Matter of Naulu

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Bienvenido D. Junasa Joanna London Accredited Representative General Attorney State Immigrant Services Center 2158 N. King Street, Suite 304 Honolulu, Hawaii 96819

代表被申请人： 代表移民局： Bienvenido D. Junasa Joanna London 认可代表 总检察长 州移民服务中心 2158 N. King Street, Suite 304 Honolulu, Hawaii 96819

On September 28, 1983, an immigration judge found the respond- ent deportable as charged under section 241(a)(2) of the Immigra- tion and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982), as a nonimmi- grant who remained in this country longer than permitted, but granted her the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of deporta- tion. No appeal was taken from that decision. On March 12, 1984, the respondent filed a motion to reopen the proceedings for consid- eration of her application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 255 (1982). An immigration judge denied the motion on July 19, 1984. The respondent has appealed from the denial of her motion to reopen.

1983年9月28日，一名移民法官认定，根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)条、8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)（1982年），被申请人作为非移民在本国停留超过许可期限，属于可被驱逐出境，但给予其自愿离境以代替驱逐出境的权利。该裁决未提起上诉。1984年3月12日，被申请人提交重新开启程序的动议，以审议其根据该法第245条、8 U.S.C. § 1 255（1982年）提出的调整身份申请。一名移民法官于1984年7月19日驳回了该动议。被申请人已就其重新开启动议被驳回一事提起上诉。

The respondent, a 39-year-old married woman, a native and citi- zen of Tonga, was admitted to the United States as a nonimmi- grant -visitor on July 15, 1975, and was authorized to remain in this country until January 15, 1976. She has not departed. The respondent claims eligibility for adjustment of status as a de- rivative beneficiary through her husband as provided by section 203(a)(8) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(8) (1982). Under section 203(a)(8) of the Act, a spouse or child who is not otherwise entitled to an immigrant status or the immediate issuance of an immigrant visa is entitled to the same preference and the same priority date or order of consideration as the principal alien, without the approv- al of a separate visa petition, if "accompanying or following to join" Lis spouse or parent. I See 8 C.F.R. §204.1(a)(4) (1985). The re- spondent's husband, whom she married in February 1973, was law- fully admitted to the United States for permanent residence on February 9, 1984. In a brief in opposition to the motion to reopen, the Immigration and Naturalization Service contended that the respondent is not el- igible to adjust her status as a derivative beneficiary since she nei- ther accompanied her husband when he was admitted to the United States as an immigrant, nor followed to join him, but she instead preceded him to this country. An alien who precedes the principal alien to the United States, the Service argued, cannot obtain derivative preference status through that principal alien. In support of that proposition, the Service cited State Department reg- ulation 22 C.F.R. § 42.1 (1985) and our decision in Matter of Khan, 14 I&N Dec. 122 (BIA 1972), aff'd sub nom. Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). Defining the term "accompanying" and "accompanied by," the foregoing regulation, to which the Board referred in Matter of Khan, supra, concludes with the statement, "An `accompanying' relative may not precede the principal alien to the United States!' 22 C.F.R. § 42.1 (1985). The immigration judge denied the motion to reopen for the reasons set forth in the Service's brief. On November 4, 1985, the Board asked the Service to review its position in the respondent's case in light of a policy memorandum, which the Acting Associate Commissioner for Examinations ad- dressed to all Regional Commissioners on July 25, 1985, regarding

