格上的陈述；律师的简报；申请人出生证明的副本；juvenile 法院于2004年12月3日、2005年12月19日和2006年9月1日发布的命令副本；佛罗里达州儿童和家庭部的倾向报告副本；申请人护照副本；与申请人移民法院程序有关的文件；申请人的陈述；申请人祖母的陈述；律师就申请人是否需要 juvenile 法院管辖权的具体同意致美国移民和海关执法局（ICE）的通信副本，以及；ICE就个人已从监护中释放但未收到最终驱逐令时是否需要具体同意的两个单独事项的两封信函副本。在就当前上诉作出裁决时考虑了整个记录。 该法第203(b)(4)条规定将合格的特殊移民 juvenile 归类为该法第101(a)(27)(J)条所述，涉及在美国境内的移民——

(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State and who has been deemed eligible by that court for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment;

(i) 已被美国境内的 juvenile 法院宣布为依赖者，或该法院已合法将其托付给、或置于州机构或部门的监护下，并因虐待、忽视或遗弃而被该法院认定有资格获得长期寄养；

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(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; and

(ii) 在行政或司法程序中已确定将其遣返至该外国人或其父母的前国籍国或最后惯常居住国不符合该外国人的最佳利益；且

(iii) in whose case the Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] expressly consents to the dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status; except that—

(iii) 在该案件中，司法部长[国土安全部部长]明确同意依赖令作为授予特殊移民 juvenile 身份的前提条件；但——

(I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody status or placement of an alien in the actual or constructive custody of the Attorney General unless the Attorney General specifically consents to such jurisdiction; and (II) no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any alien provided special immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this Act . . . . Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c), an alien is eligible for classification as a special immigrant under section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act if the alien:

(I) 任何 juvenile 法院均无管辖权确定处于司法部长实际或推定监护下的外国人的监护状况或安置，除非司法部长具体同意该管辖权；且 (II) 根据本项获得特殊移民身份的任何外国人的任何亲生父母或先前养父母，此后不得因该亲子关系而根据本法获得任何权利、特权或身份…… 根据8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)，外国人如果有以下情况，则有资格根据该法第101(a)(27)(J)条被归类为特殊移民：

(1) Is under twenty-one years of age; (2) Is unmarried; (3) Has been declared dependent upon a juvenile court located in the United States in accordance with state law governing such declarations of dependency, while the alien was in the United States and under the jurisdiction of the court;

(1) 未满二十一岁； (2) 未婚； (3) 已根据管辖此类依赖声明的州法律被宣布依赖美国境内的 juvenile 法院，当时该外国人在美国并处于法院管辖下；

(4) Has been deemed eligible by the juvenile court for long-term foster care; (5) Continues to be dependent upon the juvenile court and eligible for long- term foster care, such declaration, dependency or eligibility not having been vacated, terminated, or otherwise ended; and

(4) 已被 juvenile 法院认定有资格获得长期寄养； (5) 继续依赖 juvenile 法院并有资格获得长期寄养，此类声明、依赖或资格未被撤销、终止或以其他方式结束；且

(6) Has been the subject of judicial proceedings or administrative proceedings authorized or recognized by the juvenile court in which it has been determined that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the country of nationality or last habitual residence of the beneficiary or his or her parent or parents . . . . The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) provides the following:

(6) 已成为 juvenile 法院授权或认可的司法程序或行政程序的主体，在该程序中已确定将受益人及其父母遣返至其国籍国或最后惯常居住国不符合该外国人的最佳利益…… 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a)的法规规定如下：

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Eligible for long-term foster care means that a determination has been made by the juvenile court that family reunification is no longer a viable option. A child who is eligible for long-term foster care will normally be expected to remain in foster care until reaching the age of majority, unless the child is adopted or placed in a guardianship situation. For the purposes of establishing and maintaining eligibility for classification as a special immigrant juvenile, a child who has been adopted or placed in [a] guardianship situation after having been found dependent upon a juvenile court in the United States will continue to be considered to be eligible for long-term foster care. Florida Statute section 39.013(2) provides the following, in pertinent part:

有资格获得长期寄养是指 juvenile 法院已作出家庭团聚不再是可行选择的裁定。有资格获得长期寄养的儿童通常预计将留在寄养中直至达到成年年龄，除非该儿童被收养或置于监护情况。为确立和维持作为特殊移民 juvenile 的分类资格之目的，在被认定依赖美国 juvenile 法院后被收养或置于[监护]情况的儿童将继续被视为有资格获得长期寄养。 佛罗里达州法规第39.013(2)条的相关部分规定如下：