被申请人是一名39岁的已婚女性，汤加本地人和公民，于1975年7月15日作为非移民访客获准进入美国，并获准留在美国直至1976年1月15日。她未离境。 被申请人主张有资格通过其丈夫作为衍生受益人调整身份，依据是《移民与国籍法》第203(a)(8)条，8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(8) (1982)。根据该法第203(a)(8)条，未另行有权获得移民身份或立即签发移民签证的配偶或子女，如果“陪同或随后加入”其配偶或父母，则有权享有与主外国人相同的优先类别和相同的优先日期或审理顺序，无需另行批准单独的签证申请。见8 C.F.R. §204.1(a)(4) (1985)。被申请人的丈夫（她于1973年2月与其结婚）于1984年2月9日合法获准进入美国永久居留。 在反对重新开案的简报中，移民和归化局主张，被申请人没有资格作为衍生受益人调整身份，因为她既未在丈夫作为移民获准进入美国时陪同他，也未随后加入他，而是先于他来到美国。该局辩称，先于主外国人到达美国的外国人不能通过该主外国人获得衍生优先身份。为支持该主张，该局引用了国务院条例22 C.F.R. § 42.1 (1985)以及我们在Matter of Khan, 14 I&N Dec. 122 (BIA 1972), aff'd sub nom. Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976)中的裁决。上述条例（委员会在Matter of Khan, supra中提及）在界定“陪同”和“由……陪同”一词时，最后陈述道：“‘陪同’亲属不得先于主外国人到达美国！”22 C.F.R. § 42.1 (1985)。移民法官基于该局简报中所述理由驳回了重新开案动议。 1985年11月4日，委员会要求该局根据一份政策备忘录重新审查其在本案中的立场，该备忘录由代理负责审查的副专员于1985年7月25日致所有区域专员，内容涉及

the eligibility of derivative beneficiaries to apply for adjustment of status when the principal alien has already gained permanent resi- dent status. That memorandum states, inter alia, that an accompa- nying alien cannot precede the principal alien to the United States "as an immigrant." (Emphasis added.) The memorandum specifies that there is no bar tb adjustment where, as here, a derivative ben- eficiary enters the United States as a nonimmigrant before the principal alien acquires permanent resident status. The memorandum thus makes clear that the right of a derivative beneficiary to permanent resident status is wholly dependent upon that of the principal alien and may not be exercised unless and until the principal alien becomes a permanent resident. However, once the principal alien gains permanent residence, his spouse or child is not precluded as a matter of law from adjusting status as a person "accompanying or following to join" by reason of having physically preceded the principal alien to this country as a nonim- migrant. We note that the current Service position is not inconsistent with our holding in Matter of Khan, supra. In that case and in the other cases considered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Santiago v. INS, supra, an alien who had been issued an immigrant visa as one 'accompanying or following to join" his spouse or parent was erroneously admitted to the United States for permanent residence in advance of the principal alien. In each case, death or the expiration of her visa prevented the principal alien from joining the derivative beneficiary. It was con- sequently found that the derivative beneficiary was not in posses- sion of a valid immigrant visa at the time of his entry. Following the Associate Commissioner's policy memorandum, the Service has advised the Board upon reconsideration that the re- spondent qualifies as a person "accompanying or following to join" for purposes of adjustment of status. As the respondent has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for the relief sought under section 245 of the Act, we shall sustain the appeal, grant the motion to reopen, and remand the record to the immigration judge for consid- eration of the respondent's application for adjustment of status. ORDER: The appeal is sustained The proceedings are re- opened and the record is remanded to the immigration judge for consideration of the respondent's application for adjustment of status pursuant to section 245 of the Act.