Procedures and Jurisdiction. . . . If a petition for special immigrant juvenile status and an application for adjustment of status have been filed on behalf of a foster child and the petition and application have not been granted by the time the child reaches 18 years of age, the court may retain jurisdiction over the dependency case solely for the purpose of allowing the continued consideration of the petition and application by federal authorities. Review hearings for the child shall be set solely for the purpose of determining the status of the petition and application. The court's jurisdiction terminates upon the final decision of the federal authorities. Retention of jurisdiction in this instance does not affect the services available to a young adult under [section] 409.1451. The court may not retain jurisdiction of the case after the immigrant child's 22nd birthday. See also Fla. Child Welfare Administrative Rule 65C-31.010(1)(b)(2). The first issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant required the specific consent of the Attorney General (now Secretary of DHS) in order for the juvenile court to take jurisdiction over his custody status or placement, pursuant to section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of the Act. Section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of the Act states that an applicant only needs such specific consent when he is in the actual or constructive custody of DHS. In the instant matter, the applicant was taken into DHS custody beginning on April 25, 2003 due to his alleged violation of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act for being an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or arriving in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Secretary of DHS. He was issued a Notice to Appear and placed into removal proceedings. However, the applicant was released on September 8, 2003 pending the outcome of his removal proceedings. The record does not show that the applicant has been in DHS custody since September 8, 2003. The applicant did not obtain the Secretary’s specific consent to the juvenile court taking jurisdiction over his custody status or placement. On December 19, 2005, the juvenile court issued a Best Interest Order finding that: 1) the applicant is dependent on the court due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment by his parents; 2) the applicant is eligible for long-term foster care, as family reunification is not a viable option; 3) it is not in the applicant’s best interest to be returned to Nicaragua, and; 4) the juvenile court will retain jurisdiction to maintain compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5). Order from the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit In and For

程序与管辖权。……如果已代表寄养儿童提交了特殊移民青少年身份申请和调整身份申请，且在该儿童年满18岁时该申请和调整身份申请尚未获批，法院可以仅出于允许联邦当局继续审理该申请和调整身份申请的目的，保留对依赖案件的管辖权。为该儿童设定的审查听证应仅出于确定该申请和调整身份申请状态的目的。法院的管辖权在联邦当局作出最终决定时终止。在此情形下保留管辖权不影响根据[第]409.1451条向年轻成年人提供的服务。法院不得在该移民儿童年满22岁后保留对案件的管辖权。 另见佛罗里达州儿童福利行政规则65C-31.010(1)(b)(2)。本程序中的第一个问题是，根据该法第101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)条，申请人是否需要司法部长（现为国土安全部部长）的特定同意，以便少年法院对其监护身份或安置取得管辖权。该法第101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)条规定，申请人仅在实际或推定由国土安全部监护时，才需要此种特定同意。 在本案中，申请人因涉嫌违反该法第212(a)(6)(A)(i)条，即作为未经入境或假释而留在美国的外国人，或在国土安全部部长指定以外的时间或地点抵达美国，自2003年4月25日起被国土安全部监护。其收到了出庭通知并被置入遣返程序。然而，申请人于2003年9月8日在遣返程序结果待定期间获释。记录未显示申请人自2003年9月8日以来一直处于国土安全部监护之下。 申请人未取得部长对少年法院对其监护身份或安置取得管辖权的特定同意。2005年12月19日，少年法院签发了最佳利益令，认定：1）申请人因父母虐待、忽视或遗弃而依赖法院；2）申请人有资格获得长期寄养，因为家庭团聚不是可行选择；3）将申请人送回尼加拉瓜不符合其最佳利益；以及4）少年法院将保留管辖权以维持对8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)的遵守。佛罗里达州第十一司法巡回区巡回法院位于

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Miami-Dade County, Florida, Juvenile Division (“Best Interest Order”), dated December 19, 2005. As the juvenile court issued its order after the applicant was released from DHS custody, it is evident that he was not in the actual custody of the Secretary at the time of issuance of the order as contemplated by section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of the Act. The District Director found that the applicant was in the constructive custody of the Secretary due to the fact that he was in removal proceedings at the time that the juvenile court issued the Best Interest Order. Decision of the District Director at 4, dated November 6, 2006. The District Director referenced an unpublished AAO decision, and stated that:

佛罗里达州迈阿密-戴德县少年庭的命令（“最佳利益令”），日期为2005年12月19日。由于少年法院是在申请人从国土安全部监护中获释后签发其命令的，显然在签发该命令时，申请人并非如该法第101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)条所设想的那样处于部长的实际监护之下。 地区主任认定，由于在少年法院签发最佳利益令时申请人处于遣返程序中，申请人处于部长的推定监护之下。地区主任决定第4页，日期为2006年11月6日。地区主任引用了一项未公布的AAO决定，并称：

[T]he AAO cited and agreed with the [District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District in P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services, 867 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)] by stating, “the Court of Appeals agreed, finding that because the applicant had been placed into removal proceedings, he was in the constructive custody of the Attorney General, and the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction unless the specific consent of the Attorney General was obtained . . . . The AAO find[s] that pursuant to the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions, and consistent with the ruling of the Florida Court of Appeals, Fourth District, the dependency order issued by the Florida Circuit Court, Eleventh Judicial Circuit may be invalid if there was no specific consent from the Secretary of Homeland Security.” Id. The District Director determined that, in light of the referenced decision of the AAO and the state court’s decision in P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services, the juvenile court’s Best Interest Order was invalid, as the Secretary did not consent to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the applicant. On appeal, counsel contends that the applicant did not require the specific consent of the Secretary in order for the juvenile court to take jurisdiction over him. Brief from Counsel at 6-17, submitted February 12, 2007. Counsel asserts that the decision of the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District in P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services is not controlling in the present matter, as the holding was based on a mistaken legal premise, and it was decided in the Fourth District of the State of Florida while the present matter arises within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit(should this be District?) of the State of Florida. Id. at 13-17. Counsel further asserts that the District Director’s reliance on the referenced unpublished AAO decision is misplaced. Id. at 7-8. Counsel notes that the quoted language from the AAO decision reflects that the AAO’s comments on the necessity of specific consent and the holding in P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services were presented as dicta, and thus did not constitute a basis for the AAO’s decision or a definite position on the necessity of specific consent. Id. Counsel also relies on the unpublished decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pena v. Meissner, 232 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2000). Id. at 8-9. Counsel explains that the Ninth Circuit held that an individual is in the constructive custody of DHS only when he is subject to a final order of deportation. Id. at 9. Counsel contends that, as the applicant was not subject to a final order of removal at the time the juvenile court issued the Best Interest Order, the applicant did not require the Secretary’s specific consent to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.

[T]AAO引用并同意[佛罗里达州第四地区上诉法院在P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services, 867 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)一案中的意见]，称：“上诉法院同意，认定由于申请人已被置入遣返程序，其处于司法部长的推定监护之下，且除非取得司法部长的特定同意，少年法院缺乏管辖权……AAO认定，根据适用的法定和监管规定，并与佛罗里达州第四地区上诉法院的裁决一致，如果没有国土安全部部长的特定同意，佛罗里达州第十一司法巡回区巡回法院签发的依赖令可能无效。” 同上。地区主任认定，鉴于所引用的AAO决定以及州法院在P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services一案中的裁决，少年法院的最佳利益令无效，因为部长未同意少年法院对申请人的管辖权。 在上诉中，律师主张申请人不需要部长的特定同意，少年法院即可对其取得管辖权。律师简报第6-17页，提交于2007年2月12日。律师主张，佛罗里达州第四地区上诉法院在P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services一案中的裁决对本案不具有控制力，因为该裁决基于错误的法律前提，且该案是在佛罗里达州第四地区裁决的，而本案发生在佛罗里达州第三巡回区（此处是否应为地区？）的管辖范围内。同上第13-17页。律师进一步主张，地区主任对所引用的未公布AAO决定的依赖是错误的。同上第7-8页。律师指出，AAO决定中被引用的语言表明，AAO关于特定同意必要性的评论以及P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services一案中的裁决是以附带意见的形式提出的，因此不构成AAO决定的依据，也不构成关于特定同意必要性的确定立场。同上。 律师还依赖美国第九巡回上诉法院在Pena v. Meissner, 232 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2000)一案中的未公布裁决。同上第8-9页。律师解释称，第九巡回法院认定，个人仅在受最终驱逐令约束时才处于国土安全部的推定监护之下。同上第9页。律师主张，由于在少年法院签发最佳利益令时申请人未受最终遣返令约束，申请人不需要部长对少年法院管辖权的特定同意。

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The applicant further submits correspondence from counsel to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in which counsel requested written confirmation from ICE to show that the applicant did not require the specific consent of the Secretary in order for the juvenile court to take jurisdiction. Letter from Counsel, dated October 23, 2006. While the applicant did not submit a response from ICE , he submitted two letters from ICE regarding similar cases. In one such letter, the deputy assistant director, Office of Detention and Removal, Field Operations of ICE, stated the following:

申请人进一步提交了律师致移民和海关执法局（ICE）的函件，其中律师请求ICE书面确认，以表明申请人不需要部长的特定同意，少年法院即可取得管辖权。律师函，日期为2006年10月23日。虽然申请人未提交ICE的回复，但其提交了两封ICE关于类似案件的函件。在其中一封函件中，ICE拘留和遣返办公室外勤行动副助理主任称：