衍生受益人在主外国人已获得永久居民身份时申请调整身份的资格。该备忘录除其他外声明，随行外国人不能“作为移民”先于主外国人进入美国。（强调为后加。）该备忘录明确，如本案，衍生受益人在主外国人取得永久居民身份之前作为非移民进入美国，不存在调整身份的障碍。 因此，该备忘录明确，衍生受益人获得永久居民身份的权利完全依赖于主外国人的权利，除非且直到主外国人成为永久居民，否则不得行使。然而，一旦主外国人获得永久居留，其配偶或子女不因曾作为非移民在物理上先于主外国人进入本国而作为法律问题被排除以“随行或随后团聚”者身份调整身份。 我们注意到，移民局当前的立场与我们在Matter of Khan, supra中的裁决并不矛盾。在该案以及美国第九巡回上诉法院在Santiago v. INS, supra中审议的其他案件中，已作为“随行或随后团聚”其配偶或父母获得移民签证的外国人，在主外国人之前被错误地获准进入美国永久居留。在每起案件中，死亡或其签证到期阻止了主外国人与衍生受益人团聚。因此认定衍生受益人在入境时未持有有效的移民签证。 遵循副专员的政策备忘录，移民局在重新考虑后已告知委员会，被申请人符合“随行或随后团聚”者的资格以调整身份。由于被申请人已初步表明有资格获得该法第245条下所寻求的救济，我们将维持上诉，批准重新开启动议，并将记录发回移民法官审议被申请人的调整身份申请。 命令：上诉维持。程序重新开启，记录发回移民法官根据该法第245条审议被申请人的调整身份申请。

Decided by Board February 14, 1986

由委员会于1986年2月14日决定

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Louis Serterides, Esquire Teresita A. Guerrero 152 Central Avenue General Attorney Jersey City, New Jersey 07306

代表被申请人： 代表移民局： Louis Serterides, Esquire Teresita A. Guerrero 152 Central Avenue 总检察长 Jersey City, New Jersey 07306

In a decision dated September 25, 1985, the immigration judge found the respondent deportable on his own admissions under sec- tion 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982), as a nonimmigrant crewman who remained longer than permitted, and granted him voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. The respondent has appealed from that deci- sion. The appeal will be summarily dismissed pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1-a)(i) (1986). On his Notice of Appeal (Form I-290A), the respondent, through counsel, states the following as his reason for this appeal: "I re- spectfully submit that the hearing officer erred in that of the ap- pellant [sic] burden of proving a well-founded fear of persecution in his native Nicaragua." The respondent also specified on the Notice of Appeal that he does not desire oral argument and that he is not filing a separate written brief in support of his appeal. We are unable to determine from the respondent's stated reason for his appeal whether the error he alleges relates to the particular

在1985年9月25日的决定中，移民法官根据被申请人自己的承认，认定其根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)条，8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)（1982年），作为停留超过许可期限的非移民船员应予驱逐出境，并给予他自愿离境以代替驱逐出境。被申请人已对该决定提出上诉。上诉将依据8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1-a)(i)（1986年）被简易驳回。 在其上诉通知（Form I-290A）上，被申请人通过律师陈述以下作为其上诉理由：“我谨此提出，听证官错误在于上诉人[原文如此]在其本国尼加拉瓜证明有充分理由恐惧迫害的责任。”被申请人还在上诉通知上指明他不希望口头辩论，且不提交单独的书面简报支持其上诉。 我们无法从被申请人所述的上诉理由中确定其所指称的错误是否涉及特定的

facts of his case, the law applied to them by the immigration judge, or both. By presenting only a generalized statement without filing a supporting brief to explain the specific aspects of the immigra- tion judge's order that the respondent considers to be incorrect, he has failed to meaningfully identify the reasons for taking an appeal. In order to review the appeal, it would therefore be neces- sary for the Board to search through the record and speculate on what possible errors the respondent claims. The regulations provide for summary dismissal of an appeal where the party concerned fails to specify the reasons for the appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1-00 (1985). In Matter of Holguin, 13 I&N Dec. 423 (BlA 1969), we noted that this regulation was designed to permit us to deal promptly with appeals where the reasons given for the appeal are inadequate to apprise the Board of the particu- lar basis for the alien's claim that the immigration judge's decision is wrong. We find that the respondent's appeal is one which war- rants summary dismissal for failure to state with specificity the grounds for taking the appeal. See Reyes-Mendoza v. INS, 774 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1985). It is essential to the Board's adjudication of an appeal that the reasons given on the Notice of Appeal be as detailed as possible so that the alleged error can be identified and addressed. Without a specific statement, the Board can only guess at how the alien dis- agrees with the immigration judge's decision. It is therefore insuffi- cient to merely assert that the immigration judge improperly found that deportability had been established or denied an application for relief from deportation. See Reyes Mendoza v. INS, supra. Where eligibility for discretionary relief is at issue, it should be stated whether the error relates to grounds of statutory eligibility or to the exercise of discretion. Furthermore, it should be clear whether the alleged impropriety in the decision lies with the immigration judge's interpretation of the facts or his application of legal stand- ards. Where a question of law is presented, supporting authority should be included, and where the dispute is on the facts, there should be a discussion of the particular details contested. Although the regulations only refer to the reasons that must be stated on the Notice of Appeal, the contentions made by an alien on appeal are of course best presented in a brief setting forth his arguments. Depending on the complexity of the issues raised, a brief may be essential to an adequate presentation of the appeal. In all cases, however, the reasons for an appeal must be meaningfully identified on the Notice of Appeal. The respondent has stated only that the immigration judge erred in finding no well-founded fear of persecution. He has chosen not to