In your letter, you stated that the Honorable Judge Bowman requested that you obtain a letter from the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), stating that he has jurisdiction in a juvenile dependency matter relating to your client, [name redacted]. As you know, [name redacted] has been released from the custody of the federal government and has not received an order of removal. The current practice within ICE in [name redacted]’s situation is to not require ICE consent before a state juvenile court can exercise jurisdiction to make rulings relevant to a juvenile’s pursuit of special immigrant status under the Immigration and Nationality Act, specifically Section 101(a)(27)(j), and the accompanying regulations. Letter from Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Detention and Removal, Field Operations of ICE, dated January 20, 2004. In the second letter provided by the applicant, the national juvenile coordinator, Office of Detention and Removal, Field Operations Division of ICE, reiterated the statement quoted above. Letter from the National Juvenile Coordinator, Office of Detention and Removal, Field Operations Division of ICE, dated January 24, 2005. Upon review, the applicant has shown that he did not require the Secretary’s specific consent to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of the Act. Specifically, under current ICE policy and practice, the applicant was not deemed to be in the constructive custody of the Secretary at the time the juvenile court issued its order, as contemplated by section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of the Act. It is noted that the Act and regulations do not provide a definition of “constructive custody.” Nor are there any precedent decisions from U.S. courts or the AAO that are binding on the present matter. Thus, the AAO will look to internal policy and the past practice of ICE. On May 27, 2004, William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”), issued guidance to CIS Regional Directors and District Directors to provide policy and procedural clarification on the adjudication of SIJ petitions. Memorandum #3 - Field Guidance on Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Petitions (“Yates Memo”), William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, Citizenship and Immigration Services, HQADN 70/23 (May 27, 2004). Mr. Yates briefly discussed specific consent as follows:

在您的信中，您称Bowman法官阁下要求您取得国土安全部移民和海关执法局（ICE）的函件，说明其对涉及您客户[姓名已隐去]的少年依赖事项具有管辖权。 如您所知，[姓名已隐去]已从联邦政府监护中获释，且未收到遣返令。ICE目前在[姓名已隐去]情况下的做法是，在州少年法院行使管辖权以作出与少年根据《移民和国籍法》特别是第101(a)(27)(j)条及随附法规寻求特殊移民身份相关的裁定时，不要求ICE同意。 ICE拘留和遣返办公室外勤行动副助理主任函，日期为2004年1月20日。在申请人提供的第二封函件中，ICE拘留和遣返办公室外勤行动司全国少年协调员重申了上述引述内容。ICE拘留和遣返办公室外勤行动司全国少年协调员函，日期为2005年1月24日。 经审查，申请人已表明，根据该法第101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)条，其不需要部长对少年法院管辖权的特定同意。具体而言，根据ICE现行政策和做法，在少年法院签发其命令时，申请人未被认定处于如该法第101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)条所设想的部长的推定监护之下。 注意到该法和法规未提供“推定监护”的定义。美国法院或AAO也没有对本案具有约束力的先例裁决。因此，AAO将参考ICE的内部政策和以往做法。 2004年5月27日，公民和移民服务局（“CIS”）运营副局长William R. Yates向CIS地区主任和地区主任发布了指导意见，就SIJ申请的裁定提供政策和程序澄清。备忘录#3 - 特殊移民青少年身份申请实地指导（“Yates备忘录”），William R. Yates，公民和移民服务局运营副局长，HQADN 70/23（2004年5月27日）。Yates先生简要讨论了特定同意如下：

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The adjudicator must be satisfied that the petitioner obtained specific consent from ICE where necessary. If specific consent was necessary but not timely obtained, a juvenile court dependency order is not valid and the petition must be denied. INA § 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3). Please check with the local ICE juvenile coordinator who handled the case to determine whether specific consent was required, and if so, whether it was timely granted. Id. at 5. The record does not reflect whether the District Director consulted ICE regarding whether specific consent was required in the applicant’s case. However, the applicant has submitted copies of letters from two different Deputy Assistant Directors of the ICE Office of Detention and Removal, dated January 20, 2004 and January 24, 2005. These letters serve as evidence of ICE’s policy on specific consent. As quoted above, when an applicant “has been released from the custody of the federal government and has not received an order of removal . . . [t]he current practice within ICE in [the applicant’s] situation is to not require ICE consent before a state juvenile court can exercise jurisdiction to make rulings relevant to a juvenile’s pursuit of special immigrant status . . . .” Letter from Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Detention and Removal, Field Operations of ICE at 1. It is noted that the record contains a copy of correspondence from counsel to the National Juvenile Coordination Unit of ICE regarding whether the applicant required specific consent to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. In the letter, counsel referenced a conversation between her and the national juvenile coordinator in which they agreed that specific consent was not required in the applicant’s case. Letter from Counsel to the National Juvenile Coordinator, Office of Detention and Removal, Field Operations Division of ICE, dated October 23, 2006. Counsel requested either written confirmation that the applicant did not require specific consent, or that ICE issue guidance to the District Director regarding current policy regarding the applicant’s case. Id. The record does not reflect whether the applicant received correspondence from the national juvenile coordinator as requested, or whether ICE provided guidance to the District Director. However, there is no documentation or indication that ICE policy changed between the January 24, 2005 letter from the national juvenile coordinator and the issuance of the Best Interest Order on December 19, 2005. Accordingly, the applicant has submitted sufficient evidence to show that he was not deemed by ICE to be in constructive custody at the time the juvenile court issued the Best Interest Order. As the applicant was not in the actual or constructive custody of the Secretary, specific consent was not necessary in order for the juvenile court to properly take jurisdiction over the applicant’s custody status and placement. See Letter from Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Detention and Removal, Field Operations of ICE at 1; Letter from to the National Juvenile Coordinator, Office of Detention and Removal, Field Operations Division of ICE at 1. As per the May 27, 2004 CIS memorandum from William R. Yates, adjudicators should look to current ICE practice to determine whether specific consent is required for a particular case. Yates Memo at 5. ICE, not CIS, considers requests for specific consent to a juvenile court’s jurisdiction when necessary. Thus, in the absence of a definition of constructive custody in the Act, regulations, or precedent decisions, ICE policy as of the date of the juvenile court’s order determines whether an applicant bears the burden of obtaining the Secretary’s specific consent to

裁决者必须确信申请人在必要时获得了移民及海关执法局（ICE）的特定同意。如果特定同意是必要的但未及时获得，少年法院的依赖令无效，申请必须被拒绝。INA § 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)；8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3)。请与处理该案的当地ICE少年协调员核实，以确定是否需要特定同意，如果需要，是否及时授予。 同上，第5页。记录未反映地区主任是否就申请人案件中是否需要特定同意咨询了ICE。然而，申请人提交了来自ICE拘留和驱逐办公室两位不同副助理主任的函件副本，日期分别为2004年1月20日和2005年1月24日。这些函件作为ICE关于特定同意政策的证据。如上文所引，当申请人“已从联邦政府监护中释放且未收到驱逐令……[时，]ICE在[申请人]情况下的当前做法是，在州少年法院行使管辖权以作出与少年追求特殊移民身份相关的裁决之前，不要求ICE同意……”ICE外地行动拘留和驱逐办公室副助理主任函件第1页。 注意到记录中包含律师致ICE国家少年协调组的函件副本，内容涉及申请人是否需要少年法院管辖权的特定同意。在函件中，律师提及她与国家少年协调员之间的对话，双方一致认为申请人案件中不需要特定同意。律师致ICE外地行动司拘留和驱逐办公室国家少年协调员函件，日期为2006年10月23日。律师要求要么书面确认申请人不需要特定同意，要么ICE就申请人案件的当前政策向地区主任发出指导。同上。记录未反映申请人是否收到了所要求的国家少年协调员的函件，或ICE是否向地区主任提供了指导。然而，没有文件或迹象表明ICE政策在2005年1月24日国家少年协调员函件与2005年12月19日最佳利益令发布之间发生了变化。 因此，申请人已提交足够证据表明，在少年法院发布最佳利益令时，ICE不认为他处于推定监护之下。由于申请人不在部长实际或推定监护之下，少年法院适当行使对申请人监护状态和安置的管辖权不需要特定同意。参见ICE外地行动拘留和驱逐办公室副助理主任函件第1页；致ICE外地行动司拘留和驱逐办公室国家少年协调员函件第1页。 根据2004年5月27日William R. Yates的CIS备忘录，裁决者应参照当前ICE做法来确定特定案件是否需要特定同意。Yates备忘录第5页。ICE而非CIS在必要时考虑对少年法院管辖权的特定同意请求。因此，在《法案》、法规或先例裁决中没有推定监护定义的情况下，截至少年法院命令之日的ICE政策决定申请人是否承担获得部长对少年法院管辖权的特定同意的责任，依据《法案》第101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)条。Yates备忘录第5页。