其案件的事实、移民法官对其适用的法律，或两者兼有。仅提出概括性陈述而未提交支持性简报以解释答辩人认为移民法官命令中哪些具体方面不正确，他未能有意义地指明提出上诉的理由。因此，为审查上诉，委员会将有必要查阅记录并推测答辩人声称可能存在哪些错误。 法规规定，如果有关当事方未指明上诉理由，可对上訴进行简易驳回。8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1-00 (1985)。在Matter of Holguin, 13 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA 1969)中，我们指出，该法规旨在使我们能够迅速处理那些所给上诉理由不足以告知委员会外国人主张移民法官决定错误的特定依据的上诉。我们认定，答辩人的上诉属于因未具体说明提出上诉的理由而应予以简易驳回的情形。参见Reyes-Mendoza v. INS, 774 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1985)。 委员会对上诉的裁决至关重要的一点是，上诉通知上给出的理由应尽可能详细，以便能够识别和处理所指称的错误。没有具体陈述，委员会只能猜测外国人对移民法官决定的不同意之处。因此，仅仅声称移民法官不当认定驱逐出境已成立或不当拒绝驱逐出境救济申请是不够的。参见Reyes Mendoza v. INS, supra。在涉及酌情救济资格问题时，应说明错误是与法定资格理由有关还是与行使酌情权有关。此外，应明确所指称的决定不当之处在于移民法官对事实的解释还是其对法律标准的适用。在提出法律问题时，应包含支持性权威依据；在事实争议时，应讨论具体争议细节。 尽管法规仅提及必须在上诉通知上陈述的理由，但外国人在上诉中提出的主张当然最好在阐述其论点的简报中呈现。根据所提问题的复杂性，简报对于充分呈现上诉可能是必不可少的。然而，在所有案件中，上诉理由必须在上诉通知上有意义地指明。 答辩人仅称移民法官在认定不存在有充分理由的迫害恐惧方面有误。他选择不

submit a brief to enlighten us as to the specific rationale for his conclusory assertions and did not request an opportunity for oral argument. Under these circumstances, we find that summary dis- missal of the appeal is appropriate. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the immigration judge's order and in accordance with our decision in Matter of Chouliaris, 16 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1977), the respondent is permitted to depart from the United States voluntarily within 30 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district director; in the event of failure so to depart, the re- spondent shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's order.

提交简报以向我们阐明其结论性主张的具体理由，且未请求口头辩论的机会。在此情况下，我们认定简易驳回上诉是适当的。因此，上诉将被驳回。 命令：上诉驳回。 进一步命令：根据移民法官的命令并依照我们在Matter of Chouliaris, 16 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1977)中的裁决，允许答辩人自本命令之日起30天内或地区局长可能批准的超过该时间的任何延期内自愿离开美国；如未如此离开，答辩人应按照移民法官的命令被驱逐出境。