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the juvenile court’s jurisdiction pursuant to section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of the Act. Yates Memo at 5. As noted above, the District Director referenced an unpublished AAO decision, and stated that, in the decision, the AAO cited and agreed with the reasoning of the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District in P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services, 867 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Decision of the District Director at 4. However, as observed by counsel, the AAO discussion of P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services is dicta. The issue of specific consent did not constitute a basis for the AAO’s decision in the referenced matter, or a definite position on the necessity of specific consent. Rather than agree with or follow the findings in P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services, the AAO stated that the juvenile court order in the referenced matter may be invalid if there was no specific consent from the Secretary of Homeland Security. Further, the decision in P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services was issued by a court of the State of Florida, and thus it does not serve as binding precedent on CIS officers. Accordingly, the AAO does not find that the reasoning or holding in P.G. v. Department of Children and Family Services dictates that the applicant required the specific consent of the Secretary pursuant to section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of the Act. Counsel discusses the unpublished decision of the Ninth Circuit in Pena v. Meissner, 232 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2000). Brief from Counsel at 8-9. Counsel explains that the Ninth Circuit held that an individual is in the constructive custody of DHS only when he is subject to a final order of deportation. Id. at 9. The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Pena v. Meissner is consistent with ICE practice at the time the juvenile court issued the Best Interest Order. However, it is noted that the present matter arises within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, not the Ninth Circuit. Thus, while the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Pena v. Meissner is instructive, it does not serve as binding precedent in the instant matter. Additionally, as an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit indicated that its disposition in Pena v. Meissner “is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of [the Ninth Judicial Circuit] except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.” Pena v. Meissner, 232 F.3d at 232. Thus, the Ninth Circuit limited the precedential value of Pena v. Meissner, as Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 states that “[u]npublished dispositions and orders of [the Ninth Circuit] are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.” Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Based on the foregoing, the applicant has established that he did not require the specific consent of the Secretary in order for the juvenile court to properly take jurisdiction over his custody status and placement. Thus, the Best Interest Order is valid and may serve as a basis for SIJ status. The second issue in the present matter is whether the applicant continues to be eligible for long- term foster care, as contemplated by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5). As noted above, on December 19, 2005, the juvenile court issued a Best Interest Order finding that: 1) the applicant is dependent on the court due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment by his parents; 2) the applicant is eligible for long-term foster care, as family reunification is not a viable option; 3) it is not in the applicant’s best interest to be returned to Nicaragua, and; 4) the juvenile court will retain jurisdiction to preserve compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5). The court stated that it

少年法院依据该法第101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)条享有的管辖权。Yates备忘录第5页。 如上所述，地区主任引用了一项未公布的AAO决定，并指出在该决定中，AAO引用了佛罗里达州第四地区上诉法院在P.G.诉儿童与家庭服务部案，867 So.2d 1248（Fla. 4th DCA 2004）中的推理并表示同意。地区主任决定第4页。然而，正如律师所指出，AAO对P.G.诉儿童与家庭服务部案的讨论属于附带意见。特定同意问题并不构成AAO在所引用事项中决定的依据，也不构成关于特定同意必要性的确定立场。AAO并未同意或遵循P.G.诉儿童与家庭服务部案中的认定，而是指出，如果未获得国土安全部部长的特定同意，所引用事项中的少年法院命令可能无效。此外，P.G.诉儿童与家庭服务部案的判决由佛罗里达州法院作出，因此对CIS官员不具有约束性先例效力。据此，AAO不认为P.G.诉儿童与家庭服务部案中的推理或裁决要求申请人依据该法第101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)条获得部长的特定同意。 律师讨论了第九巡回法院在Pena诉Meissner案，232 F.3d 896（9th Cir. 2000）中的未公布决定。律师简报第8-9页。律师解释称，第九巡回法院裁定，个人仅在受最终驱逐令约束时才处于DHS的推定羁押之下。同上第9页。第九巡回法院在Pena诉Meissner案中的推理与少年法院签发最佳利益令时ICE的做法一致。然而，需指出，本事项发生在美国联邦上诉法院第十一巡回法院的管辖范围内，而非第九巡回法院。因此，尽管第九巡回法院在Pena诉Meissner案中的决定具有指导意义，但在本事项中不具有约束性先例效力。此外，作为未公布决定，第九巡回法院指出其在Pena诉Meissner案中的处理“不适合公布，且除第九巡回法院规则36-3另有规定外，不得被[第九司法巡回法院]的法院引用或由该法院引用。”Pena诉Meissner案，232 F.3d第232页。因此，第九巡回法院限制了Pena诉Meissner案的先例价值，因为第九巡回法院规则36-3规定“[第九巡回法院]的未公布处理意见和命令不构成先例，除非在案件法原则或请求排除或争点排除规则下具有相关性。”第九巡回法院规则36-3。 基于上述，申请人已证明，其不需要部长的特定同意，少年法院即可适当地对其监护身份和安置行使管辖权。因此，最佳利益令有效，可以作为SIJ身份的依据。 本事项的第二个问题是，申请人是否继续符合长期寄养照护的资格，如8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)法规所设想。如上所述，2005年12月19日，少年法院签发了最佳利益令，认定：1）申请人因父母的虐待、忽视或遗弃而依赖法院；2）申请人符合长期寄养照护资格，因为家庭团聚不是可行选择；3）将申请人送回尼加拉瓜不符合其最佳利益；以及4）少年法院将保留管辖权以确保遵守8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)。法院表示其

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“remains [sic] limited Jurisdiction, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Sec. 204.11(c)(5), to ensure that the child satisfies the requirements for classification as a special immigrant juvenile.” Best Interest Order, dated December 19, 2005. The juvenile court issued a second order on September 1, 2006, in which it confirmed that it is maintaining jurisdiction over the applicant until his 22nd birthday, pursuant to its authority under Florida Statute section 39.013(2). The District Director noted that the applicant had reached age 18. The District Director cited chapter 65C-31.010 of the Florida Department of Children and Families Child Welfare Administrative Rules (FDCFCWAR), which states, in pertinent part:

“根据8 C.F.R. Sec. 204.11(c)(5)保留[原文如此]有限管辖权，以确保儿童满足特殊移民少年分类的要求。”最佳利益令，日期为2005年12月19日。少年法院于2006年9月1日发布了第二项命令，其中确认其根据佛罗里达州法规第39.013(2)条的授权，维持对申请人的管辖权直至其22岁生日。 地区主任注意到申请人已年满18岁。地区主任引用了佛罗里达州儿童和家庭部儿童福利行政规则（FDCFCWAR）第65C-31.010章，其中相关规定如下：

(1)(b)(1) A youth may petition the court, for continued jurisdiction, anytime before his or her 19th birthday. This jurisdiction may continue for a period not to exceed one year beyond the youth’s 18th birthday. The youth does not maintain “foster care” status as those who are under the age of 18. But instead the courts maintain jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether the young adult is receiving appropriate adult services . . . . The District Director determined that, pursuant to FDCFCWAR chapter 65C-31.010(1)(b)(1), as of the applicant’s 18th birthday he was no longer eligible for long-term foster care in the State of Florida. Accordingly, the District Director found that the applicant did not satisfy the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5), as he failed to show that he “[c]ontinues to be dependent upon the juvenile court and eligible for long-term foster care.” The District Director effectively concluded that the juvenile court’s retention of jurisdiction beyond the applicant’s 18th birthday, under Florida Statute section 39.013(2), did not preserve the applicant’s eligibility for long-term foster care as required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5). On appeal, counsel asserts that the juvenile court’s order establishes that the applicant continues to be “eligible for long-term foster care” as contemplated by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5). Brief in Support of Appeal at 18. Counsel observes that, in order for an applicant to show that he is “eligible for long-term foster care,” he need only show that a juvenile court has determined that “family reunification is no longer a viable option.” Id. at 19 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a)). Thus, counsel suggests that the applicant need not establish that he meets all of the criteria for placement in foster care in the State of Florida, so long as he shows that the juvenile court found that it is not viable for him to reunite with his family. Id. Counsel asserts that, by failing to follow the juvenile court’s findings that family reunification is no longer a viable option for the applicant, the District Director made an impermissible sua sponte re-determination of the legal conclusions of the juvenile court. Id. Upon review, the applicant has shown that he meets the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5). The Best Interest Order was issued on December 19, 2005, when the applicant was age 17. The juvenile court found that he was dependent on the court, he was eligible for long-term foster care, and that it was no longer viable for the applicant to be reunified with his family. Thus, the applicant met the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3) and (4). Pursuant to its authority under Florida Statute section 39.013(2), the juvenile court ordered that it would retain jurisdiction over the applicant “to ensure that [he] satisfies the requirements for classification as a special immigrant juvenile.” Best Interest Order at 1. The juvenile court confirmed that it would retain

(1)(b)(1) 青少年可以在其19岁生日之前的任何时间向法院申请继续管辖。该管辖可持续至该青少年18岁生日之后不超过一年的期间。该青少年不维持18岁以下者所具有的“寄养”身份。相反，法院维持管辖是为了确定该年轻成年人是否正在接受适当的成人服务…… 地区主任认定，依据FDCFCWAR第65C-31.010(1)(b)(1)章，自申请人18岁生日起，其不再有资格在佛罗里达州获得长期寄养。因此，地区主任认定申请人不符合8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)的规定，因为其未能证明其“[继续]受少年法院抚养并有资格获得长期寄养”。地区主任实际上得出结论，即少年法院依据佛罗里达州法规第39.013(2)条在申请人18岁生日之后保留管辖，并未维持申请人获得8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)所要求的长期寄养的资格。 在上诉中，律师主张少年法院的命令确立申请人继续“有资格获得长期寄养”，正如8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)规定所设想的那样。支持上诉的简报第18页。律师指出，为证明申请人“有资格获得长期寄养”，其只需证明少年法院已认定“家庭团聚不再是可行选项”。同上第19页（引用8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a)）。因此，律师建议申请人无需证明其符合在佛罗里达州获得寄养安置的所有标准，只要其证明少年法院认定其与家庭团聚不可行即可。同上。律师主张，地区主任未能遵循少年法院关于家庭团聚对申请人不再是可行选项的认定，从而对少年法院的法律结论作出了不被允许的依职权重新裁定。同上。 经审查，申请人已证明其符合8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)的要求。最佳利益命令于2005年12月19日签发，当时申请人17岁。少年法院认定其受法院抚养，有资格获得长期寄养，且申请人与其家庭团聚不再可行。因此，申请人符合8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3)和(4)的要求。依据佛罗里达州法规第39.013(2)条赋予的权力，少年法院命令其将对申请人保留管辖，“以确保[其]满足作为特殊移民青少年的分类要求”。最佳利益命令第1页。少年法院确认其将保留

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jurisdiction until the applicant’s 22nd birthday in a second order. Juvenile Court Order, dated September 1, 2006. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) states that eligibility for long-term foster care “means that a determination has been made by the juvenile court that family reunification is no longer a viable option.” Thus, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5) does not require an applicant to directly establish that he meets all State requirements to be placed into a foster care program. In light of 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a), an applicant may meet the foster care component of 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5) by showing that the juvenile court on which he is dependent continues to find that it is not viable for him to be reunited with his family. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a). In the present matter, the juvenile court’s order explicitly states that family reunification is no longer a viable option for the applicant. The juvenile court’s determination is based on clearly stated findings of neglect and abandonment of the applicant by his parents. The juvenile court provided that it would retain jurisdiction over the applicant until his 22nd birthday, pursuant to Florida Statute section 39.013(2). The juvenile court made no indication that its finding of the non-viability of family reunification would expire on the applicant’s 18th birthday, or at any time prior to his 22nd birthday. Nor does the record reflect that the juvenile court has issued a subsequent order amending its findings or its retention of jurisdiction. Thus, by the juvenile court retaining jurisdiction, the applicant remains dependent upon the court and the determination of the non-viability of family reunification remains effective. Best Interest Order at 1. Based on the foregoing, the applicant “continues to be dependent upon the juvenile court and eligible for long-term foster care,” as contemplated by the regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.11(a) and (c)(5). The AAO finds that the applicant has established that he meets the requirements for SIJ status as provided in sections 203(b)(4) and 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c). Accordingly, the District Director’s decision will be withdrawn and the petition will be approved. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proof is on the applicant to establish eligibility for the benefit sought by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Brantigan, 11 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1965). The issue “is not one of discretion but of eligibility.” Matter of Polidoro, 12 I&N Dec. 353 (BIA 1967). In this case, the applicant has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, eligibility for the benefit sought. Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained and the petition will be approved. ORDER: The appeal is sustained.

管辖直至申请人22岁生日，此见第二份命令。少年法院命令，日期为2006年9月1日。 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a)的规定指出，获得长期寄养的资格“意味着少年法院已作出认定，即家庭团聚不再是可行选项”。因此，8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)的规定不要求申请人直接证明其符合被安置进入寄养项目的所有州要求。鉴于8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a)，申请人可以通过证明其所受抚养的少年法院继续认定其与家庭团聚不可行，来满足8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5)的寄养组成部分。8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a)。 在本案中，少年法院的命令明确说明家庭团聚对申请人不再是可行选项。少年法院的认定基于对其父母忽视和遗弃申请人的明确陈述的认定。少年法院规定，依据佛罗里达州法规第39.013(2)条，其将对申请人保留管辖直至其22岁生日。少年法院未表明其关于家庭团聚不可行的认定将在申请人18岁生日时或在其22岁生日之前的任何时间失效。记录也未反映少年法院已签发后续命令修改其认定或其对管辖的保留。因此，通过少年法院保留管辖，申请人继续受法院抚养，且关于家庭团聚不可行的认定仍然有效。最佳利益命令第1页。 基于上述，申请人“继续受少年法院抚养并有资格获得长期寄养”，正如8 C.F.R. §§ 204.11(a)和(c)(5)规定所设想的那样。 AAO认定申请人已证明其符合《法案》第203(b)(4)和101(a)(27)(J)条以及8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)所规定的SIJ身份要求。因此，地区主任的决定将被撤回，申请将被批准。 在签证申请程序中，举证责任在于申请人以优势证据证明其寻求的福利的资格。Matter of Brantigan，11 I&N Dec. 151（BIA 1965）。问题“不是自由裁量的问题，而是资格的问题。”Matter of Polidoro，12 I&N Dec. 353（BIA 1967）。在本案中，申请人已以优势证据证明其寻求的福利的资格。因此，上诉将被支持，申请将被批准。 命令： 上诉被支持。